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PETITIONER: ANDHRA INDUSTRIAL WORKS, A. P.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/04/1974

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN ALAGIRISWAMI, A. GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1539            1975 SCR  (1) 327  1974 SCC  (2) 348  CITATOR INFO :  R          1975 SC1208  (28,29)  RF         1980 SC1285  (48)  R          1989 SC2138  (99)

ACT: Import  trade  Control  policy-Application  for  licence  to import-Rejected-If  order  of rejection can  be  challenged, under Art. 32.

HEADNOTE: The petitioner-firm made four applications between  November 1969  and November 1970 for April 1969 to March,  1970.  for the  grant of licences to import stainless steel sheets  and electrolytic  copper  wire  bars  for  the  manufacture,  of automobile  parts.  The Deputy Chief Controller  of  Imports and Exports. received some complaints that the firm had been misutilising  imported  material, and  criminal  proceedings were started against the firm.  Since the applications, were not  disposed of within the usual time of three  weeks,  the petitioner  filed writ petitions in the High Court  and  the High  Court  directed  the respondents. to  dispose  of  the applications  as  expeditiously as possible.   In  September 1972,  instructions  were given by the Chief  Controller  of Imports and Exports that the import trade control policy had been  amended  and  that  the import  of  the  materials  in question for utilisation in automobile parts was prohibited. In November, 1972 the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports informed the petitioner ’,hat its applications  have been rejected. Dismissing  the writ petitions filed under Art. 32  in  this Court,  alleging violation of the  petitioner’s  fundamental rights under Arts. 14 and 19, HELD  : (1) Since the firm stands for all the  partners  and the  petitions must be deemed to have been filed by all  the partners  who are citizens of India, the writ  petitions  on behalf of the firm were maintainable. [329H] (2)  But no relief could be granted to the petitioner.   The jurisdiction  of  this Court under Art. 32, can  be  invoked only for the enforcement of fundamental rights.  L330A-B] (a)  An  applicant has no vested right to an import  licence

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in  terms  of  the  policy  in force  at  the  time  of  the application, and in accordance with the amended import trade control  policy  the  licences  applied  for  could  not  be granted.   The Import and Export Control Act, 1947,  or  any Order  or rule made thereunder is not ultra vires;  and  the validity of the Import control Policy Statement had not been impeached.   No  person can merely on the basis  of  such  a statement  claim a right to the grant of an import  licence, enforceable at law.  The policy cane be changed or rescinded by  mere  administrative orders  or  executive  instructions issued at any time. [330E-G; 331C] (b)  There  is  no  substance in  the  contention  that  the instructions  or orders made in pursuance of the Import  and Export  Control Act place unreasonable restrictions  on  the petitioners’  right to carry on trade, or  business.   These restrictions obviously have been imposed in the interest  of general public and national economy. [331G] (c)  The  Deputy  Chief  Controller did  not  lack  inherent jurisdiction  to deal with and decline the applications  for the grant of licences.  In view of the supervening  criminal proceedings   against  the  petitioner  the   Deputy   Chief Controller might have thought that it was better for him  to defer  decision on the application till the  termination  of those proceedings.  There was thus delay in dealing with the application, but the delay could not be said to be undue  or motivated by bad faith. [331A-B, F] (d)  There  is  no question of violation of Art. 14  of  the Constitution as no particulars have been given of any  other applicant,  similarly  situated,  of having  been  given  an import licence in similar circumstances. [332-B-C] 322 Smt.   Ujjam  Bai v. State of U.P. [1963] 1 S.C.R.  781  and Deputy  Assistant  Iron  and Steel Controller  and  anr.  v. Manickchand  Proprietor,  Katrella  Metal  Corpn.    Madras, [1972] 3, S.C.R. 1, followed.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos, 122 to  125  of 1973. Under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. Y.   S. Chitale, and K. Rai Choudhury, for the appellant. S.   N. Prasad and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- SARKARIA, J.-.In these four writ petitions under Article  32 of the Constitution, the parties and the basic questions for determination are the same.  They will therefore be disposed of by a common judgment. The  petitioner-firm  is  dealing  in  the  manufacture   of automobile  parts,  wires and cables.  The  petitioner  made four   applications  on  November  5,1969,  March   23,1970, November  5,  1970  and November 6,1970, for  the  grant  of licences  to import stainless steel sheets and  electrolytic copper wire bars, for the period April-March 1970 and April- March  1971.   At  the  time of the  receipt  of  the  first application  dated  November 5, 1969, Respondent  3  (Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Hyderabad) received some  complaints that the petitioner-firm was  mis-utilizing the  imported material.  After a  preliminary  investigation made   by  the  C.B.I.,  a  First  Information  Report   was registered on December 12, 1969 with the police against the. petitioner-firm and some others in respect of the commission of  offences  under s.5 of the Imports (Control)  Act,  1947 read with clause 5 of the Imports (Control) Order, 1948.  In

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the  normal  course,  such  applications  should  have  been disposed  of within three weeks of the dates on  which  they were received.  Since the respondents did not dispose of the applications, the petitioner-firm filed four writ  petitions (Nos. 3526-3529 of 1971) in the High Court of Madras praying for the issue of writ of Mandamus directing the  respondents to issue the :import licences applied for. Before the High Court, no counter-affidavit was filed by the Respondents.   The High Court, instead of issuing a writ  of Mandamus,  directed the Respondents to consider and  dispose of the applications in accordance with law as  expeditiously as possible.  The applications were however not disposed  of for   another  five  months.   On  September  20,1970,   the petitioner  moved the High Court for proceeding against  the authorities  for  contempt  of its  order.   Thereafter,  on October  22,  1972,  the  petitioner  caused  a  notice   by registered post to be served on the respondents. Respondent  No. 3 then informed the petitioner-firm  by  his communication dated November 7, 1972, that its  applications bad  been  rejected.  The reasons set out  in  the  impugned orders were: (1) Stainless steel-sheets are not allowed  for the  manufacture of the end product of automobile  parts  as their import has been prohibited in terms of the 32 3 existing in instructions; (2) Since the petitioner-firm  was a  manufacturer of automobile parts "import of  Electrolytic copper  wire bars for end use of ’automobile parts’  is  not permissible". The petitioners challenge the aforesaid orders ’of  November 7, 1972 passed by the 3rd Respondent, on the ground that  in view of the Import Policy contained in the Red Book for  the relevant  period,. they were entitled to the grant of  these import licences, and that the "existing instructions" on the basis  of which their applications were rejected, could  not override   that   Import  Policy.   In   any   case,   these instructions  are  unconstitutional; they do not  amount  to ’reasonable   restrictions’  within  the  contemplation   of Article 19 of the Constitution on the petitioners’ right  to carry  on  their  trade.   The  petitioners  pray  that  the impugned  orders, dated November 7, 1972, be  declared  void and  a  Mandamus  directing the  respondents  to  issue  the licences for the import of the materials in question for the licensing  period, April 1969-March 1970, in favour  of  the petitioners. At  the  outset,  Mr. Prasad, appearing  on  behalf  of  the respondents, has raised these objections: (1) Article 19 (1) (g)  on  which  the petitioners stake  their  claim  can  be availed  of  only by a citizen of India; the  writ  petition filed  by the firm is therefore not maintainable; (2)  Since the petitioners had no fundamental right to the grant of the licences  in  question  and the law in  pursuance  of  which Respondent 3 passed the impugned order, was intra vires, the procedural  irregularity or error, if any, committed by  the Respondent  in the exercise of his jurisdiction, not  having resulted in violation of or threat to any fundamental  right of the petitioners, cannot be impeached by way of a petition under  Article 32 of the Constitution.  Reference  has  been made  to  Smt.   Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P.  (1)  :  (3)  No Mandamus  or other relier as prayed for by the  petitioners, can be granted because the petitioners had no specific legal right  to  the  licences, nor was  the  Respondent  under  a corresponding legal obligation to grant the same; (4) In any case, no import licences for the year 1969-70 in respect  of the materials in question can now be granted because of  the restrictions  subsequently imposed by import Control  Policy

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of the year 1972. In reply, Mr. Chitale submits that the Respondents have  not followed  the mandatory procedure prescribed in  the  Import Trade Control Hand Book, contravention of which entitles the petitioners  to  the issue of a writ of  Certiorari  or  any other appropriate order or direction from this Court.   This contravention,  it  is added, has, in effect,  violated  the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Articles 14  and 19 of the Constitution. We find no merit in the preliminary objection that the  writ petition on behalf of the "firm" is not maintainable.  Since "firm"  stands  for  all  the  partners  collectively,   the petition  is  to  be deemed to have been filed  by  all  the partners who are citizens of India.  We, therefore,. negative this objections (1)  [1963] 1 S. C. R. 781. 324 We however, find force in the other contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the Respondents. It  must be remembered that the jurisdiction of  this  Court under Article 32 can be invoked only for the enforcement  of the fundamental Tights guaranteed ’by the Constitution,  and not  any  other  legal  right.  A  petitioner  will  not  be entitled   to   relief  under  this   Article,   unless   he ,establishes that his fundamental right has been violated or imminently threatened.  Such violation, actual or  potential may  arise in a variety of ways, and it is not  possible  to give their exhaustive classification.  But on the analogy of Ujjam Bai’s case (supra) instances, most usual, in  relation to laws regulating the citizen’s right to carry on trade  or business guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) may be catalogued as ,under:               (a)   Where the impugned action is taken under               a  statute  which itself is  ultra  vires  any               provision of part III of the Constitution.               (b)   Where  the  statute concerned  is  intra               vires  but  the  impugned  action  is  without               jurisdiction  on account of a basic defect  in               the constitution of the authority or  tribunal               or  owing  to  the absence  of  a  preliminary               jurisdictional fact i.e. a condition precedent               to the exercise of jurisdiction;               (c)   Where the impugned action is based on  a               misconstruction of the ultra vires statute  or               is so contrary to the established procedure or               rules  of natural justice that it  results  in               violation of a fundamental right. The  instant  case  is clearly not covered  by  any  of  the categories. Herein,  it  is  not contended that the  Import  and  Export (Control) Act, 1947 or any Order or rule made thereunder  is ultra  vires.   Nor is the validity of  the  Import  Control Policy Statement (for the period April-March 1969) known  as Red  Book impeached.  Indeed, this Policy statement  is  the sheet-anchor  of  the  petitioners’ claim.   Such  a  Policy Statement, as distinguished from an Import or Export Control order  issued under s.3 of the said Act, is not a  statutory document.   No  person  can merely on the basis  of  such  a Statement  claim a right to the grant of an import  licence, enforceable at law.  Moreover, such a Policy can be changed, rescinded  or  altered  by  mere  administrative  Orders  or executive instructions issued at any time. From   the   counter-affidavit  filed  on  behalf   of   the Respondents,  it  is  clear that the  Import  Trade  Control Policy  (Red Book-Vol.1) had been amended and the import  of

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the  materials  in  question  for  utilization  in  the  end products  of most ’automobile parts’ was prohibited  as  per instructions  conveyed  by  Chief Controller  of  Imports  & Exports  in  his letter No. IPC(Gen.  33)/73/72/3499,  dated September   29,  1.972  although  general  notice  of   this amendment  was  published  later on August  18,  1973  (Vide Annexure.  R-5).  The result was that in accordance with the amended  Import Trade Control Policy, the  Respondent  could not, in November 1972, grant the licences applied for to the petitioners in respect of the past period, April  1969-March 1970.                             325 It  is  nobody’s  case that  Respondent  3  lacked  inherent jurisdiction  to deal with and decline the  application  for the  grant  of  the licences.   Serious  complaints  of  the commission  of  criminal offences arising out  of  the  mis- utilization  of materials previously imported  under  import licences,  were pending investigation by the C.B.I.  against the  petitioners.   Subsequently, a criminal  complaint  has also  been  made in court for trial of the  petitioners  and others for those offences.  In these circumstances, it could not  be  said  that the disposal of  the  applications,  was delayed by Respondent 3 due to ulterior motives, or that the refusal to grant the licences was violative of the rules  of natural justice. So that as it may, on the basis of an Import Trade Policy an applicant  has  no absolute right, much less  a  fundamental right,  to  the grant of an import licence.  The  nature  of such a claim came up for consideration before this Court  in Deputy  Assistant Iron and Steel Controller and anr.  v.  L. Maneckchand, Proprietor, Katrella Metal Corpn., Madras. (1) That was an appeal by special leave against the judgment  of tile  High Court rendered in exercise of  writ  jurisdiction under Art. 226.  The writ-petitioner asked for the issue  of a  Mandamus  requiring  the  authorities  to  consider   his application  for licence to import stainless steel in  terms of 1968-69 Policy and not in accordance with 1970-71  Policy when the application was made.  This Court held that in view of  s.3(1)(a) of the Imports and Exports Control  Act,  1947 and  cl.6 (1) (a) of the Imports (Control) Order,  1955,  an applicant has no vested right to an import licence in  terms of  the policy in force at the time of the application.   No case for the Mandamus prayed had been made out, particularly when  the delay in disposing of the application for  licence was not due to the fault of the Licensing Authority. The ratio of Maneckchand’s case (supra), is applicable  with greater force to the present petitions which have been  made under  Article 32 of the Constitution.  The instant case  is no doubt one of delay on the part of the authority, but this delay  could not be said to be ’undue’ or motivated  by  bad faith.   In  view of the  supervening  criminal  proceedings against  the petitioners, the Respondent might have  thought that  it  was  better  for him  to  defer  decision  on  the applications   till   the  termination   of   the   criminal proceedings. Nor  do  we find any substance in the  contention  that  the "existing  instructions" or the orders made in pursuance  of the   Import  &  Export  Control  Act  place   "unreasonable restrictions" on the petitioners’ right to carry on trade or business.  These restrictions obviously have been imposed in the  interests of the general public and  national  economy. Again,  in  this connection the observations  made  by  this Court in Maneckchand’s case (supra) are relevant and ,nay be extracted               "....it  has to be borne in mind that  in  the

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             present  stage of our  industrial  development               imports   requiring  foreign   exchange   have               necessarily to be appropriately controlled and               regulated.   Possible abuses of  import  quota               have also to be (1)  [1972] 3 S.C.R. 1. 326                effectively   checked  and  this   inevitably               requires   proper  scrutiny  of  the   various               applications for import licence.  In  granting               licences for imports, the authority  concerned               has to keep in view various factors which  may               have  impact  on  imports of  other  items  of               relatively  greater  priority  in  the  larger               interest,  of  the  overall  economy  of   the               country   which   has  to   be   the   supreme               consideration". Lastly, there is no question of the violation of Article  14 of the Constitution.  Excepting a nebulous allegation in the rejoinder,  the  petitioners  have not set up  any  plea  of hostile discrimination.  They have not given any particulars whatever,  of any other applicant, similarly situated,  who’ might  have  been  granted such an import  licence  in  like circumstances. For  all the reasons aforesaid, the petitions fail  and  are dismissed,  but, in the circumstances of the  case,  without any order as to costs. V.P.S.                           Petitions dismissed. 32 7