http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 14  

PETITIONER: ASHOK HURRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RUPA ASHOK HURRARUPA BIPIN ZAVERI

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       10/03/1997

BENCH: M.M. PUNCHHI, K.S. PARIPOORNAN

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                           W I T H         CIVIL APPEAL NO. ....1835......... OF  1997           (Arising out of SLP (C) No.6443 of 1995)                       J U D G M E N T PARIPOORNAN. J.      Special Leave granted in both cases. The main appeal is the one  arising out  of Special Leave Petition (C) No.20097 of 1996.  The said  appeal is filed against the judgment and order of the Gujarat High Court rendered in L.P.A. No.373 of 1996. The  appellant in  both the  appeals is  Sri Ashok  G. Hurra (the  husband) and  the respondent in both the appeals is Rupa  Ashok Hurra (the wife). We will deal with the facts in the  main  appeal  which  is  covered  by  Special  Leave Petition No.20097 of 1996. 2.   The marriage  between the  appellant (husband)  and the respondent (wife)  was solemnized  on 3.12.1970 according to the Hindu  rites and custom at Ahmedabad. The couple have on issue. It seems difference of opinion cropped up between the parties. Presumably  it persisted and so they could not stay together. On  30.6.1983, the wife left the matrimonial home. Thereafter,  the  couple  started  residing  separately.  On 21.8.1984, a  joint petition  for divorce  was  filed  under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act. It was signed by both the parties  and both of them appeared before Court. Both of them are  highly educated and intelligent and managing their own affairs  and business.  In the  joint petition,  it  was averred that  all the  matters regarding  ornaments, clothes and other  movables were  settled between  them and the wife and renounced  her right  to claim  maintenance. The parties simply sought  a decree  of dissolution  of the  marriage by mutual consent. 3.   Under  Section   13B(2)  of   the  Hindu  Marriage  Act (hereinafter referred  to as ‘the Act’), on a motion by both the parties,  six months  after the  date of presentation of the petition under sub-section (1) of the Act, and not later than eighteen  months, the Court, shall, after enquiry, pass a decree  of divorce  by mutual  consent. On  4.4.1985,  the husband alone  moved an  application praying  for passing  a decree of  divorce. On  this motion, the Court issued notice to the  wife. It  is seen  than the  hearing of the petition

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 14  

commenced  on   15.4.1985.  On   that  day,   on  the  joint application of  the advocates  of both the parties, the case was  adjourned.  Subsequently,  the  case  stood  posted  to various dates  and for  one reason  or other,  it got itself adjourned. In the meanwhile, attempts were made by the trial Judge to  bring about reconciliation between the husband and the wife.  But, it  was not  successful. Such  attempts were made  on   30.9.1985,  10.10.1985,   30.10.1985,  9.12.1985, 16.12.1985,  10.1.1986   etc.  Most   of  the  requests  for adjournments were  made jointly  by the  advocates appearing for the parties. In all such requests, mention was made that talks of  compromise/settlement  between  the  parties  were going on. 4.   On 27.3.1986, the wife filed an application withdrawing her consent  for  divorce.  She  prayed  that  petition  for divorce by  mutual consent may be dismissed. this submission was objected to by the appellant, denying the averments made in the  application and  also stating  further that the wife has no  right to  revoke the  consent which  she has legally granted. The husband filed an affidavit-in-reply on 9.4.1986 and contended  that the  wife has  no right  to withdraw  or revoke the  consent after  the period  of 18 months. He also prayed that  consistent with  the prayer  made in  the joint Hindu Marriage  Petition filed  on 21.8.1984  a  decree  for divorce by  mutual consent  may be passed. The wife seems to have filed an objection thereto. 5.   After hearing the parties, the learned City Civil Judge (the trial  court) held  that since  consent to  be accepted and, in  this view,  dismissed the  petition for  divorce by mutual consent.  In the  appeal  filed  by  the  husband,  a learned single  Judge of  the Gujarat  High Court  in  First Appeal No.1070 of 1987, by judgment dated 15.3.1996, after a review of  the entire  facts and  the relevant  law  on  the subject, came to the following conclusions:-      (1)  that all  the  ingredients  of      section  13B(1)  of  the  Act  were      satisfied  when  the  petition  was      filed;      (2)  that for  a period  six months      thereafter   the    parties    have      continued to live separate and have      not cohabited or stayed together as      husband and wife;      (3)  that the  wife  withdrew  here      consent after  the expiry of period      of 18  months from  the date of the      institution of the petition;      (4)  that the revocation of consent      after the  prescribed period  under      section 13B(2),  (18 months) by the      wife  was  not  based  on  true  or      correct ground but a false pretext,      ruse, or  non-existent  ground  put      forward   by    her   to    justify      revocation of her consent;      (5)  that  under   section  13B(2),      once the  period of  interregnum or      transitional period  starting  from      six  months   from  the   date   of      presentation of  the petition  till      the expiry  of  the  period  of  18      months  from   the  date   of   the      petition  was   over,  and  if  the      petition  is   not   withdrawn   or      consent  is   not  revoked  in  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 14  

    meantime, the  Court shall  pass  a      decree and the limited enquiry t be      made under section 13B(2) is to the      effect that :      (i)  the    marriage    has    been      solemnised;      (ii) the  averments   made  in  the      petition, namely,           (a)  that   the  parties  have      separated for  a period of one year      or more, and           (b) they have not been able to      live together; and           (c) that  they  have  mutually      agreed that  the marriage should be      dissolved." 6.   On the  basis of the above and in view of the fact that the marriage  between the husband and wife has irretrievably broken down  and reunion is not at all possible, the learned single Judge  set aside  the order  passed in Hindu Marriage Petition No. 248 of 1984 dated 17.10.1986 by the trial court and passed  the decree  of dissolution  of marriage from the date of the petition. 7.   In the  Letters Patent  Appeal No. 373/96, filed by the respondent herein  (the  wife),  a  Division  Bench  of  the Gujarat High  Court, by  judgment dated  9.9.1996, set aside the order of the learned single Judge and concluded thus:      "......the   wife    withdrew   her      consent even before the trial court      could make  an inquiry.  The  trial      court  was,   therefore,  right  in      dismissing     the      application      submitted under  section 13B of the      Act. There is no requirement in law      that the  party withdrawing consent      must give reasons or the withdrawal      must   be   based   on   reasonable      grounds. Irretrievable breakdown of      marriage   by    itself   is   nota      sufficient ground  for  dissolution      of a  marriage, as held by the Apex      Court. In the  result, we quash and      set  aside   the  order  passed  by      learned   single   Judge   granting      decree of  dissolution of  marriage      solemnized  between   the   parties      herein and  the order passed by the      trial court  is restored. We direct      the  Principal  Judge,  City  Civil      Court,   Ahmedabad   to   forthwith      assign HMP  No.328 of 1994 filed by      husband to  a learned Judge of that      court, with a request to dispose of      the petition within a period of two      months  from  the  receipt  of  the      writ."      It is  against  the  judgment  of  the  Division  Bench rendered in  the Letters  Patent Appeal  No.373 of 1996, the husband, as  appellant, filed  this appeal  after  obtaining special leave. 8.   Certain facts  which are  discernible from  the records and have some impact in the decision to be rendered, deserve to be noticed, at this stage:      The learned  single Judge  in his  judgment rendered in First  Appeal   No.1070  of   1987  has   stated  that   the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 14  

appellant/husband remarried  with one Sonia on 18.8.1985 and a male  child named Prasad was born out of the said wedlock. The respondent/wife  filed a  suit on  1.8.1994 in  the City Civil Court  for a  declaration that the judgment and decree of the  City Civil  Court dated 17.10.1986 in Hindu Marriage Petition  was   still  subsisting   and  that   relation  of appellant-husband with  Sonia was illegal and that the child out  of   such  marriage   was  illegitimate  and  that  the appellant-husband should be restrained from describing Sonia as  his   wife.  It  also  appears  that  on  15.9.1994  the appellant/husband filed  another petition for dissolution of marriage against  respondent/wife (HMP  No. 328  of 1994) on the ground  of unchastity  of the  respondent/wife  alleging large number  of pornographic relations which she is alleged to have  with her  father and  other persons  and also under Sec.13(1) alleging that the wife has for a continuous period of  not  less  than  two  years  immediately  preceding  the presentation of  the petition  deserted the  husband.  (See- paragraphs 54 and 55 in F.A. No.1070 of 1987). Regarding the subsequent petition  filed by  the wife,  the learned single Judge, in paragraph 56, has stated thus:      ".........The   allegations    made      therein by  each against  the other      are so  vulgar and  centering round      the  science  of  pornography  that      this  Court   feels  that  detailed      reference to  such facts would even      pollute  the   present  matrimonial      proceeding.   This    Court    has,      therefore,  refrained  itself  from      making reference to such allegation      made in  the subsequent petition by      the husband  against wife  and  the      allegations  made   by   the   wife      against the  husband in  her reply.      Undoubtedly, a  very strong feeling      and impression  is created  in  the      mind of this Court that not only on      re-union or  reconciliation between      the spouses  was  possible  at  any      stage  after   the  institution  of      petition  for   divorce  by  mutual      consent under sec.13B on 21.8.1984,      the parties were convinced that the      marriage was  irretrievably broken.      This  Court   also  finds  that  no      useful purpose  would be  served by      prolonging  and/or  procrastinating      the miseries  of two  spouses  when      the very  purpose of  happy married      life was lost."           (emphasis supplied)      On 15th  September, 1994,  the  appellant/husband  also filed a  criminal complaint  under Section  497 and 498 read with Section  347 of  the Indian Penal Code. The respondent- wife filed  a criminal  complaint  on  14th  November,  1994 against the appellant/husband and Sonia under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that the second marriage of the  husband with  Sonia was  bigamous marriage  and  was prohibited under Section 17 of the Act. 9.   We heard counsel. 10.  Mr.  R.K.  Jain,  Senior  Counsel,  for  the  appellant submitted thus:      (1)  The Trial  Court erred  in  dismissing  the  joint application filed  by the  parties under  Section 13B of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 14  

Act. The  respondent/wife has  no  locus  or  competency  to withdraw her consent after the period of 18 months specified in Section 13B(2) of the Act.      (2)  The trial  court as  will as the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court which heard the Letters Patent Appeal overlooked the crucial words occurring in Section 13B(1) and 13B(2) of  the Act.  Under Section  13B(1)  of  the  Act,  a petition for  dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce should be presented by both the parties together. But, under Section 13B(2),  for making the motion for passing a decree, after the period of six months, both the parties need not be present. In this case, the joint petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce was presented by the husband and wife  together in  compliance with Section 13B(1) of the Act. All the three ingredients were satisfied when the joint petition was  filed by  the parties,  namely, (a)  that they have separated  for a  period of  one year or more; (b) that they have  not been  able to live together and (c) that they have mutually  agreed to  dissolve the  marriage. The motion for passing  a decree  was made after six months of the date of presentation of the petition by the husband for which the wife had notice and this is sufficient compliance of Section 13B(2) of  the Act.  Since the  wife has  not withdrawn  her consent within  the period  of 18  months after  the date of presentation of the petition, the trail court was obliged to pass a decree of divorce after hearing the parties.      (3)  In any  view of  the  matter,  from  the  strained relationship between  the parties for over 13 years, and the "Kilkenny fight"  between  the  parties,  who  are  educated persons, it  is evident, that the marriage has irretrievably broken down  with no chance of re-union and so this Court by taking  into   account,  the   totality  of  the  facts  and circumstances in this exceptional case, should pass a decree of divorce,  with appropriate  directions, in  order  to  do complete justice in the matter. 11.  On the  other hand, Mr. Jaitley, senior Counsel for the respondent stated thus:      (1)  It is  true, that a joint petition for dissolution of marriage  by the  decree of  divorce was made by both the parties together  and the requirements of Section 13B(1) are satisfied. Under Section 13B(2) of the Act, in order to pass a decree  after the period of six months, a motion should be made by  both the  parties. It  is not  so in this case. The motion was made only by the husband. It is incompetent.      (2)  The  respondent/wife  had  withdrawn  the  consent before the  enquiry, at  any rate,  before the  decree under Section 13B(2)  could be  passed.  Consent  for  dissolution should  be   present  at   the  time  of  filing  the  joint application as  also on  the date  when the decree has to be passed. The  expiry of  18 months from the date of filing of the petition is irrelevant.      (3)  Notwithstanding the  strained relationship between the parties  and  other  factors  urged  to  show  that  the marriage has  broken down  irretrievably, the conduct of the appellant/husband disentitles  him to  any  relief.  Indeed, when the  proceedings were  still pending in the trial court the appellant  married a  second time  and got a male child. Thereby, he  committed a  wrong. He cannot take advantage of his own  wrong, and  cannot invoke  the jurisdiction of this Court by  urging it  as a  ground for  passing a  decree  of divorce in order to do complete justice in the matter. 12.  Counsel  on   both  sides   placed   their   respective interpretation of  Section 13B  of the  Hindu Marriage  Act. Section 13B of the Act reads as follows:      "13B. (1) Subject to the provisions

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 14  

    of  this   Act   a   petition   for      dissolution of marriage by a decree      of divorce  may be presented to the      district court  by both the parties      to  a  marriage  together,  whether      such marriage was solemnized before      or after  the commencement  of  the      Marriage  Laws  (Amendment  )  Act,      1976 on  the ground  that they have      bee living  separately for a period      of one year of more, that they have      not been  able to live together and      that they have mutually agreed that      the marriage should be dissolved.      (2)  On  the  motion  of  both  the      parties  made   not  earlier   than      months  after   the  date   of  the      presentation   of    the   petition      referred to  in sub-section (1) and      not  later   than  eighteen  months      after  the   said  date,   if   the      petition is  the said  date, if the      petition is  not withdrawn  in  the      meantime, the court shall, on being      satisfied,   after    hearing   the      parties  and   after  making   such      enquiry as  it thinks  fit, that  a      marriage has  been  solemnized  and      that the  averments in the petition      are true,  pass a decree of divorce      declaring  the   marriage   to   be      dissolved with effect from the date      of the decree."           (emphasis supplied) 13.  Mr. Jaitley, counsel for the respondent, heavily relied o the  decision of this court in Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash [1991(1) SCR  274 =  AIR 1992 SC 1904] and contended that it is open to one of the parties at any time till the decree of divorce is  passed to  withdraw the  consent  given  to  the petition, and  mutual consent  to the  divorce is a sine qua non for  passing a  decree for  divorce under Section 13B of the Act.  Mutual consent  should continue  till the  divorce decree is  passed. It  is positive requirement for the Court to pass  a decree  of divorce.  Since this  crucial or vital aspect is  absent in  this case,  counsel  argued  that  the matter is  concluded and  that it is unnecessary to consider the other  aspects urged regarding Section 13B of the Act or to focus  attention on  the totality  of the circumstance to consider whether  any  other  appropriate  order  should  be passed by this Court at this juncture. 14.  On the  other hand, counsel for the appellant Mr. Jain, contended that the actual issue involved in Sureshtra Devi’s case (supra  ) was  in a narrow compass, namely, whether the consent given  can be  unilaterally withdrawn. In that case, the consent was withdrawn within the period of 18 months and no question arose as to whether the consent can be withdrawn 18 months  after the filing of the joint petition and so the decision is  distinguishable. But  the court  considered the larger question  as to  whether it  is open  to one  of  the parties till  the decree  of divorce  is passed, to withdraw the consent  given to  the position.  The  decision  on  the larger question  is only  obiter and  the decision  requires reconsideration. That apart, this Court has got the power to consider the  totality of  the circumstances,  including the subsequent events,  in order  to do  complete justice in the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 14  

matter, which are the following :      The pendency  of the  proceedings for  a long period of over 12  years, the  acrimonious battle between the parties, the allegation  and counter-allegations made by the parties, the fact  that the  marriage is  dead  or  has  broken  down irretrievably without  any chance  or re-union  between  the parties,  that  continuance  of  the  stalemate  is  only  a futility leading  to a  tortious life for both and continued agony and  that the  parties are  living separately for more than 13  years -- these should weigh with the Court to grant a decree  for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Act  and dissolve  the marriage  between them  and  give appropriate    directions     including     provision     of reasonable/adequate funds  for the  wife to  have  a  decent living and  it was  indicated that a lump sum payment of Rs. 4/5 lakhs  may be reasonable. Counsel also stressed the fact that in  the joint  petition filed for divorce, it is stated that all  matters regarding  ornaments, clothes,  moveables, etc. were  settled between  the parties  and  the  wife  has renounced her  right to claim maintenance and this should be taken into  consideration. Counsel  on both sides brought to out notice few decisions of the different High Courts and of this Court to substantiate their pleas. 15.  We are  of  opinion  that  in  the  light  of  the  fat situation present  in this case, the conduct of the parties, the admissions  made by  the parties  in the  joint petition filed in  Court, and  the offer  made by appellant’s counsel for settlement,  which  appears  to  be  bonafide,  and  the conclusion reached  by us  on an overall view of the matter, it may  not be  necessary to deal with the rival pleas urged by the parties regarding the scope of Section 13B of the Act and the  correctness or otherwise of the earlier decision of this Court  in Sureshta  Devi’s case  (supra) or the various High Court  decisions brought  to  our  notice,  in  detail. However, with  great  respect  to  the  learned  Judges  who rendered the  decision  in  Sureshta  Devi’s  case  (supra), certain observations  therein seem  to be  very wide and may require reconsideration  in an appropriate case. In the said case, the facts were :-      The appellant  (wife) before  this  Court  married  the respondent therein on 21.11.1968. They did not stay together from 9.12.1984  onwards. On  9.1.1985, the  husband and wife together moved  a petition  under Section 13B of the Act for divorce by  mutual consent. The Court recorded statements of the parties.  On 15.1.1985, the wife filed an application in the Court  stating that  her statement  dated  9.1.1985  was obtained  under   pressure  and   threat.  She   prayed  for withdrawal of  her consent  for  the  petition  filed  under Section 13B  and also  prayed for dismissal of the petition. The  District  Judge  dismissed  the  petition  filed  under Section 13B  of the  Act. In appeal, the High Court observed that the  spouse who  has given  consent to  a petition  for divorce cannot  unilaterally withdraw  the consent  and such withdrawal, however, would not take away the jurisdiction of the Court to dissolve the marriage by mutual consent, if the consent was other wise free. It was found that the appellant (wife) gave  her consent  to the petition without any force, fraud or  undue influence  and so  she  was  bound  by  that consent. The  issue that  came up  for consideration  before this Court was, whether a party to a petition for divorce by mutual  consent   under  Section   13B  of   the  Act,   can unilaterally withdraw  the consent  and whether  the consent once given  is  irrevocable.  It  was  undisputed  that  the consent was  withdrawn within a week from the date of filing of the  joint petition  under Section 13B. It was within the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 14  

time limit  prescribed under  Section 13B(2)  of the Act. On the above  premises, the  crucial question  was whether  the consent given  could be unilaterally withdrawn. The question as to  whether a  party to  a joint  application filed under Section 13B  of the  Act can withdraw the consent beyond the time limit  provided under Section 13B(2) of the Act did not arise for  consideration. It  was not  in issue at all. Even so, the  Court considered  the larger question as to whether it is  open to  one of the parties at any time till a decree of divorce  is passed  to withdraw  the consent given to the petition. In considering the larger issue, conflicting views of the  High Courts  were adverted  to and finally the Court held that  the  mutual  consent  should  continue  till  the divorce decree  is passed.  In the light of the clear import of the  language employed  in Section  13B(2) of the Act, it appears that  in a  joint petition  duly filed under Section 13B(1) of the Act, motion of both parties should be made six months after  the date  of filing  of the  petition and  not later than  18 months,  if the  petition is not withdrawn in the meantime. In other words, the period of interregnum of 6 to 18  months was  intended to  give time and opportunity to the parties to have a second thought and change the mind. If it is  not so  done within the outer limit of 18 months, the petition duly  filed under  Section 13B(1) and still pending shall be  adjudicated by  the Court  as provided  in Section 13B(2) of  the Act.  It appears  to us,  the observations of this Court to the effect that mutual consent should continue till the  divorce decree  is passed, even if the petition is not withdrawn  by one of the parties within the period of 18 months, appears to be too wide and does not logically accord with Section  13B(2) of  the Act. However, it is unnecessary to decided  this vexed  issue in  this case,  since we  have reached the  conclusion on  the fact  situation herein.  The decision  in   Sureshta  Devi’s  case  (supra)  may  require reconsideration in an appropriate case. We leave it there. 16.  Now we  shall advert  to the findings arrived at by the learned single  Judge and  the Division  Bench in the letter Patent Appeal.  In paragraph 56 of the judgment, the learned single Judge has found thus :      "Undoubtedly, a very strong feeling      and impression  is created  in  the      mind of this Court that not only no      re-union or  reconciliation between      the spouses  was  possible  at  any      stage  after   the  institution  of      petition  for   divorce  by  mutual      consent  under   Section   13B   on      21.8.1984,   the    parties    were      convinced  that  the  marriage  was      irretrievably  broken.  This  Court      also finds  that no  useful purpose      would  be   served  by   prolonging      and/or procrastinating the miseries      of  two   spouses  when   the  very      purpose of  happy married  life was      lost.      ..................................      Parties  have   now   resorted   to      various    civil    and    criminal      proceeding against each other."           (emphasis supplied)      Again in  paragraph 59 of the judgment, the Court found thus:      "The fact  situation which prevails      before this  Court though not fully

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 14  

    comparable to the facts can be said      to be identical, the rupture in the      marital tie is created much earlier      and  admittedly  the  parties  have      started residing  separately  since      1983 and   after full understanding      and consideration of facts they had      filed  petition   for  divorce   by      mutual consent  in the  year  1984.      The    husband    has    thereafter      remarried Sonia and had a child out      of  such   wedlock.  The  wife  has      thereafter  filed  Civil  suit  for      declaration  about  the  status  of      second wife  and child  born out of      such  marriage  and  also  criminal      complaint. The  husband has also in      his   turn    filed   petition   of      dissolution of  marriage and also a      criminal complaint.  The fact  that      there is  no possibility of reunion      is clearly established and is in no      uncertain  terms  admitted  by  the      wife before  the Court. The obvious      conclusion is that she has resolved      not only  to live  in agony  but to      make life  of her husband miserable      too. ....  .....  ....  .....  ....      ....   In    the   fact   situation      obtaining before  this Court it can      safely conclude  that the  marriage      between  the   parties   has   been      irretrievably broken and that there      is  no   chance  of   their  coming      together or living together."           (emphasis supplied)      Again in  paragraph 72  of the  judgment,  the  learned single Judge stated thus :      "However, in my opinion, in view of      the decisions of the Apex Court, in      the subsequent decisions, namely in      the case Chandrakala Menon v. Vipin      Menon (1993)  2 SCC  6; in the case      of V.  Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (1994) 1      SCC 337; in the case of Chandrakala      Trivedi v.  Dr. S.P. Trivedi (1993)      4 SCC  232;  and  in  the  case  of      Romesh Chander  v. Smt. Savitri (JT      1995 (1)  SC 362)  when  the  Court      come to  the  conclusion  that  the      marriage  is  irretrievably  broken      and that  there was  no possibility      of   reunion    or   reconciliation      between  the   parties   and   that      ingredient  of  Sec.23(1)(bb)  were      non-existent; i.e.  there was  free      consent to  a  joint  petition  for      divorce by  mutual consent  by both      the  parties,  the  Court  can  and      shall have  to pass  a  decree  for      dissolution of  marriage by  mutual      consent  as  the  very  legislative      intent  behind   enacting  such   a      provision   would    be    rendered      meaningless if  it would render the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 14  

    provision to  lead to  position  of      perpetuation or  procrastination of      agonies   and   miseries   of   the      separated   spouses   despite   the      realisation that  no reconciliation      was possible."           (emphasis supplied) 17.  In  the  Letters  Patent  Appeal,  the  Division  Bench entered the following findings :-      (i)  Irretrievable  break  down  or           marriage is  not a  ground  by           itself to  grant a  decree  of           dissolution of marriage;      (ii) Even   if    a    decree    of           dissolution  could  have  been           granted,  it  could  not  have           been granted  from the date of           the  petition,  but  it  could           have been  granted  only  from           the date of the decree;      (iii)    In     the    facts    and           circumstances  of   the  case,           even if  discretion is  vested           in  this   Court,  this  Court           would not like to exercise the           discretion  looking   to   the           conduct of  the husband,  i.e.           (1)  remarriage   during   the           subsistence   of   the   first           marriage   and    during   the           pendency of  the petition, (2)           participating               in           reconciliation     proceedings           knowing  fully  will  that  he           cannot accept appellant as his           wife  any   more  as   he  has           remarried,       and       (3)           unnecessarily  prolonging  the           matter;      (iv) We would  just say  that  this           Court has  no power similar to           Article     142     of     the           Constitution   and   even   if           similar powers  are conferred,           in  the   peculiar  facts  and           circumstances of  the  instant           case, it  would not  be proper           on our  part to  exercise such           powers;      (v)  Summing up,  we must  say that           there is  not  a  singly  case           where    the    consent    was           withdrawn before the  stage of           inquiry  and   yet  the  Court           passed  a  decree  of  divorce           with effect  from the  date of           the application;  there is not           a single case where either the           husband or  wife marriage  and           yet the  Court  has  passed  a           decree of  dissolution of  the           first  marriage   which  would           benefit  a   party   who   has           committed  a   wrong.  On  the           contrary, the  Apex Court  has

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 14  

         refused to  grant a  decree on           the  ground  of  irretrievable           break  down   of  marriage  as           during  the  pendency  of  the           appeal, husband remarried. The           paramount consideration should           be that  a party  who come  to           the  Court  with  clean  hands           should be  assisted. Power may           be exercised  in favour of the           party who  comes to  the Court           with clean hands. 18.  After considering  the matter  in detail,  we find that the appellate Court has not disputed the following:      (a)  the   marriage   between   the           parties  is   dead   and   has           irretrievably broken down;      (b)  there   are  allegations   and           counter-allegations    between           the    parties     and    also           litigations in  various courts           an no  love  is  lost  between           them;      (c)  there is delay in the disposal           of the matter;      (d)  the husband  has married again           and has got a child; and      (e)  the wife has not withdrawn her           consent lawfully  given for  a           period of  18 months and it is           not a  case where  the consent           given is revoked on the ground           that it  is vitiated  by fraud           or undue  influence or mistake           etc.      (f)  That the  joint petition filed           in court by the parties stated           (a)  that   the  parties  have           settled all  the  matters  and           the  wife  has  renounced  her           right to claim maintenance and           (b) what  the  parties  prayed           for,  was  only  a  decree  of           desolution of  the marriage by           mutual consent. 19.  It appears to us that the appellate Court was swayed by the fact  that the  appellant/husband has  not come to court with clean  hands; in that he married during the pendency of the proceeding.  It may  be, as  expressed by  the appellate Court that  factors such  as the  marriage is  dead and  has broken down  irretrievably, that  there was no chance of re- union, that  there were  allegations and counter-allegations made  by   the  parties,  that  the  parties  were  residing separately for  nearly 13  years --  each one  of the  above factors by itself (individually) may not afford a ground for divorce by mutual consent. 20.  When the  matter was  pending in this Court, there were attempts to  settle the  matter. But, finally consel on both sides reported that there is no scope for settlement between the parties. 21.  We are  of the  view that  the cumulative effect of the various aspects  in the case indisputably point out that the marriage is  dead, both  emotionally  and  practically,  and there is  no chance  at all  of the  same being  revived and continuation of  such relationship is only for name-sake and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 14  

that no  love is  lost between  the parties,  who have  been fighting like  "Kilkenny cats"  and there  is long  lapse of years since the filing of the petition and existence of such a state  of affairs warrant the exercise of the jurisdiction of this  Court under  Article 142  of the  Constitution  and grant a  decree of  divorce by  mutual consent under Section 13B of  the  Act  and  dissolve  the  marriage  between  the parties, in  order to  meet the  ends of justice, in all the circumstances of  the case  subject to  certain  safeguards. Appropriate safeguard  or provision  for the respondent/wife to enable  her to  have a  decent living should be made. The appellant is  a well  to do person and is a Doctor. He seems to be affluent being a member of the medical fraternity. But his conduct  during  litigation  is  not  above  board.  The suggestion or  offer of a lump sum payment of rupees four to five  lakhs,   towards  provision   for  wife,   is  totally insufficient, in  modern days  of high  cost of  living  and particularly for a women of the status of the respondent. At least, a sum of about Rs.10,000/- p.m. will be necessary for a  reasonable   living.  Taking   into  account  all  aspect appearing in  the case,  more so  the conduct of the parties and the  admissions contained in the joint petition filed in court, we  hold that the respondent (wife) should be paid, a lump sum of rupees ten lakhs (Rs.10 lakhs) (and her costs in this litigation  as estimated by us) on or before 10.12.1997 as mentioned  hereinbelow, as  a condition precedent for the decree passed by this Court to take effect. 22.  There is  no useful  purpose served  in prolonging  the agony any  further and  the curtain  should be  rung at some stage. In  coming to  the above conclusion, we have not lost sight of  the fact that the conduct of the husband is blame- worthy in  that he  married a  second time  and got  a child during the  pendency of  the proceedings.  But  that  factor cannot be  blown out  of proportion  or viewed in isolation, nor can  deter this  Court to take a total and broad view of the ground  realities of  the situation  when we  deal  with adjustment  of  human  relationship.  We  are  fortified  in reaching the  conclusion aforesaid  by a  decision  of  this Court reported in Chandrakala Menon v. Vipin Menon [(1993) 2 SCC 6].  Earlier decisions  of  this  Court  in  Chandrakala Trivedi v.  Dr. S.P. Trivedi [(1993) (4) SCC 232]; V. Bhagat v. D.  Bhagat [(1994)  1 SCC 337] and Romesh Chander v. Smt. Savitri [JT  1995 (1)  SC 362] also afford useful guidelines in the matter. 23.  A few excerpts from the Seventy-first Report of the Law Commission of  India on  the Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  -- "Irretrievable breakdown of marriage" -- dated April 7, 1978 throw much light on the matter:      "Irretrievable     breakdown     of      marriage is  now considered, in the      law of  a number  of  countries,  a      good  ground   of  dissolving   the      marriage by  granting a  decree  of      divorce.   .....            .......      ..........       ...............      Proof of  such a breakdown would be      that  the  husband  and  wife  have      separated  and   have  been  living      apart for, say, a period of five or      ten  years   and  it   has   become      impossible   to    resurrect    the      marriage   or   to   re-unite   the      parties. It  is stated  that one it      is  known   that   there   are   no      prospects of  the  success  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 14  

    marriage, to  drag  the  legal  tie      acts as a cruelty to the spouse and      gives rise  to crime and even abuse      of religion  to obtain annulment of      marriage. ... .... .....      The    theoretical     basis    for      introducing irretrievable breakdown      as a  ground of divorce is one with      which, by  now, lawyers  and others      have become  familiar.  Restricting      the  ground   of   divorce   to   a      particular offence  or  matrimonial      disability,  it  is  urged,  causes      injustice in  those cases where the      situation  is  such  that  although      none of the parties is at fault, or      the fault  is of such a nature that      the parties  to the marriage do not      want to  divulge it,  yet there has      arisen a  situation  in  which  the      marriage  cannot   be  worked.  The      marriage  has   all  the   external      appearance of marriage, but none of      the  reality.   As  is   often  put      pithily, the  marriage is  merely a      shell out of which the substance is      gone. In  such circumstance,  it is      stated, there is hardly any utility      in maintaining  the marriage  as  a      facade, when  are of the essence of      marriage have disappeared.           After the  marriage has ceased      to  exist   in  substance   and  in      reality, there  is  no  reason  for      denying divorce.  The parties alone      can  decide  whether  their  mutual      relationship      provides      the      fulfilment which they seek. Divorce      should be seen as a solution and an      escape route  out  of  a  difficult      situation.    Such    divorce    is      unconcerned with  the wrongs of the      past,   but   is   concerned   with      bringing  the   parties   and   the      children  to  terms  with  the  new      situation   and   developments   by      working out  the most  satisfactory      basis upon  which they may regulate      their relationship  in the  changed      circumstances.............      Moreover, the  essence of  marriage      is a  sharing  of  common  life,  a      sharing of  all the  happiness that      life  has  to  offer  and  all  the      misery that  has  to  be  faced  in      life, an experience of the joy that      comes  from  enjoying,  in  common,      things of  the matter  and  of  the      spirit and  from showering love and      affection n one’s offspring. Living      together  is   a  symbol   of  such      sharing in  all its aspects. Living      apart is  a symbol  indicating  the      negation of  such  sharing.  It  is      indicative of  a disruption  of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 14  

    essence of marriage -- "breaking" -      - and  if it continues for a fairly      long  period,   it  would  indicate      destruction  of   the  essence   of      marriage     --      "irretrievable      breakdown." 24.  S.L.P.  No.6443  of  1995  was  filed  earlier  by  the appellant herein  praying that  this Hon’ble  Court  may  be pleased to  invoke Article  142 of the Constitution of India and pass  appropriate orders  granting a  decree of divorce. The Special  Leave Petition was filed against the order of a single Judge of the Judge of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Application No.949  of 1995  dated 17.2.1995  dismissing the application of  the  appellant  for  granting  a  decree  of divorce in respect of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent.  It is  unnecessary to  advert to  the facts stated therein  and other  matter since consideration of the appeal arising  out of  S.L.P. No.6443  of 1995  has  become academic and  unnecessary in  view of the final order passed in the main appeal. hold accordingly.  No separated  orders  are  necessary  the Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. No.6443/95. 25.  The appeal  (filed  from  S.L.P.20097/96)  is  allowed. Subject to  the fulfilment  of the  following conditions,  a decree of  divorce for  dissolution of  marriage  by  mutual consent solemnized  between the appellant and the respondent is passed  under Section  13B of  the Act.  It is made clear that the decree is conditional and shall take effect only on payment or deposit in this Court of the entire sum of rupees ten lakhs  by the  appellant to  the respondent,  as ordered herein and  also the  cost as  assessed below  on or  before 10.12.1997. The  appellant shall  pay or  remit the  amounts ordered before  the said date, in two instalments - a sum of Rs.5 lakhs  + Rs.50,000/-  (the assessed  cost)  as  ordered hereinbelow, on or before 10.8.1997 and the balance of Rs. 5 lakhs (rupees  five lakhs)  on  or  before  10.12.1997.  The assessed costs required to be paid by the appellant shall be Rs.50,000/- towards the entire proceeding to the respondent. If default  is made  in the payment of the instalment due on 10.8.1997 together  with cost,  then also, this decree shall not take effect and the appeal shall stand dismissed. If the amounts ordered  herein are  duly deposited in this Court by the appellant, the respondent can withdraw the said amounts, without further orders. We further declare and hold that all pending proceedings, more particularly referred to in para 8 of this judgment, including the proceeding under Section 494 IPC read with Section 17 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 between the parties  shall stand  terminated, but only on payment or deposit of  the amounts ordered by us in this judgment. This is made clear.      The appeal are disposed of in the above terms.