REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1123 OF 2008

Arun Raj                                                                         ……….Appellant

Versus

Union of India & Ors.                                                    ……..Respondents

JUDGMENT

H.L. Dattu, J.  

1)         This appeal by special leave is limited to a particular question  

only, namely, correctness of the conviction of the appellant Arun Raj  

for  an  offence  under  Section  302  of  Indian  Penal  Code  and  the  

propriety of the sentence passed thereunder by the Presiding Officer  

of General Court Martial under the Indian Army Act.  The short facts  

are these - The appellant joined the Indian Army in the year 1983 and  

1

in the year 1998 he was working as Ex-Signalman (Lance Nayak) of  

787  (Independent)  Air  Defence  Brigade  Signal  Company.  On  

22.3.1998, one Mr. S.S.B Rao (PW-4) was the Section In-Charge of  

Operator Section. At about 1 PM, Mr. Rao returned from lunch and  

the appellant reported to him that Havildar R.C Tiwari (deceased) and  

Havildar Inderpal (PW-3) abused him by using the word “Gandu”. On  

Mr. Rao making an inquiry into the same, they replied in the negative,  

despite the appellant making repeated assertion that they insulted him  

using the said word. The appellant also brought to the information of  

Mr.  Rao  that  in  the  previous  night  there  was  a  heated  discussion  

between the appellant and the deceased and Inderpal, and the matter  

was reported to the superior officer. Paulose (PW-1), after having his  

lunch, returned to the barrack from the rank mess and he was relaxing  

in the cot. At this point of time, he saw the appellant coming towards  

the door.  He was wearing a  half  T-shirt  and lungi.  The cot  of  the  

deceased was near the door and he was sleeping on it. The appellant  

took  out  a  knife  which  was  hidden  in  the  lungi   and  stabbed  the  

deceased on the right side of the chest.  On witnessing the incident,  

PW-1 was shocked and shouted to the appellant as to why he did it.  

On  hearing  the  shout  of  PW-1,  people  came  in  and  gathered  

2

immediately.  The  appellant  was  separated  by  the  crowd  and  the  

deceased was sent to the hospital where he finally succumbed to the  

injury. Major Prabal Datta (PW-9) testified that there was no external  

injury on the body of the deceased except the stab injury caused by a  

knife.

2)        An FIR was lodged at the Dehu Road Police Station vide CR-

26 of 1998 under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code. Thereafter,  

investigation commenced, during the course of which the body of  

the deceased was sent for post mortem and an inquest Panchnama  

was also prepared. On completion of the investigation, the charge-

sheet was prepared against the appellant/accused and forwarded to  

the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Vadgaon Maval. In the meantime,  

since  the  appellant  belonged  to  the  armed forces,  court  martial  

proceedings were initiated under the provisions of the Army Act.  

Charges were framed against the appellant under Section 302 read  

with Section 69 of the Army Act for committing civil offence, i.e.,  

knowingly causing the death of the deceased on 22.3.1998. On the  

appellant pleading not guilty, the General Court Martial proceeded  

to record the evidence of witnesses.  The prosecution examined 18  

3

witnesses. The General Court Martial after appreciating the facts  

and  the  evidence  on  record,  found  the  appellant  guilty  of  the  

offence for which he was charged and after hearing his submission  

with regard to the quantum of sentence, sentenced the appellant to  

undergo  7  years  of  rigorous  imprisonment  and  he  was  also  

dismissed  from  service  for  committing  the  offence  of  murder  

punishable under Section 69 of the Army Act read with Section  

302 of IPC. However upon revision, the Confirming Authority by  

an order dated 15.12.1998 held that the sentence awarded by the  

General Court Martial after finding the appellant guilty of murder  

under Section 69 of the Army Act read with Section 302 of IPC,  

was  not  justiciable  and further  observed that  once the  appellant  

was held guilty under the abovementioned Sections, he could be  

either  sentenced  to  life  imprisonment  and  fine  or  sentenced  to  

death. Accordingly, the General Court Martial by an order dated  

15.1.1999,  revised  the  sentence  and  sentenced  the  appellant  to  

imprisonment  for  life  and  dismissal  from  service,  which  was  

subsequently  confirmed  by  the  Confirming  Authority.  Being  

aggrieved by this  order,  the appellant filed a petition before the  

Chief of Army Staff under Section 164 of the Army Act, which  

4

was rejected. The appellant being aggrieved by the same filed a  

writ petition before the Bombay High Court.  

3)           The learned Counsel for the appellant raised two contentions  

before  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay  in  the  Writ  

proceedings.  Firstly,  it  was  submitted  that  the  charge  framed  

against the appellant was vague, as a result of which, entire Court  

Martial proceedings was vitiated. The second submission was that  

the  intervention  of  High  Court  was  required  as  the  facts  and  

circumstances of the case does not justify the punishment of life  

imprisonment as the offence revealed from the material evidence is  

only punishable under Section 304 Part II and not under Section  

302 of Indian Penal Code. As regards the first contention, the High  

Court has observed that as the appellant was informed of all the  

allegations  put  forth  against  him  at  the  time  of  Court  Martial  

proceedings, the charge framed against the appellant cannot be said  

to be vague. Considering the second contention, the High Court  

found the testimony of PW-1 Paulose who is the eyewitness and  

PW-3 Haveldar Indrpal to whom the dying declaration was given  

by the deceased, is reliable and, hence, observed that there is no  

5

doubt about the fact that appellant caused the death of the deceased  

by stabbing him with a knife. Therefore, the submission that there  

was no intention on the part of the appellant to kill the deceased as  

only one stab injury was found on deceased, was rejected by the  

Court.  The High Court while considering the decision on which  

reliance was placed by learned counsel for the accused observed,  

that there was no sudden quarrel and the murder was not caused on  

spur  of  moment  and  no  sufficient  provocation  is  found  for  the  

offence committed by appellant to fall under section 304 Part II of  

Indian Penal Code. As the offence was found to be committed with  

enough time to  mediate  on the action to commit  the murder of  

deceased, appellant was said to have intention to cause the death of  

the deceased. Thus, the High Court found the charge under Section  

302 of Indian Penal Code proved and the procedure under Army  

Act  followed  without  any  infringement  of  principles  of  natural  

justice  and,  accordingly,  the  Writ  Petition  was  dismissed  vide  

judgment dated 25.8.2005.

4)          We now come to the particular question to which this appeal  

is limited, namely, propriety of the conviction and sentence passed  

6

on the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC read with  

Section  69  of  the  Army Act,  1950.   Mr.K.K.Mani,  the  learned  

counsel for the appellant contends, that, the death of the deceased  

was caused due to grave and sudden provocation and, therefore,  

offence would fall under Exception I of Section 300 I.P.C. Further,  

it is contended that the offence committed by the appellant is liable  

for punishment under Section 304 Part II of the I.P.C., as there is  

absence of any intention on part of the appellant to cause death.  

Mr.Mani  also  cited  few  decisions  of  this  Court  to  support  his  

submission that the single stab injury caused by the appellant to the  

deceased only amounts to offence punishable under Section 304  

Part II and not under Section 302 of I.P.C.  Per contra, the learned  

counsel for the Union of India  submitted  that, the findings of the  

Court Martial and the punishment upheld by the High Court need  

not be interfered by this Court as the facts and the evidence on  

record  are  enough  to  prove  that  the  offence  committed  by  the  

appellant falls under Section 302 of I.P.C. It is also contended that  

the scope of judicial review is for limited purpose and that cannot  

be used to re-appreciate  the evidence recorded in Court  Martial  

proceedings to arrive at a different conclusion.  

7

5)           We now consider the first contention of the learned counsel  

for the  appellant.  It  is  not  in dispute  that  the cause of  death of  

deceased is due to the stabbing by a knife by appellant. However, it  

is argued on behalf of the appellant that the appellant caused the  

said injury because on 23.03.1998 deceased Havildar R.C.Tiwari  

and Havildar  Inderpal  (PW-3)  abused  the  appellant  and he was  

provoked to ‘punish’ the deceased. Thus, the stab injury caused to  

the deceased was a result of such grave and sudden provocation  

and thus the incident took place on spur of moment. Therefore, the  

case  of  the  appellant  falls  under  Exception  I  of  Section 300 of  

I.P.C.

At this state itself, it is relevant to notice Section 300 of I.P.C.:

“Section 300. Murder Except  in  the  cases  hereinafter  excepted,  culpable  homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is   caused is done with the intention of causing death, or- 2ndly  If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily   injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the   death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or- 3rdly  If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury   to  any person and the bodily  injury  intended to  be   inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature  to cause death, or- 4thly  

8

If the person committing the act knows that it  is so   imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability,   cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause   death, and commits such act without any excuse for   incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as  aforesaid.

Exception I-When culpable homicide is not murder- Culpable  homicide  is  not  murder  if  the  offender,   whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave   and  sudden  provocation,  causes  the  death  of  the   person who gave the provocation or causes the death  of any other person by mistake or accident.

The  above  exception  is  subject  to  the  following   provisos:- First-That the provocations not sought or voluntarily   provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or  doing harm to any person. Secondly-That  the  provocation  is  not  given  by   anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public   servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such  public servant. Thirdly-That the provocations not given by anything  done  in  the  lawful  exercise  of  the  right  of  private   defence.

Explanation-Whether  the  provocation  was  grave  and  sudden  enough  to  prevent  the  offence  from  amounting to murder is a question of fact.”

6)         The aforesaid Section provides five exceptions wherein the  

culpable homicide would not amount to murder. Under Exception  

I,  an  injury  resulting  into  death  of  the  person  would  not  be  

considered as murder when the offender has lost his self-control  

9

due to the grave and sudden provocation. It is also important to  

mention at this stage that the provision itself makes it clear by the  

Explanation  provided,  that  what  would  constitute  grave  and  

sudden provocation, which would be enough to prevent the offence  

from amounting to murder, is a question of fact. Provocation is an  

external stimulus which can result into to loss of self-control. Such  

provocation and the resulting reaction need to be measured from  

the surrounding circumstances. Here the provocation must be such  

as will upset not merely a hasty, hot tempered and hypersensitive  

person  but  also  a  person  with  clam nature  and  ordinary  sense.  

What is sought by the law by creating the exception is that to take  

into  consideration  situations  wherein  a  person  with  normal  

behavior   reacting to the given incidence of provocation. Thus, the  

protection extended by the exception is to the normal person acting  

normally in the given situation.  

7)        The scope of the “doctrine of provocation” was stated by  

Viscount  Simon  in  Mancini  v.  Director  of  Public  Prosecution,  

(1942)  A.C.  200  at  p.206:  “it  is  not  all  provocation  that  will   

reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter. Provocation to have  

that  result,  must  be  such  as  temporarily  deprive  the  person  

10

provoked  of  the  power  of  self-control  as  result  of  which  he   

commits  the  unlawful  act  which  caused  death.  The  test  to  be   

applicable is that of the effect of the provocation on a reasonable   

man, as was laid down by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex v.   

Lesbini,  (1914)  3  K.B.1116  so  that  an  unusually  excitable  or   

pugnacious individual is not entitled to rely on provocation which  

would not have led ordinary person to act as he did. In applying  

the test, it is of particular importance to (a) consider whether a  

sufficient  interval  has  elapsed since the  provocation  to  allow a   

reasonable  man time  to  cool,  and (b)  to  take  into  account  the   

instrument with which the homicide was effected, for to retort, in  

the heat of passion induced by provocation, by a simple blow, is   

very different thing from making use of a deadly instrument like a   

concealed dagger. In short, the mode of resentment must bear a  

reasonable relationship to the provocation if the offence is to be   

reduced to manslaughter.”

8)           It is, therefore, important in the case at hand to consider the  

reasonable relationship of the action of appellant of stabbing the  

deceased,  to  the  provocation  by  the  deceased  in  the  form  of  

abusing the appellant. At this stage, it would be useful to recall the  

11

relevant  chain  of  events  in  brief  to  judge  whether  there  was  

sufficient  provocation  and  the  criterion  under  the  provision  are  

satisfied to bring the offence under the Exception I. As is already  

stated, on the previous night of the incidence, there was altercation  

between the appellant and deceased, as the deceased had abused  

the  appellant.  On  23.3.1998  at  about  1.00  PM,  the  deceased  

complained  to  the  Higher  Officer-Mr.S.S.B.Rao  about  the  said  

incident.  Thereafter,  he returned to his  barrack and was present  

there  before  the  happening  of  the  incident.  In  the  testimony,  

(PW-1) Paulose states that he was also present in the same barrack  

after he came back from Other Rank Mess at 2.15 PM and was  

relaxing on his cot which was in the corner of the same barrack. At  

that time he saw the appellant coming towards the door on which  

he thought that the appellant  was coming for either urinal  or to  

collect  his  clothes  spread  out  in  sun.  The  appellant  who  was  

wearing a half T-shirt and lungi came near the cot of the deceased  

which was at the door and took out a knife from the lungi and  

stabbed on the right side of chest of the deceased when he was  

asleep. PW-1 agreed at the time of examination of witness, that he  

was shocked to see the appellant  stab the deceased and he also  

12

shouted at the appellant asking him what was he doing. Thus, PW-

1 was unable to relate the actions of appellant  to the abuses by  

deceased  or  the  altercation  which  happened  the  previous  night.  

Further,  it  is  clear  from  the  testimony  of  the  PW-1  and  the  

evidence collected (ME-1),  that the knife which was completely  

made of iron and had a sharp edge was hidden at the waistline of  

the  lungi  of  the  appellant.  Major  Prabal  Datta,  PW-9  was  the  

Regimental  Medical  Officer  at  19  AD  Regt.  In  his  cross  

examination,  he  has  stated,  that  there  was  not  much  time  lag  

between  the  occurrence  of  the  incident  and the  deceased  being  

rushed to the hospital. The facts like that there was time lag of 40-

45  minute  after  appellant  had  come  from the  office  of  Higher  

Officer after complaining and was present with the appellant in the  

same barrack without any conversation between them, that he had  

got the knife which was sharp enough to have the knowledge that it  

might cause death of a human being when stabbed, that the knife  

was hidden and removed by appellant only when he was about to  

stab the deceased, that the appellant stabbed the deceased on the  

chest which is a fragile portion of the body and can cause death  

when stabbed by sharp weapon and also that the eyewitness was  

13

unable to link the abusing and the altercation of the deceased and  

appellant to the action of stabbing, rules out the possibility of the  

offence being committed due to ‘grave and sudden’ provocation.  

The appellant clearly had time to deliberate and plan out the death  

of Havildar R C Tiwari  (the deceased).  We, therefore,  conclude  

that the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant has  

no merit and the appellant cannot get benefit of the Exception I to  

Section 300 of I.P.C.

9)            We now turn to second point urged on behalf of the  

appellant.  It  is  contended  by  learned  counsel  that  there  was  no  

intention  on  the  part  of  the  appellant  to  cause  the  death  of  the  

deceased and, hence, Section 304 Part II of the IPC which deals  

with culpable homicide not amounting to murder, will be attracted.  

Alternatively,  it  is  contended that  the appellant  dealt  one single  

blow on the deceased, and hence, intention to cause death cannot  

be attributed to the appellant and, hence, the act of the appellant  

will not fall under Section 302 of IPC but under Section 304 Part  

II.  In light  of these contentions,  it  is  necessary to look into the  

wordings of the relevant provision. Section 304 of IPC reads:-

14

“Section  304.  Punishment  for  culpable  homicide  not amounting to murder Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting  to  murder  shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment  for  life ,or imprisonment of either description for a term  which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable  to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done  with the intention of causing death, or of causing such  bodily injury as is likely to cause death, Or with imprisonment of either description for a term  which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with  both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is  likely  to  cause  death,  but  without  any  intention  to  cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely  to cause death.”

10)          Essentially the ingredients for bringing an act under Part II of  

the Section are:-

(i) act  is  done  with  the  knowledge  that  it  is  likely  to  cause  

death,

(ii) there is no intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily  

injury as is likely to cause death.

11)           The first ingredient is easily solved by referring to the  

weapon  used  by  the  appellant  to  strike  a  knife  blow  to  the  

appellant. The appellant in this instance has used a kitchen knife. A  

kitchen knife with sharp edges is a dangerous weapon and it is very  

obvious that the appellant was aware that the use of such a weapon  

15

can  cause  death  or  serious  bodily  injury  that  is  likely  to  cause  

death. As far as the second ingredient is concerned, the appellant’s  

learned counsel contended that the fact that there was one single  

blow struck, proves that there was no intention to cause death. In  

support of the plea, reliance is placed on the decisions of this court  

in the case of Bhera v. State of Rajasthan, [(2000) 10 SCC 225],  

Kunhayippu v. State of Kerala, [(2000) 10 SCC 307], Masumsha  

Hasansha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra, [(2000) 3 SCC 557],  

Guljar  Hussain  v.  State  of  U.P.,  [1993 Supp (1)  SCC 554],  K.  

Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, [(1999) 3 SCC 309],  

Pappu v. State of M.P., [(2006) 7 SCC 391], Muthu v. State by  

Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, [(2007) 12 Scale 795]. A brief  

perusal of all these cases would reveal that in all these cases there  

was  a  sudden  and  instantaneous  altercation  which  led  to  the  

accused  inflicting  a  single  blow  to  the  deceased  with  a  sharp  

weapon. Hence, there has been conviction under Section 304 Part  

II as delivering a single blow with a sharp weapon in a sudden  

fight would not point towards intention to cause death. These cases  

are clearly  distinguishable  from the case at  hand,  purely on the  

basis  of  facts.  In  the  present  case,  there  has  been  no  sudden  

16

altercation which ensued between the appellant and the deceased in  

the  present  case.  The  deceased  called  the  appellant  ‘gandu’  

following which there was a heated exchange of words between  

the two, the day before the murder.  The next day, however,  the  

appellant concealed a kitchen knife in his lungi and went towards  

the cot of the deceased and struck the deceased a blow on the right  

side of the chest, while the deceased was sleeping. The fact that the  

appellant  waited till  the  next  day,  went  on to  procure  a  deadly  

weapon like a kitchen knife and then proceeded to strike a blow on  

the chest of the appellant when he was sleeping, points unerringly  

towards due deliberation on the part of the appellant to avenge his  

humiliation at the hands of the appellant.  The nature of weapon  

used and the part of the body where the blow was struck, which  

was a vital part of the body helps in proving beyond reasonable  

doubt,  the  intention  of  the  appellant  to  cause  the  death  of  the  

deceased.  Once  these  ingredients  are  proved,  it  is  irrelevant  

whether  there was a single blow struck or  multiple  blows. This  

court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh, [(2004) 12  

SCC 546] while dismissing a similar contention has stated that, “It  

is  the nature  of injury,  the part  of  body where it  is  caused,  the  

17

weapon used in causing such injury which are the indicators of the  

fact whether the respondent caused the death of the deceased with  

an intention of causing death or not. In the instant case, it is true  

that the respondent had dealt one single blow with a sword which  

is a sharp-edged weapon measuring about 3 ft. in length on a vital  

part of body, namely, the neck. This act of the respondent though  

solitary  in  number  had  severed  sternoclinoid  muscle,  external  

jugular  vein,  internal  jugular  vein  and  common  carotid  artery  

completely leading to almost instantaneous death. Any reasonable  

person with any stretch of imagination can come to the conclusion  

that such injury on such a vital part of the body with a sharp-edged  

weapon would cause death.  Such an injury,  in our  opinion,  not  

only exhibits the intention of the attacker in causing the death of  

the victim but also the knowledge of the attacker as to the likely  

consequence  of  such  attack  which  could  be  none  other  than  

causing the death of the victim. The reasoning of the High Court as  

to the intention and knowledge of the respondent in attacking and  

causing  death  of  the  victim,  therefore,  is  wholly  erroneous  and  

cannot be sustained.”

18

12)        In the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, [AIR 1958 SC  

465],  this  court  while  referring  to  intention  to  cause  death  laid  

down:-

“27.  Once  these  four  elements  are  established  by  the  prosecution  (and,  of  course,  the  burden  is  on  the  prosecution throughout)  the offence is  murder under s.  300, 3rdly. It does not matter that there was no intention  to  cause  death.  It  does  not  matter  that  there  was  no  intention  even  to  cause  an  injury  of  a  kind  that  is  sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature  (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It  does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an  act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the  intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be  proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the  only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective  inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of  nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around  inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the  ordinary  course  of  nature  and  claim that  they  are  not  guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they  must face the consequences; and they can only escape if  it  can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury  was accidental or otherwise unintentional.”

                   This court further observed:-

“33. It  is true that in a given case the enquiry may be  linked  up  with  the  seriousness  of  the  injury,.  For  example,  if  it  can  be  proved,  or  if  the  totality  of  the  circumstances justify an inference, that the prisoner only  intended a superficial; scratch and that by accident this  victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear that was  used, then of course the offence is not murder. But that is  not because the prisoner did not intend the injury that he  intended to inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be  

19

but  because  he  did  not  intend  to  inflict  the  injury  in  question at all. His intention in such a case would be to  inflict a totally different injury. The difference is not one  of law but one of fact; and whether the conclusion should  be  one  way  or  the  other  is  a  matter  of  proof,  where  necessary, by calling in aid all reasonable inferences of  fact in the absence of direct testimony. It is not one for  guess-work and fanciful conjecture.”

13)       In Anil  v.  State  of Haryana,  [(2007) 10 SCC 274],  while  

referring to Virsa Singh (supra) this court laid down:-

“19.  In  Thangaiya  v.  State  of  T.N.,  relying  upon  a  celebrated decision of this Court in Virsa Singh v. State  of Punjab 1958 CriLJ 818 , the Division Bench observed: 17. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become  locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh case  for the applicability of Clause "thirdly" is now ingrained  in our legal system and has become part of the rule of  law. Under Clause "thirdly" of Section 300 IPC. culpable  homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are  satisfied: i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done  with the intention of causing death or is done with the  intention  of  causing  a  bodily  injury;  and  (b)  that  the  injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary  course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that  there  was  an  intention  to  inflict  that  particular  bodily  injury  which,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  nature,  was  sufficient to, cause death viz. that the injury found to be  present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. 18. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh  case even if the intention of the appellant was limited to  the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death  in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the  intention of causing death, the offence would be murder.  Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out  this point.  

20

14)       In the aforesaid decision, this Court held that there is no fixed  

rule that whenever a single blow is inflicted Section 302 would not  

be attracted.

15)        It is clear from the above line of cases, that it is necessary to  

prove first that there was an intention of causing bodily injury; and  

that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary  

course of nature to cause death. From the evidence on record, it is  

very clear that the appellant intended to cause death. In light of this  

finding, the evidence on record makes it clear that Section 304 Part  

II  of  the  IPC will  not  be attracted.  Further  PW-1,  in  his  cross-

examination asserts that the deceased held his hand out after he  

was stabbed in the chest. It is very likely that this action on the part  

of the deceased prevented the appellant from stabbing him multiple  

number of times. The argument might deserve some merit in case  

there  is  a  sudden  altercation  which  ensues  in  the  heat  of  the  

moment and there is no deliberate planning. In the present case, as  

stated above there was due deliberation on the part of the appellant  

and he assaulted the deceased a day after he misbehaved with him.  

Hence, the contention of the learned counsel that the appellant had  

21

no  intention  to  cause  death  of  the  deceased  has  no  merit  and,  

accordingly, it is rejected.

 16)       We, accordingly, hold that the conviction of the appellant for  

the offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, is not bad in  

law.  In our opinion, the appeal has no merit and, accordingly, it is  

dismissed.  

……………………………………J.                                                                                     [Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA]

…………………………………J.  [H.L. DATTU]

New Delhi, May 13, 2010.

22