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PETITIONER: ANSAL PROPERTIES & INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/05/1992

BENCH: KASLIWAL, N.M. (J) BENCH: KASLIWAL, N.M. (J) SAHAI, R.M. (J)

CITATION:  1992 SCR  (3) 465        1993 SCC  Supl.  (1)  61  JT 1992 (4)   264        1992 SCALE  (2)2

ACT:      Delhi   Development   Act,  1947-Sections   9(2),   41- Legislative  object-Master  plan-Restriction  on  high  rise construction by Central Government-Legality of.      Delhi Development Act, 1947-Sections 41 read with  Bye- Laws  6.7.4, 6.1 of the Building Bye-Laws, 1983 of the Delhi Development Authority-Requirement under-Deemed sanction-When arises-Compounding fee-Charging of interest-Whether arises.

HEADNOTE:      The auction of leasehold rights on the plot in question was  in  favour  of the appellant for  Rs.  8.13  crores  on 19.1.1981.  The appellant paid 25% of the auction amount  on the  fail  of  the  hammer.   According  to  the  terms  and conditions  of  the auction balance 75% was required  to  be paid  within  90 days of the formal acceptance  of  the  bid which was made on 18.2.1982.      The appellants did not pay the balance amount and  took a  stand that there was some confusion as to whether it  was D.D.A.  or  the Union of India, which was the owner  of  the plot  in question.  The appellant also sought for  time  for payment  on the ground that money market in relation to  the land property had gone down tremendously.      On  14.12.1984 revised terms were communicated  by  the D.D.A.  to  the  appellants.  The  essential  terms  of  the revised agreement were that 25%  of the bid amount was to be paid within 90 days of the issuance of the letter of revised terms.  50% of the remaining bid amount along with  interest for  delayed  payments  was to be paid in  five  equal  half yearly instalments which included the interest calculated at 18% per annum.      The  appellants submitted a bank guarantee  dated  15th July,  1985  in favour of the D.D.A. The fresh  schedule  of instalments   was   specifically  mentioned  in   the   bank guarantee.  Thereafter on 23.7.1985, a formal deed                                                        466 of agreement was executed between the parties and possession over  the plot was given on 25.7.1985.  The  building  plans were  submitted by the appellant on 12.8.1985.   The  D.D.A. forwarded building plans to the Delhi Urban Arts  Commission (DUAC).   The  DUAC  by its letter  dated  18.9.1985  sought certain  clarifications from the appellant within  ten  days

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and  again sent a reminder on 24.9.1985, but  the  appellant did not send any reply.      The  appellant  sent  a  notice  for  commencement   of construction  on  15.10.1985 claiming that they  having  not received  any order of rejection of the plans  within  sixty days  as  contemplated under bye-law No. 6.7.4.  had  become entitled  to  deemed sanction; that  the  first  instalment, according  to the re-schedule of instalments was payable  on 15.11.1985 but even before that they had paid Rs.47 lakhs on 8.10.1985 itself.      Thereafter  the  Government  of  India  by  an   office memorandum dated 17.10.1985 decided to stop construction  of multi-storeyed  building in New Delhi including areas  under D.D.A. and Municipal Corporation, with immediate effect till the Master plan for 2001 was finalised.      The  DUAC then returned the proposals of the  buildings plans  of  the appellant to the D.D.A. on  20.11.1985.   The D.D.A. by its letter dated 9.12.1985 informed the appellants regarding  the  decision  of the  Government  of  India  and returned  the  building  plans and it was  directed  not  to process  the sanction further till further  directions  were received from the Government of India.      A notice to stop the construction immediately till  the plans were sanctioned finally by the D.D.A. was given to the appellants on 17.1.1986.      On  25.3.86  the D.D.A. informed  the  appellants  that their  plans  had  been rejected as the  same  had  no  been approved by the DUAC.      The  appellants  filed writ  petition  challenging  the notice  issued  by the D.D.A. of stopping  the  construction work and also the ban introduced by the Government of India.      The  High  Court on 17.9.1986 passed an  interim  order permitting the appellants to continue the construction  work at their own risk.      On  15.10.1987  the bank guarantee was invoked  by  the D.D.A. for a sum of Rs.8 crores approximately.                                                        467      The appellants filed a second writ petition challenging the  encashment of the bank gurantee by D.D.A. and  obtained an  interim order on 28.10.1987 restraining the D.D.A.  from encashing the bank guarantee.      The ban imposed by the Central Government was lifted on 8.2.1988.  The appellants completed the construction of  the building in 1988 under the cover of the stay order given  by the  High Court.  The two writ petitions were  dismissed  by the High Court.      These appeals were filed by the contractors against the judgment  of  the High Court, by special  leave,  contending that  the  D.D.A. was not entitled to  charge  any  compound interest;  that  the D.D.A. was not entitiled to  claim  any interest  for the period 7.10.1985 to 8.2.1988 during  which the  ban  in  respect  of  construction  of   multi-storeyed buildings  remained in force; that the ban itself  was  also illegal;  that  the  D.D.A. was not entitled  to  claim  any compounding  fee;  and that the D.D.A. was not  entitled  to claim any interest on the compounding fee.      Partly  allowing the appeals of the  contractors,  this court,      HELD:  1.1. The object of Delhi Development Act  is  to provide for the development of Delhi according to the  plan. While under Section 9(2) of the Delhi Development Act  every master  plan has to be submitted to the  Central  Government for approval and the Government may either approve the  plan without  modifications or with such modifications as it  may consider necessary or reject the plan with directions to the

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Authority  to  prepare  a  fresh  plan  according  to   such directions.   The  Development Authority had  sent  the  new master  plan for approval of the Central Government  and  as such the Government for the planned development of Delhi was entitled to issue directions in consonance with law.  [475H- 476B]      1.2.  There  was  no  violation of  law  in  issuing  a restriction   on   high  rise   constructions   during   the formulation  stages  of  the new  master  plan  pending  for approval  before the Central Government.  Thus it cannot  be said  that the ban imposed by the Central Government was  in any manner unauthorised or illegal. [476 D]      2.1.  The  question of deemed sanction only  arises  if within sixty days of the receipt of notice under 6.1. of the bye-laws  the authority fails to intimate in writing to  the person who has given a notice of its refusal or                                                        468 sanction or any intimation. [478 B]      2.2.  In the instant case the D.D.A. had  informed  the appellant that the plans had been sent to DUAC for  approval and  the DUAC was also seeking some clarifications from  the appellant  by their letters dated 18.9.1985  and  24.9.1985. [478 B]      2.3.  The  requirement as  contemplated  under  bye-law 6.7.4.  is  that  the  fact of deemed  sanction  has  to  be immediately  brought  to  the notice  of  the  authority  in writing by the person who has given notice and thereafter if no intimation is received from the authority within 15  days of  giving  such  written notice  the  provision  of  deemed sanction comes into operation.                                                      [478 C]      2.4. The appellant only sent a notice for  commencement of  construction on 15.10.1985 and the same does not  fulfil the  requirement of the notice which is  contemplated  under bye-law  6.7.4.  in as much as intimation had  already  been given by DUAC seeking information.  Apart from this the  ban on  the construction of multi-storeyed buildings  came  into operation  from  17.10.1985  itself  and  in  view  of  this circumstance also there was no question of the applicability of deemed sanction in the facts of this case.                                                     [478D-E]      2.5.  The amount which was required to be paid in  five instalments  of  Rs. 166.20 lakhs each  from  15.11.1985  to 15.11.1987, included simple interest charged at the rate  of 18% per annum but it was based on a fresh agreement and  the appellants cannot claim any right to re-open the transaction on  the basis of terms of auction made originally  in  1982. The  indulgence of re-scheduling of delayed payment  of  bid amount  in  July,  1985  was made  on  the  request  of  the appellant  and  for  its own benefit.  Thus  the  D.D.A.  is perfectly right and justified in claiming future interest at the  rate of 18% per annum on the instalments fixed  in  the agreement dated 23rd July, 1985.  The D.D.A. is not charging any  compound interest but are claiming simple  interest  at the rate of 18% per annum on the amount of instalments fixed in  the fresh agreement dated 23rd July, 1985 till  payment, After novation of the agreement the instalments fixed  shall be considered as principal amount and thus it is not a  case of charging compound interest.  [474H-475C]      2.6. For charging of interest during the ban period  is concerned, the D.D.A. cannot be held responsible as the  ban was  imposed  by the Central Government.   This  action  was taken for the whole of Delhi and the D.D.A.                                                        469 was  to carry out such directions as provided under  Section

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41 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957. [475D-E]      2.7.  It is not in dispute that the building  has  been constructed  without any sanction or permit from the  D.D.A. as required under the building bye-laws and the building has been constructed at the risk of the appellant under the stay order of the High Court. [478 F]      2.8.   No  building  permit  has  been  given  to   the appellants and as such they are bound to pay the compounding fee  according to the rates prescribed in this regard.  [479 C]      2.9.  In  the facts and circumstances of the  case  the D.D.A.  is  not  entitled  to charge  any  interest  on  the compounding fee. [479 D]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLANTS JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.  2457 and 58 of 1992.      From  the  Judgment and Order dated 31.10.1991  of  the Delhi High Court in C.W.P. Nos. 1499/86 and 3068 of 1987.      Harish  Salve, Ms. J.S. Wad, Ms. Tamali Wad  and  Manoj Wad for the Appellants.      V.R. Reddy, Addl. Solicitor General, Arun Jaitley,  Ms. Indu Malhotra, C. Ramesh, V.K. Verma and C.V.S. Rao for  the Respondents.      D.D.  Sharma, C.L. Chopra and Ms. Rachna Issar for  the Intervener.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KASLIWAL, J. Sepcial leave granted.      It  is one more avoidable litigation between Ansals,  a big building contractor and the Delhi Development  Authority in  which allegations and counter allegations for breach  of terms of contract have been levelled against each other.  We would have asked the appellant to stand in queue for hearing of the matter, but the real sufferers would be those persons who  have  invested their hard earned life time  savings  in forlorn  hope  of  an allotment of a flat  in  a  commercial building on plot No. 38 situated in Nehru Palce near Kalkaji a prime place of importance in Delhi.  It is the  repetition of  the  usual bureaucratic rigmarole from the side  of  the Delhi                                                        470 Development   Authority  and  the  usual  payment  of   some instalments  of the lease money and  thereafter  withholding the  payment  of the balance amount on one  pretext  or  the other form the side of the builders.      Facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary for  the disposal  of  this case are that the  auction  of  leasehold rights  on  plot  No. 38, Nehru Place was  knocked  down  in favour  of  M/s  Ansal Properties  &  Industries  (P)  Ltd., hereinafter  referred  to as "the appellant"  for  Rs.  8.13 crores  on 19.1.1981.  25% of the auction amount was paid on the  fall  of  the  hammer.   According  to  the  terms  and conditions of the auction the balance 75% was required to be paid  within  90 days of the formal acceptance  of  the  bid which  was made on 18.2.1982.  The appellant admittedly  did not  pay the balance amount and took a stand that there  was some  confusion as to whether it was D.D.A. or the Union  of India,  which  was the owner of the plot in  question.   The appellant  also sought the indulgence of granting more  time for  payment on the ground that money market in relation  to the land property had gone down tremendously.  On 14.12.1984 revised  terms  were  communicated  by  the  D.D.A.  to  the appellant.   The  essential terms of the  revised  agreement

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were  that  25% of the bid amount was to be paid  within  90 days  of the issuance of the letter of revised terms. 50% of the  remaining  bid amount along with interest  for  delayed payments   was  to  be  paid  in  five  equal  half   yearly instalments  which included the interest calculated  at  18% per  annum.  These instalments were fixed in  the  following manner :      (i)   Ist instalment payable on 15.11.1985  Rs.  166.20           lacs.      (ii)  2nd  instalment payable on 15.5.1986  Rs.  166.20            lacs.      (iii)  3rd instalment payable on 15.11.1986 Rs.  166.20            lacs.      (iv)  4th  instalment payable on 15.5.1987  Rs.  166.20            lacs.      (v)  5th  instamlent payment on 15.11.1987  Rs.  166.20           lacs.      The appellant is this regard submitted a bank guarantee dated  15th  July, 1985 of the Canara Bank and New  Bank  of India in favour of the D.D.A.  The aforesaid fresh  schedule of  instalments  was  specifically  mentioned  in  the  bank gurantee.   Thereafter  a  formal  deed  of  agreement   was executed  between  the parties on 23.7.1985  and  possession over  the plot was given on 25.7.1985.  The  building  plans were  submitted by the appellant on 12.8.1985.   The  D.D.A. vide letter dated 13.9.1985 forwarded building plans                                                        471 to the Delhi Urban  Arts Commission (DUAC). The DUAC by  its letter  dated 18.9.1985 sought certain  clarifications  from the  appellant  within ten days and again sent  reminder  on 24.9.1985,  but the appellant did not send any  reply.   The appellant   then   sent  a  notice   for   commencement   of construction on 15.10.1985.  The appellant claimed that they having  not  received any order of rejection  of  the  plans within  sixty days as contemplated under bye law No.  6.7.4. had  become  entitled  to deemed  sanction.   The  appellant claimed  that  the first instalment, according  to  the  re- schedule  of instalments was payable on 15.11.1985 but  even before that they had paid Rs. 47 lakhs on 8.10.1985  itself. Thereafter the Government of India by an office   memorandum dated   17.10.1985   decided   to   stop   construction   of multi-storeyed buildings in New Delhi including areas  under D.D.A.  and Municipal Corporation of Delhi falling in  South Delhi,  with immediate effect till the Master plan for  2001 was  finalised.   It was clarified  that  a  ‘multi-storeyed building’ may be taken as a building going beyond 45 feet or above four storeys, which has to be serviced by lifts.   The DUAC  then returned the proposals of the building  plans  of the  appellant  to the D.D.A. on 20th November,  1985.   The D.D.A. by its letter dated 9.12.1985 informed the  appellant regarding  the  decision  of the  Government  of  India  and returned the building ‘’ plans and requested them to  depute their architect to discuss about the height of the building. It  was mentioned in the letter that the sanction shall  not be  processed further till further directions  are  received from the Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India. A notice to stop the construction immediately till the plans were  sanctioned  finally  by the D.D.A. was  given  to  the appellant  on 17.1.1986.  By another letter dated  25.3.1986 the D.D.A. informed the appellant that their plans had  been rejected as the same had not been approved by the DUAC.  The appellants  then  filed writ petition No.  1499/86  on  17th July,  1986 challenging the notice issued by the  D.D.A.  of stopping  the construction work and also the ban  introduced by  the  Government of India.  The High Court  on  17.9.1986

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passed  an  interim  order  permitting  the  appellants   to continue  the  construction  work at  their  own  risk.   On 15.10.1987 the bank guarantee was invoked by the D.D.A.  for a sum of Rs. 8 crores approximately.  The appellants filed a second  writ  petition  No. 3068  of  1987  challenging  the encashment  of the bank gurantee by D.D.A. and  obtained  an interim  order  on 28.10.1987 restraining  the  D.D.A.  from encashing  the  bank  guarantee.  The  ban  imposed  by  the Central  Government was lifted on 8.2.1988.  The  appellants completed the construction of the building in 1988                                                        472 under the cover of they stay order given by the High  Court. The  aforesaid two writ petitions have been disposed  of  by the  High Court by order dated October 31, 1991.   The  High Court  after examining the matter in detail arrived  to  the conclusion as under:-          "After  considering the pleadings of  the  parties,          documents  on  record and submissions  made  before          this  court,  it  is absolutely  evident  that  the          petitioner has been consistently making defaults in          payment  of  the amount due to the  D.D.A.  on  one          pretext  or the other.  According to the  terms  of          the  auction, the petitioner’s bid was accepted  on          February  19, 1982 and the petitioner was  supposed          to deposit the balance 75% of the bid amount within          90  days.   The  amount which ought  to  have  been          deposited with the D.D.A. way back in 1982 has  not          been deposited till this date.  Further more at the          request of the petitioner, the D.D.A. entered  into          an  agreement with the petitioner.  This  agreement          was  entered  into because the  petitioner  pleaded          grave  financial  difficulty and according  to  the          agreement, the first instalment had to be deposited          by  the petitioner on or before November  15,  1985          and  all subsequent instalments on or  before  15th          November, 1987.  Astonishingly, till this date  not          even one full instalment has been deposited by  the          petitioner.  Looking to the entire past conduct  of          the petitioner, no indulgence can be granted in any          manner because any indulgence would be at the  cost          of public money".      The  High  Court  then  observed  that  after   careful consideration  of the facts and the issues involved  in  the case  it  would be proper to dispose of the  writ  petitions with the following directions:      (i)  The  petitioner  is directed to  pay  the  balance outstanding  amount due to the Delhi Development  Authority, including  interest  at the rate of 18% per annum  within  a period of two months from today.      (ii) the respondent-D.D.A. would be entitled to  encash the  bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner. The  amount recovered   by  encashment  of  bank  guarantee   from   the petitioner  would stand adjusted from the total  outstanding amount.      (iii)  On the petitioner’s making the  entire  payment, the respondent                                                        473 shall  sanction the building plans forthwith and in no  case later  than  one month of receiving the  entire  outstanding amount from the petitioner.      (iv)  Thereafter  the petitioner shall  apply  for  the grant of occupancy certificate as per rules, if not  already applied.      The respondent D.D.A. shall grant necessary certificate as  per rules without any delay but in any event  not  later

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than two weeks from the date of the petitioner’s  submitting application pertaining to occupancy certificate.      Subject to these directions, both these writ  petitions are dismissed.  Counsel’s fee is addressed at Rs. 5,000.  It is  made clear that if the petitioner fails to  comply  with the above directions, the respondent shall be at liberty  to take necessary action as permissible according to law.      Aggrieved  against the aforesaid Judgment of  the  High Court the appellants by grant of special leave have come  in appeal before this Court. We have heard learned counsel  for the  parties  at  length and  have  thoroughly  perused  the record.  The contentions now raised before us on  behalf  of the appellants can be summarised under the following points:      (i)  The D.D.A. is not entitled to charge any  compound interest.      (ii)  The D.D.A. is not entitled to claim any  interest for the period 7.10.1985 to 8.2.1988 during which the ban in respect of construction of multi-storeyed building  remained in force.  The ban itself was also illegal.      (iii)   The  D.D.A.  is  not  entitled  to  claim   any compounding fee which amounts to Rs. 93 lakhs.      (iv)  The D.D.A. is not entitled to claim any  interest on the compounding fee.      We shall consider the above submissions in seriatim.      Point  No.  1:  It has been submitted  by  the  Learned counsel  for  the  appellants that  the  authority  to  levy interest  in  the  instant case  flows  from  the  statutory directive  issued by the Government and incorporated in  the letter   dated   14.12.1984.   This   letter   states   that ".........The delayed payment of premium will carry interest 18 per cent p.a. from the due date, viz.                                                        474 17.5.1982,  to  the  actual dated  of  payment.......".  The revised agreement dated 23rd July, 1985 accordingly provides in  clause 2 "......The balance amount and the interest  for delayed  payment of the bid amount shall be payable  by  the auction  purchaser in five equated half  yearly  instalments including  interest calculated at 18 per cent per  annum  on the following dates.......".      It  has  been contended that the bank  guarantee  dated 15.7.1985 is really a part of the same transaction.  In fact the  licence  agreement of 23.7.1985 was  issued  only  upon furnishing  of  the bank guarantee dated 15.7.1985.   It  is submitted  that  the  total amount demanded  by  the  D.D.A. includes an element of Rs. 6.69 crores as further  interest. This interest amounting to Rs. 6.69 crores comprises of  the following  ......... (a) Rs. 3.27 crores is the interest  on the  balance  unpaid  premium  of Rs.  3.60  crores  (as  on 15.11.1985) (b) Rs. 3.42 crores is the interest on  interest component already included in the instalments referred to in the bank guarantee.      It  has  been  contended  that  the  further  claim  of interest  on  the five instalments of Rs. 1.66  crores  each amounts  to  charging compound interest as  the  instalments already include interest.  According to the appellants  even if  the  interest  is charged then it  should  be  a  simple interest re-calculated as though the instalments instead  of being  paid in the period 1985-87 are being paid in  1991-92 on the same principle which was adopted when the instalments were initially fixed in 1985.  We find no force in the above contention.   As  already mentioned above  the  auction  was knoked  down  for  Rs.  8.13 crores  on  19.1.1982  and  the appellant  had  paid only 25% of the auction amount  on  the fall  of  the hammer.  According to the  conditions  of  the auction  the balance 75% was required to be  paid within  90

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days  of the formal acceptance of the bid which was made  on 18.2.1982.    The  balance  amount  was  thus   payable   by 18.5.1982.  Admittedly the appellant did not pay the balance amount  until  18.5.1982  and  thereafter  sought  to  raise certain  objections regarding the ownership of the  plot  in question,  but ultimately made a request that due  to  money market  in  relation to the land property having  gone  down tremendously  some  more time may be given  for  making  the balance payment.  Thereafter a fresh agreement was  executed by  the appellant on 23.7.1985 re-scheduling the payment  in instalments  and according to which the amount was  required to be paid in five instalments of Rs. 166.20 lakhs each from 15.11.1985  to  15.11.1987.  This amount no  doubt  included simple interest charged at the rate of 18% per                                                        475 annum  but  it  was  based on  a  fresh  agreement  and  the appellants cannot claim any right to re-open the transaction on  the basis of terms of auction made originally  in  1982. The  indulgence of re-scheduling of delayed payment  of  bid amount  in  July,  1985  was made  on  the  request  of  the appellant  and  for  its own benefit.  Thus  the  D.D.A.  is perfectly right and justified in claiming future interest at the  rate of 18% per annmum on the instalments fixed in  the agreement dated 23rd July, 1985.  The D.D.A. is not charging any  compound interest but are claiming simple  interest  at the rate of 18% per annum on the amount of instalments fixed in  the fresh agreement dated 23rd July, 1985 till  payment. After novation of the agreement the instalments fixed  shall be considered as principal amount and thus it is not a  case  of charging compound interest as contended on behalf of  the appellants.      Point No. (ii) :- So far as charging of interest during the  ban  period  is concerned, the D.D.A.  cannot  be  held responsible   as  the  ban  was  imposed  by   the   Central Government.  The Central Government by an office  memorandum dated  17.10.1985  decided to stop  construction  of  multi- storeyed buildings in New Delhi including areas under D.D.A. and  Municipal Corporation of Delhi falling in  South  Delhi with  immediate  effect  till  master  plan  for  2001   was finalised.  This action was taken for the whole of Delhi and the  D.D.A.  was  to carry out such directions  as  provided under Section 41 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957.   There is  no allegation that such action was taken malafidely  and it cannot be considered as a valid ground for not paying the interest  for  the  period during which the  ban  on  multi- storeyed  constructions remained in force.  It may  also  be noted  that so far as the appellant is concerned it was  not affected by such ban as the construction contained under the umbrella  of  stay  order  obtained  from  the  High  Court. According  to  the  admitted  case  of  the  appellant   the construction  of the building had completed in  1988  itself and as such the appellant was not put to any loss on account of the ban imposed by the Central Government.      The master plan for Delhi was formulated originally  in 1962 with projections up to 1981.  There was no provision in any  law, master plan, zonal development plans  or  building bye-laws  wherein  the appellant was entitled  to  construct sixteen   storeys.   Thus  the  directive  of  the   Central Government  dated  17.10.1985 imposing a ban  on  high  rise structures was not contrary to any law.  The object of Delhi Development Act is to provide                                                        476 for  the development of Delhi according to the  plan.  While under Section 9(2) of the Delhi Development Act every master plan  has  to  be submitted to the  Central  Government  for

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approval  and  the Government may either  approve  the  plan without  modifications or with such modifications as it  may consider necessary or reject the plan with directions to the Authority  to  prepare  a  fresh  plan  according  to   such directions.   The  Development Authority had  sent  the  new master  plan for approval of the Central Government  and  as such the Government for the planned development of Delhi was entitled  to  issue  directions  in  consonance  with   law. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  has  placed   strong reliance  on  Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S.  Muddappa  and others,   (1991)   3   JT  172.   This   case   is   clearly distinguishable   since   in  that  case  the   zonal   plan statutorily  provided  for the user of a plot of land  as  a park.   The  Chief  Minister  contrary  to  the  said  plan, sanctioned  the plot for a nursing home.  Thus there  was  a positive violation of law in that case.  In the case in hand before  us  there  was  no violation of  law  in  issuing  a restriction   on   high  rise   constructions   during   the formulation  stages  of  the new  master  plan  pending  for approval  before the Central Government.  Thus it cannot  be said  that the ban imposed by the Central Government was  in any manner unauthorised or illegal.      Point  No. (iii) :- It has been contended on behalf  of the  appellants that no compounding fee can be levied  since the D.D.A. had wrongfully withheld grant of sanction to  the building  plans  submitted by the appellant.   It  has  been further contended that in view of the commitment made in the licence deed as well as the agreement read together with the letter  of 14.12.1984, the D.D.A. was bound to sanction  the plans.   It  has  been contended that when  the  plans  were submitted to the D.D.A. for sanction on 12.8.1985, there was no sum outstanding as due and payable as all the sums  which were  payable under the agreement up to that date  had  been duly   paid.   According  to the fresh  agreement the  first instalment  was  payable on 15.11.1985 and so far  as  other payments are concerned the same had already been paid by the appellants.  Even according to the bye-laws, the D.D.A.  had to  sanction plans within sixty days and the D.D.A.  had  no justification  of  withholding the sanction as  nothing  was required  to  be done on behalf of the appellants.   It  has been further contended that according to the stand taken  by the  D.D.A. itself the sanction was not withheld on  account of non-payment of any dues but on account of the ban put  by the Central Government.  It has been further argued that  in any event, the building has been constructed pursuant to the interim orders of the High                                                        477 Court  which  expressly permitted the  construction  of  the building albeit at the risk and cost of the appellant.   The High  Court  has  itself  recorded a  finding  that  the  16 storeyed  building stands constructed according to the  bye- laws  and even if a formal sanction is given now  it  should relate back to the date on which such sanction ought to have been  granted and the building constructed by the  appellant in the present case cannot be considered as unauthorised  in law.      The  admitted facts of the case are that  the  building plans  were  submitted to the D.D.A. on  12.8.1985  and  the D.D.A.  had forwarded the plans for approval of Delhi  Urban Arts  Commission  (DUAC) on 13.9.1985.  Section  12  of  the Delhi  Urban Art Commission Act, 1973 clearly provides  that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for  the time  being  in  force,  every  local  body  shall,   before according  approval  in respect of  any  building  operation refer the same to the DUAC for scrutiny and the decision  of

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the  Commission in respect thereof shall be binding on  such local  body.  The DUAC by its letter dated 18.9.1985  sought certain  clarifications from the appellant within ten  days and again sent a reminder on 24.9.1985 but the appellant did not  send any reply.  In the other hand the  appellant  sent notice of commencement of construction on 15.10.1985 and on that basis is claiming that having not received any order of rejection  of  the plans within sixty days  as  contemplated under bye-law No.6.7.4. the appellant had become entitled to deemed  sanction.  We find no force in this submission.   As already  mentioned  above, it was necessary  to  obtain  the approval of the DUAC and the DUAC by letter dated  18.9.1985 and 24.9.1985 were seeking certain clarifications  from  the appellant.   Bye-law No.6.7.4 of the building bye-law,  1983 of the Delhi Development Authority reads as under:-          "If  within 60 days of the receipt of notice  under          6.1  of  the  Bye-Laws,  the  authority  fails   to          intimate  in writing to the person, who  has  given          the  notice,  of  its refusal or  sanction  or  any          intimation, the notice with its plan and statements          shall  be deemed to have been  sanctioned  provided          the  fact is immediately brought to the  notice  of          the  Authority  in writing by the  person  who  has          given notice and having not received any intimation          from  the Authority within fifteen days  of  giving          such  written  notice. Subject  to  the  conditions          mentioned  in  this  bay-laws,  nothing  shall   be          construed to authorise any person to                                                        478          do  anything in contravention or against the  terms          of lease or titles of the land or against any other          regulations, bye-laws or ordinance operating on the          site of the work".      According to the above provision the question of deemed sanction only arises if within sixty days of the receipt  of notice  under  6.1 of the bye-laws the  authority  fails  to intimate in writing to the person who has given a notice  of its  refusal or sanction or any intimation.  In the  present case  the D.D.A. had informed the appellant that  the  plans had  been  sent to DUAC for approval and the DUAC  was  also seeking  some  clarifications from the  appellant  by  their letters   dated  18.9.1985  and  24.9.1985.    The   further requirement as contemplated under bye-law 6.7.4. is that the fact of deemed sanction has to be immediately brought to the notice  of  the authority in writing by the person  who  has given  notice  and thereafter if no intimation  is  received from  the  authority within 15 days of giving  such  written notice   the  provision  of  deemed  sanction   comes   into operation.  In  the present case the appellant only  sent  a notice  for commencement of construction on  15.10.1985  and the same in our view does not fulfil the requirement of  the notice which is contemplated under by-law 6.7.4. in as  much as  intimation  had  already  been  given  by  DUAC  seeking information. Apart from this the ban on the construction  of multi-storeyed buildings came into operation from 17.10.1985 itself  and in view of this circumstance also there  was  no question  of  the applicability of deemed  sanction  in  the facts of this case. It is not dispute that the building  has been  constructed  without any sanction or permit  from  the D.D.A.  as  required  under the building  bye-laws  and  the building  has been constructed at the risk of the  appellant under  the stay order of the High Court.  Clause (B) of  the Appendix  "q"  of the building bye-laws, 1983  provides  for compoundable items as under:-      COMPOUNDABLE ITEMS

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          Deviations  in  terms  of covered  area  -  If  a          building  or  part  thereof  has  been  constructed          unauthorisedly i.e. without obtaining the requisite          building  permit  from the  authority  as  required          under clause 6.1 & 6.7.1 of the building  bye-laws,          the same shall be compounded at the following rates          provided   the   building  or   part   thereof   so          constructed  otherwise conforms to  the  provisions          contained in the Building Bye-Laws and                                                        479          Master/Zonal  Plan  regulations.   For  this  party          shall  have  to  submit the  request  for  building          permit in the prescribed procedure".      Thus  under  the above provision any building  or  part thereof constructed without obtaining the requisite building permit  from the authority as required under clause 6.1  and 6.7.1  of  the  building bye-laws will be  considered  as  a construction  made  unauthorisedly  and  the  same  can   be compounded  at the rates mentioned in clause (B).  It is  an admitted  position  in  the present case  that  no  building permit has been given to the appellants till now and as such they  are bound to pay the compounding fee according to  the rates  prescribed in this regard.  Thus we find no force  in the contention of the appellant that they are not liable  to pay any compounding fee.      (iv) So far as charging of interest on the  compounding fee is concerned, we are definitely of the view that in  the facts  and  circumstances  of the case  the  D.D.A.  is  not entitled to charge any interest on the compounding fee.      In the result we find no force in these appeals and  we uphold  the  order  of  the  High  Court  except  with   the modification  that the D.D.A. is not entitled to charge  any interest  on the amount of compounding fee.  It  is  further ordered  that the directions given by the High  Court  shall now  be  carried out from the date of the Judgment  of  this Court instead of the date of the Judgment of the High Court. Thus except the abovementioned modifications, we uphold  the order  of the High Court as well as the directions given  by it.  There will be no order as to costs in this Court. V.P.R.                               Appeals Partly allowed.