http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: ASHOK SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ASSISTANT CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY.CALCUTTA AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/05/1992

BENCH: MOHAN, S. (J) BENCH: MOHAN, S. (J) RAY, G.N. (J)

CITATION:  1992 AIR 1756            1992 SCR  (3) 190  1992 SCC  (3) 169        JT 1992 (4)   147  1992 SCALE  (1)1126

ACT:      Estate Duty Act, 1953:      Sections  53-A, 56(2), 58, 59 and 73A-Estate  Duty-Levy of-Proceedings  not  commenced within five  years  from  the death  of estate owner-Application for grant  of  succession certificate  made  by  the deceased’s  son  after  attaining majority-Whether  proceedings  debarred-Whether   succession certificate  could be denied on ground of non-production  of certificate from Controller-"Proceedings for the levy of any duty"-Whether includes proceedings for assessment.      Interpretation  of Statues-Plain  meaning to  be  given effect to.      Words and Phrases-World ’levy’-Meaning of.      Legal Maxims-Quai Hearet in Litera Haeret in Cortice.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellant’s father died intestate  leaving  behind the  appellant and his brother.  Since they were  minors  at that time their maternal uncle was appointed as guardian  by the City Civil Court.  The guardian never filed the  account of the property or the return as required under Sections  53 or 56 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 in respect of the  estate of the appellant’s father within five years from the date of his death.      On attaining majority, the appellant as Karta,  applied to  the  City  Civil Court for the  grant  of  a  succession certificate  in  respect  of  the  estate  of  his   father. However,  during the proceeding, it was pointed out  that  a certificate  from Estate Duty Authority was necessary  under Section 56(2) of the Act.      On behalf of the appellant it was urged that in view of Section 73A of the Act, the time to commence any proceedings for levy of estate duty                                                        191 had  become barred inasmuch as five years had  expired  from the date of the death of his father.  Hence, the question of production of certificate under Section 56(2) did not arise.      The  Chief Judge of the City Civil Court held  that  he could  not  go  into this  question  since  the  authorities constituted under the Act alone could decide this.      Thereafter,  the  appellant filed the return  with  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

Assistant  Controller  of Estate Duty.   the  appellant  was served  with  a  notice under Section 58(2),  along  with  a questionnaire   with  the  first  respondent-the   Assistant Controller   of  Estate  Duty.   Despite   the   appellant’s objection that no proceedings could be initiated in view  of the statutory bar under Section 73A, inasmuch as the  period of  five  years had expired from the date  of  his  father’s death,  the  appellant was called upon  to  furnish  certain particulars.    Under  these  circumstances  the   appellant challenged  before  the High Court the notice  issued  under Section  58(2) of the Act, along with the questionnaire  and the  proceedings.  A Single Judge cancelled  the  notice  in question.      On  appeal by the first respondent, the Division  Bench held that Section 73A did not do away with the liability  of an  accountable person for payment of duty; it  only  barred the initiation of proceedings for levy of duty.   Therefore, if  the  liability  remained but proceedings  could  not  be initiated,  there was no question of full payment  of  duty. As  such  it could not be stated in the certificate  by  the Controller  that  there  was no claim of  estate  duty  from accountable person; and, accordingly, the bar of  limitation was  not applicable to cases as provided under  Section  73A where  application was made for grant of  representation  or succession   certificate  and  the  account  or   the   copy application  was  delivered to the  Controller  as  required under Section 56.      In  the  appeal  before this Court, on  behalf  of  the appellant  it was contended that the construction placed  by the  Division Bench was totally incorrect; Section  73A  was comprehensive  in its scope in so far it threw  a  statutory bar preventing the authority from commencing any  proceeding after  the  expiry of five years; and would take  within  it Section 56 also; that the High Court was not correct in  its view   that  no  grant  of  representation   of   succession certificate  could be made after the expiry of  five  years; that Section 56 would have to be so read as to bring about a harmonious                                                     192 construction  between Section 73A and Section 56;  and  that strict  literal interpretation would defeat the  object  and purpose of the statutory bar under Section 73A.      Allowing the appeal, this Court,      HELD  : 1.1 The language of Section 73A of  the  Estate Duty  Act,  1953  is unambiguous.   This  section  throws  a statutory  bar and is comprehensive in nature. In so far  as it  says  "no  proceeding under this Act",  that  means  any proceedings  whatever  in  relation  to  levy  can  ever  be commenced  after  five  years.  The  world  "levy"  used  in Section 73A embraces within it the process of assesment  and also  the imposition of tax.  Therefore, it is certain  that even a proceeding for assessment cannot be taken after  five years.      Padampat  Singhania and others v. Controller of  Estate Duty, Kanpur, 122 ITR 162 at 163, relied on.      Controller  of Estate Duty v. Bbola Dutt, 130  ITR  468 approved.      P.C. Saxena v. The State, 104 ITR 106, distinguished.      Block’s  Law  Dictionary  (fifth  edition)  page   816, referred to.      1.2.  No doubt, both under sub-section (1), clause  (b) and sub-section (2), the language used in "no order shall be made  upon his application".  To require in a case  of  this character, the production of certificate from the Controller would amount to the insistence of an impossible compliance.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

    1.3  The  Division  Bench of the  High  Court  was  not correct  in holding that Section 73A was only applicable  to proceedings  initiated  under Section  59.   Merely  because Section 59 says "subject to section 73A" that does not  mean a  statutory  bar  under  Section 73A  is  lifted.   On  the contrary, Section 53A reinforces the rigour of Section  73A. The  words "commencement of any proceedings under  the  Act" are  comprehensive  enough to include Section  59  as  well. Equally, it was not correct in holding that the  application of  73A  to  cases coming under Section 56  would  make  the latter Section unsustainable.  That will be only placing  in literal   interpretation   of  Section  56   regardless   of situation.      1.4  If,  therefore,  the  object  of  Section  73A  is unambiguous to bar the                                                        193 commencement of any proceeding for levy after the period  of five  years in the case of first assessment, the  rigour  of the Section cannot be diluted, by introducing a construction not warranted in the situation.  If it was the intention  of the  Parliament to provide exceptional cases making  Section 73-A  inapplicable  to such cases nothing  would  have  been easier  than  to  have so  expressed.   The  language  under Section 73A is imperative.  It admits of no doubt that there cannot  be two limitations (i) in a case where the  assessee files  a  belated  return,  and (ii) in  a  case  where  the assessee  seeks  a succession certificate.  In such  a  case where  the  assessee,  as  in  the  instant  case,  seeks  a certificate from the Controller, all that the Controller has to say is that no such certificate could be issued since  in view  of  the  statutory bar under  Section  73A.   In  this context, Section 56 will have to be given meaning and  life. He  who  clings to the letter of the law clings ot  the  dry bone; that would be against the spirit of the Act.      Herbert Broom Legal Maxims, pp. 466-67.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2107 of 1980.      From  the  Judgment and Order dated  16.3.1979  of  the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 348 of 1973.      Shanker Ghosh and P.K. Mukharjee for the Appellant.      B.B.  Ahuja, Ms. A. Subhashini and Manoj Arora for  the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      MOHAN J. This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment and order of the Calcutta High Court dated 16th March 1979 in Appleal No. 348 of 1973.      The  facts  are that on 6th February,  1967  one  Ganga Singh,  governed  by Mitakshara School of  Hindu  Law,  died intestate.   He left two sons, the appellant and  one  Binod Singh.   The wife of Ganga Singh had pre-deceased  him.   As the  appellant  and Binod Singh were minor at  the  time  of death  of  Ganga Singh the maternal uncle of  the  appellant moved an application in the City Civil Court at Calcutta  in March 1967 for the appointment of guardian of the  appellant and his brother.  Accordingly, he was appointed                                                        194 as  the guardian.  When the paternal uncle of the  appellant and his brother appealed against the order, the  appointment was  confirmed.   However,  the  guardian  was  directed  to continue till the appellant attained majority.      On 7th December, 1970 the appellant attained  majority.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

As karta he applied to the City Civil Court at Calcutta  for the  grant  of a succession certificate in  respect  of  the estate  of Ganga Singh.  It appears that the guardian  never filed the account of the property or the return as  required under  Section  53  or  56  of the  Estate  Duty  Act,  1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).  The appellant being a minor  did  not  know about this.  The  result  is  that  no account  had  been  filed by any person in  respect  of  the estate of Ganga Singh within five years from the date of his death.      In the proceedings before City Civil Court the grant of succession certificate it was pointed out that a certificate from Estate Duty Authority was necessary under Section 56(2) of the Act.  It was urged on behalf of the appellant that in view  of  Section 73A of the Act the time  to  commence  any proceedings  for  levy  of estate  duty  had  become  barred inasmuch  as  five years had expired from the  date  of  the death of Ganga Singh.  Hence, the question of production  of certificate under Section 56(2) would not arise.      By an order dated July 25, 1972 the learned Chief Judge of the City Civil Court held that he could not go into  this question  since  the authorities constituted under  the  Act alone could decide this.  Since the appellant was advised to file  an account to the Estate Duty Authority, he filed  the return on 18th August, 1972 with the Assistant Controller of Estate  Duty.   As  per the return  the  estate  was  valued approximately at Rs.52,000.  The appellant was served with a notice under Section 58(2) along with a questionnaire by the first  respondent, the Assistant Controller of Estate  Duty, fixing  the date for hearing.  On the said date  of  hearing the  appellant  contended  that  no  proceedings  could   be initiated  in view of the statutory bar under  Section  73A, inasmuch  as the period of five years had expired  from  the date  of  the death of Ganga Singh.  Hence,  no  proceedings could be commenced.  In spite of these objections, the first respondent adjourned the case calling upon the appellant  to furnish certain particulars. It is under these circumstances the notice dated 4th of September, 1972 issued under Section 58(2)  of  the  Act  along  with  a  questionnaire  and  the proceedings  were challenged the High Court of  Calcutta  by way of a writ petition in Matter                                                        195 No.  417 of 1972.  The learned Single Judge making the  rule absolute  held that the impugned notice under Section  58(2) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, dated 4th September, 1972  was cancelled by a writ of mandamus.      Aggrieved  by the said order, the first respondent took up  the matter in appeal. The Division Bench considered  the scope of Section 73A vis-a-vis Section 56 and concluded that Section  73A  does  not do away with  the  liability  of  an accountable  person for payment of duty.  It only  bars  the initiation  of proceedings for levy of duty.  Therefore,  if the  liability remains but proceedings cannot be  initiated, there  is  no question of full payment of duty.  In  such  a case,  it  cannot  be  stated  in  the  certificate  by  the Controller  that  there  is no claim  of  estate  duty  from accountable  person.  Accordingly, the bar of limitation  is not applicable to cases as provided under Section 73A  where application   is  made  for  grant  of   representation   or succession   certificate  and  the  account  or   the   copy application is delivered to the Controller as required under Section 56.  Thus, this appeal by special leave.      Mr.  S. Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant  would urge  that the construction placed by the Division Bench  is totally  incorrect.   Section 73A is  comprehensive  in  its

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

scope in so far as it throws a statutory bar preventing  the authority from commencing any proceeding after the expiry of five  years.  Having regard to the use of words "under  this Act"  that will take within it Section 56 also.  If  in  any case of this character the appellant is required to  produce a  certificate from the Controller it will be requiring  him to do the impossible.  In respect of his submission he would place reliance on the ruling of the Allahabad High Court  in Controller  of  Estate Duty v. Bhola Dutt,  (130  ITR  468). That  was  a  case  when the proceeding  was  sought  to  be commenced on the basis of a return filed by the  accountable person  voluntarily after five years.  The High  Court  held that the Assistant Controller had no jurisdiction because of the expiry of the limitation.  It is that ratio which has to be adopted in this case.      If  the  interpretation  placed by the  High  Court  is accepted it would amount to putting a premium on the  laches of the authority and enabling it to do something  indirectly which it cannot do even directly.      The   view  of  the  High  Court  that  no   grant   of representation  or succession certificate can be made  after the  expiry of five year, cannot be supported.   Section  56 will have to be read as to bring about a har-                                                        196 monious construction between Section 73A and Section 56.  No doubt  if there is no original assessment,  reassessment  is impossible but on the score the statutory bar under  Section 73A  cannot  be  lifted.  If, as held  by  the  High  Court, Section  73A is made inapplicable where application is  made for  the grant of representation or  succession  certificate and  the  account or copy application is  delivered  to  the Controller  as required by Section 56 it will be  conferring an   additional  power  on  Controller  which  is   not   in contemplation   under   the   Act.    The   strict   literal interpretation  will  defeat the object and purpose  of  the statutory  bar  under  Section  73a.   In  support  of   the submission  reliance is placed on Herbert Broom’s  Selection of  Legal  Maxims : QUI HAERET IN LITERA HAERET  IN  CORTICE (Page 466).      In opposition to this, Mr. B.B. Ahuja, learned  counsel for the Revenue, comments the acceptance of the view of  the Division  Bench  of  the High Court.   When  Section  56  is mandatory  in  character  the requirement  of  that  Section Cannot be dispensed with even by Court.  The party who seeks a succession certificate or representation in Civil Court is bound  to  fulfil  the  statutory  conditions  without   any exception, is exactly the view taken by the Delhi High Court in P.C. Saxena v. The State, (104ITR 106).      Section  73A used the word "levy".  As to what  exactly is  mentioned  by levy under the Act could  be  gathered  by Padampat  Singhania and other v. Controller of estate  Duty, Kanpur, (122 ITR 162 at 163).  Therefore, there is no  merit in the plea.      We shall now proceed to consider the relative merits of the respective submissions.  Section 73A reads as follows:          "73A.   No proceedings for the levy of  any  estate          duty under this Act shall be commenced-          (a)  in the case of a first assessment,  after  the          expiration of five years from the date of death  of          the  deceased in respect of whose  property  estate          duty became payable; and          (b)  in  the  case of a  re-assessment,  after  the          expiration   of  three  years  from  the  date   of          assessment  of such property to estate  duty  under          this Act."

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

    A  careful reading of the above Section  discloses  the following :                                                        197     (i) For the levy of any estate duty     (ii) Under this Act     (iii) No proceedings shall be commenced.      We  are concerned, in this case, only with clause  (a). Therefore,  the  fourth  qualification  will  be  after  the expiration  of  five  years from the date of  death  of  the deceased.    The  language,  in  our  considered  view,   is unambiguous.   This  section throws a statutory bar  and  is comprehensive  in  nature.   In  so  far  as  it   says  "no proceeding  under  this  Act"  that  means  any   proceeding whatever  in  relation to levy can ever be  commenced  after five  years.   The  word "levy" in  Black’s  Law  Dictionary (fifth edition) at page 816 is stated thus :          "Levy,  v. To assess; raise; execute;  exact;  tax;          collect;  gather;  take up; seize.  Thus,  to  levy          (assess,  exact, raise, or collect) a tax; to  levy          (raise or set up) a nuisance; to levy (acknowledge)          a  fine;  to  levy (inaugurate)  war;  to  levy  an          execution, i.e., to levy or collect a sum of  money          on an execution."      As a matter of fact, in Padampat Singhania (supra)  the meaning  of  this word under this very Act came to  be  laid down which is extracted as under:          "The  word  "levy"  has  been  interpreted  by  the          Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Collector of          Central  Excise  v. National Tobacco Co.  of  India          Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 2563, as embracing within it  the          process  of assessment and also the  imposition  of          tax."      Therefore,  even a proceeding for assessment cannot  be taken after five years.  That much is certain.  Now, we come to  the  decisions  cited on behalf of  the  appellant.   In Controller  of  Estate Duty v. Bhola Dutt, (130 ITR  468  at 470) the following passage is found:          "This  provision lays down a clear and  categorical          bar to the commencement of assessment  proceedings.          They  cannot be commenced after the expiry of  five          years from the date of death of the deceased.                                                        198           Under  the  E.D. Act, the  assessment  proceedings          commence   with  the  filing  of  the   return   as          prescribed  by s. 53(3) of the Act and,  under  it,          the return could validly be filed within six months          of the date of death or within such further time as          may  be  extended by the  Asst.  Controller.   That          provision obviously is not applicable to the  facts          of  the  present  case.  Under s.  56  of  the  Act          another   method  of  commencement  of   assessment          proceedings  is  by the  Controller  requiring  the          accountable  person to file the  requisite  return.          Yet  another method of commencement  of  assessment          proceedings is prescribed by s.58 of the Act.  Sub-          section (4) of s.58 provides that in any case where          no  account has been delivered as required by  s.53          or s.56, or the person accountable fails to  comply          with  the terms of the notice served  under  sub-s.          (2),  the Controller shall make the  assessment  to          the  best of his judgment and determine the  amount          payable   as  estate  duty.   In   this   provision          assessment  proceedings could be commenced  by  the          Controller  in  case the requisite return  has  not          been  filed by the accountable person.  But to  all

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

        these   modes   of   commencement   of   assessment          proceeding  s.73A  is  applicable.   Ex  hypothesis          assessment   proceedings  under  either  of   these          provisions could not validly be commenced after the          expiry  of the period of limitation  prescribed  by          s.73A  of  the  Act.  Here,  the  proceedings  were          sought  to be commenced on the basis of the  return          filed  by  the accountable person  voluntarily  but          after  the expiry of the prescribed period of  five          years.  In view of s.73A, the Asst.  controller had          no jurisdiction to commence the proceedings even on          the basis of such a voluntary return.               Our attention was invited to s.56 of the  Act.          It is true that s.56 does not prescribe any  period          of   limitation,   but  it   applies   in   limited          circumstances.  Sub-section (1) of s.56 applies  to          a  case where the executor of the deceased wants  a          representation  certificate.   Then  alone  he   is          required  to file an account of the  properties  of          the  deceased to the Controller.  Under  sub-s.(2),          the  accountable  person is required to  produce  a          certificate from the Controller that the  requisite          estate  duty  has  been  paid  in  respect  of  the          property  for  which a  succession  certificate  is          applied for.  Proceedings under s.56 commence  when          some one                                                        199          desires  to have a representation certificate or  a          succession  certificate,  not  otherwise.   In  the          present  case,  none  of the  two  situations  have          occurred.   We  are,  therefore,  clear  that   the          assessment   proceedings  were  invalid  and   were          rightly quashed by the Tribunal."      We  think the High Court is right in its  approach.  In opposition  to this, what is relied on is the case  in  P.C. Saxena (supra).  It is sufficient to extract the head-note.          "In 1966 the appellant applied in the court of  the          Subordinate   Judge  for  grant  of  a   succession          certificate to realise various debts and securities          of  the deceased who had died on October 28,  1959.          The  Subordinate  Judge allowed the  petitions  and          ordered grant of the succession certificate subject          to the production of a certificate of clearance  in          respect  of estate duty under section 56(2) of  the          Estate  Duty  Act, 1953.  The  appellant  thereupon          applied  for  exemption  from  complying  with  the          condition   for   production   of   the   clearance          certificate in respect of estate duty claiming that          in  view of Section 73A of the Act  no  proceedings          could  be commenced for levy of estate duty on  the          estate  of  the deceased after the expiry  of  five          years  from the date of his death. The  Subordinate          Judge  rejected the application for exemption.   On          appeal to the High Court :               Held,  dismissing  the appeal,  (i)  that  the          civil  court  did not possess any  jurisdiction  or          discretion  to  waive the condition  under  section          56(2)  of the Act which was precedent to the  grant          of representation or succession certificate;          (ii) that the bar imposed by Section 73A of the Act          could  not  be  claimed by a  party  who  sought  a          succession certificate and applied to a civil court          for   grant   of   representation   or   succession          certificate   and  he  was  bound  to  fulfil   the          statutory conditions, without any exception, before

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

        obtaining the certificate."      We are of the view that this is only an  authority  for the  proposition that the civil court does not  possess  any jurisdiction or discretion to waive the condition to produce the certificate from the Controller which is a precedent  to the grant of representation or succession certificate.                                                        200      Now, we come to Section 56.  That is extracted below:          "56.   (1)  In  all  cases in  which  a  grant   of          representation is applied for-               (a) the executor of the deceased shall, to the          best  of  his knowledge and belief, specify  in  an          appropriate  account  annexed to the  affidavit  of          valuation filed in court under section 19-I of  the          Court-Fees  Act, 1870, all the property in  respect          of  which estate duty is payable upon the death  of          the  deceased  and  shall deliver  a  copy  of  the          affidavit with the account to the controller, and          (b)  no order entitling the applicant to the  grant          of   representation   shall  be   made   upon   his          application  until  he has  delivered  the  account          prescribed  in  clause  (a)  and  has  produced   a          certificate  from the Controller under  sub-section          (2)  of  section 57 or section 67 that  the  estate          duty payable in respect of the property included in          the account has been or will be paid, or that  none          is due, as the case may be.          (2)  In all cases in which a grant of a  succession          certificate   is  applied  for,  a  copy   of   the          application shall be furnished by the applicant  to          the Controller and no order entitling the applicant          to  the grant of such a certificate shall  be  made          upon  his  application  until  he  has  produced  a          certificate  from the Controller under  sub-section          (2)  of  section 57 or section 67 that  the  estate          duty  payable in respect of the property  mentioned          in  the  application has been or will be  paid,  or          that none is due, as the case may be."      No doubt, both under sub-section (1) clause (b) of sub- section  (2)  the language used is "no order shall  be  made upon  his  application".   To  require in  a  case  of  this character   the  production  of  a  certificate   from   the Controller  would amount to the insistence of an  impossible compliance.      The  view  of the Division Bench of the High  Court  is unacceptable  to us when it holds that Section 73A  is  only applicable  to  proceedings  initiated  under  Section   59. Merely because Section 59 says "subject to section 73A" that does not mean a statutory bar under Section 73A is lifted.                                                        201 On  the  contrary,  Section 53A  reinforces  the  rigour  of Section  73A.  The words "commencement  of  any  proceedings under  the Act" as we stated above are comprehensive  enough to include Section 59 as well.      Equally,  the finding that the application  of  Section 73A  to cases coming under Section 56 would make the  latter Section  unsustainable  is not correct.  That will  be  only placing a literal interpretation of Section 56 regardless of situation.   In  this  connection,  we  may  usefully  quote Herbert Broom’s Legal Maxims (Pages 466-67) :          "QUI  HAERET IN LITERA HAERET IN CORTICE (Co.  Litt          283b.)-          He   who   considers  merely  the  letter   of   an          instruments goes skindeep into its meaning.          The   law  of  England  respects  the  effect   and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

        substance  of the matter, and not every  nicety  of          form  or circumstance.  "The reason and  spirit  of          cases  make law, and not the letter  of  particular          precedents".   Hence  it is , as  we  have  already          seen,   a   general   rule   connected   with   the          interpretation  of deeds and  written  instruments,          that,  where the intention is clear, too  minute  a          stress should not be laid on the strict and precise          signification of words.  For instance, by the grant          of  a  remainder,  a  reversion  may  pass,  and  a          converso; and if a lessee covenant to leave all the          timber  which was growing on the land when he  took          it  down, but leaves it there; for this,  though  a          literal  performance of the covenant, would  defeat          its intent."          "In interpreting an Act of Parliament, likewise, it          is not always a true line of construction to decide          according  to  the strict letter of the  Act;  but,          subject to the remarks already made, the Courts may          consider  what is its fair meaning, and expound  it          differently  from the letter, in order to  preserve          the  intent.   The  meaning  of  particular  words,          indeed,   in   statutes,  as  well  as   in   other          instruments, is to be found not so much in a strict          etymological  propriety  of language, nor  even  in          popular use, as in the subject or occasion on which          they  are used, and the object that is intended  to          be attained."                                                        202      If,  therefore, the object of Section 73A is unmbiguous to bar the commencement of any proceeding for levy after the period of five years in the case of first assessment, we  do not  think  we  can dilute the rigour  of  Section  73A   by introducing  a construction not warranted in the  situation. If  it  was  the  intention of  the  Parliament  to  provide exceptional  cases making Section 73A inapplicable  to  such cases  nothing  would  have  been easier  than  to  have  so expressed.   The language under Section 73A  is  imperative. It  admits of no doubt that there cannot be two  limitations (i) in a case where the assessee files a belated return  and (ii)  in  a  case where the  applicant  seeks  a  succession certificate.   In such a case where the assessee, as in  the instant  case, seeks a certificate from the Controller,  all that the Controller has to say is, that no such  certificate could  be  issued since in view of the statutory  bar  under Section  73A.  In this context, Section 56 will have  to  be given meaning and life.  He who clings to the letter of  the law clings to the dry bone; that would be against the spirit of the Act.      In the result, we set aside the impugned judgment.  The appeal  will  stand  allowed.  However, there  shall  be  no orders as to costs. N.P.V.                                   Appeal allowed.                                                        203