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PETITIONER: ATTAR SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: INDER KUMAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/11/1966

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. MITTER, G.K. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1967 AIR  773            1967 SCR  (2)  50

ACT: East Punjab Urban Restriction Act (III of 1949)-s. 13(3) (a) (ii)-scope  of-Whether  ejectment order can be  obtained  by landlora  for  any  purpose "for his own  use"-Or  only  for purposes of business or trade.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  was  the tenant of certain  land  which  was "rented  land"  within the -meaning of s. 2(f) of  the  East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act III of 1949, and which was taken  by  him  for the purpose of a  firewood  stall.   The respondent  filed ’an application for the ejectment  of  the appellant from the land mainly on the ground that he  needed the  land himself to erect a residential house  and  claimed that  he  was  entitiled  an order  of  ejectment  under  s. 13(3)(a)(ii)  of  the Act.  The landlord could an  order  of ejectment  under  s.  13(3)(a)(ii) of  the  Act.   The  Rent Controller  dismissed the application on the view  that  the landlord could only obtain an order under s. 13 (3) (a) (ii) to  have  the land vacated if he needed it  for  a  business purpose.   However,  the  Appellate  authority  allowed  the appeal  holding  that it was open to the landlord to  get  a tenant  ejected  whatever may be the purpose  for  which  he required the land for his own use.  The decision was  upheld in revision by the High Court. On appeal to this Court, HELD : As the respondent landlord required the land not  for business  or trade principally but only for  constructing  a house  for  himself,  he  was  not  entitled  to-eject   the ’appellant under s. 13(3)(a)(ii). [55 D] Although  sub-sclause (a) of s.13(3)(a)(ii)  which  provides for  the landlord to be put in possession of the land if  he requires  it  "for his own use" is not qualified,  the  fact that sub-cls. (b) and (c) ’require that the landlord  should not be in possession of any rented land for his own business and should not have given up possession of any other  rented land,  i.e.,  land  which  he  was  principally  using   for business,  shows  that he can only take  advantage  of  sub- cl.(c)  if he is able to show that he requires  the   rented land for business.  Otherwise the restrictions contained  in sub-cl.   (b)  and  sub-cl. (c)  would  become  meaningless.

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Reading sub-cls. (a) (b) and  (c) together there can  be  no doubt  that sub-cl. (a) is restricted to land  required  for business or trade. [54 G-55 G] Municipal  committee,  Abohar v. Daulat Ram,  I.L.R.  [1959] Punjab 1131; overruled.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  2009  of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the.judgment and  order  dated July  15,  1966 of the Punjab High Court in  Civil  Revision 1077 of 1966. Gopal Singh, for the appellant. S.   L. Chhiber and M. L. Chhiber, for the respondent. 51 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, J. The main question raised in this appeal by  spe- cial leave from the judgment of the Punjab High Court is the interpretation  of  s. 13 (3) (a) (ii) of  the  East  Punjab Urban  Rent Restriction Act, No. III of  1949,  (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  Act).   Brief  facts  necessary   for determination of this question are these.  The appellant was the  tenant of certain land at Lahori Gate, Patiala.  It  is not  in dispute that the land in question is  "rented  land" within  the meaning of s. 2 (f) of the Act inasmuch  as  the land  was  taken  by  the appellant for  the  purpose  of  a firewood  stall.  The original owner of the land  became  an evacuee,  and eventually the respondent purchased  the  land from the Managing Officer and a sale certificate was  issued in  his favour on May 31, 1963.  The appellant  thus  became the respondent’s tenant.  Thereafter the respondent filed an application  for the ejectment of the appellant on a  number of grounds.  One of the grounds in support of the claim  for ejectment  was  that  the respondent  needed  the  land  for erection  of  a residential house.  It is this  ground  with which  we are mainly concerned in the present  appeal.   The case of the appellant on the other hand was that even if the respondent   required  the  land  for  construction   of   a residential  house  he  could  not  be  given  an  order  of ejectment  under  s.  13  (3) (a) (ii).   That  is  how  the interpretation  of  this  provision mainly  arises  in,  the present appeal. The  Rent  Controller  held  that  it  was  clear  that  the respondent  did not need the land for running  any  business and only needed it for constructing a residential house  for himself.   He took the view that rented land could  only  be got vacated under s. 13 (3) (a) (ii) if the landlord  needed it  for a business purpose.  On the other points  raised  in the  case the Rent Controller found against the  respondent. Therefore he dismissed the application. The  respondent then went in appeal to the Appellate  Autho- rity.   The Appellate Authority allowed the appeal.  It  was of the view that it was open to the landlord to get a tenant ejected  from rented land under s. 13 (3) (a)  ii)  whatever may be the purpose for which the landlord required the  land for  his  own  use.  The Appellate  Authority  followed  the decision  of the Punjab High Court in  Municipal  Committee, Abohar  v.  Daulat Ram.(1) The other points  raised  in  the appeal  were also decided in favour of the landlord and  the Appellate  Authority  allowed the appeal  and  directed  the tenant to put the landlord in possession. The appellant then went in revision to the High Court  which upheld  the  view  taken  by  the  Appellate  Authority  and

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dismissed  the revision.  Thereupon the  appellant  obtained special  leave,  and  that; is how the matter  has  come  up before us. (1)  I.L.R. [1959] Punjab 1131. 52 The  Act  was  passed  in  1949,  and  the  purpose  of  the legislation was to restrict the increase of rent of  certain premises  situate  within  ’the limits of  urban  areas  and eviction   of  tenants.   The  Act  thus  is  a   piece   of ameliorative  legislation  in the interests  of  tenants  of premises  in  urban  areas, so that they  may  be  protected against  large  increase  in rents and  from  harassment  by eviction  consequent on the increase of population  and  the division  of  the  Punjab  in 1947  and  large  movement  of population  in  consequence  thereof.  The  Act  deals  with buildings-residential  and  non-residential-and  also   with rented  land.  In the present appeal we are  concerned  with rented land, which is defined in s. 2(f) as meaning any land let separately for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade.  ’Thus rented land is a piece of land  on which  there is no building-residential or  non-residential, but  which  has been let for business or trade, as  in  this case,  for keeping a firewood stall.  Sections 4 to 10  deal with  fair  rent and other ancillary  matters.   Section  13 provides  for  protection to tenants  from  eviction.   Sub- section (1) thereof, inter alia, lays down that a tenant  in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom  except in accordance with the provisions of  that section.   Sub-section (2) then provide grounds on  which  a landlord  may  get  a tenant evicted  and  applies  both  to buildings  and  rented land.  We are not  concerned  in  the present  appeal  with  this  sub-section.   Sub-section  (3) provides  for  special cases of eviction  and  the  relevant provision with which we are concerned reads thus :-               "(3)   (a)  A  landlord  may  apply   to   the               Controller  for an order directing the  tenant               to put the landlord in possession.               (ii)in the case of rented land, if-               (a)   he requires it for his own use               (b)   he  is not occupying in the  urban  area               concerned for the purpose of his business  any               other such rented land, and               (c)   he  has  not vacated  such  rented  land               without    sufficient    cause    after    the               commencement  of this Act, in the  urban  area               concerned." The  contention of the respondent-landlord which  has  found favour with the High Court is that this provision applies in the case of rented land if the landlord requires that rented land for his own use, and it is urged that as the expression "for  his own use" is unqualified, the landlord can ask  for eviction  if  he requires the rented land for his  own  use, whatever may be the use to which he may put the rented  land after eviction.  This view was taken by the High 53 Court in the case of Municipal Committee, Abohar(1) and  has been  followed in the present case.  On the other hand,  the contention on behalf of the appellant-tenant is that  though the  words  "for his own use" in this provision are  not  in terms  qualified,  they  must be read  as  qualified,  on  a combined reading of sub-clauses (b) and (c) along with  sub- cl.  (a);  and if that is done, the provision  really  means that a landlord can ask for eviction of rented land only  in those  cases where he requires the rented land for  his  own use for carrying on a trade or business principally.   Thus,

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it is urged, even if a landlord requires the rented land  in order to construct a residential building for himself,  that is  not  requirement for his own use within the  meaning  of sub-cl. (a) of this provision.  As in this case the landlord has  stated  definitely  that  he  required  the  land   for constructing  a residential building for himself and for  no other  purpose  it is contended for the  appellant  that  he cannot take advantage of s. 13 (3) (a) (ii). We  are of opinion that the contention raised on  behalf  of the  appellant  is correct, and the view taken by  the  High Court in the case of Municipal Committee Abohar(1) cannot be sustained.  It is   true that in sub-cl. (a) the words  "for his  own  use" are not qualified and at first sight  it  may appear that a landlord can ask for eviction from rented land if  he requires it for his own use, whatever may be the  use to which he may put it after eviction.  Now if sub-cls.  (b) and   (c)  were  not  there  this  would  be   the   correct interpretation of sub-cl. (a).  This interpretation has been put by the High Court in Municipal Committee Abohar(1);  but in that case the High Court has not considered the effect of sub-cls. (b) and (c) on the meaning to be given to the words "for his own use" in sub-cl. (a) and seems to have proceeded as if sub-cls. (b) and (c) were not there at all.  We are of opinion  that sub-cl. (a) has to be read in  this  provision along  with  sub-cls.  (b) and (c) and it  has  to  be  seen whether  the  presence  of sub-cls. (b) and  (c)  makes  any difference to the meaning     of the words "for his own use" in sub-cl (a), which is otherwise unqualified.  Now if  sub- cls.  (b) and (c) were not there, a landlord can ask for  an order  directing the tenant to put him in possession in  the case  of rented land if he required it for his own use.   In such  circumstances it would have been immaterial  what  was the  use  to which the landlord intended to put  the  rented land  after he gets possession of it so long as he  uses  it himself.   But as the provision stands, he  landlord  cannot get  possession  of  rented land merely by  saying  that  he requires  it "for his own use" (whatever may be the  use  to which he may put it after getting possession of it); he  has also to show be-fore he can get possession, firstly, that he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of  his  business  any other ’such  rented  land.   If  (for example) he is in possession of any     other rented land in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business  he cannot ask for eviction of his tenant from his rented (1)I.L.R. [1959] Punj. 1131. 54 land,  even  though the rented land of which he  may  be  in possession  for the purpose of his business may not  be  his own  land  and he may only be a tenant of that  land.   This shows  clearly  that though the words "for his own  use"  in sub-cls  (a)  are  not  qualified,  the  intention  of   the legislature  must  have  been that if  the  landlord  is  in possession  of  other  rented  land,  whether  his  own   or belonging to somebody else, for his business he cannot evict a tenant from his own rented land.  It clearly follows  from this that the intention when the words "for his own use" are used in sub-cl. (a) is that the landlord requires the rented land from which he is asking for eviction of the tenant  for his  own trade or business.  Otherwise we cannot  understand why,  if  it is the intention of the  legislature  that  the landlord  can ask for eviction of his tenant of rented  land for any purpose whatever, he should not get it back if he is in  possession of other rented land for his business.   This to our mind clearly implies that sub-cl. (a) has to be  read in  the  light of sub-cl.(b), and if that is so,  the  words

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"for  his own use" must receive a meaning restricted by  the implication arising from sub-cl. (b). Turning  now to sub-cl. (c), we find that the  landlord  has not  only to prove before he can get the tenant  evicted  on the ground that he requires rented land for his own use that he  is  not in possession of any other rented land  for  the purpose of his business in that urban area but also to prove that  he had not vacated any rented land without  sufficient cause  after the commencement of the Act.  Thus he  has  not only  to  prove that he is not in possession  of  any  other rented  land for his business but also to prove that he  had not vacated any other rented land which he used  principally for business without sufficient cause.  For example, even if the landlord is not in possession of any rented land for his business but had vacated other rented land which means  land that  he had taken for business without sufficient cause  he would still not be entitled to ask for eviction of a  tenant from  his  own rented land.  This again shows  that  if  the landlord  had  been  in  possession  of  land  for  business principally  and  vacated  it without  sufficient  cause  he cannot ask for the eviction of a tenant from his own  rented land on the ground that he requires it for his own use. It should therefore be clear that "for his own use" in  sub- cls  (a) means use for the purpose of business  principally, for otherwise we cannot understand why, if the landlord  had given  up some rented land which he had taken  for  business principally,  he should not be entitled to recover  his  own rented  land  if he required it (say) as in this  case,  for constructing  a residential building for himself.  The  very fact  that  sub-cls. (b) and (c) require that  the  landlord should  not be in possession of any rented land for his  own business  and  should not have given up  possession  of  any other rented land, ie., land which he was principally  using for business, show that he can 55 only  take  advantage of sub-cl. (a) if he is able  to  show that  he requires the rented land for  business.   Otherwise the  restrictions contained in sub-cl. (b) and  sub-cl.  (c) would  become meaningless, if it were held that sub-cl.  (a) would be statisfied if the landlord requires the rented land for any purpose as (for example) constructing a  residential house  for himself.  We are of opinion therefore  that  sub- cls.  (a),  (b)  and  (c) in this  provision  must  be  read together,  and reading them together there can be  no  doubt that  when sub-cl. (a) provides that the  landlord  requires rented land for his own use, the meaning there is restricted to  use principally for business or trade.  We have  already said  that the Act is an ameliorative piece  of  legislation meant  for  the  protection  of  tenants,  and  we  have  no hesitation  in coming to the conclusion that the words  "for his  own  use" in sub-cl. (a) in the circumstances  must  be limited  in  the manner indicated above, as that  will  give full protection to tenants of rented land and save them from eviction unless the landlord requires such land for the same purpose for which it had been let ie. principally for  trade or  business.   We are therefore of opinion  that  the  view taken  in  the  case of  Municipal  Committee  Abohar(1)  is incorrect, and as the respondent landlord required the  land in this case not for business or trade principally but  only for  constructing a house for himself he is not entitled  to eject the appellant under s. 13 (3) (a) (ii). In  this  view of the matter it is unnecessary  to  consider other  points which were raised in the High Court and  which were  also raised before us.  The appeal is  hereby  allowed and the application for eviction of the appellant  rejected.

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As already ordered, the appellant will pay the costs of  the respondent. R.K.P.S. Appeal allowed. (1) I.L.R. 11959] Punj. 1131. 56