02 May 1991
Supreme Court
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ANDHRA STEEL CORPORATION LTD. ETC. Vs ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ELECTRICITYBOARD AND ORS.

Bench: OJHA,N.D. (J)
Case number: Appeal Civil 1454 of 1981


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PETITIONER: ANDHRA STEEL CORPORATION LTD. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ELECTRICITYBOARD AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/05/1991

BENCH: OJHA, N.D. (J) BENCH: OJHA, N.D. (J) VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR 1456            1991 SCR  (2) 624  1991 SCC  (3) 263        JT 1991 (2)   581  1991 SCALE  (1)864

ACT:      Electricity  Supply Act, 1948: Sections 48  and  78-A-- Mini  steel  plants--Electricity  supply--State   Government fixing  concessional  tariff and directing  the  Electricity Board  to supply electricity at such rates--Whether  amounts to  granting  of  immunity to the  plants  from  payment  of minimum  charges--Concessional tariff and  minimum  supply-- Imposition of conditions by Electricity Board--Validity of.      Administrative   Law:   Establishment  of  mini   steel plants--Supply  of  electricity  at  concessional   tariff-- Applicability of principles of natural justice, doctrine  of promissory   estoppel   and  doctrine   of   of   legitimate expectation.

HEADNOTE: The  appellants owning mini steel plants have  been  getting supply of electricity from the Respondent-Board.  The  Board revised its terms and conditions for supply of  electricity, and  concessional  tariff of 11 paise per unit for  3  years from  1.11.1977  was  applied to five  steel  plants.   This tariff  was  subsequently enhanced to 12.5 paise  per  unit. However, the concessional tariff was not extended to one  of the  appellants viz. M/s. Andhra Steel Corporation  since  a Writ  Petition  had  been  filed by  it  claiming  that  the agreement   entered  into  with  the  Respondent-Board   for availing  high  tension  electric supply was  no  longer  in force.   In  respect  of the other steel  plants,  the  Bard extended the concessional tariff subject to escalations  and other  terms  and  conditions and fixed  a  certain  minimum consumption.   However, the tariff was revised to  16  paise without  reference  to  the  maximum  demand  charges   from 1.3.1978.   In  reply  to  a  clarification  sought  by  the Respondent-Board,  the State Government clarified  that  the Government  order did not preclude the Board  from  applying the  normal terms and conditions of supply  and  prescribing the  monthly  minimum  charges and the working  out  of  the escalated  rate from time to time.  Subsequently  the  State Government  withdrew  the concessional  tariff.   The  State Government  made a further clarification that its  intention was  to allow the concessional tariff without  limiting  the

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concession by imposition of minimum-                                                   625 consumption charges till the end of March, 1979.      Aggreived by the withdrawal of the concessional tariff, the  mini steel plants filed Writ Petitions before the  High Court  contending  that it was not open to  the  Electricity Board  to  have levied minimum charges and it was  bound  to supply electricity to them at the concessional tariff  fixed by  the State Government.  It was also contended that  State Government’s  subsequent clarification should  prevail  over the  earlier  one.   Violation  of  principales  of  natural justice, doctrine of promissory estoppel and right based  on doctrine of legitimate expectation were also contended.      It  was  further  contended that  the  directions  were issued  under section 78A of the Electricity Supply Act  and hence  they were of a compulsory nature and binding  on  the Board.      The  Andhra  Steel  Corporation  contended  that  while applying the concessional tariff to other mini steel plants, the Electricity Board was not justified in refusing the same to  it  thereby  singling it out and hence  its  action  was discriminatory and male fide.      The  High  Court rejected the various  contentions  and dismissed the Writ Petitions.      Aggrieved by the dismissal of their Writ Petitions, the mini  steel plants filed appeal before this  Court,  raising the same contentions as were advanced before the High Court.      Dismissing the appeals, this Court,      HELD:  1. In granting concessional tariff obviously  it does not appear to be the purpose to compel the  Electricity Board  to  maintain  the supply of the  contracted  load  of electricity to the appellants by incurring loses.  The  only purpose in directing supply of energy at concessional  rates was  to reduce the charges of actual energy consumed by  the appellants and this purpose could not be frustrated till the Electricity  Board complied with the direction of  supplying electricity  to them at the concessional rate.   Though  the order dated 16.1.80 in substance amounts to a  clarification of   the   earlier   order  of   clarification   dated   5th December,1978, it states nothing as to why the clarification contained   in  the  order  dated  5th  December,  1978   in categorical terms did not express the real intention of  the State  Government in issuing the earlier  Government  orders granting concessional tariff.  The orders-                                              626 granting concessional tariff, did not either expressly or by necessary  implication  grant  immunity to  the  mini  steel plants from their obligation to pay minimum charges and this having been categorically stated by the State Government  in its  clarificatory order dated 5th December, 1978 there  was apparently  no  basis for issuing the  second  clarificatory order  dated  16th  January, 1980.  It was  issued  on  some representation  made by the mini steel plants at a point  of time  when  Writ Petition on their behalf had  already  been filed in the  High Court and matter was sub-judice.  In  such a situation, apart from the propriety of issuing the  second clarificatory order on 16th January, 1980 it is obvious that what was contained in this order is analogous to an averment made by the State Government in reply to the Writ  Petitions filed  on behalf of the appellants and it has no bearing  in finding  out  the  true import of the orders  of  the  State Government granting concessional tariff. [633C-D;636A-E]      Amalgamated   Electricity   Co.  v.   Jalgaon   Borough Municipality,  [1975] 2 SCC 508 and Bihar State  Electricity Board v. Green Rubber Industries, [1990] 1 SCC 731, referred

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to.      2.  By the Government Orders dated 2nd  November,  1977 and  26th  November,  1977 concession  was  granted  to  the appellants.   This  is manifest from the  government  Orders themselves which expressly used the expression "concessional power  tariff" or "concessional tariff".  At no  stage,  the appellants  disputed that what was extended to them  by  the said Government Order was by way of concession.  In view  of the  settled  law.  Neither of the two  orders  viz.,  order dated  5.12.78 and 12.3.79 can be said to be illegal on  the ground  that they were passed in violation of principles  of natural justice.[633F-H]      Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat, [1987] 1 SCC 31; relied on.      3.  With regard to the plea of promissory estoppel,  it is  not  the case of the appellants  that  they  established their mini plants after the grant of concessional Tariff  by the said two Government Orders and but for the grant of such concessional  tariff they would not have  established  their mini steel plants.  The necessary facts so as to sustain the plea  of promissory estoppel are not pleaded or  established by the appellants. [635B-D]      4. There is nothing on record to substantiate the  plea of doctrine of legitimate expectation on the basis of  which the appellants could be held entitled to any relief.[635G]                                                   627      5.  On  the  facts of the present  appeals  it  is  not necessary  to  go  into the question whether  the  power  of fixing tariff under section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act could be regulated by a direction under section 78A thereof. The  electricity Board proceded to implement the  directions with regard to fixation of concessional tariff issued by the State Government and resolved to realise electricity charges from the appellants only at the concessional tariff of  12.2 p.  as  fixed in the Government Order dated  26th  November, 1977.    It,  however,  took  the  further  view  that   the directions issued by the Government did not have any bearing on  the obligation of the appellants to pay minimum  charges which  they were bound to pay under the agreements  executed by  them  even  though  such  minimum  charges  were  to  be calculated  at  the  rate of 12.2 p.  per  unit  subject  to escalation   as  indicated  in  the  Government  Orders   in question.  Such  minimum  charges were payable  even  if  no electricity  was consumed by the appellants for  any  reason whatsoever. [631B-D]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1454-63 & 1642-45 of 1981.      From  the  Judgment and Order dated  10.4.1981  of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 3720 of 1979.      G.  Ramaswamy, M.S Ganesh, S. Murlidhar, Sanjeev  Ahuja and B. Parthasarthy for the Appellants.      C.  Sitaramaiya, T.V.S.N. Chari and Mrs. B. Sunita  Rao for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      OJHA, J. These appeal are directed against the  judgment of  the  Andhra Pradesh High Court dated  10th  April,  1981 rendered  in  a batch of writ petitions,  reported  in  M/s. Poddar  Projects Ltd. (Multi Steels) v. A.P.S.E. Board,  AIR 1982 Andhra Pradesh 189. For the sake of convenience,  these appeals are being decided by a common judgment.  In order to appreciate  the  respective  submissions  made  by   learned

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counsel  for  the parties necessary facts may be  stated  in brief.      The  appellants  are some of the mini steel  plants  of Andhra Pradesh.  Revised terms and conditions of electricity supply were notified by the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board  (for short the Electricity Board) in B.P. Ms.  No.690 (Coml.) on 17.9.75 to be effec-                                                   628 tive  from 20 October, 1975, Subsequently, G.O. Ms. No.  832 dated 2nd November, 1977 was issued by the State  Government whereby  concessional  tariff of 0.11 p. per  unit  for  the period  of three years commencing from  1st  November,  1977 and  endings with 31st October, 1980 was applied in  respect of the following five consumers:          1.  Andhra  Pradesh State  Corporation  Limited  2.          Poddar Projects Limited 3. A.K. Corporation Limited          4.    Andhra   Steels,   Vishakapatnam   5.    A.K.          Corporation, Vishakapatnam.      This  concessional tariff was subsequently enhanced  to 12.5 p. by the State Government vide G.O. Ms. No. 876  dated 26th  November, 1977.  The concessional tariff  referred  to above,  however,  was  not extended  to  M/s.  Andhra  Steel Corporation by the Electricity Board by passing a resolution in  its meeting held on 26th November, 1977 inasmuch as  the Andhra  Steel Corporation had already filed a writ  petition inter alia claiming that the agreement which it had  entered into  with the Electricity Board for availing  high  tension electric  supply was no longer in force.  In respect of  the remaining   four   steel  plants  referred  to   above   the Electricity  Board extended the concessional tariff of  12.2 p. subject to escalations and other terms and conditions  of supply  and fixed minimum consumption of 403.325  units/KVA. This was done by issuing B.P. Ms. No. 78 dated 20th January, 1978.    These  four  mini  steel  plants   were,   however, subsequently directed by the Electricity Board vide B.P. Ms. No. 436/Coml. dated 3rd May, 1978 to be charged at a  tariff rate of 16 p. per unit instead of 12.2 p. without  reference to  the  maximum demand charges from 1st March,  1978.   The Electricity  Board also sought clarification from the  State Government vide its letter No. DE (Coml.) 1205-1/76-32 dated 27  November,  1978  with  regard  to  fixation  of  minimum consumption   of   403.325   units/KVA   and   fixation   of concessional  tariff at 0.16 p. per unit in view of the  new levy  of  central excise duty and in view of  the  increased cost of generation.  The State Government vide G.O. Ms.  No. 697 dated 5th December, 1978 issued a clarification that the aforesaid  G.O.  Ms.Nos. 832 and 876 did  not  preclude  the Electricity  Board  from  applying  the  normal  terms   and conditions  of  supply and prescribing the  monthly  minimum charges and the working out of the escalated rate from  time of  time.  Subsequently the State Government vide  G.O.  Ms. No.  146  dated 12th March, 1979 withdrew  the  concessional tariff contemplated by G.O. Ms. Nos. 832 and 876 referred to above.    This  was  done  on  the  representation  of   the Electricity Board which in its turn through its B.P. Ms. No. 830 dated 2nd April, 1979 cancelled B.P.Ms. Nos. 78 and  436 with effect from 12th March, 1979.  The State Government                                                   629 subsequently  also  issued  G.O.  Ms.  No.  10  dated   16th January.,  1980 whereby it was clarified that its  intention in issuing the earlier G.O. Ms. No. 697 dated 5th  December, 1978  was to allow the concessional tariff rate notified  in G.O.   Ms.  no  876  without  limiting  the  concession   by imposition  of minimum consumption charges till the  end  of March,  1979.  The Electricity Board felt aggreived by  this

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G.O.  and  requested  the Government to cancel  it  for  the reasons set out in its letter dated 28th January, 1980.      One  of the grievances of the Andhra Steel  Corporation in  its  writ petition before the High Court  was  that  the Electricity Board while applying the concessional tariff  to the  other mini steel plants was not justified  in  refusing the said concession to it merely because it had filed a writ petition.   The action of the Electricity Board is  singling it  out  was, according  to the  Andhra  Steel  Corporation, discriminatory and mala fide.  This plea has been reiterated before  us also and is confined to the appeal  preferred  by the Andhra Steel Corporation.      The pleas common to all the appellants which were raise before  the  High  Court  as  also  before  us  may  now  be enumerated.   It  has  been asserted that  in  view  of  the direction issued by the State Government fixing concessional tariff for the appellants it was not open to the Electricity Board  to  have levied minimum charges and it was  bound  to supply  electricity  to the appellants on  the  concessional tariff  alone as fixed by the state Government.  As  regards the  order of the State Government dated 5th December,  1978 which clarified that its earlier orders fixing  concessional tariff  did not preclude the Electricity Board from  levying inter  alia  minimum charges it has been asserted  that  the said  order is illegal.  In the alternative, it is  asserted that  if clarificatory orders could be issued by  the  State Government  with  regard to its orders  fixing  concessional tariff the subsequent clarification made by order dated 16th January, 1980 had to prevail over the earlier  clarification dated 5th December, 1978.      The  order  of the State Government dated  12th  March, 1979  withdrawing the concessional  tariff with effect  from that  date had also been assailed on the ground that it  was passed  on  the  representation  of  the  Electricity  Board without  giving  any opportunity to the appellants  to  show cause  against the said representation and consequently  the said  order  was  in  violation  of  principles  of  natural justice.   Pleas of promissory estoppel and right  based  on the  doctrine  of  legitimate  expectation  have  also  been raised.                                                   630      As regards the submission made on behalf of the  Andhra Steel  Corporation  about singling it out in the  matter  of grant  of  concessional  tariff on the basis  of  the  order issued  by the State Government for the period  ending  12th March,  1979  Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel  for  the Electricity   Board   has  very  fairly  stated   that   the Electricity   Board  would  extend  to  the   Andhra   Steel Corporation also the same benefit which was extended to  the other  four  mini  steel plants in the matter  of  grant  of concessional  tariff for the said period ending 12th  March, 1979.  In this view of the matter it is not now necessary to deal with this plea.      As regard the plea that in view of the direction issued by  the State Government fixing concessional tariff for  the appellants it was not open to the Electricity Board to  have levied minimum charges as it was bound to supply electricity to the appellants on the concessional tariff alone as  fixed by the State Government it was submitted by learned  counsel for the appellants that not only it was specifically  stated in  the G.O. dated 26th November, 1977 that  the  directions contend  there were issued under section 78A of the Act,  it was accepted even by the Electricity Board to be a direction under  Section  78A  of  the Act as  is  apparent  from  its proceedings dated 20th January, 1978.  According to  learned

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counsel for the  appellants a direction issued under Section 78A of the Act was of a compulsive nature and was binding on the   Electricity  Board.   The  only  dispute   which   the Electricity  Board could raise was as envisaged and  in  the manner  provided  by Sections 78A(2) of the  Act  about  the direction  being a matter of policy.  The Electricity  Board according to learned counsel not having taken raucous to the procedure  contained  in  Section  78A(2)  of  the  Act  was precluded  from  asserting before the High  Court  that  the Government  orders  granting  concessional  tariff  to   the appellants did not fall within the purview of Section 78A of the  Act.   The contention of the learned  counsel  for  the Electricity  Board  on  the  other  hand  has  been  that  a direction  under  Section 78A of the Act can  be  only  with regard  to  a  matter  of  policy  vis-a-vis  the  consumers generally   or   of  a  particular  class  or  category   as distinguished  from  individual consumers and  even  such  a direction  does not have a binding force and  is  calculated only to guide the Electricity Board in the discharge of  its statutory functions. Learned counsel for the parties were at variance  even  on the question as to whether the  power  of fixing tariff under Section 49 of the Act could be regulated by a direction under Section 78A thereof.  In support of the submission  that  a direction issued by  the  Government  is compulsive  in  nature  learned counsel  appearing  for  the appellants and the State of Andhra Pradesh drew or attention to-                                                   631 certain  decisions  and principles  of  administrative  laws laying down the scope of a direction.      Having considered the respective submissions of learned counsel for the parties on this point we are of the  opinion thaton the facts of the instant appeals it is not  necessary to  go into the rival contentions referred to above on  this point.  Here, the Electricity Board as is apparent from  its proceedings dated 20th January, 1978 proceeded to  implement the  directions  with  regard to  fixation  of  concessional tariff  issued  by  the State  Government  and  resolved  to realise electricity charges from the appellants only at  the concessional  tariff of 12.2 p. as fixed in  the  Government Order  dated  26th November, 1977.  It,  however,  took  the further  view  in the said proceedings that  the  directions issued  by  the Government did not have any bearing  on  the obligation  of the appellants to pay minimum  charges  which they were bound to pay under the agreements executed by them even  though such minimum charges were to be  calculated  at the  rate  of  12.2 p. per unit  subject  to  escalation  as indicated  in  the  Government  Orders  in  question.   Such minimum  charges  were payable even if  no  electricity  was consumed by the appellants for any reason whatsoever. It  is in this context that we are of the opinion that the question with  regard  to  the nature of  a  direction  issued  under section  78A of the Act is only of academic value  in  these appeals.    The   basic  question  which   falls   for   our consideration,  however, is as to whether the obligation  of the  appellants to pay minimum charges under  the  agreement executed  by them ceased to be operative on account  of  the directions   issued   by   the   State   Government   fixing concessional tariff as has been asserted by learned  counsel for  the appellants.  As indicated earlier the case  of  the electricity   Board  in  this  behalf  has  been  that   the directions  in  question  did not have any  bearing  on  the obligation  of  the appellants to continue  to  pay  minimum charges,  of  course, to be calculated on the basis  of  the concessional tariff of 12.2 p. per unit. A plain reading  of

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the  Government  Orders dated 2nd Movement,  1977  and  26th November,  1977  makes it clear that there  is  no  specific direction contained therein that the appellants would not be bound  to pay minimum charges or that the obligation to  pay minimum charges under the agreements executed by them  would remain  suspended  during  the period  when  the  concession tariff  would  be operative.  What was,  however,  urged  by learned counsel for the appellants was that the very purpose of fixing concessional tariff by the State Government  would be  frustrated  if the appellants are held to  be  bound  to continue  to  pay  minimum  charges  in  pursuance  of   the agreements  entered  into  by them.   With  regard  to  this submission it is at the outset  necessary to appreciate  the genesis of                                                    632 prescription  of minimum charges.  To put it succinctly  the purpose  of prescribing   minimum charges is to ensure  that no undue loss is caused to the Electricity Board because the absence of minimum charges is likely to create a tendency in a  prospective consumer to have connection for  an  inflated requirement  and having agreed to meet such requirement  the Electricity  Board would be under an obligation to  maintain the  supply upto that requirement even if no or very  little energy  is  consumed.   In Amalgamated  electricity  Co.  v. Jalgaon  Borough Municipality, [1975] 2 SCC Page 508 it  was held in paragraph 9 of the Report:           "Moreover  it  is obvious that  if  the  plaintiff          company was to give bulk supply of electricity at a          concessional  rate of 0.5 anna per unit it  had  to          lay  down  lines and to keep the  power  ready  for          being supplied as and when required.  The consumers          could put their switches on whenever they liked and          therefore  the  plaintiff had  to  keep  everything          ready  so  that power is supplied  the  moment  the          switch  was put on.  In these circumstances it  was          absolutely essential that the plaintiff should have          been ensured the payment of the minimum charges for          the supply of electrical energy whether consumed or          not  so  that  it  may be able  to  meet  the  bare          maintenance expenses."      In  Bihar  State  Electricity  Boara  v.  Green  Rubber Industries, [1990] 1 S.C.C. Page 731 while dealing with  the question  whether the stipulation to pay  minimum  guarantee charges  irrespective of whether energy was consumed or  not is  reasonable  and  valid  it  was  inter  alia  held  that considered  by the test of reasonableness it cannot be  said to be unreasonable inasmuch as the supply of electricity  to consumer   involves  incurring  of   overhead   installation expenses by the Board which do not very with the quantity of electricity   consumed  and  the  installation  has  to   be continued irrespective of whether the energy is consumed  or not.      The  purpose of prescribing minimum charges  being,  as stated  above,  can  it  be  said  that  while  issuing  the direction to the Electricity Board to supply electricity  to the  five mini steel plants at concessional rate  the  State Government  was oblivious of the said purpose  and  required the Electricity Board not only to supply electricity on  the concessional  rate but also incur undue loss in  maintaining the  required  bulk  of energy  stipulated  in  the  various agreements even if the concerned mini plants either used  no energy or used very little energy.                                                       633      In our opinion, on the material placed before us it  is not possible to take the view that such was the intention of

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the  State Government in directing supply to be made to  the appellants  on  concessional tariff.  That it  was  not  the intention of the State Government to do so was  subsequently clarified  by  the State Government itself  vide  Government Order dated 5th December, 1978.  In this view of the  matter the  submission made on behalf of the appellants  that  with the grant of concessional tariff the agreements in so far as they  required the appellants to pay minimum charges  ceased to be operative or that the purpose of granting concessional tariff was likely to be frustrated if they were required  to continue  to  pay  minimum  charges  cannot,  therefore,  by accepted.  In granting concessional tariff obviously it does not appear to be the purpose to compel the Electricity Board to maintain the supply of the contracted load of electricity to  the appellants by incurring losses in the manner  stated above.   The only purpose in directing supply of  energy  at concessional  rates was reduce the charges of actual  energy consumed  by  the appellants and this purpose could  not  be frustrated  till  the Electricity Board  complied  with  the direction   of   supplying  electricity  to  them   at   the concessional  rate.   In  this  view of  the  matter  it  is apparent  that the direction of the State Government to  the Electricity Board to supply electricity to the appellants at concessional  rate did not either expressly or by  necessary implication grant immunity to the appellants from payment of of minimum charges.      In  support  of  the plea that the  order of the  State Government dated 5th December, 1978 which clarified that its earlier  orders fixing concessional tariff did not  preclude the  Electricity Board from levying minimum charges and  the subsequent  order  dated 12th March,  1979  withdrawing  the concessional tariff were invalid it was submitted by learned counsel  for  the  appellants  that  those  orders  were  in violation  of  principles  of natural justice  as  also  the doctrine  of  promissory  estoppel.   In  so  far  as   this submission  is concerned what is of significance is that  by the  Government  Order dated 2nd November,  1977  and   26th November,  1977  concession was granted to  the  appellants. This  is  manifest  from  the  aforesaid  Government  Orders themselves which expressly used the expression "concessional power tariff" or "concessional tariff.  At no stage, does it appear to have been disputed by the appellants that what was extended to them by the said Government Orders was by way of concession.  In the context of granting exemption from sales tax  certain  observations were made by this Court  in  Shri Bakul  Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat, [1987]  1  S.C.C. Page 31 which would, keeping in view the principle laid down therein with regard to-                                                   634 the  grant  of  concession, be, in our  opinion,  useful  in considering the above stated submission made by the  learned counsel for the appellants.  It was held:           "Viewed  from  another  perspective,  it  may   be          noticed  that  the State Government  was  under  no          obligation to grant exemption from sales tax.   The          appellants  could not, therefore, have insisted  on          the  State  Government granting exemption  to  them          from  payment  of  sales  tax,   What  consequently          follows  is  that  the  exemption  granted  by  the          government  was  only by way of  concession.   Once          this position emerges it goes without saying that a          concession can be withdrawn at any time and no time          limit can be insisted upon before the concession is          withdrawn.   The  notifications of  the  government          clearly  manifest  that the  State  Government  had

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        earlier  granted  the  exemption  only  by  way  of          concession and subsequently by means of the revised          notification   issued   on  July  17,   1971,   the          concession  had  been  withdrawn.   As  the   State          Government  was under no obligation, in any  manner          known  to  law,  to grant exemption  it  was  fully          within its powers to revoke the exemption by  means          of   a   subsequent  notification.   This   is   an          additional    factor   militating    against    the          contentions of the appellants."      It was further held:           "The  exemption  granted  by  the  government   as          already  stated, was only by way of concession  for          encouraging  entrepreneurs to start  industries  in          rural  and  undeveloped areas and as  such  it  was          always open to the State Government to withdraw  or          revoke  the concession.  We must, however,  observe          that the power of revocation or withdrawal would be          subject to one limitation viz. the power cannot  be          exercised  in violation of the rule  of  promissory          estoppel.   In  other  words,  the  government  can          withdrawn  an  exemption granted by it  earlier  if          such withdrawal could be done without offending the          rule  of  promissory  estoppel  and  depriving   an          industry  entitled to claim exemption from  payment          of  tax  under the said rule.   If  the  government          grants  exemption to a new industry and if on   the          basis of the representation made by the  government          an  industry is established in order to  avail  the          benefit  to exemption, it may then follow that  the          new  industry  can legitimately raise  a  grievance          that-                                                   635           The  exemption  could not be withdrawn  except  by          means  of  legislation having regard  to  the  fact          that promissory estoppel cannot be claimed  against          a statute."      This  being the law with regard to grant of  concession we  are  of  the  opinion that neither  of  the  two  orders mentioned above can be said to be illegal on the ground that they  were  passed  in violation of  principles  of  natural justice.   Who  only  question  in  this  connection   which survives  is  that of promissory estoppel.  With  regard  to this  plea it would be seen that it is not the case  of  the appellants that they established their mini plants after the grant  of concessional tariff by the two Government Orders referred to above and but for the grant of such concessional tariff  they would not have established their  mini  plants. The necessary facts so as to sustain the plea of  promissory estoppel  are not, in our opinion, to be found to have  been either pleaded or established by the appellants.  To take it by  way  of  an illustration reference may be  made  to  the special  leave  petition giving rise to  Civil  Appeal  Nos. 1454-1463  of  1981 filed by M/s. Andhra  Steel  Corporation Ltd.   The plea with regard to promissory estoppel is to  be found in ground no.(i) which reads :           "Whether  in view of the fact that the  Petitioner          had   acted  upon  the  Government   orders   dated          2.11.1977  and  26.11.1977  and  thus  altered  its          position (as without the concessions being  granted          to the Petitioner they would not have possibly  run          the  industry,  since it was bound to  suffer  huge          (losses)  is  the  State  Government  stopped  from          revoking,  or  modifying the same before  the  full          period of concession had run out of efflux of  time

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        that is, by 31-10-1980?"                                         (emphasis supplied)      Almost identical is ground no.(i) in the special  leave petition giving rise to Civil Appeal Nos. 1642-1645 of 1981. The  use of the word "possible" is obviously  indicative  of lack  of  specific  averment with  regard  to  principle  of estoppel.   Even such an averment has not been made qua  the Electricity  Board.   With regard to the plea based  on  the doctrine  of legitimate expectation suffice if to  say  that except  invoking the said doctrine nothing  substantial  was brought  to our notice on the basis of which the  appellants could be held entitled to any relief.      In  so far as the Government Order dated 16th  January, 1980  on which reliance has been placed by  learned  counsel for the appellants in-                                                      636 The alternative is concerned it may be pointed out that  the said   order   even  though  in  substance  amounts   to   a clarification  of the earlier order of clarification  dated 5th   December,   1978,  states  nothing  as  to   why   the clarification  contained  in the order dated  5th  December, 1978 in categorical terms did not express the real intention of  the State Government in issuing the  earlier  Government Orders  granting concessional tariff. As  already  indicated above,  the  orders  granting  concessional  tariff, in  our opinion,   did   not  either  expressly  or   by   necessary implication  grant  immunity to the mini steel  plants  from their obligation to pay minimum charges and this having been categorically   stated  by  the  State  Government  in   its clarificatory  order  dated  5th December,  1978  there  was apparently  no  basis for issuing the  second  clarificatory order  dated  16th January, 1980.  Further, the  said  order dated   16th  January,  1980  had  been   issued   on   some representation made on  behalf of the mini steel plants at a point  of  time  when writ petitions  on  their  behalf  had already  been  filed in the High Court and  the  matter  was subjudice.   In such a situation , apart from the  propriety of issuing the second clarificatory order datd 16th January, 1980 it is obvious that what was contained in this order  is analogous  to  an averment made by the State  Government  in replay  to  the  writ  petitions  filed  on  behalf  of  the appellants.   In our opinion, in the circumstances  poinited out above the order dated 16th January, 1980 has no  bearing in  finding out the true import of the orders of  the  State Government granting concessional tariff.      In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any substance in these appeals.  They are accordingly dismissed. No. costs. G.N                                       Appeals dismissed                                                   637