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PETITIONER: AUNDAL AMMAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SADASIVAN PILLAI

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/12/1986

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR  203            1987 SCR  (1) 485  1987 SCC  (1) 183        JT 1986  1028  1986 SCALE  (2)1004  CITATOR INFO :  *          1987 SC2323  (*)  E          1987 SC2323  (3,7,12,13,14)  RF         1988 SC 339  (6)  *          1988 SC 812  (2,3,7,9,12,14,15,18,19,26,30,

ACT:     Kerala  Buildings  (Lease  & Rent)  Control  Act,  1965, Section 18(5) & 20--Jurisdiction of the High Court to inter- fere in revision under Section 115 C.P.C-- Whether ousted.     Civil  Procedure Code, 1908--Section  115--High  Court’s jurisdiction  to interfere in revision with an  order  under the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control Act. 1965.     Words and Phrases-’Shall be final’--Shall not be  liable to be called in question in any Court of Law’--Meaning of..

HEADNOTE:     The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, by s. 13(3) provides that a landlord’s petition for eviction of  his  tenant from a premises on the ground of  bona  fide personal  need,  has to be disposed of by the  Rent  Control Court. Section 18(1)(b) makes provision of an appeal to  the Appellate  Authority against the order of the  Rent  Control Court. Sub-s.(5) of section 18, stipulates that the decision of the appellate authority and subject to such decision,  an order of the Rent Controller ’shall be final’ and ’shall not be  liable  to be called in question in any court  of  law’, except as provided in section 20. By section 20, a  revision is  provided  where the appellate authority  is  Subordinate Judge  to the District Judge and in other cases, that is  to say, where the appellate authority is District Judge, to the High Court.     The  respondent-landlord  filed  an  eviction   petition against the appellant’s husband-tenant on the ground of bona fide  personal  need. The Rent Controller  passed  an  order dismissing  the petition. The order was confirmed in  appeal filed  by  the respondent before  the  Appellate  Authority. Thereafter,  the  respondent preferred a  revision  petition before  the District Judge. That petition having  been  dis- missed, he moved the High Court under s. 115 of the Code  of Civil Procedure. During the pendency of the second revision, the  appellant’s husband died and she was brought on  record

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as  the legal representative. The High Court set  aside  all the  orders of the courts below and ordered eviction of  the appellant. 486     In  appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf  of the  appellant tenant that the High Court had  exceeded  its jurisdiction  in setting aside the judgments and  orders  of the  courts below, since no revision lies to the High  Court against the order of the District Judge in view of s.  18(5) read  with s.20 of the Act which has completely  ousted  the High Court’s jurisdiction to interfere u/s. 115 of the  Code of Civil Procedure. Allowing the appeal,     HELD:  (1) The High Court had no jurisdiction to  inter- fere  in the matter u/s. 115 of C.P.C. Therefore, the  judg- ment and order of the High Court are set aside. [496 B,G]     2(i)  The ambits of revisional powers  are  well-settled and  need not be restated. It is inconceivable to  have  two revisions. The scheme of the Kerala Buildings (Lease &  Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not warrant such a conclusion.  [492 D]     2(ii)  Sub-s. (5) of s. 18 of the Act says that  subject to the decision of the appellate authority, the decision  of the Rent Controller shall be final an,] could only be  ques- tioned in the manner provided in section 20 and in no  other manner.  The  expression ’shall be final’ in the  Act  means what  it says. The intention of the legislature in  enacting the  said  Act is clear and manifest from s. 18(5)  and  the scheme  of the Act, that is to say, to regulate the  leasing of  buildings and to control the rent of such buildings  and to  provide a tier of courts by themselves for  eviction  of the  rented  premises. This is writ large in  the  different provisions of the Act. [492 G]     2(iii) When section 18(5) of the Act specifically states that  "shall not be liable to be called in question  in  any Court  of law" except in the manner provided  under  section 20,  it cannot be said that the High Court which is a  court of  law and which is a civil court under the Code  of  Civil Procedure  under section 115 of the Code of Civil  Procedure could  revise again an order on again after  revision  under section  20  of the Act. That would mean there  would  be  a trial by four courts, that would be repugnant to the  scheme manifest  in the different sections of the Act in  question. Public  policy  or public interest  demands  curtailment  of law’s  delay and justice demands finality within quick  dis- posal  of  case. The language of the provisions  of  section 18(5)  read with section 20 inhibits further  revision.  The courts must so construe. [494 G-495 A]     Kydd  y.  Watch Committee of City of  Liverpool,  (1908) Appeal  Cases 327 at 331-332; South Asia Industries  Private Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh and 487 Others,  [1965] 2 SCR 756 & Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti  Prasad, [1980]3 SCR 32, relied upon. Ouseph Vareed v. Mary, (1968) K.L.T. 583, over-ruled.     Maung  Ba  Thaw and Another--Insolvents v. Ma  Pin,  AIR 1934 P.C. 81, distinguished. Kurien v. Chacko, (1960) KLT 1248, approved.     In  the instant case, the appeal lay from  Rent  Control Court  to  the appellant authority who was  the  Subordinate Judge and therefore the revision lay to the District  Judge. After  the dismissal of the revision by the  District  Judge from  the  appellate decision of the Subordinate  Judge  who confirmed the order of the Rent Controller, the  respondent- landlord  chose  again  to go before the  High  Court  under

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section  115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But,  he  could not  have  a second revision to the High  Court,  since  the jurisdiction  of the High Court u/s. 115 of the  C.P.C.  was excluded by the Act. [491 H-492 B, D]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5032 of 1985     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  20.8.1985  of  the Kerala High Court in C.R.P. Nos. 1643 and 2552 of 1980. P.S. Poti and E.M.S. Anam for the Appellant.     G. Vishwanath lyer, P.K. Pillai and K. Dileep Kumar  for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI  MUKHARJI,  J. This appeal by  special  leave from the decision of learned single judge of the High  Court of Kerala is disposed of on a short question of law.     The  appellant is a tenant. The High Court had  reversed the  concurrent findings and the decisions of  three  courts below it and ordered eviction of the appellant.     The dispute relates to a portion of the ground floor  of a  three-storeyed  building situated in one of  the  busiest commercial  areas  Pazhavangadi of the city  of  Trivandrum. where the appellant had been conducting a tea shop by 488 name ’Sourashtra Hotel’. In the adjacent rooms on the ground floor,  the landlord was conducting a business  in  textiles namely  ’Sarada Textiles’. The tenancy began on  12th  June, 1965. The tenancy was taken by the husband of the appellant. The rent was Rs. 140 per month. The husband of the appellant died.  Thereafter  the  appellant had  been  conducting  the business from there.     On or about 15th April, 1976, the respondent purchased.a three storeyed building. The petition schedule premises is a portion  of  the  ground floor of the  said  three  storeyed building.  It is the case of the appellant that  there  were seven rooms on the first floor of the said building out  ’of which  four  were in the possession of  the  respondent  and three  rented out as aforesaid. The premises on  the  second floor  were used by the respondent-landlord as a  lodge.  On 9th  April, 1977, the respondent filed an application  under section 17 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent  Control) Act,  1965  (hereinafter called the Act) for  permission  to convert the non-residential building to a residential build- ing.  On 30th November, 1977, the  Accommodation  Controller rejected the said application.     On 2nd June, 1978, the respondent filed the petition for eviction of the appellant on the ground of bona fide need of the premises in question for his residence. Arrears of  rent was also one of the grounds taken against the appellant. The tenant duly filed his objection. On 31st October, 1978,  the Rent  Control  Court  dismissed  the   respondent-landlord’s petition  for eviction. It was found that the  landlord  had other  buildings  in his own possession  and  therefore.  no order  of  eviction could be passed by virtue of  the  first proviso to section 11(3) of the Act. The Rent Control Appel- late  Authority  on or about 2nd July,  1979  dismissed  the respondent-landlord’s appeal.     On 28th March, 1980, the revision petition filed by  the respondent was also dismissed by the District Court.     The  High  Court was moved  by  the  respondent-landlord under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.     The husband of the appellant died on 8th May, 1985.  She

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was therefore impleaded as the legal representative and  she is conducting the business since the death of her husband;     By the order dated 20th August, 1985, the High Court  by its  impugned  order  has set aside all the  orders  of  the courts  below. The tenant, the appellant herein has come  up in  appeal to this Court under article 136 of the  Constitu- tion. 489     Several  questions  were posed before us in  this  case, inter  alia, (i) whether the revision under section  115  of the  Code of Civil Procedure lies to the High Court  from  a revision order passed under section 20 of the said Act? (ii) whether  the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction  under section 115 in setting aside the judgments and orders of the courts below in ordering eviction of the appellant from  the premises in question reversing the findings of facts?  (iii) whether eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building could be ordered for the user of the building for  residence of the landlord, if the Accommodation Controller had refused permission under section 17 of the Act to convert the build- ing  from  non-residential to residential?  (iv)  where  the Accommodation  Controller refused the permission to  convert the  building from non-residential to residential, does  the claim  to  the building by the landlord  for  a  residential purpose become illegal and not recognised by law and whether the claim of the landlord can still be held to be bona fide? (v) whether in ordering eviction the special reasons  relied on by the High Court on a reappreciation of facts are  borne out  from  the evidence in this case and whether  the  facts stated  by the High Court constitute "special  reasons"  re- quired under the first proviso to section 11 (3) in ordering eviction  and setting aside the judgments and orders of  the courts below.     For  the  present purpose, it is relevant  to  refer  to section 11(3) of the Act which provides as follows:               "11  (3).  A landlord may apply  to  the  Rent               Control  Court  for  an  order  directing  the               tenant  to put the landlord in  possession  of               the building if he bona fide needs the  build-               ing for his own occupation or for the  occupa-               tion by any member of his family dependent  on               him;                          Provided  that  the  Rent   Control               Court shall not give any such direction if the               landlord  has another building of his  own  in               his  possession  in  the same  city,  town  or               village except where the Rent Control Court is               satisfied  that  for special reasons,  in  any               particular case it will be just and proper  to               do so:                          Provided  further  that  the   Rent               Control Court shall not give any direction  to               a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if               such  tenant is depending for  his  livelihood               mainly on the income derived from any trade or               business carried on in such building and there               is no other suitable building available in the               locality  for  such person to  carry  on  such               trade or business;               Provided further that no landlord whose  right               to recover               490               possession  arises  under  an  instrument   of               transfer  inter  vivos shall  be  entitled  to               apply to be put in possession until the expiry

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             of one year from the date of the instrument;                         Provided further that if a  landlord               after obtaining an order to be put in  posses-               sion  transfers his rights in respect  of  the               building  to  another person,  the  transferee               shall not be entitled to be put in  possession               unless  he proves that he bona fide needs  the               building  for  his own occupation or  for  the               occupation by any member of his family depend-               ent on him."     In the view we have taken on the question that no  revi- sion lay to the High Court, it is not necessary to refer  to other  provisions of the Act or to the details of the  facts of this case. It is, however, necessary to refer to sections 18 and 20 of the Act which are as follows:               "18.  Appeal--(1) (a) The Government  may,  by               general  or  special  order  notified  in  the               Gazette, confer on such officers and  authori-               ties not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge               the  powers of appellate authorities  for  the               purposes of this Act in such areas or in  such               classes  of cases as may be specified  in  the               order.                         (b) Any person aggrieved by an order               passed  by the Rent Control Court may,  within               thirty  days  from  the date  of  such  order,               prefer  an appeal in writing to the  appellate               authority  having jurisdiction.  In  computing               the thirty days aforesaid, the  time taken  to               obtain a certified copy of the order  appealed               against shall be excluded.                          (2) On such appeal being preferred,               the  appellate  authority may  order  stay  of               further  proceedings  in  the  matter  pending               decision on the appeal.                          (3)  The appellate authority  shall               send for the records of the case from the Rent               Control Court and after giving the parties  an               opportunity of being heard and, if  necessary,               after making such further inquiry as it thinks               fit  either directly or through the Rent  Con-               trol Court, shall decide the appeal.                          Explanation:--The appellate author-               ity  may, while confirming the order of  evic-               tion passed by the Rent Control               491               Court,  grant  an  extension of  time  to  the               tenant for putting the landlord in  possession               of the building.                        (4)  The  appellate  authority  shall               have all the powers of the Rent Control  Court               including the fixing of arrears of rent.                         (5)  The decision of  the  appellate               authority,  and subject to such  decision,  an               order of the Rent Control Court shall be final               and shall not be liable to be called in  ques-               tion  in any Court of law, except as  provided               in section 20.                         20.  Revision:--(1) In  cases  where               the  appellate authority empowered under  sec-               tion  18 is a Subordinate Judge, the  District               Court, and in other cases the High Court  may,               at  any  time, on the application of  any  ag-               grieved  party, call for and examine  the  re-               cords relating to any order passed or proceed-

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             ings  taken under this Act by  such  authority               for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the               legality regularity or propriety of such order               or  proceedings  and may pass  such  order  in               reference thereto as it thinks fit.                         (2)  The costs of and incidental  to               all  proceedings  before  the  High  Court  or               District Court under Sub-section (1 ) shall be               in its discretion."     It  has  further  to be borne in mind that  the  Act  in question was an Act to regulate the leasing of buildings and to control the rent of such buildings in the State of  Kera- la.     It  was contended by Shri Poti, learned counsel for  the appellant,  that no revision lay to the High Court. He  sub- mitted  that section 18(5) read with section 20 of  the  Act has  completely  ousted  the High  Court’s  jurisdiction  to interfere  in this matter under section 115 of the  Code  of Civil Procedure.     Under  the scheme of the Act it appears that a  landlord who  wants eviction of his tenant has to move  for  eviction and  the  case  has to be disposed of by  the  Rent  Control Court. That is provided by sub-section (2) of section 11  of the Act. From the Rent Control Court, an appeal lies to  the Appellate  Authority  under the conditions laid  down  under sub-section (1)(b) of section 18 of the Act. From the Appel- late  Authority a revision in certain circumstances lies  in case where the appellate authority is a Subordinate Judge to the District Court and in other cases to the High Court.  In this case as mentioned hereinbefore the appeal lay from Rent Control Court to the 492 appellate authority who was the Subordinate Judge and there- fore  the revision lay to the District Judge. Indeed  it  is indisputed that the respondent has in this case taken resort to all these provisions. After the dismissal of the revision by  the  District Judge from the appellate decision  of  the Subordinate  Judge who confirmed the order of the Rent  Con- troller,  the respondent-landlord chose again to  go  before the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Proce- dure. The question, is, can he have a second revision to the High  Court? Shri Poti submitted that he cannot. We  are  of the  opinion  that he is fight. This position  is  clear  if sub-section (5) of section 18 of the Act is read in conjunc- tion with section 20 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of  section 18,  as we have noted hereinbefore, dearly  stipulates  that the decision of the appellate authority and subject to  such decision,  an order of the Rent Controller ’shall be  final’ and  ’shall  not be liable to be called in question  in  any court of law’, except as provided in section 20. By  section 20, a revision is provided where the appellate authority  is Subordinate Judge to the District Judge and in other  cases, that  is to say, where the appellate authority  is  District Judge,  to the High Court. The ambits of  revisional  powers are well-settled and need not be re-stated. It is inconceiv- able  to have two revisions. The scheme of the Act does  not warrant  such a conclusion. In our opinion,  the  expression ’shall be final’ in the Act means what it says.     In Kydd v. Watch Committee of City of Liverpool.  [1908] Appeal Cases 327 at 331-332. Lord Loreburn L.C.,  construing the  provisions  of section 11 of the Police  Act,  1890  of England  which provided an appeal to quarter sessions as  to the  amount  of a constable’s pension, and  also  stipulated that  the Court shall make an order which would be just  and final, observed:

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             "Where  it  says, speaking of such  an  order,               that it is to be final, I think it means there               is  to  be an end of the business  at  quarter               sessions  .......  "                   The said observation could most  appropri- ately  be applied to the expression used by the  legislature in sub-section (5) of section 18 of the Act in question.  It means  what  it  says that subject to the  decision  of  the appellate  authority,  the decision of the  Rent  Controller shall  be final and could only be questioned in  the  manner provided in section 20 and in no other manner. The intention of  the  legislature in enacting the said Act is  clear  and manifest  from this section and the scheme of the Act,  that is  to  say,  to regulate the leasing of  buildings  and  to control the rent of such buildings and to provide a tier  of courts  by themselves for eviction of the  rented  premises. This  is writ large in the different provisions of the  Act. This Court, referring to the aforesaid observations of  Lord Loreburn, L.C. in the case of South Asia Industries  Private Ltd.  v.S.B.  Sarup Singh and Others. [1965]  2  S.C.R.  756 observed at 493 page  766  of the report that  the  expression  "final"prima facie meant that an order passed on appeal under the Act was conclusive  and no further appeal lay. This Court  was  con- struing  sections 39 and 43 of the Delhi Rent  Control  Act, 1958 and the effect thereof in the context of Letters Patent Appeal. There sections 39 and 43 provided as follows:--               "Section 39. (1) Subject to the provisions  of               sub-section  (2), an appeal shall lie  to  the               High Court from an order made by the  Tribunal               within sixty days from the date of such order.                         (2)  No appeal shall lie under  sub-               section  (1), unless the appeal involves  some               substantial question of law.                         Section  43. Save as  otherwise  ex-               pressly provided in this Act, every order made               by the Controller or an order passed on appeal               under this Act shall be final and shall not be               called  in  question  in  any  original  suit,               application or execution proceedings."                          This  Court  observed at  page  766               that  a combined reading of the said two  sec-               tions made it clear that subject to the  fight               of  appeal to the High Court on a  substantial               question  of  law,  the order  passed  by  the               Controller  or an order passed on  appeal  was               final  and could not be called in question  in               any  original suit, application  or  execution               proceeding.  The use of the expression  "shall               be  final" will have to be understood  in  the               proper context and keeping in view the purpose               of the different sections.                          On  behalf of the respondent,  Shri               Iyer relied on a decision of the Full Bench of               the Kerala High Court on which the High  Court               had  rested its decision in Ouseph  Vareed  v.               Mary,  [1968]  K.L.T.  583  in  repelling  the               submission  by the appellant on  this  aspect.               There  the High Court was concerned  with  the               identical Act. Balakrishna Eradi, J.  speaking               for the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court on               this  contention  after referring  to  several               decisions  observed  at pages 588-589  of  the               report as follows:

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             "The  contention  of the respondent  that  the               decision of the District Court rendered  under               S. 20(1) is not amenable to revisional  juris-               diction of the High Court under S. 115 of               the  Civil Procedure Code is based  mainly  on               the provision for               494               finality  contained  in S. 18(5) of  the  Act.               That Section is in the following terms:--               "The decision of the appellate authority,  and               subject to such decision, an order of the Rent               Control Court shall be final and shall not  be               liable  to be called in question in any  Court               of law, except as provided in S. 20."               What  is  to be noted here is  that  there  is               nothing  in  the Section which says  that  the               decision of the revisional authority under  S.               20  shall be final and shall not be called  in               question in any higher court."     The learned judge referred to the decision of the  Judi- cial   Committee   in  the  case  of  Maung  Ba   Thaw   and Another--Insolvents  v.  Ma  Pin, AIR  1934  P.C.  111.  The learned  judge also referred to a decision of this Court  in South  Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh  &  Ors. (supra).  The learned judge concluded that so long as  there was no specific provision in the statute making the determi- nation by the District Court final and excluding the  super- visory power of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure, it had to be held  that  the  decision rendered  by the District Court under section 20(1)  of  the Act  being  a decision of a court subordinate  to  the  High Court to which an appeal lay to the High Court was liable to be  revised by the High Court under section 115 of the  Code of  Civil  Procedure. In that view of the matter,  the  Full Bench rejected the view of the division bench of the  Kerala High  Court in Kurien v. Chacko, [1960] KLT 1248.  With  re- spect,  we are unable to sustain the view of the Full  Bench of  the  High  Court on this aspect of the  matter.  In  our opinion,  the  Full  Bench misconstrued  the  provisions  of subsection (5) of section 18 of the Act. Sub-section (5)  of section  18 clearly states that such decision of the  appel- late  authority as mentioned in section 18 of the Act  shall not  be liable to be questioned except in the  manner  under section 20 of the Act. There was thereby an implied prohibi- tion or exclusion of a second revision under section 115  of the  Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court when a  revi- sion has been provided under section 20 of the Act in  ques- tion. When section 18(5) of the Act specifically states that "shall  not be liable to be called in question in any  Court of  law" except in the manner provided under section 20,  it cannot  be said that the High Court which is a court of  law and which is a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure under  section  115  of the Code of  Civil  Procedure  could revise  again an order once again after revision under  sec- tion  20 of the Act. That would mean there would be a  trial by four courts, that would be repugnant to the scheme  mani- fest  in  the  different sections of the  Act  in  question. Public  policy  or public interest  demands  curtailment  of law’s  delay and justice demands finality within quick  dis- posal of 495 case.  The language of the provisions of section 18(5)  read with  section 20 inhibits further revision. The courts  must so construe.     Judicial  Committee in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma  Pin  (supra)

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was  dealing  with  the Provincial Insolvency  Act  and  the Judicial Committee observed that when a right of appeal  was given  to  any of the ordinary courts of  the  country,  the procedure,  orders and decrees of that Court would  be  gov- erned by the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code, and therefore  an appeal to Privy Council was maintainable  from the decision of the High Court. Here in the instant case the right  of  appeal has been given under the Act  not  to  any ordinary court of the country under the Code of Civil Proce- dure  but  to the courts enumerated under the Rent  Act.  In that  view of the matter, the ratio of that decision  cannot be  applied in aid of the submission for respondent in  this case.     Indeed  this view, in our opinion, is concluded  by  the decision  of  this  Court in the case of  Vishesh  Kumar  v. Shanti  Prasad,  [1980]  3 S.C.R. 32 where  this  Court  was concerned  with section 115 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure and the amendments made therein which superseded the  bifur- cation of the revisional jurisdiction between the High Court and the District Court. The High Court possessed  revisional jurisdiction  from an order of District Judge  disposing  of revision  petition. This Court observed that section 115  of the Code of Civil Procedure conferred on the High Court of a State power to remove any jurisdictional error committed  by a  subordinate court in cases where the error could  not  be corrected  by  resort to its appellate  jurisdiction.  There after  tracing the history of the amendment of the  Code  of Civil Procedure by Amendment Act, 1976, this Court  observed that  the amendment superseded the scheme of bifurcation  of revisional  jurisdiction  with effect from  1  st  February, 1977.  Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause  Courts  Act was  amended  from time to time in its  application  to  the State of U.P. The two questions that fell for  consideration before this Court were (i) whether the High Court  possessed the revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an order of the District Court under section 115 disposing of a revision petition and  (ii) whether  the  High Court possessed  revisional  jurisdiction under  section  115 of C.R.C. against an order  of  District Court under section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It  was held that the High Court was not vested  with  that. revisional jurisdiction. This Court was of the view that  an order under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause  Courts Act was not of a court of District Court and was not  amena- ble of revisional jurisdiction. This COurt ’further observed that an examination of the several provisions of the Provin- cial  Small  Cause Courts Act indicated that  it  was  self- sufficient  code so far as the enquiry covered by  that  Act was  concerned. All the indications in the Act were to  that effect. After 496 analysing the scheme and referring to the decisions of  this Court,  this  Court held that the jurisdiction of  the  High Court  under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure  was excluded.     In  that view of the matter, we are of the opinion  that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court was in error and the High Court in the instant case had no jurisdiction to inter- fere in this matter under section 115 of C.P.C.     It  was urged that in case we are of the opinion that  a revision  under section 115 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure does not lie, the case should be remitted to the High  Court for  consideration  as a petition under article 227  of  the Constitution.  We  are unable to accede.  A  petition  under article  227 of the Constitution is different from  revision

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under  section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  The  two procedures  are  not interchangeable though there  are  some common features. It must, however, be emphasised that we are not dealing in this appeal with the constitutional powers of the High Court under article 227 of the Constitution nor are we  concerned with the powers of the High  Court  regulating appeals  under the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. We are  con- cerned  in this case whether the High Court, in view of  the scheme  of  the  Act, had jurisdiction  to  interfere  under section  115  of the Code of Civil Procedure.  We  reiterate that to vest the High Court with any such jurisdiction would be  contrary to the scheme of the Act, would be contrary  to the public policy, and would be contrary to the  legislative intent as manifest from the different sections of the Act.     In  that view of the matter, the appeal must be  allowed on that ground alone and it is not necessary for us to refer to  the  other  grounds. We must  necessarily  overrule  the decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court referred to hereinbefore.     Before  we  conclude, we must, however, note  that  Shri Poti appearing for the tenant has conceded that rent  should be increased to Rs. 500 per month for the premises in  ques- tion, as the existing rent is too low. The appeal is accord- ingly  allowed and we direct on the concession of Shri  Poti that  rent  would be Rs. 500 per month from this  date.  The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside. In  the facts and circumstances of this case, there will  be no order as to costs. M.L.A.                                                Appeal allowed. 497