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PETITIONER: ATMA RAM MITTAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ISHWAR SINGH PUNlA

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/08/1988

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) RANGNATHAN, S.

CITATION:  1988 AIR 2031            1988 SCR  Supl. (2) 528  1988 SCC  (4) 284        JT 1988 (3)   745  1988 SCALE  (2)658  CITATOR INFO :  E&F        1990 SC 897  (11,14)  RF         1992 SC 573  (33)

ACT:     Haryana Urban [Control of Rent and Eviction] Act,  1973: Sections  1 [3] and 13 [1]-Exemption from  applicability  of Rent  Control Act-Period of ’ten  years’  exemption-Expiring during  pendency  of  eviction  suit-Effect  of-Once  rights crystallise adjudication to be in accordance with law. %     Statutory  Constitution: Purposive interpretation  in  a social amelioration-An imperative of anything else.     Words  and  Phrases:’Actus  curiam  neminem   gravabit’- Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant-landlord filed a civil suit  against  the respondent-tenant  for possession of a shop which  had  been rented  out by him in 1978. The suit was filed on the  basis that  the  respondent  was  in  arrears  of  rent  from  lst December,  1981 to 31st May,1982, that the tenancy had  been terminated by giving a suit notice, and that section 1(3) of the  Haryana  Urban  (Control of  Rent  and  Eviction)  Act, 1973_exempted the building from the purview of the Act.     On  or about 15th February, 1983, the  respondent-tenant filed his written statement, and in November, 1984, moved an application for dismissal of the suit stating that the  shop in  question was constructed in June 1974 and as  such,  the period  of  10 year  had elapsed by June 1984  in  terms  of section 1 [3] of the Act and as such, the immunity from  the application  of the Act having expired, the suit  under  the Act  is not maintainable, and that the jurisdiction  of  the Civil Court was barred.     The Sub-Judge held that the decree was not necessary, to be  passed  within the exemption period of  10  years  under section  1  (3) of the Act, and  accordingly  dismissed  the respondent’s application.     The  respondent  preferred a revision  petition  to  the High  Court  ,  which held that as the  suit  had  not  been decreed  within  the  period of 10 years,  the  building  in question  came within the operation of the Act and as  such,

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                                                 PG NO 528                                                   PG NO 529 the  rent  Act  was applicable and the Civil  Court  had  no jurisdiction.  The  High  Court  allowed  the  petition  and consequently  dismissed  the suit pending  before  the  Sub- Judge.     The landlord appealed to this Court by Special Leave.     Allowing the appeal and remanding the case,     HELD:  l.(a) The rights of the parties will have  to  be determined  on the basis of the rights available to them  on the  date  of the suit. The Judgment and Order of  the  High Court  set aside, and order of the Sub-Judge  restored.  The suit to proceed in accordance with law. {533G-535F]     (b)  Section 13 of the Act provides that the  tenant  in possession  of  a  building or a rented land  shall  not  be evicted  therefrom except in accordance with the  provisions of   the  said  Section.  Those  provisions  world  not   be applicable under Section 1(3) to a suit instituted within 10 years  from  the date of the completion of the  building  in question. {534B}     (c) It is well-settled that no man should suffer because of the fault of the Court or delay in the procedure.  "Actus curiam neminem gravabit’’-an act of Court shall prejudice no man. [534E]     (d)  Having  regard to the time  normally  consumed  for adjudication,  the  10 years exemption or holiday  from  the application  of the Rent Act would become illusory,  if  the suit  has  to he filed within that time and be  disposed  of finally. [534F]     (e)  It  is  common  knowledge that  unless  a  suit  is instituted soon after the date of letting, it world never be disposed  of within 10 years and even then within that  time it  may  not  be disposed of. That will make  the  10  years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and provide no  incentive to  the landlords to build new holiday to solve  problem  of shortages  of houses. The purpose of the  legislation  would thus be defeated. [534G]     (f) Bearing in mind the well-settled principle, that the rights of parties crystallise on the date of the institution of  the suit, the meaningful construction must be  that  the exemption  world  apply for a period of 10  years  and  will continue  to be available until the suit is disposed  of  or adjudicated.  Such  suit or proceedings must  be  instituted within  the  stipulated  period of  10  years.  Once  rights crystallise the adjudication must be in accordance with law. [535E]                                                   PG NO 530     Vineet  Kumar  v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, [1984]  3  S.C.C. 352; Nand Kishore Marwah and Ors. v. Samundri Devi, [1987] 4 S.C.C.  382;  Om Prakash Gupta v.  Dig.  Vijendrapal  Gupta, [1982]  3 S.C.R. 491; Ram Saroop Rai v. Lilavati,  [1980]  3 S.C.C. 452, referred to.     2.(a) Purposive interpretation in a social  amelioration legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything  else. [534G]     (b)  Judicial  time and energy is more  often  than  not consumed in Finding what is the intention of the  Parliament or  in other words, the will of the people. The fairest  and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law  was made, by signs most natural and probable and these signs are either  the  words,  the context, the  subject  matter,  the effects  and consequences or the spirit and reasons  of  the law. [534H-535A]     (c) Each word, phrase or sentence has to be construed in

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the light of the purpose of the Act itself but words must be construed  with imagination of purpose behind  them.  Though the  Court  is concerned with seeking of  intention,  it  is rather  looking  to  the  meaning  of  the  word  that   the legislator has used and the true meaning of the words  used. {535B}     Poppatlal  Shah v. State of Madras, [1953} SCR  677  and Black-Clawson  International  Ltd. v.  Papierwerke  Walnhof- Aschaffenburg A G, {1975] A.C. 591 at 613.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3081  of 1988.     From  the Judgment and Order dated 25. 10. 1985  of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 2457  of 1985.     R.K. Jain and Ms. Abha Jain for the Appellant.     K.C. Sharma and R.K. Virmani for the Respondent.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI  MUKHARJI,  J. Special  leave  granted.   The appeal is disposed of herein after hearing counsel for  both the parties.     The  appellant-landlord filed a suit for  possession  in the Civil Court of Hissar in Haryana. The respondent is  the tenant  in  the shop situated at Raj Guru Market  which  had                                                   PG NO 531 been  rented  out to the respondent in 1978.  The  suit  was filed  on  the basis that the respondent was in  arrears  of rent  from  lst  December, 1982 to 3lst May,  1982  and  the tenancy of the respondent had been terminated by giving  him notice. The suit was filed for recovery of possession on the termination or expiry of the period of tenancy. It was filed because  of  Section 1(3) of the Haryana Urban  (Control  of Rent  and Eviction) Act,  1973 (hereinafter referred  to  as ’the  Act’). The Act was passed with the object  to  control the  increase of rent of certain buildings and  rented  land situated  within the limits of urban areas and the  eviction of  tenants  therefrom. For our present  purpose,  it  would suffice if we bear in mind two relevant provisions.  Section 1(3) of the Act provides as follows :     "Nothing  in  this Act shall apply to any  building  the construction   of  which  is  completed  on  or  after   the commencement of this Act for a period of ten years from  the date its completion. "     Section 13 of the Act deals with the eviction of tenants and  sub-section  (1) thereof provides that  the  tenant  in possession  of  a  building or a rented land  shall  not  be evicted  therefrom except in accordance with the  provisions of  that  section.  The section  thereafter  enumerates  the statutory  grounds  for  eviction  upon  which  eviction  is permitted  which  incidentally  are  more  or  less  similar statutory ground all over the country.     On  or about 15th February, 1983, the  respondent-tenant filed   his  written  statement.  In  November,  1984,   the respondent-tenant moved an application for dismissal of  the suit of the appellant stating that the shop in question  was constructed  in June, 1974 as such the period of  ten  years had  elapsed by June, 1984 in terms of section l(3)  of  the Act. and, as such, the immunity from the application of  the had expired. The suit under the Act is not maintainable  and the  Jurisdiction  of  the Civil Court  stands  barred.  The learned  Sub-Judge,  Hissar. held that the  decree  was  not necessary  to be passed within the exemption period  of  ten

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years under section  1(3) of the Act. the learned  Sub-Judge accordingly   dismissed   the   respondent’s    application. Aggrieved   thereby,  the  tenant-respondent   preferred   a revision  to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The  High Court held that as the suit had not been decreed within  the period  of ten years, the building in question  came  within the  operation  of  the Act and as such  the  Rent  Act  was applicable  and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. In  the                                                   PG NO 532 premises, the learned Judge of the High Court dismissed  the suit  pending  before the Sub-Judge. Aggrieved  thereby  the appellant has come up in appeal to this Court.     More  or less identical provisions of the U. P. Act  had come  up for consideration before this Court in the case  of Vineet Kumar  v.Manal Sain Wadhera, [l984] 3 S.C.C. 352. The only point that was urged before this Court in that decision was  whether  the premises which was not ten years’  old  on the date of the suit and was exempted from the operation  of the  new  Rent  Act, could be governed by it  if  ten  years expired during the pendency of the litigation. The  relevant provisions  of  the  U.P.  Urban  Buildings  (Regulation  of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 provided as follows:     "20.  Bar  of  suit for eviction  of  tenant  except  on specified grounds. (1) Save as provided in sub-section  [2). no  suit  shall be instituted for the eviction of  a  tenant from  a building, notwithstanding the determination  of  his tenancy  by efflux of time or on the expiration of a  notice to quit or in any other manner.     Provided  that nothing in this sub-section shall  bar  a suit  for the eviction of a tenant on the  determination  of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a  fixed term was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise  or adjustment  arrived  at with reference to  a  suit,  appeal, revision  or execution proceeding, which is either  recorded in  court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by  the tenant."     In  Vineet  Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera,  [supra],  the respondent-landlord  filed  a  suit  for  eviction  and  for arrears of rent and damages, inter alia, on the grounds that the  building in question was not covered by the U.P.  Urban Buildings  [Regulation  of Letting, Rent and  Eviction]  ct, 1972 in view of the exemption granted to new buildings under section  2  [2]  of the said Act  and  that  the  defendant- appellant had defaulted in payment of rent.  The tenant  had resisted  the claim on the ground that having regard to  the date of construction of the building, it was covered’ by the Act, that the plaint having not been amended so as to  bring the suit under the Act, it was barred by section 20 and that term  was  no  default in payment  of  rent.   As  mentioned hereinbefore,  during  the pendency of  the  litigation  the exemption granted under section 2 [2] expired.  The question was whether the premises which was not ten years’ old on the                                                   PG NO 533 date of the suit and was exempted from the operation of  the Rent  Act,  would  be governed by it if  ten  years  expired during˜,  the  pendency  of  the  litigation.  Allowing  the appeal, this Court held that the appellant must get benefits of  the  Act  which became applicable  to  the  premises  in question  during the pendency of the litigation. That  would not  affect  the cause of action in that case. It  was  held that the contention that the Court had to decide the case on the basis of cause of action that accrued prior to the  date of filing the suit and not on a new cause of action was  not sustainable. It was further held that normally amendment  in plaint  is not allowed if it changes the causes  of  action.

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However, where the amendment does not constitute an addition of  a new cause of action, or raise a new case, but  amounts to no more than adding to the facts already, on the  record, the  amendment  would be allowed even  after  the  statutory period  of limitation. This Court observed  that  processual justice required that the events and developments subsequent to  the  institution  of  proceedings  must  be  taken  into consideration  in appropriate cases to  promote  substantial justice.  Vineet  Kumar’s  case (supra]  was  discussed  and explained by this Court in Nand Kishore Marwah und others v. Sammundri Devi, [1987] 4 S.C_’.C. 382. This Court held  that in  view of section 2(2) of the  1972 Act, if an  assessment is made of the newly built house then the date of completion of  the  building, the date from which 10 years have  to  be computed  will be the date on which the first assessment was made. Therefore, the period of 10 years have to be  computed from October. 1976. This Court further hold that if a tenant is  entitled to the advantage of sections 39 and 40  of  the Act and the period of  10 years elapses during the  pendency of  the eviction suit or appeal before this Court (which  is the  continuation  of the suit), then the  tenant  would  be entitled to the benefits of the Act. This Court further held that  within  10  years  as provided  for  in  section  2(2) restriction  on the institution of suit as provided  for  in section  20  (1) will not be applicable. It  was  held  that during  the  pendency  of the litigation even  if  10  years expired  the  restriction  under  section  20  will  not  be attracted  as the suit had been instituted within 10  years. It is well-settled that the rights of the parties will  have to  be  determined on the basis of the rights  available  to them  on the date of the suit. This Court pointed  out  that the  attention  of  the  Court had not  been  drawn  to  the decision  of  this  Court  in  Om  Prakash  Gupta  v.   Dig. Vijendrapal Gupta, [1982] 3 S.C.R. 491.  This Court referred to  the  words   used in section 20 of the  said  Act  which emphasised that "no suit shall be instituted for  eviction." ’This  clearly  indicates  that the  restriction  put  under section 20 of the said Act is to the institution of the suit itself and, therefore, it is clear that if the  provision of                                                   PG NO 534 this Act applies then no suit for eviction can be instituted except on the grounds specified in the sub-sections of  that section of the Act. This applies more so in the instant case where the section 13 of the Act provides that the tenant  in possession  of  a  building or a rented land  shall  not  be evicted  therefrom except in accordance with the  provisions of this section. Those provisions would not be applicable to a  suit  instituted  within 10 years from the  date  of  the completion  of the building in question. That is  the  plain meaning of the expression "use". It was further to be  borne in  mind  that  in  finding out the  plain  meaning  of  the expression "use"z the language, the background, the context, the purpose, these all have to be borne in mind.     In  Ram  Saroop Rai v. Lilavati, [1980]  3  S.C.C.  452, Krishna lyer, J. has explained the section 2(2) of the U. P. Act as follows ;     "The  legislature  found  that rent control  law  has  a chilling  effect  on new building construction, and  so,  to encourage  more building operations, amended the statute  to release,  from the shackle of legislative restriction,  ’new constructions’  for  a period of ten years. So  much  so,  a landlord  who  had let out his new  building  could  recover possession   with-out  impediment  if  he  instituted   such proceedings within ten years of completion ?’     It is well-settled that no man should suffer because  of

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the fault of the Court or delay in the procedure. Broom  has stated  the maxim "actus curiam neminem gravabit"-an act  of Court  shall prejudice no, man. Therefore, having regard  to the  time normally consumed for adjudication, the  10  years exemption  or holiday from the application of the  Rent  Act would  become illusory, if the suit has to be  filed  within that time and be disposed of finally. It is common knowledge that  unless  a suit is instituted soon after  the  date  of letting  it would never be disposed of within 10  years  and even  then within that time it may not be disposed of.  That will  make the 10 years holidays from the Rent Act  illusory and  provide  no  incentive to the landlords  to  build  new houses to solve problem of shortages of houses. The  purpose of   legislation   would   thus   be   defeated.   Purposive interpretation  in a social amelioration legislation  is  an imperative irrespective of anything else.     Judicial time and energy is more often than not consumed in  finding  what is the intention of the Parliament  or  in other  wards,  the will of the people. Blackstone  tells  us that  the fairest and most rational method to interpret  the will  of the legislator is by exploring his inten  tions  at                                                   PG NO 535 the  time when the law was made, by signs most  natural  and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the  subject  matter, the effects and  consequence,  or  the spirit and reason of the law. (Underlined by the Court). See Commentaries  on  the  Laws of  England  (facsimile  of  lst edition  of 1765, University of Chicago Press, 1979 Vol.  1, p. 59). Mukherjea, J. as the learned Chief justice then was, in  Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, [1953] SCR  677  said that  each word, phrase or sentence was to be  construed  in the  light of purpose of the Act itself. But words  must  be construed with imagination of purpose behind the said  Judge Learned  Hand,  long time ago. It appears,  therefore,  that though  we are concerned with seeking of intention,  we  are rather  looking  to  the  meaning  of  the  words  that  the legislator  has used and the true meaning of what  words  as was said by Lord Reid in Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke  Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A G, [1975] Appeal  Cases 591 at 613. We are clearly of the opinion that having regard to  the language we must find the reason and the  spirit  of the law. If the immunity from the operation of the Rent  Act is made and depended upon the ultimate disposal of the  case within  the  period  of exemption of 10 years  which  is  in reality  ability, then there would be empty reasons. In  our opinion,bearing in mind the well-settled principle that  the rights  of  the  parties  crystallise on  the  date  of  the institution  of the suit as enunciated by this Court  in  Om Prakash  Gupta  v.  Dig  Vijendrapal  Gupta,  (supra),   the meaningful  construction  must be that the  exemption  would apply  for  a  period of 10 years and will  continue  to  be available  until  suit is disposed of or  adjudicated.  Such suit or proceeding must be instituted within the  stipulated period of 10 years. Once rights crystallise the adjudication must be in accordance with law.     In  that view of the matter, we are of the opinion  that the  High  Court  was  in error in the  view  it  took.  The judgment  and order of the High Court are set aside and  the order  of the learned Sub-Judge is restored. The  suit  will now  proceed  in  accordance with law in the  light  of  the observations herein as expeditiously as possible. The  costs of the appeal will be the costs of the suit. N.V.K.                                   Appeal allowed.

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