http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 26  

PETITIONER: B. BANERJEE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ANITA PAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/11/1974

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 1146            1975 SCR  (2) 774  1975 SCC  (1) 168  CITATOR INFO :  F          1976 SC 479  (8)  E&R        1978 SC1062  (4,6,7,9)  RF         1978 SC1296  (59)  E          1980 SC 214  (26)  R          1980 SC 898  (66)  R          1980 SC1124  (18)  MV         1982 SC1325  (31)  O          1983 SC1155  (13,15,23,27,29)  F          1985 SC 376  (4)

ACT: West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 as amended in  1969-S. 13(1)(f) and (ff)-Constitutional validity of-Whether offends Art. 19(1)(f) and (5).

HEADNOTE: Section  13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises  Tenancy  Act, 1956  Act XII of 1956) enacted that no order or  decree  for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made  by any  court  in favour of the landlord  against  the  tenants except  among  others, on the ground that the  premises  are reasonably  required by the landlord either for the  purpose of building or rebuilding or for making thereto  substantial additions or alterations or for his own occupation if he  is the  owner  or for the occupation of any  person  for  whose benefit the premises are held. Section  13(4)  of the Act provides that  where  a  landlord requires the premises on any of the grounds mentioned in cl. (1)(f) and the Court is of opinion that such requirement may be  substantially  satisfied by ejecting the tenant  from  a part  only  of the premises the Court shall  pass  a  decree accordingly.   In  1969 the Act was amended by  West  Bengal Premises  Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act. Section 13 of  the original Act was amended by introducing sub-section (3A)  in it.   This sub-section prohibits institution of a  suit  for ejectment  of a tenant by a landlord who has  purchased  the premises for his own use within three years of the purchase. The Amending Act also enacted that the said Act shall  apply to  suits and appeals, which are pending at the date of  the commencement of the Act. The  respondent  purchased the suit premises  in  which  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 26  

appellant  was a tenant and instituted a suit for  ejectment of  the  tenant under s.13(1)(f) of the original  Act.   The suit  was  decreed by the lower court and  affirmed  by  the lower  appellate  court.  A single Judge of the  High  Court dismissed  the appeal.  When the Letters Patent  Appeal  was pending before the High Court, the Amending Act of 1969  was passed,   whereupon,   the  tenant-appellant   invoked   the provisions of the new sub-sec. (3A) and contended that since the  landlord  had instituted a suit  the  ejectment  within three  years of the purchase, the suit should be  dismissed. The  High Court held that s.3A was valid  prospectively  but that  the restriction imposed by the sub-section. giving  it retrospective effect, was violative of Art. 1(1) (f) of  the Constitution. Per Beg and Krishna Iyer, JJ: Allowing  the  appeals and remitting the case  to  the  High Court, HELD : (1) (a) There is no violation of Art. 19(1) (f)  read with Art. 19(5) of the Constitution in the Amending Act, and s.13  of  the original Act, as amended is valid.   The  evil corrected  by the Amendment Act is to stop the influx  of  a transferee  class of evictors of tenants and institution  of litigation to eject and rack-rent or re-build to make  large profits.  Apparently the inflow of such suits must have been swelling slowly over the years and when the stream became  a flood the Legislature rushed with an amending bill.  Had  it made the law merely prospective, those who had, in  numbers, already  gone  to Court and  induced  legislative  attention would  have escaped the inhibition.  This would  defeat  the object  and  so  the application of the  additional  ban  to Pending actions could not be called unreasonable.  There  is no  foundation  for the assumptions made by the  High  Court that  there  may be cases of ejectment instituted  prior  to 1956 or that a number of suits and decrees, perhaps  decades old. will unjustly be nullified by the previous operation of the  new  ban.   Recondite instances  and  casual  hardships cannot   deflect  constitutional  construction   of   social legislation, 775 if  the main thrust of the statute relates to a real  social evil  of dimensions deserving to be antidoted  by  antedated legislative  remedy.  Questions such as whether those  cases which  were filed several years ago should have been  carved out  of the category of transferees hit by the Act,  and  at what  point of time the evil assumed proportions  were  best left  to legislative wisdom and not to  courts  commonsense. [788C-D; 787F-G; 783F; 787H] In  the  instant  case  the  two  landlord-respondents   had purchased  the  buildings in the early  sixties,  but  while considering  the  constitutionality the Court would  not  be moved  by such accidental instances.  The  substantial  evil has been substantially met by a broad application of the new ban to pending proceedings. [788C] Section 13. fairly read, directs that the amendment made  by s.  4  shall  have effect in  respect  of  suits,  including appeals, pending at the commencement of the Act.  The  Court is,  therefore,  bound  to give effect to s.  4  in  pending actions  regardless  of isolated  anomalies  and  individual hardships. [788G] (b)Where  two  interpretations  are  possible  that  which validates  the  statute and shortens  litigation  should  be preferred  to the one which invalidates or proliferates  it. Although  the  old cl. (f) is substantially similar  to  the present  cls.(f)  and (ff) the latter  imposes  more  severe restrictions  protecting the tenants.  Much more has  to  be

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 26  

proved  by the landlord now before he can get eviction  than when  he was called upon to under the earlier  corresponding provision  of  the  basic Act.   Moreover,  the  three  year prohibition  against institution of the suit  is  altogether new.  It follows, therefore, that on the present  allegation and  evidence  the landlord may not get a decree,  his  suit having  been  instituted at a; time when he could  not  have foreseen  the  subsequent enactment saddling  him  with  new conditions. [789C; 789B] Though therefore, the suit, as originally brought in,  would be  defective  since it did not and could  not  contain  the averments  complying  with the new cls. (f) and (ff)  of  s. 13(1)   it  is  made  effective  by  construing   the   term ’institute’ in a natural and grammatical way. [789D] (c)’To   institute  is  ’to  begin  or   commence’.    The prohibition  clamped  down by  sub-section  (3A),  carefully read, is on suits for recovery of possession by  transferee- landlords on any of the grounds mentioned in cl. (f) Qr  cl. (ff) of sub-section (1). [789G] In  the  instant  case the suits were not  for  recovery  on grounds contained in clauses (f) and (ff).  They were  based on  the repealed cl.(f) of s.13 of the basic Act.   Strictly speaking sub-section (3A) brought in by s. 4 of the Amending Act  applies  only  if  (a) the suit  is  by  a  transferee- landlord; (b) it is for recovery of possession of  premises; and (c) the ground for recovery is what is mentioned in cls. (f)  and  (ff) of sub-section (1).   Undoubtedly  the  third condition is not fulfilled and therefore sub-s. (3A) is  not attracted. [789H] (d)But since the new cls.(f) and (ff) were included by the Amendment  Act in s.13 of the basic Act and since the  suits did not seek eviction on those grounds they will have to  be dismissed  on account of the omnibus inhibition on  recovery of possession contained in s. 13 itself. [790C] Per  Goswami,  J : (1)(a) In trying to include  old  actions that may be surviving in courts because of laws’  proverbial delay s. 13 of the Amended Act has gone far in excess of the actual  needs  of the time and problems and  the  provisions therefore cannot be said to impose a reasonable  restriction on  the  right of the transferee landlords,  albeit  a  well defined class amongst the landlords, to hold and enjoy their property  in  the  interest of  the  general  public.   Such transferee-landlords with pending old actions in suits or in appeals  are  not  likely  to be of  a  large  number.   The imposition  of  such  restrictions  on  a  few   transferee- landlords  cannot be in the general interests of  the  large body of tenants.  If relief in the shape of postponement  of the  landlord’s suit were the object of sub-section (3A)  in giving retrospectivity to it. the law did not take count  of the inevitable long 776 delay that takes place in pending litigation as a result  of man-made  laws  of  procedure in courts such  as  have  been clearly demonstrated by the cases at hand. The lawthat misses its object cannot justify its existence.  Besides  it will be a sterilerelief  if tenants have to face a  fresh summons next days. [798A-C] (b)Under the Constitution an individual’s right will  have to yield to the commonweal of the general community, That general  community  may be in broad segments but  even  then must form a class as a whole.  A few individuals cannot take the Place of a class and for the matter of that the  general public. [798H] In the present case the relief contemplated by the Amendment Act  is in favour of tenants in general and the  restriction

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 26  

under  sub-section (3A) must be viewed in that context.   It cannot be said that the legislature in applying  sub-section (3A) retrospectively has achieved that avowed object at all. The  applicability of the blanket ban to pending  suits  and appeals cannot be said to be a reasonable restriction in ,he interest of general public. [799A-B] (c)Sub-section  (3A) so far as it is retrospective and  as such applicable to pending suits including appeals is  ultra vires Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution.  The provision  is valid  only  prospectively.  The retrospectivity so  far  as subsection  (3A) in concerned with regard to institution  of suits  made  applicable  to pending  suits  and  appeals  is clearly very wide of a reasonable mark and is an  imposition of   an  unreasonable  restriction  on  the  right  of   the transferee  landlords  in  pending  suits  which  had   been instituted prior to the amendment Act and in appeals arising therefrom  and it is not saved by the protective clause  (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. [799D-E] (2)On the terms of only s. 13 (3A) it is difficult to hold that  it would bring old actions within the mischief  of  s. 13(3A) which imposes a ban expressly on institution of suits within  three years of the acquisition of ownership  of  the premises subject to the relaxation contained in the  proviso thereto. [796B-C] (3)Section  13(1)(f) and (ff) are not ultra vires of  Art. 19(1)(f)  of  the Constitution.  Further reliefs  have  been sought  to  be  given to the tenants as  a  class  by  these provisions in the Amendment Act.  These further reliefs  are in  the  general  interests of tenants and  can  be  applied without any difficulty, to pending suits including  appeals. There  is nothing unreasonable about such a  retrospectivity in  applying  these provisions for the  general  welfare  of tenants in securing for them asafe  and sure tenure  as far    as   practicable   untrammelled    by    inconvenient litigation.[799F-G] Arguments for theappellants  In  C.A. 2063/73  by  P.  C. Chatterjee There is no vestedright  to eject on determination of  the tenancy  but it is conditioned by s. 13, Cl. (a) to (k)  and therefore right to eject is not vested in the landlord until a decree is passed.  Upto that stage it is contingent depen- ding on the satisfaction of cl. (a) to (k) of s.13. If there is no vested property right, no question of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution will arise.  By denying the right to  eject for  three  years  from the date of purchase  the  right  to property is not restricted or burdened.  The approach of the High   Court  of  separately  treating   prospectivity   and retrospectivity  is  not  correct.   The  correct   approach adopted   by   this  Court  is  that  in   considering   the reasonableness  of any provision retrospectivity of the  law is  a factor to be considered.  Retrospective  operation  is not bad because it covers a period of 10 years or so. For respondent (In C.A. 1304 of 1973.) The  object  of  the  new sub-section  (3A)  being  to  give protection  to tenants for a limited period of  three  years from  the date of purchase of the premises by the  landlord, by giving retrospective effect to’ the said sub-section  the period  limited  by  the  subsection  cannot  be   enlarged. Therefore,   s.13   of   the  Amending   Act   which   gives retrospective effect to the said sub-section (3A) should  be construed  in  a  manner  so  as  to  keep  the  effect   of retrospectively within the period 777 limited by the said new sub-section  3A.  Sections 4 and  13 of  the  Amending  Act have  to  be  construed  harmoniously

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 26  

keeping  the object of the Act in view and in doing that  if the  court  has  to supply some words to  make  the  meaning clear,  it should prefer the construction which is  more  in consonance  with  reason and justice. [1958] S.C.R.  739  at 745.   The language of sub-s. 3A and the object  and  reason for introduction of the said sub-section make it clear  that Only  Prospective effect could be given to  the  sub-section and  in any case its effect cannot go beyond three years  of purchase  of the premises by the landlord.  If, s.13 of  the Amending Act means that s. 4 of the Amending Act applies  to all  pending suits including appeals filed by  a  transferee landlord after the principal Act came into force, then it is clearly violative of art 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.   The High  Court  therefore,  rightly  struck  down  s.13  giving retrospective  effect to s. 4 of the , Act.  Further no  law can  impose  restrictions  retrospectively  on   fundamental rights. Arguments for the respondent in C.A. No. 2063 of 1973. The impugned section cannot be so interpreted as to give  it retrospective effect so as to bring within its mischief  all suits and proceedings including appeals which may be pending since  the  enforcement of the Act.  This Court  can  depart from the general rule to apply the law as it is on the  date of institution of the suit and apply the law as on the  date when  the appeal comes up for disposal specially because  no injustice  is going to be caused between the parties and  as such  a  course  would avoid  multiplicity  of  proceedings. Section 13 of the Amending Act is ultra vires of article 19, because,   construed  literally  the  section  cannot   give protection  to such of the tenants against whom  proceedings are pending for more than 10 years or so, a protection for a period  more  than what is envisaged by  the  Amending  Act. This is clearly not what is intended or contemplated by  the legislature.   Giving  retrospective effect to  the  section would  only benefit a few and is not in the public  interest of the tenants of the transferee-landlords.  The restriction is  arbitrary and invades the right to property and  is  not saved  by  cl. (5) of article 19.  The  restriction  is  not reasonable.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2063 of 1973. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated- the  25th  July. 1973 of the Calcutta High Court  in  Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 1193 of 1972. Civil Appeal No. 1304 of 1973. From the judgment and order dated the 3rd February, 1972  of the Calcutta High Court in L.P.A. No. 14 of 1969. P.   Chatterjee and Rathin Das, for the appellant (In C.  A. 2063/73). Urmila  Kapoor  and Shobha Dikshit, for the  respondent  (In C.A. No. 2063/73). P.K. Chatterjee, G. S. Chatterjee, and Sukumar Basu, for the Advocate General for the State of West Bengal. Sukumar Ghose, for the appellants. (In C.A. No. 1304/73). D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondents (in C.A. No. 1304/73). The  judgment  of M. H. Beg and V. R. Krishna Iyer,  JJ  was delivered  by  Krishna  Iyer, J. P. K. Goswami,  J.  gave  a separate Opinion. KRISHNA IYER, J.-Calcutta or Cochin, for the urban people of India,  the shocking scarcity of a roof to rest one’s  tired bones is an -L346SupCI/75

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 26  

778 unhappy  problem of social justice that compels  control  of rent.  and  eviction  laws.   In the  case  now  before  us, attacking  the constitutionality of legislation  handcuffing the landlord-proprietariat’s right of eviction, the law  has to  be tested not merely by the cold print of Art.  19(1)(f) but  also  by  the public concern of  Art.  19(5)  and  the, compassionate  animus  of Art. 39, Parts III and IV  of  the Constitution  together constitute a complex of promises  the nation has to keep and the legislation challenged before  us is  in  partial fulfilment of this tryst  with  the  people. These observations become necessary in limine since  counsel for the respondents dismissed the concept of social  justice as extraneous to an insightful understanding of the  section invalidated by the High Court, while we think that  judicial conscience  is not a mere matter of citations of  precedents but of activist appraisal of social tears to wipe out  which the State is obligated under the Constitution. The  two appeals before us, raising substantially  identical points,  have been heard together and are being disposed  of by a common judgment.  Both of them stem from a decision  of the Calcutta High Court reported as Sailendra Nath v. S.  E. Dutt(1).   One of the decisions under appeal (C.A.  2063  of 1973)  was  rendered  by a Single Judge of  the  High  Court following  a Division Bench ruling of the same Court  (i.e., the  one reported as Sailendra Nath v. S. E. Dull) since  he was obviously bound by it. A  provision imparting some sort of retroactivity to a  1969 legislative amendment implanting additional restrictions  on eviction  of  premises under the earlier  West  Bengal  rent control  law  has  been  voided by the  High  Court  in  the judgment&  under appeal.  The aggrieved tenant in each  case has  appealed and the State, not being directly a  party  to the  legislation,  has entered appearance  to  support,  the legislation  and to challenge the Calcutta decision  to  the extent  it  has invalidated the retrospective  part  of  the statute. Welfare  legislation calculated to benefit  weaker  classes, when their vires is challenged in Court, casts an obligation on  the  State,  particularly when notice is  given  to  the Advocate  General,  to support the law, if  necessary  by  a Brandeis  brief and supply of  socio-economic  circumstances and  statistics inspiring the enactment.  Courts cannot,  on their own, adventure into social research outside the record and if Government lets down the Legislature in Court by  not illumining  the  provisions  from the angle  of  the  social mischief  or  economic menace sought to  be  countered,  the victims  will  be  the  class  of  beneficiaries  the  State professed  to  protect.   In this case,  we  are  unable  to compliment the State or the Advocate General from this point of view.  It may happen that when the Court decides  against the validity of a measure or order because Government  fails to bring the socially relevant totality of facts, it is used Is an alibi by (1)  A.1 R. 1971 Cal. 331. 779 he  latter for the misfortune.  Courts cannot help cover  up the  Executive’s  drowsy  default or  half-hearted  help  in making the socioconomic conspectus available. The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (Act XII of  956) (for  short,  referred  to as the basic  Act)  clamped  down several  restrictions on ejectment of tenants  by  landlords from  buildings, the policy behind it being  alleviation  of the lot of the weaker segment of the urban community without their   own  homes  in  the  context  of  the  scarcity   of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 26  

accommodation and the colossal sociceconomic upheaval  which would  follow  if  unbridled evictions  were  allowed.   The temptation  to evict or rack-rent under scarcity  conditions is  an irresistible evil in our economic order and it is  an all India phenomenon that the social conscience of the State Legislatures  has  responded to this large scale  threat  by effective control measures.  Indeed, for decades now,  every State  in  India has on, the statute book rent  control  law and, what is more pertinent to the present case, tactics  of circumvention  have  compelled the enactment  of  additional safeguards from time to time by vigilant statutory measures. West  Bengal,  a populous State, with  an  overcrowded  city choked  by the largest  human congregation in  the  country, enacted the basic Act whereby the plenary right of landlords to  recover  possession of their buildings was  shackled  in many  ways.   Industrial growth and  other  factors  induced demographic  congestion such as was witnessed in  the  urban areas  of  that State.  Consequently, the  legislature,  was faced  with  a  fresh  danger  in  the  shape  of  ingenious transfers  of  ownership  of  buildings  by  indigenous  but indigent landlords and the transferees resorting to eviction on a large scale equipped as they were with better financial muscles  and motivated as they were by hope  of  speculative returns  from their investments oil  eviction.   Presumably, the  phenomenal increase of the menance of eviction  by  the new  species of transferee-owners of building was  countered by  a legislative measure-the West Bengal  Premises  Tenancy (Second   Amendment)   Act,  1969  (Act   XXXIV   of   1959) (hereinafter  referred  to as the amendment Act).   By  this legislation  the  new  class  of  transferee  landlords  was subject  to a stringent trammel viz.. that they  should  not sue for eviction within three years of the date of  transfer (We  are not immediately concerned here with  certain  other changes   effected  by  the  Amendment  Act).   The   social objective  and the practical effect of this fetter  will  be con Court has upheldthis   provision   which   is   now contained in s. 13(3A) sidered briefly   the little  later. Suffice  it to say at this stage the High of the basic  Act. However    , while holding the provision  substantial  intra vires  the  Court has invalidated the giving effect  to  the provision  to  pending  suits  and  appeals.   Such  limited retrospectivity  had  been  incorporated by  s.  13  of  the amending  Act  and,  if the law were  only  prospective  the landlords   in  the  two  cases  who  had  initiated   their litigation  several  years  prior to the  enactment  of  the Amendment  Act would be free from the three  year  interdict and  the other extra restrictions.  Once the embargo is  out of  their way, the decree-, for eviction they  have  secured must  stand.   On  tile  contrary,  if  the  restriction  on eviction by the transferee landlords were to operate on 780 pending  litigation  the appellants-tenants  are  immune  to eviction in the current proceedings as they now stand.  Thus the short constitutional issue is as to whether s. 13(3A) of the basic Act to the extent it applies to pending litigation on the strength of s. 13 of the Amending Act is violative of Arts.  14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution,  weapons  relied upon  for  the attack before the High Court, and  here.   We will proceed to consider the constitutional vulnerability of this  limb  of  the  protective  legislation.   By  way   of anticipating  our  conclusion we may also pose  the  problem whether  ss. 1 3 and 4 of the Amendment Act can  be  validly implemented  vis-a-vis  pending actions in  any  other  just manner  which  will  preserve  the  additional   protection, minimise multiplicity of litigation and make law and justice

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 26  

bedfellows in the &hanged statutory circumstances. Some  background observations to appreciate the  contest  in court  are  necessary.   No social  realist  will  deny  the frightful dimensions of the problem of homeless families and precarious  tenancies;  and if the Directive  Principles  of State  Policy  are not to be dismissed by the  masses  as  a ’teasing illusion and promise of unreality’, curtailment, in public  interest, of such extreme rights of the landlord  as are ’red in tooth and claw’ is a constitutional  compulsion. The  Court,  informed by this sore  economic  situation  and reinforced by the initial presumption of  constitutionality, hesitates  to  strike a socially  beneficial  statute  dead, leading to escalation of the mischief to suppress which  the House  legislated-unless, of course, a plain breach  of  the fundamental right of the citizen is manifest. The perspective of the amending Act is sketched by the  High Court in lurid language :               "The  scarcity of accommodation is  a  burning               problem, not only of the State of West  Bengal               but of the other States as well.  Keeping pace               with  the  needs  of  the  gradually  swelling               population of West Bengal, new buildings  have               not been built owing to abnormal high price of               land  and materials.  A large majority of  the               people  of West Bengal live in those  premises               at the mercy of the landlords." The explosive import of neglecting such a distressing  urban development  reasonably obliges the State to impose  drastic restrictions  on  landlords’ right to  property.   And  when circumvention  of wholesome legal inhibitions are  practised on  a large scale the new challenge is met by  clothing  the law with more effective amount and that is the rationale  of the Amendment Act.  The learned Judges rightly refer to  the legislative  proceedings,  notorious  common  knowledge  and other  relevant factors properly brought to their ken.   The ’sound-proof  theory’ of ignoring voices from  parliamentary debates,  once  sanctified by British  tradition,  has  been replaced   by  the  more  legally  realistic  and   socially responsible  canon of listening to the  legislative  authors when  their artifact is being interpreted We agree with  the High Court when it observes :               "Proceedings of legislature can be referred to               for  the limited purpose of  ascertaining  the               conditions, prevailing at                                    781               or   about  the  time  of  the  enactment   in               question,  which actuated the sponsor  of  the               bill to introduce the same and the extent  and               urgency of the evil, sought to be remedied.               In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the               West    Bengal   Premises   Tenancy    (Second               Amendment)  Bill, 1969, it is stated  that  it               has  been  consider necessary that  some  more               reliefs  should-  be  given  to  the   tenants               against eviction.  It is found from the speech               of the Minister at the time of introducing the               Bill in the legislature, that the problems  of               tenants  are  many : there  are  landlords  of               different kinds : there is one  class-original               owners who are the old inhabitants of the city               : these owner-landlords are Dot affluent: they               solely depend upon the rents received from the               tenants.    It  has  been   ascertained   from               experience   that  two  of  the,  grounds   of               eviction, namely, of the landlords and for the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 26  

             purpose of building and rebuilding, have  been               misused  by  the landlords.  In  the  city  of               Calcutta  and other towns, there are  millions               of  tenants who are left at the mercy  of  the               landlords.   In  this  background  and   after               taking  into  account  similar  provisions  in               other  States, it has been decided  that  some               restrictions  ought to have been imposed  upon               transferee-landlords  prohibiting  them   from               bringing  ejectment suits against the  tenants               within  three years from their  purchase.   On               the  above two grounds and for  that  purpose,               the said classification has been made."               The  conclusion of the Court, crystellised  in               the following words, commends itself to us :               "Taking   an  overall  view  of  the   various               considerations,   the   statement   of,    the               Minister, the objects of the Bill, matters  of               common knowledge and state of facts,  existing               at the time of the legislation, it may be well               conceived  that underlying policy and  objects               of  the  amended  provision is  to  give  more               protection to the tenants against eviction and               the  classification of landlords  into  owner-               landlords  and  transfereelandlords  is  based               upon  a rational and intelligible  differentia               and we hold accordingly." Proceeding to examine the limited attack on s. 13(3A) of the basic  Act read with s. 13 of the Amending Act, we  have  to remember die comity of constitutional instrumentalities  and raise  the presumption that the legislature understands  and appreciates the needs of the people and is largely aware  of the  frontiers of and limitations upon its power. (See:  The State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamar-baguwala(1) and Shri  Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar &  Others(2). Some Courts have gone, to the extent of holding that  "there is  a presumption in favour of constitutionality, and a  law will not be declared unconstitutional unless the case is  so clear  as  to  be  free  from  doubt;  and  ’to  doubt   the constitutionality  of a law is to resolve it in,  favour  of its validity."(3) Indeed, the Legis- (1) [1957] S.C.R. 874.  (2) [1959] S.C.R. 279. (3)  Constitutional law of India by H. M. Seervai-p 54  vol. 1. 782 lature  owes  it  to  the  Court  to  make  like  respectful presumptions.   We  therefore view  the  provision  impugned through  a  socially  constructive,  not  legally  captious, microscope  to discover glaring unconstitutional  infirmity, if   any,  and  not  chase  every  chance   possibility   of speculative,  thought  which  may vitiate  the  law.   Stray misfortunes   when  laws  affecting  large  chunks  of   the community  are  enacted are inevitable and  the  respondents before  us  may  perhaps belong to  that  category.   Social legislation  without  tears,  affecting  vested  rights,  is impossible.    Statutory   construction  has   a   benignant sensitivity  and  we  are  satisfied  the  High  Court,   in substantially  upholding the Amendment Act, has done  right, but  in  striking  down the  retrospective  portion  of  the section has stumbled into a specious error. It is helpful to reproduce the relevant portion of s. 13  of the  basic  Act in its unamended state  and  the  amendments dovetailed   into  it  by  the  1969  Act,   The   so-called ’retrospectivity’  of this provision has been  anathematised by the respondent-landlords and annulled by the High Court :

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 26  

             "13(1)   Notwithstanding   anything   to   the               contrary in any other law, no order or  decree               for the recovery of possession of any premises               shall  be made by any Court in favour  of  the               landlord  against  a tenant except on  one  or               more of the following grounds, namely:-               unamended  cl.  (f) : where the  premises  are               reasonably required by the landlord either for               purposes  of  building or  rebuilding  or  for               making   thereto  substantial   additions   or               alterations or for his own occupation if he is               the owner or for the occupation of any  person               for whose benefit the premises are held;               cls. (f) and (ff) substituted therefor-               (f)subject to the provisions of sub-section               (3A), and section 18A, where the premises  are               reasonably   required  by  the  landlord   for               purposes  of  building or re-building  or  for               making   thereto  substantial   additions   or               alterations and such building or rebuilding or               additions or alterations cannot he carried out               without the premises being vacated,               (ff)  subject to the provisions of  subsection               (3A),   where  the  premises  are   reasonably               required   by   the  landlord  for   his   own               occupation  if  he  is the owner  or  for  the               occupation of any person for whose benefit the               premises  are  held and the landlord  or  such               person is not in possession of any  reasonably               suitable accommodation,               Sub-s. (3A) newly introduced.               13(3A)  Where  a  landlord  has  acquired  his               interest in the premises by transfer, no  suit               for the recovery of possession of the premises               on any of the grounds mentioned in clause  (f)               or  clause  (ff) of sub-section (1)  shall  be               insti-               78 3               tuted by the landlord before the expiration of               a  period of three years from the date of  his               acquisition of such-interest :               Provided  that a suit for the recovery of  the               possession  of the premises may be  instituted               on the ground mentioned in clause (f) of  sub-               section (1) before the expiration of the  said               period  of three years if the  Controller,  on               the  application  of the  landlord  and  after               giving  the  tenant an  opportunity  of  being               beard,  permits, by order, the institution  of               the  suit on the ground that the  building  or               rebuilding, or the additions or alteration, as               the  case  may be, are necessary to  make  the               premises safe for human habitation." Once the substantive restriction super-added by s. 13(3A) is held valid, we have to focus attention only on the extension of  the  new ban to pending proceedings.   That  legislative competence to enact retroactively exists is trite law and we have only to test its validity on the touchstone of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f) pressed into service before us. Law  is a social science and constitutionality turns not  on abstract  principles  or  rigid legal  canons  but  concrete realities  and given conditions; for the rule of  law  stems from  the  rule  of  life.   We  emphasize  this  facet   of sociological  jurisprudence only because the High Court  has struck  down s. 13 of the Amendment Act on surmises,  possi-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 26  

bilities and may be rather than on study of actualities  and proof  of the nature, number and age of pending  litigations caught  in the net of the retrospective clause.  Judges  act not  by hunch but on hard facts properly brought  on  record and sufficiently strong to rebuff the initial presumption of constitutionality of legislation.  Nor is the Court a  third Chamber  of the House to weigh whether it  should  legislate retrospectively or draft the clause differently.  We find no foundation for the large assumptions made by the High  Court and  duly  repeated before us by counsel that there  may  be cases of ejectment instituted prior to 1956 or that a number of  suits and decrees perhaps decades old will  unjustly  be nullified  by  the  previous  operation  of  the  new   ban. Recondite  instances  and casual  hardships  cannot  deflect constitutional  construction of social legislation,  if  the main thrust of the statute relates to a real social evil  of dimensions   deserving   to  be   antidoted   by   antedated legislative remedy. In the present case, indubitably the State was faced with  a new,  insidious and considerable situation of  exploitation, undermining  the security of tenancy conferred by the  basic Act.  A large number of original landowners living in  their own  home could not, under the basic Act, claim recovery  of possession, being occupants of their own houses.   Likewise, they  could not urge the ground of recovery for  rebuilding, not  being  financially  able to invest  on  such  a  costly venture.  They had to look up to modest old-time rentals  as the  only source of return and lest the  penurious  tenantry desperately  inhabiting  little tenements be forced  to  pay extortionate  rents the rent control law of 1956  froze  the rates  at the 1940 level with gentle increases  as  provided therein.  However, for now buildings to be constructed 784 special incentive provision was made by deeming the contract rent  as fair rent, thus ensuring a high return on  building investment.   The social upshot of this scheme was that  the old   landlords   found  their  ownership  a   poor   return investment, saw a new class of wealthier investors streaming into  cities and towns ready to buy the premises  evict  old tenants,  re-let on rack-rents or re-build and reap  a  rich return.  They had no buildings of their own and could  prove plans   to  rebuild,  thus  disarming  the   nonevictability provision of s. 13 of the basic Act.  The transferees  could thus   get  decrees  for  eviction  under  the  basic   Act. Naturally,   transfers   of  buildings  to   this   somewhat speculating  class increased and the spectacle  of  eviction litigation’ or potential eviction proceedings was  projected on the urban scene.  The Legislature promptly reacted by the Amendment  Act  to rescue the lessees by clamping  down  new restrictions by way of s. 13 (3A).  A three-year  moratorium was  given  to the tenants from being hunted  out  of  their homesteads  by  imposing a ban on institution of  suits  for eviction   by   transferee  landlords.   This   would   both disenchant speculative purchases and provide occupants  time to  seek  alternative housing.   Presumably,  these  objects inspired  the law-makers to extend the embargo backwards  to pending   eviction  proceedings.   Quite  conceivably,   the tendency to create a transferee class of real estate  owners gradually  gathered  in volume and showed up  in  rashes  of pending  actions.   When  Government  was  alerted  amending legislation was proposed.  Unfortunately, the State’s  legal wing  has  failed to protect, in Court the class  for  whose benefit the amending law was made by placing luscent  social or  statistical  materials  on these  aspect-..  As  earlier stated   by  us,  Government  have  a  duty,  where   social

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 26  

legislation  to protect the weak are challenged, to  exhibit the same activism in the Halls of Court as in the Houses  of Legislature.   Failure in the former duty can be as  bad  as not  promulgating the law.  Not an elucidatory affidavit  by the  State  nor even the Minister’s explanatory  speech  has been  filed  in  this Court.   We  make  these  observations because  of the handicaps we have faced and the little  help on facts the State has given to sustain the legislation. The Calcutta High court has upheld the vires of sub-s.  (3A) but  invalidated its application to pending litigation.   So the short issue is whether this projection into the past  of the  otherwise  reasonable  restriction  on  the  right   of eviction  arbitrary, irrational, ultra vires ? If  yes,  the lethal sting of Arts. 14 and 19(1) (f) will deaden s. 13  of the  Amendment  Act. And the High Court has held so  on  ,he latter Article. The  prospective validity of the restriction under Arts.  14 and 19(1) (f), the High Court thinks, is vindicated by sound classification and sanctioned reasonably by the interest  of the  general  public.  Having regard to the  policy  of  the legislation,  the  classification  of  landlords  into   two classes of owner-landlords and transferee-landlords and  the imposition  of  an  embargo on the  latter  minacious  class against  bringing  eviction  suits  within  three  years  of purchase passes the dual tests of reasonable  classification and  the  differentia  having  a  rational  nexus  with  the statutory   object.   Therefore,  the  High  Court  had   no hesitation-and we totally concur-that the provision is 78 5 impregnable.   The controversy rages round giving effect  to these  stringent restraints newly enacted on  earlier  legal actions.  This, it is contended, is a horrendous invasion of property right,; and unjust anteriority which hits  innocent plaintiffs whose, purchases were beyond three years.  Before us  respondents’  counsel  have contended that  Art.  14  is violated.  by  s.  3 read with s. 4  of  the  Amendment  Act although the high Court has negatived this submission thus :               "We  have carefully considered  the  arguments               advanced by the learned counsel and we are  of               the  Opinion that the retrospective  operation               of  sub-section  (3A)  on  pending  suits  and               appeals  does  not offend Article  14  of  the               Constitution." Since  the  argument, dressed, differently, has  been  urged before us again we will briefly deal with it, agreeing as we do  with  the High Court.  Plaintiffs  whose  transfers  are twenty  years  ago or two years before the Act,  are  lugged together  and subjected to the same ban if their suits  were instituted within three years of the transfer.  This blanket ban  regardless  of the varying periods which  have  elapsed after  the  transfers  and before the  Act  was  passed  was unequal  treatment  or rather harshly  equal  subjection  to restriction  of  plainly  unequally  situated   transferees. There  is seeming attractiveness in this presentation.   But Courts  are  concerned  not how best  to  hammer  out  equal justice but to oversee whether the classification is without rational basis unrelated to the object of the Act.  That  is why  we are confined to check whether the reasoning on  this aspect adopted by the High Court is not tenable.  We may  or may  not disagree with the wisdom of the Legislature in  the grouping  adopted  or  hold  views  about  fairer  ways   of treatment.  But our powers are judicial, not legislative and arbitrariness  and irrationality are not writ large  in  the method  of differentiation the legislature has here  chosen. In the words of A. K. Mukuherji J :

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 26  

             "In  the instant case, suits of  the  affected               transfereelandlords may be regarded as a  sub-               class, within a class and, if within the  said               sub-class,  the  suits  are  not   differently               treated,  they will not be hit by Article  14.               The persons affected are  transferee-landlords               who instituted their suits within three  years               of  their  purchase and they form  a  separate               class  and, among the suits of that  ’affected               class’,  there is no discrimination.  The  law               applied  equally with respect to  the  pending               suits with regard to this affected class." Some hardship is bound to occur peripherally in any mode  of classification and a few hard cases (we have not been  shown whether  many have been struck by this pattern of  grouping) cannot   guide   the   Court   in   upsetting    legislative compartmentalisation. The  next attack by the respondents is that the  deprivation of the right to sue is absurdly beyond the object of the Act when applied to pending cases where the transfers took place more than three years before the Act.  Were we draftsmen  of legislation, may be counsel’s submission could have had more potency.  But our limited power is to 786 examine  the  reasonableness  of  the  restriction,  not  by substituting our personal notions but by interfering if  the Legislature  has gone haywire in  unreasonably  hamstringing transferee-landlords by dismissing suits brought long before the legislative bill was in the womb of time. In an earlier case this Court observed(1)               "Right   at  the,  threshold  we   must   warn               ourselves of the limitations of judicial power               in  this jurisdiction.  Mr. Justice  Stone  of               the  Supreme  Court of the United  States  has               delineated these limitations in United  States               v. Butter (297 U.S. 1 56 Sup.  Ct. 312 80 Law.               Ed. 477 thus:               The  power  of  courts to  declare  a  statute               unconstitutional  is  subject to  two  guiding               principles of decision which ought never to be               absent  from judicial consciousness.   One  is               that courts ire concerned only with the  power               to enact statutes, not with their wisdom.  The               other is that while unconstitutional  exercise               of  power  by the  executive  and  legislative               branches  of  the  government  is  subject  to               judicial  restraint, the only check  upon  our               exercise  of power is our own sense  of  self-               restraint.   For  the removal of  unwise  laws               from the statute books appeal lies not to  the               courts but to the ballot and to the  processes               of democratic government."                In   short,   unconstitutionality   and   not               unwisdom  of a legislation is the narrow  area               of judicial review." The  High  Court has assumed that even  proceedings  started prior  to 1956 may be affected.  This, admittedly, is  wrong as pre-basic Act suits will be governed by the, then law  as provided in s. 40 and the Amendment Act amends only the 1956 Act.   It  may  also be conceded that in  both  the  appeals before  us, thanks to Indian longevity of  litigation,  more than three years from the date of transfer in favour of  the plaintiff  has passed and thus the spirit of the  protection in  that  sense  is fulfilled.   Indeed,  counsel  for  the. respondents  urged that the validation of the  retrospective

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 26  

limb of the law would only drive the parties to fresh suits, thus  promoting multiplicity of suits ruinous to both  sides with  no  social gain.  There is force in  this  submission. Its  relevance  to  decide,  the  constitutional  issue   is doubtful but its influence on our ultimate solution in  this case, as will be seen later, is undeniable. A  closeup of the social milieu leading up to the  enactment in  1969  of  the Amendment Act is useful  to  identify  the substantial,  mischief  the law was intended  to  overpower. Did   that  evil  reasonably  necessitate,   for   effectual implementation  of purpose, the extension of the new law  to pending  suits  and appeals ? How many  suits,  appeals  and second  appeals  by transferees within the  three-year  belt were  pending?   How long had they been  so  pending?   Were there  only  stray  eviction cases of long ago  and  was  it feasible or necessary to (1)  Murthy  Match  Works  v. Asst.   Collector  of  Central Excise, A.T.R. 1974 8.C. 497, 503. 787 draw   a  line  somewhere  to  prevent  injustice  to   non- speculative   and  old-time  buyers  of  buildings   without impairing   the-limited  immunity  meant  for  tenants   and intended  against now realty investors ? On these facts  the State  has sat with folded hands and we have been thrown  on our own to scan and sustain or strike down.  But here arises the     significance    of    initial     presumption     of constitutionality.  The High Court has made short shrift  of this plea thus :               "There  is nothing on the record to show  that               the  mischief,  sought So be remedied  by  the               amended  legislation, was in  existence  since               1956.   On  the other  hand,  the  ministerial               speech,  referred to above,  rather  indicates               that  the said mischief was  of  comparatively               recent   origin.    In   this   context,   the               application of the restriction on the  omnibus               scale  to ill pending suits and appeals  would               smack of unreasonableness." Who  has  the  onus to place  compelling  facts,  except  in flagrant  cases  of  gross  unreasonableness,  to  establish excessiveness, or perversity, in the restriction imposed  by the  statute?  Long ago in Dalmia’s Case(1) this Court  held that               "there  is always a presumption in  favour  of               the constitutionality of an enactment and  the               burden is upon him who attacks it to show that               there  has been a clear transgression  of  the               constitutional principles"; and               ’that it must be presumed that the legislature               understands and correctly appreciates the need               of its own people, that its laws are  directed               to  problems made manifest by  experience  and               that its discriminations are based on adequate               grounds-," If  nothing  is  placed on record  by  the  challengers  the verdict ordinarily goes against them. Moreover,  what is the evil corrected by the Amendment  Act? The influx of a transferee class of evictors of tenants  and institution of litigation to eject and rack-rent or re-build to  make  larger profits.  Apparently, the  inflow  of  such suits must have been swelling slowly over the years and when the  stream  became a flood the Legislature rushed  with  an amending  bill.   Had it made the  law  merely  prospective, those who bad, in numbers, already gone to Court and induced legislative  attention  would have escaped  the  inhibition.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 26  

This  would defeat the object and so the application of  the additional  ban  to  Pending actions  could  not  be  called unreasonable.  To omit to do so would have been unreasonable folly.  The question is whether those cases which were filed several  years  ago  should  have been  carved  out  of  the category  of transferees hit by the Act ? Where do you  draw the line ?  When did the evil assume proportions ? These are best left to legislative wisdom and not court’s  commonsense although   there  may  be  grievances  for   some   innocent transferees. (1)  [1959] S.C.R. 279, 297-propositions (b) and (c). 788 If   this   be   the  paradigm   of   judicial   review   of constitutionality, we have to ignore exceptional cases which suffer misfortune unwittingly.  The law is made for the bulk of  the  community to produce social  justice  and  isolated instances  of unintended injury are inevitable  martyrs  for the common good since God Himself has failed to make perfect laws and perfect justice, Freaks have to be accepted by  the victims  rightly or wrongly as forensic fate:  Not  that  it should  be  so but human infallibility  being  unattainable, easily  the  next best in social justice is to  promote  the public  weal  sacrificing  some unmerited  private  hurt  as unfortunate but unavoidable.  It must be conceded that prima facie  the  two  landlord-respondent’s  had  purchased   the buildings in the early sixties and three time three years or more have now passed since that date.  But while considering constitutionality  can  we  be  moved  by  such   accidental instances ? No. The substantial evil has been  substantially met  by  a  broad  application of the  new  ban  to  pending proceedings.   We see in the Amendment Act no  violation  of Art.  19(1) (f) read with 19(5).  The same High Court, in  a later case Kalyani Dutt v. Pramila Bala Dassi(1) came to the same conclusion by what it called ’independently considering the  question’.  We discern nothing substantially  different in  the analysis or approach to merit review of our  result. We hold s. 13 of the Amendment Act valid and repel the  vice of unreasonableness discovered in both the reported  rulings of the High Court. And if reasonable interpretation can avoid invalidation,  it is surely preferable.  Here humanist considerations,  public policy  and  statutory  purpose may  provide  guidelines  of construction  within reasonable limits.  Section 13  of  the Amendment Act reads:               "13.   Retrospective  effect.-The   amendments               made to the said Act by section 4, 7, 8 and  9               of  this Act shall have effect in  respect  of               suits  including appeals which are pending  at               the date of commencement of this Act." The  Court is called upon ’to give effect to s. 4.  of  this new  Act.’ Section 4 introduced amendments in s. 13  of  the basic Act which we have set out earlier. There  is  no  doubt  that the purpose  of  the  law  is  to interdict, for a spell of three years, institution of  suits for  eviction  on  grounds  (f) and  (ff)  of  sub-s.  (3A). Section 13 of the Amending Act makes it expressly applicable to  pending  actions,  so  much  so  the  operation  of  the prohibition is not simply prospective as in the Kerala  case cited  before,  us (Nealakandhayya  Fillai  v.  Sankaran(2). Section 13, fairly read, directs that the amendment made  by s.  4  shall  have effect in  respect  of  suits,  including appeals,  pending  at the commencement of the Act.   We  are therefore  bound to give effect to s. 4 in pending  actions, regardless  of isolated anomalies and individual  hardships. As earlier noticed, s. 4 has two limbs.  It amends s. 13  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 26  

the  basic Act by substituting two new clauses (f) and  (ff) in  place  of  the old clause (f) of sub-s.  (1)  of  s.  13 Secondly,  it forbids, for a period of three years from  the date of acquisition, suits by new acquirers of (1) I.L.R. [1972] 2 Cal. 660. (2) (1961) R.L.T. 755. 789 landlord’s interest in premises, for recovery of  possession on  any of the grounds mentioned in cl. (f) or cl.  (ff)  of sub-S. (1).  The result of the= two mandatory provisions has to  be clearly understood.  For one thing although  the  old cl. (f) is substantially similar to the present cls. f)  and (ff), the latter imposes more severe restrictions protecting the tenants.  Much more has to be proved by the landlord now before  he can get eviction than when he was called upon  to under the earlier corresponding provision of the basic  Act. Moreover, the three year prohibition against institution  of the suit is altogether new.  It follows, therefore, that  on the  present allegations and evidence the landlord  may  not get a decree, his suit having been instituted at a time when he could not have foreseen the subsequent enactment saddling him with new, conditions. We consider that where two interpretations are possible that which  validates the statute and shortens litigation  should be  preferred to the one which invalidates  or  proliferates it.    We   are  guided  by  that   consideration   in   the interpretative  process.   We  are  satisfied  further  that originally  brought  in,  is  defective  since  it  did  not contain-and  ordinarily could not-averments  complying  with the new cls. (f) and (ii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 13 and we  are making it effectively by construing the word ’institute’  in a   natural  and  grammatical  way.   The  suit  is   really instituted in compliance with cls. (f) and/or (ff) only when the new pleading is put in. The  bigger  roadblock in the way of the plaintiff is  in  a pending action lies in the prohibition of the institution of the  suit  within  three  years of  the  transfer  from  the landlord.   Indeed,  such prohibitions are  common  in  rent control legislation as has been noticed by the Calcutta High Court  and  is  found even in agrarian  reforms  laws  (vide Malaber Tenancy Act, as amended by Act VII of 1954, Madras). Section 13 of the Amendment Act compels the postponement  of the institution of the suit (including appeal) for a  period of  three years from the date of the transfer.  In both  the cases  before  us,  the suits  were  instituted  within  the prohibited period of three years. The argument therefore  is that   the  suits  must  be  straightaway   dismissed,   the institution  being  invalid.   We do  not  think  that  this consequence  is inevitable.  ’To institute, is ’to begin  or commence’,  in plain English.  The question then is  whether the  suit can be said to begin on the date it was  filed  in 1961  or 1964 as the case may be.  Here we have to notice  a certain nice but real facet of sub-s. (3A).  The prohibition clamped down by sub-s. (3A), carefully read, is on suits for recovery  of possession by transferee landlords ’on  any  of the  grounds mentioned in cl. (f) or cl. (ff) of  subs.(1)’. Obviously the suits with which we are concerned are not  for recovery  on grounds contained in cis. (f) and  (ff).   They were  based  on the repealed cl. (f) of S. 13 of  the  basic Act.   Strictly speaking, sub-s. (3A) brought in by S. 4  of the  Amending  Act  applies only if (a) the  suit  is  by  a transferee landlord; b) it is for recovery of possession  of premises  and  (c)  the  ground  for  recovery  is  what  is mentioned   in  cl.  (f)  and  cl.  (ff)  of   sub-s.   (1). Undoubtedly the third condition is not fulfilled and  there-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 26  

fore sub-s. (3A) is not attracted.  This does not mean  that the suit 790 can  be  proceeded  with and  decree  for  recovery  passed, because  S.  13 of the basic Act contains a  broad  ban,  on eviction in the following words :               "13(1)   Notwithstanding   anything   to   the               contrary in any other law, no order or  decree               for   the  recovery  of  possession   of   any               premises, shall be made by any Court in favour               of the landlord against a tenant except on one               or  more  of the following  grounds,  namely:-               (emphasis, ours) Since  the  new  cls.  (f) and  (ff)  are  included  by  the Amendment Act in s. 13 of the basic Act and since the  suits we  are  concerned  with, as they now  stand,  do  not  seek eviction on those grounds they will have to be dismissed  on account of the omnibus inhibition on recovery of  possession contained in S. 13 itself. A just resolution of this complex situation was put by us to counsel on both sides and the learned Advocate  representing the State readily agreed that the policy of the  legislation and  the conditions in the Amendment Act would be  fulfilled if  the interpretation we proposed were to be accepted.   We are  satisfied  that as far as possible  courts  must  avoid multiplicity of litigation.  Any interpretation of a statute which will obviate purposeless proliferation of  litigation, without  whittling down the effectiveness of the  protection for  the  parties sought to be helped  by  the  legislation, should be preferred to any literal, pendantic, legalistic or technically  correct  alternative.  On this footing  we  are prepared  to interpret s. 13 of the Amendment Act and  ,give effect  to s. 4 of that Act.  How do we work it out ? We  do it  by  directing the-plaintiffs in the two  cases  to  file fresh  pleadings  setting out their grounds under  cls.  (f) and/or (ff)_ of sub-s.(1) if they so wish.  On such pleading being  filed we may legitimately bold that  the  transferee- landlord  institutes his suit on grounds mentioned  in  cls. (f) or (ff) of sub-s. (1) on that ’.ate. It is only when  he puts  in  such a pleading setting out  the  specific  ground covered  by  sub-s. (3A) of s. 13 that we can  say  he,  has begun or instituted a suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on that ground.  Institution of a suit  earlier has  to  be  ignored since that was  not  based  on  grounds covered by cls. (f) and/or (ff) and is not attracted by sub- s.  (3A).  He begins proceedings on these new  grounds  only when he puts in his pleading setting out these_grounds.   In spirit and in letter he institutes his suit for recovery  on the new grounds only on the date on which he puts in his new pleading.   We  cannot be ritualistic in  insisting  that  a return  of the plaint and a representation thereof  incorpo- rating amendments is the sacred requirement of the law.   On the  other  hand, social justice and the  substance  of  the matter find fulfilment when the fresh pleadings are put  in, subject  of  course to the three-year interval  between  the transfer and the filing of the additional pleading.  Section 13  of the Amendment Act speaks of suits including  appeals. It thus follows that these fresh pleadings can be put in  by the plaintiff either in the suit, if that is pending. or  in appeal or second appeal, if that is pending.  Thereupon, the opposite  party.  tenant, will be given fin  opportunity  to file his written statement and the Court ’Will dispose of it after giving both sides the right to lead 791 additional  evidence.   It  may certainly, be  open  to  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 26  

appellate Court either to take evidence directly or to  call for  a finding.  Expeditious disposal of belated  litigation will  undoubtedly  be  a consideration  with  the  court  in exercising this discretion.  The proviso to sub-s. (3A)  can also  be complied with if the plaintiff gets the  permission of  the  Rent  Controller in the manner  laid  down  therein before filing his fresh pleading. We,  are  conscious  that  to  shorten  litigation  we   are straining language to the little extent of interpreting  the expression ’institution of the suit’ as amounting to  filing of  fresh pleading.  By this construction we do no  violence to  language but, on the other hand, promote public  justice and  social  gain,  without  in  the  least  imperiling  the protection conferred by the Amendment Act. Ruinous  protraction of litigation, whoever may  temporarily seem  to  benefit by delay, bankrupts both in  the  end  and inflicits  wounds  on society by sterile  misuse  of  money. Tenant passengers who prolong their expensive flight on  the litigation  rocket, are buying tickets for financial  crash, drugged  though  they be by the seeming blessings  of  law’s delays.  Courts, by interpreting the expression ’institution of suits’ cannot authorize reincarnation, all over again, of litigation for eviction.  We save the tenant by applying  it to pending cases and save him also from litigative waste. This consideration is itself germane, to the larger  concept of  justice which it is the duty of Courts to promote.   Law finds  its  finest hour when it speaks to  justice  on  fair terms.  In the present case our interpretative endeavour has been   imbued   with  this  spirit.   In  the   process   of interpretation  where alternatives are possible’ the man  in the  law  influences  the  law in the man  may  be  and  the construction  on  ss. 4 and 13 of the Amendment  Act  herein adopted,  we  admit,  appeals to us as  more,  humane.   The calculus  of  statutory  construction  relating  to  complex problems  of the community cannot be hide-bound by  orthodox text-book canons. An  obiter, maybe.  More buildings is the real solution  for dwelling  shortage; freezing scarcer accommodation  relieves for a little while.  Tiger balm is no serious cure for brain turnover   We make no more comments on the need for  dynamic housing policies beyond statutory palliatives.  These belong to  legislative ’wisdom’ and administrative  ,activism’  and not to judicial ’constitutionalism’. It  was  noticed  in the course of arguments  that  a  later Amending  Act of 1970 purporting to give relief  to  tenants against  whom  decrees  for eviction  bad  been  passed  but dispossession  had not ensued, had been put on  the  statute book.  It is surprising that counsel on either side did  not choose  to  address us any arguments on the basis  of  those provisions.  We therefore do not go into the impact of  that Act on situations where eviction has been ordered by Courts. We  therefore  allow the appeals with costs but  direct  the High  Court  to  dispose of the cases in the  light  of  the directions and obser- 792 vations we  have made.  It will be open to the, Court seised of  the matter to direct, in its discretion, award of  costs to be incurred hereafter. GOSWAMI,  J.Civil Appeal No. 1304 of 1973 is by  certificate granted  by the Calcutta Hi Court and Civil Appeal No.  2063 of 1973 is by Special Leave of this Court. The first one arises out of Letters Patent Appeal No. 14  of 1969  of  the Calcutta High Court dismissed on  February  3, 1972, relying upon its earlier decision in Kalyani Dutt  vs. Pramila  Bala  Dassi  since  reported  in  I.L.R.  (1972)  2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 26  

Calcutta   660.   A  preliminary  question  had  arisen   in connection  with the aforesaid Letters Patent  Appeal  along with three other appeals at an earlier stage with regard  to the  constitutionality of section 13(3A) of the West  Bengal Premises  Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1969 (briefly  the Amendment Act).  A Division Bench repelled the contention of the appellants in decision which has since been reported  in A.I.R. (1971) Calcutta 331 (Sailendra Nath Ghosal & Ors.  vs Sm.   Ena Dutt & Others).  The Division Bench had held  that sub-section  (3A)  of  section  13  in  so  far  as  it  was retrospective in operation was ultra vires Article 19(1) (f) of  the  Constitution  on the  ground  of  unreasonableness. Since, however, the Letters Patent Appeal was not completely disposed  of,  the  bar of sub-section (3A)  was  this  time pleaded  asserting that Article 19 was not at all  attracted to  the  present  case  on the  ground  that  the  right  of reversion  of  the landlord, namely, the  right  to  recover possession  of the property from the tenant, is not a  right of   property  which  is  a  condition  precedent   to   the application  of  Article  19(1) (f)  and  consequently,  the question as to the infringement of fundamental right did not at  all  rise  and that there could not be,  any  scope  for holding  that  the provision of  sub-section  (3A)  offended against Article 19(1)(f).  This second contention which  was allowed  to be raised by the Letters Patent Bench  was  also repelled  following  its earlier decision in  Kalyani  Dults case (supra) disposed of on September 7, 1971. Civil Appeal No. 2063 of 1973 arises out of the decision  of the High Court in Second Appeal No. 1193 of 1972 disposed of on 25th July, 1973 relying upon Sailendra Nath Ghosal’s case (supra)  which  is  the subject matter of  appeal  in  Civil Appeal No. 1304 of 1973. The  history of tortuous litigation in both the appeals  may also  be  noticed.   In Civil Appeal No- 1304  of  1973  the plaintiff (respondent herein) purchased the premises in suit on February 16, 1961.  She instituted Title Suit No. 480  of 1961 in the court of Munsif of Sealdah, District 24-Pargana, for ejectment of the defendant, on July 24, 1961.  The  suit was  decreed  by  the  Munsif on  July  21,  1964,  but  was dismissed by the lower appellate court on May 17, 1965.   On second  appeal  at the instance of the plaintiff,  the  High Court  framed an additional issue and remanded the  suit  to ram a finding on the same.  On receipt of the finding of the court  below,  the learned single Judge of the  High  Court, dismissed the second appeal and granted 793 leave to a Letters Patent Appeal.  That appeal was dismissed on February 3, 1972.  The High Court granted certificate  to appeal against that decision to this Court on May 24,  1973, referring  to the earlier certificate granted by that  Court in  Kalyani Dutt’s case (supra).  That is how  Civil  Appeal No. 1304 of 1973 is now before us. The  facts in Civil Appeal No. 2063 of 1973 are these.   The property in suit was purchased by the plaintiff  (respondent herein) on February 7, 1964 and the eviction suit No. 76  of 1966  was  instituted  in  February  1965.   The  suit   was dismissed by the Trial Court on October 11, 1966.  On appeal by the plaintiff, the Additional District Judge allowed  the appeal  on June 8, 1967, and remanded the suit for  disposal after  taking  additional evidence.  The  Munsif  thereafter decreed  the  plaintiff’s  suit on December  23,  1968.   On appeal  by  the  defendant  the  Additional  District  Judge allowed  the same and dismissed the suit on April  8,  1969. On plaintiff’s appeal to the High Court in Second Appeal No. 968  of  1969, the High Court allowed the same on  April  3,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 20 of 26  

1971  and remanded the suit to the Munsif for retrial.   The Munsif again dismissed the plaintiff’s suit on September 13, 1971.   On appeal by the plaintiff the  Additional  District Judge  allowed  the same and decreed the suit on  April  29, 1972.   The High Court on appeal by the defendant  dismissed the  second Appeal on July 25, 1973, relying  upon  Salindra Nath Ghosal’s case (supra) disposed of on January 28,  1971. The defendant then obtained special leave.  Thus the life of litigation  in Civil Appeal No. 1304 of 1973 is now  in  the fourteenth  year  after  purchase of  the  premises  by  the plaintiff  six months earlier.  The second one is  a  decade old;  the  property  having  been  purchased  about  a  year earlier. Both  the appeals were argued together and will be  governed by this common judgment. The  suits  in both the appeals are by what has come  to  be known  as transferee-landlords.  They have instituted  suits in one case within six months of the purchase in 1961 and in the  other within one year of the purchase in 1965.   During the long pendency of the litigation the West Bengal Premises Tenancy  (Second Amendment) Act was passed which  came  into force  on November 14, 1969. and section 4, inter-alia,  was made  applicable  to pending suits  including  appeals.   It amended  the  West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act,  1956  (West Bengal Act XII of 1956) (briefly the Original Act).  Section 4  of the Amendment Act introduced the following changes  in section 13 of Section 13(1) (f) of the Original Act stood as follows the Original Act :               "13(1)   Notwithstanding   anything   to   the               contrary in any other law, no order or  decree               for the recovery of possession of any premises               %hall  be made by any Court in favour  of  the               landlord  against  a tenant except on  one  or               more of the following grounds, namely               (f)Where   the  premises   are   reasonably               required  by the landlord either for  purposes               of building or rebuilding; or 4-L346Sup.CI/75 794               for  making thereto substantial  additions  or               alterations or for his own occupation if he is               the owner or for the occupation of any  person               for whose benefit the premises are held". After  the  amendment  of section 13 by  section  4  of  the Amendment  Act clause (f) was split up into two clauses  (f) and (ff) which read as under :-               "(f) Subject to the provisions  of,sub-section               (3A)  and section 18A, where the premises  are               reasonably   required  by  the  landlord   for               purposes  of  building or  rebuilding  or  for               making   thereto  substantial   additions   or               alterations, and such building or re-building,               or additions or alterations. cannot be carried               out Without the premises being vacated;               (ff) Subject to the provisions of  sub-section               (3A),   where  the  premises  are   reasonably               required   by   the  landlord  for   his   own               occupation  if  he  is the owner  or  for  the               occupation of any person for whose benefit the               premises  are  held and the landlord  or  such               person is not in possession of any  reasonably               suitable accommodation".               In  addition, section 4 of the  Amendment  Act               introduced  a new subsection (3A) which  reads

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 21 of 26  

             as follows :-               "Where a landlord has acquired his interest in               the  premises  by transfer, no  suit  for  the               recovery of possession of the premises on  any               of  the  grounds mentioned in  clause  (f)  or               clause  (ff)  of  sub-section  (1)  shall   be               instituted   by   the  landlord   before   the               expiration of a period of three years from the               date of his acquisition of such interest;               Provided  that a suit for the recovery of  the               possession  of the premises may be  instituted               on the ground mentioned in clause (f) of  sub-               section (1) before the expiration of the  said               period of three years if the Controller on the               application  of landlord and after giving  the               tenant an opportunity of being heard,               permits, by order, the institution of the suit               on the ground that the building or re-building               or the additions, or alterations, as the  case               may  be,  are necessary to make  the  premises               safe for human habitation". It  should  be noted that the grounds for ejectment  in  the earlier sub-section (f) ,ire the same as the new grounds  in clauses   (f)   and   (ff)  except   for   some   additional restrictions.  The common grounds for eviction are,  broadly speaking, reasonable requirement for the Purpose of building or   rebuilding,  etc.  [sub-clause  (f)]   and   reasonable requirement for occupation by the landlord, etc. [sub-clause (ff)].  There is, there fore, no particular significance  to the  mention of " grounds" in clause (f) or clause  (ff)  of subsection (1) in subsection (3A). ,Section  13  of  the Amendment Act which  is  the  bone  of contention  grants  retrospectivity  to  section  4  of  the Amendment  Act  and, therefore, necessarily  to  sub-section (3A) and section 13(1)(f)(ff).  The grievance centres  round retrospectivity of sub-section (3A) and 795 section  13(1)(f)  and  (ff) made  applicable  by  force  of section 13 of the Amendment Act to suits and appeals pending on the commencement of the Act.  It may be in order first to deal  with  the question of retrospectivily  of  sub-section (3A)  which  is  the principal ground  of  attack  in  these appeals. Section 13 of the Amendment Act provides that. effect should be given to section 4 of the Amendment Act in pending  suits including appeal on the date of the commencement of the Act. The   suits  of  the  particular  category  by   transferee- landlords,  therefore, could be pending on  commencement  of the Amendment Act and these may have been instituted several years prior to the Amendment Act.  There may also be appeals pending  in  different appellate courts against  decrees  in such  suits.  The appeals necessarily have to be  understood as appeals arising out of suits instituted within the  three years’ ban.  The tenants are now permitted to take objection on the score of contravention of section 13(3A), before  the courts  either  in  a pending suit or in  a  pending  appeal against   decrees   in  such  suits  and   the   point   for consideration  then  would  be  whether  such  a  suit   was instituted  within  three  years’ ban  and  the  appeal  was pending against such a banned suit.  When section 13 of  the Amendment  Act  provides that section 4 therein  has  to  be given effect in pending suits including appeals, effect  has to be given by the courts.  Now how will effect be given  to section  13(3A) ? Retrospectivity to be given under  section 13  of  the  Amendment Act to  section  4  broadly  requires

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 22 of 26  

compliance as follows               (1)   that   no   suit  for  eviction   by   a               transferee-landlord shall be instituted within               three   years  of  his  acquisition   of   the               premises;               (2)   if  eviction  is sought  on  the  ground               under  section 13(1)(f) of the Amendment  Act,               an additional restriction is put, namely, that               "such  building or rebuilding or additions  or               alterations cannot be carried out without  the               premises being vacated";               (3)   if  eviction  is sought  on  the  ground               under section 13(1)(ff), a further restriction               is  put  upon  the right of  the  landlord  to               evict, viz., that "the landlord or such person               is   not  in  possession  of  any   reasonably               suitable accommodation". Under  proviso to section 13(3A) a transferee-landlord  can, however,  institute a suit within three years’ ban  provided he  obtains  prior permission from me Controller who  on  an application  by the landlord and after hearing  the  parties may decide whether permission should be given or not. Prime-facie, a suit which had already been instituted  prior to  the Amendment Act would not come within the mischief  of section  13(3A) since this sub-section, in terms,  prohibits only institution of suits and does not provide for dismissal of  suits  already instituted.  Similarly while there  is  a relaxation  in  favour of a transferee  landlord  under  the proviso to obtain permission from the Controller this  bene- fit is out of the way even in a genuine case where the  suit had already 796 been instituted within three years of purchase and the  same or  an appeal therefrom is now pending after the passing  of the  Amendment  Act.  In this regard also  it  appears  sub- section (3A) is not intended to be attracted to suits  which were already instituted prior to the Amendment Act.  But  as will be seen hereafter the above position is altered by  the express provision of section 13 of the Amendment Act whereby it  is intended that the court should give  retrospectivity, inter alia, to section 4 of the Amendment Act. On the terms of only section 13 (3A) it is difficult to hold that  it  would bring old sections within  the  mischief  of section 13 (3A) which imposes a ban expressly on institution of suits within three years of the acquisition of  ownership of  the premises subject to the relaxation contained in  the proviso thereto. This  being the correct interpretation of sub-section  (3A), taken  by  itself, what is the effect of section 13  of  the Amendment  Act  upon  this provision?   Section  13  of  the Amendment  Act  in seeking to give retrospective  effect  to sub-section  (3A)  does  exactly what  sub-section  (3A)  by itself contra-indicates. The  first part of section 13(3A) which provides for  a  ban against institution of suits for eviction within three years of acquisition of the premises must be given effect to under section  13  of the Amendment Act in pending  suits  and  in pending  appeals arising out of the decrees passed  in  such suits  provided  the former had been instituted  within  the period  of the ban.  If, therefore, after the Amendment  Act it  is found in a pending suit or in a pending  appeal  that the  particular suit was instituted within the three  years’ ban the same will have to be dismissed and only in that  way the  court will be able to give effect to sub-section  (3A). With  regard  to the proviso of subsection  (3A),  when  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 23 of 26  

ground  of eviction is relatable to section 13(1)(f) of  the Amendment  Act  the court will have to dismiss the  suit  in absence of the requisite permission. That being the practical result of restrospectivity given to subsection  (3A),  is that sub-section, in so far as  it  is retrospective,   violative  of  Article  19(1)(f)   of   the Constitution?   That takes us to the object and  purpose  of the Amendment Act.  The Statement of Objects and Reasons  as quoted in Kalyani Dutt’s case (supra) is as follows               "It  has been considered necessary  that  some               more  relief  should be given to  the  tenants               against eviction, that the necessity of tender               of rent to the landlord every time the rent is               deposited   with  the  Controller   during   a               continuous  period should be  dispensed  with,               that the interests of the residents of  hotels               and  lodging houses should be safeguarded  and               that  the penalties for contravention of  some               of the provisions of the West Bengal  Premises               Tenancy   Act,  1956,  should  be  made   more               stringent". In the earlier judgment of the High Court which is also  the subject  matter  of Civil Appeal No. 1304 of 1973  the  High Court referred to the statement of the Minister at the  time of piloting of the Bill in the following words:- 797               "It  is found from the speech of the  Minister               at  the  time of introducing the Bill  in  the               legislature, that the problems of tenants  are               many:  there is one class-original owners  who               are  the  old inhabitants of the  city;  these               owner-landlords are not affluent; they  solely               depend  upon  the  rents  received  from   the               tenants.    It  has  been   ascertained   from               experience   that  two  of  the   grounds   of               eviction, namely, requirement of the  premises               for  own  use  of the landlords  and  for  the               purpose of building and re-building, have been               misused  by  the landlords.  In  the  city  of               Calcutta  and other towns, there are  millions               of  tenants who are left at the mercy  of  the               landlords.   In  this  background  and   after               taking  into  account  similar  provisions  in               other  States, it has been decided  that  some               restrictions  ought to have been imposed  upon               transferee-landlords  prohibiting  them   from               bringing  ejectment suits against the  tenants               within three years from their purchase".               The High Court also observed further that-               "there  is nothing on the record to show  that               the  mischief,  sought to be remedied  by  the               amended  legislation, was in  existence  since               1956.   On  the other  hand,  the  ministerial               speech,  referred to above,  rather  indicates               that  the said mischief was  of  comparatively               recent origin". Again in Kalyani Dutt’s case (supra) the High Court in  para 27  observed that "such suits are not many and at  the  same time most of them are pending for more than ten years".  The materials relied upon by the High Court stand uncontradicted by any affidavit before US. On  the  above materials it is safe to hold  that  the  main object of the Amendment Actis to counteract the  "recent" mischief of circumvention of theprovisions     of     the original  Act  in order to evict tenants on even  bona  fide

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 24 of 26  

requirements  specified under the law of device of  transfer of premises held under the occupation of tenants.   Although the Amendment Act has not completely barred institutions  of suits by transferee-landlords postponement of litigation for a period of three years from acquisition of the premises was provided  for  under subsection (3A).  This  had  a  twofold purpose,  namely, to enable tenants a reasonable respite  to arrange  their  affairs and also to  discourage  speculative acquisitions  with an ulterior motive.  This  salutary  pro- vision  for  the general body of tenants  cannot  be  called unreasonable.   But the question is whether by applying  the provision to pending suits and appeals has that object  been achieved  in  the interest of the general  body  of  tenants which  would certainly constitute the general public  within the meaning of clause 5 of Article 19?  From the fact-,; and circumstances extra fed above from the two judgments of  the High Court. it is not possible to bold that the interest  of the  general body of tenants would be served by  application of sub-section (3A) to pending suits and appeals. If  the mischief was of "recent" origin, there is no  reason to  overshoot the mark and outstretch the long rope  of  the law beyond the 798 requirements  of the situation.  It is clear that in  trying to include old actions that may be surviving in courts,  per chance, because of laws’ proverbial delay, section 13 of the Amendment Act has gone far in excess of the actual needs  of the  time and problems and the provisions thereof cannot  be said to impose a reasonable restriction on the right of  the transferee-landlords,  albeit a well-defined class,  amongst tile  landlords,  to hold and enjoy their  property  in  the interest  of the general public.  Such  transferee-landlords with  pending  old sections in suits or in appeals  are,  as observed  by  the High Court, not likely to be  of  a  large number  and  necessarily so the tenants of such  a  sub-sec- class.  It is not in the general interest of the large  body of  tenants to impose such restrictions on a few  transfree- landlords  of this sub-class subject to unbearable delay  in litigation,  understandably  not on their  own  account.  If relief  in  the shape of postponement of a  landlord’s  suit were   the   object   of   sub-section   (3A)   in    giving retrospectivity  to  it, the law did not take count  of  the inevitable long delay that takes place in pending litigation of  this type as a result of man-made laws of  procedure  in courts  such  as has even been clearly demonstrated  by  the cases  at  hand.   The law that  misses  its  object  cannot justify its existence.  Besides, it will be a sterile relief if tenants have to face a fresh summons next day. Hard  cases  will  be  on  both  sides  of  the  line.   law contemplates  in terms of generality and is not intended  to hit  a  few  individuals by  making  invidious  distinction. Article 19 of the Constitution confers protection of  rights specified therein belonging to all citizens.  Any individual citizen  may  complain  of encroachment of  his  rights  and freedom  guaranteed under the Article.   Law’s  encroachment upon  such  rights  and  freedom  of  citizens  can  survive challenge if it passes the tests laid down in the six saving clauses of Article 19. Coming now to article 19(1)(f), with which we are  concerned in  these  appeals,  the said provision  confers  upon  each individual citizen the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property,  This right is subject to clause (5) which we  may read so far as material for our purpose:               "Nothing  in sub-clauses (d), (e) and  (f)  of               the  said clause shall .... prevent the  State

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 25 of 26  

             from   making  any  law  imposing   reasonable               restrictions  on  the exercise of any  of  the               rights conferred by the said sub-clauses  ....               in the interests of the general public.. . . . Even a single citizen may complain against violation of  his fundamental  rights  under  Article  19  (1)  (f)  and   his vindication  of  his  right  may be  defeated  only  if  the impugned  infringement  brought  upon  by  the  law  can  be considered   as  a  reasonable  restriction  and  the   ,aid restriction is also in the interests of the general  public. It  is manifest, therefore, under the Constitution. that  an individual’s right will have to yield to the common weal  of the  general  community.  That general community may  be  in broad segments, but even then must form a class as a  whole. A  few individuals cannot take the place of a class and  for the  matter of that the general public In the  present  case the  particular relief contemplated by the Amendment Act  is in favour 799 of tenants in general and the restriction under  sub-section (3A)  must  ,be viewed in that context.  It cannot  be  said that   the   legislature  in   applying   sub-section   (3A) restrospectively  has  achieved that avowed object  at  all. The  matter  would have been different it, in  view  of  any prevailing   conditions,  a  reasonable  date   for   giving retrospective  effect were fixed under the law in the  light of  the known mischief.  In its. absence,  applicability  of the blanket ban to pending suits and appeals cannot be  said to  be  a  reasonable restriction in the  interests  of  the general public.  It may help a few tenants in litigation but will  prejudice the right of transferee-landlords locked  up in  old  and  costly litigation.  The gain  of  the  few  as opposed  to the general public cannot be the touchstone  for justifying reasonableness of the restriction imposed on  the rights  of the transferee-landlords in  applying  subsection (3A) to pending suits and appeals. In the social combat between the interests of a few and  the general welfare of the community the latter is the clinching factor  to be reckoned and hard cases of a  few  individuals cannot  be  assigned a higher place- and  status  than  they deserve to the detriment of the fundamental rights of even a single individual. Therefore, the retrospectivity so far as sub-section (3A) is concerned   with  regard  to  institution  of   suits   made applicable  to  pending suits and. appeals is  clearly  very wide of a reasonable mark and is, thus, an imposition of  an unreasonable  restriction on the rights of  the  transferee- landlords  in pending suits which had been instituted  prior to the Amendment Act and in appeals arising therefrom and it is  not saved by the protective clause (5) of Article 19  of the  Constitution.   Sub-section  (3A)  so  far  as  it   is retrospective  and  as  such  applicable  to  pending  suits including  appeal  is ultra vires Article 19 (1)(f)  of  the Constitution.  The provision is valid only prospectively. So far as the retrospectivity of section 13(1)(f) and  (ff), the position is entirely different.  Clearly further reliefs have  been sought to be given to the tenants as a  class  by these  provisions  in  the  Amendment  Act.   These  further reliefs  are in the general interests of tenants and can  be applied  without any difficulty to pending  suits  including appears.   There  is  nothing  unreasonable  about  such   a retrospectivity in applying these provisions for the general welfare  of  tenants in securing for them a  safe  and  sure tenure  as far as practicable untrammelled  by  inconvenient litigation.  It is well-established that the legislature  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 26 of 26  

enacting  laws  can  legislate  prospectively  as  well   as retrospectively.  Section 13(1)(f) and (ff) are,  therefore, not ultra vires Article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. With regard to another contention of the appellants that the right of tile landlords that is affected by sub-section (3A) is only a mere right to sue and at best a right of reversion and  hence  it  is not a right  to  property  under  Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, it is sufficient to state that the  question is covered by two decisions of this  Court  in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v.   Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt(1) and Swami (1) [1954] S.C.R. 1005 800 Motor   Transport   (P)   Limited   and   Another   v.   Sri Sankaraswamigal  Butt and Another(1).  The right to own  and hold property in order to make an effective right under  the Constitution  must include tine right to possession  of  the property including the right to evict tenants in  accordance with law.  The submission is, therefore, without any force. The  position, therefore, is that in a pending suit or  even in  a pending appeal a landlord may be given an  opportunity to adduce evidence to establish such of the new requirements in 13(1) (f) or (ff) as are relevant to the proceedings.  In that  case  the  tenant will have  also  an  opportunity  to produce  evidence  in rebuttal.  If the matter arises  in  a pending  suit,  it will be disposed of by the  trial  court. If, however, the matter arises in appeal, it will be open to the  appellate  court,  in  order to  shorten  the  life  of litigation, to remand the matter to the appropriate court to return a finding on such additional issues as may be  framed to meet the requirements of (f) and/or (ff), as the case may be, under order 41, rule 25, Civil Procedure Code. In  the  result  these  appeals  are  partly  allowed.   The judgment of the High Court with regard to invalidity of sub- section (3A) so far as it is retrospective and applicable to pending suits and appeals is upheld.  The orders  dismissing the  appeals  are, however, set aside and  the  appeals  are remanded to the High Court for disposal in the light, of the observations  with reference to section 13(1)(f) and/or  (f) whichever is applicable.  The landlords may now be given  by the  High Court an opportunity, if they so wish,  to  adduce evidence with regard to such further requirements under  (f) and/or  (ff)  as may be applicable and the High  Court  will call for a finding from the appropriate court in that behalf and  thereafter  dispose of the appeals  on  merits.   Since success  is shared, there will be no orders as to  costs  in these appeals.                            ORDER In  accordance with the majority judgment, the  appeals  are allowed  with  costs;  the cases are remanded  to  the  High Court, and the High Court is directed to dispose of the case in the light of the directions and observations made in  the majority  judgment.  It will be open to the Court seised  of the matter to direct, in its discretion, amount of costs  to be incurred hereafter. P.B.R. (1) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 282. 801