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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  324 of 2007

PETITIONER: Ashok Kumar & Ors

RESPONDENT: State of Haryana & Anr

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/01/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 233-234 of 2005]

S.B. SINHA,  J:  

       Leave granted.

       Appellants herein are owners of lands appurtenant to Khasra Nos.  3829, 3830 and 3831.  They acquired the said lands in 1993 and allegedly  raised certain construction thereupon.   A notification under Section 4(1) of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ’the Act’) was issued on  20.12.1996 for acquisition of the said lands.  A suit was filed by the  appellants herein in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panipat,  questioning the validity of the said notification, inter alia, on the premise  that the said proceeding was illegal and in any event the constructions raised  by them cannot be demolished in view of a policy decision taken by the  State.   On an application for grant of injunction filed by the appellants, an  order of  interim injunction was passed  on 30.08.1997 in the following  terms :

"\005For written statement, no reply to injunction  application and arguments on the same, to come up on  23.9.1997.  In the meantime, the defendants are  restrained from demolishing the construction and  initiating further action on the memo in dispute as  according to the Jamabandi disputed property is in the  shape of Gair Mumkin Plots and it is arguable point as to  whether the provisions of Punjab Scheduled Roads Act  are applicable to the Gair Mumkin plots or not."

       Indisputably, the said interim order was extended from time to time,   as would be noticed hereinafter.  By an order dated 24.09.1997 while  adjourning the suit to 29.11.1997, the order of stay dated 30.08.1997 was  extended.  On 29.11.1997, the following order was passed :

"\005The case is adjourned to 09.01.1998 for filing of  written statement and reply to the injunction application.   Till then stay order dated 30.8.98 is extended."

                                                       [Emphasis supplied]

       Yet again by an order dated 09.01.1998, the stay order was extended  till 23.03.1998.  Similar order was passed on 23.03.1998.  The matter was,  however,  placed on 28.07.1998 on the ground that the Presiding Officer was  to remain on leave on 29.07.1998.  The matter was adjourned to 09.09.1998.   However, the order of injunction was not extended.

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       After some adjournments, the suit was dismissed for default on  19.08.2000.                    A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 29.11.2000.   

       A writ petition was filed questioning the legality and/or validity of the  said direction before the Punjab & Haryana High Court, which was  registered as C.W.P. No. 11329 of 2002.  By reason of the impugned  judgment the said writ petition has been dismissed by a Division Bench of  the High Court, inter alia, opining :  

"\005The position, as explained in the written statement,  appears to be correct.  Simply because, while adjourning  the case the Presiding Officer was not holding the Court,  a day earlier to the date fixed, where orders with regard  to stay are silent, would not mean that stay was vacated.   In any case, case remained pending after the adjourned  date, as mentioned above, as well and it is the positive  case of respondents that stay was operative till such time  suit was dismissed in default on 19.8.2000.  Even  otherwise, we are of the firm view that if once stay is  granted and same is not specifically vacated and the case  is simply adjourned, it cannot be interpreted to mean that  stay was operative only upto a date when case was  adjourned without passing any order with regard to  extension or otherwise of stay.  The petitioners, it  appears, have intentionally withheld the orders passed  after the case was adjourned to 9.9.1998\005"                  A review application filed there against was also dismissed.

       Submission of Mr. M.N. Krishnamani, learned Senior Counsel  appearing on behalf of the appellants, is that having regard to the fact that  the order of injunction was operative only for the period between 24.09.1997  and 09.09.1998, the High Court went wrong in dismissing the writ petition  filed by the appellants herein inasmuch as the declaration made under  Section 6 of the Act on 29.11.2000 was clearly beyond the period of one  year from the date of issuance of notification issued under sub-section (1) of  Section 4 of the Act, as enshrine d under Section 6 thereof.

       Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned Senior Counsel appearing on  behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that having  regard to the nature of the order of injunction passed on 30.08.1997, it must  be held to have remained operative till 19.08.2000 when the suit was  dismissed for default.                   The short question which arises for consideration in this appeal is as  to whether the order of ad interim injunction granted by the learned Civil  Judge, Senior Division, Panipat, was operative till 09.09.1998 or  19.08.2000.  We have noticed hereinbefore the nature of the orders passed  by the learned Civil Judge.  Although in its order dated 30.08.1997, the  learned Civil Judge, used the term "In the meantime", which was repeated in  its order dated 24.09.1997, but in the subsequent orders beginning from  29.11.1997, the expression used was "till then".

       The term of the order of the learned Judge, in our opinion, does not  leave any manner of doubt whatsoever that the interim order was only  extended from time to time.  The interim order having been extended till a  particular date, the contention raised by the respondents herein that they  were under a bona fide belief that the injunction order would continue till it  was vacated cannot be accepted.

       In our considered opinion, the purport of the order passed by the  learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panipat, in extending the order of  injunction is absolutely clear and explicit.  It may be true that the date was

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preponed to 28.07.1998,  but from a bare perusal of the order passed by the  learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, it is evident that the order of injunction  was not extended.   Even on the subsequent dates, the order of injunction  was not extended.  In fact, no order extending the period was passed nor any  fresh order of injunction was passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior  Division, subsequent thereto.   

       Proviso (ii) appended to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act clearly  debars making of any declaration in respect of any particular land covered  by a notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 4 after the expiry of  one year from the date of publication thereof.   Explanation (1) appended to  the said proviso, however, stipulates that in computing any of the periods  referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or  proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section,  4(1), is stayed by an order of a Court,  shall be excluded.   On a plain reading  of the aforementioned provisions, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that  the period which is required to be excluded would be one,  during which the  action or proceeding taken was subjected to any order of stay passed by a  competent court of law.

       Provisions of the Act should be construed having regard to the purport  and intent thereof.  Section 6 of the Act is beneficent to the land owners.

       In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai  and Others [(2005) 7 SCC 622], it was held :   

       "The Act is an expropriatory legislation.  This Court  in State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma observed that in  such a case the provisions of the statute should be strictly  construed as it deprives a person of his land without  consent. [See also Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan and  CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd."  

       We have noticed hereinbefore that the proviso appended to sub- section (1) of Section 6 is in the negative term.  It is, therefore, mandatory in  nature.  Any declaration made after the expiry of one year from the date of  the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 would  be void and of no effect.  An enabling provision has been made  by reason of  the explanation appended thereto, but the same was done only for the  purpose of extending the period of limitation and not for any other purpose.   The purport and object of the provisions of the Act and in particular the  proviso which had been inserted by act 68 of 1984 and which came into  force w.e.f. 24.09.1984 must be given its full effect.  The said provision was  inserted for the benefit of the owners of land.  Such a statutory benefit, thus,  cannot be taken away by a purported construction of an order of a court  which, in our opinion, is absolutely clear and explicit.

       There is no warrant for the proposition, as was stated by the High  Court that unless an order of stay passed once even for the limited period is  vacated by an express order or otherwise; the same would continue to  operate.

       We, therefore, are of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court  cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly.  The appeal is allowed.   In the facts and circumstances, there shall,  however,  be no order as to costs.