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PETITIONER: B.   H. ASWATHANARAYAN SINGH AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/04/1965

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) SHAH, J.C. MUDHOLKAR, J.R. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1965 AIR 1848            1966 SCR  (1)  87  CITATOR INFO :  F          1968 SC1095  (5)  RF         1973 SC 534  (9)  RF         1974 SC1905  (20)  D          1977 SC1170  (5)  R          1980 SC 129  (9)

ACT: Motor   Vehicles  Act  (4  of  1939),  vs.  68C   and   68E- Specification of maximum and minimum number of vehicles  and trips  in approved scheme-Validity-Inter-State  route,  what is-Hearing  objections  on behalf of  State  Government  Who should.

HEADNOTE: The  State Transport Undertaking published a scheme  in  the Gazette for taking over the routes mentioned therein to  the entire  exclusion of the existing operators., Objections  to the scheme were heard by the Chief Minister and the approved scheme  with modifications was published.  The draft  scheme was  published when the Rules of 1960 were in force and  the approved scheme after the Rules of 1963 had come into force. Writ   petitions   were  filed  by   various   bus-operators challenging  the  validity of the approved scheme  but  they were dismissed. In their appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that :  (i) It was not open, under the Motor Vehicles  Act,  1939 and  the Rules there Linder, to the State  Government,  when approving  the scheme to specify minimum and maximum  number of  motor vehicles to be put on each route and  the  minimum and maximum number of trips to be made on each route and  in so  far as the approved scheme made such a provision it  was ultra  vires-  (ii) As the draft scheme only  specified  the maximum number of vehicles and trips as required by the 1960 Rules, but the approved scheme provided both for minimum and maximum  number  of  vehicles and trips  on  each  route  as required by the 1963 Rules, there was no opportunity to  the objectors to put forward their objections to that feature of the  scheme; (iii) Rule 3 cls. (e) and (f) and rule  12,  of the 1963 Rules, which provided for the specification of  the

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maximum  and  minimum number of vehicles and  trips  in  the scheme  and for variation of the frequency of services on  a notified  route without exceeding the maximum  number,  were ultra  vires;  (iv) The scheme could not be deemed  to  have been  approved as it related to inter-State routes  and  the approval  the Central Government had not been obtained;  and (v) The Chief Minister was not competent to hear  objections on  behalf of the State Government, but that it should  have been done by the Minister in charge of Transport., HELD : (i) The specifying of both minimum and maximum number of  vehicles and trips in the scheme was in accordance  with the  provisions of s. 68C and was not hit by s. 68E and  was valid. [98 F-G] Section 68C itself provides that "particulars of the  nature of  the  services  to be rendered" should be  given  in  the scheme  and  the intention is that such  details  should  be given as are necessary to enable the objectors to make their objections.   When  the  section speaks  of  the  nature  of services  to be rendered, it refers to the classes of  motor vehicles  for carrying passengers or goods or both, and  the scheme has to indicate which class of service is to be taken over.   Also,  the word "particulars" should  be  given  its ordinary meaning of "details".  There may be some                              88 difficulty  in working out a scheme containing  minimum  and maximum  number  of vehicles and trips, where  exclusion  is partial  as compared to a case where exclusion is  complete, but  the task of making a proper adjustment by the  Regional Transport Authority is not insuperabla and therefore, such a difficulty  would  not  change the meaning  of  the  word  " particulars."  Such  details  of  the  nature  of   services proposed to be rendered include not only the precise  number of  vehicles  and  trips but also the  minimum  and  maximum number  of  vehicles  and  trips on  each  route;  and  such indication  of  the  maximum and minimum  number  gives  the necessary  information  to enable objectors  to  oppose  the scheme  even with reference to the adequacy of  the  service proposed  to be rendered. .’Further, s. 46(c) and  s.  48(3) (ii) indicate that specification of the minimum and  maximum number of trips and vehicles is envisaged by the Act, and it is  permissible and legitimate to refer to  those  sections, Besides, such a specification would subserve the purpose  of Chap.   IV-A  of the Act inasmuch as it will provide  for  a certain amount of flexibility in the service to be rendered. Such  a.  provision for flexibility in the  approved  scheme itself, cannot be said to override s. 68-E or be a device to get round the section; and since the gap between the maximum and  minimum,  in  the present case,  was  not  wide,  their fixation  did  not operate as a fraud on ss.  68C  and  68E. [93A, 1), E-G: 94 G-H; 95A C-G; 97F; 98 B-GE] Dosa  Satyanarayanan v. Andhra Predesh Stae  Road  Transport Corporation, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 642. distinguished. C.P.C.  Motor  Service v. State of Mysore, [1962]  Supp.   I S.C.R,  717  and C. S. Rowjee v.  Stale of  Andhra  Pradesh, [1964] 6 S.C.R. 330. explained. (ii)The  fact  that  there was some  defect  in  the  draft scheme,  would not be fatal, if the approved scheme,  as  it finally  emerged  after the objections had  been  heard  and decided  under  s.  68-D was in  accordance  with  what  was required by s. 68-C. [99E] There  was  no violation of principles of  natural  justice, because,  objection  was taken to the  impropriety  of  only indicating a maximum in the draft scheme and that  objection was met by the State Government by modifying the scheme  and including a minimum also. [99 G-H]

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Dosa  Satyanarayanana  Murty v. Andhra  Pradesh  State  Road Corporation, [1961] I S.C.R. 642. followed. (iii)Since  it was permissible to specify  the  maximum and minimum ’number of vehicles and trips under s. 68-C, and since  r.  12  should  be  read  as  giving  power  to   the undertaking  to vary the frequency between the  maximum  and minimum  prescribed in the scheme, the rule are  all  valid. [100 F-G] (iv)The  two termini of the route being within  the  State. the  scheme ,did not deal with inter-State route-,.  A  road is different from ’I route and the criterion for determining if  a route is intrastate or inter-State is to  see  whether the 2 termini are in the same State or not. [101 B-C] (v)The  authority under s. 68-D to hear objections is  the State  Government.  Therefore, some living person must  hear objections  on  its behalf.  Since the rule  framed  by  the Government nominates the Chief Minister as the authority, he was competent to hear the objections. [101 D.E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIl.  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 250  and 286 of 1965. 89 Appeals from the judgment and orders dated February 2,  1965 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 1435 to 1438, 1445  to  1451, 1453 to 1461, 1496 to 1498,  1524,  1526  to 1528,     1541 to 1543 and 1721 of 1964. N.   C.  Chatterjee,  N. S. Narayana Rao, B.  P.  Singh,  D. Gundu Rao, A. G. Meshwarappa, A. T. Sundaravardan and R.  B. Datar. for the appellant (in C. A. No. 250 to 269 and 276 to 286 of 1965). G.   S.  Pathak, B. Dutta, M. Rangaswami, J. B.  Dadachanji, O.   C. Mathur and Ravinder- Narain, for the appellants  (in C. As.  Nos. 270-275 of 1965). A.V. Viswanatha Sastri and R. Gopalakrishnan, for respon- dent No. 2 (in all the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo,  J.  These  37 appeals  on  certificates  from  the judgment of the Mysore High Court raise common questions and be  dealt  with  together.  The  appellants  are  motor  bus operators in the district of Bellamy in the State of Mysore. It appears that two draft schemes for taking over  passenger bus routes were published by the State Transport Undertaking (hereinafter  referred to as the Undertaking) in  May  1962. Objections  to  those  schemes  were  heard  by  the   State Government   and  the  schemes  were  approved  after   some modifications and published in the Mysore gazette in  August 1962.   The approved schemes were however challenged by  the motor  bus  operators  who were operating  in  the  district before the High Court by writ petitions and the two  schemes were  quashed by the High Court on September 24,  1962,  for reasons into which it is unnecessary to go. Then  the Under-taking published another scheme on  November 1,  1962  in the Mysore gazette for taking over  the  routes mentioned  therein to the entire exclusion of  the  existing motor  bus operators.  This scheme was published  under  the State   Transport   Undertakings   (Mysore)   Rules    1960. Objections to the scheme were heard by the State  Government on  various dates in April and May 1963.  In  the  meantime, the   State   Transport  Undertakings   Rules   were   under modification  and the revised rules were published on  April 25,  1963.  The last date for hearing of objections  by  the State Government was May 23, .1963. On.  July 25, 1963,  the

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Rules  of  1963  came into force.  The order  of  the  State Government  approving the scheme was made on April 18,  1964 and thereafter the approved scheme with such modifications 90 as  the  State  Government had made  was  published  in  the gazette on May 7, 1964.  Then followed applications by  tile Undertaking to the Regional Transport Authority for issue of permits in accordance with the scheme.  Soon thereafter writ petitions   were  filed  by  various  motor  bus   operators challenging the validity of the approved scheme in the first week  of August 1964, and the implementation of  the  scheme was  stayed  by the High Court.  On February 23,  1965,  the High  Court  dismissed the writ petitions.   Thereafter  the High Court granted certificates to the appellants to appeal; and that is how the matter has come up before us. A  large number of contentions have been urged on behalf  of the  appellants to which we shall refer in due course.   But the  two main contentions that have been urged are : (i)  it was  not open, under the Motor Vehicles Act, No. 4 of  1939, (hereinafter   referred  to  as  the  Act)  and  the   Rule; thereunder,  to  the  State Government  when  approving  the scheme  to  specify  minimum and  maximum  number  of  motor vehicles  to  be put on each route and minimum  and  maximum number of trips to be made on each route and insofar as  the approved  scheme makes such a provision it is  ultra  vires, and (ii) when the draft scheme was published in the Rules of 1960  were in force and the draft scheme only specified  the maximum  number of vehicle and trips on each route,  but  by the  time the State Government disposed of  the  objections, Rules  of 1963 had come into force and the  approved  scheme provided both for minimum and maximum number of vehicles and trips  on each route.  As, however, the minimum  number  was not specified in the draft scheme, there was no  opportunity to  the  objectors to put forward their objections  to  this feature  of the scheme and therefore principles  of  natural justice had been violated by the State Government, which has been held to be a quasi-judicial authority for this purpose, when approving the scheme. We shall deal with these two main objections first and  then consider  other points raised on behalf of  the  appellants. It is not in dispute that one fixed number of vehicles  as-, well  as  of  trips  can be provided  in  the  scheme.   The question that arises is whether the fixing of a minimum  and maximum  number of vehicles and trips, as has been  done  in the  approved  scheme, is also permissible  under  the  Act. This takes us to s. 68-C of the Act which may be  reproduced here :               "Where  any State transport undertaking is  of               opinion  that for the purpose of providing  an               efficient,  adequate, economical and  properly               coordinated  road  transport  service,  it  is               necessary in the public interest that road               91               transport   services   in   general   or   any               particular  class of such service in  relation               to any area or route or portion thereof should               be  run  and operated by the  State  transport               undertaking,   whether   to   the   exclusion,               complete  or  partial,  of  other  persons  or               otherwise, the State transport undertaking may               prepare  scheme  giving  particulars  of   the               nature   of  the  services  proposed   to   be               rendered,  the " area or route proposed to  be               covered and such other particulars  respecting               thereto as may be prescribed, and shall  cause

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             every  such  scheme  to be  published  in  the               Official Gazette and also in such other manner               as the State Government may direct." It  will be seen that if the Undertaking is of opinion,  for reasons  indicated  in  the  section,  to  take  over   road transport services to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other  persons,  it has to frame a scheme, which has  to  be published  in the official gazette and in such other  manner as  the  State  Government  may  direct.   "Road   transport service"   means  a  service  of  motor  vehicles   carrying passengers  or  goods or both by road for  hire  or  reward. Under  the  section  the  Undertaking  may  take  over  road transport  services  in general or any particular  class  of such  service  in relation to any area or route  or  portion thereof.   In  the present case the Undertaking  decided  to take  over  passenger services over various  routes  in  the district  of Bellary to the exclusion of all other  persons. There  is no dispute that the Undertaking in publishing  the scheme acted in the manner required by s. 68-C.  The dispute arises  as  to the contents of the scheme published  by  the Undertaking  and the contention on behalf of the  appellants is that under the relevant words of s. 68-C, the scheme must only contain a precise number of vehicles and trips on  each route  and that if the scheme provides minimum  and  maximum number  of vehicles and trips it will not be  in  accordance with s. 68-C.  Stress is laid on behalf of ’he appellants on the  following  words  in  s. 68-C  which  provide  for  the publication of the scheme thereunder               "........ the State transport undertaking  may               prepare  a  scheme giving particulars  of  the               nature   of  the  services  proposed   to   be               rendered,  the  area or route proposed  to  be               covered, and such other particulars respecting               thereto as may be prescribed .... It will be seen that this provision is in two parts.  By the first part the section itself provides what should be  there in the scheme. namely--(i) particulars of the nature of  the services to be rendered, and (ii) the area or route proposed to be covered.  The Sup.CI/65-7 92 second  part provides for such other particulars  respecting hereto as may be prescribed by the rules.  We have  already indicated  that rules have been framed for this purpose  and it is not in dispute that Rules of 1960 which were in  force at the relevant time were complied with.  In the Rules  only the maximum number of vehicles and trips was required to  be mentioned  and that was done in the draft scheme, which  was published.   But the contention on behalf of the  appellants is  that  the  first part of the section to  which  we  have referred requires two things, namely-(i) particulars of  the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, and (ii) the area  or  route  proposed  to  be  covered.   ’there  is  no difficulty  as  to the meaning of the words "area  or  route proposed to be covered" and the draft scheme did provide for the  area or routes to be covered.  It is however  contended that.  when  s. 68-C requires that the  scheme  should  give particulars  of  the nature of the services proposed  to  be rendered,  it was necessary that the scheme  should  provide only  the  precise  number of vehicles and  trips  for  each route-if not, in the draft, at anyrate   in   the    scheme finally approved by the State Government     after  hearing, objections.  It is said that when the section requiresthat the scheme should give the "particulars of the nature of the services  proposed to be rendered", the  word  "particulars"

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used  in  the section necessarily imports  that  the  scheme should specify the precise number of vehicles and trips  for each route. Now   the  words  "nature  of  the   services proposed to be rendered"clearly  refer  to  the  class   of service to be taken over. It is arguedthat    the    words "nature  of  the  services  proposed  to  be  rend-red"  are different  from the words "class of services proposed to  be rendered" and have a wider meaning.  It is further submitted that there was no reason for the word "nature" being used in this  part of the section when the word "clays" was used  in the  earlier part of the section if the two meant the  same. We  are  however  of opinion that there  is  no  substantial difference  between  the class of services  which  has  been referred  earlier in the section and the nature of  services proposed to be rendered which is referred in the latter part of the section.  Road transport service as defined in s. 68- A can be of three kinds, namely-(i) passenger service,  (ii) goods services, and (iii) mixed goods and passenger service. Further passenger and goods services themselves could be  of different types as , for example, stage carriages [see s.  2 (29) ] goods vehicles [see s. 2(8)], contract carriages [see s.  2(3)], invalid carriages [see s. 2(10)], and motor  cabs [see s. 2(15].  Therefore, when s. 69-C speaks of nature  of services to be rendered it       93 refers  to  these classes of motor  vehicles.  for  carrying passengers  or  goods and the scheme has to  indicate  which class of service is to be taken over.  It may be added  that one  of  the  meanings of the word  "nature"  given  in  the Concise Oxford Dictionary is "kind, sort, class", and it  is this  meaning which is intended by the use of this  word  in this part of the section.     Besides  indicating  the class of services to  be  taken over,  the  section  requires  that  the  particulars   with reference  to the class of service to be taken  over  should also  be indicated in the scheme. It is contended on  behalf of the appellants that  where,  (for example) stage carriage services are being taken over, particulars must indicate the exact  number  of  motor vehicles that will  be  used  on  a particular  route  and the exact number of trips  that  they will  perform  in  the  course of a day  and  that  this  is essential  to be given in the scheme to enable objectors  to object  to it particularly with respect to the  adequacy  of services  to  be  rendered which is one  of  the  conditions precedent  for taking over the services under that  section. We  ate  of  opinion that the  word  "particulars"  in   the section  has  been  used in its ordinary  meaning.   In  its ordinary  meaning, the word "particulars" means  details  or items:   (see  the  Concise  Oxford  Dictionary).   In   the Dictionary  of  English Law by  Jowitt,  "particulars"  with reference  to a claim means the details of the  claim  which are necessary in order to enable the other side to know what case he has to meet.  They are intended to. make quite clear the case of the party who furnishes them.  Thus when s. 68-C provides  for  giving  particulars of  the  nature  of   the services proposed to be rendered, the intention is that such details  should  be  given as are necessary  to  enable  the objectors  to make their objections.  We do not  think  that these  details  would  necessarily consist  of  the  precise number  of vehicles and trips to be used on each route.   We see no difficulty in holding that the details of the  nature of  services proposed to be rendered may not only be in  the form  of a precise number of vehicles and trips but also  in the form of minimum and maximum number of vehicles and trips on each route.  Furnishing of minimum and maximum number  of

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vehicles and trips for each route would also in our  opinion satisfy the requirement that particulars should be furnished of  the  services  proposed to  be  rendered.   Further  the indication  of  minimum and maximum number of  vehicles  and trips for each route would give the necessary information to enable  the  objectors  to  oppose  the  scheme  even   with reference  to  the adequacy of the services proposed  to  be rendered..   We do not think that the appellants  are  right in  submitting that when the word "particulars" is  used  in this  Dart of the section, it can only be satisfied  if  the exact number of 94 vehicles  and  trips for each route is  specified  and  that there is no other way of satisfying the requirement implicit in  the use of the word "particulars".  As we  have  already said  the word "particulars’ has been used in  its  ordinary sense  and means details and the, indication of the  minimum and  maximum number of trips and vehicles would also in  our opinion  be sufficient to give the objectors  the  necessary information  to enable them to object with reference to  the conditions  precedent provided in the section for framing  a scheme.  It is obvious that the section itself has  provided the absolute minimum information which must be given in  the scheme  to enable the objectors to object and  that  minimum consists  of  details with respect to the class  of  service proposed to be rendered and the area or route proposed to be covered.  Other particulars are left to be prescribed by the rules as they are not of the same importance as the  details with respect to class of service to be rendered and the area or route to be covered.  We are therefore of opinion that if the  scheme  in leaves both minimum and  maximum  number  of vehicles  and trips on each route it will be  in  accordance with the requirements of s. 68-C. We may in this connection refer to S. 46 (c) and S. 48 (3  ) (ii)  which  also indicate that it is  permissible  to  have minimum  and  maximum number of daily services  in  case  of stage  carriages  in particular.  Section  46  provides  for application  for stage carriage permits of two kinds-(i)  in respect of a service of stage carriages, and (ii) in respect of  a  particular motor vehicle used as  a  stage  carriage. Where  a service of stage carriages has to be provided,  cl. (c) of s. 46 provides for indicating the minimum and maximum number of daily services proposed to be provided in relation to  each  route  or area and the time-table  of  the  normal services.   Section  48 which provides for  grant  of  stage carriage  permits by the Regional Transport  Authority  also provides  in  sub-s. (3) in the case of a service  of  state carriages for attaching to the permit any condition relating to  the minimum and maximum daily services to be  maintained in relation to any route generally or on specified days  and occasions.   Number of vehicles would naturally depend  upon the  number of daily services, for the larger the number  of daily  services, the larger would be the number of  vehicles required.   These  two  sections  therefore  indicate   that specification  of  minimum and maximum number of  trips  and vehicles  is  envisaged by the Act.  It is true  that  these sections are in Chapter IV while s. 68-C is in Chap.   IV-A, S. 68-B whereof provides that Chap.  IV-A would have  effect notwithstanding  anything  inconsistent therewith  in  Chap. IV.  But in order to find out what particulars of the nature 95 of  the  services proposed to be rendered have to  be  given under  S.  68-C it would be permissible  and  legitimate  to refer  to these provisions in ss. 46 and 48.  They  indicate that a provision in the scheme of minimum and maximum number

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of trips per day would be sufficient in order that necessary information  may  be available to objectors  to  make  their objections with respect to the adequacy etc. of the services proposed  to  be  rendered.   But  quite  apart  from   this consideration we see no reason to hold that the word "parti- culars"  as used in S. 68-C necessarily refers only  to  the precise  number  of vehicles and trips for  each  route  and cannot  take in the minimum and maximum number  of  vehicles and trips for each route. Besides we are of opinion that a provision for a minimum and maximum  number  of vehicles and trips  would  subserve  the purpose  of  Chap.   IV-A inasmuch it  will  provide  for  a certain amount of flexibility in the service to be rendered, for it cannot be disputed that transport needs may vary from season  to season.  This flexibility provided by  specifying the  minimum  and  maximum would obviate  the  necessity  of taking  action  under  s. 68-E of the  Act  every  time  the Undertaking decided to make a minor change in the number  of trips  with the necessary changed in the number of  vehicles employed.  We: cannot accept the argument that provision  of a  minimum and maximum number in the scheme would be hit  by s.  68-E,  of  the Act which provides  for  cancellation  or modification  of an approved scheme, for S. 68-E comes  into play after the scheme has been approved under S. 68-D.   Nor can  the provision of flexibility by indicating the  minimum and  maximum number of vehicles and trips, be said to  be  a device  to get round S. 68-E, which deals with  a  situation after  the  scheme has been approved.  But  where  a  scheme itself provides for minimum and maximum number of trips  and vehicles and has been approved, it cannot be said that  such approval  is  meant to over-ride s. 68-E, for even  such  an approved  scheme may require radical alteration  after  some years when transport needs may have radically changed and in such  cases  action under S. 68-E would be  necessary.   But this provision of flexibility providing minimum and  maximum number in a scheme cannot per se be said to be an attempt to get round S. 68-E. In  this connection our attention is drawn to a decision  of this  Court  in Dosa Satyanarayanamurty  v.  Andhra  Pradesh State  Road Transport Corporation(1).  In that case r. 5  of the  Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules was struck down  on the  ground  that  it violated S. 68-E.  In  that  case  the scheme provided for an (1)  [1961] 1 S.C.R. 642. 96 exact number of trips and an exact number of vehicles.  Rule 5 however permitted frequency of services to be varied.   It was  in  these circumstances that the rule was  held  to  be ultra  vires s. 68-E.  But where the scheme itself  provides for a minimum and maximum number of vehicles and trips there is no question of its being violative of S. 68-E.  We, Loire therefore  of  opinion  that the provision  of  minimum  and maximum  number  of  vehicle-, and trips in  the  scheme  as approved  is  not against the provision of s.  68-C  as  the section  does  not  require that only  an  exact  number  of vehicles  and trips for each route must be notified  in  the scheme. Our  attention is also drawn to C.P.C. Motor Service v.  The State of In that case at p. 727, following observations               "The  earlier Rules retired a statement as  to               the minimum and maximum number of vehicles  to               be  put  on a route, as also the  minimum  and               maximum  trips.  It was however held  by  this               Court  that  a  departure,  from  the  minimum               number  would  mean  the  alternation  of  the

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             scheme,   necessitating  the   observance   of               allformalities for framing a Scheme." These  observation  are presad into Service to show  that  a minimum  number  cannot be prescribed in a  scheme  prepared under  s. 68-C.  It is true that there is an observation  in that  case  that  it  had been held by  this  Court  that  a departure  from the minimum number would mean an  alteration of  the  scheme,  necessitating the observance  of  all  the formalities  for framing a scheme.  But learned counsel  was unable  to  point out any case of this Court. where  it  was held  that  a departure from the minimum in the  case  of  a scheme  which  mentions both the minimum and  maximum  would require  action under s. 68-E.  The only case to  which  our attention  was  invited in this connection is that  of  Dosa Satyanarayanamurty (2); but in that case it was held that  a departure from an exact number would require action under s. 68-E.  However, that was Pot a case where the scheme  itself fixed minimum and maximum.  The scheme in that case fixed an exact  number and it was held that a departure from  such  a number  would  mean modification of the  scheme  within  the meaning  of  s.  68-F,.  The  observation  in  C.P.C.  Motor Service’s case(1) that this Court had held that a  departure from  the  minimum  would  mean  alteration  of  the  scheme therefore appears to have crept in per incuriam. Lastly our attention is drawn to a judgment of this Court in C.   S. Roiviec v. The State of Andhra Pradesh(1).  In  that case (1) [1962] SLipp.  I S.C.R. 717. (2) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 642. (3)  (1964 6 S.C.R. 331). 97 the question of indicating minimum and maximum in the scheme had come up for consideration.  But the scheme in that  case was  quashed  on  the  ground of bias  and  this  Court  had therefore  no occasion to consider the question whether  the indication  of minimum and maximum in the scheme would  make it   ultra  vires s. 68-C.  Even so some  observations  were made in that connection at the end of the judgment.  But the learned  Judges made it clear that they had not  thought  it necessary  to decide the larger question viz.,  whether  the mere  prescription of the  maxima  and minima constituted  a violation of s. 6S-E, as to require ,he scheme to be  struck down.  Therefore the observations in that case with  respect to  the  fixing  of minima and maxima  must  be  treated  as obiter.  Further in that case it was argued on behalf of the State  that indication of minima and maxima by itself  would not  be  bad; but it was conceded that the gap  between  the minumum  and  maximum should not be very  wide.   The  Court assumed this position and then observed that in some of  the cases gap between the minimum and maximum was very wide  and if the scheme had not already been vitiated on the ground of bias,  this  Court might have struck it down on  the  ground that  there was a wide gap between the minimum and  maximum. There is no doubt that though fixing of minimum and  maximum number  of vehicles and trips with respect to each route  is permissible  under s. 68-C and would not be hit by s.  68-E, the proportion between the minimum and maximum should not be so  great  as to make the fixing of minimum  and  maximum  a fraud on ss. 68-C and 68-E of the Act.  It  is not  possible to lay down specifically at what stage the fixing of minimum and maximum. would turn into fraud; but it is only when  the gap  between  the minimum and maximum is so  great  that  it amounts to fraud on the Act that it will be open to a  court to  hold that the scheme is not in compliance with  s.  68-C and  is  hit by s. 68-E.  The gap between  the  minimum  and

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maximum would depend upon a number of factors,  particularly on  the variation in the demand for transport  at  different seasons of the year. Even so if the approved scheme were  to fix minimum and maximum with very wide disparity between the two.  it  may  be  possible for  the  court  to  hold  after examining the facts of the case that such fixation is not in accordance  with  s. 68-C an<] is a fraud on s.  68-E.  But, with respect, it seems to us that a variation in minimum and maximum  from  6 to 12 or 5 to 9 can hardly be  of  such  an order  as to amount to fraud on the Act.   The  observations with  respect  to fixing of minimum and  maximum  number  of vehicles  and trips in the scheme made in  Rowjee’s  case(1) must therefore (1) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 339. 98 be  treated as obiter as in that case they did  not  require determination.  In the present case the gap is not of such a wide nature. Then it is urged that whatever may be the position in a case of  complete  exclusion, fixing of maximum  and  maximum  in relation to vehicles and trips could not be contemplated  by s.  68-C where there is partial exclusion.  Therefore if  it could  not be contemplated in the case of partial  exclusion it  could  not  be  contemplated in  the  case  of  complete exclusion  also.  It may be assumed that there may  be  some difficulty  in working out a scheme containing  minimum  and maximum  number  of vehicles and trips  where  exclusion  is partial  as compared to a case where exclusion is  complete. Even  so we do not think that would ,change the  meaning  of the word "particulars" used in s. 68-C and necessarily imply that  the  particulars given must consist only of  an  exact number of vehicles and an exact number of trips.  Further we are  of opinion that though it may be assumed  that  certain difficulties may conceivably arise in carrying out a  scheme which  includes minimum and maximum in the case  of  partial exclusion the difficulties are clearly not insuperable,  and the  Regional Transport Authority is there to work  out  the details where the scheme provides for a minimum and  maximum number  of vehicles and trips after taking into account  the private  operators who are allowed to ply their buses  along with   the  Undertaking.   The  task  of  making  a   proper adjustment  by  the  Regional  TransPort  Authority  is  not insuperable  and therefore we are not prepared to hold  that because exclusion can be partial, particulars required by s. 68-C  with respect to number of vehicles and trips  must  be precise. We are therefore of opinion that specifying of both  minimum and maximum number of vehicles and trips in the scheme under challenge  is also in accordance with the provisions  of  s. 68-C  and  is  not hit by s. 68-E.  The  contention  of  the appellants under this head is therefore rejected. Then  we come to the second main point raised in  the  case. It is urged that the draft scheme was framed when rules only required maximum number to be mentioned and the draft scheme mentioned the maximum.  But in the approved scheme, this was modified  and both the minimum and maximum  were  mentioned. So it is urged that as the minimum was not mentioned in  the draft scheme which was in accordance with the Rules of  1960 as they then stood, it was not possible for the objectors to object with 99 respect  to  the minimum which was introduced by  the  State Government  by  modification  under  S.  68-D  of  the  Act. Therefore there was breach of principles of natural  justice as  the  objectors  had  no opportunity  to  show  that  the

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condition precedent, namely, that the service was  adequate, had been complied with.  It may be accepted that there was a defect in the draft scheme inasmuch as it only indicated the maximum number of services and not the minimum.  But we  are here  concerned  with  the  approved  scheme  after  it  was modified by the State Government in accordance with s.  68-D of the Act.  It is also not quite correct on the part of the appellants to say that they could not object to the adequacy of  service because the minimum was not mentioned.  We  find that  quite a few of the objectors appear to  have  objected that  it was not enough to mention the maximum only  in  the scheme   and  that  in  the  absence  of  the  minimum   the Undertaking  might  not  run even one bus  on  a  particular route.   It  was because of this objection  that  the  State Government provided for the minimum in the scheme.  The fact that there was some defect in the draft scheme would in  our opinion  be not fatal if the approved scheme as  it  finally emerges  after  the objections have been heard  and  decided under  s. 68-D is in accordance with what is required by  s. 68-C.   Nor  do  we  think that  it  was  not  possible  for objectors  to  raise the question of  adequacy  of  services where  only  the maximum is Spector.   The  approved  scheme cannot in our opinion be struck (Town if it is in accordance with  s.  68-C merely because there was some defect  in  the particulars  supplied in the draft scheme.  We may  in  this connection  refer to the case of Dosa  Satyanarayanamurty(1) where  also there was a defect in the draft scheme  inasmuch as in certain cases the number of vehicles to be operated on each  route was not specified and one number  was  mentioned against many routes which were bracketted.  An objection was taken with regard to this matter and the scheme was modified accordingly.  This Court upheld the modified scheme and  the same  principle in our opinion applies to the  present  case where only the maximum was mentioned in the draft scheme and not  the  minimum.   We  do not think  that  there  was  any violation of principles of natural justice because objection was taken to the impropriety of only indicating a maximum in the  scheme  and that objection has been met  by  the  State Government  by modifying the scheme and including a  minimum also.  The contention therefore on this head must fail. We shallnow consider the other points raised on behalf  of the appellants. It is urged that cls. (e) and (f) of  r. 3 of the 1960- (1)[1961] I S.C.R. 642. 100 Rules  are bad as they provide only for a maximum number  of vehicles  and trips.  It is further urged that r. 12 of  the 1960Rules  is  bad inasmuch as it allows an  Undertaking  to vary  the  frequency  of services operated  on  any  of  the notified   routes  or  within  the  notified  area   without exceeding the maximum number of vehicles or services having, regard  to the traffic needs during any period.  We  are  of opinion  that it is unnecessary to consider the validity  of these  rules in view of the fact that they no longer  exist. We  should however guard ourselves by saying that we  should not  be understood as accepting the view of the  High  Court which has upheld the validity of these rules.     Then  it is urged that cls. (e) and (f) of r. 3  of  the 1963-Rules  as well as r. 12 thereof are bad.   Clauses  (e) and   (f) of r. 3 provide for the specification  of  maximum and  minimum number of vehicles and trips in the scheme.  We have already considered this question and have held that  it is permissible to specify the maximum and minimum number  of vehicles and trips under s. 68-C. Rules 3 (e) and (f) is  in accordance  with  what we have held above and  is  therefore

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valid. Rule 12 lays down that where the services are run and operated  to the complete exclusion of other persons by  the Undertaking,  it may, in the interest of the public   having regard  to  the  traffic needs during any  period  vary  the frequency of services operated on any of the notified routes or  within .any notified area without exceeding the  maximum number of vehicles or services as enumerated in the approved scheme.   This  rule is ancillary to r. 3 (e)  and  (f)  and comes  into  operation only where services are  run  to  the total exclusion of other persons.  In such a case this  rule gives  power  to the Undertaking to vary  the  frequency  of services  upto  the maximum limit.  We are of  opinion  that this rule should be read as giving power to the  Undertaking to  vary  the frequency of services within the  minimum  and maximum  prescribed in the scheme.  Read as such, we see  no invalidity in this rule.     Then  it  is urged that the scheme cannot be  deemed  to have  been approved as it relates to inter-State routes  and the approval of the Central Government has not been taken as required  under  the  proviso to s. 68-D  (3).   We  are  of opinion  that there is no substance in this contention.   An inter-State route is one in which one of the terminii is  in one  State and the other in another State.  In  the  present case both the terminii are in one State. So it does not deal with  inter-State routes at all.  It is urged that  part  of the scheme covers roads which continue beyond the State 101 and connect various points in the State of Mysore with other States.   Even if that is so that does not make  the  scheme one  connected  with  interstate  routes,  for  a  road   is different  from a route.  For example, the Grand Trunk  Road runs  from  Calcutta  to Amritsar and  passes  through  many States.  But any portion of it within a State or even within a  District or a subdivision can be a route for purposes  of stage carriage$ or goods vehicles.  That would not make such a  route a part of an inter-State route even though it  lies on a road which runs through many States.  The criterion  is to see whether the two terming of the route are in the  same State  or not.  If they are in the same State, the route  is not  an  inter-State route and the proviso to  s.  68-D  (3) would  not be applicable.  The termini in the  present  case being  within the State of Mysore the scheme does  not  deal with  interState routes it all, and the contention  on  this head must be rejected. Lastly it is urged that the Chief Minister was not competent to  hear the objections under s. 68-D and that  this  should have been done by the minister of    transport.      The authority under s. 68-D tohear  objections is the  State Government.  As     the StateGovernment  is  not  a  living person, some  living person   must hear the objection.Rule 8 provides treat the Chief minister shall be theauthority to hear the decide the sections. We     fail to see why,  if according  to  the  appellants  the  Minister  incharge   of transport can hear the objections, the Chief Minister cannot do  so when the rule framed by the government under the  Act nominates  the Chief Minister as the authority to  hear  the objections  on behalf of the State Government.  There is  no force in this objection and it is hereby rejected. The  appeals  therefore fail and are hereby  dismissed  with costs-one set of hearing fee. Appeal dismissed. 102