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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  6742 of 2003

PETITIONER: Atma Ram                                                                      

RESPONDENT: Shakuntala Rani                                                     

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/08/2005

BENCH: B.P. SINGH & ARUN KUMAR

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

B.P. SINGH, J.

This appeal by Special Leave impugns the judgment and order  of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi dated October 31, 2002 in  CMM No.800 of 2000.  The High Court by its impugned judgment  and order allowed the petition filed by the respondent/landlady and  setting aside the judgment and orders of the Additional Rent  Controller dated November 15, 1999 and the Rent Control Tribunal  dated August 28, 2000 passed an order of eviction against the  appellant herein.  The High Court recorded a finding that the  appellant/tenant had defaulted in payment of rent for the period  February 1, 1992 to January 31, 1995.  It may be noticed at the  threshold that this is a case of second default, and the appellant  having availed of the benefit under sub-section (1) of Section 14 of  the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as ’the  Act’) is not entitled to such benefit in case of second default.

The facts are not in dispute.  The appellant is a tenant of the  respondent and the rent presently payable for the premises is Rs.56/-  per month.  There is no dispute with regard to payment of rent till  January, 1991.  According to the appellant he sent a money order  remitting the rent payable for the month of February, 1992 on  February 7, 1992 but the respondent refused to accept the same.   Thereafter, he sent a money order on March 29, 1993 tendering the  rent for the period January 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993.  The same was  refused.  The respondent claimed enhancement of rent by 10% i.e.  from Rs.50.75 per month to Rs.56/- per month.  The money order  sent on August 10, 1994 tendering the rent for the period February 1,  1992 to August 30, 1993 was again refused by the respondent.  The  case of the appellant is that in these circumstances in the month of   January, 1995 he deposited the rent for the period February 1, 1992  to January 31, 1995 under the provisions of the Punjab Relief of  Indebtedness Act, 1934, (hereinafter referred to as the ’Punjab Act’).   The respondent refused to receive the deposit made under the  provisions of the said Act.  Consequently, by order dated February  12, 1995 the petition under the Punjab Act was disposed of and the  appellant was allowed to withdraw the amount deposited by him.  

The respondent called upon the appellant to pay the arrears of  rent by issuance of notice dated May 16, 1996.  The appellant  expressed his willingness to pay the arrears of rent but sent with his  reply a cheque for a sum of Rs.952/- only purporting to pay rent due  for the period February, 1995 to June, 1996.  Thereafter the  appellant deposited rent for the period February, 1995 to July, 1996  under Section 27 of the Act.  This was deposited on July 20, 1996 by

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cheque for the sum of Rs.1008/-.  It is not in dispute that the arrears  of rent so tendered excluded the rent for the period February 1, 1992  to January 31, 1995, which the appellant had deposited under the  Punjab Act to which we have referred earlier.

On January 1, 1998, the respondent filed an application for  eviction of the appellant from the premises in question under Section  14(1)(a) of the Act before the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi.

The Additional Rent Controller by his judgment and order of  November 15, 1999 dismissed the Eviction Petition which was  confirmed by the Rent Control Tribunal by its judgment and order of  August 28, 2000.  The respondent preferred a petition under Article  227 of the Constitution of India which has been allowed by the  impugned judgment and order dated October 31, 2002.  The crucial  fact which deserves to be noticed is that for the period February 1,  1992 to January 31, 1995 the rent due was deposited under the  provisions of the Punjab Act, which proceeding was disposed of by  order dated February 12, 1995 permitting the appellant to withdraw  the amount deposited by him in Court under the aforesaid Act.   

From the facts noticed above it is apparent that the rent for the  period February 1, 1992 to January 31, 1995 was never remitted by  the appellant to the respondent nor was it ever deposited in the Court  of the Rent Controller, though the appellant had deposited the rent  for the later period - February 1, 1995 to July 31, 1996 under Section  27 of the Act.  Despite service of notice he did not deposit the rent  for the period February 1, 1992 to January 31, 1995 in the Court of  the Rent Controller as provided under the Act.  This was despite the  fact that the proceeding under the Punjab Act stood concluded by  order of the Court dated February 12, 1995 permitting the appellant  to withdraw the amount deposited under the Punjab Act on the  respondent’s refusal to accept the same.   

The core question, therefore, which arises for consideration is  whether the appellant defaulted in payment of rent inasmuch as he  had not paid or tendered or deposited the rent for the aforesaid  period in the manner required by law.  The question also arises  whether the deposit of rent under the Punjab Act can be construed to  be a valid deposit under the Act.   

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since the  deposit was made in accordance with the provisions of the Punjab  Act treating the arrears of rent as debt due to the landlord, there was  no default on the part of the appellant.  On the other hand learned  counsel for the respondent contended before us that to avail the  benefit of the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the arrears  of rent should have been deposited or tendered in the manner and in  accordance with the specific provisions of the Act.  Deposit made,  which is not in accordance with the procedure expressly prescribed  by the Act is not a valid deposit or tender of rent within the meaning  of the Act. Counsel for the parties have relied upon several decisions of  this Court in support of their respective contentions.  We may notice  the same hereafter.

Learned counsel for the appellant placed considerable reliance  on a judgment of this Court in Mangat Rai and another  vs,  Kidar  Nath and others : (1980) 4 SCC 276.   That case arose under the  East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.  The tenant had  deposited the entire rent due in the Court of the Senior Sub Judge,  Ludhiana under Section 31 of the Punjab Act.   In view of the  deposit made the tenant claimed protection under the proviso to  Section 13(2)(i) of the Punjab Urban Rent Act.  The landlord in that  case placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Shri Vidya

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Prachar Trust  vs.  Pandit Basant Ram :  (1969) 1 SCC 835 and  contended that this Court having examined the provisions of both  the Acts came to the conclusion that the Indebtedness Act was not  intended to operate between the landlord and the tenant, nor was the  Court of Senior Sub Judge a clearing house for rent so as to convert  it into a Court of Rent Controller.  However, this Court in Mangat  Rai (supra) did not agree with that view and held that Section 31 of  the Indebtedness Act applied even to a tenant who owed money to  his landlord by way of rent due.  Their Lordships construed the  provisions of Section 13(2)(i) of the Punjab Urban Rent Act and  held that under the proviso to the aforesaid Section the tenant was  required to deposit interest also in order to get protection of the  proviso, hence the tenant was a debtor with a sort of a statutory  agreement to pay interest and therefore squarely fell within the  definition of Section 31 of the Punjab Act. Thus any deposit made  by a tenant under Section 31 would have to be treated as a deposit  under the Rent Act to the credit of the landlord and which will be  available to him for payment whenever he likes.   

The judgment of this Court in Mangat Rai (supra) must be  understood in the factual background of that case and the provisions  contained in the Indebtedness Act and the Rent Act applicable to the  parties.  It was noticed by this Court that the Senior Sub Judge was  also functioning as a Rent Controller in Ludhiana.  Hence any  deposit made in his Court by a tenant to the credit of the landlord to  get protection of the Rent Act would have to be treated as a deposit  before the Rent Controller.   The amount would have to be deposited  by a challan in the same treasury which was to be operated by the  Senior Sub Judge who was the Rent Controller.  This Court also  noticed the fact that there was no provision whatsoever in the Rent  Act under which a deposit could be made by a tenant before the  Controller to the credit of the landlord.               

       We are of the considered view that the judgment in Mangat  Rai (supra) is clearly distinguishable.  In that case the Court dealing  with applications under Section 31 of the Indebtedness Act was also  the Court of the Rent Controller and, therefore, in the absence of any  provision under the Act for a deposit to be made by a tenant before  the Controller to the credit of the landlord, it really did not matter if  the amount due by way of rent was deposited in the Court of the  Senior Sub Judge empowered to deal with the applications under the  Section 31 of the Indebtedness Act. The consequence would have  been different if the Rent Act itself expressly provided for deposit of  arrears of rent in a manner specified and those provisions were not  followed. This becomes abundantly clear when we notice several  subsequent decisions of this Court.   

In Kuldeep Singh  vs.  Ganpat Lal and another : (1996) 1  SCC 243 this Court was concerned with a provision of the Rajasthan  Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950.  Section 19-A  thereof provided that a tenant may, apart from personal payment of  rent to the landlord, remit or deposit rent by any of the modes,  namely  : (a) he may remit the whole amount  by postal order ; (b)    he may, by notice in writing, require the landlord to specify bank  and account number into which an amount may be deposited and (c)  where the amount remitted by money order is received back by him  under a postal endorsement of refusal or unfound and when the  landlord does not specify the bank and account number, or that there  was a bona fide doubt as to the person or persons to whom the rent is  payable, the tenant may deposit such rent with the Court within the  period specified under the said Act.  Sub-section (4) of Section 19-A  of the Act further provided that for the purpose of clause (a) of sub- section (1) of Section 13, dealing with default in payment of rent, a  tenant shall be deemed to have paid or tendered the amount of rent,  if any, due from him, if he had paid, remitted or deposited the

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amount of rent by any of the methods specified in sub-section (3).   

       The Court found that before making the deposit in Court, the  tenant had not remitted the amount by postal order nor had the  tenant called upon the landlord to specify the name of the bank and  the account number in which the deposit could be made.  In such a  situation this Court held that the tenant could not avail of the benefit  of the legal fiction under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act.  This Court  held :-

"It is settled law that a legal fiction is to be limited to the  purpose for which it is created and should not be  extended beyond that legitimate fiel.  [See : Bengal  Immunity Co. Ltd.  vs  State of Bihar (SCR at p. 646).   The appellant can avail of the benefit of Section 19-A(4)  if the deposit of Rs.3600/- made by him in the Court of  Munsif (South), Udaipur, on 29-10-1982, by way of rent  for the months of May 1982 to October 1982, can be  treated as a payment under Section 19-A(3)(c) so as to  enable the appellant to say that he was not in default in  payment of rent.  Under Section 19-A(3)(c) the tenant  can deposit the rent in the court only if the conditions laid  down in the said provision are satisfied.  It is the  admitted case of the appellant that these conditions are  not satisfied in the present case.  The deposit which was  made by the respondent in court on 29-10-1982 cannot,  therefore be regarded as a deposit made in accordance  with clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section   19-A and  the appellant cannot avail of the protection of sub-section  (4) of Section 19-A and he must be held to have  committed default in payment of rent for the months of  May 1982 to October 1982.  This means that the decree  for eviction has been rightly passed against the appellant  on account of default of payment of rent for the period of  six months."             

       In Jagat Prasad  vs.  Distt. Judge, Kanpur and others : 1995  Supp (1) SCC 318 a decree for eviction was passed and one of the  grounds was that the deposit had not been made in Court in  accordance with law.  This Court, while holding that the defence of  the tenant had not been property struck off, upheld the decree of  eviction on account of default in payment of rent.  This Court  observed :-

"Nevertheless, the defence of the appellant that he had  deposited bona fide the rent in the civil proceeding that  would enure to the benefit of the rent control proceedings  is unacceptable to us.  Law prescribes the procedure as to  the deposit under U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of  Letting, Rent and Eviction ) Act, 1972.  Such a procedure  if complied with alone will be a valid defence to a  petition for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent.   Therefore, even accepting the defence the ultimate order  of eviction passed against the tenant will have to be  upheld.  This means the order of eviction is sustained."  

       In M. Bhaskar  vs.  J. Venkatarama Naidu : (1996) 6 SCC 228  a similar provision under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and  Eviction) Control Act, 1960 came up for consideration before this  Court as was considered in Jagat Prasad  vs.  Distt. Judge, Kanpur  and others (supra).  This Court while upholding the decree for  eviction observed that there is an obligation on the tenant to pay the  rent regularly and went on to observe :-

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"If he does not do so, he commits willful default. If he  finds that the landlord is evading the payment of rent,  procedure has been prescribed under Section 8 of the Act  to issue notice to the landlord to name the bank and if he  does not name the bank, the tenant has to file an  application before the Rent Controller for permission to  deposit the rent.  The appellant did not avail of that  remedy.  The omission to avail of the procedure under  Section 11 do not disentitle the landlord to seek eviction  for willful default."    

       In Ram Bagas Taparia  vs.  Ram Chandra Pal : (1989) 1 SCC  257 this Court considered the provisions of the West Bengal  Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.  The Act provided that payment or  deposit of rent shall be made by the 15th of the succeeding month.  In  that case the tenant claimed benefit of Section 17(4) of the Act.   The  High Court held that the tenant could not claim such  benefit in view  of the fact that in order to claim the benefit of Section 17(4) of the  Act, the tenant was required to comply with the term of Section  17(1) and follow the procedure laid down therein.  Since he had not  deposited the entire arrears of rent under Section 17(1) within one  month of the service of writ of summons on him or from the date of  his appearance in the suit in the court or with the Controller, the  appellant was not entitled to claim any benfit under Section 17(4) of  the Act.  It was further observed that if indeed the tenant wanted to  claim benefit under Section 17(4), he should have withdrawn the  invalid deposits made in the office of the Rent Controller and  deposited the amount afresh in terms of Section 17(1) of the Act.   Upholding the view of the High Court this Court observed :- "From what has been stated above it may be seen that the  appellant’s contention that he had personally tendered the  rent for January 1966 in the first week of February 1966  to the respondent has not been accepted by the courts  below or by the High Court.  This finding being one of  fact rendered on appreciation of evidence, its correctness  cannot be re-agitated by the appellant in this appeal by  special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of  India.   By reason of this position, it follows that the  remittance of the rent for January 1966 through money  order on February 26, 1966 and the deposit made later on  March 19, 1966 would not constitute valid payments of  rent under the Act so as to absolve the appellant of the  charge of having committed default in payment of rent.   It has further been found that if the appellant had wanted  to avail the benefit of Section 17(4) of the Act, he should  have made a fresh deposit of the rent in accordance with  the terms of Section 17(1) of the Act.  Admittedly, the  appellant had not made any such deposit.  It, therefore,  follows that the appellant would not be entitled to claim  benefit under Section 17(4) of the Act."

       In E. Palanisamy  vs.  Palanisamy (Dead) by Lrs. And others :  (2003) 1 SCC 123 the provisions of T.N. Buildings (Lease and Rent  Control) Act, 1960 came up for consideration.  The requirement of  the Act was somewhat similar to the Rajasthan Rent Act and the  A.P. Rent Act considered by this Court in  Kuldeep Singh  vs.   Ganpat Lal and another (supra) and M. Bhaskar  vs.  J.  Venkatarama Naidu (supra).  Reiterating the view in Kuldeep Singh   vs.  Ganpat Lal and another (supra) and M. Bhaskar  vs.  J.  Venkatarama Naidu (supra) this Court observed :-

"The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit  of the tenants.  At the same time, it is well settled that the  benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant

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statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict  compliance with the statutory provisions.  Equitable  consideration has no place in such matters.  The statute  contains expression provisions.  It prescribes various  steps which a tenant is required to take.  In Section 8 of  the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is  given step by step.  An earlier step is a precondition for  the next step.  The tenant has to observe the procedure as  prescribed in the statute.  A strict compliance with the  procedure is necessary.  The tenant cannot straight away  jump to the last step i.e. to deposit rent in court.  The last  step can come only after the earlier steps have been taken  by the tenant.  We are fortified in this view by the  decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh  vs.  Ganpat Lal  and M. Bhaskar  vs.  J. Venkatarama Naidu\005\005\005\005\005\005

Admittedly the tenant did not follow the procedure  prescribed under Section 8.  The only submission that  was advanced on behalf of the appellant was that since  the deposit of rent had been made, a lenient view ought  to be taken.  We are unable to agree with this.  The  appellant failed to satisfy the conditions contained in  Section 8.  Mere refusal of the landlord to receive rent  cannot justify the action of the tenant in straight away  invoking Section 8(5) of the Act without following the  procedure contained in the earlier sub-sections i.e. sub- sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 8.  Therefore, we are  of the considered view that the eviction order passed  against the appellant with respect to the suit premises on  the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent needs  no interference."  

       It will thus appear that this Court has consistently taken the  views that in Rent Control Legislations if the tenant wishes to take  advantage of the beneficial provisions of the Act, he must strictly  comply with the requirements of the Act.  If any condition precedent  is to be fulfilled before the benefit can be claimed, he must strictly  comply with that condition.  If he fails to do so he cannot take  advantage of the benefit conferred by such a provision.   

Section 26 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 provides that  every tenant shall pay rent within the time fixed by contract, and in  the absence of such contract, by the fifteenth day of the month next  following the month for which it is payable.  Every tenant who  makes a payment of rent to his landlord shall be entitled to obtain  forthwith from the landlord or his authorized agent a written receipt  for the amount paid to him, signed by the landlord or his authorized  agent.  It is also open to the tenant to remit the rent to his landlord by  postal money order.  The relevant part of Section 27 of the Act reads  as under :-

"27.  Deposit of rent by the tenant. \026 (1) Where the  landlord does not accept any rent tendered by the tenant  within the time referred to in section 26 or refuses or  neglects to deliver a receipt referred to therein or where  there is a bona fide doubt as to the person or persons to  whom the rent is payable, the tenant may deposit such  rent with the Controller in the prescribed manner :  

       Provided that in cases where there is a bona fide  doubt as to the person or persons to whom the rent is  payable, the tenant may remit such rent to the Controller  by postal money order.

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       (2)     The deposit shall be accompanied by an  application by the tenant containing the following  particulars, namely :-

(a)     the premises for which the rent is deposited  with a description sufficient for identifying  the premises ;

(b)     the period for which the rent is deposited ;

(c)     the name and address of the landlord or the  person or persons claiming to be entitled to  such rent ;

(d)     the reasons and circumstances for which the  application for depositing the rent is made ;

(e)     such other particulars as may be prescribed.   

(3)     On such deposit of the rent being made, the  Controller shall send in the prescribed manner a copy or  copies of the application to the landlord or persons  claiming to be entitled to the rent with an endorsement of  the date of the deposit.

(4)     If an application is made for the withdrawal  of any deposit of rent, the Controller shall, if satisfied  that the applicant is the person entitled to receive the rent  deposited, order the amount of the rent to be paid to him  in the manner prescribed."

       The Act, therefore, prescribes what must be done by a tenant  if the landlord does not accept rent tendered by him within the  specified period.   He is required to deposit the rent in the Court of  the Rent Controller giving the necessary particulars as required by  sub-section (2) of Section 27.  There is, therefore, a specific  provision which provides the procedure to be followed in such a  contingency.  In view of the specific provisions of the Act it would  not be open to a tenant to resort to any other procedure.  If the rent is  not deposited in the Court of the Rent Controller as required by  Section 27 of the Act, and is deposited somewhere else, it shall not  be treated as a valid payment/tender of the arrears of rent within the  meaning of the Act and consequently the tenant must be held to be  in default.

       We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was right in  holding that the appellant had failed to pay/tender arrears of rent for  the period February 1, 1992 to January 31, 1995.  The deposit made  under the provisions of the Punjab Act was of no avail in view of the  express provision of Section 27 of the Act.  

       It was then faintly submitted before us that the High Court  ought not to have exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Article  227 of the Constitution of India in view of the fact that the two courts  below had concurrently found in favour of the appellant.  The  submission is misconceived.  This is not a case where the High Court  interfered with concurrent findings of fact.  The High Court interfered  because there was a serious error of law committed by the courts  below and as a consequence thereof they failed to exercise jurisdiction  vested in them by law.  The exercise of revisional jurisdiction in a  case of this nature cannot be faulted.

       We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is

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accordingly dismissed.