IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1489 OF 2004

Ashok Kumar ….Appellant

Versus

State of Haryana                            .…Respondent

JUDGMENT

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. Inter alia but primarily the appellant has raised a question of law in  

the present appeal.   The contention is, that every demand by the  

husband  or  his  family  members  cannot  be  termed  as  ‘dowry  

demand’ within the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 4 of the  

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short referred to as ‘the Act’) and  

consequently, the death of the deceased cannot be termed as a  

‘dowry death’ within the ambit and scope of Section 304-B of the  

Indian  Penal  Code  (for  short  ‘the  Code’)  and,  as  such,  the  

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conviction and order of sentence passed against the appellant is  

liable to be set aside.

2. It is a settled canon of criminal jurisprudence that the question of  

law has to be examined in light of the facts and circumstances of a  

given case.  Thus, reference to the facts giving rise to the present  

appeal would be necessary.    

3. Vipin @ Chanchal @ Rekha, the deceased and Ashok Kumar, the  

appellant herein, were married on 9th October, 1986.  Harbans Lal,  

the father of the deceased had given sufficient dowry at the time of  

her marriage according to his means, desire and capacity.  But,  

the  appellant  and  his  family  members  i.e.  Mukesh  Kumar,  the  

brother  of  the  appellant  and  Smt.  Lajwanti,  the  mother  of  the  

appellant were not satisfied with the dowry.  They allegedly used  

to  harass  and  maltreat  the  deceased  and  used  to  give  her  

beatings.   They  had  demanded  a  refrigerator,  a  television  etc.  

One week prior to the date of occurrence, the deceased came to  

the house of her father at Kaithal  and narrated the story.   She  

specifically mentioned that her husband wanted to set up a new  

business for which he required a sum of           Rs. 5,000/-.  The  

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father of the deceased could not manage the same due to which  

the appellant  and his  family  members  particularly,  Lajwanti  and  

Mukesh  alleged  to  have  burnt  the  deceased  by  sprinkling  

kerosene oil on her as a result of which the deceased died in the  

hospital  at  about  4.00  p.m.  on  16.05.1988.   The  father  of  the  

deceased received information of the incident from his sister’s son  

Subhash Chand.  Neither the appellant nor his family members  

informed him about the said demise.   

The father of the deceased moved a complaint (Ex. PA) before  

SI Randhir Mohan who made endorsement (Ex. PA/1) on the basis of  

which FIR (Ex.  PU) was recorded.   This was done by SI Randhir  

Mohan on the basis of ruqa (Ex. PQ) received on 16.05.1988 at about  

5.45 p.m.  The deceased was brought to the hospital as a burnt case  

in gasping condition and she expired in casualty.  The said officer  

went  to  the  General  Hospital,  completed  the  proceedings  under  

Section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short ‘the Cr.PC’)  

and  during  those  proceedings  he  recorded  the  statements  of  

Lajwanti, mother in law of the deceased, Ram Lal, father in law of the  

deceased,  Khem  Chand,  Harbans  Lal   and  one  Arjun  Dass.  

Thereafter,  the  body was sent  for  postmortem which  was handed  

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over  to  Hanbans  Lal,  after  the  post  mortem.   The complaint  was  

made by Harbans Lal (PW-1) on 17th May, 1988.  Site Plan (Ex. PW)  

as well as the photographs (Ex. P-14 to P-17) and their negatives  

(Ex.  P-18  to  P-21)  were  prepared  by  Photographer  Satish  Kumar  

(PW-10).   Ex.  P6  was  also  taken into  possession which  was half  

burnt small tin, containing 3 litres of kerosene oil under Ex. PH which  

was sealed.  Certain other goods like hammer (Ex. PK), broken piece  

of a wooden door (Ex. P-11), half burnt match stick, match box etc  

(Ex. P-12) were also taken into possession.   

 4. After completing the investigation of the case and recording the  

statements  of  the  relevant  witnesses,  the  Investigating  Officer  

submitted the charge sheet in terms of Section 173 of the Cr.PC.  

The case was committed to the Court of Sessions by the learned  

CJM vide his  order  dated 18th October,  1988 which framed the  

charge under Section 304-B of the Code read with Section 34 of  

the  Code.   Upon  completion  of  the  evidence  of  prosecution,  

statement  of  the  accused  under  Section  313  of  Cr.PC  was  

recorded.   

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5. The  learned  Trial  Court  by  a  detailed  judgment  dated  

13.01.1989/16.01.1989  held  all  the  three  accused  viz.,  Ashok  

Kumar,  Mukesh  Kumar  and  Lajwanti,  guilty  of  the  offence  

punishable under Section 304-B of the Code and vide order of the  

same  date,  sentenced  the  accused  to  undergo  rigorous  

imprisonment  for  a  term of  10  years  and  to  pay  a  fine  of  Rs.  

1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo  

rigorous imprisonment for 3 months.   

6. Aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  judgment  and  order  of  sentence  

passed by the Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal before the  

High  Court  of  Punjab  and  Haryana  at  Chandigarh,  which  was  

partially accepted.  Lajwanti and Mukesh, the mother and brother  

of the accused Ashok Kumar, were acquitted of the offence under  

Section 304-B of the Code while the conviction of Ashok Kumar,  

accused  was  upheld  and  the  order  of  sentence  was  also  

maintained by the High Court.  

7. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court dated 16th December,  

2003,  Ashok Kumar,  the appellant  herein,  has filed the present  

appeal.  While impugning the judgment under appeal and besides  

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raising the legal contention afore noticed, it is also contended that  

the  Courts  below  have  failed  to  appreciate  the  evidence  in  its  

correct perspective.  The evidence brought on record clearly show  

that there was no connection between the death of the deceased  

and the alleged dowry demands or alleged cruelty.  Further, it is  

contended that there was delay in registration of the FIR and no  

explanation has been rendered whatsoever in that  behalf.   The  

occurrence was dated 16.05.1988 at 4.00 p.m. and the FIR was  

lodged on 17.05.1988, while the deceased died in the hospital on  

16.05.1988.  Unexplained and inordinate delay in lodging FIR (Ex.  

PU) creates a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution.  There  

were no specific allegations made in the FIR with regard to dowry  

and the allegations made, in any case, did not specify the basic  

ingredients  of  dowry  demand.   While  criticizing  the  serious  

contradiction between the statements of prosecution witnesses, it  

is also contended that the prosecution has failed to prove its case  

beyond  any  reasonable  doubt  particularly,  keeping  in  view  the  

letters  written (Ex.  DB to  DJ),  no  offence could  be established  

against the accused and, as such, he is entitled to be acquitted.  

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8.  On the contrary, it is argued on behalf of the State that by virtue of  

cumulative effect of the statements of Harbans Lal, the father of  

the deceased (PW-1), Krishna Rani, the mother of the deceased  

(PW-2)  and  Subhash  Chand  (PW-3)  read  in  conjunction  with  

documentary  evidence  and  the  statement  of  the  Investigating  

Officer, the prosecution has been able to prove the charge beyond  

any reasonable doubt.  It is contended that one witness, produced  

by the  accused himself,  has  fully  corroborated  the  case of  the  

prosecution and, as such, the appellant was rightly convicted and  

sentenced by the Courts below and the judgment under appeal  

does not suffer from any legal or other infirmity.  According to the  

prosecution, the appeal should be dismissed.

9. At  the  very  outset,  we  would  proceed  to  deal  with  the  legal  

submissions made on behalf of the appellant.  But before that, we  

must  notice  that  the  appellant  was  neither  charged  with  the  

offence under Section 4 of the Act nor he has been found guilty of  

the said offence.  Thus, the submissions have to be examined only  

from the point of view that the appellant has been convicted for an  

offence under Section 304-B of the Code and the provisions of the  

Act are relevant only for examining the merit or otherwise of the  

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contention raised that the expression ‘dowry’, as per explanation to  

the provisions of Section 304-B of the Code, has to be given the  

same meaning as in Section 2 of the Act.

10. The appellant was charged with an offence under Section 304-B of  

the  Code.   This  penal  section  clearly  spells  out  the  basic  

ingredients as well as the matters which required to be construed  

strictly and with significance to the cases where death is caused  

by burns, bodily injury or the death occurring otherwise than under  

normal  circumstances,  in  any  manner,  within  7  years  of  a  

marriage.  It is the first criteria which the prosecution must prove.  

Secondly, that ‘soon before her death’ she had been subjected to  

cruelty or harassment by the husband or any of the relatives of the  

husband for,  or in connection with,  any demand for dowry then  

such a death shall be called ‘dowry death’ and the husband or the  

relative, as the case may be, will be deemed to have caused such  

a death.  Explanation to this section requires that the expression  

‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Act.  

The definition of dowry under Section 2 of the Act reads as under :  

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“In  this  Act,  "dowry"  means any property  or  valuable security given or agreed to be given  either directly or indirectly--

(a)  by one party  to  a  marriage to  the  other  party to the marriage; or

(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage  or by any other person, to either party to the  marriage or to any other person,

at or before [or any time after the marriage]  [in  connection  with  the marriage of  the said  parties, but does not include] dower or mahr in  the  case  of  persons  to  whom  the  Muslim  Personal Law (Shariat) applies.

Explanation  II.--The  expression  "valuable  security" has the same meaning as in section  30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

11. From  the  above  definition  it  is  clear  that,  ‘dowry’  means  any  

property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either  

directly or indirectly by one party to another, by parents of either  

party to each other or any other person at, before, or at any time  

after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said  

parties  but  does  not  include  dower  or  mahr  under  the  Muslim  

Personal Law.  All the expressions used under this Section are of  

a  very  wide  magnitude.   The  expressions  ‘or  any  time  after  

marriage’ and ‘in connection with the marriage of the said parties’  

were introduced by amending Act 63 of 1984 and Act 43 of 1986  

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with effect from 02.10.1985 and 19.11.1986 respectively.  These  

amendments  appear  to  have  been  made  with  the  intention  to  

cover all demands at the time, before and even after the marriage  

so  far  they  were  in  connection  with  the  marriage  of  the  said  

parties.  This clearly shows the intent of the legislature that these  

expressions are of wide meaning and scope. The expression ‘in  

connection with  the marriage’  cannot  be given a restricted or  a  

narrower  meaning.   The  expression  ‘in  connection  with  the  

marriage’ even in common parlance and on its plain language has  

to  be  understood  generally.   The  object  being  that  everything,  

which is offending at any time i.e. at, before or after the marriage,  

would be covered under this definition, but the demand of dowry  

has to be ‘in connection with the marriage’ and not so customary  

that it  would not attract,  on the face of it,  the provisions of this  

section.   

12. At this stage,  it  will  be appropriate to refer  to certain examples  

showing  what  has  and  has  not  been  treated  by the  Courts  as  

‘dowry’.  This Court, in the case of Ram Singh v. State of Haryana  

[(2008) 4 SCC 70], held that the payments which are customary  

payments, for example, given at the time of birth of a child or other  

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ceremonies  as  are  prevalent  in  the  society  or  families  to  the  

marriage,  would  not  be  covered  under  the  expression  ‘dowry’.  

Again, in the case of Satbir Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 2001 SC  

2828], this Court held that the word ‘dowry’ should be any property  

or  valuable given or  agreed to  be given in  connection with  the  

marriage.  The customary payments in connection with birth of a  

child or other ceremonies are not covered within the ambit of the  

word ‘dowry’.  This Court, in the case of Madhu Sudan Malhotra v.  

K.C. Bhandari [(1988) Supp. 1 SCC 424], held that furnishing of a  

list of ornaments and other household articles such as refrigerator,  

furniture and electrical appliances etc., to the parents or guardians  

of the bride, at the time of settlement of the marriage, prima facie  

amounts to demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 2 of  

the Act.  The definition of ‘dowry’ is not restricted to agreement or  

demand for payment of dowry before and at the time of marriage  

but  even  include  subsequent  demands,  was  the  dictum of  this  

Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Asawa  

[(2004) 4 SCC 470].

13. The Courts have also taken the view that where the husband had  

demanded  a  specific  sum  from  his  father-in-law  and  upon  not  

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being given, harassed and tortured the wife and after some days  

she  died,  such  cases  would  clearly  fall  within  the  definition  of  

‘dowry’ under the Act.  Section 4 of the Act is the penal Section  

and demanding a ‘dowry’, as defined under Section 2 of the Act, is  

punishable under this section.  As already noticed, we need not  

deliberate on this aspect,  as the accused before us has neither  

been charged nor punished for that offence.  We have examined  

the provisions of Section 2 of the Act in a very limited sphere to  

deal with the contentions raised in regard to the applicability of the  

provisions of Section 304-B of the Code.

14. We have already referred to the provisions of Section 304-B of the  

Code and the most significant expression used in the Section is  

‘soon before her death’.  In our view, the expressions ‘soon before  

her death’  cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning.  

They  must  be  understood  in  their  plain  language  and  with  

reference to their meaning in common parlance.  These are the  

provisions relating to human behaviour and, therefore, cannot be  

given  such  a  narrower  meaning,  which  would  defeat  the  very  

purpose of the provisions of the Act.  Of course, these are penal  

provisions and must receive strict construction.  But, even the rule  

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of strict construction requires that the provisions have to be read in  

conjunction with other relevant provisions and scheme of the Act.  

Further, the interpretation given should be one which would avoid  

absurd results on the one hand and would further the object and  

cause of the law so enacted on the other.

 15. We are of the considered view that the concept of reasonable time  

is the best criteria to be applied for appreciation and examination  

of such cases. This Court in the case of Tarsem Singh v. State of  

Punjab  [AIR 2009  SC 1454],  held  that  the  legislative  object  in  

providing  such  a  radius  of  time  by  employing  the  words  ‘soon  

before her death’ is to emphasize the idea that her death should,  

in  all  probabilities,  has  been  the  aftermath  of  such  cruelty  or  

harassment.  In other words, there should be a reasonable, if not  

direct, nexus between her death and the dowry related cruelty or  

harassment inflicted on her.  Similar view was expressed by this  

Court in the case of Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2004)  

3 SCC 98], where this Court stated that determination of the period  

would depend on the facts and circumstances of  a given case.  

However, the expression would normally imply that there has to be  

reasonable time gap between the cruelty inflicted and the death in  

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question.  If  this is so, the legislature in its wisdom would have  

specified  any  period  which  would  attract  the  provisions  of  this  

Section.  However,  there  must  be  existence  of  proximate  link  

between the acts of cruelty along with the demand of dowry and  

the  death  of  the  victim.  For  want  of  any  specific  period,  the  

concept  of  reasonable  period  would  be  applicable.  Thus,  the  

cruelty,  harassment  and  demand  of  dowry  should  not  be  so  

ancient whereafter, the couple and the family members have lived  

happily  and that  it  would result  in abuse of  the said protection.  

Such  demand  or  harassment  may  not  strictly  and  squarely  fall  

within the scope of these provisions unless definite evidence was  

led to show to the contrary. These matters, of course, will have to  

be examined on the facts and circumstances of a given case.  

16. The cruelty and harassment by the husband or any relative could  

be  directly  relatable  to  or  in  connection  with,  any  demand  for  

dowry.   The  expression  ‘demand  for  dowry’  will  have  to  be  

construed ejusdem generis to the word immediately preceding this  

expression.   Similarly,  ‘in  connection  with  the  marriage’  is  an  

expression which has to be given a wider connotation.   It  is  of  

some  significance  that  these  expressions  should  be  given  

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appropriate meaning to avoid undue harassment or advantage to  

either of  the parties.   These are penal  provisions but  ultimately  

these  are  the  social  legislations,  intended  to  control  offences  

relating  to  the  society  as  a  whole.   Dowry  is  something  which  

existed in our country for a considerable time and the legislature in  

its wisdom considered it  appropriate to enact the law relating to  

dowry prohibition so as to ensure that any party to the marriage is  

not harassed or treated with cruelty for satisfaction of demands in  

consideration and for subsistence of the marriage.   

17. The Court cannot ignore one of the cardinal principles of criminal  

jurisprudence that  a suspect  in the Indian law is  entitled to  the  

protection of Article 20 of the Constitution of India as well as has a  

presumption of innocence in his favour.  In other words, the rule of  

law  requires  a  person  to  be  innocent  till  proved  guilty.   The  

concept  of  deeming  fiction  is  hardly  applicable  to  the  criminal  

jurisprudence.  In contradistinction to this aspect, the legislature  

has applied  the concept  of  deeming fiction to  the  provisions of  

Section  304-B.   Where  other  ingredients  of  Section  304-B  are  

satisfied,  in  that  event,  the  husband  or  all  relatives  shall  be  

deemed to have caused her death.  In other words, the offence  

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shall be deemed to have been committed by fiction of law.  Once  

the prosecution proves its case with regard to the basic ingredients  

of Section 304-B, the Court will presume by deemed fiction of law  

that the husband or the relatives complained of, has caused her  

death.  Such a presumption can be drawn by the Court keeping in  

view the evidence produced by the prosecution in support of the  

substantive charge under Section 304-B of the Code.

18. Of  course,  deemed  fiction  would  introduce  a  rebuttable  

presumption and the husband and his relatives may, by leading  

their  defence and proving that  the ingredients of  Section 304-B  

were not satisfied, rebut the same.    While referring to raising of  

presumption under Section 304-B of the Code, this Court, in the  

case of Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu [AIR 2003 SC 3828],  

stated the following ingredients which should be   satisfied :

“4……………….

1) The question before the Court must be whether  the accused has committed the dowry death of  a  woman.  (This  means  that  the  presumption  can be raised only if the accused is being tried  for the offence under Section 304-B, IPC).

2) The  woman  was  subjected  to  cruelty  or  harassment by her husband or his relatives.

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3) Such  cruelty  or  harassment  was  for,  or  in  connection with, any demand for dowry.

4) Such cruelty  or  harassment  was soon  before  her death.”

19.    In light of  the above essential  ingredients, for constituting an  

offence under Section 304-B of the Code, the Court has to attach  

specific significance to the time of alleged cruelty and harassment  

to which the victim was subjected to and the time of her death, as  

well as whether the alleged demand of dowry was in connection  

with the marriage.  Once these ingredients are satisfied, it would  

be called the ‘dowry death’ and then, by deemed fiction of law, the  

husband or the relatives would be deemed to have committed that  

offence.  The learned counsel appearing for the appellant, while  

relying upon the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), contended that the  

concept of ‘soon before the death’ is not attracted in relation to the  

alleged harassment or cruelty inflicted upon the deceased, in the  

facts  of  the  present  case.  The oral  and documentary  evidence  

produced  by  the  prosecution  does  not  suggest  and  satisfy  the  

essential ingredients of the offence.

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20. Similarly, reference was also made to the judgment of this Court in  

the case of  Appasaheb v.  State of  Maharashtra [(2007)  9 SCC  

721], to substantiate the contention that there was no co-relation  

between giving or taking of the property with the marriage of the  

parties and, as such, the essential ingredients of Section 2 of the  

Act  were missing.   Accordingly,  it  is  argued that  there  was  no  

demand  of  dowry  by  the  appellant  but  it  was  merely  an  

understanding that for his better business, at best,  the amounts  

could be given voluntarily by the father of the deceased.  This fact  

was  further  sought  to  be  substantiated  while  referring  to  the  

following  abstracts  of  the  judgment  in  the  case  of  Appasaheb  

(supra):   

“6.…….The  learned  trial  Judge  then  sought  clarification from the witnesses by putting the  following question:

“Question:  What  do  you  mean by  ‘domestic  cause’? Answer: What I meant was that there was a  demand for money for defraying expenses of  manure, etc. and that was the cause.” In  the  very  next  paragraph  she  stated  as  under: “It is not true to suggest that in my statement  before the police I never said that ill-treatment  was as a result of demand for money from us  and its fulfilment. I cannot assign any reason  

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why  police  did  not  write  about  it  in  my  statement.”

xxx               xxx      xxx                    xxx

9. Two essential ingredients of Section 304-B  IPC, apart from others, are (i) death of woman  is  caused  by  any  burns  or  bodily  injury  or  occurs  otherwise  than  under  normal  circumstances, and (ii) woman is subjected to  cruelty or harassment by her husband or any  relative of her husband for,  or in connection  with, any demand for “dowry”. The explanation  appended to sub-section (1) of Section 304-B  IPC  says  that  “dowry”  shall  have  the  same  meaning  as  in  Section  2  of  the  Dowry  Prohibition Act, 1961.

xxx               xxx               xxx                   xxx

11. In view of  the aforesaid definition of  the  word “dowry” any property or valuable security  should be given or agreed to be given either  directly or indirectly at or before or any time  after the marriage and in connection with the  marriage  of  the  said  parties.  Therefore,  the  giving  or  taking  of  property  or  valuable  security must have some connection with the  marriage  of  the  parties  and  a  correlation  between  the  giving  or  taking  of  property  or  valuable  security  with  the  marriage  of  the  parties is essential. Being a penal provision it  has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly  well-known social custom or practice in India.  It  is  well-settled  principle  of  interpretation  of  statute that if the Act is passed with reference  to a particular trade, business or transaction  and  words  are  used  which  everybody  conversant  with  that  trade,  business  or  transaction knows or understands to have a  particular meaning in it, then the words are to  be  construed  as  having  that  particular  meaning.  (See  Union  of  India v.  Garware  Nylons Ltd. and Chemical and Fibres of India  

19

Ltd. v.  Union of India[(1997) 2 SCC 664].) A  demand  for  money  on  account  of  some  financial  stringency  or  for  meeting  some  urgent  domestic  expenses or  for  purchasing  manure  cannot  be termed as a  demand for  dowry  as  the  said  word  is  normally  understood.  The  evidence  adduced  by  the  prosecution does not, therefore, show that any  demand for “dowry” as defined in Section 2 of  the Dowry Prohibition Act  was made by the  appellants  as  what  was  allegedly  asked  for  was  some  money  for  meeting  domestic  expenses and for  purchasing manure.  Since  an essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC  viz. demand for dowry is not established, the  conviction  of  the  appellants  cannot  be  sustained.”

21. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for the State while  

relying  upon the judgment  of  this  Court  in  Devi  Lal  v.  State of  

Rajasthan [(2007)  14 SCC 176],  argued that  the  relatives  and,  

particularly the father of the deceased, had specifically mentioned  

the acts  of  harassment  and,  in  any case,  the  statement  of  the  

sister of the deceased, who was produced by the accused as his  

defence witness, itself clinches the entire issue and, therefore, the  

offence under Section 304-B of the Code is made out.  It was also  

contended that an absolute accuracy in the statement of witnesses  

is not  a condition precedent  for conviction.  He relied upon the  

following dictum of the Court in Devi Lal’s case (supra) :  

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“25. Indisputably, before an accused is found  guilty for commission of an offence, the court  must  arrive  at  a  finding  that  the  ingredients  thereof have been established. The statement  of a witness for the said purpose must be read  in its entirety. It is not necessary for a witness  to make a statement in consonance with the  wording of  the section of  a statute.  What  is  needed  is  to  find  out  as  to  whether  the  evidences  brought  on  record  satisfy  the  ingredients thereof.”

22.  Now  we  may  proceed  to  discuss  the  evidence  led  by  the  

prosecution in the present case.  In order to bring the issues raised  

within  a narrow compass we may refer  to  the statement  of  the  

accused made under Section 313, Cr.PC.  It is a settled principle  

of law that dual purpose is sought to be achieved when the Courts  

comply with the mandatory requirement of recording the statement  

of an accused under this provision.  Firstly, every material piece of  

evidence  which  the  prosecution  proposes  to  use  against  the  

accused should be put to him in clear terms and secondly,  the  

accused  should  have  a  fair  chance  to  give  his  explanation  in  

relation to that evidence as well as his  own versions with regard to  

alleged involvement in the crime.  This dual  purpose has to be  

achieved in  the interest  of  the proper  administration  of  criminal  

justice  and  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Cr.P.C.  

21

Furthermore, the statement under Section 313 of the Cr.PC can be  

used by  the  Court  in  so  far  as  it  corroborates  the  case of  the  

prosecution.  Of course, conviction per se cannot be based upon  

the statement under Section 313 of the Cr.PC.   

23.     Let us examine the essential features of this section and the  

principles of law as enunciated by judgments of this Court, which are  

the  guiding  factor  for  proper  application  and  consequences  which  

shall flow from the provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.PC.  As already  

noticed, the object of recording the statement of the accused under  

Section 313 of the Cr.PC is to put all incriminating evidence to the  

accused  so  as  to  provide  him  an  opportunity  to  explain  such  

incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of  

the prosecution.  At the same time, also permit him to put forward his  

own  version  or  reasons,  if  he  so  chooses,  in  relation  to  his  

involvement  or  otherwise  in  the  crime.   The  Court  has  been  

empowered to examine the accused but only after the prosecution  

evidence has been concluded. It is a mandatory obligation upon the  

Court and besides ensuring the compliance thereof, the Court has to  

keep  in  mind  that  the  accused  gets  a  fair  chance  to  explain  his  

conduct.   The  option  lies  with  the  accused  to  maintain  silence  

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coupled with  simplicitor  denial  or,  in  the alternative,  to  explain  his  

version and reasons, for his alleged involvement in the commission of  

crime.  This is the statement which the accused makes without fear or  

right  of  the  other  party  to  cross-examine  him.   However,  if  the  

statements  made are  false,  the  Court  is  entitled  to  draw adverse  

inferences and pass consequential orders, as may be called for, in  

accordance with law.  The primary purpose is to establish a direct  

dialogue  between  the  Court  and  the  accused  and  to  put  every  

important incriminating piece of evidence to the accused and grant  

him an opportunity to answer and explain.  Once such a statement is  

recorded, the next question that has to be considered by the Court is  

to what extent and consequences such statement can be used during  

the enquiry and the trial.  Over the period of time, the Courts have  

explained this concept and now it has attained, more or less, certainty  

in the field of criminal jurisprudence.  The statement of the accused  

can be used to test the veracity of the exculpatory of the admission, if  

any, made by the accused.  It can be taken into consideration in any,  

enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly an evidence in the case.  The  

provisions of Section 313 (4) of the Cr.PC explicitly provides that the  

answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in  

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such enquiry or trial and put in as evidence for or against the accused  

in  any other  enquiry or  trial  for  any other  offence for  which,  such  

answers may tend to show he has committed.  In other words, the  

use of a statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC as an evidence is  

permissible  as  per  the  provisions  of  the  Code  but  has  its  own  

limitations.  The Courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the  

accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence  

against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made  

under  this  Section  should  not  be  considered  in  isolation  but  in  

conjunction  with  evidence  adduced  by  the  prosecution.  Another  

important caution that Courts have declared in the pronouncements is  

that  conviction  of  the  accused  cannot  be  based  merely  on  the  

statement  made under  Section  313  of  the  Cr.PC as  it  cannot  be  

regarded  as  a  substantive  piece  of  evidence.   In  the  case  of  

Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v. State of Bombay [AIR 1953 SC  

247], the Court held as under:

“3. ……….As the appellant  admitted that  he  was in charge of the godown, further evidence  was not led on the point.  The Magistrate was  in this situation fully justified in referring to the  statement of the accused under Section 342  as  supporting  the  prosecution  case  concerning  the  possession  of  the  godown.  

24

The contention that the Magistrate made use  of  the  inculpatory  part  of  the  accused’s  statement and excluded the exculpatory part  does not seem to be correct.  The statement  under  Section  342  did  not  consist  of  two  portions, part inculpatory and part exculpatory.  It  concerned  itself  with  two  facts.   The  accused admitted that he was in charge of the  godown, he denied that the rectified spirit was  found  in  that  godown.   He  alleged  that  the  rectified spirit was found outside it.  This part  of  his  statement  was  proved  untrue  by  the  prosecution  evidence  and  had  no  intimate  connection with the statement concerning the  possession of the godown.”

24.    From various answers given by the accused to the Court in his  

statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., it appears that  

the death of the deceased is not disputed.  The allegation with regard  

to cruelty was denied.  However, besides denying the case of the  

prosecution,  the  appellant  took  the  stand  that  he  was  falsely  

implicated in the crime.   According to him,  the deceased was not  

happy with  the marriage inasmuch as she was in  love with some  

other boy and wanted to marry him which was not permitted by her  

family and that is why she committed suicide.  As would be evident  

from this admitted position, the death of the deceased by burning is  

not  an  issue.   The  limited  question  was  whether  the  deceased  

committed suicide simplicitor for the reasons given by the accused or  

25

in the alternative, the prosecution story,  that it  was a dowry death  

relatable  to  the  harassment  and  cruelty  inflicted  upon  her  by  the  

accused and his family members, is correct.

25    In the postmortem report it was noticed that the cause of death  

was  shock  and  dehydration  which  resulted  from  extensive  burn  

injuries, which were ante-mortem.   The postmortem report (Ex. PO)  

and the body sketch (Ex. PO/1) clearly demonstrate that practically  

the  entire  body  had  been  affected  by  the  burn  injuries.   The  

prosecution had examined Harbans Lal, the father of the deceased  

(PW-1), who stated that immediately after the marriage of deceased  

with the accused, both were living happily and he had given dowry  

according  to  his  capacity,  but  six  months  after  her  marriage,  her  

husband and her in-laws started teasing her and giving taunts that  

she had not brought T.V. and Fridge etc. in the dowry and whenever  

she used to come to him she mentioned about the same and 20 days  

prior to her death she had told him that she was being troubled for a  

sum  of  Rs.  5,000/-  so  that  her  husband  could  change  to  a  new  

business and while consoling her, he told her that he would arrange  

for the money in some time and took her at the house of her in-laws  

7-8 days prior to her death.  He also stated that Ashok Kumar, the  

26

accused, Lajwanti,  the mother-in-law of the deceased and Mukesh,  

brother-in-law of the deceased, used to give her beatings and he had  

filed the complaint (Ex.PA).  Ex.PB and Ex. PC were the letters which  

he had given to the police, however, this witness was cross-examined  

and  confronted  with  Ex.  PA,  where  the  allegation  about  T.V.  and  

Fridge etc. had not been recorded.  He voluntarily stated that his son-

in-law (the accused) used to deal  in  vegetables but  he wanted to  

change to Kariyana business, and that is why he wanted a sum of  

Rs. 5,000/-.   Smt. Krishna Rani,  the mother of the deceased, was  

examined as PW-2.  She admitted that a child was born from the  

marriage.   She  had  also  corroborated  the  statement  of  PW  1.  

According  to  her,  Lajwanti  told  that  the  deceased  had  expired.  

Subhash Chand (PW-3)  stated  that  he had informed Harbans  Lal  

(PW-1)  about  the death of  the deceased due to burn injuries and  

stated that they (the husband of the deceased and her in-laws) used  

to ill-treat the deceased and were demanding dowry.  However, he  

did  not  refer  to  the  demand  of  Rs.  5,000/-,  as  stated  by  other  

witnesses.  To prove the case Karta Ram, SI (PW-6), Darshan Lal,  

H.C. (PW-7), Ranbir Mohan, SI (PW-8), the police officials, were also  

examined  by  the  prosecution  apart  from  Kharati  Lal,  Kariyana  

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Merchant (PW-4).  Dr. Manjula Bansal, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital,  

Jind (PW-5), was examined to prove the death of the deceased which  

was caused by burn injuries.

26.     The accused had led defence and examined as many as six  

witnesses.   Dr.  Bhushan  Aggarwal,  Incharge  Swami  Salagram  

Ashram Charitable Hospital, Jind (DW-1) was examined to primarily  

show that a child was born on 30th August, 1987.  Vijay Laxmi (DW-3)  

and Lekh Raj  (DW-4)  were examined to show that  there were no  

dowry demands and Harbans Lal, the father of the deceased had not  

complained to them about the same at any point of time.  But, the  

most  important  witness  examine by the  accused  was Vijay  Laxmi  

(DW-3), who is the daughter of Harbans Lal, aged about 14 years.  

She mentioned that the letter (Ex. DJ) was written by her and she  

stated that sometimes Ashok Kumar, the accused used to take the  

deceased to her father’s house.  She admitted that two days prior to  

writing of the letter (Ex. DJ), her sister and sister’s son had come to  

her  house and  she stated  that  whatever  is  written  in  the  letter  is  

correct.  But, in her cross-examination, she stated as under:

“Whenever  my  sister  visited  our  home after  marriage,  she  would  complain  that  her  

28

husband  and  in-laws  demanded  dowry  and  also they used to give her beating.  She came  to our home 20 days prior to her death.  At  that time she told that her in-laws etc.  were  demanded a T.V. and Rs.5,000/-.  My father  took her  to her husband’s home.  My sister  was not suffering from my disease.  She was  having good health.”

27.     The  above  statement  of  this  witness  (DW-3)  in  cross-

examination, in fact, is clinching evidence and the accused can hardly  

get  out  of  this  statement.   The  defence  would  be  bound  by  the  

statement of the witness, who has been produced by the accused,  

whatever be its worth.  In the present case, DW-3 has clearly stated  

that there was cruelty and harassment inflicted upon the deceased by  

her  husband and in-laws and also that  a  sum of  Rs.  5,000/-  was  

demanded.   The  statement  of  this  witness  has  to  be  read  in  

conjunction with the statement of PW-1 to PW-3 to establish the case  

of the prosecution.  There are certain variations or improvements in  

the statements of PWs but all of them are of minor nature.  Even if,  

for the sake of argument, they are taken to be as some contradictions  

or variations in substance, they are so insignificant and mild that they  

would no way be fatal to the case of the prosecution.   

29

28.      This Court has to keep in mind the fact that the incident had  

occurred  on  16.05.1988  while  the  witnesses  were  examined  after  

some time.  Thus, it may not be possible for the witnesses to make  

statements  which  would  be  absolute  reproduction  of  their  earlier  

statement or line to line or minute to minute correct reproduction of  

the occurrence/events.   The Court has to adopt a reasonable and  

practicable  approach  and  it  is  only  the  material  or  serious  

contradictions/variations  which  can  be  of  some  consequence  to  

create a dent in the case of the prosecution.  Another aspect is that  

the statements of the witnesses have to be read in their entirety to  

examine  their  truthfulness  and  the  veracity  or  otherwise.   It  will  

neither be just nor fair to pick up just a line from the entire statement  

and appreciate that evidence out of context and without reference to  

the preceding lines and lines appearing after that particular sentence.  

It  is  always  better  and in  the interest  of  both  the  parties  that  the  

statements of the witnesses are appreciated and dealt  with by the  

Court upon their cumulative reading.   

29.     As already noticed, the expression ‘soon before her death’ has  

to  be  accorded  its  appropriate  meaning  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances of a given case.  In the present case, there is definite  

30

evidence  to  show  that  nearly  20-22  days  prior  to  her  death  the  

deceased had come to her parental home and informed her father  

about  the  demand of  Rs.  5,000/-  and harassment  and torture   to  

which she was subjected to by the accused and her in-laws.  Her  

father had consoled her ensuring that he would try to arrange for the  

same and thereafter took her at her matrimonial home 7-8 days prior  

to the incident.  

30.     On face of the aforesaid evidence read in conjunction with the  

statement  of  DW-3,  we are  convinced  that  ingredients  of  Section  

304B have been satisfied in the present case.  It was for the accused  

to prove his defence.  He had taken up the stand that the deceased  

was in love with another boy and did not want to marry the accused  

and the marriage of the deceased with the accused being against her  

wishes was the real cause for her to commit the suicide.  However,  

he has led no evidence in this  regard and thus,  the Court  cannot  

believe this version put forward by the accused.

31.     The argument raised on behalf of the appellant that there was  

inordinate and unexplained delay in registering the FIR is without any  

31

substance.   The  incident  occurred  at  4.00  p.m.  on  16.05.1988  

whereafter the family of the deceased was informed.  It is a normal  

conduct of a normal person that the entire concentration would be  

upon looking after and saving the deceased rather than to run up to  

the police or other persons instantaneously.  Unfortunately, she died  

at 9.00 p.m. on the same day and the FIR was lodged on the next  

day i.e. on 17.05.1988.  The purpose of raising such a contention is  

to show and prove that there was a planned effort on the part of the  

complainant  or  the  prosecution  to  falsely  implicate  the  accused.  

Here, such a situation does not exist.  We have already noticed that  

the complaint (Ex.PA) has been lodged resulting in registration of FIR  

(Ex. PU) at 7.30 p.m. on 17.05.1988 which obviously means that the  

complainant had reached the police station even prior thereto.  The  

conduct  of  the  complainant  and  the  witnesses  is  in  line  with  the  

behaviour  of  a  person  of  common  prudence  and  the  facts  and  

circumstances of the case clearly demonstrate proper exercise of due  

diligence on the part  of  these witnesses.   Firstly,  the complainant  

family got the information of the death of the deceased from a relative  

named Subhash Chand (PW-3) and, thereafter, they must have tried  

to  get  the  body subjected  to  the  postmortem and have the  same  

32

released  for  performing  the  last  rites.   The  incident  occurred  on  

16.05.1988  and  the  FIR  was  registered  on  17.05.1988,  therefore,  

there was no abnormal or inordinate delay in lodging the FIR in the  

facts of this case.  Even if we presume the delay, it is not of such a  

nature that  would entail  any benefit  to the accused.   Thus, in our  

view, there is no inordinate or unexplained delay in lodging the FIR.  

32.     Having found no infirmity in the concurrent judgments of the  

learned Sessions Judge and the High Court,  we see no reason to  

interfere in these judgments in law or on facts.  Thus, we sustain the  

conviction of the accused.   

33.    Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, there are  

few factors of which we must take note of.  It is not even the case of  

the prosecution that at the time of occurrence, the accused-appellant  

was present at home and he failed to protect or save the deceased  

from burning which caused her death.  Secondly, the marriage itself  

has survived for a short period of nearly one and a half year.   The  

cruelty and harassment to the deceased was stated to be caused by  

Lajwanti, the mother in law of the deceased and Mukesh, the brother  

in law of the deceased.  As already noticed, Lajwanti and Mukesh  

33

have been acquitted  by the  High Court  for  total  lack of  evidence.  

Neither  the  State  nor  the  complainant  has  preferred  an  appeal  

against judgment of acquittal.  The accused is a young person of 48  

years.  Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and  

in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to  

do  complete  justice,  we  are  of  the  considered  view that  ends  of  

justice  would  be  met  by  awarding  him  the  minimum  sentence  

provided in law, i.e. 7 years of rigorous imprisonment.  Resultantly,  

the appeal is partially accepted and the accused-appellant is awarded  

sentence  of  7  years  rigorous  imprisonment  for  an  offence  under  

Section 304-B of the Code.   

34.    The appeal is disposed off in the above terms.

35. The  accused  is  on  bail.   His  bail  bonds  and  surety  stand  

discharged.   He be taken into  custody to  undergo the  remaining  

period of his sentence.

….…..................................J.  [ DR. B.S. CHAUHAN ]

34

………................................J.                  [ SWATANTER KUMAR]

New Delhi  July 8, 2010

35