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PETITIONER: ATMA RAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS(and connected petition)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/12/1958

BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. SUBBARAO, K. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1959 AIR  519            1959 SCR  Supl. (1) 748  CITATOR INFO :  R          1960 SC 796  (3)  R          1960 SC1080  (17,69,75)  E          1961 SC 954  (23)  R          1962 SC 137  (8)  R          1962 SC 694  (26,27,67)  R          1962 SC 723  (42)  R          1965 SC 632  (4)  R          1967 SC1110  (11,12)  R          1967 SC1373  (40)  R          1972 SC 425  (31)  F          1972 SC 486  (13)  R          1985 SC 236  (46)  RF         1988 SC1708  (15)

ACT:        Land Tenure-Modification of landlord’s rights in land-Enact-        ment-Competence    of    State    Legislature-Constitutional        validity--Punjab  Security of Land Tenure Act (Punj.   X  of        1953),as  amended by Act XI of 1955, s.  18-Constitution  of        India,  Arts.  14, 19, 31, 31A, 246(3),  Entry  18,List  11,        Seventh  Schedule-Punjab  Land Revenue Act (Punj.   XVII  of        1887), ss. 3(1), 3(3).

HEADNOTE: The  point  in controversy in these petitions was  the  con- stitutional  validity of the Punjab Security of Land  Tenure Act (Punj.  X Of 1953), as amended by Act XI of 1955,  which sought to "provide for the security of land-tenure and other incidental  matters  ". The impugned  Act  which  admittedly dealt  with holdings as defined by the  Punjab  Land-Revenue Act, 1887, limited the- area which might be held by a  land- owner  for  the  purpose  of  self-cultivation  and  thereby released surplus area to be utilised for resettling  ejected tenants ; and by s. 18 conferred upon the tenants the  right to purchase from the land-owners the lands held by them  and thus  themselves  to become the landowners on  prices  which would be below the market value.  It was contended on behalf of  the  petitioners, who were,landowners  affected  by  the impugned Act, that under Entry 18 in List II of the  Seventh

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Schedule  to  the Constitution, the  State  Legislature  was incompetent  to enact a law limiting the extent of the  land to  be held by a land-owner and that the provisions  of  the impugned Act contravened the petitioners’ fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19(1)(f)and 31 of the Constitution. Held, that the contentions must fail. The  words  " rights in or over land " and  "  land  tenures occurring in Entry 18 in List 11 of Seventh Schedule to  the Constitution  were  sufficiently  comprehensive  to  include measures  of land-tenure reforms, such as the impugned  Act, that  sought  to  limit the extent of  land  in  cultivating possession of the landowner in order to release larger areas of land to be made available for cultivation by tenants  and that  Entry read with Art. 246(3) of the  Constitution  gave the   State  Legislature  exclusive  power  to  enact   such measures. Such determination of the relation of landlord and tenant as was  contemplated  by  s. 18 and  other  provisions  of  the impugned Act, which sought to convert a tenant into a  land- owner, was well within the ambit of Entry 18. 749 The United Provinces v. Mst.  Atiqa Begum, [1940] F.C.R. 110 and  Megh  Raj  v.  Allah Rakhi, (1946)  L.R.  74  I.A.  12, referred to. It  was  beyond doubt that the  impugned  Act  substantially modified the land-owner’s rights to hold and dispose of  his property  in  any estate or portion thereof  and  thus  fell within the purview of Art. 31A(1)(a) of the Constitution and was immune from any attack on the ground that it contravened Arts. 14, 19and 31 of the Constitution. The observations made by this Court in Thakur Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer, [1953] S.C.R. 1049, in  connection with another Act, with absolutely different provisions, must be  limited  to  the  facts of that  case  and  were  wholly inapplicable. Thakur,  Raghubir  Singh v. Court of  Wards,  Ajmer,  [1953] S.C.R. 1049, distinguished and held inapplicable. The words " any estate or of any rights therein "  occurring in Art. 31A(1)(a) read in the light of Art. 31A(2)  included any  kinds of rights either quantitative or  qualitative  in the  area encompassed by an estate or any portion of it  and thus included holdings as defined by the Punjab Land-Revenue Act, 1887, and any shares or portions thereof. Regard  being had to the legal maxim that the  greater  must include the less, it was, inappropriate to suggest that  the Constitution should have specifically mentioned "portion  of an  estate" in Art. 31A if it intended to give that  Article such a comprehensive construction. Bhagirath  Ram  Chand v. State of Punjab, A.I.R.  1954  Pun. 167, approved. State of Punjab v. S. Kehar Singh, (1958) 60P.L.R. 461, dis- approved. Ram  Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay, [1959]  SUPP.  (1) S.C.R. 489, applied. Hukam  Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1955) 57  P.L.R.  359, referred to.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 176, 177 and  253  of 1956; 34, 35, 51-53, 69, 70, 75, 94 & 137 of 1957 ; 34,  58, 72, 90, 92, 106, 109 & 115 of 1958. Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for. enforcement of Fundamental rights.

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C.B.  Aggarwal  and Naunit Lal, for  the  petitioner  (In Petition No. 176 of 1956). Achhru  Ram and Naunit Lal, for the petitioner (In  Petition No. 177 of 56). Naunit  Lal, for the petitioner (In Petitions Nos. 253/  56; 34,  35, 51-53, 69, 70, 75, 94 and 137/57; 34, 58, 92,  106, 109 & 115/58). 750 Radhey   Lal  Aggarwal  and  A.  G.  Ratnaparkhi,  for   the petitioner (In Petition No. 90/58). H.   N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, S.M.  Sikri,  Advocate-General for the State  of  Punjab, Gopal Singh and T. M. Sen, for respondent No. 1 (In Petition No. 176/56). S.M. Sikri, Advocate General for the State of Punjab, and T.  M.  Sen, for respondent No. 1 (In Petitions Nos.  177  & 253/56; 34, 35, 51-53, 69, 70, 75, 94 & 137/57; 34, 58,  72, 90, 92, 106, 109 & 115/58). R.S. Gheba, for respondent No. 3 (In Petition No. 90/58). Dipak Dutta Chowdhury, for respondent No. 3 (In Petition No. 176/56). Udai  Bhan Chowdhury, for respondent No. 7 (In Petition  No. 59/57) and respondent No. 3 (In Petition No. 70/57). Harnam  Singh  and  Sadhu Singh,  for  the  Interveners  (In Petition No. 176/56). 1958.   December 8. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by SINHA, J.-These petitions under Art. 32 of the  Constitution impugn the constitutionality of the Punjab Security of  Land Tenure  Act  (Punj.  X of 1953) (which will be  referred  to hereinafter as the Act), as amended by Act XI of 1955.   The petitioners  are  land-owners of the lands affected  by  the provisions of the impugned Act.  The State of Punjab and its officers,  besides persons claiming benefits under the  Act, are the respondents in these several petitions. The impugned Act has a history which may shortly be set out. With  a  view  to providing for the security  of  tenure  to tenants,  the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure)  Ordinance IV  of 1950, was promulgated with effect from May 13,  1950. That Ordinance was replaced by the Punjab Tenants  (Security of  Tenure)  Act  XII  of 1950, which  came  into  force  on November  6,  1950,  on  the date  on  which  it  was  first published  in  the  Punjab  Government  Gazette.   The   Act prescribed  a  limit of one hundred standard acres  of  land (equivalent to two hundred ordinary acres) which could be 751 held  by a land-owner for his " self-cultivation ";  and  it was  termed" permissible limit "-(s. 2(3) ).  Any  landowner having  land  in  excess  of the  "  permissible  limit  was authorized by s. 3 to select for " self-cultivation land out of the entire area held by him in the State of.  Punjab,  as land-owner, and reserve it for his own use to the extent  of the " permissible limit ". This " right of reservation " had to  be  exercised, first, in respect of land  in  his  self- cultivation;  and if the extent of such land fell  short  of the " permissible limit ", he could, under s. 4, make up the deficiency by ejecting tenants under him in respect of  such lands as fell within his reserved area.  Section 5 fixed the minimum period of tenancy as four years, subject to  certain exceptions  set out in s. 6. These were some of the  salient features of the Act of 1950, which itself was amended by the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act (Punj.  V of  1951), which came into force on December 24, 1951.  By the amending Act,  the " permissible limit " was reduced to  50  standard acres  equivalent  to 100 ordinary acres,  and  the  minimum

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period  of tenancy was raised to five years.  It  also  made provisions  for preferential right of pre-emption-(s.  12A), and  conferred a right of purchase on the tenant in  respect of  land  in  his possession-(s. 12B),  subject  to  certain exceptions(s. 12C).  Another legislation in this series  was the Prevention of Ejectment (Temporary Powers) Ordinance No. 1  of 1952, which came into force on June 11,  1952.   Then, came  the  Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act (Punj.   X  of 1953),  now impugned, which repealed the aforesaid Acts  XII of  1950  and V of 1951.  It came into force  on  April  15, 1953.   This Act itself was amended by Act LVII of 1953  and Act  XI of 1955.  Though. this Act has undergone  subsequent amendments in 1957 and 1958, we are not concerned with those amendments,  because  they came into  existence  after  this Court  was moved under Art. 32 of the Constitution.  We  are concerned  with the state of the law as it stood  after  the amendment of 1955, aforesaid. Before dealing with the grounds of attack urged against  the impugned Act, it is convenient to set out, 752 in  a  nut-shell, the salient provisions of the  Act,  which have  given rise to the present controversy, and which  give an idea of the scope and nature of the legislation now under examination.   The  Act has a short Preamble, namely,  "  to provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental matters ". The Act further reduces the " permissible area  " (s.  2(3)  ) in relation to a landlord or a  tenant,  to  30 standard  acres  equivalent  to  60  ordinary  acres,  thus, releasing a larger area for re-settlement of tenants ejected or  to  be ejected under the provisions of the Act.   So  to say,  it  creates  a pool of  "surplus  area"  (s.  2(5-a)), meaning   thereby   the   area   other   than   the"reserved area"in  excess  of  the "permissible  area"  as  aforesaid. "Reserved  area"  means the area lawfully  reserved  by  the landlord  under  the provisions of the two  Acts  aforesaid, which were repealed by the Act-(s. 2(4)).  The definition of a  tenant under the Act, includes a sub-tenant and  a  self- cultivating  lessee-(s.  2(6)).   As  already  indicated,  a tenant also may be liable to be ejected from any area  which he  holds  in  any  capacity whatever in  excess  of  the  " permissible  area  ".  Section  10-A  authorizes  the  State Government or any officer empowered by it in this behalf, to utilize  any " surplus area " for re-settlement  of  tenants ejected  or to be ejected under the provisions of  s.  9(1). But a tenant inducted on to such " surplus area ", holds the land  under the land-owner, who, thus, becomes  entitled  to receipt  of rent from the tenant.  Section 12 lays down  the maximum rent payable by a tenant.  Section 17 recognizes the rights of certain tenants to pre-empt sales or  fore-closure of land.  Section 18, which formed the subject-matter of the most  vehement attack on behalf of the petitioners,  confers upon  the  tenants of the description given in  the  several clauses  of  the Act, the right to purchase from  the  land- owner the land held by them, subject to certain  exceptions, and  subject to the payment in a lump sum or in six  monthly instalments  not exceeding ten, of the purchase-price to  be determined  in  accordance with cls. (2) and (3) of  s.  18. Section 23 invalidates any decree or order of any. court  or authority, or a notice                        753 of ejectment, which is not consistent with the provisions of the Act.  Thus, the Act seeks to limit the area which may be held  by a land-owner for the purpose  of  self-cultivation, thereby,  releasing " surplus area " which may  be  utilized for the purpose of resettling ejected tenants, and affording

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an  opportunity  to  the tenant  to  become  the  land-owner himself on payment of the purchase-price which, if anything, would  be  less than the market value.  It,  thus,  aims  at creating  what  it calls a class of "  small  land-owners  " meaning thereby, holders of land not exceeding the " permis- sible  area "-(s. 2(2)).  The utmost emphasis has been  laid on  self-cultivation  which means " cultivation by  a  land- owner either personally or through his wife or children,  or through such of his relations as may be prescribed, or under his supervision "-(s. 2(9) ). The  arguments at the Bar, on behalf of the petitioners  may be  put  under  three  main  heads,  namely,  (1)  that  the Legislature had no legislative competence to enact the  Act, (2)   that  the  provisions  of  the  Act   contravene   the petitioners’  fundamental  rights  enshrined  in  Arts.  14, 19(1)(f)  and 31 of the Constitution, and (3)  that  certain specified  provisions  of  the Act  amount  to  unreasonable restrictions on the petitioners’ rights to hold and  dispose of property. At the outset, it is necessary to deal with the question  of legislative  competence, which was raised on behalf of  some of  the  petitioners, though not on behalf of all  of  them. This argument of want of legislative competence goes to  the root  of  the impugned Act, and if it  is  well-founded,  no other  question need be gone into.  It has been argued  that Entry  18  in  List  II  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the Constitution,  should not be read as authorizing  the  State Legislature  to enact a law limiting the extent of the  land to  be held by a proprietor or a landowner.  Entry 18 is  in these words:- " 18.  Land, that is to say, rights in or over land  tenures including  the  relation  of landlord and  tenant,  and  the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization." 754 It  will  be  noticed that the Entry read  along  with  Art. 246(3)  of the Constitution, has vested exclusive  power  in the  State to make laws with respect to " rights in or  over land   tenures  including  the  relation  of  landlord   and tenant........ The provisions of the Act set out above, deal with  the  landlord’s  rights in land  in  relation  to  his tenant,  so as to modify the landlord’s rights in land,  and correspondingly,  to  expand the  tenant’s  rights  therein. Each  of  the expressions " rights in or over land "  and  " land tenures ", is comprehensive enough to take in  measures of  reforms of land tenures, limiting the extent of land  in cultivating   possession  of  the  land-owner,   and   thus, releasing  larger  areas of land to be  made  available  for cultivation by tenants. Counsel  for  some  of the petitioners  who  challenged  the legislative  competence of the State Legislature, were  hard put  to  it to enunciate any easily appreciable  grounds  of attack against Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh  Schedule. It  was  baldly  argued that Entry  18  aforesaid,  was  not intended  to authorize legislation which had the  effect  of limiting the area of land which could be directly held by  a proprietor or a land-owner.  It is difficult to see why  the amplitude of the words " rights in or over land " should  be cut  down in the way suggested in this argument.  A  similar argument was advanced in the case of The United Provinces v. Mst.   Atiqa Begum (1).  In that case, the United  Provinces Regularization of Remissions Act, 1938 (U.  P. XIV of 1938), was challenged.  One of the main provisions of that Act  had validated  remission of rent.  It had been argued  that  the United Provinces Legislature was not competent to  legislate

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about  the  remission of rent, when the  relevant  words  in Entry  21,  relating to land in the Provincial List  of  the Seventh  Schedule  to the Constitution Act of 1935,  were  " collection  of  rents ". Entry 21 relating to " land  "  bad added  certain words by way of explanation and  illustration of  the  intention  of the Constitution-makers,  ,so  as  to indicate that the word " land " was meant to be used in  its widest connotation.  A member of the (1)[1940] F.C.R. 110. 755 Full  Bench  of the Allahabad High Court,  in  his  judgment which  was the subject-matter of the appeal to  the  Federal Court,  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  Item  No.   21 aforesaid, including the words " collection of rents ",  had not  authorized  the  Provincial  Legislature  to   validate remission  of rent.  That conclusion was not upheld  by  the Federal Court which held that remission of rent was a matter covered  by Item No. 21, and it was, therefore,  within  the competence  of  the  Provincial  Legislature  to  enact  the impugned  Act;  and  Gwyer,  C. J., in  the  course  of  his judgment observed that the Items in the several lists of the Seventh  Schedule,  should  not  be  read  in  a  narrow  or restricted sense, and that each general word should be  held to  extend  to all ancillary and  subsidiary  matters  which could  fairly’ and reasonably be said to be comprehended  in it. The same Item 21 in List II (Provincial List) of the Seventh Schedule  to  the  Constitution Act of  1935,  came  up  for consideration  before  the Judicial Committee of  the  Privy Council  on appeal from the Federal Court of India  in  Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhi (1), affirming the judgment of the Lahore High  Court.   In  that  case,  the  Punjab  Restitution  of Mortgaged Lands Act (Punj.  IV of 1938) had been  challenged as  ultra vires.  By that Act, the Legislature had  provided for redemption of mortgages on terms much less onerous  than the  terms  of the mortgage-deeds.  Their Lordships  of  the Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  repelled   the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the words of  Item  No.  21, were not wide enough  to  comprehend  the relationship  of  mortgagor  and  mortgagee  in  respect  of agricultural  land.  Their Lordships observed that  Item  21 aforesaid,  forming a part, as it did, of the  Constitution, should,   on   ordinary  principles,  receive   the   widest construction,  unless,  for  some reasons, it  is  cut  down either  by the terms of that item itself, or by other  parts of the Constitution, which have, naturally, to be read as  a whole;  and  then  proceeded  to  make  the  following  very significant observations :- (1)  (1946) L.R. 74 I.A. 12. 756 "  As to item 21, " land ", the governing word, is  followed by  the rest of the item, which goes on to say, ’that is  to say’.   These  words introduce the  most  general  concept-’ rights  in  or over land’.   Rights in  land’  must  include general rights like full ownership or leasehold or all  such rights.  Rights over land’ would include easements or  other collateral  rights,  whatever form they  might  take.   Then follow words which are not words of limitation but of expla- nation or illustration, giving instances which may furnish a clue  for  particular  matters: thus  there  are  the  words relation of landlord and tenant, and collection’ of rents ". Thus, their Lordships concluded that the Item 21 relating to land, would include mortgages as an incidental and ancillary subject. Another branch of the same argument was that Entry 18  could

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not cover the determination of the relation of landlord  and tenant, which is envisaged by some of the provisions of  the Act, particularly s. 18, which has the effect of  converting the  tenant  into  a land-owner himself, by  virtue  of  the purchase.  This argument is also disposed of by the judgment of the Federal Court in United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum (1). It was next contended that Entry 18 has got to be read  with Art. 19(5), in order to determine the legislative competence in  enacting the impugned statute.  In other words,  it  was contended that cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution, is in the nature of a proviso to the Entry ; and that the Entry so read  along  with  Art. 19(5), lays down  the  test  of  the legislative  competence.  This argument is easily  disposed. of  with  reference to the provisions of Art.  31-A  of  the Constitution.   If  it is held that the  provisions  of  the impugned  statute lay down the law for the  modification  of rights  in estates, as defined in sub-Art. (2) of Art.  31A, none  of the grounds of attack founded on any of the  provi- sions of Arts. 14, 19 or 31, can avail the petitioners.   As will  presently appear, the Act lays down  provisions  which are  in  the nature of modifications of  rights  in  estates within the meaning of Art. 31A(1).  That being (1) (1940) F.C.R. 110. 757 so,  Art. 19(5) is wholly out of the way in this  case.   In view of all these considerations, it must be held that there is no legal foundation for the contention that the  impugned Act  is  beyond  the legislative  competence  of  the  State Legislature. Having dealt with the question of legislative competence, we have  to deal with the several contentions raised on  behalf of  the  petitioners, with reference to  the  provisions  of Arts.  14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.  On this  part  of the  case,  it has rightly been conceded on  behalf  of  the petitioners  that  if  the impugned  Act  comes  within  the purview  of any of the clauses of Art. 31A, the law will  be immune  from  attack  on any of the  grounds  based  on  the provisions  of Arts. 14, 19 and 31.  But it has been  argued that the provisions of Art. 31A(1)(a), which are  admittedly the only portions of the Article, which are relevant to  the present inquiry, are not attracted to the impugned Act.   It has been conceded on behalf of the respondents that the  Act does  not  provide for the acquisition by the State  of  any estate  or of any rights in any estate.  Hence, the  crucial words  which must govern this part of the  controversy,  are the  words " the extinguishment or modification of any  such rights  "; that is to say, we have to determine  whether  or not  the  impugned Act provides for  the  extinguishment  or modification  of  any  rights in " estates  ".  Art.  31A(2) defines  what the expression II estate " used in Art. 3 1  A means.   According  to that definition, " the  expression  " estate " shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning  as that expression or its local equivalent  has  in the  existing law relating to land tenures in force in  that area,  and  shall also include any jagir, inam or  Muafi  or other similar grant and in the States of Madras and  Kerala, any janmam right".  It is common ground that we have to turn to  the definition of an estate, as contained in the  Punjab Land-Revenue Act XVII of 1887.  Section 3(1) of that Act has the following definition:- (1)  " estate " means any area- (a)  for which a separate record-of-rights has been made; or 758 (b)which has been separately assessed to land revenue,  or would have been so assessed if the land revenue had not been

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released, compounded for or redeemed ; or (c)which  the (State) Government may, by general  rule  or special order, declare to be an estate ". Clause  (c) of the definition is out of the way, because  it has not been claimed that the State Government has made  any declaration  within  the meaning of  that  clause.   Estate, therefore,  for  the -purposes of the  present  controversy, means  any  area or -which a separate  record-of-rights  has been  made,  or which has been separately assessed  to  land revenue   (omitting   the  unnecessary  words).    In   this connection, it is also necessary to refer to the  definition of a holding in s. 3(3) in the following terms:- "(3) ’holding" means a share or portion of an estate held by one landowner or jointly by two or more landowners ". It was not controverted at the Bar that in Punjab, there are very few estates as defined in s. 3(1), quoted above, in the sense that one single land-owner is seized and possessed  of an entire estate which is equated with a whole village.   In other  words, in Punjab, an estate and a village are  inter- changeable  terms,  and  almost all villages  are  owned  in parcels, as holdings by co-sharers, most likely, descendants of  the holder of a whole village which came to  be  divided amongst  the  co-sharers,  as  a  result  of  devolution  of interest.   The parties were also agreed that  the  impugned Act deals with holdings, as defined in the Land-Revenue Act, or  shares or portions thereof.  The argument on  behalf  of the  petitioners to get over the provisions of Art. 31A,  is that  the  Act does not deal with any estate or  any  rights therein,  but  only  with holdings  or  shares  or  portions thereof.   This  argument proceeds on  the  assumption  that holdings   are  not  any  rights  in  an  estate.   If   the petitioners are right in their contention that the  immunity granted  by Art. 31A of the Constitution, is available  only in  respect of entire estates and not portions  of  estates, then the argument on behalf of the respondents that the  Act is saved by the 759 provisions  of  that Article fails in limine.   If,  on  the other  hand,  it is held that Art. 31A applies not  only  to entire estates or any rights therein, but also to shares  or portions  of  an  estate or rights  therein,  then  all  the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners, founded  on the provisions of Arts 14, 19 and 31, are thrown  overboard. Therefore, it becomes necessary to consider the amplitude of the  expression " any estate or of any rights therein  "  in Art.   31A(1)(a).   Rights  in  an  estate  may  be   either quantitative  or qualitative.  That is to say, rights in  an estate may be held by persons having different qualities  of rights in lands constituting an estate, as a result of  sub- infeudation.  Generally speaking and omitting all references to  different kinds of land tenures prevailing in  different parts  of  India,  it may be said that at the  apex  of  the pyramid, stands the State.  Under the State, a large  number of   persons   variously  called   proprietors,   zamindars, malguzars,  inamdars  and jagirdars, etc., hold  parcels  of land,  subject to the payment of land revenue designated  as peshkash,  quit-rent  or malguzari, etc.,  representing  the Government demands by way of land-tax out of the usufruct of the  land  constituting an estate, except  where  Government demands  had  been  excused in whole or in part  by  way  of reward for service rendered to the State in the past, or  to be  rendered in the future.  An estate, thus, is an area  of land  which  is a unit of revenue assessment, and  which  is separately entered in the Land Revenue Collector’s  register of revenue-paying or revenue-free estates.  A single estate,

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unless  governed  by the Rule of  Primogeniture,  would,  in course  of time, be hold by a number of persons in the  same rights  as  co-sharers  in the estate.   Those  several  co- sharers are all jointly and severally liable for the payment of the Government demands, if any, though, by an arrangement with   the   Revenue  Department,  they  may  have   had   a distribution made of the total Government demands as payable in  respect  of aliquot portions of the  estate.   Generally speaking, in the first instance, each sharer in an estate is liable  to pay his portion of the landrevenue, but  if,  for any reasons, the Government 760 demands  cannot  be  realized  from  any  defaulting   share primarily liable for them, the entire estate, including  the shares  of those who may not be the defaulting  proprietors, is  liable  to  be sold or otherwise  dealt  with   for  the realization of those demands.  Thus, the unity of assessment of  land  revenue in respect of the  entire  estate  remains intact.   In actual practice, the holder of  each  specified portion or share of an estate, holds his portion for his own exclusive use and occupation.  Such a sharer in an estate in Punjab is known as the land-owner of a " holding ". But such a holding still continues to be a portion or a share of  the estate out of which it has been carved.  Such a division  of an  estate  is  quantitative or a vertical  division  of  an estate.   But there may also be a horizontal or  qualitative division of the lands in an estate, effected by the  process of  sub-infeudation.   Continuing the  illustration  of  the pyramid,  generally speaking, the lands in an estate may  in their  entirety  or  in portions, be let  out  to  what,  in Eastern  India,  are known as tenure holders,  for  example, patnidars,  in  areas covered by the  Permanent  Settlement. Tenure-holders were persons who took lands of an estate  not necessarily  for the purpose of self-cultivation,  but  also for  settling tenants on the land, and realizing rents  from them.  These patnidars may have darpatnidars under them, and darpatnidars   sepatnidars,  and  in  this  way,  the   sub- infeudation went on.  All these classes are included  within the  terms  "  tenure-holders ", " sub-proprietors  "  or  " under-proprietors ". The persons who are inducted on to  the land  for  bringing it under their direct  cultivation,  are generally  known in Eastern India as raiyats with rights  of occupancy  in the land held by them.  But raiyats, in  their turn, may have inducted tenants under them in respect of the whole  or  a portion of their holding.  The  tenant  holding under  a raiyat is known as an under-raiyat, and  an  under- raiyat may induct a tenant under himself, and he will be  an under-raiyat  of the second degree.  Thus, in each grade  of holders of land, in the process of subinfeudation  described above. the holder is a tenant under his superior holder, the landlord, and also the 761 landlord of the holder directly holding under him.  Thus, in Eastern  India, the interest of intermediaries  between  the proprietor of an " estate " at the top and the actual tiller of  the soil at the bottom, is known as that of a "  tenure- holder  ",  and the interest of tenants other  than  tenure- holders,  is  given  the generic name of a "  holding  ".  A holding  in Eastern India, thus, indicates the  interest  of the  actual tiller of the soilraiyat or  under-raiyat-unlike the  "  holding " in Punjab where, as indicated  above,  its signifies  the  interest  of the holder of  a  share  in  an estate.  Thus, holdings in Punjab are vertical divisions  of an  estate;  whereas  in Eastern  India,  they  represent  a horizontal division, connoting a lesser quality of an estate

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in land than the interest of a tenure-holder in his  tenure, or  of a land-owner in his estate or portion of  an  estate. It is not necessarily true that there should be  intermedia- ries in every estate or a portion of an estate.  Very often, the  holder  of an estate may be holding his  entire  estate directly  in  his possession by way  of  khudkasht,  zeerat, kamath  or  neezjote, or it may be that the  proprietor  has only raiyats under him without the intermediation of tenure- holders,  and  the raiyats may not  have  any  under-raiyats under them.  The process of sub-infeudation described above, naturally,  varies with the size of the estate.  It  appears to  be common ground in this case that in Punjab, an  estate means the whole village, whereas in Eastern India, an estate may comprise a whole district or only a cluster of villages, or  a  single  village, or even a part of  a  village.   The larger  the  size of an estate, the greater the  process  of sub-infeudation and vice versa.  In Punjab, as there was  no permanent settlement of Revenue as in Bengal, Bihar,  Orissa and  other  parts  of Eastern India,  the  unit  of  revenue assessment has been the village.  Thus, a holding in  Punjab means  a  portion of a village either big  or  small.   That portion  may  be in the direct possession of  the  landowner himself, or he may have inducted tenants on a portion or the whole of his holding.  The interest of the tenant in Punjab, appears to have been a precarious tenure, even more precari- ous than that of an under raiyat in Eastern India.  The 96 762 Punjab Legislature, realising that the interest of a  tenant was  much  too precarious for him to  invest  his  available labour and capital to the fullest extent so as to raise  the maximum quality and quantity of money crops or other  crops, naturally, in the interest of the community as a whole,  and in  implementation  of  the Directive  Principles  of  State Policy,  thought of granting longer tenures, and as we  have seen  above,  the period has  been  progressively  increased until  we  arrive  at  the  stage  of  the  legislation  now impugned,  which  proposes to create a large body  of  small land-owners  who  have a comparatively larger stake  in  the land, and consequently, have greater impetus to invest their labour  and  capital  with a view  to  raising  the  maximum usufruct out of the land in their possession. Keeping  in  view  the background of  the  summary  of  land tenures  in  Punjab and elsewhere, we have to  construe  the amplitude of the crucial words " any estate or of any rights therein  " in Art. 31A (1) (a).  Soon after the coming  into effect  of the Constitution, the different States  in  India embarked  upon  a scheme of legislation  for  reforming  the system   of  land-holding,  so  as  (1)  to  eliminate   the intermediaries,  that is to say, those who hold interest  in land in between the State at the apex and the actual tillers of  the soil-in other words, to abolish the class  of  rent- receivers,  and  (2)  to  create  a  large  body  of   small landholders who have a permanent stake in the land, and  who are, therefore, interested in making the best use of it.  As the  connotation  of the term " estate "  was  different  in different  parts of the country, the expression "  estate  " described  in  el.  (2) of Art. 31 A, has  been  so  broadly defined as to cover all estates in the country, and to cover all possible kinds of rights in estates, as shown by sub-cl. (b) of cl. (2) of Art. 31A, which is in these terms: shall  include  any  rights vesting in  a  proprietor,  sub- proprietor, under proprietor, tenure-holder (raiyat,  under- raiyat)  or other intermediary and any rights or  privileges in respect of land revenue."

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The expression " rights " in relation to an estate has  been given an all inclusive meaning, comprising both                           763 what  we  have  called,  for the  sake  of  brevity,  the  " horizontal  "  and " vertical " divisions of an  estate.   A proprietor  in an estate may be the proprietor  holding  the entire  interest  in a single estate, or  only  a  co-sharer proprietor.   The provisions aforesaid of Art. 31A,  bearing on the construction of the expression " estate " or "rights" in  an estate, have been deliberately made as wide  as  they could  be,  in  order  to  take  in  all  kinds  of  rights- quantitative and qualitative-in an area co-extensive with an estate or only a portion thereof.  But it has been suggested that the several interests indicated in sub-cl. (b),  quoted above,  have  been  used with reference to the  area  of  an entire  estate, but knowing as we do, that a raiyat’s or  an under  raiyat’s holding generally is not  co-extensive  with the  area  of  an  entire estate  but  only  small  portions thereof,  it would, in our opinion, be unreasonable to  hold that   the  makers  of  the  Constitution  were  using   the expression " estate " or " rights " in an estate, in such  a restricted  sense.  Keeping in view the fact that  Art.  31A was enacted by two successive amendments-one in 1951  (First Amendment),  and the second in 1955 (Fourth  Amendment)-with retrospective effect, in order to save legislation effecting agrarian  reforms,  we  have every reason  hold  that  those expressions  have  been  used  in  their  widest  amplitude, consistent  with  the purpose behind  those  amendments.   A piece of validating enactment purposely introduced into  the Constitution with a view to saving that kind of  legislation from  attacks  on the ground of  constitutional  invalidity, based  on Arts. 14, 19 and 31, should not be construed in  a narrow  sense.   On the other hand,  such  a  constitutional enactment  should  be given its fullest and  widest  effect, consistently   with  the  purpose  behind   the   enactment, provided, however, that such a construction does not involve any violence to the language actually used. Another  branch of the same argument was that if the  makers of  the Constitution intended to include within the  purview of  Art.  31A,  not only entire estates  but  also  portions thereof,  nothing would have been easier than to say  so  in terms, and that in the absence of any specific mention of  " portions of an estate 764 we  should not read that article as covering " -portions  of an estate " also.  In our opinion, there is no substance  in this  contention,  because  they  must  be  attributed  full knowledge of the legal maxim that " the greater contains the less "-Omne Majus continet in se minus.  In this connection, our attention was invited to the decision of a Full Bench of the  Punjab High Court in the case of State of Punjab v.  S. Kehar  Singh (1), to the effect that a holding being a  part of an estate, was not within the purview of Art. 31A of  the Constitution.  In this connection, it is necessary to  state the  conflict  of views in that High Court itself.   In  the case  of  Bhagirath Ram Chand v. State of  Punjab  (2),  the validity of the very Act impugned before us, was  challenged on  grounds  based  upon  Articles 14,  19  and  31  of  the Constitution.   The  learned Judges  constituting  the  Full Bench,  unanimously  held  that the  impugned  Act  did  not infringe  those  provisions  of the  Constitution,  and  the restrictions  on the right of land-holding, imposed  by  the Act,  were reasonable, and that the classification  did  not exceed  the permissible limit.  But they also held that  the Act was saved by Art. 31A of the Constitution, which applied

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equally  to  an  entire  estate or  to  a  portion  thereof. Besides  giving  other  reasons, which may  not  bear  close scrutiny, they made specific reference to the doctrine  that the   whole  includes  the  part.   Thus,  the  Full   Bench specifically held that Art. 31A of the Constitution  applied equally  to portions of estates also.  This decision of  the Full Bench was followed by a Division Bench of the same High Court, consisting of Bhandari, C. J., and Dulat, J., in  the case of Hukam Singh v. The State of Punjab (3).  That  Bench was  concerned  with the provisions of  another  Act  Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1954.  In that  case, the Division Bench, naturally, followed the decision of  the Full  Bench  in  so far as it had ruled that  the  I  whole’ includes the part, and that where an Act provides for rights in an estate, it provides for rights in a part of an  estate also.  The later Full (1) (1958) 60 P.L.R- 461.     (2) A.I.R. 1954 Pun. 167. (3) (1955) 57 P.L.R. 359.                       765 Bench  case referred to above, was decided by three  Judges, including  Bhandari, C. J., who agreed with the judgment  of the Court delivered by Grover, J. Perhaps, the better course would  have been to constitute a larger Bench, when  it  was found  that a Full Bench  of three Judges, was  inclined  to take a view contrary to that of another Full Bench of  equal strength.   Such a course becomes necessary in view  of  the fact that otherwise the subordinate courts are placed  under the  embarrassment of preferring one view to  another,  both equally  binding upon them.  In our opinion, the view  taken by  the earlier Full Bench is the correct one.  The  learned Chief Justice who was a party to both the conflicting  views on the same question, has not indicated his own reasons  for changing his view.  The Full Bench has accepted the force of the legal maxim that the greater contains the less, referred to  above,  but has not, it must be said with  all  respect, given  any  good  reasons  for  departing  from  that  well- established  maxim.  The judgment of the Full Bench on  this part of the case is based entirely upon the definition of an estate, as contained in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, set out above.  It has not stopped to consider the further  question why  a holding, which is a share or a portion of an  estate, as  defined  in the Punjab Act, should not  partake  of  the characteristics   of  an  estate.   Keeping  in   view   the background  of the legislative history and the objective  of the  legislation, is there any rational reason  for  holding that  the makers of the Constitution thought  of  abolishing only  intermediaries in respect of an area constituting  one entire  estate but not of a portion thereof ? On  the  other hand,  as indicated above, they have used the  expression  " estate" in an all-inclusive sense.  They have not stopped at that; they have also added the words " or any rights therein ". The expression " rights " in relation to an estate  again has been used in a very comprehensive sense of including not only  the  interests of proprietors or  sub-proprietors  but also of lower grade tenants, like raiyats or  under-raiyats, and  then  they added, by way of further  emphasizing  their intention,  the  expression " other  intermediary  ",  thus, clearly showing that 766 the enumeration of intermediaries was only illustrative  and not  exhaustive.   If the makers of the  Constitution  have, thus,  shown their intention of saving all laws of  agrarian reform, dealing with the rights of intermediaries,  whatever their  denomination may be, in our opinion, no good  reasons have  been adduced in support of the view that  portions  or

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shares  in  an  estate  are not  within  the  sweep  of  the expression  " or any rights therein ". A recent decision  of this  Court in the case of Ram Narain Nedhi v. The State  of Bombay  (1) dealt with the constitutionality of  the  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956,  which contains  similar provisions with a view to doing away  with intermediaries, and establishing direct relationship between the  State and tillers of the soil.  In that case also,  the contention  had been raised that the expression "  estate  " had reference to only alienated lands and not to unalienated lands,  and this Court was invited to limit the  meaning  of the  expression in the narrower sense.  This Court  repelled that contention in these words:- the  context  of the Code is thus clear and  unambiguous  as comprising both the types of lands, there is no reason why a narrower construction as suggested by the petitioners should be put upon the expression " estate...................  Even if  there  was any ambiguity in the  expression,  the  wider significance  should  be  adopted  in  the  context  of  the objectives of the Act as stated above." These  observations apply with full force to the  contention raised  on  behalf of the petitioners in the  present  cases also. Another branch of the same argument as to why the provisions of Art. 31A do not apply to the Act, is that the Act did not have  the  effect of either extinguishing or  modifying  any rights in any estate, assuming that the expression "  estate "  includes reference also to parts of an estate.   In  this connection,  it is contended that the provisions of the  Act impugned   in   these   cases,  did  not   amount   to   the extinguishment of (1)  [1959] SUPP. (1) S.C.R. 489. 767 the  interest  of  the land-owners in  estates  or  portions thereof,  and that what the Act did was to transfer some  of the  rights  of the land-owners to their tenants.   In  this connection, reliance was placed on the observations of  this Court  in  the  case of Thakur Raghubir Singh  v.  Court  of Wards,  Ajmer  (1),  where  Mahajan, J.  (as  he  then  was, speaking  for  the Court, observed that  the  expressions  " extinguishment  " and " modification " used in Art.  31A  of the  Constitution,  meant  extinguishment  or   modification respectively of a proprietary right in an estate, and should not  include, within their ambit, a mere suspension  of  the right  of  management of an estate for a  time  definite  or indefinite.  Those observations must be strictly limited  to the  facts of that case, and cannot possibly be extended  to the  provisions  of Acts wholly dissimilar to those  of  the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, XLII of 1950, which  was the subject-matter of the challenge in the case then  before this  Court.   This  Court held, on a  construction  of  the provisions  of that Act, that they only suspended the  right of  management but did not amount to any  extinguishment  or modification  of any proprietary rights in an  estate.   The provisions  of  the  Act then under  consideration  of  this Court,  have absolutely no resemblance to those of  the  Act now  before  us,  and  it is impossible  to  put  a  similar interpretation on these provisions.  In the recent  decision of  this  Court  (not yet reported*), this  Court  had  been invited to apply the observations of this Court referred  to above, to the provisions of the Bombay Act.  It was  pointed out in that case that those observations of Mahajan, J.  (as he  then was), must be read as limited to an Act which  only brings  about a suspension of the right of management of  an estate,  and could not be extended to the provisions  of  an

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Act which either extinguishes or modifies certain rights  of a proprietor in an estate or a portion thereof. In  this  connection,  it was  further  argued  that  extin- guishment of a right, does not mean substitution of (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1049, 1055, 1056. Since  reported  as  Sri Ram Narain Modhi v.  The  State  of Bombay, [1959] SUPP (1) S.C.R. 489. 768 another person in that right, but total annihilation of that right.  In our opinion, it is not necessary to discuss  this rather metaphysical argument, because, in our opinion, it is enough  for  the  purpose of this case  to   bold  that  the provisions  of  the  Act,  amount  to  modification  of  the landowner’s rights in the lands comprised in his " estate  " or   "  holding  ".  The  Act  modifies   the   land-owner’s substantive  rights,  particularly, in  three  respects,  as indicated  above,  namely,  (1) it  modifies  his  right  of settling  his lands on any terms and to anyone  he  chooses; (2)  it modifies, if it does not altogether extinguish,  his right  to cultivate the " surplus area" as understood  under the Act; and (3) it modifies his right of transfer in so far as it obliges him to sell lands not at his own price but  at a  price fixed under the statute, and not to any one but  to specified persons, in accordance with the -provisions of the Act,  set out above.  Thus, there cannot be the least  doubt that the provisions of the Act, very substantially modi the land-owner’s  rights  to hold and dispose  of  his  property estate  or a portion thereof.  It is, therefore  clear  that the  provisions of Art. 31A save the impugned Act  from  any attack  based on the provisions of Arts.  14, 19 and  31  of the  Constitution.  That being so, it is  not  necessary  to consider the specific -provisions of the Act, which, it  was contended,  were  unreasonable  restrictions  on  the  land- owner’s rights   to  enjoy his property, or whether  he  had been unduly    discriminated   against,,  or   whether   the compensation,if  any,  provided  for under  the  Act,  was illusory  or,  at any rate, inadequate.   Those  grounds  of attack are not available to the petitioners.  In the result, all  these petitions are dismissed with costs, the State  of Punjab  and its officers being entitled to only one  set  of hearing fees in all the petitions.                             Petitions dismissed. 769