ARUN B. KHANJIRE Vs THE ICHALKARANJI URBAN COOP. BANK .
Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR,MARKANDEY KATJU, , ,
Case number: SLP(C) No.-018563-018563 / 2005
Diary number: 15190 / 2005
Advocates: Vs
RAVINDRA KESHAVRAO ADSURE
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 18563 of 2005
Shri Arun B. Khanjire …Petitioner
Vs.
The Ichalkaranji Urban Co-op. Bank Ltd. & Ors. … Respondents
J U D G M E N T ALTAMAS KABIR,J.
1. In view of the limited point of law involved,
the Special Leave Petition is taken up for
final disposal at the admission stage itself.
2. The petitioner is alleged to have taken loans
from the respondent-Bank under 17 loan
transactions either in his capacity as the
principal borrower or as the Director of the
firm M/s Prakash Offset Printers. According to
the respondent-Bank a sum of Rs.413.16 lakhs
together with interest was due to it from the
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petitioner as on 31.12.03. The petitioner,
along with the firm and its other Directors,
disputed their liability to make the said
payment and filed an application under Section
91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies
Act, 1960. Initially, the Co-operative Court
granted an order of status-quo but vacated the
same after hearing the Bank. The Co-operative
Appellate Court affirmed the order of the Co-
operative Court and refused to stay the
recovery proceedings. Meanwhile, the
respondent-Bank also initiated action for
recovery under Section 101 of the aforesaid Act
against the petitioner and his business
concerns. Accepting the claim of the Bank, the
Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies
issued 12 Recovery Certificates on 12.3.2004.
The petitioner and his other concerns filed
three writ petitions before the High Court
questioning the issuance of the Recovery
Certificates. The High Court also declined to
grant any relief and on 30.6.2004 the Bank
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issued demand notices to the appellant and his
other concerns. A warrant of attachment was
also issued.
3. On 15.7.2004, the petitioner herein filed a
Misc. Complaint Application before the
Divisional Joint Registrar seeking reliefs
which were similar to the reliefs sought for in
the writ petitions. After service of notice,
the respondent-Bank entered appearance and an
order or status quo was passed while fixing the
matter for hearing on 22.12.2004. Although, an
objection was taken on behalf of the
respondent-Bank that the proceedings were not
maintainable and had been commenced in
violation of the provisions of Section 154 of
the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act,
1960, the Divisional Joint Registrar set aside
the Recovery Certificates against which
decision the respondent-Bank filed a Writ
Petition in the High Court and prayed for
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setting aside the order of the Divisional Joint
Registrar, which prayer was allowed.
4. This Special Leave Petition is directed against
the said decision of the High Court granting
the order of the Divisional Joint Registrar.
5. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Jaideep
Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that
the revisional powers under the aforesaid Act
vested in the State Government or the
Registrar, which could be exercised suo motu or
on an application. He urged that since the
revisional powers under Section 154 of the
aforesaid Act had been invoked by the
Divisional Joint Registrar of the Co-operative
Societies suo motu, the order passed by him
could not be said to have been passed contrary
to the provisions of Sub-section (2A) of
Section 154 of the aforesaid Act. Mr.Gupta
urged that the High Court had erroneously come
to the conclusion that the revision proceedings
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against the decision of the Registrar was hit
by the provisions of Sub-section (2A) of
Section 154 of the above Act, since the inquiry
was commenced by the said authority on receipt
of information and not on a formal application
made to him.
6. Mr.Gupta then contended that the views
expressed by the High Court in regard to the
interpretation of Sub-section (2A) of Section
154 was erroneous and had been wrongly applied
to the facts of the case by the High Court.
7. Opposing the petition, Mr. U. Lalit, learned
Senior Counsel, urged at the very outset that
since the application of the petitioner was
unaccompanied by 50 per cent of the total sum
of the recoverable dues, the revision was not
maintainable in view of the provisions of Sub-
section (2A) of Section 154 of the above-
mentioned Act and the matter had been wrongly
taken up for consideration by the Divisional
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Joint Registrar holding the same to be
maintainable.
8. In this regard, Mr. Lalit referred to Section
154 of the above-mentioned Act which empowers
the State Government and the Registrar, either
suo-motu or on application, to call for and
examine the records of an inquiry or
proceedings of any matter other than those
referred to in Sub-section (9) of Section 149,
where any decision or order has been passed by
any subordinate officer, and no appeal lies
against such decision or order, for the purpose
of satisfying themselves as to the regularity
of such proceedings, and to annul or reverse
such decision, if it becomes necessary to do
so, after giving the person affected an
opportunity of being heard.
9. Mr. Lalit laid special emphasis on Sub-section
(2A) of Section 154, which reads as follows:
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“154(2A) No application for revision shall be entertained against the recovery certificate issued by the Registrar under Section 101 unless the applicant deposits with the concerned Society, fifty percent amount of the total amount of recoverable dues.”
10. Sub-section (3) provides that no application
for revision may be entertained, if made after
two months of the date of communication of the
decision or order. The revisional authority,
however, has been given the power to entertain
any such application made even after such
period upon sufficient cause being shown for
the delay.
11. Mr. Lalit submitted that while an application
may be filed within the period prescribed, the
revision could not be entertained (emphasis added) or taken up for consideration unless the
condition of pre-deposit as indicated in sub-
section (2) was fulfilled. Mr. Lalit submitted
that since the condition precedent had not been
satisfied, the Divisional Joint Registrar could
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not have entertained and decided the revision
application, as had been correctly held by the
High Court. It was also urged that the
proceedings under Section 101 had been
completed and Recovery Certificates were issued
without any obstruction, and, in any event, the
same question had been decided in other matters
which have been rejected upto this Court. Mr.
Lalit submitted that the entertainment of an
application, if filed within the period
prescribed, depended on the applicant
fulfilling the pre-condition stipulated, but he
could not be held responsible if such delay was
caused not by him but by the concerned officer.
Mr. Lalit urged that since the revisional
application had not been taken up suo-motu,
and, on the other hand, the pre-deposit of 50%
had not been made, the High Court rightly
dismissed the writ application and the same did
not warrant any interference in this petition.
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12. In support of his submission Mr. Lalit firstly
referred to the decision of this Court in The
Commissioner of Income –Tax, Bombay vs. M/s
Filmistan Limited [(1961) 3 SCR 893], which
was a case where an appeal had been presented
under the Income Tax Act, 1922, within the
period of limitation. The tax was paid after
the period of limitation prescribed for
presenting the appeal had expired. In the said
case it was held that the expression “no appeal
shall lie” in the proviso to Section 30(2) of
the said Act meant that the appeal could not be
held to be properly filed until the tax was
paid and not that the memorandum of appeal
could not be presented. In other words, the
appeal would be deemed to have been filed on
the date on which the tax was paid and the
question would then have to be decided whether
there was sufficient case for condonation of
delay.
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13. Mr. Lalit submitted that in the case of Lakshmi
Rattan Engineering Works Ltd. vs.
Assistant Commissioner Sales Tax, Kanpur,
[(1968) 1 SCR 565] this Court was called upon
to consider the expression ‘entertain’ in the
proviso to Section 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act,
1948, dealing with appeals and it was held by a
three-Judge Bench that the expression
‘entertain’ meant the first occasion on which
the Court took up the matter for consideration.
But where an appeal was automatically admitted
under the Rules the first occasion for the
Court to take up the appeal would be when the
appeal came up for hearing. It was also held
that before the appeal could be taken up for
hearing, it would have to be proved to the
satisfaction of the officer concerned that the
tax had been paid and in time.
14. Mr. Lalit submitted that a similar view had
been expressed by this Court in State of
Haryana vs. Maruti Udyog Limited [(2000) 7
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SCC 348] where Section 39 of the Haryana
General Sales Tax Act, 1973, was in question
and where similar provisions were included and
it was held that the word ‘entertain’ would
mean when the case is taken up by the Court for
the first time, or, in other words, when
satisfactory proof had been made available that
the tax in question had been deposited.
15. Various other decisions were also cited on the
same lines which need not detain us.
16. Having carefully considered the submission made
on behalf of the respective parties and having
carefully considered the provisions of Section
154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies
Act, 1960, and in particular Sub-section (2A)
of Section 154, we are convinced that no
interference is called for with the order of
the High Court impugned in these proceedings.
Admittedly, Section 154(1) of the above Act
confers revisionary powers on the State
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Government and also the Registrar of Co-
operative Societies under the Act. It also
empowers the State Government or the Registrar
to satisfy themselves as to the legality or the
proprietary of any such decision or order and
to modify, annul or reverse the same after
giving the person affected thereby an
opportunity of being heard either suo motu or
on an application. In the instant case,
although learned counsel Mr. Jaydeep Gupta
tried to impress upon us that the proceedings
had been commenced suo-motu, we are unable to
accept such submission since an application had
been made by the petitioner to the officer
concerned in which all the facts relating to
the appeal had been set out. Although, the same
was not in the form of a formal Memorandum of
Appeal it served the purpose of the appeal
without compliance with the provisions of Sub-
section (2A) which required deposit of 50% of
the recoverable dues. In fact, the petitioner
resorted to an innovative procedure in order to
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avoid the pre-condition of payment of 50% of
recoverable dues as stipulated under Sub-
section (2A) of Section 154 of the above Act.
17. We agree with Mr. Lalit’s submission that the
matter was not taken up suo-motu by the
Divisional Joint Registrar, but on the basis of
the application which had been filed by the
petitioner here, though not in the form of a
Memorandum of Appeal, and that while an appeal
may be filed within the period of limitation
prescribed, it could not be entertained or
taken up for hearing before the pre-condition
indicated in Sub-section (2A) had been complied
with, which view is supported by the decisions
referred to hereinabove.
18. We, therefore, see no reason to entertain the
Special Leave Petition which is accordingly
dismissed.
19. There will be no order as to costs.
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________________J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)
________________J. (MARKANDEY KATJU)
New Delhi Dated: 3.12.2008
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