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PETITIONER: ATAM PRAKASH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/02/1986

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) OZA, G.L. (J) BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ) MISRA, R.B. (J) KHALID, V. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR  859            1986 SCR  (1) 399  1986 SCC  (2) 249        1986 SCALE  (1)260  CITATOR INFO :  R          1986 SC1910  (3)  E&R        1987 SC  68  (1,2,3)  RF         1987 SC1140  (3)  RF         1987 SC1304  (8)  F          1987 SC1325  (1)  RF         1987 SC2117  (31)  F          1988 SC2137  (2)  R          1988 SC2141  (8)  RF         1991 SC1055  (1)  RF         1992 SC 109  (5)  R&E        1992 SC 207  (2,3,4)  RF         1992 SC1851  (2)

ACT:      Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913, as applicable in the State of Haryans, 8. 15 - Whether constitutionally void.

HEADNOTE:      Interpretation of  statutes - Provision of Constitution sought to  be interpreted  or a statute whose constitutional validity is  sought to  be questioned  - Interpretation that will  promote   march  &   Progress  towards  a  Socialistic Democratic State - To be given.      Section 15  of the  Punjab  Pre-emption  Act,  1913  as applicable in  the State  of Haryana, incorporates the right of  pre-emption  based  on  consanguinity.  The  petitioners challenged this  right of pre-emption based on consanguinity under Art.  32 of  the Constitution  on the  ground that  it offends  Arts.  14  and  15  of  the  Constitution.  It  was contended  on   behalf  of  the  respondent-State  that  the classification in favour of the persons mentioned in section 15 has been made on reasonable basis in the interests of the public: (1) to preserve integrity of village community; (11) to avoid  fragmentation of  holdings; (111) to implement the agnatic theory  of succession;  (iv) to  promote public  and private  decency;  (v)  to  facilitate  tenants  to  acquire ownership rights;  (vi) to  reduce litigation  consequent to introduction of  an outsider  on family  property or jointly owned property.

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    Allowing the writ petitions, ^      HELD:  1(1)   There  is   no  justification   for   the classification  contained   in  section  15  of  the  Punjab Perception Act  of the kinsfolk entitled to pre-emption. The right of  pre-emption based  on consanguinity  is a relic of the feudal  past. It  is   totally inconsistent  with modern ideas. The  reasons which  justified its recognition quarter of a century 400 ago, namely,  the preservation  of the  integrity  of  rural society, the  unity of family life and the agnatic theory of succession are  today irrelevant.  It is difficult to uphold the classification  on the  basis of  unity and integrity of either the  village community  or the family or on the basis of the  agnatic theory of succession which 18 again in a way connected with  the integrity  of the  family. The  list  of kinsfolk   mentioned    as   entitled   to   preemption   is intrinsically defective  and self-contradictory.  There  is, therefore, no reasonable classification and clauses ’First’, ’Secondly’  and   ’Thirdly’   of   8.   15(1)(a),   ’First’, ’Secondly’, and  ’Thirdly’ of  8. 15(1)(b), clauses ’First’, ’Secondly’ and  ’Thirdly’ of  8. 15(1)(c)  and the  whole of section  15(2)   are,  therefore,  declared  ultravires  the Constitution. [419 E-H]      1.2 Clause ’fourthly’ of 8. 15(1)(a), clauses ’fourthly and fifthly’  of 8.  15(1)(b) and  clause ’fourthly’  of  8. 15(1) (c) are valid and do not infringe either Art. 14 or 15 of the Constitution. [416 H; 417 A]      2.1 Whether it is the Constitution that is expounded or the constitutional validity of a statute that is considered, a  cardinal   rule  18  to  look  to  the  Preamble  to  the Constitution as  the guiding  light  and  to  the  Directive Principles of  State Policy  as the  Book of interpretation. The  Preamble   embodies  and   expresses  the   hopes   and aspirations of  the people. The Directive Principles set out proximate goals.  At the  time of examining statutes against the Constitution, it is through these glasses that the court must  look,   ’distant  vision’   or  ’near   vision’.   The Constitution being  sui-generis, where constitutional issues are under  consideration, narrow  interpretative rules which may  have   relevance  when   legislative   enactments   are interpreted may be misplaced. [411 D-F]      2.2 In  1977 the  42nd amendment  proclaimed India as a Socialist Republic. The word ’socialist’ was introduced into the Preamble  to the  Constitution. The  implication of  the introduction of  the word  ’socialist’ which  has now become the centre  of the  hopes and  aspirations of the people - a beacon to  guide and  inspire all  that is  enshrined in the articles of  the Constitution  - is  clearly  to  set  up  a "vibrant throbbing  socialist welfare  society" in the place of a "Feudal exploited society. When the Court considers the question whether a 401 statute offends  Article 14  of  the  Constitution  it  must consider whether  a classification  that the legislature may have made  is consistent with the socialist goals set out in the Preamble and the Directive Principles enumerated in Part IV of  the Constitution.  A classification  which is  not in tune with the Constitution is per se unreasonable and cannot be Permitted. [411 G-H: 412 A-C]      3.1 The  right of pre-emption based on consanguinity is antiquated and  feudal in origin and in character. The right is very  much  like  another  right  of  feudal  origin  and character which  subsisted here  and there  in  India  until

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recently,  particularly   amongst  the   princely  families, namely, the  right of  succession by  primogeniture. It is a well-known characteristic  of feudalism  that the control of the  most   important  productive   resource,  land,  should continue in  the hands  of the same social and family group. The  right   of  preemption  based  on  consanguinity  is  a consequence  flowing  out  of  this  characteristic.  It  is entirely inconsistent  with our Constitutional scheme. Since the Forty-Second Amendment, India is a socialist republic in which feudalism  can obviously  have no  place and  must go. [404 G-H; 405 A-8]      3.2 Avoidance  of fragmentation  of holdings, promotion of private and public decency and reduction of litigation do not seem  to have any relevance to the right of pre-emption, vested in  the kinsfolk  of the  vendor. me real question is whether a classification in favour of kinsfolk of the vendor can be  considered reasonable  so as  to justify  a right of pre-emption in  their favour  for the  purpose of preserving the integrity  of the  village community or implementing the agnatic theory  of succession  or preserving  the unity  and integrity  of  the  family.  The  classification  cannot  be considered reasonable  in the circumstances prevailing today whatever  justification   there  might  have  been  for  the classification in 1960 when the legislature amended 8. 15 of the Punjab  Pre-emption Act.  A  scrutiny  of  the  list  of persons in  whose favour  the right  of preemption is vested under s.  15 reveals  certain glaring  facts which appear to detract from  the theory of preservation of the integrity of the family  and the  theory of  agnatic right of succession. Neither the father nor the mother figures in the list though the father’s  brother  does.  The  son’s  daughter  and  the daughter’s son do. The sister and sister‘s son are 402 excluded though  the  brother  and  the  brother’s  son  are included. Thus  relatives of  the same  degree are  excluded either because  they are  women or  because they are related through women.  It is  not as  if women  and  those  related through women  are altogether  excluded because the daughter and daughter’s  son are  included. If  the daughter is to be treated on  a par   with  the son’s  son it  does not appear logical why  the father’s  son (brother)  should be included and not  the father’s daughter (sister). There are but a few of the  intrinsic contradictions  that appear in the list of relatives mentioned in s.15 as entitled to the right of pre- emption. [417 G-H; 418 A-B; H; 419 A-C]      3.3 There  has been  a green  and a white revolution in Haryana. This  State is also in the process of an industrial revolution. Industries  have sprung up through out the State and the  population has been in a state of constant flux ant movement. The  traditional integrity  of the village and the family have  now become  old wives’  tales. Tribal loyalties have disappeared and family tries have weakened. Such is the effect of  the march  of  history  and  the  consequence  of industrialisation, mechanisation of agriculture, development of  marketing  and  trade,  allurement  of  professions  and office, employment  opportunity else-where  and so  on.  The processes of history cannot be reversed and the court cannot hark back  to the traditional rural-family-oriented society. Quite apart  from the  break up  of the integrity of village life and  family life, lt is to be noticed that the property in respect  of which  the right  of  pre-emption  is  to  be exercised is property of which the vendor or the vendors, as the case  may be,  have rights  of full  ownership and their kinsfolk have no present right whatsoever. [418 C-F]      3.4 The right of pre-emption is not to be confused with

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the right  to question the alienation of ancestral immovable property which  the male  lineal descendants  of the  vendor have under  the Punjab  Custom (Power  to Contest) Act 1920. The right  of preemption  is now  entirely a statutory right and dissociated from custom or personal law.[418 G]      4.1 In  Bhau Ram  v. Baijnath  Singh  1962  (Suppl.)  3 S.C.R. 724,  the right  of pre-emption given to co-share was held to  be a  reasonable restriction  on the right to hold, acquire or dispose of property conferred by Art. 19(1)(f) of 403 the Constitution.  What has  been said  there to  uphold the right of  pre-emption granted to a co-sharer as a reasonable restriction on  the right  to property applies with the same force to justify the classification of co-sharers as a class by themselves  for the  purpose of vesting in them the right of pre-emption. [416 D-E]      4.2 The  right of  pre-emption vested  in a  tenant can also be  easily sustained.  There can be no denying that the movement   of all  land reform  legislation has been towards enabling the  l tiller  of the  soil to  obtain  proprietary right in  the soil  so that  he may  not be  disturbed  from possession of  the land  and deprived of his livelihood by a superior proprietor.  The right of preemption in favour of a tenant granted  by the  Act is  only another  instance of  a legislation aimed  at protecting the tenant. There can be no doubt that  tenants form  a distinct class by themselves and the  right   of  pre-emption  granted  in  their  favour  is reasonable and in the public interest.[416 G-H]      Bhau Ram  v. B.  Baijnath Singh,  [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 724 and Sant Ram v. Labh Singh A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 314 referred to.      Ram  Sarup   v.  Munshi    Ors.  [1963]  3  S.C.R.  858 explained.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:  Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13227 of 1984 etc.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)      Pankaj Kalra  for the  Petitioner in  W.P. No. 13227 of 1984.      M/s. Harbans  Lal, V.C.  Mahajan, Mahabir  Singh, Avadh Behari Rohtagi,  S.S. Banerjee,  M.S. Gujaral,  K.G. Bhagat, Hardev Singh,  Yogeshwar Prasad, Anil Dev Singh, Govind Das, and K.P.  Bhandari,  M/s.  S.M.  Ashri,  G.K.  Bansal,  J.S. Malhotra, Ali  Ahmed, Jayashree Ahmed, C.K. Bansal, Narendra Singh  Malik,   D.K.  Garg,  B.P.  Maheshwari,  Vidya  Sagar Vashist, S.N.  Agarwal, S.K. Jain, S.K. Dhingra, M.L. Verma, S.K. Bagga,  Ranbir Singh  Yadav, H.M.  Singh, Kirpal Singh, Amlan Ghosh,  M. Qamaruddin, Mrs. M. Qamaruddin, R.K. Kapur, M.M. Kashyap,  B.R. Kapur,  Anil Katyal,  O.P. Sharma,  Amis Ahmad Khan, R.C. Kapoor, Mrs. Laxmi Arvind, Suresh C. Gupta, S.S. Ray, Anil Bhatnagar, 404 Praveen Kumar,  Ashok Mathur,  M.K.  Dua,  P.N.  Puri,  Gyan Singh, I.S.  Goel, S.N.  Singh, C.V.  Subba Rao, V.M. Issar, Khaitan & Co., Brij Bhushan Sharma, P. Narasimhan, Ms. Madhu Mool Chandani,  K.K. Jain,  Pramod Dayal,  A.D. Sangar, A.K. Ganguli, A.  Mariaputam, Nafiz Ahmad Siddiqui, M.C. Dhingra, Avtar Singh Sonal, Shreepal Singh, S.R. Srivastava, Ashok K. Srivastava, Balmukand Goel, S.K. Bhulakia, R.C. Bhatia, R.K. Agnihotri, Dr.  Meera Aggarwal,  R.C. Misra,  M.S.  Dhillon, S.K. Dholakia,  P. Narasimhan,  R.K. Agarwal,  T. Sridharan, S.C. Patel,  N.M.Popli, Brij  Bhushan and  Kailash Mehta for

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the appearing parties.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHINNAPPA REDDY,  J. The  archaic right  of pre-emption based  on  consanguinity  is  in  question  in  the  several thousand writ  petitions under  Art. 32 of the Constitution. The constitutional  validity of  sec. 15  of the Punjab Pre- emption Act,  1913 was  applicable in  the State  of Haryana which incorporates  this right  is challanged.  The State of origin of  the Punjab  Pre-emption Act, the State of Punjab, has repealed the Act in 1973. The Act, however, continues to be in  force in the State of Haryana which originally formed part of  the State  of Punjab.  The vires of sec.15(1)(a) of the Act  was questioned in this Court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi and Ors. [1963] 3 S.C.R. 858 on  the ground that it offended the fundamental  right guaranteed  by  sec.19(1)(f)  of  the Constitution. It  was ruled  by a  Constitution  Bench  that there was  no infringement  of  Art.19(1)(f)  and  that  the provision was  valid. The validity of sec.15 is now impugned primarily on  the ground  that it offends Arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution.      The right  of pre-emption  based on  consanguinity  has been variously  described by  learned  judges  as  ’feudal’, ’piratical’,  ’tribal’,   ’weak’,  ’easily  defeated’,  etc. [Ralwa v.  Vaaakha Singh  A.I.R. 1983  Punjab &  Haryana 480 (F.B.) at 490 and Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh [1959] S.C.R. 878. Fusing  as it  does the  Lies of  blood and  soil,  it cannot be doubted that the right is antiquated and feudal in origin and in character. The right is very much like another right of  feudal origin  and character  which subsisted here and there  in India until recently, particularly amongst the princely  families,  namely,  the  right  of  succession  by primogeniture. It 405 is a well-known characteristic of feudalism that the control of the  most important  productive  resource,  land,  should continue in  the hands  of the same social and family group. The  right  of  pre-emption  based  on  consanguinity  is  a consequence  flowing  out  of  this  characteristic.  It  is entirely inconsistent  with our Constitutional scheme. Since the Forty-Second Amendment, India is a socialist republic in which feudalism can obviously have no place and must go. Our Constitution now  proclaims India as a sovereign, socialist, secular democratic  republic in  which the right to equality before the  law and  the equal  protection of  the laws  are guaranteed and all citizens are assured that the State shall not discriminate  on grounds  only of religion, race, caste, sex, place  of birth  or any  of them. The citizens are also assured  of  the  right  to  move  freely  through  out  the territory of  India, to  reside or settle in any part of the territory of  India and  to practise  any profession  or  to carry on  any occupation,  trade or  business. The  State is further enjoined  to direct its policy towards securing that the operation  of the economic system does not result in the concentration of  wealth and  means  of  production  to  the common detriment.  The right to property has also now ceased to be a fundamental right since the Forty- Fourth Amendment. The question  now is  whether this  adjunct of  the right to property, perhaps  perfectly reasonable in a feudal society, can be  constitutionally sustained in a society dedicated to socialistic-principles. The question has to be examined with reference to  Arts. 14,  15 and  19(1)(d) and  (g),  in  the background of the Preamble to the Constitution and Art.39(c) of the  Directive Principles  of State Policy. We think that the question  has to be primarily answered with reference to Art 14.

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    The Punjab  Pre-emption Act,  1913 repealed  the Punjab Pre-emption Act  of 1905  and sec.12  of the  1905 Act which corresponded to sec.15 of the 1913 Act was as follows:-           "12. Subject  to the provisions of section 11, the           right of  pre-emption in  respect of  agricultural           land and village immovable property shall vest-           (a) in  the case  of the  sale  of  such  land  or           property by  a sole  owner or occupancy tenant, or           when such land or property is held jointly, by the           co-sharers, 406           in the  persons who  but for  such sale  would  be           entitled to  inherit the  property in the event of           his or their decease, in order of succession;           (b) in the case of a sale of share of such land or           property held jointly-           first in  the lineal  descendants of the vendor in           the male line in order of succession; secondly, in           the co-shares,  if any,  who are agnates, in order           of succession;           thirdly, in  the persons  described in  sub-clause           (a)  of  this  sub-section  and  not  hereinbefore           provided for;           fourthly, in  the co-sharers,  (i)  jointly,  (ii)           severally;           (c) As  section  15(c),  Act  of  1913,  with  the           addition of  words (i) jointly, (ii) severally, in           secondly, thirdly and fourthly.           Explanation 1. - In the case of sale of a right of           occupancy, clauses  (a), (b)  and (c) of this sub-           section, with the exception of sub-clause fourthly           of clause (c), shall be applicable.           Explanation 2. - In the case of a sale by a female           of property to which she has succeeded through her           husband,  son,   brother  or   father,  the   word           ’agnates’ in  this section  shall mean the agnates           of the person through whom she has so succeeded." Section 15  of  the  Punjab  Pre-emption  Act,  1913  as  it originally stood, was as follows:-           "15. Subject  to the  provisions of section 14 the           right of  pre-emption in  respect of  agricultural           land and village immovable property shall vest -           (a) where the sale is by a sole owner or occupancy           tenant or, in the case of land or property jointly 407           owned or  held, is  by all the co-sharers jointly,           in the persons in order of succession, who but for           such sale  would be  entitled, on the death of the           vendor or vendors, to inherit the land or property           sold:           (b) where the sale is of a share out of joint land           or property,  and is,  not made  by  all  the  co-           sharers jointly, -           firstly, in the lineal decendants of the vendor in           order of succession;           secondly, in  the  co-sharers,  if  any,  who  are           agnates, in order of succession;           thirdly in the persons, not included under firstly           or secondly,  above, in  order of  succession, who           but for  such sale would be entitled, on the death           of the  vendor, to  inherit the  land or  property           sold; fourthly, in the co-sharers:           (c) If  no person  having a  right of  pre-emption           under clause  (a) or  clause (b) seeks to exercise           it, -

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         firstly, when  the sale  affects the  superior  or           inferior proprietary  right and the superior right           is sold, in the inferior proprietors, and when the           inferior proprietors,  and when the inferior right           is sale, in the superior proprietors;           secondly, in the owners of the patti or other sub-           division of  the estate within the limits of which           such land or property is situate;           thirdly, in the owners of the estate;           fourthly, in the case of a sale of the proprietary           right in such land or property, in the tenants (if           any) having  rights of  occupancy in  such land or           property; 408           fifthly, in any tenant having a right of occupancy           in any  agricultural land in the estate within the           limits of which the land or property is situated.           Explanation -  In the  case of sale by a female of           land or  property to  which she has succeeded on a           life tenure  through her  husband, son, brother or           father, the  word (agnates’  in this section shall           mean the  agnates of  the person  through whom she           has so succeeded. In 1960,  there were  substantial amendments  to the  Punjab Pre-emption  Act   and,  after   amendment,  sec.15  was  as follows:-           "15. Persons in whom right of pre-emption vests in           respect of  sales of agricultural land and village           immovable property  - (1) The right of pre-emption           in  respect   of  agricultural  land  and  village           immovable property shall vest -           (a) where  the sale is by a sole owner - First, in           the son or daughter or son’s son or daughter’s son           of the vendor;           Secondly, in  the brother  or brother’s son of the           vendor:           Thirdly,  in  the  father’s  brother  or  father’s           brother’s son of the vendor;           Forthly, in  the tenant who holds under tenancy of           the vendor  the land  or property  sold or  a part           thereof;           (b) where the sale is of a share out of joint land           or property and is not made by all the co-shares           jointly-           First, in  the sons  or daughters  or sons’ son or           daughters’ sons of the vendor or vendors;           Secondly, in the brothers or brother’s sons of the           vendor or vendors; 409           Thirdly, in  the father’s brother or father’s sons           of the vendor or vendors;           Fourthly, in the other co-sharers;           Fifthly, in  the tenants who hold under tenancy of           the vendor or vendors the land or property sold or           a part thereof;           (c) where  the sale  is of  land or property owned           jointly and is made by all the co-sharers jointly-           First, in  the sons  or daughters or sons’ sons or           daughter’s sons of the vendors;           Secondly, in the brothers or brother’s sons of the           vendors;           Thirdly, in  the Father’s or brother’s or father’s           brother’s sons of the vendors:           Fourthly, in  the tenants,  who hold under tenancy           of the  vendors or  any one  of them  the land  or

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         property sold or a part thereof.           (2)   Notwithstanding    anything   contained   in           subsection(1) :-           (a) where  the sale  is by  a female  of  land  or           property to  which she  has succeeded  through her           father or  brother or  the sale in respect of such           land or property is by the son or daughter of such           female after inheritance, the right of pre-emption           shall vest:-           (i) if  the sale is by such female, in her brother           or brother’s son;           (ii) if the sale is by the son or daughter of such           female, in  the mother’s  brothers or the mother’s           brother’s sons of the vendor or vendors;           (b) where the sale is by a female of land or 410           property to  which she  has succeeded  through her           husband, or  through her  son in  case the son has           inherited the  land  or  property  sold  from  his           father, the right of pre-emption shall vest,-           FIRST, in  the son or daughter of such (husband of           the) female;           SECONDLY, in  the husband’s  brother or  husband’s           brother’s son of such female."      Agricultural land  has been  defined in the Act to mean land as  defined in  the Punjab  Alienation of Land Act, not including the rights of a mortgagee, whether usufructuary or not, in  such land.  ’Member of  an agricultural  tribe’ and ’Group of agricultural tribes’ are to have the same meanings assigned to them respectively under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act.  The  Punjab  Alienation  of  Land  Act  has  been repealed, but the definitions continue to have force for the purposes of  the Punjab  Pre-emption Act.  Section 4  of the Punjab Preemption  Act states  what the right of Pre-emption is. It says :           "4. Right  of pre-emption  application  of  -  The           right of  pre-emption shall  mean the  right of  a           person to  acquire agricultural  land  or  village           immovable property  or urban immovable property in           preference to  other persons,  and  it  arises  in           respect of such land only in the case of sales and           in respect  of such  property only  in the case of           sales or  of foreclosures  of the  right to redeem           such property.           Nothing in this section shall prevent a Court from           holding that  an alienation purporting to be other           than a sale is in effect a sale." t Section 5(b) prescribes that there shall be no right of pre- emption in  respect of  the sale  of agricultural land being waste land  reclaimed by the vendee. Section 6 provides that a right  of pre-emption  shall exist  in respect  of village immovable property  and subject to the provisions of section 5(b), in  respect of  agricultural land, but only subject to all the  provisions and  limitations contained  in the  Act. Section 7  refers to  the right of pre-emption in respect of urban immovable  property. Section  8 enables the Government to 411 declare by  a notification  that there  shall be no right of pre-emption in any local area or with respect to any land or property or class of land or property or with respect to any sale or  class of  sales. Section  10 prevents  a party to a sale along  with other joint owners from claiming a right to pre-emption. In  respect of  land sold  by a  member  of  an

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agricultural tribe,  section 14  provides that no person who is not a member of the same agricultural tribe as the vendor shall have a right of pre-emption. We have already extracted section 15. Section 16 refers to the vesting of the right of pre-emption in  the case  of  an  urban  immovable  property Section 17  prescribes how  the right  of pre-emption may be exercised where several persons are entitled to such right. Other provisions  deal with the procedure to be followed for the exercise of the right of pre-emption.      Now, to  the question  at issue and first, a word about interpretation. Whether  it  is  the  Constitution  that  is expounded or  the constitutional  validity of a statute that is considered, a cardinal rule is to look to the Preamble to the Constitution  as the  guiding light and to the Directive Principles of State Policy as the Book of Interpretation. me Preamble embodies and expresses the hopes and aspirations of the people.  The  Directive  Principles  set  out  proximate goals. When  we go  about the  task  of  examining  statutes against the  Constitution, it  is through these glasses that we  must  look,  ’distant  vision’  or  ’near  vision’.  The Constitution being  sui-generis, where Constitutional issues are under  consideration, narrow  interpretative rules which may  have   relevance  when   legislative   enactments   are interpreted may be misplaced. Originally the Preamble to the Constitution proclaimed  the resolution  of  the  people  of India to  constitute  India  into  ’a  Sovereign  Democratic Republic’ and  set forth  ’Justice,  Liberty,  Equality  and Fraternity’,  the   very  rights  mentioned  in  the  French Declarations  of   the  Rights  of  Man  as  our  hopes  and aspirations. That  was in 1950 when we had just emerged from the colonial-feudal  rule. Time  passed. The  people’s hopes and aspirations  grew. In 1977 the 42nd amendment proclaimed India as  a Socialist  Republic. The  word  ’socialist’  was introduced  into  the  Preamble  to  the  Constitution.  The implication of  the introduction  of the  word  ’socialist’, which has now become the centre of the hopes and aspirations of the  people a  beacon to  guide and  inspire all  that is enshrined in the 412 articles of  the Constitution  -, is  clearly to  set  up  a "vibrant throbbing  socialist welfare  society" in the place of a  "Feudal exploited  society". Whatever  article of  the Constitution it  is that  we  seek  to  interpret,  whatever statute it  is whose constitutional validity is sought to be questioned, we must strive to give such an interpretation as will promote  the march  and progress  towards a Socialistic Democratic State. For example, when we consider the question whether a  statute offends Article 14 of the Constitution we must  also   consider  whether  a  classification  that  the legislature may  have made  is consistent with the socialist goals set  out in  the Preamble and the Directive Principles enumerated in  Part IV of the Constitution. A classification which is  not in  tune  with  the  Constitution  is  per  se unreasonable and  cannot be  permitted. With  these  general ennunciations we  may now  examine the  questions raised  in these writ petitions.      We may first refer to two decisions of this court where the court  had occasion  to consider  the  question  of  the constitutional  validity   of  the   right  of   pre-emption incorporated in  the Rewa  State  Pre-emption  Act  and  the Punjab Pre-emption  Act in  relation to Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.       In  Bhau Ram  v. B.  Baijnath Singh  [1962]  Suppl,  3 S.C.R. 724,  a Constitution Bench of this court had occasion to consider  the question  whether a  provision of  the Rewa

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State Pre-emption  Act which  gave a  right  of  pre-emption based on  vicinage and  the provisions  of the  Punjab  Pre- emption Act,  1913 which  gave a right of pre-emption to co- sharers offended  Art.19(1)(f) of  the Constitution.  It was held that  a  right  of  pre-emption  by  vicinage  offended Art.19(1)(f) and  that a  right of  pre-emption in favour of co-sharers did  not. While dealing with the provision of the Rewa  Act   relating  to   pre-emption  by   vicinage,   the Constitution Bench  not only  held that  the right  to  pre- emption  by   vicinage  offended  Art.  19(1)(f),  but  also appeared to  indicate that  the right  might also offend the fundamental  right   guaranteed  by   Art.15.  Wanchoo,  J., speaking for the court said :           "Before the  Constitution  came  into  force,  the           statutes  if   they  were   passed  by   competent           authority, could  not be  challenged; but  we have           now to judge the reason ableness of these statutes           in 413           the light  of the fundamental rights guaranteed to           the citizens of this country by the Constitution.           In a society where certain classes were privileged           and preferred  to live  In groups  and there  were           discriminations, on  grounds of religion, race and           caste,  there   may  have  been  some  utility  in           allowing  persons   to  prevent  a  stranger  from           acquiring property  in  an  area  which  had  been           populated by  a particular  fraternity of class of           people and  in those  times a right of pre-emption           which would oust a stranger from the neighbourhood           may have  been tolerable  or reasonable.  But  the           constitution now  prohibits discrimination against           any citizen  on grounds  only of  religion,  race,           caste, sex,  place of  birth or  any of them under           Art. 15 and guarantees a right to every citizen to           acquire, hold  and dispose  of  property,  subject           only to  restrictions which  may be reasonable and           in the  interests of  the general  public.  Though           therefore the  ostensible reason  for  pre-emption           may be  vicinage, the  real reason  behind the law           was to  prevent a stranger from acquiring property           in  any   area  which  had  been  populated  by  a           particular  fraternity  or  class  of  people.  In           effect, therefore, the law of pre-emption based on           vicinage was  really meant  to  prevent  strangers           i.e. people  belonging to different religion, race           or caste,  from acquiring  property. Such division           of  society  now  into  groups  and  exclusion  of           strangers from  any locality  cannot be considered           reasonable, and  the main  reason therefore  which           sustained the law of pre-emption based on vicinage           in previous  times can  have no  force now and the           law  must   be  held  to  impose  an  unreasonable           restriction on  the right  to  acquire,  hold  and           dispose  of   property  as   now  guranteed  under           Art.19(1)(f), for  it is  impossible to  see  such           restrictions as reasonable and in the interests of           the general  public in the state of society in the           present day." Considering the  question relating  to  the  right  of  pre- emption given  to co-sharers  in the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, the court observed : 414           "The question as to the constitutionality of a law           of pre-emption  in favour  of a co-sharer has been

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         considered by  a number  of High  Courts  and  the           constitutionality has  been uniformly  upheld.  We           have no  doubt that  a law  giving  such  a  right           imposes a  reasonable restriction  which is in the           interest of  the general public. If an outsider is           introduced is  a co-sharer  in a  property it will           make common  management  extremely  difficult  and           destroy the  benefits of  ownership in common. The           result of  the law  of pre-emption  in favour of a           co-sharer is that if sales take place the property           may eventually  come into  the hands  of  one  co-           sharer as full owner and that would naturally be a           great advantage  the advantage  is all the greater           in the  case of  a residential  house and  s.16 is           concerned   with    urban   property;    for   the           introduction of an outsider in a residential house           would lead  to all  kinds  of  complications.  The           advantages arising  from such a law of pre-emption           are  clear   and  in  our  opinion  outweight  the           disadvantages  which  the  vendor  may  suffer  on           account of  his inability  to sell the property to           whomsoever he  pleases. The  vendee also cannot be           said to  suffer much  by such  a law because he is           merely  deprived   of  the   right  of  owning  an           undivided share  of the  property. On the whole it           seems to  us that  a right of pre-emption based on           co-sharership is  a reasonable  restriction on the           right to acquire, hold and dispose of property and           is in the interests of the general public. In Bhau  Ram’s case,  there was  also a question relating to the right  of pre-emption granted by s.174 of the Berar Land Revenue Code  in favour  of occupants  in a survey number in respect of transfers of interests in that survey number. Referring to  the provisions of the Berar Land Revenue Code, it was  held that the law of pre-emption in s.174 applied to those who  were co-sharers or akin to co-sharers and was not an unreasonable  restriction  on  the  right  guaranteed  by Art.19(1)(f).      The question whether section 15(1)(a) of the Punjab 415 Pre-emption Act,  1913 (as  amended in 1960) which granted a right of  pre-emption in  respect of  agricultural land  and village immovable  property (where  the sale  was by  a sole owner) to the son or daughter or son’s son or daughter’s son of the  vendor, offended the fundamental right guaranteed by Art.19(1)(f)  of   the  Constitution  was  considered  by  a Constitution Bench  of the  court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi and Ora. (supra).  Before the  Constitution Bench, the following five   grounds   were   relied   upon   to   vindicate   the reasonableness of sections 15 and 16 of the Act :           (i) to  preserve the  integrity of the village and           the village community;           (ii) to avoid fragmentation of holdings;           (iii) to  implement the  agnatic theory of the law           of succession;           (iv) to  reduce  the  chances  of  litigation  and           friction and  to promote public order and domestic           confort: and           (v) to  promote private  and  public  decency  and           convenience. It was  held that  the ground  of "promotion of public order and domestic  comfort" and  "private and  public decency and convenience" had relevance to urban immovable property which was dealt  with in  s.16 and  not to  agricultural  property which was  dealt with  in s.15. It also held that the ground

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of avoidance  of chances  of litigation had no relevance and further that  the ground  of avoidance  of fragmentation  of holdings was  of no assistance to sustain the claim of a son to pre-empt in the event of a sale by a sole owner-father as that criterion  was of  real relevance  in the  case of  the right of  pre-emption given  to co-sharers  and the like. In regard  to  the  ground  relating  to  preservation  of  the integrity of  the village  and the  village  community,  the court held  that it was not a final and conclusive answer to the argument against the reasonableness of the provision. me court however  upheld s.l5(1)(a) as a reasonable restriction in the  interest of  the general  public on the basis of the third ground which was that 416 the next  in succession  should have the chance of retaining the property in the family. It was observed that the son and other members of the family though not entitled to a present interest  in   the  property  or  a  right  to  prevent  the alienation, would nevertheless have a legitimate expectation founded  on   and  promoted  by  the  consciousness  of  the community. It  was observed that if the social consciousness did engender such feelings, and taking into account the very strong sentimental  value that was attached to the continued possession of family property in the Punjab, it could not be said that  the restriction  on the  right of free alienation imposed by  s.l5(1)(a) limited as it was to a small class of near relations  of the vendor was either unreasonable or not in the interest of the general public.      In Sant Ram v. Labh Singh, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 314, it was held that  the reasons given by the court in Bhau Ram’s case tc invalidate  the right  of pre-emption  based on  vicinage held good to invalidate such a custom also.      In the  first case,  (Bhau Ram’s  case), the  right  of preemption given  to co-sharers  was held to be a reasonable restriction on  the right  to held,  acquire or  dispose  of property conferred  by Art.  19(1)(f) of  the  Constitution. What has  been said there to uphold the right of pre-emption granted to  a co-sharer  as a  reasonable restriction on the right to property applies with the same force to justify the classification of  co-sharers as  a class  by themselves for the purpose  of vesting in them the right of pre-emption. We do not  think that it is necessary to re-state what has been said in  that case.  We endorse the views expressed therein. The right  of pre-emption  vested in  a tenant  can also  be easily sustained.  There can be no denying that the movement of all  land reform  legislations has  been towards enabling the tiller  of the  soil to  obtain proprietory right in the soil so  that he may not be disturbed from possession of the land  and   deprived  of   his  livelihood   by  a  superior proprietor. The  right of  pre-emption in favour of a tenant granted by the Act is only another instance of a legislation aimed at  protecting the  tenant. There can be no doubt that tenants form a distinct class by themselves and the right of pre-emption granted in their favour is reasonable and in the public interest.  We are, therefore, of the view that clause ’fourthly’ of s.15(1)(a), clauses ’fourthly 417 and fifthly’ of s.15(1)(b) and clause ’fourthly’ of s. 15(1) (c) are  valid and  do not  infringe either Art. 14 or 15 of the Constitution.      We now  come to  the primary question whether the right of pre-emption  based on  consanguinity and contained in the remaining clauses  of sec.15(1)(a),  (b) and  (c)  and  sec. 15(2)(a) and  (b) can  be sustained. Earlier we have briefly indicated the character of the right of pre-emption based on

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consaguinity. In  the counter  affidavit, the classification in favour  of the  persons mentioned in 9.15 is sought to be justified in the following manner           "The classifications  has been  made on reasonable           basis in the interests of the public :-           (i) to preserve integrity of village community;           (ii) to avoid fragmentation of holdings;           (iii)  to   implement  the   agnatic   theory   of           succession;           (iv) to promote public and private decency;           (v) to  facilitate tenants  to  acquire  ownership           rights;           (vi)   to    reduce   litigation   consequent   to           introduction of  an outsider on family property or           jointly owned property. These were  the very  factors  which  were  put  forward  to support the  plea in  Ram Sarup’s case that s.15(1)(a) was a reasonable restriction  on the  right  to  hold  acquire  or dispose of  property  conferred  by  Art.  19(1)(f)  of  the Constitution. As  pointed out in Ram Sarup’s case, avoidance of fragmentation  of  holdings,  promotion  of  private  and public decency  and reduction  of litigation  do not seem to have any  relevance to  the right  of pre-emption, vested in the kinsfolk  of the  vendor. The real question is whether a classification in  favour of  the kinsfolk of the vendor can be considered  reasonable so  as to  justify a right of pre- emption in their 418 favour for  the purpose  of preserving  the integrity of the village community  or implementing  the  agnatic  theory  of succession or  preserving the  unity and  integrity  of  the family, We  do not  think that  the  classification  can  be considered reasonable  in the circumstances prevailing today whatever  Justification   there  might  have  been  for  the classification in  1960 when the legislature amended s.15 of the  Punjab   Pre-emption  Act.   Apart  from   the   courts characterising the right as ’archaic’, ’feudal’, ’piratical’ ’outmoded’ and  so on, the Punjab legislature recognised the incongruity of  the right in modern times and repealed it in 1972. We  find it  difficult to uphold the classification on the basis  of unity  and integrity  of  either  the  village community or  the family  or on  the basis  of  the  agnatic theory of  succession which is again in a way connected with the integrity  of the  family. It  is well known and, we may take judicial  notice of  it, that not only has there been a green and  a white revolution in Haryana, this State is also in the  process of an industrial revolution. Industries have sprung up  through out the State and the population has been in a  State of  constant flux  and movement. The traditional integrity of  the village and the family have now become old wives’ tales.  Tribal loyalities have disappeared and family ties have  weakened. Such  is the  effect of  the  march  of history   and    the   consequence   of   industrialisation, mechianisation of  agriculture, development of marketing and trade, allurement  of  professions  and  office,  employment opportunity elsewhere  and so  on. The  processes of history cannot  be   reversed  and   we  cannot  hark  back  to  the traditional rural-family-oriented  society. Quite apart from the break-up  of the  integrity of  village life  and family life, it  is to  be noticed  that the property in respect of which the  right  of  pre-emption  is  to  be  exercised  is property of which the vendor or the vendors, as the case may be, have rights of full ownership and their kinsfolk have no present right whatsoever. The right of pre-emption is not to be confused  with the  right to  question the  alienation of

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ancestral  immovable   property  which   the   male   lineal descendants of  the vendor  have  under  the  Punjab  Custom (Power to  Contest) Act,  1920. The  right of pre-emption is now entirely  a statutory  right and dissociated from custom or personal law.      A scrutiny  of the  list of persons in whose favour the right of pre-emption is vested under s.15 reveals certain 419 glaring facts  which appear  to detract  from the  theory of preservation of  the integrity  of the family and the theory of agnatic right of succession. First we notice that neither the father  nor the  mother figures  in the  list though the father’s brother  does. me son’s daughter and the daughter’s brother does. The son’s daughter and the daughter’s daughter do not  appear though  the son’s  son and daughter’s son do. The sister  and the  sister’s son  are excluded,  though the brother and  the brother’s  son are included. Thus relatives of the  same degree  are excluded  either because  they  are women or  because they  are related through women. It is not as if  women and  those related through women are altogether excluded  because   the  daughter  and  daughter’s  son  are included. If the daughter is to be treated on a par with the son and  the daughter’s  son is  treated on  a par  with the son’s son  it does  not appear  logical why the father’s son (brother) should  be included  and not the father’s daughter (sister).  These   are  but   a   few   of   the   intrinsic contradictions  that   appear  in   the  list  of  relatives mentioned in  s.15 as  entitled to the right of pre-emption. It is  ununderstandable why  a son’s  daughter, a daughter’s daughter, a sister or a sister’s son should have no right of pre-emption whereas a father’s brother’s son has that right. As s.15 star, s, if the sole owner of a property sells it to his own  father, mother,  sister, sister’s  son,  daughter’s daughter or  son’s daughter, the sale can be defeated by the vendor’s father’s  brother’s son  claiming a  right of  pre- emption.      We are  thus unable  to find  any justification for the classification  contained   in  section  15  of  the  Punjab Preemption Act  of the kinsfolk entitled to pre-emption. The right of  pre-emption based  on consanguinity  is a relie of the  feudal   .  It   is  totally   inconsistent  with   the Constitutional me. It is inconsistent with modern Ideas. The reasons such  justified its recognition quarter of a century ago, namely,  the preservation  of the  integrity  of  rural society, .  unity of  family life  and the agnatic theory of succession  are   today  irrelevant.  me  list  of  kinsfolk mentioned  as   entitled  to  pre-emption  is  intrinsically defective and  self-contradictory. There  is, therefore,  no reasonable classification  and clauses  ’First’, ’Secondly’, and  ’  Thirdly’  of  s.l5(1)(a),  ’First’,  ’Secondly’  and ’Thirdly’, of  s.15(1)(b), Clauses  ’First’, ’Secondly’  and ’thirdly’ of  s.15(1)(c) and the whole of section 15(2) are, therefore, declared ultravires the Constitution. 420      We are  told that  in some  cases suits  are pending in various courts  and, where decrees have been passed, appeals are pending in appellate courts. Such suits and appeals will now be  disposed  of  in  accordance  with  the  declaration granted by  us. We are told that there are a few cases where suits have  been decreed  and the decrees have become final, no appeals  having been  filed against  those  decrees.  The decrees will  be binding  inter-partes and  the  declaration granted by us will be of no avail to the parties thereto.      There will be no order regarding costs. M.L.A.

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