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PETITIONER: ARJAN SINGH AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NARAIN SINGH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/02/1963

BENCH:

ACT: Customary       Law-Jats  of  Tehsil  Zira   of   Ferozepore District--Adoption--Formal  adoption in Hindu Law  and  cus- tomary   appointment  of  an   heir--Difference--Effect   of appointment of heir on connection with natural family.

HEADNOTE: Harnam  Singh died leaving behind two daughters.  They  also died without leaving any issue surviving them.  The  Revenue authorities  ordered that the entire estate of Harnam  Singh be entered in the revenue records in the names of the defendants. The plaintiffs filed a suit for possession of the estate  of Harnam Singh.  Their contention was that notwithstanding the adoption of Ghuda Singh, their predecessor, by his  maternal uncle, they as descendants of Ghuda Singh were not  excluded from  inheritance to the estate of a member in  the  natural family  of  Ghuda  Singh.  It was also  contended  that  the family  of the plaintiffs and Harnam Singh was  governed  by Zamindara  Riwaj-i-am  by virtue of which a son  adopted  in another  family and his decendants did not lose their  right to  inherit  in the natural family because by  the  adoption according  to the custom of the community, the  adopted  son did  not  completely sever his connection with  his  natural family. The  contention  of defendants-appellants was  that  in  the District of Ferozeporc, every adoption in a Hindu family was formal  and according to the Riwaj-i-am of the District,  an adopted  son was excluded from the right to inherit  in  his natural family.  Consequently, Ghuda Singh, who was  adopted by  Bhan  Singh, could not inherit the  estate  because  his adoption  operated  as complete severance from  the  natural family. The  suit  was dismissed by the Subordinate  judge  and  his order  was  confirmed by the District judge.   However,  the High  Court  set aside the order of the District  judge  and held that the record disclosed no evidence that the adoption of Ghuda Singh was formal and hence it must be presumed that the adoption was a customary appointment of an heir and  not a  formal -adoption under the Hindu Law.  It was  also  held that  there  was  overwhelming authority in  favour  of  the proposition  that  by reason of a  customary  adoption,  the adopted 20 son and his descendants were not excluded from the right  to inherit   to  collaterals  in  the  natural   family.    The plaintiffs as grandsons in the male line of Ghuda Singh were entitled to inherit the estate.  The appellants came to this Court by a certificate of fitness granted by High Court.

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Held, that the view of the High Court was correct.  A person adopted according to the customs of the community, i.e.  who is  appointed as a heir to inherit the property of a  person outside the family, does not. by virtue of such appointment, lose  his right to inherit in his natural family except  the right  to  inherit the property of his natural  father  when there are natural brothers.  The natural brothers would take the property to the exclusion of such an adopted son and his defendants. Daya  Ram v. Sohel Singh (1906) P. R. No. 110 (F.B.),  Abdul Hussain  Khan  v.  Bibi Sona Dero 1917) L.R. 45  I  .A.  10, Vaishno  Ditti v. Rameshri (1928) L. R. 55 I. A.  407,  Mela Singh v. Gurdas, (1922) 1. L. R. 3 Lah. 362, Jagat Singh  v. Ishar Singh    30) I. L. R. 11 Lah. 615, Kanshi Ram v. Situ (1934) I. L.   R.16 Lah. 214, Rahmat v. Ziledar (1945) 1. L. R.26 Lah. 504  and  Jai Kapur v. Sher Singh, [1960] 3 S.  C. R.975, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 223 &  224 of 1961. Appeals  from the judgment and decree dated April 25,  1956. of  the  Punjab High Court in Civil Regular  Second  Appeals Nos. 158 and 159 of 1949 respectively. N.   S. Bindra and K. L. Mehta, for the appellants. Gurbachan  Singh,  Harbans Singh and M. L.  Kapur,  for  the respondents (in C. A. No. 224/61). 1963.  February 12.  The judgment of the court was delivered by SHAH  J.  These appeal arise  out of two suits  relating  to certian  agricultural  lands situate in  village  Umri  Ana, tehsil Zira District Ferozepore in the Punjab.  The  dispute relates  to  the right to inherit the estate  of  one  Hamam Singh who was the last male holder.  The -disputing  parties are  descended  from  Sahib  Singh’  as  disclosed  by   the following genealogy 21                          Sahib Singh                              |   |-----------------------------------------------------|   | Hamir Singh                                 Wazir Singh                                                         |                                                  Attar Singh    |--------------|------------|                        |  Chuhar Singh   Ghuda Singh  Kahan Singh                |    |             |              |              Mangal Singh    |             |              | Daughter    |----------------|  |  |---------------------| Mst. Bishno  Ramji Singh Dasau- |  Tehl Singh    Arjan Singh (married)        |       ndha   |  (Defdt.2)      (Defdt.1) Singh  |                 Singh  | again)                          ------|                  |      Narain Singh  |                  |        (Pltff.)    | |----------------|--------------|     | Bakhshish       Ajaib    Mukhtar      |  Singh          Singh     Singh       | (Pltff.)        (Pltff.)  (Pltff.)    |                                       |                     ---------------------------------|                     |                                |                     Roor Singh                  Bhola Singh                     |

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                   |                 Harman Singh                     |                     |    |--------------------------------------|    |                                      |  Mst. Tejo                             Mst. Gejo   (Died without issue)                (died without issue) 22 Harnam  Singh  grandson  of Kahan  Singh  died  leaving  him surviving  two  daughters Mst.  Tejo and Mst.  Gejo  and  no male  lineal  descendant.   The  property  of  Harnam  Singh devolved  upon  his two daughters in equal shares.   On  the death  of  Mst.  Tejo without issue the  entire  estate  was entered   in  the  name  of  Mst.   Gejo  by   the   revenue authorities.   Mst.  Gejo also died in 1942 without  leaving any  issue surviving her.  By order dated September 6,  1945 the  Assistant Collector directed that the entire estate  be entered in the name of   Narain  Singh s/o  Dasaundha  Singh and Bakshish   Singh,  Ajaib  Singh  and Mukhtar Singh  sons of   Ramji  Singh-who will     hereinafter   be     referred to   collectively  as  ’the  plaintiffs.’    In  appeal   to the  Collector  of  Ferozepore the order  of  the  Assistant Collector  was set aside and the estate was directed  to  be entered  in the names of Tehl Singh and Arjan Singh sons  of Mangal Singh--who will hereinafter be referred to  collecti- vely  as ’the defendants.’ The Commissioner of the  Division confirmed the order of the Collector. The  plaintiffs who are the descendants of Ghuda Singh  then instituted  suit No. 9/1947 in the Court of the  Subordinate judge,  Zira  for a decree for possession of the  estate  of Harnam  Singh,  barring  a small area of  8  Kanals  and  11 MarlasKhasra  No. 325--which was in their  possession.   The defendants  who are the descendants of Wazir Singh in  their turn  commenced an action (Suit No. 13/1947) for  possession of Khasra No. 325 against the plaintiffs.  Each side claimed title  to  the  estate  of Harnam  Singh  according  to  the customary  law  applicable to the Jats  residing  in  tehsil Zira,   District  Ferozepore.   It  was  the  case  of   the plaintiffs that notwithstanding the adoption of Ghuda  Singh by his maternal uncle Bhan Singh, Ghuda Singh’s  descendants were not excluded from inheritance to the estate of a member in the natural family of Ghuda Singh It was submitted by the plaintiffs  23 that  the  family  of the plaintiffs and  Harnam  Singh  was governed  by Zamindara Riwaj-i-am (general custom  obtaining amongst  the Zamindars) by virtue of which a son adopted  in another  family and his descendants do not lose their  right to inherit in their natural family, because by the  adoption according  to  the custom of the community the  adopted  son does  not completely sever his connections with his  natural family.  The defendants, on the other hand, claimed that  in the District of Ferozepore every adoption in a Hindu  family is ’formal’ and according to the Riwaj-i-am of the  District an adopted son is excluded from the right to inherit in  his natural  family.  Consequently Ghuda Singh, who was  adopted by Bhan Singh, could not inherit the estate of Hamir  Singh, his  adoption  operating as a complete  severance  from  the natural  family.  The sole dispute between the parties  was, therefore, as to the customary law applicable to the  rights of  a son adopted in a jat family residing in  tehsil  Zira, District Ferozepore. The two suits were consolidated for trial.  The  Subordinate judge  held  that all ceremonies relating to  adoption  were

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performed  and  Ghuda  Singh ceased to be a  member  of  the family  of  his  natural  father  according  to  the  custom prevailing  in the District and the plaintiffs who were  the descendants  of Ghuda Singh could not inherit the estate  of Hamir  Singh.   In so holding he relied upon the  manual  of Riwaji-i-am of Ferozepore District prepared in 1914,  which, in his view, recorded that when any adoption in the District takes effect the adopted on adoption son stand  transplanted to the family of the adopter.  In appeal the District Court, Ferozepore  held  that  in the case of  Jats  of  Ferozepore District  by special custom prevailing in the District,  the adopted  son  bad the right to inherit collaterally  in  the family  of  his adoptive father only and could  not  inherit collaterally  in  his natural father’s  family.   In  second appeal the High Court of Punjab set aside the decree passed 24 by  the District Court.  In the view- of the High Court  the record  disclosed  no evidence that the  adoption  of  Ghuda Singh  made by his maternal uncle Bhan Singh was formal  and in the absence of any such evidence it must be presumed that the adoption was a customary appointment of an heir and  not a  formal  adoption under the Hindu Law and that  there  was overwhelming authority in favour of the proposition that  by reason  of  a  customary adoption the adopted  son  and  his descendants  were not excluded from the right to inherit  to collaterals   in  the  natural  family.   The   High   Court accordingly  held that the plaintiffs, as grandsons  in  the male  line  of  Ghuda Singh, were entitled  to  inherit  the estate of Hamir Singh.  With certificate of fitness  granted by  the High Court, these two appeals are preferred  by  the defendants. It  is common ground that Ghuda Singh was adopted some  time before 1856 by Bhan Singh, his maternal uncle.  The  dispute between  the  parties  has to be resolved  by  applying  the customary law applicable to the parties, because s. 5 of the Punjab  Laws  Act, 1872 which governs the  parties  provides that : "In  questions  regarding succession,  special  property  of females,  betrothal and marriage, divorce, dower,  adoption, guardianship,  minority, bastardy, family relations,  wills, legacies, gifts, partition, or any religious usage or insti- tution, the rule of decision shall be- (a)  any  custom applicable to the parties concerned,  which -is not contrary to justice, equity or good conscience,  and has  not  been  by this or any other  enactment  altered  or abolished,  and  has  not been declared to be  void  by  any competent authority  25 (b)  The  Muhammadan  Law  in cases where  the  parties  are Muhammadans,  and the Hindu Law, in cases where the  parties are  Hindus, except in so far as such "law has been  altered or abolished by legislative enactment, or is opposed to  the provisions  of  this Act, or has been modified by  any  such custom as is above referred to." In  Daya Ram v. Sohel Singh (1), Rober son, J., (at P.  410) in dealing with the true effect of s. 5 observed : "In all cases it appears to me under this Act, it lies  upon the  person  asserting  that  he is ruled  in  regard  to  a particular  matter  by  custom,  to  prove  that  he  is  so governed,  and  not by personal law, and further,  to  prove what  the  particular custom is.  There  is  no  presumption created by the clause in favour of custom; on the  contrary, it  is only when the custom is established that it is to  be the  rule of decision.  The Legislature did not show  itself enamoured  of custom rather than law, nor does it  show  any

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tendency to extend the "Principles’ of custom to any  matter to  which a rule of custom is not clearly proved  to  apply. It  is  not the spirit of customary law, nor any  theory  of custom  or  deductions from other customs which is to  be  a rule  of decisions, but only ’any custom applicable  to  the parties  concerned which is not......... and it  "therefore’ appears to me clear that when either party to a suit sets up ’custom’  as a rule of decision, it lies upon him  to  prove the  custom  which he seeks to apply; if he fails to  do  so clause  (b) of s. 5 of the Punjab Laws Act applies, and  the rule  of  decision must be the personal law of  the  parties subject to the other provisions of the clause." This view was affirmed by the judicial Committee (1)  (1906) P.R. No. 110 (F.B.). 26 of the Privy Council in Abdul Hussein Khan v. Bibi Sona Dero (1).   In  Vaishno  Ditti v.  Rameshri  (2),  the  ,Judicial Committee observed : "x  x  x x their Lordships are of opinion  that  in  putting custom  in the forefront, as the rule of succession,  whilst leaving the particular custom to be established, as it nece- ssarily  must be, the Legislature intended to recognize  the fact  that in this part of India inheritance and  the  other matters mentioned in the section are largely regulated by  a variety  of customs which depart from the ordinary rules  of Hindu and Mohamedan law." The pleadings also disclose an unanimity that the rights  of the  parties  have  to  be adjudged  in  the  light  of  the customary law applicable and not by the rules of Hindu  Law. The  relevant  general  custom which is  applicable  in  the matter  of adoption is to be found in Rattigan’s  Digest  of Civil law for the Punjab, 13. Edn. p. 572 Article 48 "An heir appointed in the manner above described  ordinarily does  not thereby lose his right to succeed to  property  in his  natural  family, as against collaterals, but  does  not succeed in the presence of his natural brothers." Article 49 : "Nor,  on the other hand, does the heir acquire a  right  to succeed  to  the  collateral relatives  of  the  person  who appoints  him,  where no formal adoption  has  taken  place, inasmuch as the relationship established between him and the appointer is a purely personal one." This  adoption, according to Rattigan is irrevocable and  an adopted son cannot relinquish his status. (1)  (1917) L.R. 45.  I.A. 10.   2) (1928) LR, 55 I.A.  107, 421.  27 Article  52  sets  out the rights of the  adopted  son.   It states : "The appointed heir succeeds to all the rights and interests held or enjoyed by the appointer and, semble, would  succeed equally with a natural son subsequently born." There  is  a long course of decisions in the High  Court  of Lahore  and  the High Court of Punjab in which it  has  been held  that the relationship between the appointed  heir  and the appointer which is called adoption is purely a  personal one  and  resembles the Kritrima form of adoption  of  Hindu Law: Mela Singh v. Gurdas (1), Sir Shadi Lal, C.J.  observed in  dealing with the effect of a customary adoption  in  the Punjab : "The tie of kinship with the natural family is not dissolved and  the fiction of blood relationship with the  members  of the  new  family has no application to the  appointed  heir. The  relationship established between the appointer and  the

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appointee,  is  a purely personal one and  does  not  extend beyond the contracting parties on either side." Similarly  in  Jagat Singh v. Ishar Singh (2), it  was  held that the reservation as to the adopted son not succeeding in the  presence of his brothers refers only to his  succession to  his  natural  father  but does not  apply  to  cases  of collateral  succession in his natural family A similar  view was  expressed  in  Kanshi Ram V. Situ (3),  and  Rahmat  v. Ziledar (4).  In the last mentioned case it was stated : "Under  the general custom of the province a person  who  is appointed as an heir to a third person does not thereby lose his right to succeed to the property of his natural  father. But (1)(1922)I.L.R.3 Lah.362(F.B.) (2)(1930)1.L.R.II Lah.615. (3) (1934)   16 Lah. 214.  (4) (1945) I.L.R. 26 Lab. 540. 28 the appointed heir and his lineal- descendants have no right to  succeed to the property of the appointed heir’s  natural father  against  the other sons of the  natural  father  and their  descendants.  The appointed heir can succeed  to  the property of his natural father when the only other  claimant is the collateral heir of the latter." But it is urged on behalf of the defendants that the general custom  applicable to the Punjab as recorded by Rattigan  is shown  to be superseded by proof of a special custom of  the District  recorded in the Riwaj-i-am of Ferozepore  District prepared  by  Mr.  Currie at the  settlement  of  1914,  and reliance is placed upon answers to Questions 76 and 77 which deal  with  the effect of adoption.  The Questions  and  the Answers recorded are : "Question  76--Does  an  adopted son  retain  his  right  to inherit  from his natural father ? Can he inherit  from  his natural father if the natural father dies without other sons ? Answer-All  agree that the adopted son cannot  inherit  from his  natural father, except as for as regards such share  of the  property  as  would come to his adoptive  father  as  a collateral.   Sodhis ’however’ say that he can  inherit  his natural   father’s  estate  if  the  latter  has   no   male descendants,  while the Nipale say the adopted son  inherits from both fathers. Question 77-Describe the rights of an adopted son to inherit from  his  adoptive  father.   What is  the  effect  of  the subsequent birth of legitimate sons to the adoptive father ? Will  the  adopted  son take equal shares  with  them  ?  If natural legitimate sons be born subsequently to the adoption where the chundawand system  29 of  inheritance prevails, how will the share of the  adopted son, whose tribe differs from that of the adoptive  father,’ inherit from him ? Does an adopted son retain his own got or take that of his adoptive father ? Answer-An  adopted  son  has  exactly  the  same  rights  of inheritance from his adoptive father as a natural legitimate son.   The inheritance would only be by chundawand, if  that was the prevalent rule of the family. The  Nipals, Rajputs, Arains, Moghals, Sayyads, Gujjars  and Muhammadan  Jats  state  that if the adopted  son  is  of  a different  got  he takes the got of his  adoptive  father  ; while if he is of a different tribe, he cannot inherit. As it is, as a rule aged men without hope of sons who adopt, cases  of  the birth of legitimate sons after  adoption  has taken place must be rare." When there is conflict between the general custom stated  in Rattigan’s Digest of Customary Law and the Riwaj-i-am  which

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applies to a particular area it has been held by this  Court that the latter prevails.  In Jai Kapur  v. Sher Singh  (1), it was observed "There is, therefore, an initial presumption of  correctness as regards the entries in the Riwaj-i-am and when the custom as  recorded  in  the Riwaj-i-am is  in  conflict  with  the general   custom  as  recorded  in  Rattigan’s   Digest   or ascertained otherwise, the entries in the Riwaj-i-am  should ordinarily  prevail  except that as was pointed out  by  the Judicial Committee in Mt.  Subhani v. Nawab [A.I.R. 1941 (1)  [1960] 3 S. C.,R, 975. 979. 30 (P.  C.)  21],  "that  where, as in the  present  case,  the Riwaj-i-am  affects adversely the rights of females who  had no  opportunity  whatever of appearing  before  the  revenue authorities,  the presumption would be weak, and only a  few instances would suffice to rebut it." Therefore  when  there is a conflict between the  record  of custom  made in Rattigan’s Digest of Customary Law  and  the local  Riwaj-i-am, prima facie, the latter would prevail  to the  extent  of the inconsistency, and it would be  for  the person pleading a ’custom or incident thereof different from the  custom recorded in the Rewaj-i-am to prove such  custom or incident.  Attention must, therefore, be directed to  the question whether there is in fact Any inconsistency between’ the  custom recorded in Rattigan’s Digest of  Customary  Law and  the  relevant entries in the Riwaj-i-am.   The  general custom recorded in Rattigan’s Digest is apparently this :  a person adopted according to the custom of the community i.e. who  is appointed as an heir to’ inherit the property  of  a person  outside  the  family does not,  by  virtue  of  such appointment,  lose his right to inherit the property in  his natural family except the right to -inherit the property  of his  natural  father when there are natural  brothers.   The natural brothers would take the property to the exclusion of such an adopted son and his descendants.  Question 76 in the Riwaj-i-am  primarily refers to the right of an adopted  son to  retain his right to inherit the property of his  natural father  and  the  answer recorded is that  the  adopted  son cannot  inherit the property of the natural  father,  except such property as would devolve upon his adoptive father as a collateral (of the adopted son’s natural father).  It is  to be  noticed that the question was directed to ascertain  the right  of  the  adopted son to inherit  the  estate  of  his natural father : it did not seek elucidation on the right of the adopted son to inherit the estate of any collaterals  of the natural  31 father, and the fact that in the answer it was recorded that to  the estate which would devolve upon his adoptive  father as  a  collateral of his natural father he has  a  right  of inheritance,  strongly  supports the view that  the  village elders in replying to the question were only concerned  with the  right of an adopted son to inherit the property of  his natural  father  and were not concerned to dilate  upon  any right  to collateral succession in the natural family.   The answer to question 77 also supports this view.When asked  to describe the rights of an adopted ’on to inherit the  estate of  his adoptive father, they replied that the  adopted  son had exactly the same rights of inheritance from his adoptive father as a natural legitimate son. Mr.  Bindra appearing on behalf of the defendants  submitted that  questions  76 and 77 were in-tended to  ascertain  the custom of the District relating to the rights of the adopted son  in  his natural family and the family of  his  adoptive

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father  and the answers must be read in that light.  We  are unable to accept this suggested interpretation of  Questions 76  and  77  and  the  information  elicited  thereby.   The Riwaj-i-am  appears  to  have  been  carefully  compiled  by officers  of  standing and experience and it is  clear  that they  made a limited enquiry about the rights of an  adopted son to inherit the property of his natural father and of his adoptive father.  There is undoubtedly some conflict between the  custom recorded in Rattigan’s Digest and the custom  in the Riwaj-i-am.  Whereas in Rattigan’s Digest it is recorded that an heir appointed in another family does not succeed to his natural father in the presence of his natural  brothers, in  the Riwaj-i-am it is recorded that the adopted son  does not directly inherit the estate of his natural father in any event, But we are not concerned with that’ inconsistency  in this  case.  It is sufficient to observe that in Art. 48  of Rattigan’s Digest, it is 32 recorded that an heir appointed in the manner described  (an adopted  son) does not thereby lose his right to succeed  to property  in his natural family : and  nothing  inconsistent therewith  is shown to be recorded in the Riwaj-i-am of  the District. Mr.  Bindra  contended  that in any  event  there  is  clear evidence  of  instances  of devolution of  property  in  the family  of  the  parties indicating that a  son  adopted  in another family was totally excluded from inheritance in  the natural  family.  Counsel relied upon Ext.  D-5  an  extract from   the  register  of  mutations  relating   to   certain agricultural  lands  in village Umri Ana.  It  appears  from that extract that on the death of Hamir Singh the estate was in  the  first instance entered in the names  of  his  three sons.  But Salig Ram, Patwari of the village, made a  report on  May 28, 1884 that Kahan Singh and Chuhar Singh  (two  of the sons of Hamir Singh) claimed that Ghuda Singh had  never been  in possession of the 1/3rd share of the Khata  entered in  his name and that Ghuda Singh himself had admitted  that he  had no concern with the Khata in question and  that  his name  should  be  removed.  On  that  report  the  Assistant Collector ordered that the lands be entered in the names  of Kahan  Singh  and Chuhar Singh and that the  name  of  Ghuda Singh  be  removed  from the mutation  entry  and  that  the Jamabandi papers be altered accordingly.  But this  instance of exclusion of Ghuda Singh from the right to participate in the estate of his father is consistent with the statement of custom  recorded  in  Rattigan’s Digest.   It  is  expressly recorded in Art. 48 that an appointed heir does not  thereby lose his right to succeed to property in his natural family, as  against  collaterals,  but he does not  succeed  in  the presence  of his natural brothers.  Kahan Singh  and  Chuhar Singh  were brothers of Ghuda Singh and Ghuda  Singh  having been adopted could not, according to the custom recorded in  33 Rattigan’s  Digest,  inherit  his  fathers  estate  in   the "presence of his brothers." The  other  instance  relied upon by counsel  is  about  the devolution  of the estate of Chuhar Singh on the  remarriage of  his  daughter Bishno.  On the death of Chuhar  Singh  it appears  that  his property was entered in the name  of  his daughter  Bishno,  and  when  Bishno  contracted  a   Karewa marriage according to the custom prevalent in the community, the estate held by her was entered in the name of Rura Singh and  Bhola  Singh sons of Kahan Singh.  In the  register  of mutations  Ext.  R D-1 it is recorded that Ghuda  Singh  who was   the  Lambardar  appeared  before  the  Tehsildar   and

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identified  Mst.  Bishno and stated that she had  contracted Karewa marriage with jawala Singh and further admitted  that Rura  Singh  and  Bhola  Singh were  entitled  to  take  her property,  and  pursuant  to this  statement  the  Tehsildar directed that mutation regarding succession be sanctioned in favour of Rura Singh and Bhola Singh in equal shares.   This instance also, in our judgment, does not support any case of departure from the custom recorded in Rattigan’s Digest.  It is clear from the genealogy and the extract of the  register of mutations Ext.  D-1 that the occasion for making an entry of  mutation  was  the remarriage  of  Bishno.   Mr.  Bindra submitted  that according to the custom of the  community  a daughter  inheriting  property,  from her  father  would  on marriage  be divested of the property, which  would  devolve upon  the collaterals of her father, and according  to  that custom  when  on  the remarriage of  Bishno  the  succession opened, Ghuda Singh was on his own admission excluded.  This, counsel submitted, was a stronginstance supporting         a departure from the custom recorded in   Rattigan’s   Digest. But  if by virtue of the custom prevalent in the  community, as asserted by Mr. Bindra, on her marriage Bishno would lose her interest in the property of her father, it is 34 difficult to appreciate how she acquired title or  continued contrary to that custom, to remain owner of the property  of her  father after her first marriage.  It is clear  that  it was  not because of her marriage, but on  re-marriage,  that the  property was alleged to have devolved upon  Rura  Singh and  Bhola Singh.  Why Bishno did not forfeit her  right  to the property on her marriage and forfeited her right thereto on remarriage has been left in obscurity. The  learned  judges of the High Court held  that  the  mere circumstance that Ghuda Singh permitted the estate to go  to the descendants of Kahan Singh was not by itself  sufficient to  establish  the  custom  set up  by  the  defendants  and uncontested instances were of little value in establishing a custom.  They observed that the instance might have received considerable  reinforcement if it had been shown that  Ghuda Singh  or any of his descendants had inherited  collaterally in  the family of Bhan Singh but except succession of  Ghuda Singh  to  the estate of Bhan Singh which is  in  accordance with  the general custom no proof of  collateral  succession was  established, and the single instance of Chuhar  Singh’s estate  devolving upon the descendants of Kahan  Singh  with the  consent  of Ghuda Singh does not establish  any  custom contrary  to  what is stated in Rattigan’s Digest.   We  are unable to disagree with the view so expressed. On  that  view  of  the case, these  appeals  fail  and  are dismissed with costs.                      Appeal dismissed.  35