http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

PETITIONER: ARUL NADAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: AUTHORISED OFFICER, LAND REFORMS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       22/09/1998

BENCH: M.M. PUNCHHI, G.B.PATTANAIK, AND A.P. MISRA,

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT G.B. PATTANAIK, J. ----------------- The  question  that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the provisions  of  Section  21-A  of  the Tamil  Nadu  Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961, would apply to the facts and circumstances of the case and the appellant can derive benefit of the same, and if so, to what extent?  When the matter was listed before  a  Bench of  two judges of this Court Their Lordships felt that there is a conflict between  two  decisions  of  this  Court  both rendered by two Hon’ble Judges, one in the case of V.  Gopal Reddiar (dead) By Lrs.    & Anr.  vs.  State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.  - 1995 Supp.  (2) Supreme Court Cases  481,  to  which one  of  us  was a party, namely (Hon’ble Punchhi, J., as he then was), and the other in the case of A.G.  Vardarajulu  & Anr.  vs.   State  of  Tamil Nadu & Ors.  - (1998) 4 Supreme Court Cases 231, and that is how the matter has come  before a three judge Bench. The  appellant was the owner of 43.55 standard acres of agricultural land.    He  also  purchased  some  land  on 20.10.1961.   The  Tamil  Nadu  Land  Reforms  (Fixation  of Ceiling Land) Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred  to  as  "The Act") came  into  force on 5.4.1960.  A proceeding under the Act was initiated by the authorised officer who came to  the conclusion  that  the  appellant  was  in possession of 7.01 standard acres as surplus land, over and above the permitted ceiling area of 30 standard acres.  The appellant challenged the said  order  of  the  authorised  officer  by  filing  a Revision  before  Land  Commissioner who ultimately remanded the matter to the authorised officer for re-disposal.  After the matter  came  back  on  remand  the  authorised  officer prepared  a  revised draft statement indicating therein that the total surplus land in possession of the appellant  comes to 19.28  standard  acres.  It may be stated that subsequent acquisition  made  by   the   appellant   was   taken   into consideration for computing the surplus land.  The appellant -  land  owner  filed  objection to the said draft statement contending inter alia that two settlement  deeds  have  been executed  in  favour  of  two minor sons on 28.4.1970 and on

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

2.5.1970 and those transfers are valid under Section 21-A of the Act, and as  such  they  should  be  excluded  from  the computation  of  the  ceiling  surplus  in  the hands of the appellant and on such exclusion the appellant cannot be said to have any excess land in his possession.   The  authorised officer,  however rejected the said objection and the matter being carried in an appeal, the appeal was  also  dismissed. The  appellant  then  preferred a Revision to the High Court and the High Court by the impugned  judgment  in  C.W.P  No. 3688   of  1982  having  negatived  the  contention  of  the appellant and having dismissed  the  Revision,  the  present appeal has  been  preferred.   The High Court considered the provisions of Section 21-A which came into  the  Statute  by Tamil  Nadu Act XVII of 1970 with effect from 15th February, 1970, as well as Section 3(1) and 3(2)  of  the  said  Tamil Nadu  Act  XVII  of 1970 and came to the conclusion that the proceedings in the present case having been initiated  under the Principal Act the same has to be continued and concluded thereunder  and, as such Section 21-A which was brought into the Statute by Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Reduction of Ceiling on  Land),  Act  1970  (Act  XVII  of  1970)  will  have  no application. The  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the appellant contended that in view of  non-obstante  clause  in  Section 21-A  and  the  legislatures  having allowed a land owner to transfer a part of his land between 15.2.1970 and  2.10.1970 the  High  Court  committed  serious  error in coming to the conclusion that Section  21-A  has  no  application  to  the present case.  According to the learned counsel Section 21-A has  an  overriding  effect  on  all  provisions of the Land Reform Act or even any other law in  force  and,  therefore, the  said  provision  must  have its full play and cannot be restricted in any manner so as to exclude its operation to a proceeding which had been initiated  prior  to  coming  into force of  the  said Tamil Nadu Act XVII of 1970.  In support of his contention reliance was placed on  the  decisions  of this court  in  the  case  of  Susila Devi Ammal & Ors.  vs. State of Madras - 1993 (1) Supreme Court Cases 462,  and  V. Gopal reddiar & Anr.   vs.  State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.  1995 Supp, (2) Supreme Court Cases  respondent  -  State  on  the other  hand  contended,  that  the  aforesaid interpretation would frustrate the very object of the Tamil Nadu  Act  XVII of 1970, namely, to reduce the ceiling area from 30 standard acres  to  15  standard  acres and therefore, the High Court rightly held that Section 21-A will have no application. Before  examining  the  correctness  of  the   rival submissions  it  would  be  appropriate for us to notice the decision of this Court in Varadarajulu’s case (supra)  as  a Bench  of  this  Court  apparently  thought  that there is a conflict between the said decision and the  decision  in  V. Gopal Reddiar’s  case  (supra).   In Vardarajulu (supra) the question  for  consideration  was   whether   Section   21-A overrides Section  3(42)?    Section 3(42) defines Stridhana Land to mean any land held on the date  of  commencement  of the Land Reforms Act by any female member of a family in her own name.  The expression ’held’ would have its meaning from Section 3(19)  which  defines  ’to hold land’.  Section 21-A has absolutely no connection with Section 3(42) in  as  much as  under  Section  21-A the legislature recongnises certain transfers made between 15-2-1970 and 2-10-1970 to be  valid. But  if the transfer or had no right to transfer question of legislature validating such transfer would not  arise.    In Varadarajulu’s  case  (supra) the said question really arose for  consideration  and  this  Court  held  that  since  the transferer  was not holding the land as ’Stridhana land’ the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

provisions of Section 21-A will have no application.  In  V. Gopal  Reddiar’s case (supra) the question for consideration was whether a proceeding under the parent Act of 58 of  1961 having  been  initiated but had not been concluded and Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Reduction of Ceiling on  Land)  Act  1970 having come into force whether Section 21-A brought into the statue  by  virtue  of Act XVII of 1970 would apply and this Court answered in affirmative.  We, therefore, do  not  find any  inconsistency  between  the  decision  of  the Court in Vardarajulu  and  Gopal  Reddiar,  the  two   operating   in different fields.  In  M.K.    Harihara Iyer vs.  Authorised Officer, Land Reforms Tiruneveli - 1990 (supp.)  SCC  182  a Three  Judge  Bench of this Court considered the question of applicability of Section 21-A vis-a-vis Section  22  thereof and  came  to  hold  that Section 21-A which begins with the words ’Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  Section  22 clearly   overrides   Section   22   and,   therefore,   the transactions referred to  in  Section  21-A  cannot  be  the subject matter   of   enquiry   under   Section   22.    The interpretation of Section 21-A came up again in the case  of Susila Devi (supra).  In the said case certain partitions in the family  had taken place within the interregnum.  But the High Court had come to the conclusion  that  the  Authorised Officer shall calculate the ceiling area under Section 23 as if no  transfer  had  taken  place.  This Court reversed the judgment of the High Court  and  came  to  hold  that  while reducing the ceiling area of a person from 30 standard acres to  15  standard acres under Tamil Nadu Act XVII of 1970 the legislatures have granted the transfer holiday for  a  small period  between  15.2.70  to 2.10.70 as contained in Section 21-A and the  said  provision  would  apply  notwithstanding anything  contained  in Section 22 or any other provision of the Act or any other law for the time being in  force,  and, therefore,  while  computing  the  ceiling, the transfers if falls within any other clause of Section  21-A  have  to  be given effect  to.  This decision was also relied on in Gopal Reddiar’s case (supra) and it was held that for the  purpose of   determining   the  final  holding  under  the  modified Principal Act the amended Section 23 will have to be applied to  the  ceiling  holding  determined  under  the   original Principal  Act  and  for  that purpose the sale transactions between the two dates, namely, 15.2.70 and 1.10.70 will have to be ignored.  It was also held that while pendency of  the ceiling  proceedings under the Principal Act, Act XVII of 70 having come into force and inserting Section 21-A  into  the Parent  Act, if any land has been voluntarily transferred to an educational institution between the two dates  then  said land has  to be excluded under Section 21-A.  In other words Section 21-A was made applicable to a proceeding  which  had been  initiated  under  the  Parent Act and was pending when said Section 21-A was brought on to the Statute  book.    In view  of  the  aforesaid  two decisions and on examining the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act XVII of 1970 more  particularly Section   21-A,  we  have  no  hesitation  to  come  to  the conclusion  that  the  said  provision  does  apply   to   a proceeding  which  was  pending  on  the  date the aforesaid provision was inserted in the parent  Act  even  though  the proceeding  might  have  been initiated under the Parent Act itself and the High Court committed error  in  holding  that Section  21-A  will  have  no  application  as  the  ceiling proceeding had been initiated under the Parent Act. We may notice at this stage the contentions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that the object of the Act being to further reduce the ceiling  area. Section   21-A,   if  is  made  applicable  to  the  pending

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

proceeding then said object would be  frustrated.    We  are afraid  that  this contention cannot be sustained in as much as when  the  language  of  a  statute  is  unambiguous,  in interpreting  the  provisions thereof it is not necessary to look into the legislative intent or the object of  the  Act. As  has  been  stated  by this Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs.  Vijay  Anand  Maharaj  1963  (1)  Supreme Court Reports p.1, "When a language is plain and unambiguous and  admits  of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself." In  the  Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 CI&F 85, p.143 Tindal C.J.  stated thus  "If  the  works  of  the  statue  are  in themselves  precise  and  unambiguous  then  no  more can be necessary than to expound those words in their  natural  and ordinary  sense  and  the  words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver." That  apart, while  the  legislature  intended to reduce the ceiling area from 30 standard acres to 15 standard acres they  themselves provided for a transfer holiday by inserting Section 21-A as has  been  held  by this Court in Susila Devi’s case (supra) and there would be no justification to give any  restrictive meaning  to  the  said  provision  of Section 21-A where the legislature  indicated  that  the  aforesaid  provision   is notwithstanding  anything  contained in Section 22 or in any other provision of the Act or in any other law for the  time being in  force.  In this view of the matter it would not be appropriate for  us  to  give  any  restrictive  meaning  to Section  21-A of the Act as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent. In the aforesaid premises the impugned  judgment  of the  High Court as well as the authorities under the Act are set aside and we hold that the provisions  of  Section  21-A would  apply  to  the  facts  of the case for computation of ceiling provided, however, all the necessary ingredients  of the said   provision   are   attracted.     This  appeal  is accordingly allowed and the matter is remanded back  to  the authorised  officer  for recomputation of the ceiling in the light of the law laid down by us in this judgment.