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PETITIONER: ASSISTANT COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE CHANDAN NAGAR, WEST BE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DUNLOP INDIA LTD. AND ORS .

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/11/1984

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SEN, A.P. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR  330            1985 SCR  (2) 190  1985 SCC  (1) 260        1984 SCALE  (2)819  CITATOR INFO :  F          1985 SC1289  (10)  R          1986 SC 614  (5,6)  RF         1988 SC2010  (12)

ACT:      Constitution of India 1950 Articles 226 and 141      Interim orders in writ petition-Grant OF-Situations and circumstances-What are-Matters  involving public revenue-Not sufficient showing  a prima  facie case-Furnishing  of  bank guarantee not a circumstance-Balance of convenience to be in favour of  grant of interim order-Likelihood of prejudice to public interest to be shown.      Supreme Court  decisions binding on all courts-Judgment per  incuriam   Principle  of-High  Court  not  entitled  to disregard  judgment   of  Supreme   Court  labeling  It  per incuriam.

HEADNOTE:      The Government  of India  by a notification dated April 6,1984, exempted  tyres from  a certain percentage of Excise Duty to  the extent  that the  manufacturers had not availed themselves of  the exemption  granted  under  certain  other earlier notifications.      The Customs  and Excise Department was of the view that the Respondent-company  who was  a  manufacturer  of  Tyres, Tubes and  various other rubber products was not entitled to the aforesaid  exemption as it had cleared the goods earlier without paying  Central Excise  Duty but  on furnishing Bank Guarantees under various interim-orders of courts.      The Company  claimed the  benefit of  exemption to  the tune of about Rs. 6 crores and filed a Writ Petition in the- High Court  and sought  an  interim  order  restraining  the Central Excise  authorities from  the levy and collection of excise duty. The High Court held that a prima facie case had been made  out in  favour of  the company  and by an interim order allowed  the benefit  of the  exemption to the tune of about Rs.  2 crores  and directed that the goods be released on furnishing a Bank Guarantee.      In  the   Department’s  appeal,   the  Division   Bench confirmed the  above order with a slight modification to the effect that  the Collector of Central Excise could encash 30

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per cent of the Bank Guarantee.      Allowing the appeals by the Department, this Court, ^      HELD: 1.  The orders of the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench  are wholly  unsustainable and  should  never have been made, Even assuming the 191 company had  established a  prima facie  case, it  was not a sufficient justification  A for  granting the  said  interim orders. There  was no question of any balance of convenience being in  favour of the respondent-Company, it was certainly in favour of the Government of India. [201B-C]      2. Governments  are not  run on  mere Bank  Guarantees. Very often some courts act as if furnishing a Bank Guarantee would meet  the ends  of justice.  No Governmental business, for that  matter no  business of any kind can be run on mere Bank Guarantees. Liquid cash is necessary for the running of a Government as indeed any enterprise. [201C]      3. Where matters of public revenue are concerned, it is of utmost  importance that  interim orders  are  not  to  be granted merely because prima facie case has been shown. More is required.  The balance  of convenience must be clearly in favour of  the making  of an  interim order and there should not be the slightest indication of a likelihood of prejudice to the public interest. [201D1      4. Article  226  is  not  meant  to  short  circuit  or circumvent statutory  procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are  entirely ill-suited  to meet  the  demands  of extraordinary situations,  as for  instance where  the  very vires of  the statute  is in  question or  where private  or public  wrongs   are  so   inextricably  mixed  up  and  the prevention of  public injury  and the  vindication of public justice require  it, that  recourse may  be had to Art. 226. The Court  must also  have good and sufficient reason to by- pass the  alternative remedy  provided by  statute.  Matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not  such matters.  The vast  majority of  the petitions under Art. 226 are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders  and thereafter to prolong the proceedings by one device  or the other. This practice needs to be strongly discouraged. [194F-H; 195A] E      5. There  are, cases  which demand  that interim orders should be  made in  the interests  of justice.  Where  gross violations of the law and injustices are about to be, or are perpetrated,  it  is  the  bounden  duty  of  the  court  to intervene and  give appropriate  interim  relief.  In  cases where denial  of interim relief may lead to public mischief, grave irreparable private injury, or shake a citizen’s faith in the  impartiality of  public administration,  a court may well be  justified in granting interim relief against public authority.      Samarias Trading  Company Pvt.  Ltd. v.  S. Samuel  and Ors., [1985]  2 S.C.R. 24, Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, [1981]  2 SCC  436, Titaghur  Paper Mills  Co. Ltd.  v. State of  Orissa, [1983]  2 SCC 433, Union of India v. Oswal Woollen Mills  Ltd., [1984]  2 SCC 646 and Union of India v. Jain Shudh  Vanaspati Ltd., C.A. No. 11450 of 1983; referred to.      6. In  India, under  Art. 141,  the law declared by the Supreme Court  shall be binding on all courts and under Art. 144 all  authorities civil  and judicial shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. [200B]      7. In the hierarchical system of Courts which exists in our country it is 192

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necessary for  each lower tier, including the High Courts to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers. The better wisdom of the Court below must yield to the higher wisdom of the Court above. [199E-F]      8. The label per incuriam is relevant only to the right of an  appellate court  to decline  to follow one of its own previous decisions, not to its right to disregard a decision of a  higher appellate  court or  to the right of a judge of the High Court to disregard a decision of the Supreme Court. [199H; 200A]      Cassel and  Co. Ltd.  v. Broome,  [1972] A  C. 1027 and Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4742-43 of 1984.      a Appeal  by Special  leave from the Judgment and order dated the  9th August,  1984 of  the Calcutta  High Court in FMAT No. 2139 of 1984 and 2023 of 1984.      K.  Parasaran,   Attorney  General,   V.  J.   Francis, Chandrasekharan, N.M.  Popli and Miss Savitha Sharma for the Appellant.      F. S.  Nariman, D.  N. Gupta  and Harish  Salve for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHlNNAPPA REDDY,  J. It  is indeed a great pity-and, we wish we  did not have to say it but we are afraid;we will be signally failing  in our  duty if  we do  not  do  so  -some courts, of  late, appear  to have  developed an  unwarranted tendency to grant interim orders-interim orders with a great potential for  public mischief-for  the mere asking. We feel greatly disturbed.  We find  it more  distressing that  such interim orders,  often ex-parte  and non-speaking,  are made even by  the High  Courts while  entertaining writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and in the Calcutta High Court, on oral application too. Recently in Samaries Trading Company Pvt.  Ltd. v. S. Samuel & Ors(l). we had occasion to condemn and  prohibit this  practice  of  entertaining  oral applications under  Art.  226  and  passing  interim  orders thereon. In  several other  cases, Siliguri  Municipality v. Amelendu Das(2),  Titagur Paper  Mills  Co.  Ltd.  State  of Orissa,(3) Union (1) [1985] 2 S.C R. 24. (2) [1983] 2 S.C.C 436 (3) [1983] 2 S.C.C 433 193 Of India  v. Oswal  Woollen Mills Ltd(l)., Union of India v. Jain Shubh  A Vanaspati  Ltd.(a), this  Court was  forced to point out how wrong it was to make interim orders so soon as an application  was but presented, when a second thought (or a second’s  thought) would  expose  the  impairment  of  the public interest and often enough the existence of a suitable alternative remedy.  Despite the fact that we have set our 8 face against  interfering with  interim orders passed by the High Courts  and made  it practically a rigid rule not to so interfere, we were constrained to interfere in those cases.      In Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, (supra) A. P. Sen and M. P. Thakkar, JJ. had to deal with an interlocutory order passed  by the  Calcutta High  Court  restraining  the Siliguri   Municipality    from   recovering   a   graduated consolidate rate  on the  annual value of buildings in terms of the  amended provisions  of the  Bengal Municipal Act. We reiterate the following observations made therein:

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        "We  are constrained to make the observations which      follows as  we do  feel dismayed at the tendency on the      part of  some of the High Courts to grant interlocutory      orders for  the mere  asking. Normally,  the High Court      should not, as a rule, in proceedings under Article 226      of the  Constitution grant  any stay of recovery of tax      save under very exceptional circumstances. The grant to      stay in  such matters, should be an exception and not a      rule.         "It is needless to stress that a levy or impost does      not become bad as soon as a writ petition is instituted      in order  to assail  the validity  of the levy. So also      there is no warrant for presuming the levy to be bad at      the  very   threshold  of  the  proceedings.  The  only      consideration at  that juncture  is to  ensure that  no      prejudice is occasioned to the rate payers in case they      ultimately   succeed   at   the   conclusion   of   the      proceedings. This  object can  be attained by requiring      the body  or authority  levying the  impost to  give an      undertaking to  refund or  adjust against  future dues,      the levy  of tax or rate or a part thereof, as the case      may be,  in the  event of  the entire  levy or  a  part      thereof being ultimately held (l) [1984l 1.2 S.C.C. 646 t (2) C, A. No. 11420 of 1983 194      to be  invalid by  the court  without obliging the tax-      payers to  institute a civil suit in order to claim the      amount already  recovered from them. On the other hand,      the Court  cannot be  unmindful of  the need to protect      the authority  levying the  tax, for, at that stage the      Court  has  to  proceed  on  the  hypothesis  that  the      challenge may or may not succeed. The Court has to show      awareness of the fact that in a case like the present a      municipality cannot  function  or  meet  its  financial      obligations if  its source  of revenue is blocked by an      interim  order   restraining  the   municipality   from      recovering the taxes as per the impugned provision. And      that the  municipality has  to maintain essential civic      services like  water supply, street lighting and public      streets etc.,  apart from  cunning public  institutions      like schools,  dispensaries,  libraries  etc.  What  is      more, supplies  have to  be purchased and salaries have      to paid.  The grant  of an  interlocutory order of This      nature would  paralyze the administration and dislocate      the entire  working of  the municipality. It seems that      these serious  ramifications of  the matter  were  lost      sight of while making the impugned order".      In Titaghur  Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. S/ate of Orissa A. P. Sen  E. S.  Venkataramiah and  R. B. Misra, JJ. held that where the  statute itself  provided the  petitioners with an efficacious alternative  remedy by  way of  an appeal to the Prescribed Authority,  a second  appeal to  the Tribunal and there after  to have  the case  stated to the High Court, it was not  for the  High Court  to exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction under  Art. 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statuary machinery. That it has become necessary, even  now, to  as to  repeat this  admonition  is indeed a  matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to  short circuit  of circumvent statutory procedures. It is  only were  statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet  the demands  of extraordinary  situations,  as  for instance where the very vires of thee statute is in question or where  private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and  the prevention  of public injury and the vindication

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of public  justice require  it that  recourse may  be had to Art. 226  of the  Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by  statute. Surely  matters involving  the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast 195 majority of  the petitions under Art. 226 o the Constitution are filed  . solely  for the  purpose of  obtaining  interim orders and there after prolong the proceedings by one device or the  other. The  practice certainly  needs to be strongly couraged.      In Union  of India  v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd., we had occasion to consider an interim order passed by the Calcutta High Court  in regard  to a  matter no  part of the cause of action relating  to  which  appeared  to  arise  within  the jurisdiction of  the Calcutta  High Court.  In that case the interim order  practically granted  the very  prayers in the writ petition. We were forced to observe,          "It  is obvious  that the  interim order  is  of  a      drastic character  with a great potential for mischief.      The principal  prayer  in  the  writ  petition  is  the      challenge to  the order  made or  proposed to  be  made      under Clause 8 of the Import Control order. The interim      order in terms of prayers (j) and (k) has the effect of      practically allowing  the writ petition at the stage of      admission without  hearing the  opposite parties. While      we do  not wish to say that a drastic interim order may      never be  passed without  hearing the  opposite parties      even if  the circumstances  justify  it,  we  are  very      firmly of  the opinion  that a  statutory order such as      the one  made in  the present  case under Clause 8-B of      the Import  Control order ought not to have been stayed      without at  least hearing  those that  made the  order.      Such  a  stay  may  lead  to  devastating  consequences      leaving  no  way  of  undoing  the  mischief.  Where  a      plentitude of  power is given under a statute, designed      to meet  a dire  situation, it is no answer to say that      the very nature of the power and the consequences which      may ensue  is itself a sufficient justification for the      grant of a stay of that order, unless, of course, there      are sufficient  circumstances to justify a strong Prima      facie inference that the order was made in abuse of the      power conferred  by the statute. A statutory order such      as the  one under Clause 8-B purports to be made in the      public interest  and unless  there  are  even  stronger      grounds of public interest an expert interim order will      not be justified. The only appropriate order to make in      such cases  is to  issue notice  to the  respondent and      make it  returnable within  a short period. This should      particularly be  so where the offices of the principals      respondents and relevant records 196      lie outside  the ordinary jurisdiction of the court. To      grant interim  relief straightaway  and leave it to the      respondents to  move the  court to  vacate the  interim      order  may   jeopardise  the  public  interest.  It  is      notorious how  if an  interim order  is once  made by a      court, parties  employ every  device and tactic to ward      off the  final  hearing  of  the  application.  It  is,      therefore, necessary  for the  courts to be circumspect      in  the   matter  of   granting  interim  relief,  more      particularly so  where the  interim relief  is directed      against orders or actions of public officials acting in      discharge of  their public  duty  and  in  exercise  of

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    statutory powers.  On the facts and circumstance of the      present case,  we are  satisfied that no interim relief      should have been granted by the High Court in the terms      in which it was done",      We  repeat  and  deprecate  the  practice  of  granting interim order  which practically  give the  principal relief sought in  the petition  for no  better reason  than that  a prima facie  case has been made out, without being concerned about the  balance of convenience, the public interest and a host  of   other  relevant   considerations.  Regarding  the practice of  some clever  litigants of  resorting to  filing writ  petitions  in  the  far-away  courts  having  doubtful jurisdiction, we had this to observe:         "..... Having regard to the fact that the registered      office of  the Company is at Ludhiana and the principal      respondents against  whom the  primary relief is sought      are at  New Delhi,  one would  have expected  the  writ      petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab      and Haryana  or p  in the  Delhi High  Court. The  writ      petitioners however,  have  chosen  the  Calcutta  High      Court  as   the  forum   perhaps  because  one  of  the      interlocutory reliefs  which is sought is in respect of      a consignment  of beef  tallow which has arrived at the      Calcutta Port.  An inevitable  result of  the filing of      writ petitions  elsewhere than  at the  place where the      concerned offices  and the relevant records are located      is to delay prompt return and contest. We do not desire      to probe  further into  the question  whether the  writ      petition  was  filed  by  design  or  accident  in  the      Calcutta High  Court when  the office of the Company is      in  the   State  of   Punjab  and   all  the  principal      respondents are in Delhi. But we do feel disturbed that      such writ petitions are of ten deliberately 197      filed in distant High Courts, as part of a manoeuvre in      a A  legal battle, so as to render it difficult for the      officials at  Delhi to move applications to vacate stay      where it becomes necessary to file such applications".      In  Union  of  India  v.  Jain  Shudha  Banaspati  Ltd. (supra), Chandrachud,  CJ., A.  P. Sen,  R.  N.  Misra,  JJ. allowed an  appeal  against  an  interim  order  making  the following observations:           "After  hearing  learned  counsel  for  the  rival      parties, we  are of  the opinion that the interim order      passed by  the High  Court on  November 29, 1983 is not      warranted since  it virtually grants to the respondents      a substantial  part of  the relief  claimed by  them in      their writ petition. Accordingly, we set aside the said      order".      We have  come across  cases  where  the  collection  of public revenue has been seriously jeopardised and budgets of Governments and  Local Authorities  affirmatively prejudiced to the  point  of  precariousness  consequent  upon  interim orders made  by courts.  In fact  instances have come to our knowledge where  Governments have  been  forced  to  explore further sources  for raising  revenue,  sources  which  they would rather  well  leave  alone  in  the  public  interest, because of  the stays granted by courts. We have come across cases where  an entire  Service is left in a stay of flutter and unrest  because of  interim  orders  passed  by  courts, leaving the  work they  are supposed  to do  in a  state  of suspended animation.  We have  come across cases where buses and lorries  are being run under orders of court though they were  either  denied  permits  or  their  permits  had  been canceled or suspended by Transport Authorities. We have come

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across cases  where liquor shops are being run under interim orders of  court.  We  have  come  across  cases  where  the collection of  monthly rentals payable by Excise Contractors has been  stayed with the result that at the and of the year the contractor  has paid  nothing but  made his profits from the shop  and walked  out. We  have come  across cases where dealers in  food grains  and essential commodities have been allowed to  take back  the stocks  seized from them as if to permit them  to continue  to indulge  in the  very practices which were  to be  prevented by  the seizure.  We have  come across  cases   where  land  reform  and  important  welfare legislations have  been stayed  by courts. Incalculable harm has been done by such interim orders. All this is not to say that interim orders may never be 198 made against public authorities. There are, of course, cases which demand  that interim  orders should  be  made  in  the interests of  justice. Where gross violations of the law and injustices are  perpetrated or  are about to be perpetrated, it is  the bounden  duty of  the court to intervene and give appropriate interim relief. In cases where denial of interim relief  may  lead  to  public  mischief,  grave  irreparable private  injury   or  shake   a  citizen’s   faith  in   the impartiality of  public administration,  a Court may well be justified  in   granting  interim   relief  against   public authority.  But   since  the   law  presumes   that   public authorities function  properly and  bonafide with due regard to the  public interest,  a court  must  be  circumspect  in granting interim orders of far reaching dimensions or orders causing administrative,  burdensome inconvenience  or orders preventing collection of public revenue for no better reason than that  the parties  have  come  to  the  Court  alleging prejudice, inconvenience or harm and that a prima facie case has been  shown. There can be and there are no hard and fast rules.  But  prudence,  discretion  and  circumspection  are called for.  There are  several other  vital  considerations apart from the existence of a prima facia case. There is the question of balance of convenience. There is the question of irreparable injury.  There is  the question  of  the  public interest   There   are   many   such   factors   worthy   of consideration. We  often wonder  why in  the  case  indirect taxation where  the burden has already been passed on to the consumer, any  interim relief  should at all be given to the manufacturer, dealer and the like !      There is  just one  more thing  that we wish to say. In Siliguri v. Amalendu Das, the Court was put to the necessity of pointing out the following:          "We will be failing in our duty if we do not advert      to feature  which causes  us dismay  and distress. On a      previous occasion,  a Division  Bench  had  vacated  an      interim order  passed by  a  learned  single  Judge  on      similar facts  in a  similar situation.  Even so when a      similar matter  giving rise  to the present appeal came      up again,  the same  learned judge whose order had been      reversed earlier,  granted a non-speaking interlocutory      order of  the aforesaid  nature. This order was in turn      confirmed by  a Division Bench without a speaking order      articulating reasons  for  granting  a  stay  when  the      earlier Bench had vacated the stay. We 199      mean no disrespect to the High Court in emphasizing the      necessity for  self-imposed discipline  in such matters      in   obeisance    to   such    weighty    institutional      considerations like  the need  to maintain  decorum and      comity. So also we mean no disrespect to the High Court

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    in stressing  the need  for self-discipline on the part      of the  High Court  in passing  interim orders  without      entering into  the question  of amplitude  and width of      the powers  of the  High Court to grant interim relief.      The main  purpose of  passing an  interim order  is  to      evolve a  workable formula or a workable arrangement to      the extent  called for  by the demands of the situation      keeping  in   mind  the   presumption   regarding   the      constitutionality   of    the   legislation   and   the      vulnerability of  the challenge,  only in order that no      irreparable  injury   is  occasioned.   The  Court  has      therefore  to   strike   a   delicate   balance   after      considering the pros and cons of the matter lest larger      public interest  is not  jeopardized and  institutional      embarrassment is eschewed".      We desire to add and as was said in Cassel and Co. Ltd. v. Broome(l)  we hope  it will  never be necessary for us to say so  again that  ’in the  hierarchical system  of Courts’ which exists in our country, ’it is necessary for each lower tier’, including  the High  Court, ’to  accept  loyally  the decisions of  the higher  tiers’. "It  is  inevitable  in  a hierarchical system of Courts that there are decisions 11 of the Supreme  appellate tribunal  which do  not  attract  the unanimous    approval     of    all     members    of    the judiciary............... But the  judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the  last word  and that  last word,  once  spoken,  is loyally accepted"(2).  The better  wisdom of the Court below must yield  to the higher wisdom of the Court above. That is the strength  of the hierarchical judicial system. In Cassel v. Broome,  commenting on the Court of Appeal’s comment that Rookes v.  Barnard(3) was rendered per incuriam Lord Diplock observed,-          "The  Court of  Appeal  found  themselves  able  to      disregard the  decision of  this  House  in  Rookes  v.      Barnard by  applying to  it the label per incuriam That      label is  relevant only  to the  right of  an appellate      court to decline to (1)  [1972] AC 1027 (2)  (See observations  of Lord  Hailsham and Lord Dipock in      Broome v. Cassell). (3)  [1984] A.C. 1129. 200      follow one  of its  own previous  decisions, not to its      right to  disregard a  decision of  a higher  appellate      court or  to the  right of a judge of the High Court to      disregard a decision of the Court of Appeal."      It is  needless to  add that in India under Act. 141 of the Constitution the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding  on all  courts within the territory of India and under Art.  144 all  authorities, civil  and judicial in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court.      Now coming  to the  facts  of  the  present  case,  the respondent, Dunlop India Limited is a manufacturer of types, tubes and  various other  rubber products. By a notification dated April  6, 1984  issued by  the  Government  of  India, Ministry of  Finance (Department  of Revenue) in exercise of the powers  conferred by  Rule 8  (1) of  the Central Excise Rules, 1944,  types, falling  under item No. 16 of the First Schedule to  the Central  Excise and  Salt Act,  1944,  were exempt from  a certain  percentage of  excise  duty  to  the extent that  the manufacturers had not availed themselves of the  exemption   granted   under   certain   other   earlier notifications The  Department  was  of  the  view  that  the Company was  not entitled to the exemption as it had cleared

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the goods earlier without paying central excise duty, but on furnishing Bank  Guarantees under  various interim orders of courts. The  Company claimed the benefit of the exemption to the tune of Rs. 6.05 crores and filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High  Court and sought an interim order restraining the central  excise authorities from the levy and collection of excise  duty. The learned single judge took the view that a prima  facie case  had been  made out  in  favour  of  the Company and  by an  interim order allowed the benefit of the exemption to  the tune  of Rs. two crores ninety three lakhs and eighty  five thousand  for which  amount the company was directed to  furnish a  Bank Guarantee,  that is to say, the goods were  directed to  be released  on the  Bank Guarantee being furnished.  An appeal  was preferred  by the Assistant Collector of  Central Excise  under clause 10 of the Letters Patent and  a Division  Bench of  the  Calcutta  High  Court confirmed the  order of the learned single Judge, but made a slight modification  in that the Collector of Central Excise was given  the liberty  to encash 30% of the Bank Guarantee. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise has preferred this appeal by special leaue. By our interim order dated November 15, 1984,  we vacated  the orders  granted  by  the  learned single Judge 201 as well as by the Division Bench. We gave two weeks’ time to the A  respondent Company to file a counter No. counter has, however been  filed. Shri  F.S.  Nariman,  learned  counsel, however appeared  for the  respondent. We  do not  have  the slightest doubt  that the orders of the learned single judge as well  as Division  Bench  are  wholly  unsustainable  and should never  been made.  Even assuming that the company had established a  prima facie  case,  about  which  we  do  not express any  opinion, we do not think that it was sufficient justification for granting the interim orders as was done by High  Court.  There  was  no  question  of  any  balance  of convenience being  in favour  of the respondent-Company. The balance of  convenience  was  certainly  in  favour  of  the Government of  India. Governments  are not  run on mere Bank Guarantees. We  notice that very often some courts act as if furnishing a  Bank Guarantee would meet the ends of justice. No governmental  business or  for that matter no business of any kind  can be run on mere Bank Guarantees. Liquid cash is necessary for  the running  of a  Government as  indeed  any other enterprise.  We consider  that where matters of public revenue are  concerned, it is of utmost importance to reales that interim orders ought not to be granted merely because a prima facie  case has  been shown.  More  is  required.  The balance of  convenience must  be clearly  in favour  of  the making of  an interim  order and  there should  not  be  the slightest indication  of a  likelihood of  prejudice to  the public interest.  We are  very sorry  to remark  that  these considerations have not been borne in mind by the High Court and interim order of this magnitude had been granted for the mere asking. The appeal is allowed with costs. E N.V.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 202