11 August 1986
Supreme Court
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ANWAR Vs IST ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE,BBULANDSHAHR & ORS.

Bench: VENKATARAMIAH,E.S. (J)
Case number: Special Leave Petition (Civil) 8001 of 1986


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PETITIONER: ANWAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: IST ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE,BBULANDSHAHR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/08/1986

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) MISRA RANGNATH

CITATION:  1986 AIR 1785            1986 SCR  (3) 540  1986 SCC  (4)  21        JT 1986   111  1986 SCALE  (2)249

ACT:      Motor  Vehicles   Act,  1939:S.68-D(-)Civil   suit  for injunction restraining proceedings before Hearing Authority- Whether maintainable.

HEADNOTE:      Section 68-C,  occurring in  Chapter IVA  of the  Motor Vehicles Act,  1939 provides  for publication  of the scheme where any  State Transport Undertaking is of opinion that it is necessary  in the  public interest  that  road  transport services in  relation to  any  area  or  route  be  run  and operated by  such undertaking.  Section 68-D(l) provides for filing  of   objections  to  the  scheme  before  the  State Government, s.  68-D(2) for  approval or modification of the scheme by  the State  Government after  giving a  hearing to objectors, while  s.68-D(3)  states  that  the  approved  or modified scheme when published shall become final.      Before the  Hearing Authority  could give its approval, the petitioner  in  the  Special  Leave  Petition,  a  stage carriage permit  holder, who had earlier filed objections to the scheme  published under  s. 68-C, filed a civil suit for declaration that the said scheme was illegal, void and ultra vires and  for  an  injunction.  It  was  contended  by  the defendants-respondents that  the suit  was not  maintainable since the  jurisdiction of  the Civil Courts in such matters was impliedly  barred. During  the pendency of that suit the petitioner filed  an application  before the Civil Court for staying the  hearing of  the suit  till the  disposal  of  a special leave  petition before  the Supreme  Court in  which question relating to the maintainability of suits of similar nature was involved. The Court declined to grant the request and fixed  the suit  for  arguments.  The  revision  to  the District Judge  and the  writ petition  to  the  High  Court preferred by the petitioner were dismissed.      In the  special leave  petition to  the  Court  on  the question: Whether  a suit  is maintainable  in a Civil Court for an injunction restraining the Hearing Authority under s. 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act from pro- 541 ceeding with the hearing and approving the scheme.      Dismissing the special leave petition,

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^      HELD: The  Civil Judge  was right  in declining to stay further proceedings in the suit. This is a suit which should have been rejected at the threshold under order 7 rule 11 of the Code  of Civil  Procedure on  the ground that it did not disclose a cause of action. [546F-G]      The Jurisdiction  conferred on  the  hearing  authority under s.68D  of the  Motor  Vehicles  Act  is  exclusive  in character and  it is  not open  to a civil court to issue an order of  injunction restraining  the  said  authority  from proceeding with  the hearing  of the case and exercising its statutory functions. [545H; 546A]      Whenever a  statute uses the expression that a decision of an  authority shall be final, the jurisdiction of a civil court to  go  into  the  correctness  or  otherwise  of  the decision  is   taken  away.   The  civil  courts  then  have jurisdiction only  to examine  whether the provisions of the statute have  not been  complied with or the tribunal had or had not  acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial  procedure. Their jurisdiction is barred insofar as merits of the case is concerned. [546B;D-E]      In the  instant case the scheme had been duly published under s  68-C by an authority which had the power to publish it and the authority which was hearing the case under s.68-D had the  power to  do so.  All the  contentions urged in the plaint  related   to  the  merits  of  the  scheme  and  the desirability of bringing the scheme into force and these can be  raised   by  an  aggrieved  person  before  the  Hearing Authority under  s. 68-D  of the  Act. It is for the Hearing Authority to consider the objections and to pass appropriate orders thereon. [546B-D]      Parliament has  created  a  special  machinery  by  the provisions contained  in Chapter IVA of the Act for bringing into force  an approved  or modified scheme which would have the  effect  of  excluding  completely  or  partially  other persons from  operating motor  service vehicles on any route or in any area. The very object of enacting that Chapter can be frustrated  by interested parties by resorting to a civil court with  the sole  purpose of delaying the implementation of a  scheme if  suits as in the instant case are allowed to be entertained. [545C-D: 546E-F]      H.C. Narayanappa  and Ors.  v. The  State of  Mysore  & Ors., [19601 3 S.C.R. 742 referred to. 542

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition (Civil) No. 8001 of 1986      From the  Judgment and  order  dated  8.7.1986  of  the Allahabad High Court in W.P. No. 9664 of 1986.      U.R. Lalit and T. Sridharan for the Petitioner.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      MISRA,  J.   The  short   question  which   arises  for consideration in this case is whether a suit is maintainable in a  civil court  for an injunction restraining the Hearing Authority appointed under section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ’the  Act’)  from proceedings with the hearing of matters under that provision and from  approving a scheme published under section 68-C of the Act either with or without any modification.      The petitioner  is the  holder of a permit issued under Chapter  IV   of  the   Act  to  ply  a  stage  carriage  on Bulandshahr-Siana-Garh-Bugrasi-Brijghat-Bhasians-Shambhaoli-

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Babugarh-Jadol-Jahangirabad route  in  the  State  of  Uttar Pradesh. The  State Transport  Undertaking of  the State  of Uttar Pradesh  published a scheme dated March 7, 1975 in the U.P. Gazette  dated April  5, 1975 under section 68-C of the Act pro  posing  to  operate  its  stage  carriages  to  the exclusion of  all private operators on the route referred to above. The  petitioner filed  his  objections  to  the  said scheme  along   with  several  others.  After  a  number  of adjournments the  Hearing Authority  empowered under section 68 of  the Act was able to conclude the proceedings by April 26, 1979  and it is alleged that the Authority in the course of the  hearing ob served that it would finalise and approve the scheme by 21.5.1979. Before the  Hearing Authority could give its  approval to  the scheme under section 68-D of Act, the petitioner  filed original  Suit No.  145 of 1979 on the file of  the Civil Judge, Bulandshahr for a declaration that the above scheme published under section 68-C of the Act was illegal,  void   and  ultra  vires  and  for  an  injunction restraining the  defendants in  the suit from finalising and approving the  scheme  and  acting  upon  it  after  it  was published. The  State Transport Undertaking, i.e., the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, the State of Uttar Pradesh and  the Regional  Transport Authority,  Meerut were impleaded as  the defendents  in the  suit.  The  defendants contested the  suit. L  one of  the pleas  raised  in  their written statement was that the suit was 543 not maintainable in a civil court for the reliefs prayed for by the  petitioner. During  the pendency  of  the  suit  the petitioner filed  an application  before the Civil Court for staying the  hearing of  the suit  till the  disposal  of  a special leave  petition before this Court since the question relating to  the maintainability  of suits of similar nature was involved in the said special leave petition. The learned Civil Judge  declined to grant the request of the petitioner and fixed  the suit  for  arguments  on  November  8,  1985. Aggrieved by  the order  of the  Civil Judge, the petitioner filed a  revision petition  before the  Additional  District Judge, Bulandshahr.  That revision  petition was  dismissed. Against  the   order  of   Additional  District  Judge,  the petitioner filed  a writ  petition. On  the file of the High Court of  Allahabad. That  petition was also dismissed. This special leave  petition is  filed against  the order  of the High Court of Allahabad.      We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner in this case on the question of maintainability of the suit out of which this petition arises.      The question  for consideration  in this  case  is,  as mentioned above,  whether a  suit is maintainable in a civil court for  an injunction  restraining the  Hearing Authority under section  68-L) of  the Act  from proceeding  with  the hearing and  approving the  scheme either  with  or  without modification. The  contention of  the respondents before the trial court  was that  the suit was not maintainable for the reliefs prayed  for by the petitioner since the jurisdiction of the civil courts in such matters was impliedly barred.      Chapter IVA  of the  Act was introduced into the Act by Act 100  of 1956.  Section 68-D of the Act provides that the provisions of  the Chapter IVA and the rules and orders made thereunder  shall   have  effect   notwithstanding  anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter IV of the Act or any other  law for  the  time  being  in  force  or  in  any instrument having  effect by virtue of any such law. Chapter IVA contains  certain special  provisions  relating  to  the State   Transport    Undertakings.   A    ’State   Transport

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Undertaking’ is defined by section 68-A(b) of the Act as any Undertaking providing  road transport  J service  where such undertaking is carried on by (i) the Central Government or a State  Government;  (ii)  any  Road  Transport  Corporation, established  under   section  3   of  the   Road   Transport Corporations Act,  1950; and  (iii) any  municipality or any corporation or  company owned  or controlled  by the Central Government or one or more State 544 Governments, or  by the  Central Government  and one or more State Governments.  Chapter IVA  of the Act provides for the preparation and  approval of  a scheme  enabling  the  State Transport Undertaking  to operate road transport services to the exclusion  complete or  partial of  other  persons.  The procedure laid  down for  the preparation  of the  scheme is contained in sections 68-C and 68-D of the Act. Section 68-C of  the   Act  provides   that  where  any  State  Transport Undertaking is  of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport  service,  it  is  necessary  in  the  public interest that  road transport  services in  general  or  any particular class  of such service in relation to any area or route or  portion thereof  should be run and operated by the State  Transport  Undertaking,  whether  to  the  exclusion, complete or  partial, of  other persons  or other  vise, the State Transport  Undertaking may  prepare  a  scheme  giving particulars of  the nature  of the  service proposed  to  be rendered, the  area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars  respecting thereto  as may be prescribed, and shall  cause every  such scheme  to be  published in the official Gazettee  and also  in such  manner  as  the  State Government may direct. Section 68-D of the Act provides that on the publication of any scheme in the official Gazette any person already  providing transport  facilities by any means along or  near the  area or  route proposed to be covered by the scheme,  any association representing persons interested in the  provision of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf  by the State Government and any local authority or police  authority within  whose jurisdiction  any part of the area or route proposed to be covered by the scheme lies, may within  thirty days  from the date of its publication in the official  Gazette file objections to it before the State Government. The  State Government may, after considering the objections and  after giving  an opportunity to the objector or his  representatives and the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking  to be  heard in the matter if they so desire, approve or modify the scheme. The scheme as approved or modified  as stated  above shall then be published in the official Gazette  by the State Government and the same shall thereupon become  final and  shall be  called  the  approved scheme and  the area  or route  to which it relates shall be called the  notified area  or notified  route. Under section 68-I of  the Act  the State Government is authorised to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter. The rules which are promulgated provide for the details  relating to  the manner  in which objections or representations can  be filed  under section 68-D(i) and the procedure to  be followed at the hearing of persons who have filed such objections 545 and/or representations  and the representatives of the State Transport  Undertaking.  The  rules  also  provide  for  the particulars to be incorporated in the scheme published under section 68-C  of the  Act. From  the above  provisions it is clear that  on the  publication of  the scheme under section

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68-C of  the Act any person who is aggrieved by the proposed introduction  of   the  scheme   is  entitled  to  file  his representations and  objections and  to  appear  before  the Hearing Authority under section 68-D of the Act and make his submissions in support of his objections or representations. Sub-section (ii)  of section  68-D of the Act authorises the Hearing Authority  to approve  the  scheme  either  with  or without modification.  By necessary  implication it can also reject a  scheme if  it feels  that it  is not  necessary to introduce  the  scheme.  When  the  scheme  is  approved  or modified under  section 68-D  of the  Act, such  approved or modified scheme  is required to be published in the official Gazette and on such publication it becomes final. It is thus seen that  Parliament has created a special machinery by the provisions contained  in Chapter IVA of the Act for bringing jnto force  an approved  or modified scheme which would have the  effect  of  excluding  completely  or  partially  other persons from  operating motor  service vehicles on any route or in  any area.  After the scheme become final, as provided in sub-section  (iii) of  section 68-D of Act, the transport authorities concerned  can issue  permits only in accordance with the  scheme  and  the  other  provisions  contained  in Chapter IVA of the Act . This Court in H. C. Narayanappa and Ors. v. The State of Mysore and Ors., [1960] 3 S.C.R. 742 at page 753  has observed  that the scheme approved or modified and published  under section 68-D of the Act may properly be regarded as  ’law’, within  the meaning  of Article 19(6) of the  Constitution,  made  by  the  State  excluding  private operators from notified routes or notified areas, and immune from the  attack that  it infringes  the  fundamental  right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.      Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that  the   courts  (subject  to  the  provisions  contained therein) have  jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting  suits   of  which   their  cognizance  is  either expressly or  impliedly barred.  It is  no doubt  true  that there is  no express  provision in  the Act  taking away the jurisdiction of  the civil courts to try a suit in which the validity of  the proceedings under Chapter IVA of the Act is called  in   question.  But  we  are  of  opinion  that  the jurisdiction of  the civil  courts is  impliedly barred from entertaining suits  of the  present nature. The jurisdiction of the State Government (the Hearing Authority under section 68-D of  the Act)  is exclusive  in character  and it is not open to  a civil  court to  issue  an  order  of  injunction restraining the Hearing Authority from proceeding 546 with the  hearing of  the case  and exercising its statutory functions. Whenever  statute  uses  the  expression  that  a decision of an authority shall be final, the jurisdiction of a civil court to go into the correctness or otherwise of the decision is  taken away.  We have  gone through  the  plaint presented in  this case.  It is not disputed that the scheme had been  duly published under section 68-C of the Act by an authority which  had the  power to  publish it  and that the authority which  was hearing  the case under section 68-D of the Act had the power to do so. All the contentions urged in the plaint  relate to  the merits  of  the  scheme  and  the desirability of  bringing the  scheme into  force. All  such objections relating  to  the  merits  of  a  scheme  or  the desirability of  bringing such  scheme can  be raised  by an aggrieved person  before the Hearing Authority under section 68-D of  the Act  and it  is for  the Hearing  Authority  to consider such  objections and  representations and  to  pass appropriate orders thereon. Where the Statute gives finality

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to the  orders  of  a  special  tribunal  the  civil  courts jurisdiction must  be held  to be  excluded insofar  as  the merits to  the case  is concerned.  If  jurisdiction  is  so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction only to examine whether the provisions of the Statute have not been complied with or the tribunal had or had not acted in conformity with the fundamental  principles of  judicial procedure. In cases of the present nature where invariably reliance is placed by the  private   operators  on   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the Constitution, a writ petition lies before the High Court. In such cases  a suit is hardly the remedy which can be availed by  them.  If  suits  of  this  nature  are  allowed  to  be entertained, the  very object  of the  several provisions of Chapter IVA  of the  Act can  be  frustrated  by  interested parties by  resorting to  a civil court with the sole object of delaying  the implementation  of a  scheme. Such attempts should be  curbed at  the earliest  opportunity. The learned Civil Judge  was right  in declining  to  stay  the  further proceedings in  the suit.  This is  a suit which should have been rejected  at the threshold under order 7 rule 11 of the Code of  Civil Procedure  on the  ground  that  it  did  not disclose a  cause of  action. We, therefore, do not find any ground to  interfere with  the orders of the High Court, the District Judge  and the  Civil Judge.  The  Civil  Judge  is directed to dispose of the suit in the light of the observa- tions  made  in  this  order.  The  petition  fails  and  is dismissed. P.S.S                                    Petition dismissed. 547