22 September 1998
Supreme Court
Download

B KANDASAMY REDDIAR Vs O GOMATHI AMMAL

Bench: M.K.MUKHERJEE,S.SAGHIR AHMAD
Case number: C.A. No.-004949-004949 / 1998
Diary number: 16961 / 1997


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 2  

PETITIONER: B. KANDASAMY REDDIAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: O. GOMATHI AMMAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       22/09/1998

BENCH: M.K.MUKHERJEE, S.SAGHIR AHMAD

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:  JUDGMENT M.K. MUKHERJEE, J. Leave granted in all the three petitions. 2.Gomathi  Ammal,  the respondent in these appeals, is the owner  of  a  three-storied  building  in  the  city  of Nagerkoil.   In  its  first  and  second  floors  she runs a lodging house;  and  the  rooms  in  the  ground  floor  are occupied  by  different  persons,  including  the appellants herein, as tenants.  In the year 1982,  she  filed  separate petitions  before  the  Rent  Controller for eviction of the three appellants and two others, invoking Sections  10(3)(c) and  14(1)(b)  of  the  Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,  1960  [’Act’  for  short],  which  entitle  a landlord to evict a tenant for his requirement of additional accommodation  and  for immediate demolition of the building and erection of a new one, respectively. 3.The Rent Controller dismissed  the  petitions  by  a common  judgment  and,  aggrieved  thereby,  the  respondent preferred  appeals  which  were  allowed  by  the  appellate authority  by reversing the adverse findings recorded by the Rent  Controller  on  both  the  grounds  canvassed  by  the respondent for  eviction.    Thereafter  one  of the tenants moved the High Court by filing a revision petition which was summarily dismissed.  The  aggrieved  tenant  then  filed  a special leave petition before this Court contending that the appellate  authority  failed  to appreciate that the grounds for eviction under Sections 10(3)(c) and 14(1)(b) of the Act were distinct and mutually exclusive.  Accepting  the  above contention  this  Court  set  aside  the  eviction order and remitted  the  matter  to  the   appellate   authority   for reconsideration on the available evidence.  In the meantime, the  other  tenants including the appellants, had also filed revision petition; and in view of the order of  this  Court, the High  Court  passed  similar  directions therein.  After rehearing, the appellate authority allowed the three appeals (out of the five) preferred by the respondent against  Rasul Ahmed  [appellant  in  the appeal arising out of SLP (c) No. 1511 of 1997].  G.  Sastha [appellant in the appeal  arising out of  SLP  (c)  No.  191 of 1998] and co-optex, tenants of door Nos.  145, 146 and 143 respectively.    The  other  two

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 2  

appeals which  were  preferred against B.  kandasamy Reddiar [the appellant in the appeal arising  out  of  SLF  (c)  No. 20181  of  1997]  and  one Thiru Appollos, who occupied door Nos.  147 and 147A respectively, were  dismissed.    Against the  above decision of the appellate authority appellants G. Sastha and rasul Ahmed filed two revision petitions and  the respondent  in her turn, filed two similar petitions against the dismissal of her other two appeals.  Co-optex,  however, did  not  file  any  appeal  and vacated the premises in its occupation.  By a common judgment the High Court allowed the revision petitions of the respondent and dismissed those  of the appellants Rasul  Ahmed  and  G.    Sastha.    The above judgment is under challenge in these appeals. In disposing of the revision petitions in the manner indicated above the High Court firstly observed :-           "Both  the  Rent  Controller  and  the   Appellate           Authority  have  held  that eviction cannot be had           under Section  14(1)(b)   of   the   Act.      The           correctness  of  the  said  finding also cannot be           doubted since the  landlady  does  not  intend  to           demolish the  building.   That finding of the Rent           controller as well  as  the  Appellate  Authority,           therefore, does not call for any interference." and then proceeded to consider whether  the  respondent  was entitled  to  evict the appellants under Section 10(3)(c) of Act. It ultimately held that the  claim  of  the  respondent that  she  required additional accommodation for the purpose of running the lodging house was genuine. 5.Having  heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the respondent we are  of  the  view  that  the  factual aspects  of  the case need not be gone into as these appeals must be allowed for the simple reason that in  disposing  of the  revision  petitions  the High Court did not at all take into consideration the following proviso, which finds  place under clause (e) of Section 10(3) and reads as under :-           "Provided  that,  in  the  case  of an application           under clause (c) the Controller shall  reject  the           application  if  he is satisfied that the hardship           which may be caused to the tenant by  granting  it           will outweigh the advantage to the landlord." Apart  from  the fact that while dealing with the question of eviction  of  a  tenant  on  the  ground  of  requirement  of additional  accommodation  the  consideration  of  the  above proviso is mandatory, in the instant case it is all the  more necessary  in  view of the admitted facts that the respondent has now taken possession of door No.  143,  earlier  occupied by  Co-optex,  and  that  she  has  also  initiated execution proceeding for eviction of the tenant of door No.  147 A.  As the mandatory requirement of the above quoted proviso has not at all been adverted to by the High Court in the light of the materials already on record and the above  subsequent  events we  set  aside  the impugned judgment so far as it relates to the three appellants and remand the matter to  it  for  fresh disposal   of  the  three  connected  revision  petitions  in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinbefore.  Since the matter  is  long  pending  the  High Court  is  requested  to  dispose  of  the above petitions as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period  of  six months from  the  date of communication of this order.  There shall be no order as to costs.