IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.              OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP [C] No.7319 of 2009]

Anokh Singh                  ...Appellant

VERSUS

Punjab State Election Commission         …Respondent

WITH  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.              OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP [C] No.10948 of 2009]

Harchand Singh                ...Appellant

VERSUS

State of Punjab and Ors.                       ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals arise out of a common judgment of  

the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 5.12.2008 in  

Writ Petition Nos. 7727 of 2008, 8264 of 2008, 8270 of  

2008, 8279 of 2008, 8310 of 2008 and 11724 of 2008.

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REPORTABLE

3. The primary issues raised in all these writ petitions  

were:-

i) Whether the office of a Lambardar would be an  

‘office  of  profit’  so  as  to  disqualify  the  

incumbent of such an office to seek election as  

Panch of the Gram Panchayat.  

ii) Whether  the Anganwari  workers employed in  

the various social-welfare schemes in the State  

of  Punjab  held  an  ‘office  of  profit’  and  

consequently  disqualified  for  seeking election  

to the Gram Panchayats.

iii) Whether  the  State  Election  Commissioner,  

Punjab was justified in issuing the clarificatory  

Memorandum,  Memo  No.  SEC-2008/4365  

dated  30.4.2008  on  the  subject  “General  

Elections  to  Panchayat  Samitis  and  Zila  

Parishads  –  2008  Clarification  regarding  

contesting  of  election  by  Lambardars  and  

Anganwari workers.  

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4. Civil Writ Petition No. 7727 of 2008 was filed by a  

Lambardar, who was seeking election to the Gram Sabha,  

Village  Ladpur,  Tehsil  Amloh,  Distt.  Fatehgarh  Saheb.  

He had come to know from a news item in the Daily ‘Ajit’  

dated 3.5.2008 that Lambardar and Anganwari workers  

have been debarred from contesting election as Member  

Panchayat.  On enquiry, the appellant came to know that  

a Circular Memo No. SEC-2008/4365 has been issued  

conveyed to all the Deputy Commissioners-cum-District  

Electoral  Officers  in  the  State  that  Lambardars  and  

Anganwari  workers,  who  are  ineligible  to  contest  

elections  as  Member  of  Panchayat  because  they  hold  

‘office of profit’.  As a result of which, the appellant was  

debarred  from  contesting  the  election  as  Member  

Panchayat,  which  he  intended  to  contest  as  he  was  

otherwise duly qualified to contest the same.  The prayer  

in  the  writ  petition  was  for  issuance  of  a  writ  in  the  

nature  of  certiorari  quashing  the  impugned  

memorandum  by  which  Lambardars  and  Anganwari  

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workers  have  been  debarred  from  contesting  the  

elections.  

5. Similarly, the Civil Writ Petitions No. 8264 of 2008,  

8270 of 2008, 8279 of 2008 and 8310 of 2008 were filed  

by Anganwari  workers claiming that they could not be  

disqualified as they were not holding any ‘office of profit’.  

Civil Writ Petition No. 11724 of 2008 sought a direction  

to the respondents not to permit respondent No. 5, who  

was an Anganwari worker to participate in the election of  

Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat of Village Ghaloti.   

6. The High Court upon detailed consideration of the  

entire matter concluded that the office of Lambardars is  

an ‘office of profit’ and, therefore, the Lambardar would  

be  disqualified  from  contesting  the  election.   To  this  

extent,  the  impugned  memorandum  was  held  valid.  

Consequently, Civil Writ Petition No. 7727 of 2008 was  

dismissed.   

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7. With  regard  to  the  Anganwari  workers,  the  High  

Court held that the Anganwari workers did not hold any  

civil post under the Government.  It is also held that the  

Anganwari workers do not hold an ‘office of profit’ under  

the State Government.  Consequently, Civil Writ Petition  

Nos.  8264  of  2008,  8270  of  2008,  8279  of  2008  and  

8310  of  2008  were  allowed  and  the  impugned  

memorandum was quashed so far as it pertained to the  

Anganwari workers.

8. In view of the decision rendered in the aforesaid writ  

petitions,  Civil  Writ  Petition  No.  11724  of  2008  for  

issuing  direction  not  to  permit  the  Anganwari  worker,  

respondent  No.  5,  to  participate  in  the  election  of  

Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat was dismissed.   

9. In this appeal, we are only concerned with the issue  

as to whether an incumbent Lambardar would hold an  

‘office of profit’ under the Government.   

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10. Although by a common order, the High Court has  

decided  the  writ  petitions  in  two  parts.  The  first  part  

relates to the Lambardars in C.W.P. 7727 of 2008 and  

connected  matters.  In  these  matters,  the  High  Court  

crystallized  three  issues  for  consideration.  Firstly,  

whether  the  disqualification  prescribed  under  Section  

208  of  the  Panchayati  Raj  Act  or  the  disqualification  

prescribed  under  Section  11  of  the  State  Election  

Commission Act is applicable in case of  the petitioner.  

Secondly, whether the petitioner, as a Lambardar, holds  

an  ‘office  of  profit’.  Thirdly,  whether  in  view  of  

clause (1) of Article 243F of the Constitution read with  

Section 2(a) of the Punjab State Legislature (Prevention of  

disqualifications)  Act,  1952,  the petitioner  shall  not  be  

deemed to be disqualified for being chosen as a member  

of a Panchayat as the office of Lambardar is one of the  

offices  of  profit,  holding  which  does  not  attract  

disqualification.  

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11. The second part  relates  to  Anganwari  Workers  in  

CWP  No.11724  of  2008,  CWP  No.  8264  of  2008  and  

connected  matters.  The  issues  highlighted  in  these  

matters are :  

Firstly whether the Anganwari workers were holding  

‘office of profit’. Secondly whether the State Election  

Commission was justified in issuing circular dated  

30.4.2008  clarifying  that  Anganwari  workers  are  

disqualified  to  contest  the  election of  Members  of  

Panchayats.  

12. In  the  matters  concerning  Lambardars,  the  High  

Court observes that in view of the judgment of this Court  

in Som Lal Vs. Vijay Laxmi & Ors.  1   the disqualifications  

prescribed  under  Section  11  of  the  State  Election  

Commission Act would prevail. Under the Panchayati Raj  

Act,  by  virtue  of  Section  208  a  person  would  be  

disqualified  to  contest  the  elections  as  a  member  of  

Panchayat, if he is a whole-time salaried employee of the  

1 [(2008) 11 SCC 413]

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State  Government.  But  under  Clause  11(g)  of  

State  Election  Commission  Act,  a  person  is  so  

disqualified if he holds an ‘office of profit’ under the State  

Government. However, the issue has been set at rest by  

this Court in Som Lal’s case (supra), therefore, we need  

not say more on this issue.     

13. Now the  next  issue  would  be  to  see  whether  the  

High Court was correct in concluding that the office of  

Lambardar  would  be  an  ‘office  of  profit’  under  the  

Government,  as  the  incumbent  would  be  entitled  to  

receive an honorarium of Rs.900/- per month.  

14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.  

The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits:  

(i) An  office  of  Lambardar  is  merely  a  heritage  

office  as  his  paramount  duty  was  to  collect  

land revenue which has been abolished in the  

state of Punjab.  

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(ii) A Lambardar is only being paid an honorarium  

of  Rs.900/-  per  month  with  no  other  

remuneration,  emolument,  perquisite  or  

facilities.  The  logic  behind  paying  such  

payment  is  that  he  does  not  have  to  spend  

money out of his own pocket while discharging  

his duties.  

(iii)  The  Punjab  State  Legislature  (Prevention  of  

Disqualification) Act, 1952, section 2 of the Act  

enumerates  that  a  person  shall  not  be  

disqualified for being chosen as and for being a  

member  of  the  Punjab  State  Legislature  for  

holding ‘office of profit’  under Government of  

India  or  Govt.  of  State  of  Punjab and hence  

memo dated issued by the  respondent  dated  

30.4.2008 is void ab initio.  

(iv) The  respondent,  i.e.  Punjab  State  Election  

Commission  has  no  power  and  authority  

under the Punjab State Election Commission  

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Act,  1994  to  issue  the  memorandum  in  

question.  

(v) The  disqualification  of  the  appellant  from  

contesting the election is clearly  ultra vires of  

the Constitution of India and also provisions of  

Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994.

15. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondent  

submits:  

(i) Exemption from being called an ‘office of profit’  

granted to the office of the Lambardar under  

the  Punjab  State  Legislature  (Prevention  of  

Disqualification ) Act, 1952 applies only in the  

case of election to State Legislative Assembly  

and  not  in  case  of  election  as  Member  of  

Panchayat.

(ii) The  Government  exercises  power  of  

appointment and removal over ‘office of profit’  

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for  those  who  perform  functions  for  the  

government and receives remuneration in form  

of  honorarium,  conditions  laid  down  as  

indicative of ‘office of profit’ in Maulana Abdul  

Shakoor Vs.  Rikhab  Chand and Anr  2    and  

Shivamurthy  Inamdar Vs.  Agadi  Sanganna  

Andanappa  3  .    

(iii) The  word  ‘profit’  connotes  the  idea  of  a  

pecuniary  gain  and  if  the  pecuniary  gain  is  

received in connection with the office, it is an  

‘office of profit’ irrespective of whether the gain  

is actually received or not.

(iv) The  Amount  of  money  received  is  not  

important and neither is the label attached to  

the  pecuniary  gain  being  made,  as  long  as  

money  is  received  by  virtue  of  holding  the  

office

2 [AIR 1958 SC 52] 3 [(1971) 3 SCC 870]

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16. In  our  opinion,  even  this  issue  is  no  longer  res  

integra.  In  a  recent  judgment  in  the  case  of  Mahavir  

Singh Vs. Khiali Ram & Ors.  4   this Court has held that :

“Although the post of Lambardar is governed  by the provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue  Act and the Rules framed thereunder, holder of  the said post is not a government servant. He  does not hold a civil post within the meaning  of Article 309 of the Constitution of India.”  

17. Since the Lambardar is not holding any post under  

the Government, no salary is payable to him. There is no  

pay scale attached to the office of Lambardar. Therefore,  

it  cannot  be  said  that  he  is  in  receipt  of  any  

remuneration.  

18. The duties to be performed by a Lambardar and the  

remuneration, for holding the said office are tabulated in  

Rules  20  and  21  of  the  Punjab  Land  Revenue  Rules.  

These rules are as under:

“20.  In  addition  to  the  duties  imposed upon  headman by law for any purpose, a headman  shall -

4 [(2009) 3 SCC 439]

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(i) collect by due date all land-revenue and  all  sums  recoverable  as  land  revenue  from  the  estate,  or  Sub-Division  of  an  estate in which he holds office, and pay  the same personally or by revenue money  order or by remittance of currency notes  through the  post  at  the  place  and time  appointed in that behalf to the Revenue  Officer  or  assignee  empowered  by  Government to receive it. Selected  lambaradars,  approved  by  the  Collector, may pay land revenue and all  sums recoverable  as  land  revenue  from  the estate or sub division of an estate in  which they hold office, by cheques on the  Imperial  Bank  of  India,  provided  that  there is a branch of the Imperial Bank at  the headquarters of the district in which  the said estate is include;

(ii) collect the rents and other income of the  common  land  and  account  for  them to  the persons entitled thereto;

(iii) acknowledge  every  payment  received  by  him in the books of the land owners and  tenants;

(iv) defray  joint  expenses  of  the  estate  and  render  account  thereof  as  may  be  duly  required of him;

(v) report to the tehsildar the death of  any  assignee of land revenue or Government  pensioner  residing  in  the  estate,  or  the  marriage  or  re-marriage  of  a  female  drawing a family pension and residing in  the  estate,  or  the  absence  of  any  such  person for more than a year;

(vi) report to the tehsildar all encroachments  on  roads  including  village  roads  or  on  Government waste lands and injuries to  or  appropriations  of,  nazual  property  

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situated  within  the  boundaries  of  the  estate;

(vii) report  any  injury  to  Government  buildings made over to his charge;

(viii) carry out to the best  of  his  ability,  any  orders  that  he  may  receive  from  the  Collector  requiring  him  to  furnish  information,  or to assist  in providing or  payment supplies or means of transport  for troops or for officers of Government on  duty;

(ix) assist  in  such  manner  as  the  Collector  may from time to time direct at all crop  inspections,  recording  or  mutations  surveys preparation of record of rights, or  other revenue business carried on within  the limits of the estate;

(x)  attend  the  summons  of  all  authorities  having jurisdiction in the estate, assist all  officers  of  the  Government  in  the  execution of their public duties, supply to  the  best  of  his  ability,  any  local  information  which  those  officers  may  require,  and  generally  act  for  the  land  owners,  tenants  and  residents  of  the  estate  or  sub  division  of  the  estate  in  which  he  holds  office  in  their  relations  with the Government;

(xi) report  to  the  patwari  any  outbreak  of  disease among animals;

(xiii)  report  to the  patwari  the deaths of  any  right holders in their estates;

(xiii) report any breach or cut in a Government  irrigation canal or channel to the nearest  canal officer, (ziledar) or canal patwari;

(xiv) under the general or special directions of  the collector, to assist by the use of his  personal  influence  and  otherwise  all  officers of Government and other persons,  

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duly  authorised  by  the  Collector  in  the  collection  and  enrolment  of  recruits  for  military  service  whether  combatant  or  non-combatant;

(xv) render  all  possible  assistance  to  the  village  postman while  passing the night  in  the  village,  in  safeguarding  the  cash  and other valuables that he carries.”

Remuneration of the headman was as under :

“Rule 21 (i) The remuneration of a headman in  an estate or sub division of an estate, owned  chiefly  or  altogether  by  Government  shall  be  such a portion of the village officer's cess or of  the income accruing to Government from the  estate as may be sanctioned by the Financial  Commissioner. (ii)  In  other  estates  the  remuneration  of  a  headman  shall  be  the  remunerations  appointed when the land revenue of the estate  was last assessed. (iii) In any case not provided for by sub-section  (i) and (ii), a headman shall receive a portion of  the  village  cess equal  to  five  per  cent  of  the  land revenue for  the  time being assessed on  the estate or portion of the estate in which he  holds office whether the assessment is leviable  or not. (iv)  The  Collector  may  at  any  time  alter  the  existing  arrangements in  an estate  regarding  the  collection  of  the  land  revenue  by  the  different  headmen  and  the  division  of  the  remuneration between them.”

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19. Under  the  aforesaid  rules,  the  Lambardar  was  

receiving a portion of the village officer’s cess or of the  

income  accruing  to  the  Government  from  the  estate  

which was fixed by the Financial Commissioner. Under  

Rule 21(iii),  the Lambardar was entitled to a portion of  

the village officer’s cess equal to ten percent of the land  

revenue  assessed  on  the  estate  or  the  portion  of  the  

estate in which he holds office, whether the assessment  

is levied or not. It is an undisputed fact that the Punjab  

Government  has  abolished  land  revenue.  Therefore,  

Lambardar  has  no  land  revenue  to  collect.  Thus  the  

Lambardar would not receive any remuneration as 10%  

of the land revenue assessed.  

20. Thereafter the aforesaid percentage of cess has been  

replaced  by  an  honorarium  of  Rs.500/-  pm  under  a  

circular  dated 9.10.2006 issued  by  the  Government  of  

Punjab, Department of Revenue and Rehabilitation to all  

Deputy  Commissioners  in  the  State.  Currently  the  

Lambardar receives Rs.900/- per month as honorarium.  

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This honorarium is merely compensatory to meet the out  

of pocket expenses, incurred in the performance of his  

duties.  

21. The High Court  has rejected the  submission  that  

such an honorarium would not fall within the ambit of  

the term ‘office of profit’. The High Court has concluded  

that –  

“In the instant case, the Lambardars are being  appointed  by  the  official  of  the  Government  and they can be removed by the official of the  Government.  Their  appointments  are  under  the  statute  and are  in  overall  control  of  the  Government.  They  are  also  receiving  monthly honorarium which cannot be said  to  be  compensatory  in  nature  [Emphasis  supplied]. The  facts  of  this  case  are  fully  covered  by  the  aforesaid  tests  laid  down for  finding out  whether  the  office  of  profit  is  an  office under a Government.”

22. In  our  opinion,  the  High  Court  has  erroneously  

distinguished the observations of this Court in the case  

of  Shivamurthy  Swami Inamdar Vs.  Veerabhadrappa  

Veerappa  5  .  In the aforesaid case, this Court laid down  

5 [1971 (3) SCC 870]

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some of the tests that may be relevant to determine as to  

whether a particular office can be said to be an ‘office of  

profit’.  These tests are :-

“(1) Whether  the  Government  makes  the  appointment;

(2) Whether the Government has the right to  remove or    dismiss the holder ;

(3) Whether  the  Government  pays  the  remuneration;

(4) What  are  the  functions  of  the  holder?  Does  he  perform  them  for  the  Government; and

(5) Does  the  Government  exercise  any  control  over  the  performance  of  those  functions?”

All  the  five  tests  would  be  relevant  to  determine  that  

whether  a  particular  office  is  an  office  under  the  

Government.  For determining whether such an office is  

also an ‘office of profit', tests 3, 4, 5 assume importance.  

It is, therefore, necessary to evaluate the nature and the  

importance  of  the  functions  performed.   It  would  be  

essential to determine whether it would be necessary for  

the  person holding an office  under  the  Government  to  

incur any expenditure in performance of the functions.  

These matters would then have to be correlated to any  

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honorarium, allowance or stipend that may be attached  

to the office.  Without examining any of these issues, the  

High Court concluded that the honorarium received by  

the Lambardar is not compensatory in nature.  We are  

unable  to  endorse  the  approach  adopted  by  the  High  

Court.  

23. Bearing in mind these tests, we may now examine  

whether the office of Lambardar is an ‘office of profit’.  

It  would  be  apparent  from  the  facts  that  though  the  

Lambardar may not be holding a civil post, he would be  

holding an office under the Government.  The Lambardar  

is  not  paid  any  salary  but  is  entitled  to  receive  an  

honorarium  of  Rs.900/-  per  month.   He  receives  no  

salary,  emoluments,  perquisites  or  facilities.   Is  that  

sufficient to conclude that he holds an ‘office of profit’?  

This  seems to  be the  conclusion reached by the State  

Election  Commissioner,  whilst  issuing  the  impugned  

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circular dated 30.4.2008.  The High Court affirmed the  

aforesaid conclusion.   

24. The term ‘office of profit’ has not been defined in the  

Constitution,  Representations  of  Peoples  Act,  Punjab  

State Election Commission Act or the Panchayati Raj Act.  

It is one of those rare terms which is not even defined in  

the  General  Clauses  Act,  1897.  It  has,  however,  been  

judicially  considered  in  numerous  judgments  of  this  

Court.  We may notice here some of the judgments.

25. In  Gatti  Ravanna, son of Gatti  Subanna, Gubbi  

Taluk, Mysore State Vs.  G.S.Kaggeerappa, Merchant,  

Gubbi  6   considered whether a person holding the position  

of the Chairman of Gubbi Taluk Development Committee,  

could be said to be holding an ‘office of profit’ under the  

Government.  In that case, the Chairman was entitled to  

a  fee  of  Rs.6/-  for  each  sitting  of  the  aforesaid  

Committee.  It was clearly held by this Court that a fee of  

6 (AIR 1954 SC 653)

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Rs.6/- which the Chairman was entitled to draw for each  

sitting  of  the  Committee  was  neither  meant  to  be  

payment by way of remuneration nor it could amount to  

profit; and the fee was paid to the Chairman to enable  

him to meet “out of pocket expenses, which he has to  

incur for attending the meetings of the Committee.”  It  

was held as under:-

“The plain meaning of the expression seems to  be  that  an  office  must  be  held  under  Government  to  which  any  pay,  salary,  emoluments  or  allowance  is  attached.  The  word  “profit”  connotes  the  idea  of  pecuniary  gain. If there is really a gain, its quantum or  amount would not be material; but the amount  of money receivable by a person in connection  with  the  office  he  holds  may  be  material  in  deciding whether the office really carries any  profit.

From the facts stated above, we think it can  reasonably  be  inferred  that  the  fee  of  Rs  6  which the non-official Chairman is entitled to  draw  for  each  sitting  of  the  committee,  he  attends, is not meant to be a payment by way  of remuneration or profit, but it is given to him  as  a  consolidated  fee  for  the  out-of-pocket  expenses which he has to incur for attending  the  meetings  of  the  committee.  We  do  not  think  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Government  which  created  these  Taluk  Development  Committees  which  were  to  be  manned exclusively  by non-officials,  that  the  

21

office  of  the  Chairman  or  of  the  members  should carry any profit or remuneration.”

26. The High Court gives no reason for concluding that  

the  honorarium  received  by  a  Lambardar  is  not  

compensatory  in  nature.  The  High  Court  erred  in  not  

analyzing  the  real  and  substantive  nature  of  the  

honorarium. The High Court failed to take notice of the  

fact that the respondents had placed no material on the  

record  to  establish  that  the  honorarium  of  Rs.900/-  

would result  in a net  gain to the Lambardar.  In other  

words,  the out of pocket expenses for attending to the  

duties of a Lambardar would be less than Rs.900/- per  

month. This court in S.Umrao Singh Vs. Darbara Singh  

& Ors.  7    has clearly held :-

“5. The payment to a Chairman, Panchayat  Samiti, under Rule 3 is described in the rule  as a monthly consolidated allowance in lieu of  all  other allowances for performing all official  duties and journeys concerning the Panchayat  Samiti within the district, including attending  of  meetings,  supervision  of  plans,  projects,  schemes  and  other  works,  and  also  for  the  discharge  of  all  lawful  obligations  and  

7 [1969 (1) SCR 421]

22

implementation of Government directives. This  provision in very clear language shows that the  allowance paid is not salary, remuneration or  honorarium. It is clearly an allowance paid for  the purpose of ensuring that the Chairman of  a  Panchayat  Samiti  does  not  have  to  spend  money out of his own pocket for the discharge  of his duties. It envisages that, in performing  the  duties,  the  Chairman  must  undertake  journeys  within  the  district  and  must  be  incurring  expenditure  when  attending  meetings, supervising plans, projects, schemes  and other works and also in connection with  the discharge of  other  lawful  obligations and  implementation  of  Government  directives.  No  evidence  has  been  led  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  to  show  that  a  Chairman  of  a  Panchayat  Samiti  does  not  have  to  perform  such  journeys  in  the  course  of  his  official  duties  and  to  incur  expenditure  in  that  connection. The State Government, which was  the  competent  authority,  fixed  the  allowance  for  a Chairman of  a Panchayat Samiti  at  Rs  100 per month, obviously because it was of the  opinion that this sum will  be required on an  average  every  month  to  meet  the  expenses  which the Chairman will have to incur in this  connection.  In  these  circumstances,  the  burden lay on the appellant to give evidence on  the basis of which a definite finding could have  been arrived at that the amount of Rs.100 per  month was excessive and was not required to  compensate the Chairman for the expenses to  be  incurred  by  him  in  the  discharge  of  his  official  duties  as envisaged in  the  rule.  That  burden clearly has not been even attempted to  be discharged by the appellant.

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8.   Our  attention  was  drawn  by  learned  counsel to the fact that in Rule 7 the persons  entitled to daily allowance are divided into two  categories  and  a  Chairman  of  a  Panchayat  Samiti belonging to Category I is entitled to Rs  6  per  diem  when  a  Member  of  the  Samiti  belonging to Category II is only entitled to Rs 4  per diem. The argument was that there was no  explanation for payment at a higher rate to the  Chairman and, consequently, it must be held  that the Chairman must be making gain out of  the payment to him of daily allowance. We are  unable  to  accept  this  submission.  The  daily  allowance  is  invariably  fixed  after  estimating  what  extra  expenditure  in  a  day  the  person  concerned would have to incur. A Chairman, it  appears,  was  expected  to  incur  more  expenditure per day than a Member, and that  seems to be the reason why a higher rate of  daily allowance was prescribed for him. In any  case, such a payment is clearly meant only to  cover additional expenditure and out-of-pocket  expenses  of  the  Chairman  and,  while  no  evidence has been advanced to show that out  of the amount received as daily allowance the  Chairman will in fact invariably make a saying,  it  cannot  be  held  that  this  payment  would  result in gain so as to make the office an office  of profit.”

The aforesaid observations are squarely applicable to the  

facts and circumstances of this case. Even the payment  

of allowances to Chairman Panchayat Samiti was held to  

be out of pocket expenses. It  was emphasised that the  

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burden lay on the appellant to give evidence to show that  

amount paid would be in excess of the expenses. It was  

further  observed  that  even  with  regard  to  higher  

allowance paid to Chairman for performing duties outside  

the  district,  there  was  no  evidence  from  which  an  

inference could be drawn that the allowance paid would  

be in excess of the expenditure incurred in performance  

of the duties by the Chairman.  

27. In  the  case  of  K.B.  Rohamare  Vs.  Shanker  Rao  

Genuji Kolhe  8  ,  this Court again considered the factors  

which are necessary to be taken into consideration :-

i) Whether  the  office  in  question  is  an  office  

holding under the Government; and  

ii) Whether such an office is an ‘office of profit’.

Considering the question in the light of the test laid down  

in the case of  Shivamurthy Swami (Supra), it was held  

that a member of the Board would be holding an office  

8 [(1975) 1 SCC 252]

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under the Government.  It was, however, observed that  

mere  drawal  of  the  daily  allowance  and  traveling  

allowance could not make membership of the Board, an  

‘office of profit’ as the allowances drawn by such member  

would be merely compensatory in nature.  In coming to  

the  aforesaid  conclusion,  this  Court  considered  the  

nature  of  the  payment  made  to  the  members  of  the  

Board.  It was observed that the dictionary meaning of  

the  word  ‘honorarium’  would  not  be  of  much  help.  

Therefore, “the matter must be considered as a matter of  

substance ratter than of form, the essence of payment  

rather than its nomenclature”.  

28. In considering the substance of the nature of the  

payment  made,  this  Court  considered  in  detail  the  

various  payments  made  to  the  member  of  the  Wage  

Board as well as the number of meetings attended and  

the places at which the meetings were attended.  This  

was not necessary to determine whether the particular  

member made a profit after the payments made to him  

26

but  to  see  the  effect  of  payments  in  general.   Upon  

examination of  the  entire  material,  it  was observed as  

under:-

“The question has to be looked at in a realistic  way. Merely because part of the payment made  to  the  first  respondent  is  called  honorarium  and part of  the payment daily allowance, we  cannot come to the conclusion that the daily  allowance  is  sufficient  to  meet  his  daily  expenses and the honorarium is  a source of  profit.  A  member  of  the  Wage  Board  cannot  expect  to  stay  in  Taj  Hotel  and  have  a  few  drinks  and  claim  the  expenditure  incurred,  which may come perhaps to Rs 150 to Rs 200  a  day,  for  his  personal  expenses.  In  such  a  case  it  may  well  be  held  to  give  him  a  pecuniary gain. On the other hand he is not  expected to live like a sanyasi and stay in a  dharmshala and depend upon the hospitality  of  his  friends  and  relatives  or  force  himself  upon them.  Nobody with a knowledge of  the  expenditure likely to be incurred by a person  staying at a place away from his home could  fail  to  realise  how correct  the  assessment  of  the learned Judge is. We are satisfied that the  payments made to the first respondent cannot  be a source of profit unless he stays with some  friends or relatives or stays in a dharmshala.  The  appellant  has  not  satisfied  the  test  or  discharged  the  burden  pointed  out  by  this  Court in Umrao Singh case. The law regarding  the question whether a person holds an office  of  profit  should  be  interpreted  reasonably  having regard to the circumstances of the case  and the times with which one is concerned, as  also  the  class  of  person  whose  case  we  are  

27

dealing with and not divorced from reality. We  are thus satisfied that the first respondent did  not hold an office of profit.”

29. The expression ‘office or profit’ was reconsidered in  

detail  by  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Shibu  Soren Vs.  

Dayanand Sahay  9  .    This  Court,  apart  from reiterating  

the  ratio  of  law  in  the  aforesaid  two  cases  i.e.  

K.B. Rohamare Vs. Shanker Rao Genuji Kolhe (Supra)  

and  Shivamurthy Swami (Supra) observed as follows:-

“27.  With  a  view  to  determine  whether  the  office  concerned  is  an  “office  of  profit”,  the  court  must,  however,  take  a  realistic  view.  Taking  a  broad  or  general  view,  ignoring  essential  details  is  not  desirable  nor  is  it  permissible  to  take  a  narrow  view  by  which  technicality may overtake reality. It is a rule of  interpretation  of  statutes  that  the  statutory  provisions  are  so  construed  as  to  avoid  absurdity and to further rather than defeat or  frustrate the object of the enactment.  

28.  While  interpreting  statutory  provisions,  courts have to be mindful of the consequences  of  disqualifying a candidate  for being chosen  as, and for being, a Member of the legislature  on the ground of his holding an office of profit  under the State or the Central Government, at  the  relevant  time.  The  court  has  to  bear  in  mind  that  what  is  at  stake  is  the  right  to  

9  [(2001) 7 SCC 425]   

28

contest an election and to be a Member of the  legislature,  indeed  a  very  important  right  in  any democratic set-up. “A  practical  view,  not pedantic basket of tests” must, therefore,  guide  the  courts  to  arrive  at  an  appropriate  conclusion. A ban on candidature must have a  substantial  and  reasonable  nexus  with  the  object  sought  to  be  achieved,  namely,  elimination  of  or  in  any  event  reduction  of  possibility of misuse of the position which the  legislator concerned holds or had held at the  relevant  time.  The  principle  for  debarring  a  holder of office of profit under the Government  from  being  a  Member  of  Parliament  is  that  such  person  cannot  exercise  his  functions  independently  of  the  executive  of  which  he  becomes a part by receiving “pecuniary gain”.  Under Article 102(1)(a),  of  course, Parliament  has  the  jurisdiction  to  declare  an “office”  as  not to disqualify its holder to be a Member of  Parliament and likewise under Article 191(1)(a)  the  State  Legislature  has  the  jurisdiction  to  declare  an  “office”  as  not  to  disqualify  its  holder  to  be  a  Member  of  the  State  Legislatures.  Moreover,  apart  from  the  office  being an “office of profit”,  it must also be an  office under the State or Central Government.

30. It was further observed that for determining of the  

core question each case has to be judged in the light of  

the relevant provisions of the statute and its own peculiar  

facts.   This is  to ensure that there should not be any  

29

conflict  between  the  duties  and  interest  of  an  elected  

member.  

31. In view of the above, the conclusion reached by the  

High Court that receipt of Rs.900/- is not compensatory  

can not be accepted. It would be preposterous to accept,  

in this day and age, that a sum of Rs.900/- per month  

would be sufficient to cover the out of pocket expenses of  

a Lambardar.

32. In  this  case  the  High  Court  erred in  recording  a  

conclusion without insisting on the evidence on the basis  

of which such conclusion could have been recorded. The  

circular dated 30.4.2008 merely states :-

“To

All the Deputy Commissioners-cum- District Electoral Officers in the State.

Memo No. SEC-2008/4365 Chandigarh, dated the 30.4.2008

30

Subject : General  Elections  to  Panchayat  Samitis  and Zila  Parishads –  2008  Clarification regarding contesting of  election  by  Lambardars  and  Anganwari Workers.  

…

Some of the Deputy Commissioners-cum- District  Electoral  Officers  have  raised  the  question  whether  the  Lambardars  and  Anganwari  workers  are  eligible  to  contest  Panchayati  Raj  Institution  elections.   The  answer to this question depends upon whether  the aforesaid functionaries are holding “office  of  profit”  under  the  State  Government.   The  Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has laid down  certain  tests  for  determining  the  question  whether a particular office is an office under  the  State  Government  or  not:  particularly  in  Shivamurthy  Swami  Inamdar  Vs.  Agadi  Sanganna Andanaappa as follows:-

i) Whether  the  government  makes  the  appointment;  

ii) Whether the government has the right to  remove or dismiss the holder;

iii) Whether  the  government  pays  remuneration;  

iv) What the functions of the holder are and  does  he  perform  them  for  government;  and  

v) Does the government exercise any control  over the performance of these functions.  

Therefore,  the  question  whether  a  person  is  holding  an  office  of  profit  under  the  Government  of  India  or  a  State  has  to  be  decided  by  applying  these  tests  to  the  facts  

31

and  circumstances  of  each  case.   Applying  these questions to the instant case, it is well  established  that  both  the  above  mentioned  functionaries  are  appointed  by  the  Government and the Government has the right  to  remove  them.   They  are  also  paid  remuneration.  However, it has been said that  the  remuneration  is  of  the  nature  of  honorarium.   Here,  on  “office  of  profit”  the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  of  India  held  in  Ravanna  Subanna  Vs.  Kaggeerappa  that  the  word  ‘profit’  connotes  the  idea  of  pecuniary  gain.  If there is really a gain, its quantum or  amount would not be material but the amount  of money receivable by a person in connection  with  the  office  he  holds  may  be  material  in  deciding whether the office really carried any  profit.  Further, it is also well established that  functions  performed by  both  Lambardar  and  Anganwari workers are for the government and  the government also exercises control over the  performance  of  these  functions.   A  similar  point  has  been  decided  by  the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  in  Ramappa  Vs.  Sangappa  where  the  Hon’ble  Supreme  court  observed  that the appointment of Patels and Shanbhogs  was  made  by  the  Government  under  the  Mysore Village Offices Acts 1908 and though it  may be under the statute it had no option but  to appoint the heir to the office, if he fulfills the  statutory requirements, but the office was held  by them by reason of the appointment by the  government  and  not  simply  because  of  hereditary right to it.  They worked under the  control  and  supervision  of  the  Government,  could be removed by the government and were  paid by it.   

32

Accordingly,  the  Commission  is  of  the  view  that  the  Lambardar  and  Anganwari  workers  held  “office  of  profit”  and  thus  are  ineligible to contest.   

   Sd/-

                               (A.K. Dubey) State Election Commissioner, Pb.”

A perusal of the circular would clearly show that State  

Election Commission has failed to take note of the factual  

situation. The circular is based on a misinterpretation of  

the  law  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  the  cases  of  

Shivamurthy and Ravanna Subanna (supra).  There is  

no  material  on  the  record  to  show that  the  receipt  of  

Rs.900/- per month by the Lambardar would invariably  

lead to a saving. Even though the office of Lambardar is  

regarded  as  a  mere  relic  in  this  day  and  age,  it  still  

carries with it certain important duties which are to be  

performed  by  the  incumbent.   Although  purely  

‘honourary’  being  a  Lambardar  gives  the  incumbent  a  

certain status in the village.  In some cases, the office of  

33

Lambardar has been in the same families for generations.  

For them, it  becomes a matter  of  honour and prestige  

that the office remains in the family.  Learned counsel for  

the  appellant  has  rightly  submitted  that  the  office  of  

Lambardar is a heritage office.  Therefore, some families  

would cherish the office of Lambardar, even though the  

incumbent  does  not  get  any  salary,  emoluments  or  

perquisites. In our opinion, the very basis of issuing the  

circular  was  non-  existent  and  misconceived.  On  this  

very basis, the High Court has quashed the circular in  

relation to  Anganwari  workers.  In  our  opinion,  for  the  

same reasons the circular could not be sustained qua the  

Lambardars also.

33. In  view  of  the  aforesaid  conclusion,  we  need  not  

consider  the  effect  of  Section  2(a)  of  the  Punjab  State  

Legislative (Prevention of disqualifications) Act, 1952, on  

Section 11(g) of the State Election Commission Act. By  

virtue  of  the  aforesaid  Act  a  Lambardar  would  be  

qualified to contest the elections for legislative assembly.  

34

This could be a stepping stone for  becoming the Chief  

Minister  of  the  State.  Therefore,  it  would seem a little  

incongruous that a Lambardar would not be permitted to  

seek  election  to  the  Panchayat.  The  village  level  

democracy  is  the  bedrock  of  the  Indian  National  

Democracy.  Being a member of Panchayat can be the  

beginning of a long career in public life.  Therefore, the  

disqualification introduced though the impugned circular  

could  prove  disastrous  to  democracy  at  the  grassroots  

level in Punjab.  But we need not go into controversy, as  

we  have  already  held  that  the  office  of  a  Lambardar  

would not be an ‘office of profit’.

34. In view of  the  above,  the  appeal  is  allowed.   The  

impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, in so  

far as it relates to Lambardars.  The impugned circular  

dated  30.4.2008  is  quashed  and  set  aside  qua  the  

Lambardars also.   

35

Civil Appeal No.              of 2010 @ Special Leave  

Petition (C) No.10948 of 2009 :

1.     Leave granted.

2. In  view  of  the  judgment  in  Civil  Appeal  

No. ……………...of 2010 @ SLP (C) No. 7319 of 2009, this  

appeal becomes infructuous and is dismissed as such.

……………………………..J. [B.Sudershan Reddy]

……………………………..J. [Surinder  Singh  Nijjar]

New Delhi; October 29, 2010.

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