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PETITIONER: ASSISTANT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS & ANR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: U.L.R. MALWANI AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/10/1968

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. SHAH, J.C. RAMASWAMI, V. MITTER, G.K. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  962            1969 SCR  (2) 438  CITATOR INFO :  R          1971 SC 458  (99)

ACT: Constitution of India, Art. 20(2)--Accused given benefit  of doubt  by  customs authority in respect of  alleged  offence under  Sea Customs Act, 1878--Subsequent prosecution  before Magistrate  in  respect of same offence  whether  barred  by Article--Principle of issue estoppel whether  applies--Delay in filing complaint, effect--Code of Criminal Procedure, ss. 173(4)--Section  whether applicable in a trial on  complaint by  customs  authorities--S. 94(1)  whether can be  used  to secure  supply  of documents mentioned in s. 173(4)  to  the accused.

HEADNOTE:     The  accused  persons were charged with  having  entered into  a  conspiracy  at  Bombay  and  other  places  in  the beginning of October 1959 or there about for the purposes of smuggling foreign goods into India and having, in  pursuance of  that  conspiracy, smuggled several  items    of  foreign goods  in  the years 1959 and 1960.  In that  connection  an enquiry  was held by the Customs authorities. In the  course of the enquiry some of the goods said to have been  smuggled were  seized.  After the close of the enquiry  those.  goods were  ordered  to be confiscated. In  addition  penalty  was imposed  on  some of the accused. Accused No. 1 and  2  were given  by the Collector benefit of doubt on the ground  that there  was no conclusive evidence against them.   Thereafter the  Assistant  Collector of Customs  ’after  obtaining  the required  sanction  of  the  Government  filed  a  complaint against five persons including Accused 1 and 2 under s. 120- B  I.P.C. read with s. 167 of the Sea Customs Act,  1878  as well as under s.’5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947.   Before    the commencement of the  enquiry  the  1st accused  filed an application before the Magistrate  raising therein  various  questions of law namely   (i) whether  the prosecution  of Accused 1 and 2 was barred by Art. 20(2)  of the  Constitution  by  reason  of  the   decision  of    the Collector   of  Customs  (ii) whether  the  finding  of  the

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Collector of  Customs  operated as an issue estoppel in  the criminal  case  against Accused 1 and 2, (iii)  whether  the prosecution  amounted  to ’an abuse of the  process  of  the Court  in  view of the inordinate, delay  in  launching  the same, and (iv) whether s. 273(4) Cr. P.C. was applicable  to the  facts  of  the  case, and  (v)  whether  the  documents mentioned in the petition of Accused No. 1 to the Magistrate could  be  summoned  under s. 94 Cr.  P.C.   The  Magistrate dismissed the application of Accused No. 1.  In revision the High  Court,  while agreeing with the  Magistrate  on  other issues, did not agree with him that there was no need at the stage  to summon the statements of the witness  recorded  by the customs authorities in the enquiry under the Sea Customs Act.    It  directed  the   Magistrate    to’summon    those statements  and to see that the prosecution  made  available copies  of  these  statements  to  the  accused  before  the commencement  of  the  ennquiry in the  case.   Against  the orders of the High Court the customs authorities as well  as the accused appealed to this Court.     HELD: (i) In order to get the benefit of s. 403 Criminal Procedure Code or Art. 20(2) it is necessary for an ’accused person to establish 439 that   he   had  been  tried  by  a  "court   of   competent jurisdiction"  for  an  offence  and  he  is  convicted   or acquitted  of  that  offence and the said  acquittal  is  in force.   If  that much is established. it can  be  contended that  he  is  not liable to be tried  again  for  any  other offence  for  which  a different charge from  the  one  made against  hun might have been made under s. 236 or for  which he  might  have been convicted’ under s. 237.  It  has  been repeatedly  held  by this Court that adjudication  before  a Collector  of  Customs  is  not  a  "prosecution"  nor   the Collector  of Customs a "Court".  Therefore in  the  present case  the plea of the accused based on Art. 20(2) could  not be accepted. [442 E--G]    .     Maqbool Hussain v. State o/Bombay,  [1953]  S.C.R.   730 and  Thomas  Dana  v. State  o/Punjab,  [1959]  S.C.R.  274, applied.    (ii)  Before  the accused can call into aid the  rule  of issue  estoppel he must establish that in a previous  lawful trial before a competent court  he has secured a verdict  of acquittal which verdict is binding on his prosecutor. In the instant case since the proceeding before the’ Collector  was not  a  criminal trial it follows that the decision  of  the Collector did not amount to a verdict of acquittal in favour of accused Nos. 1 and 2.[444 A--B]    Sambasivan  v. Public Prosecutor, Federation  of  Malaya, [1950] A.C. 458 at p. 479, Pritam Singh v. State of  Punjab, Aj.I.R. [1956] S.C. 415 and N.R. Ghose @ Nikhil Ranjan Ghose v.-State  of  west  Bengal,[1960] 2 S.C.R. 58, applied.    (iii)  The question of delay in filing the complaint  may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration in arriving at the final verdict. But by itself it affords no ground for dismissing the complaint. [444 D]    (iv) Section 173 Criminal Procedure is attracted only  in a case in,   vestigated by a police officer under Ch. XIV of the Code followed by    a final report.  Section 173(4)  was incorporated into the Code by Central Act 25 of 1955 because of  the  changes  effected in the mode of  trials  in  cases instituted  on  police reports.  Under  the  new   procedure prescribed  in s. 251(A) of the Code, but for  the  facility provided to him under s. 173(4) an accuse person would  have been  greatly  handicapped in his defence.  But in  a  .case instituted  on complaint like  the present, and governed  by

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ss. 252 to 259 of the Code no such difficulty.   arises  and the position is as it was before the amendment of the  Code. in 1955. [444 H; 445 G]      The   High  Court  was  wrong  in  holding   that   the Legislature did not make available the benefit of s.  173(4) Criminal  Procedure Code in cases instituted otherwise  than on  police reports by oversight. It is not proper to  assume except on very good grounds that there is any lacuna in  any statute  or  that the legislature has not   done  its   duty properly.[445 H]      (v)  Section  94 (1) does not empower a  Magistrate  to direct the prosecution to give copies of any documents to an accused person.  It was impermissible for the High Court  to read into s. 94 Criminal ProcedUre COde the requirements  of s.  173(4)  of  the,  Code.  The High  Court  was  wrong  in indirectly   applying   to  cases  instituted   on   private complaints the requirements of s. 173(4). [446 E-F]      Further the High Court was not justified in interfering with  the discretion of the learned  Magistrate.  Whether  a particular    document   should  be  summoned  or   not   is essentially  in the discretion of the-trial court.   In  the present case the reasons given by ’the Magistrate.:for his 440 order were good reasons.  Unnecessary interference with  the orders of the ,trial court results in waste of public  money and time as had happened in the present case. [447 D]

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals  Nos. 15 and 35 of 1967.     Appeals from the judgment and order  dated  October  12, 1966   of  the  Bombay  High  Court  in  Criminal   Revision Application No. 289 of 1966.     N.S.Bindra,R.M.Parikh and S.P. Nayar, for the appellants (in  Cr. A. No. 15 of 1967) and the respondents  (in Cr.  A. No. 35 of 1967).     N.N.  Keswani, for the appellants (in Cr. A. No.  35  of 1967) and the respondents (in Cr. A. No. 15 of 1967).     K.R.  Chaudhuri, for the intervener (in Cr. A.   No.  15 of 1967).     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Hegde,  J. These appeals by certificate arise  from  the decision  of the High Court of Bombay in  Criminal  Revision Application No. 238 of 1966 wherein the following  questions of law arise for decision:                   (i)  Whether  the prosecution  from  which               these  Criminal  Revision Petitions  arose  is               barred  under Art. 20 (2) of the  Constitution               as against accused Nos. 1 and  2 in that  case               by reason of the decision of the Collector  of               Customs  in  the  proceedings  under  the  Sea               Customs Act ?                   (ii)  Whether under any  circumstance  the               finding of the Collector of Customs  that  the               Ist  and  2nd  accused are not  proved  to  be               guilty   operated  as  an issue  estoppel   in               the  criminal  case  against  those accused ?                   (iii)  Whether  the  present   prosecution               amounts  to  an abuse of the  process  of               the  Court  in  view of  inordinate  delay  in               launching the  same  and  consequently whether               it is liable to be quashed ?

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                 (iv) Whether s. 173(4), Criminal Procedure               Code  is applicable to the facts of this  case               and (v) Whether the documents mentioned in the               petition filed by the 1st accused on August 3,               1965 are required tO be summoned under s.  94,               Criminal Procedure Code ?                   The  aforementioned questions were  raised               before  the   trial  Magistrate  by  the   1st               accused by means of an  application  but 441 the  learned-Magistrate’  found ,no substance in  the  pleas advanced  in that application and accordingly  he  dismissed the  same as per his order dated-25,1-1966.   In   revision, a .Division Bench of the Bombay High Court agreeing with the trial  Magistrate negatived all but one of  the  contentions advanced  on  behalf  of accused Nos. 1 and 2.  It  did  not agree with the learned Magistrate that there was no need, at that  stage to summon the  statements of witnesses  recorded Customs  Act.  It directed the learned Magistrate to  summon hose  statements and curiously enough, it went  further  and directed him to see that the prosecution made available  the copies  of  those  statements  to  the  accused  before  the commencement of the enquiry in the case.  In so far as.  the Other   documents called for are concerned, the  High  Court after  indicating,  what according to it, is the law on  the subject  left  the matter to the discretion of  the  learned Magistrate.     Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 1967 is filed by the Assistant Collector  of Customs, Bombay and the State  of  Maharashtra and   Criminal Appeal No. 35 of 1967 is the appeal filed  by accused Nos. 1 and 2 in the case (Case No. 98 of 1965 in the Court  of  the Chief Presidency  Magistrate,  Bombay).   The appellants  in Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 1967 challenge  the correctness  of the decision of the Bombay High Court in  so far  as it went against them and the appellants in  Criminal Appeal  No.  35  of  1967 challenge that decision  in  other respects.     The  prosecution case is that the accused  persons   and some other unknown persons had entered into a conspiracy  at Bombay and other places in the beginning Of October, 1959 or India and in pursuance of that conspiracy they had  smuggled several items of foreign goods in the years 1959 and 1960.     In  that connection an enquiry was held by  the  Customs authorities.  In the course of the enquiry some of the goods said to have been smuggled were seized.  After the close  of the enquiry those goods were ordered to be confiscated.   In addition  penalty  was  imposed  on  some  of  the  accused. Thereafter on February 19, 1965, the Assistant Collector  of Customs, Bombay after obtaining the required sanction of the Government flied a complaint against five persons  including the  appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 35 of  1967  (accused Nos.  1  and  2 in the case)   under  s.  120-B,I.P.C.  read with  cls.  (37), (75), (76) and (81) of s. 167 of  the  Sea Customs Act, 1878 (Act VIII of  1878)  as well as under s. 5 of  the Imports and Exports  (Control)  Act,  1947.   Before the  commencement of the enquiry in that complaint, the  1st accused filed on August 3, 1965, the application   mentioned above. 3Sup.C.I./69-11 442 Now  we  shall proceed to examine the  contentions  set  out earlier.     Reliance  on  Art. 20(2) is placed under  the  following circumstances.   In  the enquiry held by  the  Collector  of Customs, he gave the benefit of doubt to accused Nos. 1  and

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2.  This is what he stated therein:                   "As  regards M/s. Lamel  Enterprises   (of               which  accused  No. 1 is  the  proprietor  and               accused  No. 2 is the Manager) although it  is               apparent that they have directly assisted  the               importers in their illegal activities and  are               morally  guilty. Since there is no  conclusive               evidence against them to hold them as  persons               concerned   in   the   act   of   unauthorised               importation,  they  escape  on  a  benefit  of               doubt."     Despite  this  finding the Assistant  Collector  in  his complaint  referred  to earlier seeks  to  prosecute   these accused   persons.  Hence  the  question  is  whether   that prosecution  is barred under Art. 20(2) of the  Constitution which  says that no person shall be prosecuted and  punished for the same offence more than once. This Art. has no direct bearing  on the question at issue.  Evedently those  accused persons  want  to  spell  out from this  Art.  the  rule  of autrefois  acquit  embodied in s.  403,  Criminal  Procedure Code.   Assuming we can do that still it is not possible  to hold that a proceeding before the Collector of Customs is  a prosecution for an offence.  In order to get the benefit  of s.  403,  Criminal  Procedure  Code or  Art.  20(2),  it  is necessary  for an  accused person to establish that  he  had been  tried  by a "court of competent jurisdiction"  for  an offence and he is convicted or acquitted of that offence and the  said conviction or acquittal is in force. If that  much is established, it can be contended that he is not liable to be  tried again for the same offence nor on the  same  facts for any other offence for which a different charge from  the one  made against him might have been made under s.  236  or for  which he’ might have been convicted under-s.  237.   It has  been  repeatedly held by this Court  that  adjudication before a Collector of Customs is not a "prosecution" nor the Collector of Customs a "Court".  In Maqbool Hussain  v.  The State of Bombay(1), this Court held that the wording of Art. 20 of the Constitution and the words used therein show  that the proceedings therein contemplated are proceedings of  the nature  of criminal proceedings before a court of law  or  a judicial  tribunal and "prosecution" in this  context  would mean an initiation or starting of proceedings of a  criminal nature  before  a  court of law or a  judicial  tribunal  in accordance with the procedure prescribed  in the statute (1) [1953] S.C,R. 730. 443 which creates the offence and regulates the procedure.  This Court  further  held  that  where  a  person  against   whom proceedings  had been taken by the Sea  Customs  authorities under  s.  167  of  the Sea Customs Act  and  an  order  for confiscation  of  goods had been  passed,  was  subsequently prosecuted  before a criminal court for an offence under  s. 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in respect of  the same act, the proceeding before  the Sea Customs authorities was  not a "prosecution" and the order for confiscation  was not a "punishment" inflicted by a Court or judicial tribunal within  the  meaning of Art. 20(2) of the  Constitution  and hence  his subsequent prosecution was not barred.  The  said rule was reiterated in Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab(1) and in several other cases.     We shall not take up the contention that the finding  of the Collector of Customs referred to earlier operated as  an issue  estoppel  in  the  present  prosecution.   The  issue estoppel  rule is but a facet of the doctrine  of  autrefois acquit.   In Sambasivan v. Public Prosecutor, Federation  of

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Malaya(a), Lord MacDermott enunciated the said rule thus:                  "The  effect  of  a  verdict  of  acquittal               pronounced  by a competent court on  a  lawful               charge  and  after  a  lawful  trial  is   not               completely  stated by saying that  the  person               acquitted  cannot be tried again for the  same               offence.   To that it must be added  that  the               verdict  is  binding  and  conclusive  in  all               subsequent proceedings between the parties  to               the adjudication.  The maxim "Res judicata pro               veritate accipitur" is no less  appliCable  to               criminal than to civil proceedings.  Here, the               appellant  having been acquitted at the  first               trial  on the charge of having  ammunition  in               his  possession, the prosecution was bound  to               accept  the correctness of  that  verdict  and               was  precluded  from  taking  any   step    to               challenge  it  at the second  trial.  And  the               appellant was no less entitled to rely on  his               acquittal in so far as it might be relevant in               his defence. That it was not conclusive of his               innocence on the firearm charge is plain,  but               it  undoubtedly  reduced in  some  degree  the               weight  of  the case against him, for  at  the               first trial the facts proved in support of one               charge  were  clearly relevant  to  the  other               having  regard to the circumstances  in  which               the ammunition and revolver were found and the               fact that they fitted each other." The  rule  laid down in that decision was adopted’  by  this Court  in  Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab(a) and  again  in N.R.  Ghose  alias  Nikhil Ranjan Ghose v.  State  of   West Bengal(4). (1) [1959] S.C.R. 274.      (2) [1950] A.C. 458 at p. 479. (3) AI.R. 1956 S.C, 415.    (4) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 58. 444 But  before an accused can call into aid the above rule,  he ’must  establish  that in a previous lawful trial  before  a competent court,he has secured a verdict of acquittal  which verdict  is binding on his prosecutor.  In the instant  case for  the  reasons already mentioned, we are unable  to  hold that  the  proceeding before the Collector of Customs  is  a criminal  trial.  From this it follows that the decision  of the  Collector does not amount to a verdict of acquittal  in favour of accused Nos. 1 and 2. This takes us to the contention whether the prosecution must be quashed because of the delay in instituting the same.  It is urged on behalf of the accused that because of the  delay in launching the same, the present prosecution amounts to an abuse  of  the  process of the Court.  The  High  Court  has repelled  that  contention.  It has come to  the  conclusion that  the  delay in filing the complaint  is  satisfactorily explained.  That apart, it is  not the case. of the  accused that any period of limitation is prescribed for filing.  the complaint.   Hence the court before which the complaint  was filed could not have thrown out the same on the sole  ground that  there  has been delay in filing it.  The  question  of delay  in  filing a complaint may be a  circumstance  to  be taken  into consideration in arriving at the final  verdict. But  by  itself  it affords no  ground  for  dismissing  the complaint.  Hence we see no substance in the contention that the prosecution should be quashed on the ground that  there, was  delay in  instituting  the complaint.      We also see no merit in the contention that the accused in  this  case  are entitled to the benefit  of  s.  173(4),

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Criminal  Procedure  Code  which provides  that  before  the commencement  of the enquiry or trial the  officer-in-charge of  the police station who forwards a report under  s.  173, Criminal  Procedure  Code,  should furnish or  cause  to  be furnished to the accused, free of cost, a copy of the report forwarded  under s. 173(1), Criminal Procedure Code  of  the first  information  report recorded under s.  154,  Criminal Procedure Code and all other documents or relevant  extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely, including the-statements  and confessions, if any, recorded  under  s. 164,  Criminal Procedure Code and the  statements   recorded under  s.  161, Criminal Procedure Code of all  the  persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its  witnesses.     On  a plain reading of s. 173, Criminal Procedure  Code, it  is  clear that the same is wholly  inapplicable  to  the facts  of the present case.  In the instant case  no  report had  been  sent   under s.  173,  Criminal  Procedure  Code. Therefore  that provision is not attracted.  That  provision is attracted only in a case investigated by a police officer under  Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code,  followed up by a final report under s. 173, Criminal Procedure  Code. It may be remembered that sub-s. (4) of 445 173,  was incorporated into the Criminal Procedure Code  for the first time by Central Act 26 of 1955, presumably because of  the  changes  effected in the mode of  trials  in  cases instituted on police reports.  Before the Criminal Procedure Code was amended by Act 26 of 1955, there was no  difference in  the procedure to be adopted in the cases  instituted  on police reports and in other cases.  Till then in all.  cases irrespective  of  the fact whether they were  instituted  on police  reports  or  on private  complaints,  the  procedure regarding enquiries or trials  was  identical.  In both type of  cases, there were two distinct stages i.e.  the  enquiry stage  and the trial stage.  When the prosecution  witnesses were  examined in a case before a charge is framed,  it  was open to the accused to cross-examine them.  Hence  there was no  need for making available to the accused  the  documents mentioned  in subs.(4) of s. 173, Criminal  Procedure  Code. The right given to him under s. 162, Criminal Procedure Code was thought to be sufficient to safeguard his interest.  But Act 26 of 1955 as mentioned earlier made substantial changes in the procedure to  be adopted in the matter of enquiry  in cases  instituted on police reports.  That procedure is  now set  out in s.  251(A),  Criminal Procedure Code.  This  new procedure  truncated  the  enquiry stage.  Section 251  (A), Criminal  Procedure Code says that the Magistrate,  if  upon consideration  of all the documents referred to  in  s.  173 and  making  such examination if any, of the accused  as  he thinks  necessary  and after giving  the   prosecution   and the  accused  an opportunity of being heard  considers   the charge  against  the  accused  to  be  groundless  he  shall discharge  him but if he is of opinion that there is  ground for  presuming  that the  accused has committed  an  offence triable as a warrant case which he is competent to try.  and which in his  opinion could be  adequately punished by  him, he  shall frame in writing a charge against him.  Under  the procedure prescribed in s. 251 (A), Criminal Procedure  Code but  for the facility provided to him under s.173(4)of  that Code   an   accused   person   would   have   been   greatly handicapped  in his defence. But in a case instituted  on  a complaint, like the one before us and governed by ss. 252 to 259  of  the  Criminal Procedure Code,  no  such  difficulty arises.  Therein  the  position  is as  it  was  before  the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code in 1955.

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We  are unable to agree with the learned fudges of the  High Court  that  the  legislature did  not  make  available  the benefit  of  s.173(4),  Criminal  Procedure  Code  in  cases instituted   otherwise than on police reports by  oversight. The  observations  of the learned Judges in  the  course  of their judgment that "Even the great Homer occasionally nods. There  is nothing to show that the,legislature  has  applied its  mind to the question of the amendment of the  procedure so far as the investigation of an offence 446 under  the Sea Customs Act is concerned at the time when  it was considering amendments to the Criminal  Procedure  Code" is without any basis.  In the first place, it is not  proper to  assume  except on very good grounds that  there  is  any lacuna  in any statute or that the legislature has not  done its  duty  properly.   Secondly  from  the  history  of  the legislation  to which reference has been made  earlier,  the reason  for  introducing  s. 173(4) is  clear.  The  learned judges  of the High Court were constrained to hold  that  s, 173(4),  Criminal Procedure Code in terms does not apply  to the  present  case.  But strangely enough  that  even  after coming  to the conclusion that provision is inapplicable  to the  facts  of  the present case,  they  have  directed  the learned  Magistrate  to  require  the  prosecution  to  make available  to  the accused, the copies,  of  the  statements recorded  from the prosecution witnesses during the  enquiry under  the  Customs Act.  They have purported to  make  that order  under s. 94(1), Criminal Procedure Code which to  the extent material for our present purpose reads:                   "Whenever  any Court ..........  considers               that production of any document or other thing               is necessary or desirable for the purposes  of               any ...... enquiry, trial or other  proceeding               under  this Code by or before such  Court  ...               such Court may  issue  a  summons  ......   to               the person in whose possession and power  such               document or thing is believed to be, requiring               him  to attend and produce it. or  to  produce               it,  at  the  time and  place  stated  in  the               summons or order." This  section  does not empower a Magistrate to  direct  the prosecution  to give copies of any documents to an   accused person  That much appears to be plain from the  language  of that section it was impermissible for the High Court to read into  s. 94, Criminal Procedure Code the requirements of  s. 173(4),  Criminal  Procedure Code.  The High Court  was  not justified,  in  indirectly applying to cases  instituted  on private complaints the  requirements of s. 173(4),  Criminal Procedure Code.     That  apart  we  do not think that the  High  Court  was justified  in  interfering  with  the  discretion   of   the learned  Magistrate Whether a particular document should  be summoned  or  not is essentially in the  discretion  of  the trial  court.  In  the  instant  case  the  Special   Public Prosecutor had  assured  the  learned  trial Magistrate that he  would  keep  in readiness the  statements  of  witnesses recorded  by  the Customs authorities and shall  make  avail able  to the defence Counsel the statement of the  concerned witness  as  and  when  he is  examined.  In  view  of  that assurance, the learned Magistrate observed in his order:                  "The recording of the prosecution  evidence               is  yet commence in this case and  at  present               there are no male- 447               before  me  to  decide  whether  or  not   the

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             production  of  any  of  the  statements   and               documents   named  by  the  accused   in   his               application is desirable or necessary for  the               purpose of the enquiry or trial. As stated  at               the outset, the learned Special Prosecutor has               given an undertaking that he would produce all               the  relevant statements and documents at  the               proper  time in the course of the  heating  of               the  case. The request made for the  issue  of               the  summons under s. 94,  Criminal  Procedure               Code is also omnibus." The   reasons given by the learned Magistrate in support  of his order are good reasons.  The High Court has not come  to the  conclusion  that  the documents  in  question,  if  not produced  in  court are likely to be destroyed  or  tampered with  or the same are not likely to be made  available  when required.  It has proceeded on the erroneous basis that  the accused will not have a fair trial unless they are  supplied with the copies of those statements even before the  enquiry commences.   Except  for very good reasons, the  High  Court should  not interfere with the discretion conferred  on  the trial  courts  in the matter of summoning  documents.   Such interferences  would  unnecessarily impede the  progress  of eases  and result in waste of public money and time  as  has happened in this case.     For  the  reasons  mentioned above,  we  allow  Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 1967 and dismiss Criminal Appeal No. 35  of 1967.  In other words, we restore the order of  the  learned Magistrate. G.C.           Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 1967 allowed.                Criminal Appeal No. 35 of 1967 dismissed. 448