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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1078-1079 of 2005

PETITIONER: Arun Nivalaji More

RESPONDENT: State of Maharashtra

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/08/2006

BENCH: G.P. Mathur & R.V. Raveendran

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

G. P. MATHUR, J.

       These appeals, by special leave, have been preferred against the  judgment and order dated 28.9.2004 of Bombay High Court by which  the appeal preferred by the appellant against his conviction under  Section 304 Part I IPC and sentence of 7 years R.I. and a fine of  Rs.200/- awarded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jalgaon  in Sessions Case No.145 of 1987, was dismissed and the appeal  preferred by the State of Maharashtra was allowed and his conviction  was altered from 304 Part I to Section 302 IPC and he was sentenced  to imprisonment for life. 2.      The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the appellant Arun  Nivalaji More was working as a licensed commission vendor in the  catering unit at Bhusawal Railway Station.  He absented from duty  with effect from 3.11.1986 and reported back for work after more than  two months on 6.1.1987 on which date he gave an application giving  reasons for his absence from duty.  In this application he stated that he  had gone home on account of illness of his wife and subsequently he  was arrested by police in connection with some criminal case and  after being released on bail he had reported for duty.  PW-1 Pramod  Uniyal, Senior Divisional Commercial Superintendent, directed that  an enquiry may be made from the concerned Police Station regarding  the arrest of the appellant.  PW-5 Narayan Dhangar, Head Clerk then  sent a letter to Police Station, Faizpur, enquiring about the case in  which the appellant had been arrested.  The Incharge of Police  Station, Faizpur, informed that the appellant had been arrested in case  Crime No. 63 of 1986 under Section 302 IPC and that he had been  released on bail.  After receiving the information that a case under  Section 302 IPC had been registered against the appellant, PW-1  Pramod Uniyal and Chhedilal Baliram Ahirwar, who was working as  Divisional Commercial Superintendent and who lost life in the  incident in question, took a decision to cancel the licence of the  appellant.  Accordingly a letter was prepared on 20.1.1987 under the  signature of Chhedilal Baliram Ahirwar (hereinafter referred to as  ’Shri Ahirwar’) giving intimation to the appellant regarding  termination of his licence.  The letter was served on the appellant on  the same day by PW-5 Narayan Dhangar at about 1.30 P.M.  The case  of the prosecution further is that the appellant, armed with a knife,  entered the office of the Divisional Commercial Superintendent at  about 4.15 P.M. on 20.1.1987.  First he went near the table of Shri  Tadvi, who was working as Office Superintendent and thereafter  stood near the table of Shri Bandu Kulkarni as he was looking for an  opportunity when Shri Ahirwar would be left alone in his chamber.   Thereafter he entered the chamber of Shri Ahirwar and gave him a  blow by the knife on the left side of stomach. Shri Ahirwar shouted  for help saying "Bachao............... bachao" (save .......... save).  PW-2

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Ashok Pardeshi, who had gone to the D.C.S. Office in connection  with a tender which his father had submitted for taking contract of a  cycle stand, and was standing in front of the chamber of Shri Ahirwar,  saw the appellant stabbing him with a knife.  He immediately rushed  inside and after picking up a chair threw it at the appellant.  Shri  Ahirwar also threw a glass containing water on the appellant in order  to save himself.  The appellant thereafter ran away from the door at  the rear side of the chamber.  Hearing the commotion some persons  including PW-3 Mohammed Ilias and PW-4 Eknath reached the scene  of occurrence.  PW-1 Pramod Uniyal had also come and Shri Ahirwar  told him that he was assaulted by a knife by the appellant Arun  Nivalaji More.  PW-7 Sukhdeo Bavane, a constable of RPF, gave a  chase to the appellant and managed to apprehend him at a distance of  about 200 meters near Poonam Hotel.  He seized a blood stained knife  from the pocket of the appellant and thereafter the appellant was taken  to the police station.  Shri Ahirwar was rushed to the railway hospital  in a jeep where an operation was performed but he succumbed to his  injuries on 23.1.1987.  After usual investigation the police submitted  charge-sheet against the appellant under Section 302 IPC. 3.      During the course of trial the prosecution examined several  witnesses and also filed some documentary evidence.  PW-1 Pramod  Uniyal, Senior Divisional Commercial Superintendent and PW-5  Narayan Dhangar, Head Clerk deposed regarding the absence of the  appellant from duty with effect from 3.11.1986, the enquiry conducted  after the appellant had given an application on 6.1.1987 giving   explanation for his absence and also the order which had been passed  under the signature of the deceased Shri Ahirwar on 20.1.1987  cancelling the licence of the appellant.  PW-2 Ashok Pardeshi gave  direct eye witness account of the assault made by the appellant upon  the deceased by a knife while the latter was sitting in his office.  PW-7  Sukhdeo Bavane, constable of RPF, deposed about the chase given by  him and also the fact that he apprehended the appellant at a distance  of about 200 meters and recovered a blood stained knife from the  pocket of the appellant.  Apart from the above evidence the  prosecution also relied upon the evidence of three separate dying  declarations made by the deceased.  PW-1 Pramod Uniyal, Senior  Divisional Commercial Superintendent had reached the chamber of  the deceased after hearing the commotion and immediately after the  assault had been made.  He stated that the deceased told him that the  appellant Arun Nivalaji More had assaulted him with a knife.  PW-12  Shantidevi, who is wife of the deceased, deposed that when she  visited the hospital after learning about the incident the deceased told  her that the appellant had assaulted him with a knife.  A formal dying  declaration was also recorded by PW-13 Raghunath Shankar Kahire,  Dy. Superintendent of Police, after PW-6 Dr. Anand Thakare,  Medical Officer had certified that the deceased was in a fit mental  condition to give a statement.  In this statement also the deceased  clearly said that the appellant had assaulted him with a knife.  The  recovery of blood stained knife from the pocket of the appellant was  proved by the statement of PW-7 Sukhdeo Bavane. 4.      The appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., which  he gave in writing under his signature, denied to have inflicted any  knife blow upon the deceased.  He admitted that he had received a  letter from PW-5 Narayan Dhangar whereby he was informed that his  licence as a commission vendor had been cancelled.  He further  admitted that he went to the office of the deceased to have the order of  cancellation of his licence recalled.  He had no grudge against Shri  Ahirwar.  He told the deceased that because of him, his children will  have to suffer and they will starve.  Shri Ahirwar ridiculed him and  sarcastically said "why do you procreate offsprings like pig?  Do you  procreate by relying upon us?"  The appellant has then said that he  was enraged by these utterances of Shri Ahirwar and he took out a pen  knife with the intention to threaten him and it was not the knife which  had been produced in the court.  At this juncture the deceased hurled  the drinking water glass and a paper weight on him and then there was

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scuffle between the two in which the deceased caught hold of the hand  of the appellant in which he was holding the pen knife and it was in  the scuffle that the pen knife struck the deceased.  The appellant also  admitted that while he was running away the RPF constable  apprehended him and took him to the police station but he had thrown  the pen knife.  He explained the possession of the pen knife by saying  that there are goondas around Bhusawal railway station and he used to  come to the railway station from a long distance.   5.      The learned Additional Sessions Judge, after carefully   analyzing the evidence on record, accepted the prosecution version of  the incident that the appellant assaulted the deceased with a knife  which had been recovered from his possession and had been produced  in court.  He also disbelieved the defence taken by the appellant that  the deceased had used any sarcastic words or that there was any  scuffle between the appellant and the deceased.  However, for  reasons, which we will advert to later on, he convicted the appellant  under Section 304 Part I IPC and sentenced him to undergo 7 years  R.I. and a fine of Rs.200/- and in default to undergo 2 months R.I.   The appellant preferred an appeal against his conviction and sentence  before the High Court and the State of Maharashtra also preferred an  appeal challenging the acquittal of the appellant under Section 302  IPC.  As stated earlier the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by  the appellant and allowed the appeal filed by the State and altered the  conviction of the appellant to that under Section 302 IPC and  sentenced him to imprisonment for life. 6.      Learned counsel for the appellant tried to assail the conviction  of the appellant and urged that the prosecution had failed to establish  the charge against the appellant.  In our opinion the contention raised  has no substance. The case of the prosecution that the appellant  assaulted the deceased with a knife is clearly established by the  evidence regarding motive, namely, the cancellation of commission  vendor licence of the appellant by the deceased, eye witness account  given by PW-2 Ashok Pardeshi, the fact that the appellant was  apprehended at a short distance after he was given a chase by PW-7  Sukhdeo Bavane, constable of RPF and the recovery of blood stained  knife from his pocket, besides evidence of three dying declarations  which were deposed to by PW-1 Pramod Uniyal, Senior Divisional  Commercial Superintendent, PW-12 Shantidevi, wife of the deceased  and PW-13 Raghunath Shankar Khaire, Dy. Superintendent of Police.   There is absolutely no reason why the deceased, who was holding a  fairly senior position in the railways, would make a false statement  implicating the appellant.  The medical evidence clearly shows that  the injury had been caused by a sharp cutting weapon like knife.   There is absolutely no evidence on record in support of the plea taken  by the appellant in his defence that the deceased had used any  sarcastic words or had thrown a paper weight and a glass upon the  appellant which allegedly enraged him.  Except for giving his  statement in writing under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant did not  choose to examine himself as a witness which he could do in  accordance with Section 315 Cr.P.C. or lead any other evidence.  Thus, we are clearly of the opinion that the prosecution version of the  incident has been fully established and has been rightly believed both  by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and also by the High Court. 7.      Learned counsel for the appellant has next contended that the  learned Additional Sessions Judge had rightly convicted the appellant  under Section 304 Part I IPC and the High Court has erred in altering  his conviction to that under Section 302 IPC.  In fact the contention is  that the appellant should have been convicted under Section 304 Part  II IPC as the appellant had no intention to cause death or to cause such  bodily injury as is likely to cause death.  It has been urged that there  was no premeditation and the appellant gave a single blow and the  blow was not repeated although the appellant could have done so as  the deceased was unarmed and was not in a position to offer any kind  of resistance.  In this connection learned counsel has laid emphasis on  the following reasons assigned by the learned Additional Sessions

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Judge in his judgment for holding that the case would not fall within  the ambit of clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC: - " i)    the accused has given only one blow and that too  on the stomach of Shri Ahirwar; ii)     Shri Ahirwar after receiving the blow could walk  to a certain distance and came and sat on the  nearby chair of his employee; iii)    Shri Ahirwar died after two days of the stabbing; iv)     the accused had an ample opportunity to inflict  more blows on Shri Ahirwar when he found him  alone  in the chamber, but he only gave one blow,  that too on his stomach."

8.      In view of the submission made the main question which  requires consideration is whether the offence committed by the  appellant comes within the ambit of clause Thirdly of Section 300  IPC. 9.      The medical evidence on record may be considered first.  PW-6  Dr. Anand Thakare, who was doctor in the railway hospital, examined  and performed surgery on the deceased Shri Ahirwar on 20.1.1987  and found following injuries on his body: - "1=" x 1=" lacerated wound, left hypochondrium  transversely placed, fresh bleeding, depth could not be  ascertained at that time, but signs were suggestive of  intra abdominal injuries, big haematoma around the  wound, blood clots around the wound." On internal examination he found following injuries: - 1)      Two tears in omentum 3" x 3" each. 2)      2=" long rupture in anterior wall of body of  stomach, midway between two curvatures, edges  clean cut. 3)      1" long tear in posterior wall of stomach in middle  part of body of stomach, involving mucosa and  musculature serosh intact. 4)      3" long rupture in left lobe of liver, interiorly 1"  deep edges clean out. 5)      One small perforation about half centimeter in  diameter in middle of transverse colon, anteriorly. Bleeding about 4 to 5 pints in peritoneal cavity present."

In the opinion of the doctor the injuries had been caused by a sharp  elongated heavy object.  When the knife recovered from the pocket of  the appellant was shown to him during the course of his statement in  the Court, he opined that the injuries could have been caused by the  said weapon.  The post mortem examination on the body of the  deceased was performed by Dr. Sonawane but he expired before his  statement could be recorded in Court.  The post mortem report  prepared by him was proved by PW-11 Dr. Vishnu Zope.  The  prosecution also examined PW-14 Dr. Arjun Ganpat Bhangale,  Honorary Surgeon in the Civil Hospital, Jalgaon.  Both PW-6 Dr.  Anand Thakare and PW-14 Dr. Arjun Ganpath Bhangale have  deposed that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature  to cause death.   10.     In order to ascertain whether the offence committed by an  accused would fall under one of the clauses of Section 304 IPC or  under Section 302 IPC, attention must be focused on the language  used by the Legislature in Sections 299 and 300 IPC, as otherwise  irrelevant considerations come into play which affect the judgment  resulting in failure of justice. 11.     First it has to be seen whether the offence falls within the ambit  of Section 299 IPC.  If the offence falls under Section 299 IPC, a  further enquiry has to be made whether it falls in any of the clauses,  namely, clauses ’Firstly’ to ’Fourthly’ of Section 300 IPC.  If the  offence falls in any one of these clauses, it will be murder as defined  in Section 300 IPC, which will be punishable under Section 302 IPC.  

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The offence may fall in any one of the four clauses of Section 300 IPC  yet if it is covered by any one of the five exceptions mentioned  therein, the culpable homicide committed by the offender would not  be murder and the offender would not be liable for conviction under  Section 302 IPC.  A plain reading of Section 299 IPC will show that it  contains three clauses, in two clauses it is the intention of the offender  which is relevant and is the dominant factor and in the third clause the  knowledge of the offender which is relevant and is the dominant  factor.  Analyzing Section 299 as aforesaid, it becomes clear that a  person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is  caused is done \026 (i)     with the intention of causing death; or (ii)    with the intention of causing such bodily injury as  is likely to cause death; or (iii)   with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause  death."

If the offence is such which is covered by any one of the   clauses enumerated above, but does not fall within the ambit of  clauses Firstly to Fourthly of Section 300 IPC, it will not be murder  and the offender would not be liable to be convicted under Section  302 IPC.  In such a case if the offence is such which is covered by  clauses (i) or (ii) mentioned above, the offender would be liable to be  convicted under Section 304 Part I IPC as it uses the expression "if  the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of  causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause  death" where intention is the dominant factor.   However, if the  offence is such which is covered by clause (iii) mentioned above, the  offender would be liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC  because of the use of the expression "if the act is done with the  knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to  cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death"  where knowledge is the dominant factor. 12.     What is required to be considered here is whether the offence  committed by the appellant falls within any of the clauses of Section  300 IPC.  

13.     Having regard to the facts of the case it can legitimately be  urged that clauses Firstly and Fourthly of Section 300 IPC were not  attracted.  The expression "the offender knows to be likely to cause  death" occurring in clause Secondly of Section 300 IPC lays emphasis  on knowledge.  The dictionary meaning of the word ’knowledge’ is \026  the fact or condition of being cognizant, conscious or aware of  something; to be assured or being acquainted with.  In the context of  criminal law the meaning of the word in Black’s Law Dictionary is as  under: - "An awareness or understanding of a fact or  circumstances; a state of mind in which a person has no  substantial doubt about the existence of a fact. It is necessary ... to distinguish between producing a  result intentionally and producing it knowingly.   Intention and knowledge commonly go together, for he  who intends a result usually knows that it will follow,  and he who knows the consequences of his act usually  intends them.  But there may be intention without  knowledge, the consequence being desired but not  foreknown as certain or even probable.  Conversely,  there may be knowledge without intention, the  consequence being foreknown as the inevitable  concomitant of that which is desired, but being itself an  object of repugnance rather than desire, and therefore not  intended."

In Blackstone’s Criminal Practice the import of the word ’knowledge’  has been described as under: -

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       "’Knowledge’ can be seen in many ways as playing the  same role in relation to circumstances as intention plays  in relation to consequences.  One knows something if one  is absolutely sure that it is so although, unlike intention,  it is of no relevance whether one wants or desires the  thing to be so.  Since it is difficult ever to be absolutely  certain of anything, it has to be accepted that a person  who feels ’virtually certain’ about something can equally  be regarded as knowing it."

The Law Commission of United Kingdom in its 11th Report proposed  the following test :  "The standard test of knowledge is \026 Did the person  whose conduct is in issue either knows of the relevant  circumstances or has no substantial doubt of their  existence?" [See Text Book of Criminal Law by Glanville Wiliams  (p.125)] Therefore, having regard to the meaning assigned in criminal law the  word "knowledge" occurring in clause Secondly of Section 300 IPC  imports some kind of certainty and not merely a probability.  Consequently, it cannot be held that the appellant caused the injury  with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the appellant knew  to be likely to cause the death of Shri Ahirwar.  So, clause Secondly  of Section 300 IPC will also not apply. 14.     The enquiry is then limited to the question whether the offence  is covered by clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC.  This clause, namely,  clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC reads as under: - "Culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the  death is caused is done with the intention of causing  bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended  to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of  nature to cause death." The argument that the accused had no intention to cause death is  wholly fallacious for judging the scope of clause Thirdly of Section  300 IPC as the words "intention of causing death" occur in clause  Firstly and not in clause Thirdly.  An offence would still fall within  clause Thirdly even though the offender did not intend to cause death  so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury and the  injuries are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.   This is also borne out from illustration (c) to Section 300 IPC which is  being reproduced below: - "(c)    A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound  sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary  course of nature.  Z dies in consequence.  Here A is  guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to  cause Z’s death."

Therefore, the contention advanced in the present case and which is  frequently advanced that the accused had no intention of causing  death is wholly irrelevant for deciding whether the case falls in clause  Thirdly of Section 300 IPC.   15.     The scope and ambit of clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC was  considered by this Court in the oft quoted decision in Virsa Singh vs.  State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465 and the principle enunciated therein  explains the legal position succinctly.  The accused Virsa Singh was  alleged to have given a single spear blow and the injury sustained by  the deceased was "a punctured wound 2" x =" transverse in direction  on the left side of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac  region just above the inguinal canal.  Three coils of intestines were  coming out of the wound."  After analysis of the clause Thirdly, it was  held: -         "The prosecution must prove the following facts  before it can bring a case under S. 300 "Thirdly"; First, it  must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is

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present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be  proved.  These are purely objective investigations.   Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to  inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it  was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other  kind of injury was intended.         Once these three elements are proved to be  present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it  must be proved that the injury of the type, just described,  made up of the three elements set out above, is sufficient  to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.  This part  of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has  nothing to do with the intention of the offender.         Once these four elements are established by the  prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the  prosecution throughout), the offence is murder under S.  300 "Thirdly".  It does not matter that there was no  intention to cause death, or that there was no intention  even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to  cause death in the ordinary course of nature (there is no  real distinction between the two), or even that there is no  knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause  death.  Once the intention to cause the bodily injury  actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the  enquiry is purely objective and the only question is  whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the  injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to  cause death."

The same question was examined in great detail in Jai Prakash vs.  State (Delhi Administration) (1991) 2 SCC 32.  The accused in this  case was married to a cousin of Agya Devi, whose husband received  injuries and lost his life.  The accused used to visit the house of the  deceased ostensibly as a relative, but this was objected to by his  mother and two brothers as they suspected that the accused had illicit  relations with Agya Devi.  The accused visited the house of Agya  Devi at about 11 p.m. when the deceased was not in the house but he  came within few minutes and objected to the presence of the accused.   On this there was an altercation and exchange of hot words and  thereafter the accused took out a kirpan from his waist and stabbed the  deceased in the chest and ran away.  The deceased sustained one  incised stab wound horizontally placed on the left side of the chest 1"  lateral to the left side and 2" below the medial to the left nipple size  1" x =" with spindle shaped appearance and with either margins  pointed.  There was another small incised wound over right little  finger.  In the opinion of doctor the injury no. 1 was sufficient to  cause death in the ordinary course of nature.  A similar contention was  raised that there was no intention to cause death and only one blow  was given.  The Court held that it is fallacious to contend that when  death is caused by a single blow clause Thirdly is not attracted and,  therefore, it would not amount to murder.  The contention which is  usually advanced that there was no premeditation, that the incident  took place all of a sudden, that there was no intention to cause death  or that a single blow was given and has also been advanced in the  present case was considered in para 13 of the reports and the relevant  part thereof is being reproduced below : -         "It can thus be seen that the ’knowledge’ as  contrasted with ’intention’ signify a state of mental  realization with the bare state of conscious awareness of  certain facts in which human mind remains supine or  inactive.  On the other hand, ’intention’ is a conscious  state in which mental faculties are aroused into activity  and summoned into action for the purpose of achieving a  conceived end.  It means shaping of one’s conduct so as  to bring about a certain event.  Therefore in the case of

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’intention’ mental faculties are projected in a set  direction. Intention need not necessarily involve  premeditation.  Whether there is such an intention or not  is a question of fact.  In Clause Thirdly the words  "intended to be inflicted" are significant.  As noted  already, when a person commits an act, he is presumed to  expect the natural consequences.  But from the mere fact  that the injury caused is sufficient in the ordinary course  of nature to cause death it does not necessarily follow  that the offender intended to cause the injury of that  nature.  However, the presumption arises that he intended  to cause that particular injury.  In such a situation the  court has to ascertain whether the facts and  circumstances in the case are such as to rebut the  presumption and such facts and circumstances cannot be  laid down in an abstract rule and they will vary from case  to case.  However, as pointed out in Virsa Singh case the  weapon used, the degree of force released in wielding it,  the antecedent relations of the parties, the manner in  which the attack was made that is to say sudden or  premeditated, whether the injury was inflicted during a  struggle or grappling, the number of injuries inflicted and  their nature and the part of the body where the injury was  inflicted are some of the relevant factors.  These and  other factors which may arise in a case have to be  considered and if on a totality of these circumstances a  doubt arises as to the nature of the offence, the benefit  has to go to the accused. .............................................."

16.     In order to ascertain that "there was an intention to inflict that  particular bodily injury" the enquiry should not be directed to find out  whether the offender had intention to cause those very injuries to the  internal organs of the body which were actually found to be there in  medical examination.  The intention has to be gathered from host of  circumstances like the seat of injury, viz., the place or portion of the  body where the injury has been caused, the nature of the weapon, its  size and dimension or other attributes and the force applied in  inflicting the injury.  Being a question of fact it is difficult to lay down  exhaustive tests to ascertain as to whether the offender intended to  inflict that particular injury which is found on the body of the  deceased but the features enumerated above will certainly play a vital  role in arriving at a correct conclusion on the said issue. 17.     The mere fact that a dangerous or deadly weapon was not used  or the injuries were not caused on vital part of the body may not  necessarily take out the offence from the clutches of clause Thirdly of  Section 300 IPC.  Death may take place on account of large number of  blows given by a blunt weapon like lathi on hands and legs causing  fractures.  Though the injuries may not be on a vital part of the body  as the said term is generally understood, but if the medical evidence  shows that they were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to  cause death, the offence would fall in clause Thirdly of Section 300  IPC.  In Anda vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1966 SC 148, where there  were large number of injuries which had resulted in fractures of ulna,  third metacarpal bone, tibia and fibula, Justice Hidayatullah (as His  Lordship then was) speaking for a four Judge Bench held that the  offence will be under clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC having regard  to the fact that the doctor had opined that all these injuries collective  were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature though  individually no injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature  to cause death.  It was observed: -          "The third clause of S. 300, I.P.C. views the matter  from a general stand point.  It speaks of an intention to  cause bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary  course of nature to cause death.  Here the emphasis is on  the sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary course of

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nature to cause death.  The sufficiency is the high  probability of death in the ordinary way of nature.  When  this sufficiency exists and death follows and the causing  of such injury is intended, the offence is murder.   Sometimes the nature of the weapon used, sometimes the  part of the body on which the injury is caused, and  sometimes both are relevant.  The intentional injury  which must be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary  course of nature, is the determinant factor."

18.     It is not necessary for us to burden this judgment with other  decisions of this Court as the law enunciated in Virsa Singh case  (supra) has neither been doubted nor departed in any case and has  uniformly been followed ever since the judgment was rendered half a  century back in November, 1956. 19.     In the present case the prosecution has established beyond any  shadow of doubt that the appellant caused an injury by knife on the  left hypochondrium which resulted in 1" long tear in posterior wall of  stomach in middle part of body of stomach, 2=" long rupture in  anterior wall of body of stomach, there were two tears in omentum 3"  x 3" each, there was 3" long rupture in left lobe of liver, and there was  one small perforation in the middle of transverse colon.  The injury  inflicted by the appellant was clearly intended by him and it was not  an accidental or unintentional injury.  The medical evidence  established that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of  nature to cause death.  In these circumstances there is no escape from  the conclusion that the offence committed by the appellant is clearly  covered by clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC. 20.     Having given our careful consideration to the submissions  made by the learned counsel by the appellants and the material on  record we are clearly of the opinion that the offence committed by the  appellant is one under Section 302 IPC and not under Section 304 Part  I IPC as held by the learned Additional Sessions Judge.  The High  Court was, therefore, perfectly correct in allowing the appeal filed by  the State and altering the conviction of the appellant from Section 304  Part I IPC to that under Section 302 IPC. 21.     In the result the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.