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PETITIONER: ASSOCIATED HOTELS OF INDIA LTD., DELHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S.   B. SARDAR RANJIT SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/12/1967

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. MITTER, G.K.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  933            1968 SCR  (2) 548  CITATOR INFO :  F          1974 SC 280  (6)  R          1987 SC2055  (6)  R          1989 SC1141  (19)

ACT: Delhi  and  Ajmer Rent Control Act (38 of  1952),  s.  13(1) proviso (b), (c) and (k)-Hotel premises Constituents of sub- letting-Knowledge of sub-letting, if waiver.

HEADNOTE: The respondent-landlord of a hotel filed a suit for eviction of  his tenant-appellant under s. 13(1) proviso (b) and  (c) of  the  Delhi  and  Ajmer Rent Control  Act,  1952  on  the allegation  that  the appellant had sub-let  several  rooms. These occupants were doing business, which were not confined to the residents of the hotel.  The occupants were given ex- clusive  possession  of  the rooms occupied  by  them.   The appellant did not retain any control and dominion over these rooms.   It was not a condition of the grants that the  keys would  be  left at the reception counter, or that  the  keys would  be retained by the appellant.  The occupants were  at liberty to take away the keys if they liked.  The  occupants availed themselves of the services of the hotel sweeper  for their  own convenience.  The appellant retained  control  of the corridor, but the entrance to the corridor was open  day and night.  The occupants paid monthly sums to the appellant as the consideration of the sub-leases.  The appellanttenant denied  the  allegations and pleaded  that  the  respondent- landlord  had  waived the breaches, if any.   The  suit  was decreed which the High Court, in appeal maintained HELD : The landlord was entitled to the decree for eviction. [558 B] On the question whether the occupier of a separate apartment in a premises is a licensee or a tenant, the test is has the landlord  retained control over, the apartment Normally,  an occupier  of an apartment in a hotel is in the  position  of licensee as the hotel-keeper retains the general control  of the  hotel  including  the  apartment.   But  it  is  not  a necessary inference of law that the occupier of an apartment in a hotel is not a tenant.  A hotel-keeper may run a  first class hotel without sub-letting any part of it.  Where as in this  case,  the hotel-keeper retained no control  over  the

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apartment,  the  occupier was in the position of  a  tenant. The  onus to prove sub-letting was on the  respondent.   The respondent  discharged the onus by leading evidence  showing that  the  occupants  were in exclusive  possession  of  the apartments for valuable consideration.  The appellant  chose not  to  rebut  this prima facie  evidence  by  proving  and exhibiting  the relevant agreements. [553 D; 554  C-D,  F-H; 555 C; 556 E] Under  s.  2(g) "premises" does not include " a  room  in  a hotel  or  lodging house".  The sub-lessee of a  room  in  a hotel   is,  therefore,  not  a  tenant  and  cannot   claim protection  under  s. 13 from eviction, nor can he  ask  for fixation  of standard rent.  But, because a room in a  hotel is  not premises, it does not follow that the room is not  a part of the hotel premises or that a sub-letting of the room is not a contravention of cls. (b) and (c) of the proviso to s. 13(1). [555 F-G 556 A] Associated  Hotels  of India Ltd. v. R. N.  Kapoor,  [1960]1 S.C.R. 368, followed. Addiscombe  Garden  Estates Ltd. & Anr. v. Grabbe  and  Ors. [1958] 1 QB.  513 and Helman v. Horsham Assessment Committee,  [1949] 2 K.B. 335,referred to.                             549 A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known  right. There  can be no waiver unless the person against  whom  the waiver  is claimed had full knowledge of his rights  and  of facts  enabling  him  to  take  effectual  action  for   the enforcement of such rights.  Assuming that the landlord  can waive  the requirement as to consent, it was not shown  that the  respondent waived it.  It is said that  the  respondent knew of the sub-lettings as be frequently visited the  hotel up to 1953 and he must have known of the occupation of  some of the occupants.  But he came to know of the other lettings in 1958 only.  Moreover, the precise nature of the grant was -never communicated to the respondent. [557 B-D] Dhanukdhari  Singh  v. Nathima Sahu, [1907] 11  C.W.N.  852, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1249 of 1967. Appeal  from the judgment and decree dated July 21, 1967  of the  Delhi High Court in Regular First Appeal No.  166-D  of 1965. A.K.  Sen,  Rameshwar  Nath, P.  L.  Vohra  and  Mahinder Narain, for the appellant. Bishan  Narain, Radhey Mohan Lal and Harbans Singh, for  the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. This appeal arises out of a suit for  ejectment instituted  by  a landlord against a tenant.  It  is  common case  that  the suit is governed by the provisions  of’  the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (Act No. 38 of  1952) hereinafter referred to as the Act.  The material provisions of s. 13(1) of the, Act are as follows : "13. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained. in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery  of possession of any premises shall be  passed  by any  Court  in  favour of the landlord  against  any  tenant (including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated) : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any

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suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession  if the Court is satisfied- (b)that  the tenant without obtaining the consent  of  the landlord  in  writing has, after the  commencement  of  this Act,- (i)sub-let,   assigned  or  otherwise  parted   with   the possession of the whole or any part of the premises; or 550 (ii) used the premises for a purpose other than that for which they were let; or, (c)  that the tenant without obtaining the consent of the landlord has before the commencement of this Act,- (i)sub-let,   assigned  or  otherwise  parted   with   the possession of, the whole or any part of the premises;, or (ii)used  the  premises for a purpose other than  that  for which they were let; or (k)that  the  tenant  has, whether  before  or  after  the commencement of this Act, caused or permitted to be  ,caused substantial  damage  to  the  premises,  or  notwithstanding previous  notice has used or dealt ’with the premises  in  a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord  by the Government, or the Delhi Improvement Trust while  giving him a lease of the land on which the premises are situated;" The  respondent constructed the building known as the  Hotel Imperial, New Delhi, on land leased to him by the  Secretary of  State for India in Council under a perpetual lease  deed dated  July  9, 1937.  By a deed dated August 18,  1939,  he leased  to  the appellant the hotel premises  together  with fittings and furniture for a term of 20 years commencing  on September  15,  1939. On January 28,  1958,  the  respondent instituted  the present suit alleging that in breach of  the express conditions of the lease dated August .18, 1939,  the appellant   sub-let  portions  of  the  premises  and   made unauthorised additions and alterations in the premises, that on such breaches he was entitled to determine the lease  and he  did so, by notice in writing dated January 6, 1958.   He claimed  eviction of the appellant on the grounds  mentioned in  cls. (b), (c) and (k) of the proviso to s. 13(1) of  the Act.  The appellant filed its written statement on April  3, 1958 denying most of the material allegations in the plaint. The  appellant also pleaded that the respondent  had  waived the  breaches,  if any, of the conditions of  the  lease  by accepting   rents  with  knowledge  of  such  breaches   and particularly by accepting rent on or about January 3,  1958. On  April  24,  1958,  Sri P.  L.  Vohra,  counsel  for  the appellant,  made  the following statement before  the  trial Court : "The plaintiff can seek ejectment of the defendant only under section 13 of Act 38 of 1952.  In case the 551 plaintiff  succeeds  in establishing the liability  of,  the defendant  for  ejectment  on  any  of  the  grounds   given in .section 13 of the Rent Act, the defendant would not seek any protection under the terms of the lease deed dated  18th August,  1939 executed between the parties, as  regards  the period of lease fixed therein. . ." Having regard to the pleadings and statement of counsel, the Court settled the following issues on May 12, 1958 : "1. Whether the defendant had sublet, assigned or  otherwise parted  with  possession, of any part of the  suit  premises before the commencement of Act 38 of 1952 ? 2.   If so, was the same done with express or implied consent   of the plaintiff ? 3.   Whether the defendant had sublet, assigned or otherwise  parted  with possession of any part of  the  suit

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premises after the commencement of Act 38 of 1952 ? 4.If  so,  was the same done with the  prior  consent  in writing of the plaintiff ? 5.Whether the defendant has used the tenancy premises for a purpose other than that for which they were let ? 6.   Whether the defendant has caused substantial damage    to the tenancy premises ? 7.   Whether the defendant notwithstanding previous notice has been. using and dealing with the tenancy premises in  a  manner  contrary to the  conditions  imposed  on  the plaintiff  by, the Government while giving him lease of  the site of the tenancy premises ? 8.   Is the defendant entitled to special cost ? 9.   Whether the plaintiff is estopped or has waived his  right to seek ejectment of the defendant on any of  the grounds mentioned above ? If so, what and to what effect ? 10.Whether the defendant is entitled to sublet any part of the  hotel  premises  even when there was a  clause  to  the contra in the lease dated the 18th August, 1939. and in face of  statutory  provisions under the Rent  Control  Act  (for reasons  given in para 16 of the amended written  statement) ?" A  tenant holding premises under a subsisting lease is  pro- tected  by the lease and needs no protection under the  Rent Act.   It was open to the appellant to contend that  it  was protected by 552 the  terms  of  the lease dated August 18,  1939,  that  the breaches,  if any, of the conditions of the lease  had  been waived  by  the  respondent  and  that  the  lease  had  not determined.  But the appellant deliberately elected to  seek protection  under  s. 13 of the Act only.   The  appellant’s counsel made a’ formal statement in the trial Court that the appellant  would not seek any protection under the terms  of the  lease  deed as regards the period of  the  lease  fixed therein.  The Court accordingly settled the ten issues. Issue No. 8 was not pressed.  All the other issues relate to thegrounds of eviction mentioned in cls. (b), (c) and (k) of theproviso  to  s.  13(1) of the Act.   Issue  No.  9 raises the question-  of  waiver  of the  respondent’s  right  to  seek ejectment  on  those grounds.  Thus, the only  questions  in issue  between  the parties was whether  the  appellant  was entitled to protection from eviction under s. 13 and whether any  ground  for eviction under the Act was made  out.   The case was tried and decided on this footing.  We have come to this conclusion after a close examination of the ’pleadings, particulars,  statement of counsel, issues and the  judgment of  the  trial Court.  No issue was raised on  the  question whether the breaches of the express conditions of the  lease had been waived by the respondent, and whether the lease was still  subsisting.  The appellant sought to raise this  plea in  the High Court and also in this Court Having  regard  to the  deliberate  stand taken by the appellant in  the  trial Court, the appellant cannot be allowed to raise the plea  at a  later stage.  The lease determined by efflux of  time  on September  15, 1959.  Had the appellant taken the plea  that the  lease had not determined by forfeiture on the  date  of the  institution  of  the  suit, it  is  possible  that  the respondent  might have filed another suit for  ejectment  of the appellant immediately after September 15, 1959.  Because of  the stand taken by the appellant, it was  not  necessary for  the respondent to file another suit.  This appeal  must

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be  decided on the footing that the lease had determined  by forfeiture  on  the date of the institution of  the  present suit.   The respondent is entitled to a decree for  eviction if any of the grounds mentioned in cls. (b), (c) and (k)  of the proviso to s. 13(1) is made out. The trial Court answered issue No. 5 in the negative.   With regard  to  all the other issues, the trial Court  found  in favour  of  the  respondent, and held that  the  grounds  of eviction  mentioned  in  cls. (b)(1), (c)(i)  and  (k)  were proved.  With regard to the ground of eviction mentioned  in cl.  (k),  the  trial  Court held  that  the  appellant  was entitled to relief on certain conditions.  The trial  Court, however,  held  that  the  respondent  was  entitled  to  an unconditional  decree,  for eviction on the ground  of  sub- letting mentioned in cls. (b)(i) and (c)(i).  The  appellant preferred 553 an,  appeal to the High Court.  The High Court  agreed  with all  the  findings of the trial  Court,  and  dismissed  the appeal.  The  two Courts- concurrently found that the appellant  had sub-let  several  rooms, counters, showcases  -and  garages. The two Courts found that the appellant had sub-let rooms to (1)  Pan American World Airways, (2) Mercury Travels,  India (Private)  Ltd.,  travel agents, (3)  Indian  Art  Emporium, dealers  in curios and jewellery, (4) Shanti Vijay and  Co., dealers  in jewellery, (5) Roy and James, hairdressers,  (6) Sita  World Travels, travel agents and (7) Ranee Silk  Shop, dealers  in  saris and curios.  The businesses of  the  sub- lessees  were  not confined to the residents of  the  hotel. The  letting  to Pan American World Airways and  Indian  Art Emporium  were  before the commencement of the Act  and  the lettings  to Mercury Travels, Shanti Vijay and Co., and  Roy and  James  were after the commencement of  the  Act.   Sita Travels  and Ranee Silk Shop were inducted as tenants  after the  institution of, the suit.  The entrances to  the  rooms were in ,the main corridor of the hotel on the ground floor. The  concurrent  finding is that the  occupants  were  given exclusive  possession  of the rooms occupied by  them.   The appellant  did not retain any control and dominion over  the rooms.  It is possible that the keys of the apartments  were sometimes left at the reception counter, but the evidence on this  point was not convincing.  It was not a  condition  Of the  grants  that the keys would be left  at  the  reception counter, or that the duplicate keys would be retained by the appellant.   The occupants were at liberty to take away  the keys  if they liked’.  The occupants availed  themselves  of the   services   of  the  hotel  sweeper  for,   their   own convenience.    The  appellant  retained  control   of   the corridor, but it is common case before us that the  entrance to the corridor was open day and night.  The occupants  paid monthly  sums to the appellant as the consideration  of  the sub-leases.   The consideration though described as  license fee  was in reality rent.  The portion occupied by  Roy  and James  has an interesting history.  It was formerly  sub-let to R. N., Kapoor.  In Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v.  R. N.   Kapoor(1),  this  Court  held  by  a  majority   on   a construction  of  the grant to R. N. Kapoor that  he  was  a lessee  and not a licensee.  Roy and James began  to  occupy this portion of the premises from February, 1955.  According to the appellant, the agreements with Roy and James, Mercury Travels  and  Shanti Vijay and Co., were  in  writing.   The appellant  produced several documents in Court at  an  early stage  of  the suit.  The appellant’s case  was  that  these documents  were the relevant agreements.  According  to  the

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respondent,  the  documents were not genuine  and  the  real agree- (1)  [196] 1 S.C.R. 36F 554 meats  were being withheld.  The stamp auditor noted on  the documents  the deficiency-in stamps and penalty leviable  on them  on  the  footing  that they  were  lease  deeds.   The appellant did not contest this note nor paid the penalty and deficiency  as directed by the trial Court. -The  surprising feature of the case is that the appellant did not attempt to prove  any  of  the documents.  Where the  agreement  is  in writing,  it is a question of construction of the  agreement whether  the grant is a lease or a license.  It was for  the appellant  to  prove the written agreements, and  the  Court could  then  construe them.  The appellant has  not  brought before  the Court the best and the primary evidence  of  the terms on which the apartments were being occupied.  The onus to prove sub-letting was on the respondent.  The  respondent discharged  the  onus by leading evidence showing  that  the occupants were in exclusive possession of the apartments for valuable  consideration.  The appellant chose not  to  rebut this  prime  facie evidence by proving  and  exhibiting  the relevant  agreements.   The  documents formed  part  of  the appellant’s  case.  The appellant bad no right  to  withhold them from the scrutiny of the Court.  In the absence of  the best  evidence  of  the grants, the  Courts  below  properly inferred  sub-lettings  from  the  other  materials  on  the record. The test of exclusive possession, though not conclusive,  is a  very  important  indication in  favour  of  tenancy,  see Addiscombe  Garden  Estates  Ltd. and  Anr.  v.  Crabbe  and Ors.(1)  The argument is that as the landlord is  living  in the  premises,  that  fact raises the  presumption  that  he intends  to retain the control of the whole of the  premises and  that  the occupation of the other parts is  that  of  a lodger or inmate and not that of a tenant, and reliance  was placed on Helman v. Horsham Assessment Committee(2) and  the cases  referred  to  therein.   Those  cases  consider  what constitute  rateable  occupation.  In the case  last  cited, Denning,  L.  J.  said that a person who is  regarded  as  a lodger for rating purposes need not necessarily be a  lodger for  the  purposes  of  the  Rent  Restriction  Acts,  while Evershed  L.J. seems to have expressed a  contrary  opinion. Normally,  an occupier of an apartment in a hotel is in  the position  of  a  licensee as the  hotel-keeper  retains  the general  control of the hotel including the apartment.   But it is not a necessary inference of law that the occupier  of an apartment in a hotel is not a tenant.  Where, as in  this case,  the hotel-keeper retains no control over  the  apart- ment,  the  occupier  is in the position of  a  tenant.   In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 23, Art. 1028, p. 433,  the law is accurately summarised thus "A lodger who has no separate apartment is only a  licensee, and, even though he has a separate apart- (1) [1958] 1 Q.B. 513, 525. (2) [1949] 2 K.B.  335. 555 ment,  he  has not in law an exclusive  occupation,  and  is therefore  in  the position of a licensee, if  the  landlord retains  the  general  control and dominion  of  the  house, including  the part occupied by the lodger; but, if in  fact the  landlord  exercises  no control  over  that  part,  the occupier  is  a  tenant.  The occupier  does  not,  however, become  a  lodger  merely by reason of  the  fact  that  the landlord resides on the premises and retains control of  the

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passages and staircases and other parts used in common." On the question whether the occupier of a separate apartment in a premises is a licensee or a tenant, the test is-has the landlord retained control over the apartment ? The fact that the apartment is a room in a hotel may lead to the inference that  the hotel-keeper retains the general dominion  of  the en-tire hotel including the apartment and that the  occupier is in the position of a lodger or inmate.  But the inference is  not  a necessary inference of law.  Where,  as  in  this case,  the best evidence of the -rant was withheld from  the scrutiny of the Court, the inference was rightly drawn  that the occupiers were tenants. At the hearing of this appeal, the appellant moved an appli- cation   for  reception  of  the  documents  as   additional evidence.  The genuineness of the documents was disputed  by the respondent.  In the Courts below, the appellant made  no attempt  to prove these documents.  We found no  ground  for directing a new trial.  Having regard to all these facts, we dismissed the application. The  hotel building constitutes premises within the  meaning of  s.  2(g) of the Act.’ It is because the  hotel  building constitutes Premises that the appellant can claim protection from eviction under the Act.  A room in a hotel is a part of the  hotel premises.  A sub-letting of a room in a hotel  in contravention of cls. (b) and (c) of the proviso to s.  13(1 )  is  a ground for eviction under the  Act.   Section  2(g) provides  that  ’premises’ does not include "  a room  in  a hotel or lodging house." The sub-lessee of a room in a hotel is,  therefore,  not a tenant and  cannot  claim  protection under  s. 13 from eviction, nor can he ask for  fixation  of standard rent. see Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.  N. Kapoor(1).   If  the  interest of the tenant  of  the  hotel premises is determined, the sub-tenant to whom a room in the hotel has been lawfully sublet becomes under s, 20 a  direct tenant  of the landlord, It may be that when the  sub-tenant of a room in a hotel becomes a direct tenant under s. 20  he enjoys  the  protection of the Act because the room  is  no, longer a room in a hotel.  But that point does not arise and need not be decided.  Because a room in a hotel is not (1)  [1960] 1 S.C.R. 368. 556 premises, it does not follow that the room is not a part  of the hotel premises or that a sub-letting of the room is  not a  contravention  of cls. (b) and (c) of the proviso  to  s. 13(1). The  Courts below concurrently found that  the  sub-lettings after  the  commencement  of  the  Act  were  made   without obtaining  the consent of the landlord in writing,  and  the sub-lettings  before the commencement of the Act  were  made without obtaining the consent of the landlord either  orally or  in writing.  We are not inclined to interfere with  this concurrent finding. It is said that by the lease deed dated August 18, 1939  the respondent impliedly consented to this sub-letting.  Clauses 21 .and 22 of the lease are in these terms "21.   That  the  lessee shall not  be  entitled  to  either transfer  or sub-lease the premises or any part  thereof  to any  other party without the written consent of  the  lessor and  on  such transfer, both the transferee and  the  lessee shall  be liable for the payment of rent to the  lessor  and responsible  to  deliver,possession  of  the  building   and equipments in the same condition as when taken. 22.That  the  lessee will use the premises  only  for  the purpose of running a first class hotel." It  is -,aid that for the purpose of running a  first  class

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hotel  it  was necessary to sub-let the apartments.   It  is impossible to accept the contention.  A hotel-keeper may run a  first  class hotel without sub-letting any  part  of  it. Clause  21-clearly provided that the lessee shall  not  sub- lease the hotel premises or any part thereof.  In the  teeth of  cl.  21, it is impossible to read in cl. 22  an  implied consent to sub-letting. Reliance is placed on the correspondence passed between  the Land Development Officer, New Delhi and the respondent  bet- ween April 1948 and February 1949 for establishing that  the respondent  gave written consent to the  sub-lettings.   The Land  and  Development Officer was then complaining  of  the occupation of portions of the premises by Pan American World Airways and other persons.  By his letters dated November 4, 1948  and  February 23, 1949, the respondent  requested  the Land and Development Officer to regularise the matter adding that  in  an first class hotels counters  of  air-lines  and show-rooms  of  jewellery and curios were  always  provided. These  letter,.;  do not amount to a consent in  writing  to sub-lettings  of  portions  of  the  hotel  to  the  persons mentioned  therein.  Moreover, the consent, if any, ’was  to the  sub-lettings  made  before 1949 and  not  to  the  sub- lettings made thereafter.  It is not possible to infer  from these letters a general consent to all sub-lettings.                             557 It  is argued that the respondent waived the requirement  of consent to the sub-letting.  Any subletting in breach of the provisions  of  cl. (b) of the proviso to S. 13 ( 1)  is  an offence punish-able under s. 44.  Assuming that the landlord can  waive  the requirement as to consent, it is  not  shown that  the respondent waived it.  A waiver is an  intentional relinquishment  of  a known right., There can be  no  waiver unless  the  person against whom the waiver is  claimed  had full  knowledge of his rights and of facts enabling  him  to take  effectual action for the enforcement of  such  rights. See  Dhanukdhari Singh v. Nathima Sahu(1).  It is said  that the  respondent  knew of the sub-lettings as  he  frequently visited the hotel.  It appears that he visited the hotel  up to  1953 and he must have known of the occupation of  R.  N. Kapoor, Indian Art Emporium and Pan American World  Airways. But  he came to know of the other lettings in  January  1958 only.   Moreover, the precise nature of the grant was  never communicated  ,to the respondent.  The Courts below  rightly held  that the respondent did not waive his right  to  evict the appellant on the ,-rounds mentioned in cls. (b) and  (c) of the proviso to s. 13 (1). We  are therefore satisfied that the respondent is  entitled to  evict the appellant on the ground of sub-letting of  the rooms.   The Courts below held that the appellant  had  also sublet  several counters, show-cases and garages to  various persons.   We  express no opinion on  the  question  whether there  was any sub-letting of the counters,  show-cases  and garages.   The  sublettings  of  the  rooms  are  sufficient grounds  of eviction tinder cls. (b) and (c) of the  proviso to s. 13(1). Clause  2(v) of the head lease granted by the Government  to the  respondent  provided  that the  respondent  would  not, without  the  previous  consent  in  writing  of  the  Chief Commissioner.. Delhi or a duly authorised officer, erect  or suffer to be erected on any part of the demised premises any building other than the buildings erected there on the  date of  the  lease.   The  appellant  had  due  notice  of   the conditions of the head lease.  Notwithstanding such previous notice,  the appellant dealt with the premises in  a  manner contrary to the conditions imposed by cl. 2 (v).  The Courts

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below  found that contrary to this condition, the  appellant made  several unauthorised constructions  without  obtaining the  requisite  consent.   To  give  one  illustration,  the appellant admittedly constructed a room 16 ft. 6 in X 19 ft. 6 in. with R.C.C. slab and brick masonry walls.  This  newly constructed  room  was -let to Shanti Vijay and Co.  On  the ground  of unauthorised construction of this room  alone  it must-be held that the appellant in contravention of cl.  (k) of  the  proviso  to s.  13  (1),  notwithstanding  previous notice, dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to (1)  (1907) 11 C.W.N. 848, 852. 558 a  condition  imposed on the respondent  by  the  Government while ,giving him a lease of the land on which the  premises are  situated.  The notice of the conditions imposed by  the head  lease  was sufficient notice for the purposes  of  cl. (k).   The  ground of eviction under cl. (k) was  thus  made out.   The Courts below also held that the appellant  caused substantial  damage to the premises.  We express no  opinion on it, and this question is left open. It  follows  that the respondent is entitled  to  evict  the appellant on the grounds mentioned in cls. (b) (i), (c)  (i) and (k) of the proviso to s. 13(1). In  the  result, the appeal is dismissed  with  costs.   The execution of the decree is stayed for a period of six months from  today.  The appellant through Mr. A. K. Sen  gives  an undertaking  that  the  appellant  will  hand  over  to  the respondent,  on the expiry of six months, vacant  possession of  the  entire  hotel premises except the  portion  in  the possession of sub-lessees. Y.P.                                                  Appeal dismissed. 559