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PETITIONER: ATTAR SINGH & OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF U. P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/12/1958

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. SUBBARAO, K.

CITATION:  1959 AIR  564            1959 SCR  Supl. (1) 928  CITATOR INFO :  D          1967 SC  57  (7)  RF         1967 SC 856  (13)  F          1967 SC1568  (6)

ACT: Agricultural Holdings, Consolidation of-Constitutional vali- dity   of   enactment-Procedure,   if    discriminatory-U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (U.P. V of 1954) as amended by Act  No. XVI of 1957, ss. 8, 9, 10, 14 to 17, 19 to 22,  49- Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 31(2).

HEADNOTE: The  petitioners challenged the constitutional  validity  of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (U . P. V of 954), as amended  by  the  amending  Acts,  which  was  intended   to encourage the development of agriculture by the allotment of compact  areas to tenure-holders in lieu of scattered  plots so  that large-scale cultivation might be possible with  all its  attendant advantages.  A notification was issued  under s. 4 Of the impugned Act declaring the decision of the State Government  to  formulate  a  scheme  of’  consolidation  in respect of the area where the petitioners held their  lands. This  was followed up by a statement of proposals  under  s. 19.   The  petitioners  objected  to  these  proposals   and thereafter    appealed    to    the    Settlement    Officer (Consolidation)  but to no effect.  It was contended,  inter alia,  on their behalf that (1) the provisions of ss.  8,  9 and  10  read with those Of s- 49 Of the impugned  Act  were discriminatory  in  that  they laid  down  a  procedure  for correction and revision of revenue records for 929 villages under consolidation that was vitally different from that  applicable  to  other villages  under  the  U.P.  Land Revenue  Act, 1901; (2) that ss. 14 to 17 as also ss. 19  to 22  read  with  s.  49 conferred  arbitrary  powers  on  the consolidation  authorities  in respect of the lands  of  the tenure-holder and his rights therein and deprived him of the protection of courts available to other tenure: holders  and that  (3) S. 29B which provided for compensation, by  giving

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inadequate  compensation,  offended Art. 31(2) Of  the  Con- stitution. Held, that the contentions must fail. Although the procedure laid down by the impugned Act was  to some extent different from that under the U.P. Revenue  Act, 1901,  it  was by no means arbitrary or  devoid  of  natural justice.    Regard   being  had  to  the   advantages   that consolidation conferred on the tenure-holder such difference was  supportable  as  a  permissible  classification  on  an intelligible  differentia  reasonably  connected  with   the object   of   the  Act.   The  expeditious   procedure   for effectuating  consolidation laid down by ch.  II of the  Act read with the Rules, therefore, could not be said to violate Art. 14 Of the Constitution. Nor could for similar reasons the provisions of ch.  III  of the Act be said to violate Art. 14 Of the Constitution.  The provision Of S. 22(2) Of the Act which made the decision  of the arbitrator final by ousting the jurisdiction of ordinary courts even where a party had obtained a decree which  might be   under  appeal,  was  necessary  in  the   interest   of expedition. Having  regard to the peculiar conditions in cases  of  this kind and the advantages a scheme of consolidation offered to the entire body of tenure-holders, it could not be said that the cash compensation for tenure holders provided by s.  29B of the impugned Act was inadequate, even assuming that  Art. 31(2) applied to the case.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 119 of 1957. Writ Petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Achhru   Ram,  J.  P.  Goyal  and  K.  L.  Mehta,  for   the petitioners. H.   N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,  K.L. Misra, Advocate-General for the State of U. P. and Gopi Nath Dixit, for the respondent. 1958.  December 17.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the  Constitution challenges the constitutionality of the 117 930 U.P.  Consolidation of Holdings Act, (U.  P. V of 1954),  as amended  by U. P. Acts No. XXVI of 1954, No. XIII  of  1955, No.  XX  of  1955, No. XXIV of 1956 and  No.  XVI  of  1957, (hereinafter  called  the  Act).  The  applicants  are  four brothers  holding  land in village  Banat,  tahsil  Kairana, District Muzaffarnagar.  A notification was issued under  s. 4  of the Act in respect of 223 villages in tahsil  Kairana, declaring  that the State Government had decided to  make  a scheme of consolidation in that area.  This was followed  up by necessary action under the various provisions of the  Act resulting   in  a  statement  of  proposals  under  s.   19. Objections to these proposals were filed by the  petitioners and   others,  which  were  decided  in  April  1956.    The petitioners  went  in  appeal  to  the  Settlement   Officer (Consolidation),  which was decided in August 1957.  It  was thereafter  that  the  present petition was  filed  in  this Court. The  petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the  Act on  various grounds, of which the following five  have  been urged before us:-

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(1)Section  6  read  with s. 4 of the  Act  gives  arbitrary powers  to  the State Government  to  accord  discriminatory treatment to tenure-holders in different villages by placing some  villages under consolidation while  excluding  others, thus offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. (2)Sections 8, 9 and 10 read with s. 49 of the Act provide a procedure for the correction and revision of revenue records for villages under consolidation, which is vitally different from  that applicable to villages not  under  consolidation, and  there is thus discrimination which offends Art.  14  of the Constitution ; (3)Sections  14  to 17 read with s. 49,  confer    arbitrary powers on the consolidation authorities under which they can deprive  a tenure-holder of his land or rights  therein  and the  tenure-holder  has been deprived of the  protection  of courts  available  to other tenure-holders in  villages  not under  consolidation,  thus  creating  discrimination  which offends Art. 14. 931 (4)Sections  19  to  22,  read  with  s.  49,  again  create discrimination on the same grounds as ss. 14 to 17, and are, therefore, hit by Art. 14; and (5)Section  29-B,  which  provides  for  compensation  gives inadequate compensation and is, therefore, hit by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. Before we take these points seriatim, it is useful to  refer to the background of this legislation.  As far back as 1939, the  U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act No. VIII  of  1939, was  passed.  It was, however, of little effect, because  it could  only  be  applied when more  than  one-third  of  the proprietors of the cultivated area of a village applied  for an   order  of  consolidation  of  the  village.   It   was, therefore,  felt  that  some kind  of  compulsion  would  be necessary  in order to achieve consolidation of holdings  in villages.   That  consolidation would  result  in  improving agricultural production goes without saying and it was  with the  object  of encouraging the development  of  agriculture that consolidation schemes with a compulsory character  were taken up in various States, after the recommendation of  The Famine  Inquiry  Commission,  1944,  in  its  Final  Report; (Seepage  263).  The State of Bombay. was the first to  pass an  Act  called the Bombay Prevention of  Fragmentation  and Consolidation  of Holdings Act, (Bom.  LXII of 1947).   This was  followed  by the impugned Act in  Uttar  Pradesh.   The object  of  the Act is to allot a compact area  in  lieu  of scattered  plots  to  tenure-holders  so  that  large  scale cultivation   may  be  possible  with  all   its   attendant advantages.  Thus’ by the reduction of boundary-lines saving of  land takes place and the number of boundary-disputes  is reduced.   There  is  saving of time in  the  management  of fields inasmuch as the farmer is saved from travelling  from field to field, which may be at considerable distances  from each  other.’  Proper barriers such as  fences,  hedges  and ditches  can  be erected around a compact  area  to  prevent trespassing  and  thieving.  It would further be  easier  to control  irrigation  and drainage and  disputes  over  water would  be  reduced  considerably  where  compact  areas  are allotted  to tenure-holders.  Lastly, the control of  pests, insects 932 and plant-disease is made easier where farmers have  compact areas  under cultivation.  These advantages  resulting  from consolidation  of  holdings are intended  to  encourage  the development  of  agriculture and larger production  of  food grains, which is the necessity of the day.

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With these objects in mind, the Act was passed by the U.  P. Legislature in 1953 and received the assent of the President on March 4, 1954.  It was published in the gazette on  March 8, 1954, and declarations under s. 4 were made for the major part   of  the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh,   including   the petitioners’ village, in July, 1954. The scheme of the Act is as follows:- When consolidation of a village is taken up, the first thing that is done is to correct the revenue records, and ss. 7 to 12 deal with that.  Then comes the second stage of preparing what  are called statements of principles ; (see ss.  14  to 18).   Objections  to these principles are  entertained  and decided and thereafter the principles are confirmed under s. 18.   Then comes the third stage (vide ss. 19 to 23),  which deals  with the preparation of the statement  of  proposals. Objections  to  this are also invited and disposed  of,  and then  proposals  are  confirmed  under  s.  23.   After  the proposals have been confirmed, we come to the last stage  in which  the  confirmed proposals are enforced;  (see  ss.  24 onwards).   It will be clear therefore from the  objects  of the   Act   and  the  advantages  that   accrue   from   its implementation  that  it is a piece  of  legislation,  which should  be  a boon to the tenure-holders in  a  village  and should  also  lead  to the development  of  agriculture  and increase of food-production.  It is in this setting that  we have  to  examine  the  attack that has  been  made  on  the constitutionality of the Act. Re.  1  :  Section 6 of the Act gives  power  to  the  State Government at any time to cancel the declaration made  under s.  4  in  respect  of the whole or any  part  of  the  area specified  therein.  When such declaration is made the  area ceases  to be under consolidation operations and s. 5  which provides for the effect of a declaration ceases to  operate. It is urged that s. 4 933 gives arbitrary power to the State Government to cancel  the declaration, even with respect to a part of the area covered by  it  and thus discriminates between  villages  which  are under   consolidation   and  those  which  are   not   under consolidation.   The  learned Additional  Solicitor  General counters this argument in two ways: (i) Section 6 is nothing more  than  a  restatement  of the  power  which  the  State Government  otherwise  possessed under the  General  Clauses Act;  and (ii) the high status of the authority to whom  the power is given, namely, the State Government, and the  rules framed  under  the  Act  laying  down  a  standard  for  the Government  to follow, remove any flavour  of  arbitrariness which  the  terms of the section might import.   It  is  not necessary  to express any opinion in this case on  the  said contention, for, even if it be accepted, the result would be only that s. 6 would be struck down.  The petitioners  would be in the same position with s. 6 on the Statute or  without it.   It may be that, if a citizen in whose favour an  order of  consolidation has been made but subsequently  cancelled, comes   to  court  with  a  grievance  that  the  order   of consolidation  was  for  his benefit but  was  cancelled  in exercise  of  a power under a void  section,  this  question might  arise  for consideration.  It may also  be  that  the petitioners’  right  might  be infringed if s.  6  were  not severable from the other provisions of the Act which  enable the  Government  to direct consolidation of  holdings.   The power  of cancellation cannot be said to be so  inextricably mixed up with the power to order consolidation as to prevent the operation of one section without the other.  Nor can  it be  said that the Legislature would not have  conferred  the

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power  on the Government to consolidate holdings without  at the  same  time conferring on them the power to  cancel  the said  order  of  consolidation.   The  said  provisions  are clearly   severable.    In   the   circumstances,   as   the petitioners’  case  is not affected by s. 6 of the  Act,  we leave this open to be decided in an appropriate case. Re.  2:  This  deals with the first stage  of  revision  and correction  of  maps and records, which has  to  take  place before the actual consolidation scheme is put 934 into  force.  Section 7 provides for the examination of  the revenue  records by the Assistant Consolidation Officer  and he  is  enjoined to test the accuracy of  the  village  map, khasra  and the current annual registers by making a  partal in accordance with the procedure to be prescribed.  After he has  done the partal, he is to prepare a  statement  showing the  mistakes  discovered in the map, khasra  and  khatauni, ’and  the number and nature of disputes pertaining  to  land records under the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901.  Then  under s.  8  he submits a report to the Settlement  Officer  (Con- solidation) in this connection with his opinion whether  any revision of such maps and records is needed.  On receipt  of this  report,  the Settlement Officer may either  order  the Assistant   Consolidation  Officer  to  proceed   with   the correction  of  maps and records, which we presume  he  will order when there are not too many mistakes, or recommend  to the  State  Government for revision of maps  or  records  in accordance with the provisions of Ch.  IV of the U. P.  Land Revenue Act, 1901, which he will presumably do if there  are too  many  mistakes found.  If the  Assistant  Consolidation Officer  is ordered to make the corrections he will  make  a further  partal,  if necessary, and correct the map  or  the entries in annual register in accordance with the  procedure to be prescribed.  The procedure is prescribed in r. 22  and among   other  things  it  lays  down  that  the   Assistant Consolidation  Officer shall issue a notice to  all  persons affected  by  the  provisional  entries  proposed  by   him; objections  are invited and parties are examined  and  heard and   their   evidence   taken  and   then   the   Assistant Consolidation  Officer makes the corrections.  His order  is open  to appeal within twentyone days under s. 8(4)  to  the Consolidation  Officer, and the order of the latter is  made final. It  is urged that this procedure is vitally  different  from the  procedure prescribed under the U. P. Land  Revenue  Act and  that  under s. 49 of the Act the  jurisdiction  of  the civil and revenue courts with respect to any matters arising out  of consolidation proceedings is barred, thus  depriving those  affected by the orders of the  Consolidation  Officer the right to file a suit as they 935 could  have  done  under the provisions of the  U.  P.  Land Revenue Act; (see ss. 40, 41, 51 and 54).  There is no doubt that there is some difference between the procedure provided under the Act and that which the tenure-holders ’Would  have been   entitled   to  if  their  village   was   not   under consolidation.   But  if  consolidation is  a  boon  to  the tenure-holders of a village, as we hold it is, and if it  is to be put through within a reasonable period of time, it  is necessary  to have a procedure which would be  shorter  than the  ordinary procedure under the U. P. Land Revenue Act  or through  a suit in a civil or revenue court.  The  procedure that  has  been provided cannot by any means be said  to  be arbitrary  or  lacking in the essentials  of  principles  of natural justice.  The Assistant Consolidation Officer  gives

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notice  to the persons affected, hears their objections  and gives  them an opportunity to produce evidence.   Thereafter he decides the objections and one appeal is provided against his  order.  This should, in our opinion, be enough  in  the special circumstances arising under the Act to do justice to those who object to the correction of records.  All that has happened  is that the number of appeals is out down  to  one and that in our opinion is not such a violent departure from the  ordinary  procedure  as  to make  us  strike  down  the provisions   contained   in   Ch.   II   of   the   Act   as discriminatory, in the peculiar circumstances arising out of a scheme of consolidation which must, if it has to be of any value,  be put through within a reasonable period  of  time. Whatever difference there may be may well be supported as  a permissible  classification on an  intelligible  differentia having  a  reasonable relation to the object  sought  to  be achieved  by  the Act.  Further s. 12  provides  that  where there  is  dispute  as to title and such  question  has  not already  been  deter.  mined by  any  competent  Court,  the Consolidation   Officer  has  to  refer  the  question   for determination  to the Civil Judge who thereafter will  refer it  to the arbitrator.  The arbitrator then proceeds in  the manner provided by r. 73 and gives a bearing to the  parties and  takes evidence both oral and documentary before  making his award; and s. 37 of the Act makes the 936 Arbitration  Act  applicable to the proceedings  before  the arbitrator  in the matter of procedure.  Taking,  therefore, the  scheme of Ch. 11 and remembering that if  consolidation is  to  be  put through there must  be  a  more  expeditious procedure,  there  is  in our  opinion  rational  basis  for classification which justifes the procedure under Ch. 11  of the Act read with the Rules in villages where  consolidation scheme  is  to be effective.  The attack,  therefore,  under Art.  14  of the Constitution on the provisions of  Ch.   II fails. Re.  3  and 4: The contentions on these heads may  be  taken together.   They  attack the provisions of Ch.  III  dealing with the Statement of Principles and Statement of Proposals. The   statement  of  principles  is  first   published   and objections   are  invited.   Under  s.  17   the   Assistant Consolidation  Officer decides the objections after  hearing the parties, if necessary, and taking into account the  view of the Consolidation Committee.  He then submits a report to the  Consolidation Officer who after hearing  the  objectors and  taking such evidence as may be necessary  passes  final order and confirms the statement of principles; (see r.  43- B).  Similarly, when statements of proposals are  published, objections  are invited to them, and the same  procedure  is followed in the decision of these objections as in the  case of  the objections to the statement of principles.   In  the case  of the statement of proposals also, there  is  similar provision  to refer disputed question of title to the  Civil Judge,  who,  in  his turn, refers  it  to  the  arbitrator. Section  22 also provides that where such question has  been referred to the arbitrator, all suits or proceedings in  the court  of first instance, appeal, reference or revision,  in which  the  question  of title to the  same  land  has  been raised,  shall be stayed.  Section 22(3) makes the  decision of  the arbitrator final.  There is no provision for  appeal in  Ch.   III though in fact two persons  hear  the  matter, namely,   the  Assistant  Consolidation  Officer   and   the Consolidation  Officer.   But  the main  attack  is  on  the provisions  of s. 22(2) on account of which it is said  that even  where  a party has obtained a decree  which  might  be

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under appeal, the jurisdiction of the ordinary 937 courts  is taken away and the decision of the arbitrator  is made   final.    That  is  undoubtedly  so.   But   if   the consolidation  scheme has to be put through in a  reasonable period  of  time  such  a  provision  is,  in  our  opinion, necessary; but for it the consolidation schemes may never be really  put  through  for there will be  little  purpose  in making  consolidation where a large number of  disputes  are pending  in  the  courts.  Reasons which we  have  given  in dealing  with  the second point apply with  equal  force  to these two points also, and we are of opinion that there is a rational  basis for a classification which has a nexus  with the object of the Act, and therefore, the attack under  Art. 14 on the provisons of Chapter III also must fail. Re.  5.  Under this head,, the  inadequacy  of  compensation provided  under  s. 29-B of the Act is raised.   It  may  be mentioned  that  the  Act, as  originally  passed,  did  not contain any provision for compensation.  There were a number of  writ applications in the Allahabad High Court  and  that court  held  that inasmuch as some property was  taken  away under s. 14(1) (ee) for public purposes and no  compensation was  provided, that provision was void under Art. 31 (2)  as it  stood  before the Constitution (Fourth  Amendment)  Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Fourth Amendment,).  Appeals by the  State  Government from that decision of  the  Allahabad High Court are pending before us and we shall deal with them separately.   The  legislature then enacted s.  29-B  laying down the principles on which compensation would be paid  for lands taken away under s. 14 (1) (ee) after the decision  of the  Allahabad High Court.  This section was put by Act  XVI of  1957 in the original Act with retrospective effect  from the  date from which the original Act was enforced.   It  is urged that the compensation provided therein is  inadequate, and,  therefore, the provision should be struck  down  under Art.  31  (2),  as  it  was  before  the  Fourth  Amendment. Arguments were also addressed on the question whether s. 29- B would be saved by the 118 938 Fourth  Amendment.  We, however, think it unnecessary to  go into these arguments for we have come to the conclusion that in the circumstances of this case the compensation  provided under  s.  29-B  is adequate.  Assuming  that  the  case  is governed  by  Art.  31  (2) as  it  was  before  the  Fourth Amendment, s. 29-B provides for payment of cash compensation equal to four times the value determined at hereditary rates to  a  bhumidar and two times the value to  a  sirdar.   The difference  between the two rates has not been attacked  for the rights of a bhumidar are much higher than the rights  of a  sirdar.  The bhumidar is the owner of the land while  the sirdar  is  merely a tenant; but the argument  is  that  the amount provided is inadequate, and that it is certainly  not the fair market value of the land. Let  us see what s. 14 (1) (ee) provides.  It lays down  the basis  on which the tenure--holder will  contribute  towards the  land  required for public purposes and  the  extent  to which vacant land may be utilised for the said purpose.   We are  here  concerned  with  the  first  part,  namely,   the contribution  of  tenure-holders towards land  required  for public purposes.  In this case the petitioners had lands  in one  chak  of the rental value of Rs. 20-6-0 and  they  have been  allotted  lands  of the rental  value  of  Rs.  20-5-0 instead.  In another chak, in place of land the rental value of which is Rs. 148-10-0 they have been allotted land of the

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rental  value of Rs. 147-13-0.  Thus out of the land  valued at Rs. 169-0-0, they have been allotted land of the value of Rs. 168-2-0, and land valued at Annas 0-14-0 has gone to the common  pool.  The percentage is just over a half per  cent. it hardly ever exceeds one per cent.  Thus the land which is taken over is a small bit, which sold by itself would hardly fetch  anything.   These small bits of lands  are  collected from  various tenure-holders and consolidated in  one  place and added to the land which might be lying vacant so that it may  be used for the purposes of s. 14 (1) (ee).  A  compact area is thus created and it is used for the purposes of  the tenure-holders  themselves and other villagers.  Form  CH-21 framed under r. 41 (1) shows the purposes to which this land would be applied, 939 namely,  (1)  plantation  of trees, (2)  pasture  land,  (3) manure pits, (4) threshing floor, (5) cremation ground,  (6) graveyards, (7) primary or other school, (8) playground, (9) panchayatghar,  and  (10) such other objects.   These  small bits   of  land  thus  acquired  from:  tenure-holders   are consolidated and used for these purposes, which are directly for the benefit of the tenure-holders.  They are deprived of a small bit and in place of it they are given advantages  in a  much larger area of land made up of these small bits  and also of vacant land.  The question then is whether in  these circumstances  it  can be said that the  tenureholders  have been  given adequate compensation by. s. 29-B for the  small bits  of land acquired from them for public purposes.   This case must be distinguished from other cases where lands  are acquired  under  the  Land Acquisition  Act,  for  here  the benefit  is direct to the tenure-holders while  in  ordinary cases of land acquired for public purposes, if there is  any benefit to the person from whom the land is acquired, it  is indirect and remote.  It is contended on behalf of the State in the circumstances that the compensation which the tenure- holders  get is not merely the cash compensation which  they receive  under  s. 29-B but also the  advantage  which  they receive   by  these  small  bits  taken  from   them   being consolidated  into a larger area of land in which they  will have benefits, the nature of which is indicated in form  CH- 21,  over and above the advantage of having their  scattered holdings  consolidated into a compact block.  The  question, therefore,  is whether in these circumstances the  provision of actual cash compensation under s. 29-B can be said to  be inadequate.  We are of opinion that taking into account  the peculiar  conditions in cases of this kind  and  remembering that  the land taken from each individual tenure-holder  may be a small bit and it is then consolidated into a large area by adding some other lands taken from other  tenure-holders, and  the whole is then used for the advantage of  the  whole body  of  tenure-holders, it cannot be said  that  the  cash compensation,  added  to the advantages  which  the  tenure- holders get in the 940 large  area  of  land thus constituted  and  on  account  of getting  a  compact  block for  themselves,  is  inadequate. Therefore,  assuming  that  Art. 31 (2) applies  as  it  was before  the  Fourth Amendment, it cannot be  said  that  the compensation which the tenure-holders will get under s. 29-B is  inadequate in the circumstances.  This ground of  attack also therefore fails. There  is  no  force  in this  petition  and  it  is  hereby dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.

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