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PETITIONER: B. KRISHNA BHAT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/03/1990

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ) PUNCHHI, M.M.

CITATION:  1990 SCR  (2)   1        1990 SCC  (3)  65  JT 1990 (2)    34        1990 SCALE  (1)653

ACT:     Constitution  Of  India, 1950: Articles  32  &  37--Writ Petition  for  direction to State of  Karnataka  to  enforce total prohibition--Whether maintainable.     Karnataka  Excise (Sale of Indian and  Foreign  Liquors) Rules,  1968: Rule 3(11)(b) as amended by  Amendment  Rules, 1989  "Distributor  licence--Monopoly  conferred  on  State- Whether constitutionally valid--Writ Petition under Art.  32 of  Constitution for enforcement of policy  of  prohibition. Whether maintainable.

HEADNOTE:     Clause  (b)  of sub-rule (11) rule 3  of  the  Karnataka Excise  (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules, 1968  as amended  by  the Amendment Rules, 1989, requires  the  State Government to issue distributor licence only to such company owned or controlled by it as may be specified.     The  petitioner assailed the constitutional validity  of clause (b) on the ground that the policy of prohibition  was not  being  implemented  as enjoined by Article  47  of  the Constitution  inasmuch as the State of Karnataka instead  of bringing total prohibition in the State, had evinced  inter- est  in taking up the responsibility of selling  liquors  to the general public, and sought a direction to the Union  and other  State  Governments  to enforce the  policy  of  total prohibition. Dismissing the writ petition, the Court,     HELD:  1. There is no direct or casual violation of  any fundamental  right of which the petitioner can  legitimately claim enforcement.     2.  Article 47 is in Part IV of the  Constitution  which contains  Directive Principles of State Policy.  Article  37 enjoins  that the provisions of this part shall not  be  en- forceable  by any court. Article 32 gives the Supreme  Court the  power to enforce rights which are  fundamental  rights. Fundamental rights are justifiable, Directive Principles are not. 2 Directive Principles are aimed at securing certain values or enforcing  certain  attitudes in the law making and  in  the administration  of law. Directive Principles cannot  in  the very nature of things be enforced in a court of law.

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   Akhil  Bharatiya  Soshit Karamchari Sangh  v.  Union  of India, [1981] 1 SCC 246, referred to.     3. Whether a law should be made embodying the principles of  Directive Principles depends on the legislative will  of the  legislature. In the instant case, what  the  petitioner sought  to achieve by his application was to inject a  sense of priority and urgency in that legislative will.  Determin- ing  the  choice of priorities and  formulating  perspective thereof,  is a matter of policy. Article 32 is not  the  ma- chinery  through which policy preferences or priorities  are determined.  It  is  not the nest for all the  bees  in  the bonnet of ’public spirited persons’.     Rustom  Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3  SCR 550, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil)  No. of 1990. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) N.D.R. Ramachandra Rao and Vineet Kumar for the petitioner. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI  MUKHARJI,   CJ.  This is  a  petition  under article  32  of the Constitution of  India.  The  petitioner claims  to  be "a public spirited  individual".  He  further claims  to  be a person aggrieved and seeks  to  assail  the constitutional  validity of the State of Karnataka  and  the Union of India not promoting, enforcing and carrying out the policy of prohibition i.e. manufacturing, sale and  consump- tion  of intoxicating drinks and drugs throughout the  coun- try--India--Bharat,  and  also  assails  the  constitutional validity  of  clause  (b) of sub-rule  1 of rule  3  of  the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules, 1968 as amended by the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian  and Foreign  Liquors)  (Amendment) Rules, 1989 which  came  into fore on 10th September, 1989. The  petitioner refers to the Preamble to  the  Constitution which, 3 according  to him, explains the general purpose  behind  the general provisions of the Constitution. He refers to Mahatma Gandhi  and his commitment to prohibition. According to  the petitioner, manufacture, sale and consumption of  intoxicat- ing  drinks  and drugs have become a stumbling block  and  a dangerous dragon to the progress and stability of the nation as a whole. The petitioner states that unless this dragon is completely  destroyed  the  country  could  never  think  of achieving    the   objects   of   the    Constitution    and justice--social, economic and political. People are flouting the laws of this country, therefore, the petitioner  objects that  the  State should take upon the  business  of  selling liquors. He has asserted that the State of Karnataka instead of  bringing  total prohibition in the  State,  has  evinced interest in taking up the responsibility of selling  liquors to the general public. Hence, it is bad and contrary to  the Constitution,  and  he challenges the amendment  which  pre- scribes  the licence for sale shall be issued to  only  such company  owned or controlled by the State Government as  the State Govt. may specify. According to the petitioner, such a rule is unconstitutional. He draws our attention to  Article 47  of the Constitution of India which  indicates  directive principles.     In the aforesaid view of the matter he claims that  this Court  should  direct  the Union of India  and  other  State

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Governments  to  enforce  the policy  of  total  prohibition throughout the country including the State of Karnataka  and to impose restrictions on manufacture, sale and  consumption of  intoxicating drinks and to declare rule 3 of  the  these rules as void and unconstitutional.     We  are  unable to entertain this  writ  petition  under article  32 of the Constitution. The petition of  the  peti- tioner is that the policy of prohibition is not being imple- mented as enjoined by article 47 of the Constitution. In our opinion, it is not entertainable. Article 47 of the  Consti- tution,  which is part of our Directive Principles of  State Policy  enjoins that the State shall regard the  raising  of the  level  of nutrition and the standard of living  of  its people  and  the improvement of public health as  among  its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to  bring  about prohibition of the consumption  except  for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are  injurious  to health. Article 47 is in Part IV  of  the Constitution  which contains Directive Principles  of  State Policy. Article 37 enjoins that the provisions of this  Part shall  not be enforceable by any court, but  the  principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the gover- nance  of the country and it shall be the duty of the  State to apply these principles in making laws. It has to be borne in mind that Article 4 32 of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power  to enforce  rights  which are fundamental  rights.  Fundamental rights are justifiable, Directive Principles are not. Direc- tive  Principles  are aimed at securing  certain  values  or enforcing  certain  attitudes in the law making and  in  the administration  of law. Directive Principles cannot  in  the very nature of things be enforced in a court of law. See  in this  connection  the observations of this  Court  in  Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India,  [1981] 1 SCC 246. Whether a law should be made embodying the  prin- ciples  of Directive Principles depends on  the  legislative will  of  the  legislature. What  the  petitioner  seeks  to achieve by this application is to inject a sense of priority and urgency in that legislative will. Determining the choice of  priorities  and formulating perspective  thereof,  is  a matter  of policy. Article 32 is not the  machinery  through which  policy preferences or priorities are  determined  and this Court is not the forum where the conflicting claims  of policies  or priorities should be debated. See the  observa- tions  of this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v.  Union  of India, [1970] 3 SCR 530 at p. 584.     We find no direct or casual violation of any fundamental right  of  which the petitioner can legitimately  claim  en- forcement  in this application. To make the State  accept  a particular  policy,  desirable and necessary as  the  policy might be is not the function of Article 32 of the  Constitu- tion. Article 32 of the Indian Constitution is not the  nest for all the bees in the bonnet of ’public spirited persons’.     In  the  aforesaid  view of the matter,  we  decline  to entertain  this  application  and the  same  is  accordingly dismissed. P.S.S.                                   Petition dismissed. 5