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PETITIONER: ASHARAM M. JAIN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: A. T. GUPTA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/08/1983

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SEN, A.P. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1983 AIR 1151            1983 SCR  (3) 719  1983 SCC  (4) 125        1983 SCALE  (2)138  CITATOR INFO :  R          1992 SC 904  (55)

ACT:      Contempt  of   Court-Strains   and   mortification   of litigation cannot  be allowed  to lead litigants to tarnish, terrorise  and  destroy  the  system  of  administration  of justice by vilification of judges.

HEADNOTE:      In a petition for special leave to appeal filed by him, the petitioner indulged in wild and vicious diatribe against the Chief Justice of the High Court who had passed the order sought to  be appealed  from. In answer to the notice issued to him  under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 he prayed for two weeks’ time to file an affidavit (which was granted) and stated that  he was not prepared to withdraw the allegations but desired  to make  amends. When the matter came up again, his counsel  placed before  the Court  an affidavit  said to contain  the   sincere  and  unconditional  apology  of  the petitioner and  pleaded that  the Court should accept it and refrain from  sending him  to prison. Council, relying on In re: Shri  S. Mulgaonkar,  [1978] 3 S.C.R. 162 suggested that "a normative  guideline for  the judges  to observe  in this jurisdiction" was not to be hypersensitive where distortions and criticism  overstep the  limits, but  to deflate  vulgar denunciation    by    dignified    bearing,    condescending indifference and repudiation by judicial rectitude".      Rejecting the  plea and  sentencing  the  contemner  to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two months. ^      HELD:   There   is   never   any   risk   of   judicial hypersensitivity. The  very nature  of the judicial function makes judges  sympathetic and  responsive. Judges  more than others  realise   the   foibles,   the   frustrations,   the undercurrents and  the tensions of litigants and litigation. But, as  elsewhere, lines  have to be drawn. The strains and mortification  of  litigation  cannot  be  allowed  to  lead litigants to  tarnish, terrorise  and destroy  the system of administration of  justice by  vilification of judges. It is not that judges need be protected; judges may well take care of themselves. It is the right and interest of the public in

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the due  administration of justice that has to be protected. The question has to be approached not from the point of view of  the  judge  whose  honour  and  dignity  require  to  be vindicated, but  from the  point of  view of  the public who have entrusted  to judges  the task of due administration of justice. A  contumacious disregard of all decencies, such as that exhibited  by the  contemner in this case can only lead to a  serious disturbance of the system of administration of justice, unless  duly repaired  at  once  by  inflicting  an appropriate punishment on the 720 contemner which must be to send him to jail to atone for his misconduct and  thereafter to come out of prison a chastened but a better citizen.                                            [722 D-G; 723E-G]      Advocate General  of Bihar  v. M.  P. Khair Industries, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 1172, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLETE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition (Civil) No. 6735 of 1983.      From the  Judgment and Order dated the 14th April, 1983 of the Bombay High Court in Notice of Motion No. 859 of 1982 in Appeal No. 295 of 1982.      R. K.  Garg, U.  R.  Lalit,  R.  V.  Mehta  and  B.  P. Maheshwari, with them for the Petitioners.      Dr. Y. S. Chitale, Raju Ramchandran and D. C. Singhania for the Respondents.      The order of the Court was delivered by      CHINAPPA REDDY, J. Asharam M. Jain sought special leave of this  Court under  Art. 136 of the Constitution to appeal against the order of the High Court of Maharashtra in Notice of Motion No. 859 of 1982. The petition for special leave to appeal ran  to 84  pages at the foot of the petition, it was stated "drawn and filed by B. P. Maheshwari & Co., Advocates for the  petitioner". Asharam  M. Jain  filed  an  affidavit along with  the special  leave petition  affirming that  the statement of facts in paragraphs 1 to 67 in the petition for special leave  to appeal  were true  to  his  knowledge  and belief and  based on  the record  of  the  lower  court.  In several paragraphs of the special leave petition, Asharam M. Jain indulged  in wild and vicious diatribe against the then Chief  Justice   of  the   High  Court  of  Maharashtra.  To illustrate the  limits of the invective, we wish to refer to but one  paragraph of  the petition,  In paragraph 26 of the petition, it was stated by Asharam M. Jain:           "The petitioner  says that  having found that they      would no  longer be justified in continuing to hear the      Notice of  Motion and appeal for the several true facts      set out  in the Transfer Application and the affidavits      made by  the petitioner  and  briefly  hereinabove  set      about the learned 721      Chief Justice  tried by  the said  order  to  harm  the      petitioner as  much as  he could and made totally false      and wrong  observations quite  unworthy of  the head of      the judiciary  of the  State of  Maharashtra,  and  His      Lordship, Mr.  Justice  Pendse  supported  the  learned      Chief Justice  The said  Order, it  is clear,  has been      made with  the sole  and dishonest  object  of  causing      prejudice in  the minds  of the Judges of the new Bench      against the  petitioner and depriving the Judges of the      new Bench  of their  right to  independently judicially

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    decide the  Notice of  Motion on  merits, and  which is      proved by subsequent events." When the  special leave petition was heard on April 27, 1983 by this  Court, the  outrageous allegations made against the Chief Justice  and the other learned Judge of the High Court of Maharashtra  were noticed and two of us (A. P. Sen and E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ) made the following order:           "The special  leave  petition  is  dismissed.  Our      attention is drawn to paragraphs 6, 10, 11, 13, 16, 19,      20, 26,  27, 28  30, 31, 34, 38, 39, 42, 50, 57, 60, 62      and grounds  5(v), (x),  7 to 10, (z), (mm), (tt), (uu)      of the  special leave petition. The learned Judges have      also in  the course  of the order made reference to the      conduct of  the petitioner in casting aspersions on the      former Chief  Justice. Issue notice for contempt to the      petitioner why  he should not be committed for contempt      under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971". In answer  to the  notice issued  to  Asharam  M.  Jain,  he appeared  before  the  court  on  July  25,  1983  when  the following order was made:           "Shri Garg,  appears along  with the contemner. He      prays for  two weeks’  time to  file an  affidavit  and      states on  instruction that  his client is not prepared      to withdraw  the allegations  but wants to make amends.      He is allowed two weeks’ time to file an affidavit.           "Issue notice  to the  Attorney-General for  India      requesting him  to appear  ann assist  the court in the      case. The  Registry shall furnish a copy of the special      leave 722      petition and  the show  cause  notice  to  the  learned      Attorney-General.           "The matter  be listed  on August  22,  1983.  The      contemner shall  remain present  in the  court on  that      date". When the matter was taken up for hearing on August 22, 1982, Shri R.  K. Garg  placed before  us an  affidavit,  said  to contain the  sincere and unconditional apology of Asharam M. Jain and  stated that  the contemner  was placing himself at the mercy  of the  court. He submitted that the court should be so gracious as to accept the unqualified apology tendered by the  contemner and  refrain from sending the contemner to prison.  He   invited  our  attention  to  In  Re:  Shri  S. Mulgaonkar(1) where  Krishna  Iyer,  J.  suggested  that  ‘a normative guideline  for  the  judges  to  observe  in  this jurisdiction’  was   "not   to   be   hypersensitive   where distortions  and  criticism  overstep  the  limits,  but  to deflate   vulgar    denunciation   by   dignified   bearing, condescending  indifference   and  repudiation  by  judicial rectitude".      There is  never any  risk of judicial hypersensitivity. The very  nature  of  the  judicial  function  makes  judges sympathetic and responsive. Their very training blesses them with ‘insensitivity’, as opposed to hypersensitivity. Judges are always  seeking good  reasons to  explain wrong conduct. They know there are always two sides to a coin. They neither give nor  take offence  because they  deal with  persons and situations impersonally,  though with  understanding. Judges more than  others realise the foibles, the frustrations, the undercurrents and  the tensions of litigants and litigation. But, as  elsewhere, lines  have to be drawn. The strains and mortification  of  litigation  cannot  be  allowed  to  lead litigants to  tarnish, terrorise  and destroy  the system of administration of  justice by  vilification of judges. It is not that judges need be protected; judges may well take care

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of themselves. It is the right and interest of the public in the due  administration of justice that has to protected. We had occasion  to point this out in Advocate General Bihar v. M. P. Khair Industries,(2) where we said:           "But, on  the other  hand, it  may be necessary to      punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses 723      and makes  a mockery  of the judicial process and which      thus  extends   its  pernicious  influence  beyond  the      parties to  the action  and affects the interest of the      public in  the administration  of justice.  The  public      have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a      vital stake in the effective and orderly administration      of justice, because, unless justice is so administered,      there  is   the  peril  of  all  rights  and  liberties      perishing. The  Court has  the duty  of protecting  the      interest of  the public  in the  due administration  of      justice and,  so, it  is entrusted  with the  power  to      commit for  Contempt of  Court, not in order to protect      the dignity  of the  Court against  insult or injury as      the expression "Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest,      but, to  protect and  to vindicate  the  right  of  the      public that  the administration of justice shall not be      prevented, prejudiced,  obstructed or  interfered with.      "It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its      active manifestation  against obstruction and outrage."      "The law  should not  be seen  to sit  by limply, while      those who  defy it  go free,  and those  who  seek  its      protection lose hope." So we  approach the  question not  from the point of view of the judge whose honour and dignity require to be vindicated, but from  the point of view of the public who have entrusted to us  the task  of due  administration of  justice.  Having given  our   utmost  consideration,  we  have  come  to  the conclusion that  it is not open to us to accept the easy and ready solution  suggested by Mr. R. K. Garg of accepting the apology and  imposing a  fine. We  think that a contumacious disregard of  all decencies,  such as, that exhibited by the contemner  in   this  case   can  only  lead  to  a  serious disturbance of  the system  of  administration  of  justice, unless duly  repaired atones  by inflicting  an  appropriate punishment on  the contemner  which must  be to  send him to jail to  atone for his misconduct and thereafter to come out of prison  a chastened  but a better citizen. We accordingly sentence him  to suffer  simple imprisonment for a period of two months.      Before we part with the case, we must express our sense of shock  at a sad revelation made by Shri R. K. Garg during the course  of the  hearing. When  we expressed our surprise and disgust that the special leave petition should have been drawn and  settled by  advocates of  this Court,  he told us that special leave petitions are 724 often filed  over the  names of  counsel,  who  receive  the papers from  counsel outside  Delhi and  file  them  in  the Registry of  the Court  as if  drawn and  settled  by  them, though they may have never even looked into the papers. This is hardly  proper and  surely discourteous  to the Court. We hope this is not a common practice. H.L.C.                                   Petition dismissed. 725