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CASE NO.: Writ Petition (crl.)  199 of 2003

PETITIONER: Ashok Kumar Pandey

RESPONDENT: The State of West Bengal

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/11/2003

BENCH: DORAISWAMY RAJU & ARIJIT PASAYAT.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

       This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India,  1950 (in short ’the Constitution’) has been filed purportedly in  public interest.  The prayer in the writ petition is to the effect  that the death sentence imposed on one Dhananjay Chatterjee @  Dhana (hereinafter referred to as ’the accused’) by the Sessions  Court, Alipur, West Bengal, affirmed by the Calcutta High Court  and this Court, needs to be converted to a life sentence because  there has been no execution of the death sentence for a long time.   Reliance was placed on a Constitution Bench decision of this Court  in Smt. Triveniben vs. State of Gujarat, (1989 (1) SCC 678).

       According to the petitioner, he saw a news item in a TV  channel wherein it was shown that the authorities were unaware  about the non-execution of the death sentence and, therefore,  condemned prisoner, the accused has suffered a great degree of  mental torture and that itself is a ground for conversion of his  death sentence to a life sentence on the basis of ratio in  Triveniben’s case (supra). It needs to be noted here that prayer  for conversion of death sentence to life sentence has already been  turned down by the Governor of West Bengal and the President of  India in February 1994 and June 1994 respectively as stated in the  petition. When the matter was placed for admission, we asked the  petitioner who appeared in-person as to what was his locus standi  and how a petition under Article 32 is maintainable on such nature  of information by which he claims to have come to know of it. His  answer was that as a public spirited citizen of the country, he  has a locus to present the petition and when the matter involved  life and liberty of a citizen, this Court should not stand on  technicalities and should give effect to the ratio in Triveniben’s  case (supra).  There has been violation of Article 21 of the  Constitution and the prolonged delay in execution of sentence is  violative of Article 21, so far as the accused is concerned.

       Reliance was also placed on few decisions, for example,  Sunil Batra (II) vs. Delhi Administration, (1980 (3) SCC 488);  S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, (1981 (Supp.) SCC 87); Daya Singh  vs. Union of India, (1991 (3) SCC 61) and Janata Dal vs. H.S.  Choudhary, (1992 (4) SCC 305) to substantiate the plea that the  petitioner had locus standi to present the petition in public  interest and this was a genuine public interest litigation.

       When there is material to show that a petition styled as a  public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster  personal disputes, said petition is to be thrown out.  Before we

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grapple with the issue involved in the present case, we feel it  necessary to consider the issue regarding public interest aspect.   Public Interest Litigation which has now come to occupy an  important field in the administration of law should not be  "publicity interest litigation" or "private interest  litigation" or "politics interest litigation" or the latest  trend "paise income litigation". If not properly regulated and  abuse averted it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to  release vendetta and wreck vengeance, as well. There must be real  and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not  merely an adventure of knight errant or poke ones into for a  probe. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons  to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their  personal grudge and enmity.  Courts of justice should not be  allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to  the extraordinary jurisdiction.  A person acting bona fide and  having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest  litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the  Court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine  infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or  private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration.  These aspects were highlighted by this Court in The Janta Dal case  (supra) and Kazi Lhendup Dorji vs. Central Bureau of  Investigation, (1994 Supp (2) SCC 116). A writ petitioner who  comes to the Court for relief in public interest must come not  only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with  a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective.  See Ramjas  Foundation vs. Union of India, (AIR 1993 SC 852) and K.R. Srinivas  vs. R.M. Premchand, (1994 (6) SCC 620).

       It is necessary to take note of the meaning of expression  ’public interest litigation’.  In Strouds Judicial Dictionary,  Volume 4 (IV Edition), ’Public Interest’ is defined thus:

"Public Interest (1) a matter of public or general  interest does not mean that which is interesting as  gratifying curiosity or a love of information or  amusement but that in which a class of the  community have a pecuniary interest, or some  interest by which their legal rights or liabilities  are affected."

       In Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), "public  interest" is defined as follows :

"Public Interest something in which the public, or  some interest by which their legal rights or  liabilities are affected.  It does not mean  anything the particular localities, which may be  affected by the matters in question.  Interest  shared by national government...."

       In Janata Dal case (supra) this Court considered the scope  of public interest litigation.  In para 52 of the said judgment,  after considering what is public interest, has laid down as  follows :

"The expression ’litigation’ means a legal action  including all proceedings therein initiated in a  Court of law for the enforcement of right or  seeking a remedy.  Therefore, lexically the  expression "PIL" means the legal action initiated  in a Court of law for the enforcement of public  interest or general interest in which the public or  a class of the community have pecuniary interest or

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some interest by which their legal rights or  liabilities are affected."

       In paras 60, 61 and 62 of the said judgment, it was pointed  out as follows:

"Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasis that  the requirement of locus standi of a party to a  litigation is mandatory, because the legal capacity  of the party to any litigation whether in private  or public action in relation to any specific remedy  sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the  threshold."

       In para 96 of the said judgment, it has further been pointed  out as follows:

"While this Court has laid down a chain of notable  decisions with all emphasis at their command about  the importance and significance of this newly  developed doctrine of PIL, it has also hastened to  sound a red alert and a note of severe warning that  Courts should not allow its process to be abused by  a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper or  wayfarer or officious intervener without any  interest or concern except for personal gain or  private profit or other oblique consideration."

       In subsequent paras of the said judgment, it was observed as  follows:

"It is thus clear that only a person acting bona  fide and having sufficient interest in the  proceeding of PIL will alone have as locus standi  and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of  the poor and needy, suffering from violation of  their fundamental rights, but not a person for  personal gain or private profit or political motive  or any oblique consideration.  Similarly a  vexatious petition under the colour of PIL, brought  before the Court for vindicating any personal  grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold".

       It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery  proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are  wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the  disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no  efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL  and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant,  the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed  and violated and whose grievance go unnoticed, un-represented and  unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while  genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil  matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees  and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing  gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life  imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons  suffering from undue delay in service matters - government or  private, persons awaiting the disposal of cases wherein huge  amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax  amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the  detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine  queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and  having their grievances redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome  interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely

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no public interest except for personal gain or private profit  either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other  extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue  muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public interest  litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and  frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of  the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the  doors of the court never moves, which piquant situation creates  frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly  they loose faith in the administration of our judicial system.

       Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used  with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be  extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public  interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity  seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in  the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens.   The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not  be used for suspicious products of mischief.  It should be aimed  at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not  publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta.  As indicated  above, Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or  member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and  not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or  other oblique consideration.  The Court must not allow its process  to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested  interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process  either by force of habit or from improper motives.  Often they are  actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity.  The  petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by  rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with  exemplary costs.

       The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford  Foundation in USA defined the "public interest litigation" in its  report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows:

"Public Interest Law is the name that has recently  been given to efforts provide legal representation  to previously unrepresented groups and interests.   Such efforts have been undertaken in the  recognition that ordinary market place for legal  services fails to provide such services to  significant segments of the population and to  significant interests.  Such groups and interests  include the proper environmentalists, consumers,  racial and ethnic minorities and others."

       The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of  the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of  information given by him; (c) the information being not vague and  indefinite.  The information should show gravity and seriousness  involved.  Court has to strike balance between two conflicting  interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and  reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii)  avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions  seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive  actions.  In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be  liberal.  It has to be extremely careful to see that under the  guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon  the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the  Legislature.  The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with  imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating  as public-spirited holy men.  They masquerade as crusaders of  justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico,

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though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to  protect.

       Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and  prevent law from crafty invasions.  Courts must maintain the  social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of  justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social  interest and public good.  (See State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu,  (1994 (2) SCC 481), and Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation  vs. M/s GAR Re-Rolling Mills and Anr., (AIR 1994 SC 2151).  No  litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and  public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as  he wishes.  Easy access to justice should not be misused as a  licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions.  (See  Dr.  B.K. Subbarao vs. Mr. K. Parasaran, (1996) 7 JT 265). Today people  rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive  name of public interest.  They must inspire confidence in Courts  and among the public.

       As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions,  which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence  something else. It is shocking to note that Courts are flooded  with large number of so called public interest litigations where  even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public  interest litigations.  Though the parameters of public interest  litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of  cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, Courts  are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time  which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of  genuine cases. Though in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra  Kumar Mishra and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 114), this Court held that in  service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so- called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the  Courts and strangely are entertained.  The least the High Courts  could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision.  The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official  documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the  petitioner came to possess them.  In one case, it was noticed that  an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was  stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of  curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the  official documents.  Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to  explain possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss  the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be  desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and  dismiss them with costs as afore-stated so that the message goes  in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do  not have the approval of the Courts.

       Coming to the facts of the case, it has not been shown as to  how and in what manner the accused, condemned prisoner is  handicapped in not seeking relief if any as available in law. The  matter pertains to something to happen or not at Kolkatta and what  was the truth about the news or cause for the delay, even if it be  is not known or ascertained or even attempted to be ascertained by  the petitioner before approaching this Court.  To a pointed query,  the petitioner submitted that the petitioner "may not be aware"  of his rights, that except the news he heard he could not say any  further and "the respondent-State may come and clarify the  position. This petition cannot be entertained on such speculative  foundations and premises and to make a roving enquiry. May be at  times even on certain unconfirmed news but depending upon the  gravity or heinous nature of the crime alleged to be perpetrated  which would prove to be obnoxious to the avowed public policy,  morals and greater societal interests involved, Courts have

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ventured to intervene but we are not satisfied that this could be  one such case, on the facts disclosed. It is reliably learnt that  a petition with almost identical prayers was filed before the  Calcutta High Court by relatives of the accused and the same has  been recently dismissed by the High Court.           In Gupta’s case (supra) it was emphatically pointed out that  the relaxation of the rule of locus standi in the field of PIL  does not give any right to a busybody or meddlesome interloper to  approach the Court under the guise of a public interest litigant.   He has also left the following note of caution: (SCC p.219, para  24)

"But we must be careful to see that the member of  the public, who approaches the court in cases of  this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal  gain or private profit or political motivation or  other oblique consideration.  The court must not  allow its process to be abused by politicians and  others to delay legitimate administrative action or  to gain a political objective."

       In State of H.P. vs. A Parent of a Student of Medical  College, Simla and Ors. (1985 (3) SCC 169), it has been said that  public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with  great care and circumspection.

       Khalid, J. in his separate supplementing judgment in  Sachidanand Pandey vs. State of W.B., (1987 (2) SCC 295, 331)  said:

"Today public spirited litigants rush to courts to  file cases in profusion under this attractive name.   They must inspire confidence in courts and among  the public.  They must be above suspicion. (SCC p.  331, para 46)

*                 *             *

       Public interest litigation has now come to  stay.  But one is led to think that it poses a  threat to courts and public alike.  Such cases are  now filed without any rhyme or reason.  It is,  therefore, necessary to lay down clear guidelines  and to outline the correct parameters for  entertainment of such petitions.  If courts do not  restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of  public interest litigations, the traditional  litigation will suffer and the courts of law,  instead of dispensing justice, will have to take  upon themselves administrative and executive  functions. (SCC p.334, para 59)

*                 *             *

       I will be second to none in extending help when  such help is required.  But this does not mean that  the doors of this Court are always open for anyone  to walk in.  It is necessary to have some self- imposed restraint on public interest litigants."  (SCC p.335, para 61)

       Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) speaking for the  Bench in Ramsharan Autyanuprasi vs. Union of India, (1989 Supp (1)  SCC 251), was in full agreement with the view expressed by Khalid,

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J. in Sachidanand Pandey’s case (supra) and added that ’public  interest litigation’ is an instrument of the administration of  justice to be used properly in proper cases.

       See also separate judgment by Pathak, J. (as he then was) in  Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India, (1984 (3) SCC 161).

       Sarkaria, J. in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar,  Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors. (1976 (1) SCC 671) expressed his view  that the application of the busybody should be rejected at the  threshold in the following terms: (SCC p. 683, para 37)

"It will be seen that in the context of locus  standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an  applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these  categories : (i) ’person aggrieved’; (ii)  ’stranger’; (iii) busybody or meddlesome  interloper.  Persons in the last category are  easily distinguishable from those coming under the  first two categories.  Such persons interfere in  things which do not concern them.  They masquerade  as crusaders for justice.  They pretend to act in  the name of pro bono publico, though they have no  interest of the public or even of their own to  protect.   They indulge in the pastime of meddling  with the judicial process either by force of habit  or from improper motives.  Often, they are actuated  by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity;  while the ulterior intent of some applicants in  this category, may be no more than spoking the  wheels of administration.  The High Court should do  well to reject the applications of such busybodies  at the threshold."

       Krishna Iyer, J. in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union  (Regd.) Sundri and Ors. v. Union of India, (1981 (1) SCC 568) in  stronger terms stated: (SCC p.589, para 48)

"If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or  officious intervener without any interest or  concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660  million people of this country, the door of the  court will not be ajar for him."

       In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of  U.P., (1990 (4) SCC 449), Sabyasachi Mukharji, C.J. observed: (SCC  p.452, para 8)

"While it is the duty of this Court to enforce  fundamental rights, it is also the duty of this  Court to ensure that this weapon under Article 32  should not be misused or permitted to be misused  creating a bottleneck in the superior court  preventing other genuine violation of fundamental  rights being considered by the court."

       In Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991 (4)  SCC 584, 610), Ranganath Mishra, C.J. in his separate judgment  while concurring with the conclusions of the majority judgment has  said thus: (SCC p.610, para 21)

"I am prepared to assume, nay, concede, that public  activists should also be permitted to espouse the  cause of the poor citizens but there must be a  limit set to such activity and nothing perhaps

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should be done which would affect the dignity of  the Court and bring down the serviceability of the  institution to the people at large.  Those who are  acquainted with jurisprudence and enjoy social  privilege as men educated in law owe an obligation  to the community of educating it properly and  allowing the judicial process to continue  unsoiled."

       In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991 (1) SCC 598) it  was observed as follows:   "Public interest litigation cannot be invoked by a  person or body of persons to satisfy his or its  personal grudge and enmity.  If such petitions  under Article 32, are entertained it would amount  to abuse of process of the court, preventing speedy  remedy to other genuine petitioners from this  Court.  Personal interest cannot be enforced  through the process of this Court under Article 32  of the Constitution in the garb of a public  interest litigation. Public interest litigation  contemplates legal proceeding for vindication or  enforcement of fundamental rights of a group of  persons or community which are not able to enforce  their fundamental rights on account of their  incapacity, poverty or ignorance of law.  A person  invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under  Article 32 must approach this Court for the  vindication of the fundamental rights of affected  persons and not for the purpose of vindication of  his personal grudge or enmity.  It is the duty of  this Court to discourage such petitions and to  ensure that the course of justice is not obstructed  or polluted by unscrupulous litigants by invoking  the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for  personal matters under the garb of the public  interest litigation".

       In the words of Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) "the courts  must be careful in entertaining public interest litigations" or  in the words of Sarkaria, J. "the applications of the busybodies  should be rejected at the threshold itself" and as Krishna Iyer,  J. has pointed out, "the doors of the courts should not be ajar  for such vexatious litigants".

It will be appropriate at this stage to take note of what  this Court felt when dealing with petitions under Article 32 with  somewhat similar issues. The petitioner in one case filed writ  petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the  order of this Court whereby it had affirmed the conviction of two  accused and confirmed the death sentence for reasons stated in its  judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdeo Singh (AIR 1992 SC  2100).

       The writ petition was dismissed holding that third party has  no locus standi to challenge the conviction by filing the writ  petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. (See Simranjit  Singh Mann v. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC 280)

       The petitioner there claimed to be a friend of the convicts,  and it was held that he has no locus standi to move the Court  under Article 32 of the Constitution. Unless the aggrieved party  is a minor or an insane or one who is suffering from any other  disability which the law recognizes as sufficient to permit

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another person e.g., next friend, to move the Court on his behalf;  for example, see Sections 320(4-a), 330(2) read with Sections  335(1)(b) and 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in  short the ’Code’). Ordinarily the aggrieved party has the right to  seek redress. Admittedly, it was not the case of the petitioner  that the two convicts are minors or insane persons but had argued  that since they were suffering from an acute obsession such  obsession amounts to a legal disability which permits the next  friend to initiate proceedings under Article 32 of the  Constitution.  

       A mere obsession based on religious belief or any other  personal philosophy cannot be regarded as a legal disability of  the type recognized by the Code or any other law which would  permit initiation of proceedings by a third party, be he a friend.  It must be remembered that the repercussions of permitting such a  third party to challenge the findings of the Court can be serious,  e.g., in the instant case, itself the co-accused who have been  acquitted by the Designated Court and whose acquittal has been  confirmed by this Court would run the risk of a fresh trial and a  possible conviction.  

Similar view was expressed in Karamjeet Singh v. Union of  India (AIR 1993 SC 284).

It was noted that Article 32 which finds a place in Part III  of the Constitution entitled "fundamental rights" provides that  right to move this Court for the enforcement of the rights  conferred in that part is guaranteed. It empowers this Court to  issue directions or orders or writs for the enforcement of any of  the fundamental rights. The petitioner did not seek to enforce any  of his fundamental rights nor did he complain that any of his  fundamental right was violated. He sought to enforce the  fundamental rights of others, namely, the two condemned convicts  who themselves did not complain of their violation. Ordinarily,  the aggrieved party which is affected by any order has the right  to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or  correctness of the order, unless such party is a minor, an insane  person or is suffering from any other disability which the law  recognizes as sufficient to permit another person, e.g. next  friend, to move the court on his behalf.  

       Unless an aggrieved party is under some disability  recognized by law, it would be unsafe and hazardous to allow any  third party be a member of the Bar to question the decision  against third parties.  

Neither under the provisions of the Code nor under any other  statute is a third party stranger permitted to question the  correctness of the conviction and sentence.      

       Based on the above backgrounds, we do not think this a fit  case which can be entertained and that too, under Article 32 of  the Constitution and is accordingly dismissed, but without costs.