http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 38  

PETITIONER: ASHOK KUMAR GUPTA , VIDYA SAGAR GUPTA & ORS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       21/03/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD, G.B. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             AND              WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 511 OF 1995                       J U D G M E N T K. Ramaswamy, J.      Leave granted.      This appeal  by special  leave arise  from the judgment dated 4th  August, 1983 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, In  Writ petition No. 3088 of 1993. The Writ petition also arises  from the  same facts  but is filed by different set of  officers challenging  the promotion of respondents 2 to 10  (in the  writ petition)  the 2nd  respondent (in  the civil  appeal)  to  the  post  of  Superintending  Engineers (Civil), Chief  Engineer Level-II  (Civil,  Chief  Engineer, Level-I and  Engineer-in-Chief in Public Works Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. The petitioners seek a writ of mandamus  to restrain the first respondent from Nos. 2 to 10. They  also seek  writ of  certiorari to quash the orders dated March  12, 1981  appointing the  second respondent  as Superintending Engineer  on ad hoc basis an on regular basis w.e.f. April  10, 1991  as temporary Chief Engineer by order dated November  7, 1994 and orders promoting Harbans Lal and others as Superintending Engineers.      The Governor  exercising the  power  under  proviso  to Article 309  of the  Constitution  made  the  Uttar  Pradesh Service of  Engineers  (Public  works  Department)  (Higher) Rules, 1990  effective from October 15, 1990 (for short, the ’Rules’). They  came into force at once by operation of Rule 1(2). The  services comprised  thereunder are  grouped as  a Group ’A’ posts, consisting of various posts. Under sub-rule (1) of  Rule 4  which speaks  of "Cadre of the Service", the strength of  the service  and of  each category of the posts shall be  such as  may be  determined by the Government from time to  time. Sub-Rule  (2) gives  power to  determine  the strength of service and of each category of posts until they are ordered  to be  varied. The  posts of Executive Engineer (Civil), Executive  Engineer  (Electrical  and  Mechanical), Superintending  Engineer  (Civil),  Superintending  Engineer (Electrical  and   mechanical),  Chief   Engineer   Level-II (Civil),   Chief    Engineer   Level-II    (Electrical   and Mechanical), Chief  Engineer Level-I  (Civil), and Engineer-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 38  

Chief have  been specified  under tow  categories, viz., the permanent and temporary cadre and strength in the respective cadres has  been enumerated.  In part  III, Rule  5 provides method  of   recruitment  by   way  of  promotion  from  the substantive post  of Assistant  Engineers  to  the  post  of Executive  Engineers   and  recruitment  by  promotion  from amongst substantive  post of Executive Engineers to the post of  Superintending   Engineers;  from   the   Executive   to Superintending Engineer  Level -  II and from Chief Engineer Level  -   II  to  Engineer-in-Chief  respectively.  Rule  6 prescribes  reservation  for  the  candidates  belonging  to Scheduled Casts  (for Short,  ’Dalits") and Scheduled Tribes (for   Short, , ’Tribes’) and other categories in accordance with the  orders of  the Government  in force at the time of the recruitment.  The qualifying  service in the lower cadre for promotion  to  higher  cadre  is  also  prescribed.  The procedure for  determination of the vacancies to be reserved under Rule  6 for  Dalits, Tribes  and other  categories has been provided in Rule 7.      Rule 8   adumbrates  that t  recruitment to the post of Executive Engineer  (Civil) shall  be made  on the  basis of seniority subject  to rejection  of unfit and to the post of Superintending Engineer and above shall be made on the basis of merit thorough a Selection Committee to be constituted of officials specified  thereunder. Recruitment  to the post of Chief Engineer Level - II is by the process of screening and selection.  The  details  thereof  ar  not  material,  hence omitted. Rule  9 empowers  the  Government  to  appoint  the selected candidates  in the order of seniority. If more than one persons  are recruited  in one  selection by a committee appointed in  their behalf,  a combined order indicating the names of  persons has to be issued in the seniority order as it stood  in the  earlier  cadre.  The  procedure  has  been prescribed in  Rule 10 for declaration of the probation etc. Rule 11  empowers the Government to confirm the appointee at the end  of the probation of the extended probation. Rule 12 prescribes procedure  for determination  of  seniority.  The other details  are not  material, hence are omitted. Rule 18 is saving provision which provides that nothing in this rule shall effect  reservations and other concessions required to be provided  for Dalits, Tribes and other special categories of persons  in accordance  with the orders of the Government issued from time to time in that regard.      By proceedings  dated March 8, 1973, the Government had provided percentage  in reservation  for Dalits and Tribes @ 18% and  2% respectively  in all  services or  posts  to  be filled in  by promotion  through process of selection either by direct  recruitment  or  by  competitive  examination  or limited department  or by competitive examination or limited departmental examination  . The  said  percentage  has  been increased by  21% for  Dalits and retained 2% for the Tribes under the  U.P. Service  (reservation for  Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes  and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994 (for short, the  U.P. Act’) that came into force with effect from December 11,  1993. It  has  provided  for  the  first  time reservation @  27% to the Other Backward Classes, 1973 Rules provided that  if sufficient  number of  suitable candidates belonging to  Dalits and  Tribes were  not available against reserved vacancies  at the  time of  selection  and  if  the vacancies were  required to  be  filled  up  in  the  public interest, general  category employees  could be appointed on ad hoc  basis. It  had to be so mentioned in their orders of appointment that  the provision/appointments were ad hoc and conferred no  rights and that the vacancies would be carried forward to  the following  year. Carried  forward  vacancies

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 38  

would be  carried forward  to the  following   year. Carried forward vacancies  could not exceed 45% of the total of such vacancies etc.  Under Rule  3 of 1973 Rules, for suitability purpose, Dalits  and Tribes  were treated  to be same as the general candidates,  i.e., the  standard of  suitability was same for  all the  candidates. The  Dalits  and  Tribes  who fulfilled the  minimum required  standard of  merit would be selected upto  to the  limit of  reservation. Under  Rule 4, when  Dalits  and  Tribes  were  promoted  substantively  or temporarily to  the above  reserved vacancies  for the first time, their  confirmation would  be done under normal rules. The rule  of the  reservation was  not applicable  again for conformation in their case.      Through  the   Government  Omitted   under  1973  Rules reservation  in   the  posts   pursuant  to  which  required recruitment by  promotion  on  the  principle  of  seniority subject to  rejection of unfit, by the rules issued on March 20, 1974,  the Government  amended  the  same  and  restored recruitment by  promotion to  the posts  on  the  prescribed percentage. The  reservation was  limited to  those services only where  direct recruitment  was not  more than  50%. The promotion thereafter  was to  be done according to rules and regulations  under  those  provisions  of  reservation.  The candidates who  were eligible  and suitable  on the basis of seniority and  were not  found unfit, would be selected upto the reservation  limit. Rule  2 of  1974 Rules  provides for promotion  to   the  posts   where  merit   was   also   the consideration. The  selected  candidates  from  amongst  the Dalits and  Tribes and the general candidates would be shown in separate  eligibility list to each category. The selected candidates were  to be  placed according  to their  inter se seniority of  the original  post. Afterward,  all the  three lists  were  to  be  compiled  according  to  the  inter  se seniority  and  promotion  were  to  be  given  against  the vacancies accordingly  and common  seniority list  was to be maintained. By  orders issued  on December  27, 1974, it was further   clarified   that   "after   reconsideration,   the Government has  withdrawn the restriction, i.e., reservation will  be   limited  to   those  services   on  where  direct recruitment is  not more  than 50%". The above referred G.O. Will be treated to be modified accordingly. thus, the Dalits and Tribes  were to  get reservation  in  promotion  on  all posts/services. By  proceedings dated  July 5,  1984, it was further amplified,  vis-a-vis that  these order  referred to hereinbefore thus:  "The  Government  after  reconsideration feels it  necessary to clarify the process of preparation of separate eligibility lists in this regard".      "Rule 2  of the 1984 order provided      that :      "The total  vacancies for promotion      on the  basis of  seniority subject      to rejection of unfit arises in any      department/office at any time shall      be divided  into general candidates      and SC/ST  candidates on  the basis      candidates on  the basis  of  G.Os.      issued  from   time  to   time  for      reservation in promotions for these      special categories.  Each  category      shall be prepared separately in the      order of  their inter  se seniority      for available  vacancies  for  each      category and  selection  have  been      done from such eligibility list for      each category  and  selection  have

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 38  

    been  done  from  such  eligibility      list for each category on the basis      of seniority  subject to  rejection      of unfit.  A combined list shall be      prepared   after    selection    of      candidates   form   each   category      according   to   their   inter   se      seniority.      For ad  hoc promotion also the above principle was made applicable. In  this legal  backdrop, it would thus, be seen that preceding  1990,  promotions  in  State  Service  where regulated by  above instructions  and from  1990 Rules, they formed statutory  base. The rule of reservation in promotion at all  levels has,  thus, been  provided for the Dalits and Tribes. Under  The U.P. Act it was extended to the OBCs only in direct recruitment.      When respondents  2 to 10 were considered and recruited as promotees from the cadre of Executive Engineer to that of Superintending Engineer  and above  cadres on  the basis  of merit, the  appellants came to challenge their appointments. It was  contended in  the High  Court and  reiterated by the learned counsel,  M/s. Prag P. Tripathi and Anil Kumar Gupta that in Indira Sawhney & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1992 supp. (3)  SCC 217] know as Mandal’s case, eight of the nine judges, per  majority [Ahmadi,j.  as he then was, having not participated  on   this  issue]  held  that  appointment  by promotion under Articles 16(2) and 16(4) of the Constitution is  unconstitutional.  In  particular,  they  placed  strong reliance on  the judgment  of jeevan  Reddy, J. Speaking for three judges)  and Sawant,  J. (for himself) in that behalf. They referred  to question  No. 7  framed by  the Bench  and contended that  the finding  has been  recorded in paras 859 (7) and  860(8) by Jeevan Reddy, J., in paras 242-431(10) by Pandian, j.,  In paras  323-24-D by  Thommen, J.  and Kuldip Singh, J.  In para 381, by Sawant, J. in Para 553-553 and by Sahai,  J.  In  paras  623-625.  On  that  premise,  it  was contended that  the 1996  Rules  are  ultra  vires  and  the promotion of  the respondents  unconstitutional. It  is also contended that having declared the promotions under Articles 16(1) and  16(4) of  the constitution  as  unconstitutional, overruling the  judgment of  a Bench  of five judges of this Court in  the General  Manager, southern Railway. Rangachari [(1962) 2 SCR 586] the same being not correct in law. Jeevan Reddy, J.  with whom  Kania, C.J. and Venkatachaliah, J., as he then  was, had  concurred, and  Pandian, J.  Having  also concurred,    expressly    overruled    prospectively    the applicability  of  the  rule  of  reservation  in  promotion operative for  a period  of five year November 16, 1992 i.e. the dare  of the judgment. The contention of the petitioners is that it is only a minority view. The ratio, therefore, is unconstitutional. Under  Article 145(5) of the Constitution, it does not constitute majority judgment.      Having declared  that the  reservation in  promotion as unconstitutional ,  it is void ab initio under Article 13(3) of  the   Constitution.  It  bears,  thereby,  no  legal  or constitutional existence.  The promotion made to respondents 2 to  10 at  all levels  therefore, is unconstitutional. The operation  of   the  unconstitutional  direction  cannot  be postponed by  prospective overruling  of Rangachari’s ratio. The judgment  of Jeevan  Reddy, J.  concurred by Pandian, J. being minority  judgment, cannot operate prospectively. Even if it  assumed  that  it  is  a  mojority  judgment,  it  is inconsistent with  and contrary to the constitutional scheme of the  Articles 14  and 16 violating the fundamental rights of the  appellants/petitioners  and,  therefore,  the  power

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 38  

under Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be exercised to curtail the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution.      There is  a distinction  between  the  conclusions  and directions. Justice  Pandian and  Justice  Sawant  expressed their concurrence on the conclusions and not with directions given by  Jeevan Reddy,  j. The  direction  for  prospective overruling  of   Rangachari’s  case  and  for  operation  of Mandal’s ratio  after five  years in  only by  a minority of four judge.  It being  inconsistent with and contrary to the scheme of  the Constitution  in exercise  of  the  power  of judicial review,  the Court cannot postpone the operation of the  judgment   to  a  future  date,  which  violates  there fundamental rights.  In support  thereof, they placed strong reliance on  the judgment  in A.R.  Antulay v.  R.S. Nayak & Anr. [(1988) 2 SCC 602, para 15] and Delhi Judicial Services Association, Tis  Hazari V. State of Gujarat & Ors.  [(1991) 4 SCC  406, para  37[. Having  declared the  reservation  in promotions as  void, the  prospective over-ruling is illegal as it  is no  part of  the doctrine  of  stare  decisis.  In support thereof,  they placed reliance on Woman Rao & Ors V. Union of  India &  Ors. [1981  (2) SCR  1]. Postponement  of operation of  the judgment  amounts to  judicial legislation which is  inconsistent with  the power  of  judicial  review which   empowers   only   to   declare   the   law   to   be unconstitutional and not to make the law.      It is  further contended the exercise of Article 142 to postpone the operation of judgement after five years amounts to perpetration  of void  action and  is  violative  of  the appellants’ fundamental  rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. The order under Article 142, being only a remedial measure to do complete justice, cannot operate as a substantive right. The direction to operate the scheme of  reservation in  promotion    for  five  years  is inconsistent with and in derogation of the substantive right to  equality   guaranteed  under   Articles  14  and  16(1). Therefore,  the   Scheme  is  unconstitutional.  Prospective operation of  Mandal’s case  amounts to judicial legislation and amounts to temporary amendment to the Constitution or an addition in  the from  of proviso to Articles 16(1) or 16(4) of the Constitution.      Shri  Rakesh   Dwivedi,  learned   Additional  Advocate General, contended  that the Micro Lexicon surgery conducted by  the  counsel  for  the  appellants-petitioners  to  make distinction between  conclusions and  directions requires no detailed examination.  The end  result is  that five  out of eight learned  judges, who  opined in  the negative  on  the issued reservation  in promotion direction that reservation, from that  date, will  continue for five years, while giving liberty to   the  appropriate Government  to  make  suitable legislative amendments. In fact, the right to promotion is a facet of  right to  recruitment to  a post or a office under the State.  No express  provision in required in this behalf in Article  16(1) or  16(4) of  the Constitution.  After the judgment in  Mandal’s case,  however, the Constitution (77th Amendment) Act  was enacted by the parliament which was come into force  w.e.f. June  17, 1995  for which date Article 16 (4A) was  brought into  the Constitution.  It provides  that "nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion of any class or  classes of  posts in  the services  under State in favour of  Scheduled Castes  and Scheduled  Tribes which, in favour of  Scheduled Castes  and Scheduled Tribes which , in the opinion  of the  State, are not adequately represented i the services  under the  State". Thereby, the Parliament has

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 38  

re-manifested  its  policy  that  right  to  reservation  in promotion is  a part  of  constitutional  scheme  or  public policy in  order to  accord socio-economic  empowerment  and dignity of  person and  status to the Dalits and Tribes. The right to  reservation in  promotion would  be  available  to Dalits and  Tribes in  any, class  or class,  of post in the state does  not get  adequate  representation  of  Dalits  & Tribes. This  due to the historical evidence that the Dalits and Tribes  are  socially,  educationally  and  economically deprived, denied  and disadvantaged  sections of the society to make their right to equality meaningful. They are equally entitled to  the facilities  and apportunities,   by  way of reservation in  promotions, and  the State  in compliance of the mandate  of the Preamble. Article 14, 21, 38, 46 and 335 of  constitution,  has  provided  them  with  the  right  to equality of  opportunity is  all post of classes of posts in the  services  under  the  State.  Therefore,  the  majority section of  the society  are required  to  reconcile  to  an accept the  equal fundamental  rights of  Dalits and  Tribes guaranteed under Articles 16 and 14 of the Constitution. The right to  reservation in  promotions is  not an  anathema to right to equality enshrined to other general candidates. The competing rights of both should co-exist and consistently be given effect  by balancing the abstract doctrine of equality and the  distributive justice  would filled in the gap. Only upholding  of  affirmative  action  of  State  by  pragmatic interpretation under  rule of  law would enable the State to harmonise competing rights of all  sections of the society.      There  is  no  dichotomy  or  distinction  between  the conclusion and  directions. Paragraph  680(8) should be read with the  conclusion of  Sawant. J. in paragraph 552 and 555 and, therefore,  the opinions  of Kania, CJ. Venkatachaliah, Pandian, Sawant  and Jeevan  Reddy  JJ.,  as  the  issue  of reservation in  promotion constitute majority of five judges under Article  145(5) of  the Constitution. Prospective over over-ruling  is   a  part   of  constitutional  policy.  For application, different  perceptions would  be considered and given effect  while over  -  ruling    the  prior  decision. Rangachari’s ratio  had operated  as constitutional  law for over three  decades and  rights were  settled on  the basis. Therefore. With  a view to enable the appropriate Government to amend  the law  in theat  behalf, the  operation  of  the judgment was  postponed for  five years.  It is, there fore, not judicial  legislation but  a part  of the    declaration granted by  the Court.  In pith and substance, it is a facet of suspending  the operation  of the judgement for the years so  that   the   constitutional   objective   of   providing reservation in  promotion to Dalits and tribes would operate without any hiatus. The decision in R.K. Sabharwal Vs. State of Punjab  [(1995) 2  SCC 745]  by a  Constitution Bench re- affirms that  the decision in Mandal’s case on promotion was by a  majority. Obviously  Sabharwal’s ration had upheld the principle of  reservation in promotions and applied "running account theory"  put forth  by the  State to  give practical content to  equality in  results applying  the roster points earmarked for  the  Dalits  and  Tribes,  apart  from  equal opportunity to  them to  compete with the general candidates for general  posts. The  employees from general sections and Dalits and  Tribes are  integrated in  the roster  system to harmonise the  competing interests.  The Dalits  and  Tribes Selected for  promotion on merit in open competition are bot to  be   treated   as   part   of   reserved   quota.   That contemporaneous understanding  of the operation of law is in accordance with  the law  laid in  para 860(8)  of  Mandal’s case. So, it is a valid direction.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 38  

    The reservation  in promotions  in all  the services or posts under  the State  of Uttar  Pradesh was  in vogue from March 1973.  The legislature of Uttar Pradesh reiterated the need for  continuance of  the reservation not only in direct recruitment but  also its  continuance, as  mentioned in the U.P Act  the U.P.  Act came  into force  w.e.f. December 11, 1993 The judgment in Mandal’s case was delivered on November 16, 1992.  All the  promotions made  prior to that date were held valid  in Mandal’s  case. The impugned judgement of the High  Court  was  rendered  on  August  4,  1993  while  the Constitution (77th Amendment) Act of 1995 came into force on June 17, 1995. The promotions of respondents came to be made between November  17, 1992  and  December  11,  1993,  i.e., within five  years of  the  directions  in  para  860(8)  in Mandal’s  case  and  agreed  to  by  other  learned  judges. Therefore, it  was contended  that   the promotions  to  and appointment of the private respondents is constitutional.      He further  contended that  right to promotion is not a fundamental right  to general  candidates while  it is so in the case  of Dalits  and Tribes. It is subject to rules. The policy  of   the  Government   as  per   the  constitutional objectives is  that the  Dalits and  Tribes should  be given adequate representation in all posts or classes of posts and services under the State. Reservation in promotion is one of the policies  under the Constitution and the statutory share in the governance makes no discrimination nor offend Article 14 as  the rights  of general and reserved employees. are to be mutually  balanced. The  law  is  always  presumed  o  be constitutional until it is declared otherwise. The Rules and the Act  are constitutionally valid. By operation of Article 13(1), pre-constitutional  law, if  declared void,  is  void only from the date of the Constitution, namely, from January 26, 1950  and though the post-constitutional law may be void from its  inception. To  adjust the  competing rights of the general  and   Dalit  and   Tribe  employees,  there  is  no prohibition for  this Court to postpone the operation of the judgment in  Mandal’s case  or to so prospectively over-rule Rangachari’s ratio  as to  be operative  from expiry of five years from  the date  of judgment.  The intention behind the direction appears  to be  that the law in the transition, as per the  constitutional scheme of reservation in promotions, would be  smooth and  operate as a continuous scheme. If the Government makes  no amendment  to the statute, after expiry of five years, the operation of the scheme of reservation in promotion would  come  to  a  stop.  By  constitution  (77th Amendment)  Act,   1995,  the   scheme  of   reservation  in promotions in  continued without  any need  to  bring  about amendment to the statutory rules wince Article 16(4A) itself provided  constitutional   operation   of   reservation   in promotion obviating  the necessity  to amend  all  statutory rules.      The  Prospective  operation  of  law  for  5  years  is consistent  with  the  doctrine  of  stare  decisis  as  the declaratory law  becomes operative  therefore. The  ratio of Antule’s case  has no  application. Therein,  the appellant- Antule was  meted out  with a hostile discrimination denying him the  normal  trial  and  right  of  appeal  and  he  was subjected to  special trial by the High Court, depriving him of the  statutory appeal  violating his fundamental right to equality. Therefore,  this Court had held that the direction given under  Article 142  to constitute  a separate Tribunal presided over  by a  High Court  Judge was inconsistent with the fundamental  right to equality guaranteed by Article 14. From that perspective, it was held therein that the exercise of power  under Article  142 should  be consistent  with the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 38  

constitutional scheme.  In Golaknath  vs.  State  of  Punjab [(1967) 2  SCR 762  at 808],  it was  held that the power of this Court  under Article  142 is very wide and it cannot be controlled by  any statutory  prohibition. In  Union Carbide vs. Union  of India  [(1991) 4 SCC 584 at 634 paragraph 83], this Court held that the competing rights are required to be adjusted by  balancing them.  The Court  in  Mandal’s  case, being conscious  of the consequences and pervasive effect of its declaration  on the policy of reservation in promotions, by the  arm of  the judicial  review, extended  the time  to enable the  executive to suitable amend its law. This Court, therefore, set  the time limit upto which existing law would remain  in  operation,  as  the  selection  procedure  is  a continuous  process  to  fill  up  existing  or  anticipated vacancies each  year. The  gap between  equality in  law and equality in results was bridged by Article 1694A). It is not case of  hostile discrimination  meted out to any section of the citizens  but one  of adjustment balancing the competing rights of  two groups  of the  citizens of  the country. The directions issued,  in exercise  of the  power under Article 142, therefore,  was not  in violation  of  the  fundamental rights of  the employees  belonging to the general category. The  direction  issued  under  Article  142  is,  therefore, neither unconstitutional  nor contrary  to the law. In fact, the direction  is to  prevent injustice  as is  provided  in Article 46  of the Constitution. In M. Venkateswarulu & Ors. vs. Government  of A.P.  & Ors. [(1996) 5 SCC 167], Union of India &  Anr. vs. Madhav s/o Gajanan Chaubal & Anr. [JT 1996 (9) SC  320], G.S.I.C. Karmachari Union & Ors. Gujarat Small Industries Corpn.  & Ors.  [JT  1997  (1)  SC  384]  and  s. Sathvapriva &  Ors. vs.  State of  A.P. &  Ors. [1996] 9 SCC 466, this  Court held that the Constitution (77th Amendment) Act,  1995  has  given  effect  to  the  law  laid  down  in Rangachari’s case  as enshrined  in Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution.      Shri  Raju   Ramchandran,   learned   senior   counsel’ appearing  for   private  respondents,  while  adopting  the arguments  of   Shri  Rakesh   Dwivedi,  argued   that   the prospective   over-ruling    of   Rangachari’   ratio,   the distinction  of   stare  decisis   and  the   constitutional invalidation of a legislative enactment may be kept in view. The ratio  in Rangachari’s  case having  prevailed the field for over  three decades,  majority in  Mandal’s case  opined that the  ratio in  Rangachari’s case would remain operative for a further period of five years. Exercise of the power of judicial review and power under Article 142 are the judicial tools given  to this court to prevent injustice. By judicial craftsmanship, the  directions came to be issued to elongate the constitutional  and  public  policy  of  reservation  in promotion,  until  appropriate  amendments  are  brought  on statute within five years. He cited instances of staying the operation of  the judgement by the High Court, Pending grant of leave  under Article  136. The  decision to  postpone the effect of  Mandal’s case  is a legal policy as a part of the inherent power  preserved in this Court by Article 142. This Court, by prospective operation of a statute or operation of a judgment has no sanctioned any unconstitutional scheme but intended   to postpone  the operation  of the declaration of law to  a future  date. In  sampath Kumar vs. Union of India [(1987) 1  SCC  124],  this  Court,  with  a  view  to  void constitutional crisis  in dispensation  of  service  dispute between public  servants and  the appropriate  Government or instrumentally, by  the administrative Tribunals constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, instead of declaring the Act  ultra  vires.  issued  mandamus  to  make  suitable

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 38  

amendments to  the Tribunals Act so as to be consistent with the  constitutional   scheme.   The   judicial   creativity, therefore,  cannot   be  cribbed   or  crabbed  by  any  set proposition or standard formulation. They are required to be modulated depending  upon the fact situation in a given case on  hand   and  the   consequences  of  the  judgment  under consideration. Rangachari’s  ratio having held the field for three decades,  the conclusions and the directions which are integral part  of part  860(8) of Mandal’s judgment are part of ratio  decidendi and are intended to be operative after a period of  five years  from the date of the judgment unless. By then, suitable amendments are brought out.      Dr.  M.P.  Raju,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the intervener, contended  that the  Dalits and  the Tribes have equal constitutional rights. The Constitutional has provided in their  favor protective  and positive  discrimination  by providing for reservation in promotions are part of equality of opportunity, status, social and economic justice, dignity of person  which were  given effect  to by  the Constitution (77th Amendment)  Act, 1995. Reservation in promotion itself is a  fundamental right to the Dalits and Tribes. They claim equality of  opportunity at  all levels or promotions to the respective cadres/grade/categories  of posts.  The right  to reservation in  promotion is  required to  be balanced  with competing  right  to  equality  of  the  general  employees. Article 16(4A)  gives effect  to  that  balancing  competing right. In St. Stephen College vs. Delhi University [(1992) 1 SCC 558  in para  102], this  Court worked out the competing claims by  a schemes directing minority institutions to fill up  50%  of  admissions  by  the  general  candidates  while ensuring to  the minorities their constitutional right under Article 30(1)  to admit  to students  belonging to  minority community  with  balance  50%  seats.  Such  declaration  is consistent not  only with the scheme of the Constitution but also special  protection of  the rights  of the  minorities. Reservation in  promotions in  Article 16(4A)  also requires same  interpretation.  If  so  viewed,  there  would  be  no violation of  Article 13(2).  The Prospective over-ruling of Rangachari’s ratio  in Mandal’s  case, is constitutional and fulfils competing equality between sections of the society.      Shri Parag  Tripathi, in  reply, contended that Article 145(5) requires that for a judgment to be majority judgment, concurrence of  the majority learned Judges constituting the Bench is necessary. There was no need for four other learned Judges to express their concurrence with Jeevan Reddy, J. as they felt that the reservation in promotion is void from the inception, by operation of Article 13(2). Unless they agreed to the view expressed by Jeevan Reddy, J., it could not be a majority judgment.  The Separate  judgments of  the  learned judges are  self-operative from  the date of the judgment in the absence  their express concurrence for prospective over- ruling of  Rengachari  ratio.  The  prospective  over-ruling evolved under  Article 142 is inconsistent with the ratio in Waman Rao’s  case which  had held  that an  amendment to the Constitution violating the fundamental right, unless the Act receives protective  umbrella of  Schedule IX,  is void from inception. The  ratio in Mandal’s case laid by Jeevan Reddy, J. and  agreed to by other three Judges does not amount to a statutory law  nor it receives any protective umbrella under Schedule IX by is one declared under Article 141. Therefore, Mandal’s ratio  of prospective  over-ruling of  Rangachari’s case is  unconstitutional and  void ab  initio. Article 142, therefore, does not save its voidity; nor can the void order be given effect to or saved by Article 142.      In The  State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. Triloki Nath Khosa

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 38  

& Ors.  [AIR 1974  SC 1], a Constitution Bench had held that the code  of equality and equal opportunity is a charter for equals; equality  of opportunity  is  matters  of  promotion means an equal promotional opportunity for persons who fall, substantially, within  the same  class. A  classification of employees can,  therefore, be made for first identifying and then distinguishing  members of  one  class  from  those  of another.  Classification   on  the   basis  of   educational qualifications made  with a view to achieving administrative efficiency was upheld.      In service  jurisprudence, a  distinction between right and interest  has always  been maintained.  Seniority  is  a facet of  interest. When  the Rules prescribe the methods of selection/recruitment, seniority  is governed by the ranging given and  governed by  such rules as was held by a bench of three judges  in A.K.  Bhatnagar &  Ors. v. Union of India & Ors [(1993)  supp. 1 SCC 730 in paras 14 & 15] another Bench of three  judges had  held that no one has a vested right to promotion or  seniority but  an officer  has an  interest to seniority acquired  by working  out the  rules. In  A.B.S.K. Sangh v.  Union of  India & Ors. [JT (1996) SC 274], a Bench to which tow of us, K. Ramaswamy & G.P. Pattanaik, JJ., were members, following  the above  ratio, held that no one has a "vested right  to promotion  or seniority but an officer has an interest to seniority acquired by working out the rules". It could  be taken  away only  by operation of valid law. In M.D. Shujat  Ali &  Ors. v.  Union of India & Ors. [(1975) 1 SCR 449]  a Constitution  Bench had held that Rule 18 of the Andhra Pradesh  Engineering Service  Rules which  confers  a right of  actual promotion  or a  right to  be considered by promotion is  a rule  prescribing conditions  of service. In Md. Bhakar v. Krishna Reddy [1970 SLR 768], another Bench of three Judges  had held  that any  rule  which  affects  that promotion of  a person  relates to conditions of service. In State of  Mysore v.  G.B. Purohit  [1967 SLR 753] a Bench of two judges  had held  that the  rule  which  merely  affects chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying condition of service.  Chances  of  promotion  are  not  condition  of service.  In   Ramchandra  Shankar   Deodhar  v.   State  of Maharashtra [(1974)  1 SCC  317], a  Constitution Bench  had held that  a  rule  which  merely  affects  the  changes  of promotion does  not amount  to change  in the  conditions of service. In Syed Khalid Rizvi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors [(1993) supp.  3 SCC  575] a Bench of three judges following the above  ratio, with  approval, had  held at page 602 para 31, that  no employee  has a  right to  promotion but he has only the  right to  be considered for promotion according to rules. Chances  of promotion  are not  conditions of service and are defeasible in accordance with the law.      In  the   light  of   this  normal   run   of   service Jurisprudence, the  question emerges  whether the  right  to promotion is  a  fundamental  right  and  the  direction  of prospective operation  of the  decision is  Mandal Judgment, after five years, violates equality enshrined in Articles 14 and  16(1)   and  is   void  under   Article  13(2)  of  the Constitution? Right  to reservation  itself is a fundamental right under  Article 16(1) as was laid in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas  [1976 (2)  SCC 310]  which  was  reiterated  in Mandal’s case.  The permanent bureaucracy in Part XIV of the Constitution is  an integral  scheme of  the Constitution to aid and  assist the political executive in the governance of the country.  Abraham Lincon, one of the greatest Presidents of the  United States  of America,  a noble should, who laid his life in giving right to equality to the Blanks, a living truth  enshrined   in  14th   Amendment,  had   stated  that

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 38  

democracy, is  by the  people, of  the people  and  for  the people. Democracy  governed by  rule  of  law  brings  about change in  the social  order only through rule of law. Every citizen or  group of  people has  right to  a share  in  the governance of the State. The Dalits and Tribes equally being citizens have  a right  to a  share in the governance of the State and  in the permanent democracy service conditions are assured under  Article  309  to  312A  of  the  Constitution subject to  the pleasure  of the President under Article 310 and also  the express  exclusion of its applicability to the specified services  in Articles 33 and 34. The right to seek equality of  opportunity to     a office or a post under the State is  a guaranteed   fundamental  right to  all citizens alike under  Article 16(1),  the specie  of Article  14, the genus. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale [(1983) 3 SCC 387] it was held that public employment opportunity is a national wealth  and all  citizens are  equally entitled  to share it.  In Delhi  Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and  Ors. [(1991)  supp. 1 SCC 600 at 737 para 271] it was  held that  law is  social engineering  to remove the existing imbalance  and to further the progress, serving the needs of  the Socialist  Democratic Bharat Under the rule of law. The  prevailing social  conditions and  actualities  of life are  to be  taken into  account in adjudging whether or not the  impugned legislation  would observe  the purpose of the society.      The historical  evidence of disabilities worked against the  Dalits  and  the  Tribes  received  acknowledgement  in Articles 17  which provides  for abolition  of  practice  of untouchability: Article  15(2) which provides prohibition of access to public places and article 29(2) which provides for prohibition  of   denial  of   admission  into   educational institutions. So  social educational and economic protection is provided  to them  under Article  46 of the Constitution. Article 335  which is  part of  the scheme  of  equality  of opportunity in  governance of the State in chapter XVI, by a special provision,  enjoins the State that the claims of the members of  the Dalits  and the  Tribes shall  be taken into consideration   consistently    with   the   efficiency   of administration in  the making  of the appointment to service and post  in connection  with the  affairs of the Union of a State. In  Comptroller & Auditor General v. K.S. Jagannathan [A.I.R. 1987  SC 537  in para  21 and  23] a  Bench of three judges had  held that Article 335 is to be read with Article 46 which  enjoins that the State shall promotes with special care the  educational and  economic interest  of the  weaker section, in  particular, the Dalits and the Tribes and shall protect them  from  social  injustice,  Article  38  of  the Constitution enjoins  the State  to  secure  and  protect  a social    order  in  which  justice,  social,  economic  and political shall  inform all the institutions of the national life. The State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities  in   income,  and   endeavour   to   eliminate inequalities in  status, "facilities"  and  "opportunities", not only  amongst individuals  but also  amongst  groups  of people residing  different areas  or  engaged  in  different vacations. The Preamble of the Constitution assures to every citizen  justice,   social,  economic  and  political    and "equality of status" and opportunity assuring dignity of the individual to  integrate all  sections of  the society  in a integrated Bharat.      In Consumer  Education &  Research Centre  &  ors.  V/s Union of  India &  ors. {(1995)  3 SCC  45]  and  Air  India Statutory Corporation  etc V/s.  United Labour  Union & Ors. etc. [(1996 (9) SCALE 70] and Dalmia Cements (bharat) Ltd. &

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 38  

Anr, vs.  Union of  India &  Ors. JT 1996 (4) SC 555] social justice was  held by  three-judge Benches  to be fundamental right approving  the view  taken in C.E.S.C. Ltd & Ors. V/s, Subhash Chandra Bose & Ors. [(1992) 1 SCC 441]. In Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar  V/s Vishwanath  Pandu Barde & Anr. [(1995) Supp. 2  SCC 549];  R. Chandevarapa  & Ors.  V/s.  State  of Karnataka &  Ors. [(1995)  6 SCC 309] and Papaiah V/s. State of karnataka  & Anr.  [(1996) 10  SCC 533] right to economic empowerment was held by the two judges Benches of this Court to be fundamental right.      It is now settled legal position that social justice is a fundamental  right and  equally economic  empowerment is a fundamental  right  to  the  disadvantaged.  Article  51A(j) enjoins that  it shall be the day of every citizen to strive towards  excellence   in  all   spheres  of  individual  and collective activities so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels  of endeavour  and  achievement.  Equality  of status and  dignity of  the individual  will be secured when the employees  belonging to  Dalits and  Tribes are given an opportunity of  appointment by  promotion in higher echelons of service  so that  they will  have opportunity  to  strive towards excellence  individually and collectively with other employees in  improving the  efficiency  of  administration. Equally they get the opportunity to improve their efficiency and  opportunity   to  hold  offices  of  responsibility  at hierarchical levels.      In A.K.  Gopalan v.  State of Madras [1950 SCR 88], per majority the  Constitution Bench had held that the operation of each  Article of  the Constitution  and its effect on the protection of  fundamental rights is required to be measured independently and  not in  conjoint consideration of all the relevant provisions.  The above  ratio was  overruled  by  a Bench of  11 Judges in R.C. Cooper V. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC  248] This  Court had  held that all the provisions of the Constitution  conjointly  be  read  on  the  effect  and operation of  fundamental right  of the  citizens  when  the state action  infringes the  right  of  the  individual.  In D.T.C. case (supra) [(1991) supp. 1 SCC 600 at 750-51, paras 297 and at 298] it was held that:      "It is  well settled constitutional      law that  different articles in the      chapter on  Fundamental Rights  and      the Directive Principles in Part IV      of the Constitution must be read as      an integral  and incorporeal  whole      with possible and incorporeal whole      with possible overlapping with  the      subject matter  of what  is  to  be      protected by its various provisions      particularly    the     Fundamental      Rights.      ....The nature  and content  of the      protection   of   the   fundamental      rights  is   measured  not  by  the      operation rights is measured not by      the operation  of the State action,      must be  adjudged in  the light  of      its operation  upon the  rights  of      the individuals  or  group  of  the      individual in all their dimensions.      It  is   not  the   object  of  the      authority making  the law impairing      the right  of the  citizen nor  the      form   of    action   taken    that      determines the  protection  he  can

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 38  

    claim: it  is the effect of the law      and of  the action  upon the  right      which of  the action upon the right      which attract  the jurisdiction  of      the   court  to  grant  relief.  In      Minerva Mills  Ltd.  vs.  Union  of      India  [(1980)   3  SCC   625]  the      fundamental  rights  and  directive      principles  are   held  to  be  the      conscience of  the Constitution and      disregard of either would upset the      equibalance built  up  therein.  In      Maneka Gandhi case it was held that      different articles  in the  chapter      of  fundamental   rights   of   the      Constitution must  be  read  as  an      integral   whole    with   possible      overlapping of  subject  matter  of      what is  sought to  be protected by      its various provisions particularly      by  articles  relating  fundamental      rights of  the Constitution must be      read as  an  integral  whole,  with      possible overlapping of the subject      matter of  what  is  sought  to  be      protected by its various provisions      particularly by  articles  relating      to fundamental  rights contained in      Part III of the Constitution do not      represent entirely separate streams      of rights  which do  not mingle  at      many points.  They are all parts of      an   integrated   scheme   in   the      Constitution. Their waters must mix      to constitute  that grand  flow  of      unimpeded  and  impartial  justice;      social,  economic   and   political      justice;   social,   economic   and      political,  and   of  equality   of      status and  opportunity which imply      absence of  unreasonable or  unfair      discrimination between  individuals      or groups  or protected by Part III      of the  Constitution, out  of which      Articles 14, 19 and 21 are the most      frequently  invoked   to  test  the      validity of  executive as  well  as      legislative  actions   when   these      actions are  subjected to  judicial      scrutiny.  Fundamental  rights  are      necessary means  to  develop  one’s      own personality  and to  carve  out      one’s own  life in  the manner  one      likes best,  subject to  reasonable      restrictions   imposed    in    the      paramount interest  of the  society      and to  a just, fair and reasonable      procedure.    The     effect     of      restriction procedure.  The  effect      of restriction  of deprivation  and      not of  the form adopted to deprive      the right  is the  conclusive test.      It already seen that the right to a      public     employment      is     a      constitutional right  under Article

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 38  

    16(1).  All   matters  relating  to      employment  include  the  right  to      continue  in   service   till   the      employee reaches  superannuation or      his service  is duly  terminated in      accordance  with   just,  fair  and      reasonable   procedure   prescribed      under   the   provisions   of   the      Constitution  or   the  rules  made      under proviso to Article 309 of the      Constitution   or   the   statutory      provision or the rules, regulations      or  instruction   having  statutory      favour  made  thereunder.  But  the      relevant   provisions    must    be      conformable    to     the    rights      guaranteed in  Parts III  and IV of      the   Constitution.    Article   21      guarantees the  right to live which      includes right  to livelihood, to a      many the  assured tenure of service      is  the   source,  the  deprivation      thereof must  be in accordance with      the  procedure  prescribed  by  law      conformable  to   the  mandates  of      Articles 14 and 21 as be fair, just      and reasonable  nut  not  fanciful,      oppressive or  at vagary.  The need      for  the   fairness,  justness   or      reasonableness of the procedure was      elaborately  considered  in  Maneka      Gandhi case  and  it  hardly  needs      reiteration."      It would,  therefore,  be  necessary  to  consider  the effect of  reservation in  promotion to  the Dalits  and the Tribes vis-a-vis  the employees  belonging  to  the  general categories; it  is a  balancing right to equality in results and adjusting  the competing  rights  of  all  sections.  In Ahmedabad St.  Xaviers College  Society &  Anr. v.  State of Gujarat &  Anr. [(1975) 1 SCR 173 at 252] through a Bench of nine Judges,  this  Court  Pointed  out  that  to  establish equality, it  would require  absolute identical treatment of both the  minority and  majority. That  would result only in equality in law but inequality in fact. The distinction need not be  elaborated. It  is  obvious  that  equality  in  law precludes discrimination  of any  kind whereas  equality  in fact may  involve the necessity of differential treatment in order to  attain a  result which establishes and equilibrium between   different    situations.    To    give    adequate representation to  the Dalits  and Tribes  in all  posts  or classes  of   posts  or  services,  a  reality  and  truism. Facilities and  opportunities, as enjoined in Article 38 are required to  be provided  to them to achieve the equality of representation in  real content.  In Dr. Pradeep Jain & Ors. V/s. Union  of India & Ors. [(1984) 3 SCC 654] a three-judge Bench of this Court considered the concept of equality under Articles 14  and 15(1)  of the  Constitution and had held in para 13 at page 676 thus:      "Now the  concept of equality under      the  Constitution   is  a   dynamic      concept. It  takes within its sweep      every process  of equalisation  and      protective discrimination. Equality      must   not    remain   mere    idle      incantation but  it must  become  a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 38  

    living reality for the large masses      of  people.   In   a   hierarchical      society with  an  indelible  feudal      stamp    and    incurable    actual      inequality. It is absurd to suggest      the   progressive    measures    to      eliminate  group  disabilities  and      promote  collective   equality  are      antagonistic  to  equality  on  the      ground  that  every  individual  is      entitled to equality of opportunity      based purely on merit judged by the      marks obtained  by him.  We  cannot      countenance such  a suggestion, for      to do  so would  make the  equality      clause   sterile   and   perpetuate      existing inequalities.  Equality of      opportunity is  not simply a matter      of legal  equality .  Its existence      depends not  merely on  the absence      of disabilities but on the presence      of  abilities.   Where,  therefore,      there is inequality, in fact, legal      equality always tends to accentuate      it. What  the famous  poet  William      Blake  said   graphically  is  very      true, namely,  "once  law  for  the      Lion and  the  Ox  is  oppression".      Those who  are  unequal,  in  fact,      cannot  be   treated  by  identical      standard; that  may be  equality in      law but  it would  certainly not be      real equality.  It  is,  therefore,      necessary to  take into  account de      facto inequalities  which exist  in      the society and to take affirmative      action by  way of giving preference      to the  socially  and  economically      disadvantaged persons or inflicting      handicaps     on     those     more      advantageously placed,  in order to      bring about  reals  equality.  Such      affirmative      action      though      apparently    discriminatory     is      calculated to produce equality on a      broader  basis  by  eliminating  de      facto inequalities  and placing the      weaker sections or the community on      footing  of   equality   with   the      stranger and more powerful sections      so  that   each   member   of   the      community, whatever  is his  birth,      occupation or  social position  may      enjoy equal opportunity of using to      the full  his natural endowments of      physique,  of   character  and   of      intelligence.:      In Marri  Chandra Shekhar  Rao  V/s.  Dean,  Seth  G.S. Medical  College  &  ors.  [(1990)  3  SCC  130  at  138]  a Constitution Bench  to which one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J. Was a member, had held in para 8 thus:      "Therefore, reservation  in  favour      of Scheduled  Castes and  Scheduled      Tribes   for    the   purpose    of      advancement   of    socially    and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 38  

    educationally backward  citizens to      make them equal with other segments      of community  in educational or job      facilities is  the mandate  of  the      Constitution.   Equality   is   the      dictate   of    our   Constitution.      Article 14  ensures equality in its      fullness to all our citizens. State      is enjoined  not  to  deny  to  any      persons  equality  before  law  and      equal protection  of the law within      the territory of India. Where it is      necessary, however, for the purpose      of bringing  bout real  equality of      opportunity between  those who  are      unequals, certain  reservations are      necessary  and   these  should   be      ensured.   Equality    under    the      Constitution is  a dynamic  concept      which must  cover every  process of      equalisation. Equality  must become      a  living  reality  for  the  large      masses of the people. Those who are      unequal, in fact, cannot be treated      by identical standards; that may be      equality  in   law  but   it  would      certainly  not  be  real  equality.      Existence    of     equality     of      opportunity depends  not merely  on      the absence  of disabilities. It is      not  simply   a  matter   of  legal      equality.  De  jure  equality  must      ultimately finds  its raison d‘etre      in de  facto  equality.  The  State      must,    Therefore,    resort    to      compensatory State  action  for the      purpose of  making people  who  are      factually unequal  in their wealth,      education  or  social  environment,      equal in which exist in the society      and to  take affirmative  action by      way  of   giving   preference   and      reservation  to  the  socially  and      economically disadvantaged  persons      or inflicting  handicaps  on  those      more  advantageously   placed,   in      order to bring about real equality.      Such  affirmative   action   though      apparently    discriminatory     is      calculated to produce equality on a      broader  basis  by  eliminating  be      facto inequalities  and placing the      weaker sections of the community on      a  footing  of  equality  with  the      stronger and more powerful sections      so  that   each   member   of   the      community, whatever  is his  birth,      occupation or  social position  may      enjoy equal opportunity of using to      the full  his natural endowments of      physical,  of   character  and   of      intelligence."      By abstract  application of  equality under Article 14, every citizen  is treated  alike  without  there  being  any discrimination. Thereby,  the  equality  in  fact  subsists.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 38  

Equality prohibits  the States  from  making  discrimination among citizens  on any  ground. However,  inequality in fact without differential  treatment between  the advantaged  and disadvantaged subsists.  In order  to bridge the gap between inequality in  results  and  equality  in  fact,  protective discrimination provides  equality of  opportunity. Those who are  unequal  cannot  be  treated  by  identical  standards. Equality in law certainly would not be real equality. In the circumstances, equality of opportunity depends not merely on the absence  of disparities but on the presence of abilities and opportunities. De jure equality must ultimately find its raison d’etre  in de  facto equality. State must, therefore, resort to  protective  discrimination  for  the  purpose  of making people,  who factually  unequal,  equal  in  specific areas. It  would,  therefore,  be  necessary  to  take  into account de  facto inequality in which exists the society and to take affirmative action  by giving preferences and making reservation in promotions in favour of the Dalits and Tribes or by  "inflicting handicaps  on those  more  advantageously placed", in  order to bring about equality, such affirmative action, though  apparently discriminatory,  is calculated to produce equality  on a broader basis by eliminating de facto inequality and  placing Dalits  and Tribes on the footing of equality with  non-tribal employees  so as to enable them to enjoy  equal   opportunity  and   to   unfold   their   full potentiality.   Protective   discrimination   envisaged   in Articles 16(4)  and 16  (4-A) is the armour to establish the said equilibrium  between equality  in law  and equality  in results as  a fact  to the  disadvantaged. The  Principle of reservation in promotion provides equality in results.      From this  backdrop, the socio-economic justice assured by Article  46,  the  Preamble  and  Article  39  would  get practical content  and effect  so that the dignity of person and  equality   to  status  assured  to  them  would  become meaningful and  real. Harmonious interpretation of all these provisions should, therefore, pave way for the target/goals. So  they   need  to   be  conjointly   read  so  that  every provision/clause/concept  in   different  Articles   of  the Constitution is  given full play, effect and flesh and blood are infused in their dry bones.      In  Mandal’s   case,  admittedly,  the  two  Government Memorandum provided  for reservation  to  OBCs.  in  initial direct recruitment  in central  services.  The  question  of reservation in  promotion was  non-issue as conceded in that case itself and across the bar: but the learned judges, with all due respect and deference to their learned view, decided a non-issue,  though objected  to on the ground that counsel appearing for  the parties  had put their heads together and formed the issue and reference was made to a larger Bench so that the  issue was  decided on  that premise  though it  is settled constitutional law that constitutional issues cannot be decided  unless the  issues directly arises for decision, with  due  respect  the  Bench  decided  a  non-issue  on  a constitutional law  affecting 22% of the national population and held that Article 16(1) read with Article 16(4) provides right to  reservation in initial recruitment. The framers of the Constitution  did nor intend to provided for reservation in promotion.  Since Article  335 speaks  of  efficiency  of administration, reservation  in promotion  to the Dalits and Tribes,  without  competition  with  non-reserved  employees would affect  efficiency in  service is unconstitutional. IT si an  admitted case that as there was no issue, nor was any evidence   adduced    to   prove   whether   efficiency   of administration  was   deteriorated  due  to  reservation  in promotion; nor  was it  pointed out  from the  facts of  any

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 38  

case.      In Maharashtra  State Board  of  Secondary  and  Higher Secondary Education  V. K.S. Gandhi & Ors. [(1991) 2 SCC 716 at 748 at 37] a Bench of two judges had held that to prove a fact, inference  must be  drawn on the basis of the evidence and circumstances. They must be carefully distinguished form conjectures or  speculation.  The  mind  is  prone  to  take pleasure adapt  circumstances to  one another  and  even  in straining them  a little  to force them to form parts of one connected  whole.   There  must   be  evidence   direct   or circumstantial to deduce necessary inferences in prof of the fact in  issue. There  can be no inferences unless there are objective facts,  direct or  circumstantial, from  which the other fact  which is  sought to establish an be inferred. In some case,  the other  facts can  be inferred, as much as is practical, as  if they  had been actually observed. In other cases,  the   inferences  d   not   go   beyond   reasonable probability. It  there are  no positive  proved facts, oral, documentary or  circumstantial from which the inferences can be made.  the method  of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation  or conjecture. Therefore, for an inference of proof  that a  fact in dispute has been hold established, there must be some material facts or circumstances on record form which such an inference could be drawn." In the absence of any issue and facts and proof thereof, the inference that reservation in  promotion  deteriorates  the  efficiency  or administration remains only a conjecture or an opinion based on no evidence. As seen, it is constitutional mandate of the State  under  Article  335  that  to  render  socio-economic justice and  to prevent  injustice to  the Dalit and Tribes, facilities and  opportunities of  reservation  in  promotion should be   provided  consistently with  the  efficiency  of administration.      The question then is: what is the meaning of the phrase "efficiency of  administration"?  In  D.T.C.  case,  it  was observed in para 275 that "the term efficiency is an elusive and relative  one to  the adept  capable to  be  applied  in diverse circumstances. If a superior officer develops liking towards sycophant, though corrupt, he would tolerate him and find him to be efficient and pay encomiums and corruption in such cases  stand no  impediment. When  he finds  a sincere, devoted and honest officer to be inconvenient, it is easy to cast  him/her  off  by  writing  confidential  reports  with delightfully vague  language imputing to be ’not up to mar’, ’wanting public  relations’ etc. At times they may be termed to be "security risk" (to their activities). Thus they spoil the career  of the  honest,  sincere  an  devoted  officers. Instances either  way are  galore in this regard. Therefore, one would  be circumspect,  pragmatic and realistic to these actualities of life while angulating constitutional validity of wide,  arbitrary, uncanalised and unbridled discretionary power of dismissal."      V.T. Rajshekar  in his  "merit’ May  Foot" (A  reply to Anti-Reservation Racists),  1996 published  by Dalit Sahitya Academy, Bangalore,  has stated  that nowhere  in the  world ’merit and  efficiency’ are  given so  much importance as in India which  is now pushed to the 120th position - virtually the last among different countries in the world. Upper caste rulers  of   India  keep   the   country’s   vast   original inhabitants- the  Untouchables, Tribals, Backward castes and ’religious minorities" - permanently as salves with the help of this ’merit’ mantra. By ’merit and efficiency’, they mean the birth.  Merit goes  with the  Highborn - the blue blood. This is  pure and  simple racism.  That Birth and skin-color have nothing  to do with ’merit and efficiency’ (brain) is a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 38  

scientifically proved  fact". "But  the ruling class nowhere in the  world is  concerned  with  science  because  science stands for  progress. And  those interested in progress will have to  be human. That is not so in India. If on has to see man’s inhumanity  to man in its most naked from he must come to India, the original home of racism and inequality. So the ’meri theory’  beautifully suits its ruling class or caste". At page  10, he  states that  Scientist have  identified tow forces which  are perpetually  and  constantly  at  work  to influence the  character,  growth  and  development  of  the features of  every living  being in  the universe  including animals and  plants: (1)  heredity and (2) environment. Each species products  only its own species. Biology is funded on the cell  theory. Cell  live and  die. At page 11, he states that ’Merit  and efficiency’  are not inherited. They are an acquired quality  that has  not reached the germ plasma. So, to say  that a  Brahmina’s son  alone is a Brahmin and hence has the  ’merit’ to  become a temple priest (archaka) has no scientific basis.  Some other  influence acts in combination with  heredity   and  that   is  environment.   With   right environment -  food, education, free atmosphere-Untouchables can prove  better than Brahmins". At page 12, he states that genetic  factors   only  provide  the  potential  for  human development whereas  it is  the environmental  factors  that translate this inherent potential into the full flowering of the personality.  Experiments though  selective breeding and studies on  identical twins  have  established  to  a  large extent the  influence of  genetics on  behaviours. But  what ultimately determines  the personality is the inter-actional influences of  heredity and  environments. At  page  15,  he states that  heredity is fixed by parentage but it is not an ideal environment.  Opportunity is  necessary on  merit  and efficiency.  A  genius  is  only  10%  inspiration  and  90% perspiration.  There   is  nothing   like  a   born  genius. Ramanujam,  Indian   prodigy  on   mathematics   was   given opportunity by  the British  to prove  his  genius  and  was provided with  the right  environment. though  he  was  born genius  without   opportunities,  he   could  not  have  got recognition.  Rajshekar  states  that  "all  ruling  classes built" a  theory by  suited to their needs and try to give a ’scientific’ backing  to it.  Merit and efficiency is a pure Aryan invention,  aimed at  maintaining their  monopoly". He states that  "human rights are due to blending of the forces of heredity  and the  more important  environment. The White meritocrats made  us believe  that the  ’Block Negro’  is  a backward race."      Justice O.  Chinnappa Reddy,  in K.C.  Vasanth Kumar  & Anr. vs.  State of  Karnataka [1985  (Supp.) SCC 714 at 738- 740] had stated thus :      "Efficiency is  very  much  on  the      lips  of  the  privileged  whenever      reservation      is      mentioned.      Efficiency,  it   seems,  will   be      impaired if  the total  reservation      exceed 50%;  efficiency, it  seems,      will suffer  if the ’carry forward’      rule  is  adopted;  efficiency,  it      seems, will  be injured if the rule      of  reservation   is  extended   to      promotional   posts,    From    the      protests    against     reservation      exceeding  50%   or  extending   to      promotional posts  and against  the      carry forward rule, one would think      that  the   civil  service   is   a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 20 of 38  

    Heavenly Paradise  into which  only      the archangels,  the chosen  the of      the elite,  the very best may enter      and may  be allowed to go higher up      the  ladder.   But  the   truth  is      otherwise. The  truth is  that  the      civil services  is no  paradise and      the upper echelons belonging to the      chosen classes  are not necessarily      models    of     efficiency.    The      underlaying assumption  that  those      belonging to  the upper-castes  and      classes, who  are appointed  to the      non-reserved posts will, because of      their presumed  merit,  ’naturally’      perform better  than those who have      been  appointed   to  the  reserved      posts and  that the clear stream of      efficiency will  be polluted by the      infiltration of the latter into the      sacred  precincts   is  a   vicious      assumption, typical of the superior      approach of  the elitists  classes.      There is  neither statistical basis      nor  expert   evidence  to  support      these assumptions  that  efficiency      will  necessarily  be  impaired  if      reservation   exceeds    50%,    if      reservation is  carried forward  or      if  reservation   is  extended   to      promotional  posts.  Arguments  are      advanced are  opinion are expressed      entirely on  an ad  hoc presumptive      basis. The  age long  contempt with      which the  ’superior’ or ’ forward’      castes have  treated the ’inferior’      or   ’backward’   castes   is   now      transforming   and    crystallising      itself into  an  unfair  prejudice,      conscious  and  subconscious,  ever      since  the  ’inferior’  castes  and      classes  started   claiming   their      legitimate share of the cake, which      naturally means, for the ’superior’      castes, parting  with a  bit of it.      Although in  actual practice  their      virtual    monopoly     on    elite      occupations  and   post  is  hardly      threatened. the  forward casts  are      nevertheless  increasingly   afraid      that they might loses this monopoly      in the  higher ranks  of government      service and  the profession.  It is      so  difficult  for  the  ’superior’      castes to understand and rise above      their  prejudice   and  its  is  so      difficult for  the inferior  castes      and classes  to overcome the bitter      prejudice and opposition which they      are forced  to face at every stage,      always   one    hears   the    word      ’efficiency’ as if it is sacrosanct      and  the   sanctorum  has   to   be      fiercely guarded.  ’Efficiency’  is      not a  Mantra which is whispered by

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 21 of 38  

    the Guru  in the Sishya’s year. The      mere securing  of high  marks at an      examination  may   not  necessarily      mark out  a good  administrator. An      efficient administrator,  one takes      it,  must   be  one  who  possesses      amount other qualities the capacity      to understand  with  sympathy  and,      therefore, to  tackle  bravely  the      problems  of  a  large  segment  of      population constituting  the weaker      sections of  the people.  And,  who      better than  the ones  belonging to      those very  sections? Why  not  ask      ourselves  why   35   years   after      independence, the  position of  the      Scheduled  Castes,   etc.  has  not      greatly  improved?   Is  it  not  a      legitimate  question to ask whether      things might  have been  different,      had the District Administrators and      the State  and Central  Bureaucrats      been drawn  in larger  numbers from      these  classes?   Courts  are   not      equipped to answer these questions,      but the  courts may  not  interfere      with the  honest endeavours  of the      Government  to   find  answers  and      solutions. We  do not  mean to  say      that  efficiency   in   the   civil      service is  unnecessary or  that it      is a  myth. All that we mean to say      is  that   one  need   not  make  a      fastidious fetish  of it. It may be      that for  certain posts,  only  the      best  may   be  appointed  and  for      certain courses  of study  only the      best may  be admitted. If so, rules      may  provide  for  reservation  for      appointment to  such posts  and for      admission  to   such  courses.  The      rules   may    provide    for    no      appropriate method of selection. It      may be that certain posts require a      very high  decree of  industry  and      intelligence. If  so, The rules may      prescribe a high minimum qualifying      standard and  an appropriate method      of  selection.   Different  minimum      standards and  different  modes  of      selection  may  be  prescribed  for      different posts  and for  admission      to   different    posts   and   for      admission to  different courses  of      study  and  having  regard  to  the      requirements of  the posts  and the      courses  of   study.  No  one  will      suggest   that    the   degree   of      efficiency required  of  a  general      medical practitioner. Similarly, no      one will suggest that the decree of      industry and  intelligence expected      of a candidate seeking admission to      an ordinary  arts degree course. We      do not,  therefore,  means  to  say

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 22 of 38  

    that efficiency is to be altogether      discounted. All that we mean to say      is that  it cannot  be permitted to      be used  as a camouflage to let the      upper classes  in its  name and  to      monopolise      the       services,      particularly the  higher posts  and      the professional  institutions.  We      are afraid we have to rid our minds      of many cobwebs before we arrive at      the core  of the problem. The quest      for our  illusions, though  not our      faith. It  is the dignity of man to      pursue the  quest for  equality. It      will be  advantageous to  quote  at      this juncture  R.H. Tawney  in  his      ’classic work  Equality’  where  he      says.      The truth is that it is absurd and degrading for men to make much of their the members of a social groups where each would consider  the other as his equal, not higher of lower, A society,  which does  not treat  each of  its  members  as equals, forfeits  its right of being called a democracy. All are equal  partners in  the freedom. Every one of our ninety four  hundred  million  people  must  have  equal  right  to opportunities and  blessings that  freedom of  India has  to offer. To  bring freedom  in a  comprehensive sense  to  the common  man,   material  resources   and   opportunity   for appointment  be  made  available  to  secure  socio-economic empowerment which  would ensure justice and fullness of list of workman,  i.e., every  and and woman." In para 43, it was held That "(I)n a developing society like ours, steeped with unbridgeable and  ever-widening gaps of inequality in status and of  opportunity, law  is a catalyst, rubicon to the poor etc. To  reach the  ladder of  social justice.   What is due cannot be  ascertained by  an absolute  standard which keeps changing, depending  upon the  time, place and circumstance. The constitutional  concern of  social justice as an elastic continuous process  is to  accord justice to all sections of the society  by providing  facilities due to which the poor, the workmen  etc. are  languishing ar  to secure  dignity of their person.  The  Constitution,  therefore,  mandates  the State to accord justice to all members of the society in all facets of  human activity.  The concept  of  social  justice embeds equality to flavour and enliven the practical content of life.  Social justice  and equality  are complementary to each other so that both should maintain their vitality. Rule of law,  therefore, is a potent instrument of social justice to being about equality in results."      Efficiency is  service attracts the well-known parabole the insanity  cannot be  cured until  married  and  marriage cannot be  celebrated till  insanity is cured. Unless one is given opportunity  and facility  by promotion  to  hold  and office on  a post  with responsibilities,  there would be no opportunity  to  prove  efficiency  in  the  performance  or discharge of  the duties.  With  efficiency  one  cannot  be promoted. How  to synthesise  both and  give effect  to  the Constitutional animation  to  effectuate  the  principle  or adequacy of  representation in all posts or classes of posts in all cadres, service or grad is the nagging question. From that  perspective,   one  is  required  to  examine  whether reservation in  promotion is constitutionally valid. It seen that the  rules provide promotion from Assistant Engineer to Executive Engineer on the principle of "seniority subject to rejection of unfit" ad from Superintending Engineers onward,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 23 of 38  

’merit’ is  the consideration. In other words, the promotion is based  on the  aforesaid principles.  Even employees from Dalits or  Tribes get  promoted only on satisfying the above test. Appointment  by promotion is a facet of recruitment to a service  or cadre/grade/classes  of posts.  In fairness on the part  of the  appellants/Petitioners and  their  learned counsel,  none   impugned  not   alleged  that  the  private respondents are  not meritorious  of  inefficient.  No  such evidence is placed on record.      The  fundamental   requisites  to   all  employees  are honesty, integrity  and character,  apart  from  hard  work, dedication and  willingness  to  apply  assiduously  to  the responsibilities attached  to the  office or  post and  also inclination to  achieve improved excellence. What Dalits and Tribe employees  need is  an opportunity  and fair chance of promotion to  higher posts and offices earmarked for them in the roster  where they  are not  adequately represented.  In clash of competing claims between general category employees on the one hand and Dalits and Tribes on the other, what the authorities need to take into consideration is the aforesaid factors and  their service  record  with  an  objective  and dispassionate assessment.  When the authorities have a power coupled with constitutional duty, the doctrine of full faith and credit  under Article  261 gets due acceptance when done truly  and   sincerely  with   an  honest,   objective   and dispassionate assessment by the appropriate authority. Their claims need  to be  considered  in  that  perspective;  they should be  given promotion,  if found eligible, to the posts or classes  of posts  in the  higher cadre,  grade, class or category etc.  The selecting officer/Officers need to eschew narrow. sectarian, caste, religion or regional consideration or prejudices  which were  deleterious to  fraternity, unity and integrity  and integration  of  the  nation  as  unified Bharat. What  needs to  be achieved by the Dalits and Tribal officers so  promoted is that they could, on par with others assiduously devote  themselves with character, integrity and honesty in  the discharge  of the  duties of  the posts with added willingness  and  dedication  to  improve  excellence. Thereby the efficiency of administration would automatically get improved  and the  nation  constantly  rises  to  higher levels of  achievement. Therefore,  it cannot  be held  that reservation in promotion is bad in law or unconstitutional.      As stated  earlier, Article 16 (4A) has come into force w.e.f. 17th  June,  1995.  The  appellants/petitioners  have sought amendment  of the  pleadings challenging the vires of Article 16(4A)  of the  Constitution and  in fairness on the part  of  the  learned  counsel,  they  did  not  press  for consideration thereof  obviously  for  the  reason  that  it objects are  mentioned  in  the  statement  of  Objects  and Reasons as under:      "The  Scheduled   Castes  and   the      Scheduled Tribes have been enjoying      the  facility   of  reservation  in      promotion since  1955. The  Supreme      Court in  its judgment  dated  16th      November, 1992 in the case of India      & Others,  however,  observed  that      reservation  of   appointments   or      posts under  article 16  (4) of the      Constitution is confined to initial      appointment and  cannot  extent  to      reservation  in   the   matter   of      promotion.  This   ruling  of   the      Supreme Court will adversely affect      the  interests   of  the  Scheduled

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 24 of 38  

    Castes and  the  Scheduled  Tribes.      Since  the  representation  of  the      Scheduled Castes  and the Scheduled      Tribes in  services in  the  States      have  not   reached  the   required      level, it  is necessary to continue      the   existing    dispensation   of      providing reservation  in promotion      in the case of the Scheduled Castes      and the  Scheduled Tribes.  In view      of the commitment of the Government      to protect  the  interests  of  the      Scheduled Castes  and the Scheduled      Tribes, the Government have decided      to  continue the existing policy of      reservation is  promotion  for  the      Scheduled castes  and the Scheduled      Tribes. To  carry out  this, it  is      necessary to  amend article  16  of      the   of    the   Constitution   by      inserting a  new clause (4A) in the      said   article   to   provide   for      reservation in  promotion  for  the      Scheduled  Castes   and   Scheduled      tribes."      Lord Macnaughten  in Vacher  &  Sons  Ltd.  vs.  Londan Society  of Compositors [(1913) Ac 107 at 118] has laid that a judicial tribunal has nothing to do with the policy of any Act which  it may be called upon to interpret. That may be a matter for private judgment . The duty of the Court, and its only duty,  is  to  expound  the  language  of  the  Act  in accordance with the settled rules of construction. The above principle was  followed by this Court in the Bengal Immunity Company Ltd.  vs. The  State of  Bihar &  Ors. [(1955) 2 SCR 603].      This Court  in Shirt  Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. & Anr. V/s Union of  India &  Ors. [(1990)  1 SCR  909 at  936 and 942] through a  Constitution Bench,  had  held  that  legislative policy is  beyond the  pale of  assailment on  the anvil  of violation of  the fundamental rights. In S. Azeez Bash & Ar. V/s. Union  of India  [(1968) 1  SCR  833  at  845]  another Constitution Bench  had held  that it is not the function of the Court  to consider  the policy  underlying the amendment made to the Act nor the Court proposed to go into the merits of the amendment made by that Act (the Constitutionality  of the underlying  policy  of  the  Aligarh  Muslim  University (Amendment) Act of 1965 was questioned put the Court did not go into  the underlying  policy except the constitutionality of the Act itself which was upheld by this Court. Though the doctrine of original intent was given effect to in Gopalan’s case, this  Court had not accepted the same in R.C. Coopar’s case and  the later was followed in Menaka Gandhi V/s. Union of India  [AIR 1978  SC 597]  etc.  Therefore,  thought  the doctrine of original intent of reservation in promotion does not expressly  find place  in the speech of Dr. Ambedkar, as supported in  Mandal’s case  it  found  place  in  statutory policy engrafted  in  the  rules  issued  under  proviso  to Article 309  of the  Constitution, which  is legislative  in character adopted  and explained in the Statement of Objects and Reasons  of the Constitution (77th Amendment) Act, 1995, which was  declared as  constitutional in Rangachari’s case. After mandal’s  case, the parliament has given effect to the legislative  policy   of   reservation   in   promotion   as constitutional  scheme.   This  Court   in  Commissioner  of Commercial Taxes,  A.P. Hydrabad & Anr. V/s. G. Sethumadhava

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 25 of 38  

Rao &  Ors. [(1996])7  SCC 512] through a three judge Bench, has held  that he  intention behind  introduction of Article 16(4A) was to remove the defect as pointed out by this Court in Mandal’s  case. By  legislative judgment,  the Parliament upheld the  ratio in  Rangachari’s case.  Thomas’s case  and akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) V/s. Union of India  & Ors.  [(1981) 1  SCC 246]  upholding the rule of reservation in promotion . The interpretation put up therein was given  acceptance  by  legislature  amendment.  It  was, therefore, held that Article 16(4A) would establish that the principle of  rule of  reservation is applicable not only to initial recruitment  but also  in promotions where the State is of  the opinion  that  the  Dalits  and  Tribes  are  not adequately represented  in promotional  posts in  a class or classes of  services under the State. In G.S.I.C. Karmachari Union &  Ors. V.S. Gujarat Small Industries Corp. & Ors. {J] 1997 (1) SC 384] another Bench of three Judges has held that "the question  of retrospectivity  of the  policy  does  not arise;  what  is  being  done  is  to  give  effect  to  the constitutional policy  of providing  adequate representation to the  members of  Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in all  classes   of  service  or  posts  where  they  are  not adequately   represented.   Therefore,   the   question   of arbitrariness does  not arise since it is part of the scheme of the Constitution. Unless adequate representation is given to the employees belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions also, the adequacy of representation in all classes and grades of service, where there is no element of  direct   recruitment,  cannot  be  achieved.  Obviously, therefore, Article  16 (4-A) was brought in the Constitution by Constitution  (77th Amendment)  Act, after  the  majority judgment of  this Court  by a Bench of nine Judges in Indira Sawhney v/s.  Union of  India & India & Ors. [(1992) Supp. 3 SCC 210].  So, the  policy of  reservation is part of socio- economic  justice   enshrined  in   the  Preamble   of   the Constitution, the  fundamental rights  under Articles 14, 15 (1), 15  (4), 16  (1), 16  (4), 16  (4A), 46 and 335 and the other  related   Articles,  to  give  effect  to  the  above constitutional objectives.  In Union  of India  & Anr.  V/s. Madhav s/o  Gajanan Chaubai  & Anr.  [J] 1996 (9) SC 320], a there-Judge Bench, to which two of us, K. Ramaswamy and G.P. Pattanaik,  JJ.  were  members,  also  considered  the  same question and  held in  paragraph 6  that "Government evolved reservation in  posts or  offices under  the State as one of the modes to give effect to socio-economic justice to Dalits and Tribes.  Appointment to an office or post into a service under the State is one of the means to render socio-economic Justice.  Constitution   (77th  Amendment)   Act,  1995  has resuscitated the  above objective  to enable  the Dalits and Tribes-employees to improve excellence in higher echelons of service and  a source of equality of opportunity, social and economic  status   guaranteed  by   the  Preamble   to   the Constitution, As  a consequence,  the Parliament has removed the lacuna pointed out by this Court in Mandal’s case. Thus, it would  be seen that the legal position held by this Court in Rangachari’s  case and  followed in  other cases has been restored and  reservation of  appointment by promotion would be available  to the  members of  the Scheduled  Castes  and Scheduled Tribes  under 50%  quota as  is maintained by this Court in Indira Sawhney’s case."      It would  thus be  clear that  right to  promotion is a statutory right. It is not a fundamental right. The right to promotion to  a post  or a  class of  posts depends upon the operation of the conditions of service. Article 16 (4A) read with Articles 16 (1) and 14 guarantees a right  to promotion

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 26 of 38  

to Dalits  and Tribes  as fundamental  right where  they not have   adequate   representation   consistently   with   the efficiency  in   administration.  The   Mandal’s  case,  has prospectively overruled  the  ratio  in  Rangachari’s  case, i.e., directed  the decision  to be  operative after 5 years from the  date of  the  judgment;  however,  before  expiry. thereof, Article  16 (4A)  has come into force from June 17, 1995. Therefore,  the right  to  promotion  continues  as  a constitutionally guaranteed  fundamental right. In adjusting the competing  rights of  the Dalits  and Tribes  on the one hand and  the employees belonging to the general category on the other,  the balance is required to be struck by applying the egalitarian  protective discrimination  in favour of the Dalits and  Tribes to  give  effect  to  the  Constitutional goals. policy and objectives referred to hereinbefore.      In R.K.  Sabharwal’s & Ors. V/s. State of Punjab & Ors. [(1995) 2  SCC 745],  the Constitution Bench was called upon to consider  whether the reservation in promotion as per the roster was correct in law and, therefore, constitutional and whether the  employees belonging  to Scheduled  Castes  have right to be considered for promotion in their own merits, if so, how  they are  required to  be adjusted  in  the  roster prescribed by  the Government.  The Constitution  Bench  has pointed out  that when percentage of reservation is fixed in respect of  a particular  cadre and the roster indicates the reserved points,  it has to be taken that the posts shown at the reserved  points are  to  be  filled  from  amongst  the members of the reserved categories. The candidates belonging to the  general category  are not  entitled to be considered for the  reserved posts.  On the  other hand,  the  reserved category candidates  can compete for the non-reserved posts. In the event of their appointment to the said posts,  In the event of  their appointment  to the said posts, their number cannot be added and taken into consideration for working out the percentage  of reservation.  When the  State  Government after doing  the necessary  exercise makes  reservation  and provides the  extent of  percentage of  posts to be reserved for the  said backward  class, then the percentage has to be followed  strictly.  The  prescribed  percentage  cannot  be varied or  changed simply because some of the members of the backward class  have  already  been  appointed  or  promoted against the general seats. The fact that considerable number of members  of the  backward classes  have  been  appointed/ promoted against  the general  seats in  the State  may be a relevant factor  for the  State  Government  to  review  the question of continuing reservation for the said class but so long as  the instructions/rules providing certain percentage of reservations  for the backward classes are operative, the same have  to be  followed. It  was further  held  that  the reserved vacancies like a running account. When the reserved quota is  full in  the cadre  then application  of  rule  of reservation would  be stopped  until vacancies  as  per  the roster  arise  and  operate.  It  was  also  held  following Mandal’s case  that the  judgment therein could be operative prospectively from  that date,  viz., February  10, 1995 and all the  promotions  which  became  settled  rights  due  to reservation in  promotion could  not be  unsettled. As  seen earlier,  "right  to  equality",  "equality  or  status  and opportunity"; duty  to "improve  excellence"; "opportunities and facilities  to remove  inequality in status" and "social justice", all  should be given their due and full play under rule of  law to bring about equality in results to establish an egalitarian  social order.  It would, therefore, be clear that reservation in promotion is constitutionally valid; the posts earmarked for Dalits and Tribes shall be filled up and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 27 of 38  

adjusted with  them. The  Dalits and Tribes selected in open competition for  posts in general quota should be considered appointees to  the general  posts in  the roster  as general candidates. The  promotions given  in excess  of  the  quota prior to  the judgment  in Sabharwal’s  case should  not  be disturbed.      The  further  question  is;  whether  the  judgment  in Mandal’s case  in paragraph  860 (8)  by  Jeevan  Reddy,  J. prospectively overruling the ratio in Rangachari’s case is a majority judgment?  In  this  connection,  we  may,  at  the outset, refer  to Article  145 (5)  of the  Constitution. It postulates that  "(N)o judgment and no such opinion shall be delivered by the Supreme Court, save with the concurrence of a majority of the Judges present at the hearing of the case, but nothing  in this  clause shall  be deemed  to prevent  a judge who  does not  concur  from  delivering  a  dissenting judgment or  opinion". It would, therefore, be manifest that unless majority  Judges comprised in the Bench concur on the opinion or  the decision,  it would not be a judgment and no such opinion  shall be  delivered by  the Supreme  Court, In Mandal’s case,  on the question of reservation in promotion, eight of  the nine  Judges participated  in the  opinion. Of them, Jeevan  Reddy, J. spoke for himself, Kania, C.J.I. and Venkatachaliah, J.  as he  then was. Pandian and Sawant. JJ. also greed  with them.  There is  a considerable  debate  on Micro Lexicon  Surgery conducted  by the learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners  drawing  a  distinction  between conclusions and  directions contained  in paragraph  860 (8) and the  language used in the concurrent opinions of Pandian and Sawant,  JJ. In support thereof, they have placed strong reliance on the wording used by Sawant, J. in paragraphs 552 and 555 on the conclusion and directions. Equally, there was absence of  concurrence by  other learned  Judges. They have also drawn  our attention to the dictionary meaning of those words. Having  given due  consideration, we  are of the view that the  Micro Lexicon  Surgery of  the distinction between conclusions  and   directions  leads  us  nowhere  to  reach satisfactory solution. One needs to adopt pragmatic approach to understand  the conclusions  reached and  the  directions given as  part of  the judgment in that behalf. Even if rule of strict  interpretation is  to be applied, as is sought by the  learned  counsel,  Sawant,  J.  in  paragraph  555  has indicated his  concurrence with  the conclusions  of  Jeevan Reddy, J.  in paragraph 860 (8) given by Jeevan Reddy, J. is majority judgment  and it  gets reinforced from the approval thereof, as  followed by  the Constitution  Bench,  in  R.K. Sabharwal’s case.  The presiding Judge therein, viz., Kuldip Singh, J.,  who was one of the nine Judges in Mandal’s case, participated  in  the  majority  opinion  on  the  issue  of reservation in  promotion. However, no opinion was expressed on the  conclusions and  directions of  Jeevan Reddy,  J. in para 860,  the Constitution  Bench having upheld the rule of reservation in  promotion, proceeded  to apply  the law  and worked out  rights of  the  Dalits  in  promotions  in  R.K. Sabharwal’s case.  The same  do support  our conclusion that the  Constitution   Bench  equally   understood   that   the directions  contained   in  paragraph   860(8)   constituted majority judgment. Otherwise, the Constitution Bench in R.K. Sabharwal’s case  would not  have proceeded  to consider the right to  promotion of  the Dalits  and question  of  giving effect to  the roster  system and the question of percentage of reservation  provided in  promotions would  not have been give effect.  The Constitution Bench in that case would have declared that  in the  light of  the majority  judgment  the reservation in  promotions were void ab initio under Article

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 28 of 38  

13 (2)  and that,  therefore, the question of application of the roster  would not  have arisen. It is true that there is no positive  indication or  a  finding  to  that  effect  in Sabharwal’s case  but the  fact  that  the  presiding  Judge therein was  one of  the members  of the nine-judge Bench in Mandal’s case,  and that  the Constitution  Bench considered and upheld  the right to reservation in promotion and upheld the right  to reservation  in promotion  to the  Dalits  and Backward Classes  and applied  the  roster  points  to  such promotions. itself  goes to  point out  and reassure us that prospective overruling of Rangachari’s case by Jeevan Reddy, J. is  a majority  opinion. In  that view of the matter, the Micro Lexicon Surgery fails.      The next  questions are:  whether the prospective over- ruling of  Rangachari’s case,  to be  operative  after  five years from  the date  of Mandal’s  case, amounts to judicial legislation? Is it void ab initio under Article 13(2) of the Constitution? whether  it is  violative of  the  fundamental rights of the appellant-petitioners and whether the exercise of the  power by  this Court  under Article 32(4) and 142 of the Constitution  is inconsistent with and derogatory to the fundamental rights of the appellants-petitioners and, if so, what would be the consequence? It is settled  constitutional principle  that  to  make  the  right  to  equality  to  the disadvantaged  Dalits   and  Tribes   meaningful,  practical contents of results would be secured only when principles of distributive  justice   and  protective  discrimination  are applied, as  a facet  of right  to equality  enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution. Otherwise, right to equality will be  a teasing  illusion. Right to promotion is a method of recruitment  from one  cadre to  another higher  cadre or class or  category or  grade of posts or classes of posts or offices, as  the case  may be.  Reservation in promotion has been evolved  as a  facet of  equality where the appropriate Government is of the opinion that the Dalits  and Tribes are not adequately  represented in the class or classes of posts in diverse  cadres, grade,  category of  posts or classes of posts.  The   discrimination,  therefore,  by  operation  of protective  discrimination   and  distributive   justice  is inherent in the principle of reservation and equality too by way of  promotion but  the same  was evolved  as a  part  of social and  economic justice  assured in  the  Preamble  and Articles  38,   46  14,  16(1),  16(4)  and  16(4A)  of  the Constitution. The  right to  equality, dignity of person and equality of status and of opportunity are fundamental rights to bring  the Dalits and the Tribes in the Mainstream of the national life.  It would,  therefore, be  an  imperative  to evolve  such  principle  to  adjust  the  competing  rights, balancing the  claims, rights  and interest  of the deprived and disadvantaged  Dalits and  Tribes on  one hand  and  the general section of the society on the other.      The Constitution,  unlike other  Acts, is  intended  to provide an  enduring paramount law and a basic design of the structure and  power of  the State  and rights and duties of the citizens  to serve  the society  through a long lapse of ages. It  is not  only designed to meet the needs of the day when it  is enacted but also the needs of the day when it is enacted but  also the  needs of  the altering conditions  of the  future.  It  contains  a  framework  of  mechanism  for resolution of  constitutional disputes.  It also  embeds its ideals of establishing an egalitarian social order to accord socio-economic and  political justice to all sections of the society assuring dignity of person and to integrate a united social  order  assuring  every  citizen  fundamental  rights assured in  part III  and the  directives in  part IV of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 29 of 38  

Constitution. In  the interpretation  of  the  Constitution, words of width are both a framework of concepts and means to achieve  the  goals  in  the  preamble.  Concepts  may  keep changing to  expand and  elongate the rights. Constitutional issues are  not solved  by mere appeal to the meaning of the words without an acceptance of the line of their growth. The intention  of   the  Constitution  is,  rather,  to  outline principles than  to engrave  details. In  State of Karnataka vs. Appa Balu [(1995) Supp. 4 SCC 469 at 485-86] a two-Judge Bench of  this Court,  to which  one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J. was a  member, while interpreting Articles 17 and 15 (2) and the Civil Rights Protection Act, held that "(J)udiciary acts as a bastion of the freedom and of the rights of the people. Jawaharlal Nehru,  the architect of Modern India as early as in 1944  stated that  the spirit  of the age is in favour of equality though  the practice  denies it  almost everywhere, yet the  spirit of the age triumphs. The judge must be atune with the  spirit of his/her times. Power of judicial review, a constituent  power has, therefore, been conferred upon the judiciary which  constitutes one  of the  most important and potent weapons  to protect the citizens against violation of social, legal  or  constitutional  rights.  The  judges  are participants in the living stream of national life, steering the law  between the dangers of rigidity on the one hand and formlessness on  the other hand in the seemless web of life. The great  tides and  currents which  engulf the rest of the men do  not turn  aside in  their course and pass the judges idly by. Law should subserve social purpose. Judge must be a jurist endowed  with the  legislator’s  wisdom,  historian’s search for  truth, prophet’s  vision, capacity to respond to the needs  of the  present,  resilience  to  cope  with  the demands of  the future and to decide objectively disengaging himself/herself   from    every   personal    influence   or predilections. Therefore,  the judges should adopt purposive interpretation of  the dynamic  concepts of the Constitution and the  Act with  its interpretative  armoury to articulate the felt  necessities of  the time. The judge must also bear in mind  that social  legislation  is  not  a  document  for fastidious dialects  but a means of ordering the life of the people. To  construe law one must enter into its spirit. its setting and  history. Law  should be  capable  of  expanding freedoms of the people and the legal order can, weighed with utmost equal  care, be  made to  provide the underpinning of the highly  inequitable social  order. The power of judicial review must,  therefore,  be  exercised  with  insight  into social values  to supplement  the changing social needs. The existing social inequalities or imbalances are to be removed and social  order readjusted  through rule  of law, lest the force of violent cult gain ugly triumph. Judges are summoned to  the   duty  of  shaping  the  progress  of  the  law  to consolidate society  and grant  access  to  the  Dalits  and Tribes to  public means or places dedicated to public use or places of amenities open to public etc. The law which is the resultant product  is not  found but  made. Public policy of law, as  determined by  new  conditions,  would  enable  the courts to  recast the  changing conceptions of social values of yesteryears  yielding place to the changed conditions and environment to the common good. The courts are to search for light from  among the social elements of every kind that are the living  forces behind  the factors  they deal  with.  By judicial  review,   the  glorious  contents  and  the  trite realisation in  the constitutional  words of  width must  be made vocal  and audible  giving  them  continuity  of  life, expression and  force when they might otherwise be forgotten or ignored  in the  heat of  the moment  or  under  sway  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 30 of 38  

passions or  emotions  remain  aroused,  that  the  rational faculties get  befogged and  the people are addicted to take immediate for  eternal, the transitory for the permanent and the ephemeral for the timeless, it is in such transitory for the permanent  and the  ephemeral for the timeless. It is in such surging  situation the  presence and  consciousness and the restraining  external force  by judicial  review ensures stability and  progress of  the society.  Judiciary does not forsake the  ideals enshrined in the Constitution, but makes them meaningful  and makes  the pople  realise and enjoy the rights.      The Judges,  therefore, should  respond  to  the  human situations to  meet the  felt necessities  of the  time  and social needs;  make meaningful  the right  to life  and give effect to  the Constitution and the will of the legislature. This Court  as the vehicle of transforming the nation’s life should respond to the nation’s needs, interpret the law with pragmatism  to   further  public   welfare   to   make   the constitution broadly  and liberally enabling the citizens to enjoy the rights.      In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. V/s. The Union of India [(1962)  3   SCR  842   at  857]  it  was  held  by  another Constitution Bench thus;      "It must  be borne in mind that the      Constitution  must  be  interpreted      in a  broad way and not in a narrow      and pedantic  sense. Certain rights      have   been    inshrined   in   our      Constitution  as  fundamental  and,      therefore,  while  considering  the      nature and  content of those rights      the Court  must not  be took astute      to interpret  the language  of  the      Constitution in  so literal a sense      as to  whittle them  down.  On  the      other   hand,    the   Court   must      interpret  the  Constitution  in  a      manner  which   would  enable   the      citizen   to   enjoy   the   rights      guaranteed by  it  in  the  fullest      measure  subject,   of  course,  to      permissible restrictions."      Common sense has always served in the court’s ceaseless striving as  a voice  of reason  to maintain  the  blend  of change and  continuity of  order which  is sine  qua non for stability in the process of change in a parliamentary democracy.      Therefore, it  is but  the duty  of the Court to supply vitality, blood  and flesh,  to balance the competing rights by interpreting the principles, to the language or the words contained in  the living  and organic  Constitution, broadly and liberally.  The judicial function of the Court, thereby, is to  build up,  by  judicial  statesmanship  and  judicial review, smooth  social change  under  rule  of  law  with  a continuity of  the past  to  meet  the  dominant  needs  and aspirations of  the present.  This Court, as sentinel on the qui vive,  has been  invested  with  more  freedom,  in  the interpretation   of    the   Constitution    than   in   the interpretation of  other laws. This Court, therefore, is not bound to accept an interpretation which retards the progress or impedes social integration; it adopts such interpretation which would  bring about the ideals set down in the Preamble of the  Constitution aided  by Part  III and  IV -  a truism meaningful and  a living  reality to  all  sections  of  the society as  a whole by making available the rights to social

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 31 of 38  

justice and economic empowerment to the weaker sections, and by preventing  injustice to  them. Protective discrimination is an  armour to  realise distributive  justice. Keeping the above perspective  in the backdrop of our consideration, let us broach  whether the  rights of the employees belonging to the  general   category  are   violative  of   Article   14; inconsistent with  and derogatory  to right  to equality and are void ab initio.      In Union  of India  & Anr. vs. Reghubir Singh (Dead) by LRs. etc.  [(1989) 2  SCC 754  at 766], a Constitution Bench had held  that like  all principles  evolved by  man for the regulation of  the social  order, the  doctrine  of  binding precedent is  circumscribed in its government by perceptible limitations, limitations.  arising by  reference to the need for re-adjustment  in a changing society, a re-adjustment of legal norms  demanded by a changed social context. This need for adapting  the law  to new  urges in  society brings home that truth  that the life of the law has not been logic, but it has  been experienced.  The law  is forever  adopting new principles from life at one end and "sloughing off" old ones at  the   other.  The  choice  is  between  competing  legal propositions rather  than by  the operation  of  logic  upon existing legal  propositions that the growth of law tends to be determined.  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution  is  a continuous  process.  The  concepts  engraved  therein  keep changing with the demands of changing needs and time.      The doctrine of stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action,  because in  most matters,  it is  more important that the  applicable rule  of law be settled right. The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to keep consistency and uniformity of  decisions, is not an inflexible rule. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the Court and it does not deter the court to depart from it. Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res judicata, a universal, inexorable command. whether it would   be   desirable   to   continue   the   decision   in constitutional  questions  is  one  of  the  choice  between competing rights.  In The Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. case, considering  the   question  whether   the  decision   of  a Constitution Bench  referred in  the State of Bombay vs. The Union Motors  (India) Ltd.  [(1953) SCR 1069], a majority of seven Judges  following the descending judgment of Stone, CJ in United  States of  America vs. South-Eastern Underwriters Association [322  US 533], had held that the Court has never committed itself  to any rule or policy that it will not bow to the  lessons  of  experience  and  the  force  of  better reasoning by  overruling a  mistaken precedent. The doctrine of stare  decisis should  not  be  rigidly  applied  to  the constitutional as  well as  to other  laws. In  the case  of private import,  the  chief  desideratum  is  that  the  law remained certain,  and, therefore,  where a  rule  has  been judicially declared  and private  rights created thereunder, the courts  will not, except in the clearest cases of error, depart from  the doctrine  of stare  decisis. When, however, public interests  are involved,  and  especially,  when  the question is  one of  constitutional construction, the matter is otherwise.  Accordingly the  Bench overruled the majority decision. It  would,  thus,  be  settled  law  that  in  the interpretation of the Constitution  or the concepts embodied therein, the application of the doctrine of stare decisis is not an  inexorable or  rigid rule. It requires modulation or adherence based  upon the need of the constitutional command and social  imperatives. It  would, therefore,  be  entirely within the discretion of the Court when it is called upon to consider its application to the given set of circumstances.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 32 of 38  

    It is  settled principle  right from  Golak Nath  ratio that prospective  over-ruling is a part of the principles of constitutional canon  of interpretation.  Though Golak  Nath ratio of  unamendability of fundamental rights under Article 368 of  the  Constitution  was  over-ruled  in  Keshavananda Bharati’s  case   [1973  Supp.   SCR  1]   the  doctrine  of prospective over-ruling  was upheld  and followed in several decisions. This  Court negatived  the  contention  in  Golak Nath’s case that prospective over-ruling amounts to judicial legislation. Explaining  the  Blackstonian  theory  of  law, i.e., Judge  discovers law  and does  not make  law, and the efficacy of  prospective over-ruling  at page 808 placitum D to H,  this Court  by a Bench of eleven Judges had held that the doctrine of prospective over-ruling is a modern doctrine and is  suitable for  a fast  moving society. It does not do away with  the doctrine  of stare decisis but confines it to past transactions.  While in  strict theory,  it may be said that the  doctrine involves  the making of law, what a Court really does  is to  declare the  law  but  refuses  to  give retrospectivity to  it. It  is really  a pragmatic  solution reconciling the  two conflicting  doctrines, namely,  that a Court finds  law and that it does make the law. It finds the law but  restricts its  operation to  the future. It enables the Courts  to bring about a smooth transition by correcting the errors  without disturbing the impact of those errors on past transactions. By implication of this doctrine, the past may be  preserved and the future protected. The Constitution does not expressly or by necessary implication speak against the doctrine  of prospective over-ruling. Articles 32(4) and 142 are designed with words of width to enable this Court to declare the  law and  to give  such direction   or pass such orders as  are necessary to do complete justice. Declaration of law  under Article 141 is wider than words found or made. The law  declared by  this Court is the law of the land. So, there is no acceptable reason as to why the Court in dealing with the  law in  supersession of  the law  declared  by  it earlier  could   not  restrict  the  operation  of  law,  as declared, to  the future  and save the transactions, whether statutory or  otherwise, that  were effected on the basis of the earlier  law. This  Court is, therefore, not impotent to adjust the  competing rights of parties by prospective over- ruling of  the previous  decision in  Rangachari ratio.  The decision in  Mandal’s case postponing the operation for five years from  the date  of the judgment is an instance of, and an extension  to the  principle of  prospective  over-ruling following the  principle evolved  in  Golak  Nath  case.  In Managing Director,  ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. vs. B.Karunakar & Ors. [(1993) 4 SCC 727], a Constitution Bench of this Court, while over-ruling  Union of  India V/s.  Mohd.  Ramzan  Khan [(1991) 1  SCC 588]  had held  that benefit of the decisions would be  given only  to the  parties to  the cases  pending before the authorities from the date of the judgment but not to the  actions already  taken by the date of that judgment. In that behalf in separate but partly dissenting judgment to a limited  extent, on  the issue of the need to give benefit to the  party that approaches the Court in that case, one of us,  K.  Ramaswamy,  J.,  had  held  that  as  a  matter  of constitutional law retrospective operation of an over-ruling decision  is   neither  required   nor  prohibited   by  the Constitution; it  is a matter of judicial attitude depending on the  facts and circumstances in each case; the nature and purpose the  particular over-ruling  decision seeks to serve are required to be taken into consideration. The Court would look into the justifiable reliance on the over-ruled case by the  administration.  All  the  factors,  viz.,  ability  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 33 of 38  

effectuate the  new rule  adopted in  the over-ruling  case, without doing  injustice and  whether the  likelihood of its operation  substantially   burdens  the   administration  or retards the  purpose, are  to be  taken into  account, while over-ruling the  earlier  decision  or  laying  down  a  new principle. Equally,  no distinction  could be  made  between claims involving  constitutional rights,  statutory right or common law  right. The  Court  is  required  to  adjust  the competing rights taking into consideration the prior history of the  rule in question, its purpose and effect and to find out  whether  retrospective  operation  will  accelerate  or retard its operation. Therefore, evolving of the appropriate rule to give effect to the decision of the Court over-ruling its previous  precedent, is  one of  judicial  craftsmanship with pragmatism  and  judicial  statesmanship  as  a  useful outline to bring about smooth transition of the operation of law without  unduly affecting  the rights  of the people who acted upon  the law  operated  prior  to  the  date  of  the judgment over-ruling the previous law.      The question, therefore, is: whether such a decision is void when  it offends  the fundamental  rights under Article 13(2) of the Constitution? The doctrine of voidity was dealt with in  the Administrative Law by wade (Seventh Edition) at page 342,  and it is stated that "the truth of the matter is that the  Court would  invalidate an order only if the right remedy  is   sought  by   the  right  person  in  the  right proceedings and  circumstances". The  terms "void ab initio" or "nullity"  or "voidable" are descriptive of the status of the legislation  or subordinate  legislation alleged  to  be ultra vires  for patent  or for  latent defects  before  its validity  has  been  pronounced  by  a  Court  of  competent jurisdiction.  It  would,  therefore,  be  of  necessity  to consider in each case, the effect of the declaration granted by the  Court  before  labelling  it  as  void,  nullity  or voidable, as the case may be.      It is  seem that  Article 13(2)  envisages a  situation where the  State action,  be it  legislative  or  executive, violates  the   fundamental  rights   in  Part  III  of  the Constitution; such  law is  declared as  void but  when  the previous over-ruled  decision and  the new rule laid down by the Court  as a  stare decisis operates prospectively from a given date,  namely, either  the date  of  the  judgment  or extended date.  Judgment or  order is  not a legislative Act which is void under Article 13(2) but judicial tool by which the  effect  of  the  judgment  was  given.  Therefore,  the judgment of  this Court  in  Mandal’s  case  declaring  that Rangachari ratio  did not correctly interpret Articles 16(1) and 16(4)  of the  Constitution is  a declaratory  law under Article 141  of the  Constitution. It  is true  that Article 13(1)  deals  with  pre-constitutional  law  and  if  it  is inconsistent with  fundamental rights,  it becomes void from January 26,  1950, the  date on  which the  Constitution  of India came  into force  and  if  a  post-constitutional  law governed by  Article 13(2)  violates fundamental  rights, it becomes void  from its  inception. Either  case  deals  with statute law  and not  the law  declared by  this Court under Article 141 and directions/orders under Article 142.      The question  then is:  whether such  a declaration  is inconsistent with  the Constitution  or in derogation of the fundamental rights?  As held earlier, both the disadvantaged and advantaged  sections of the society have equal competing fundamental rights  in Part  adapter of  Fundamental Rights. The Court  in mod  had  obviously  recognised  the  need  to exempting rights of both sections of citizens and therefore, it postponed  the operation  of that judgment for five years

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 34 of 38  

from that date giving an option to the Executive to have the law amended appropriately.      In Union  Carbide Corpn. & Ors v. Union of India & Ors. [(1991) 4 SCC 584], a Constitution Bench was to consider the scope, ambit  and limitation  of the  exercise of  the power under Article  142. Therein,  the contention raised was that the direction issued was contrary to the statutory provision violating  Article   21  of   the  constitution   and  that, therefore,  the   power  under  Article  142  could  not  be exercised  in  that  backdrop.  This  Court  explaining  the interplay of  inference of  Prohibition or limitation on the constitutional power and as to when need to its exercise the same under  Article 142  arises, had  pointed out in para 83 thus:      "It is  necessary to  set  at  rest      certain   misconceptions   in   the      arguments touching the scope of the      powers of  this Court under Article      142(1) of  the Constitution.  These      issues  are   matters  of   serious      public importance.  The proposition      that a  provision in  any  ordinary      law irrespective  of the importance      of the public policy on which it is      founded,  operates   to  limit  the      powers  of  the  apex  Court  under      Article  142(1)   is  unsound   and      erroneous. In  both Garg as well as      Antulay cases  the point was one of      violation     of     constitutional      provisions    and    constitutional      rights. The  observations as to the      effect   of    inconsistency   with      statutory  provisions  were  really      unnecessary in  those cases  as the      decisions in  the ultimate analysis      turned    on    the    breach    of      constitutional  rights.   We  agree      with Shri Nariman that the power of      the court under Article 142 insofar      as quashing of criminal proceedings      are concerned  is not  exhausted by      Section 320  or 321 or 482 Cr.PC or      all of them put together. The power      under Article 142 is at an entirely      different level  and of a different      quality.      Prohibitions       or      limitations or provisions contained      in  ordinary   laws  cannot,   ipso      facto,  act   as  prohibitions   or      limitations on  the  constitutional      powers  under   Article  142   Such      prohibitions or  limitations in the      statutes might  embody and  reflect      the scheme  of  a  particular  law,      taking into  account the nature and      status  of  the  authority  or  the      court on which conferment of powers      - limited  in some  appropriate way      not necessarily reflect or be based      on any  fundamental  considerations      of public  policy.  Shri  Sorabjee,      learned Attorney General, referring      to Garg  case, said that limitation      on the  powers  under  Article  142

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 35 of 38  

    arising  from  "inconsistency  with      express  statutory   provisions  of      substantive law"  must really  mean      and be  understood as  some express      prohibition   contained    in   any      substantive   statutory   law.   He      suggested that  if  the  expression      ‘prohibition’ is  read in  place of      ‘provision’  that   would   perhaps      convey the appropriate idea. But we      think that  such prohibition should      also be  shown to  be based on some      underlying fundamental  and general      issues of  public  policy  and  not      merely incidental  to a  particular      statutory  scheme  or  pattern.  It      will again  be wholly  incorrect to      say that  powers under  Article 142      are   subject   to   such   express      statutory prohibitions.  That would      convey  the   idea  that  statutory      provisions        override        a      constitutional provision.  Perhaps,      the proper  way of  expressing  the      idea is  that in  exercising powers      under Article  142 and in assessing      the needs  of "complete justice" of      a cause  or matter,  the apex Court      will  take   note  of  the  express      prohibitions  in   any  substantive      statutory provision  based on  some      fundamental  principles  of  public      policy and regulate the exercise of      its    power     and     discretion      accordingly. The  proposition  does      not relate  to the  powers  of  the      Court under  Article 142,  but only      to what  is  or  is  not  ‘complete      justice’ of  a cause  or matter and      in the  ultimate  analysis  of  the      propriety of  the exercise  of  the      power.  No   question  of  lack  of      jurisdiction  or   of  nullity  can      arise."      In  Delhi  Judicial  Service  Association,  Tis  Hazari Court, Delhi  vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. [(1991) 4 SCC 406] and In  Re: Vijay  Chandra Mishra  [(1995) 2  SCC 584], this Court considered  its paramount  power and  duty to  protect limbs of  administration of justice from those whose actions created interference  with or  obstruction to  the course of justice. It  was held that the failure to exercise the power with such  situations, when  it is invested specifically for the purpose,  is a  failure to discharge the duty. The first case deals  with a case when the judicial officer in Gujarat was assaulted  by the  police  and  in  the  latter  when  a practising advocate  assaulted a  Judge of  the High  Court, this Court  took suo  motu  action  and  passed  appropriate orders, in  spite of  absence of specific power to deal with or  despite  the  disciplinary  power  available  under  the Advocates Act.  In Delhi  Development Authority  vs. Skipper Construction Co.(P)  Ltd. & Anr. [(1996) 4 SCC 622], a Bench of two Judges exercised the power under Articles 129 and 142 of the  Constitution and  not only  punished the  defrauding party  but   also  directed   restoration  of  the  benefits illegally derived  to the  persons defrauded. The imposition

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 36 of 38  

of the punishment, it was held, does not denude the power of Court; it could issue directions to remedy the wrong done by the contemner  including directions  to refund  the  amounts wrongfully derived by the contemner to the rightful persons.      It would  be seen  that there  is no  limitation  under Article 142(1)  on the  exercise of the power by this Court. The necessity  to exercise  the power  is  to  do  "complete justice in  the cause  or matter".  The  inconsistency  with status  law  made  by  Parliament  arises  when  this  Court exercises  power   under  Article  142(2)  for  the  matters enumerated  therein.   Inconsistency  in  express  statutory provisions of  substantive law  would mean and be understood as some  express prohibition  contained in  any  substantive statutory prohibition contained in any substantive statutory law. The  power  under  Article  142  is  constituent  power transcendental to  statutory prohibition. Before exercise of the power under Article 142(2) and we find no limiting words to mould  the relief  or when  this Court  takes appropriate decision to  met out  justice or  to remove  injustice.  The phrase "complete justice" engrafted in Article 142(1) is the word  of  width  couched  with  elasticity  to  meet  myriad situations created  by human ingenuity or cause or result of operation of  statute law  or law declared under Article 32, 136 and  141 of  the Constitution  and cannot  be cribbed or crabbed within  any limitations  or phraseology.  Each  case needs examination  in the  light of  its  backdrop  and  the indelible effect  of the decision. In the ultimate analysis, it is  for this  Court to  exercise its power to do complete justice or  prevent injustice arising from the exigencies of the cause  or matter  before it.  The question  of  lack  of jurisdiction or  nullity of the order of this Court does not arise. As  held earlier,  the power  under Article  142 is a constituent power within the jurisdiction of this Court. So, the question  of a  law being  void ab  initio or nullity or voidable does not arise.      Admittedly,  the   Constitution  has   entrusted   this salutary duty  to this  Court with power to remove injustice of to do complete justice in any cause or matter before this Court. The  Rangachari ratio  was in operation for well over three decades  under which  reservation in  promotions  were given to several persons in several services, grade or cadre of the  Union of  India or the respective State Governments. This Court,  with a  view to see that there would not be any hiatus in the operation of that law and, as held earlier, to bring about  smooth transition  of the  operation of  law of reservation in promotions, by a judicial creativity extended the principle  of prospective  over-ruling applied  in Golak Nath case  in the  case of statutory law and of the judicial precedent in  Karunakaran’s case  and further  elongated the principle  postponing  the  operation  of  the  judgment  in Mandal’s case  for five years from the date of the judgment. This judicial  creativity is  not anathema to constitutional principle but  an accepted doctrine, as an extended facet of stare decisis.  It would  not  be  labelled  as  proviso  to Article 16(4) as contended for.      In S.P.  Sampat Kumar vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1987) 1 SCC  124], while noticing that the Administrative Tribunal Act suffered  from  constitutional  invalidity,  instead  of declaring the  Act as  invalid, declared that its invalidity would be  removed by  making necessary  suggested amendments thereto so  that the  law will  become consistent  with  the Constitution. In  St. Stephen  College case  (supra),  while holding that  the orders  issued by  Delhi  University  were violative of  Article 30(1)  of the Constitution, this Court declared that  admission by the minority institutions in the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 37 of 38  

ratio of  50:50 between  minority students  and the  general students  was  constitutional  which  is  another  facet  of judicial creativity.  In Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of Andhra Pradesh  [(1996) 2  SCC 498],  this Court, instead of declaring that  abolition of  hereditary trusteeship  of the founder   of   the   temple   to   manage   a   temple   was unconstitutional, declared  the law reading it down that the institutions would  be managed  by a  Committee of  the non- hereditary and  hereditary trustees  presided  over  by  the hereditary trustees  so as  to be  conducive to  proper  and efficient management  of the  endowment or  institutions. At the same  time,  this  Court  upheld  the  power  to  remove hereditary  trustees   who  mismanaged   the  endowment   or committee for  acts of misfeasance or malfeasance, as valid. It is settled legal principle of reading down the provisions of a  statute by  so interpreting  them as  to make  the Act consistent with  the constitutional  principles.  Instances, therefore, are  many under  which this Court has evolved the appropriate  principle   to  sustain   the  legislative   or executive  actions   consistent  with   the   constitutional philosophy or  principles. Mahendra  Lal Jaini vs. The State of Uttar  Pradesh &  Ors. [1963 Supp.(1) SCR 912], relied on by the petitioners. is of no assistance to the facts of this Case.   Therein,   the   distinction   between   the   post- constitutional and pre-constitutional law which violated the fundamental rights  and the  effect  thereof  under  Article 13(1) and  13(2) was considered. The doctrine of eclipse was pressed into  service and  explaining the  circumstances  in which the  voidity of  the pre-constitutional  law  and  the validity of  the post-constitutional  law was declared, this Court held  that the  post-constitutional law  violating the fundamental rights  was still-born  and that, therefore, was void from its inception, while the pre-constitutional law is effective from inception but its voidity supervened when the Constitution came  into force.  Therefore, it  would be void only from January 26, 1950 and the previous operation of the law remained  unaffected. The  ratio therein, therefore, has no application  to the  facts in  this case.  Similarly, the ratio in  Atam Prakash vs. State of Haryana & Ors. [(1986) 2 SCC 249]  is equally inapplicable to the facts of this case. Therein, it  was declared that the justification of right of pre-emption to different classes enumerated in Section 15 of the Punjab  Promotion  Act  was  declared  ultra  vires  and inconsistent with the modern concept of equality. Therefore, it was  held that  the law was not valid. Equally, the ratio in  Waman  Rao’s  case  (supra),  is  equally  inapplicable. Therein, it  was held  that a  law violating the fundamental rights was  void but  it remained valid under the protective umbrella of  Schedule IX of the Constitution and, therefore, though it  was void,  it cannot  be declared  to be void and remained  to   be  valid   law.  But  a  post-constitutional Kesavananda Bharati law which did not receive the protective umbrella of  Schedule IX  is void from its inception. we are not concerned,  as stated  supra, with  statute law  in this case.  Under  those  circumstances,  the  ratio  therein  is inapplicable to  the facts  in this case. A.R. Antule’s case is inapplicable  to the  facts in this case. Therein, though this Court  had directed  under Article  142  trial  of  the appellant by  a High  Court Judge,  it was  held  that  such direction  was   inconsistent  with  fundamental  rights  of equality under  Article 21  read with  Article 14  with  the trial  of  other  similarly  circumstanced  offenders  by  a properly constituted  Court with a right of appeal while the order passed under Article 142 denied him of the equality of trial process.  This Court accepted that contention and held

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 38 of 38  

that the direction issued on earlier occasion was invalid in law. In  that context,  the observations  came to be made in para 50. The ratio therein is also inapplicable to the facts in this  case. In  Delhi Judicial  Service  Association  vs. State of  Gujarat [(1991) 4 SCC 406 AT 452, para 37], it was held that the powers under Articles 32, 136, 141 and 142 are basic structures of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by statute law. Equally, the same position was reiterated in para 51 therein. The ratio also is inapplicable to the facts in this  case as  we have already held that the direction in Mandal’s case  postponing the  operation of  the judgment of reservation in  promotions for  a period  of five years is a part of  the scheme  of judicial  review being an innovative device to  mete out  justice to the Dalits and Tribes giving breathing time  to the  executive to  bring  about  suitable legislative measures,  if they  so desired  and if no action was taken  by amending the law, on expiry of five years, the judgment in  Mandal case  would become operative. Thereafter reservation in  promotion would  be  unconstitutional  which invalidity was  remedied. As held earlier, this being one of the tools  of judicial  craftsmanship adopted  by exercising the power under Article 142, which is available only to this Court, the  directions given  are not  violative  of  rights under Article  14 read  with Article  16(1), not ultra vires the power nor void, nor incompatible to or inconsistent with the doctrine  of equality  enshrined under  Article 14  read with Article  16(1) of  the Constitution. On the other hand, the power was exercised by this Court under Article 142 read with Articles  32 and the direction postponing the operation of the  decision for  a period of five years is a law of the land under Article 141.      It is  already seen  that the  rule of  reservation  in promotions was  in vogue in the State of Uttar Pradesh right from 1973  and the  promotions came  to be  made  from  1981 onwards to  the respondents  2 to 10. The U.P. Act saves the existing policy  of reservation  in promotions. The judgment in  Mandal  case  saves  the  promotions  already  made.  In Sabharwal’s case  also a  Constitution Bench  has upheld the validity of  the promotions  given in  excess of the roster; otherwise also  those promoted  on their own merit were held to be  validly promoted.  Even  excess  promotions  remained undisturbed and  the law became operative only from the date of the  judgment. This Court upheld the previous promotions, though in excess of the roster system, as constitutional and valid.  Therefore,  we  hold  that  the  promotions  of  the respondents are  legal and valid and they do not become void or unconstitutional as contended.      Both, the  appeal and the writ petition are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.