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PETITIONER: ANANT CHINTAMAN LAGU

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BOMBAY

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/12/1959

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  500            1960 SCR  (2) 460  CITATOR INFO :  F          1963 SC  74  (38)  RF         1970 SC1321  (16)  F          1972 SC1331  (32)  D          1984 SC1622  (156,170)  R          1988 SC1011  (9,27)

ACT: Criminal  Law-Murder  by  poisoning-Circumstantial  evidence -Poison not detected in body of deceased-Conduct of accused, both before and after-Conviction for murder.

HEADNOTE: At  the trial of a person for murder by  alleged  poisoning, the fact of death by poisoning is provable by circumstantial evidence,  notwithstanding that the autopsy as well  as  the chemical  analysis fail to disclose any poison;  though  the cause  of death may not appear to be established  by  direct evidence,   the   medical  evidence  of  experts   and   the circumstances  of the case may be sufficient to  infer  that the  death must be the result of the administration  to  the victim  of some unrecognised poison or drug which acts as  a poison,  and  a conviction can be rested  on  circumstantial evidence provided that it is so decisive that the court  can unhesitatingly hold that the death was not a natural one. Per  S. K. Das and M. Hidayatullah, jj.-Where  the  evidence showed that the appellant who was the medical adviser of the deceased, deliberately set about first to ingratiate himself in  the  good  opinions  of his  patient  and  becoming  her confidant,  found  out all about her affairs  and  gradually began  managing  her  affairs,  that all  the  time  he  was planning to get at her property and had forged her signature on  a dividend warrant and had obtained undated cheque  from her  and  then  under the guise of helping  her  to  have  a consultation  with  a  specialist in Bombay took  her  in  a train,  and  then  brought  the  patient  unconscious  to  a hospital  bereft of all property with which she had  started from  home and gave a wrong name to cover her  identity  and wrong  history  of  her ailments, that after  her  death  he abandoned  the body to be dealt with by the hospital  as  an unclaimed body, spread the story that she was alive and made use  of the situation to misappropriate all her  properties,

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and  that  he  tried  by  all  means  to  avoid   postmortem examination  and when questioned gave false and  conflicting statements, held that if the deceased died in  circumstances which  prima  facie admit of either disease or  homicide  by poisoning one must look at the conduct of the appellant both before and after the death of the deceased, that the  corpus delicti  could  be held to be proved by a  number  of  facts which  render the commission of the crime certain, and  that the  medical  evidence in the case and the  conduct  of  the appellant  unerringly  pointed to the  conclusion  that  the death  of the deceased was the result of the  administration of  some  unrecognised poison or drug which would act  as  a poison   and   that  the  appellant  was  the   person   who administered it. 461 Per Sarkar, J.-If it could be established in this case  that the  deceased  had died an unnatural death,  the  conclusion would  be inevitable that unnatural death had  been  brought about  by poison, but the circumstances were not  such  that from  them  the only reasonable conclusion to be  drawn  was that  the deceased died an unnatural death.  Held, that  the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the appellant. Regina v. Onufrejczyk, [1955] 1 Q.B. 388, The King v. Horry, [1952] N.Z.L. 111, Mary Ann Nash’s case, (1911) 6 Cr.   App. R. 225 and Donnall’s case, (1817) 2 C.& K, 308n,  considered and relied on.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 73  of 1959. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated January   16/20th,  1959,  of  the  Bombay  High  Court   in Confirmation  case No. 25 of 1958 with Criminal  Appeal  No. 1372  of 1958, arising out of. the judgment and order  dated October 27, 1958, of the Sessions Judge, Poona, in  Sessions Case No. 52 of 1958. A.   S.  R.  Chtiri,  S. N. Andley,  J.  B.  Dadachanji  and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant. H.   N.  Seervai, Advocate-General for the State of  Bombay, Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent. 1959.   December  14.   The  Judgment  of  S.  K.  Das   and Hidayatullah, JJ., was delivered by Hidayatullah, J. Sarkar, J., delivered a separate Judgment. HIDAYATULLAH J.-This appeal by special leave is against  the judgment  of the Bombay High Court [J. C. Shah, J.  (now  of the  Supreme  Court)  and  V. S.  Desai,  J.]  by  which  it maintained  the conviction of the appellant, Lagu, under  s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and confirmed the sentence  of death  passed  on  him by Shri V. A.  Naik  (now  Naik,  J.) Sessions Judge, Poona. The  appellant  was  tried for the murder  of  one  Laxmibai Karve, and the charge held proved against him was that on or about the night between November 12 and 13, 1956, either  at Poona  or in the course of a railway journey  between  Poona and Bombay, he administered to the said Laxmibai Karve, some unrecognised poison or drug which would act as a poison, 59           462 with the intention of causing her death and which did  cause her death.     Laxmibai  Karve was a resident of Poona where she  lived at  93-95,  Shukrawar Peth. Before her marriage of  she  was known  as  Indumati, Indutai or Indu Ponkshe.  In  the  year

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1922, she married Anant Ramachandra Karve, a widower with  a son by name, Vishnu. On her marriage, as is the custom,  she was  named  Laxmibai by the family of her  husband  and  was known  as Laxmibai Karve. She was also known as Mai  or  Mai Karve.  From Laxmibai there were born two sons,  Ramachandra (P.W. 1) and Purshottam alias Arvind, who died in 1954. Anant  Ramachandra Karve was a moderately rich man, who  had been successful in business. He died in 1945 of pleurisy. He was  attended  till  his  death by  the  appellant  and  his brother,  B.  C.  Lagu,  both of  whom  are  doctors.  Anant Ramachandra Karve left a will dated February 28, 1944. Prior to  the execution of the will, he had gifted Rs.  30,000  to his  son, Vishnu, to set him up in business. By his will  he gave   the  house  No.  93-95,  Shukrawar  Peth,  Poona   to Ramachandra  with  a right of residence in  at  least  three rooms  to his widow, Laxmibai and a further right to her  to receive  Rs.  50 per month from the rent of  the  house.  He assigned an insurance policy of Rs. 5,000 in her favour. The business was left to Ramachandra. The cash deposits in Bank, Post  Office and with other persons together with the  right to  recover loans from debtors in the Bhor State were  given to  Purushottam alias Arvind. Certain bequests of lands  and debentures were made to Visbnu’s children. Laxmibai was also declared  owner  of all her ornaments of about 60  tolas  of gold and nose-ring and pearl bangles which were described in the  will.  In  addition  to  what  she  inherited  from  her  husband, Laxmibai inherited about Rs. 25,000 invested in shares  from her   mother,  Girjabai,  and  another  60  tolas  of   gold ornaments. In January 1954, Purushottam alias Arvind died at Poona.  By Purushottam’s death Laxmibai also  inherited  all the property held by him. 463 Thus, at the time of her death, Laxmibai possessed of  about 560  shares  in diverse Electric’ Companies,  debentures  in South Madras Electric Supply Corporation and Mettur Chemical and  Industrial Corporation, a sum of Rs. 7,882-15-0 at  the Bank of Maharashtra, a sum of Rs. 35,000 in deposit with one Vasudeo Sadashiv Joshi, gold and pearl ornaments and  sundry movables like clothes, house hold furniture, radio etc. In the year 1946, Ramachandra, the elder son, started living separately.   There were differences between the mother  and son.  The latter had suffered a loss in the business and had mortgaged  the house with one Shinde, who filed a suit,  and obtained  a  decree but Vishnu filed a  suit  for  partition claiming  that his onethird share was not affected.   Before this,  Ramachandra  had closed his business in  195  1,  and joined the military.  He was posted at different places, but in  spite  of  their differences, mother  and  son  used  to correspond with each other.  In May, 1956, Laxmibai arranged and performed his marriage, and he went away in June, 1956. Laxmibai  had  contracted tuberculosis after  the  birth  of Purushottam.  That was about twenty years before her  death. The lesion, however, healed and till 1946 her health was not bad.  From 1946 she suffered from diabetes.  In 1948 she was operated for hysterectomy, and before her operation, she was getting hysterical fits.  On June 15, 1950, she was examined by Dr, R. V, Sathe, who prescribed some treatment.  In July, 1950,  she  was admitted in the Wanless  Tuberculosis  Sana- torium  for  pulmonary affection, and she was  treated  till November  15, 1950.  Two stages of thoracoplasty  operations were  performed,  but  she left, though  a  third  stage  of operation  was  advised.  In the  operations,  her  leftside first  rib  and portions of 2nd to 6th  ribs  were  removed. Laxmibai  was,  however,  treated with  medicines,  and  the

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focus, it appears, was under control. We  now come to the events immediately preceding her  death. Laxmibai  had, through the appellant, taken  an  appointment from Dr. Sathe of Bombay for 464 a  consultation about her health, for November 13, 1956,  at 3-30  p. m. It was to attend this appointment that she  left Poona in the company of the appellant   by  Passenger  train on  the  night of November 12,1956, for Bombay.   The  train arrived  at Victoria Terminus Station at 5-10 a. m.  thirty- five minutes late.  It is an admitted fact that Laxmibai was then deeply unconcious and was carried on a stretcher by the appellant  to a taxi and later to the G. T. Hospital,  where she  was  entered as an in-door patient at 5-45  a.  m.  She never  regained  consciousness and died at 11-30 a.  m.  Her body  remained it the G.T. Hospital till the evening of  the 14th,  when  it was sent to the J. J.  Hospital  morgue  for preservation.   Later,  it was to be handed over  under  the orders  of the Coroner to the Grant Medical College for  the use of Medical Students.  It was noticed there that she  had a  suspicious  ligature mark on the neck, and the  body  was subjected  to  postmortem  examination and  the  viscera  to chemical  analysis and then the body was disposed of.   Both the  autopsy  as  well as the chemical  analysis  failed  to disclose any poison and the mark on the neck was found to be postmortem. The  appellant was the medical attendant and friend  of  the family.   He and his brother (also a  medical  practitioner) attended  on  Anant Ramachandra Karve till his  death.   The appellant also treated Purshottam alias Arvind for two  days prior  to  his death on January 18, 1954.  He was  also  the medical  attendant  of Laxmibai and  generally  managed  her affairs.  In 1955, he started living in the main room of the suite  occupied  by Laxmibai, and if Ramachandra  is  to  be believed,  the reason for the quarrel between  Laxmibai  and himself was the influence which the appellant exercised over the mother to the disadvantage of the son.  However that be, it is quite clear that the son left Poona in June, 1956, and did not see his mother alive again. The  death  of Laxmibai was not known to  the  relatives  or friends.   The appellant also did not disclose this fact  to any  one.   On the other hand, he kept it  a  close  secret. Soon afterwards, people began receiving 465 mysterious  letters purporting to be from Laxmibai,  stating that she had gone on pilgrimage, that she did not intend  to return  and  that none should try to find  her  whereabouts. She  advised  them  to  communicate  with  her  through  the newspaper  " Sakal ". Laxmibai also exhorted all persons  to forget her, as she had married one Joshi and had settled  at Rathodi,  near Jaipur in Rajasthan.  People who went to  her rooms  at first found them locked, but soon the  doors  were open  and  the  meveable property was  found  to  have  been removed.  Through these mysterious letters Laxmibai informed all  concerned that she had herself removed  these  articles secretly and that none was to be blamed or suspected.  It is the prosecution case that these letters were forgeries,  and that   the  appellant  misappropriated  the  properties   of Laxmibai, including her shares, bank deposits etc.  The  appellant  has admitted his entire conduct  after  the death  of Laxmibai, by which he managed to get hold  of  her property.  His explanation was that he would have given  the proceeds  to  some charitable institution according  to  her wishes adding some money of his own to round off the figure. He  led no evidence to prove that Laxmibai before  she  left

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Poona  or at any time gave such instructions to him  in  the matter. - Meanwhile,  the  continued  disappearance  of  Laxmibai  was causing  uneasiness  to  her  friends  and  relatives.    On December  31,  1957,  G. D. Bhave (P.   W.  8)  addressed  a complaint to the Chief Minister, Bombay.  Similarly , Dr. G. N.  Datar  (P.  W. 5) also addressed a letter to  the  Chief Minister,  Bombay  on February 16, 1958, and in  both  these petitions,  doubts were expressed.  Ramachandra too  made  a report,  and in consequence of a preliminary  investigation, the  appellant  was  arrested  on  March  12,1958.   He  was subsequently  tried  and convicted by  the  Sessions  Judge, Poona.   His appeal was also dismissed, and the  certificate of  fitness having been refused, he obtained  special  leave from this Court and filed this appeal. The  appellant’s  contention  in this  appeal  is  that  the prosecution has not succeeded in proving that 466 Laxmibai  was poisoned at all, or that there was any  poison administered  to her which would evade detection, yet  cause death  in the manner it actually took place.  The  appellant contends also that his conduct before the death of  Laxmibai was bona fide and correct, that no inference of guilt can be drawn from all the circumstances of this case, and that  his subsequent  conduct,  though suggestive of  greed,  was  not proof of his guilt on the charge of murder. The  conviction  of the appellant  rests  on  circumstantial evidence,  and  his  guilt has been  inferred  from  medical evidence  regarding the death of Laxmibai and his  conduct.’ The  two Courts below have held that the total  evidence  in this  case unerringly points to the commission of the  crime charged and every reasonable hypothesis compatible with  the innocence  of the appellant has been successfully  repelled. A  criminal  trial, of course, is not an  enquiry  into  the conduct  of  an  accused  for  any  purpose  other  than  to determine  whether he is guilty of the offence  charged.  In this  connection,  that piece of conduct can be held  to  be incriminatory which has no reasonable explanation except  on the hypothesis that he is guilty. Conduct which destroys the presumption   of  innocence  can  alone  be  considered   as material.  The contention of the appellant, briefly, is that the  medical evidence is inconclusive, and that  his-conduct is explainable on hypotheses other than his guilt. Ordinarily,  it  is not the practice of this  Court  to  re- examine  the  findings  of fact reached by  the  High  Court particularly in a case where there is concurrence of opinion between  the  two Courts below.  But the  case  against  the appellant is entirely based on circumstantial evidence,  and there  is no direct evidence that he administered a  poison, and no poison has, in fact been detected by the doctor,  who performed  the  postmortem examination, or by  the  Chemical Analyser.   The inference of guilt having been drawn  on  an examination  of a mass of evidence during  which  subsidiary findings were given by the two Courts below, we have felt it necessary, in view of the extraordinary nature of this case, to satisfy ourselves 467 whether  each  conclusion on the separate’  aspects  of  the case,  is  supported  by evidence and is  just  and  proper. Ordinarily,  this  Court is not required to  enter  into  an elaborate examination of the evidence, but we have  departed from  this  rule  in this particular case, in  view  of  the variety  of  arguments  that were addressed to  us  and  the evidence  of  conduct  which the  appellant  has  sought  to explain  away  on hypotheses  suggesting  innocence.   These

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arguments,  as  we have stated in brief,  covered  both  the factual as well as the medical aspects of the case, and have necessitated a close examination of the evidence once again, so  that we may be in a position to say what are  the  facts found, on which our decision is rested. That Laxmibai died within six hours of her admission in  the G.  T. Hospital is not questioned.  Her body was  identified by  persons who knew her well from her photograph  taken  at the  J.  J. Hospital on November 19, 1956.  In view  of  the contention of the appellant that she died of disease  and/or wrong  treatment,  we have to determine first what  was  the state  of  her  health  before she  went  on  the  ill-fated journey.  ,This  enquiry  takes us  to  the  medical  papers maintained at the institutions where she was treated in  the past, the evidence of some of the doctors who dealt with her case,  of the observation of witnesses who could  depose  to her   outward  state  of  health  immediately   before   her departure,  and  lastly, the case papers maintained  by  the appellant as a medical adviser. The earliest record of Laxmibai’s health is furnished by Dr. K.  C.  Gharpure  (P.   W. 17), who  treated  her  in  1948. According  to Dr. Gharpure, she entered his Nursing Home  on April  6,  1948,  and  stayed there  till  April  24,  1948. Laxmibai   was   then   suffering   from   Menorrhagia   and Metrorrhagia  for  about six years.  In 1946  there  was  an operation  for  dilatation  and  also  curettage.   She  had Diabetes  from  1945  and hysterical fits  since  1939.   On admission in Dr. Gharpure’s Nursing Home, her blood pressure was found to be 140/80 and urine showed sugar + + ,  albumin nil.  She was kept in the hospital and probably treated, and on the 11th, when a sub-total 468 hysterectomy  was performed, she had blood  pressure  110/75 and  sugar traces (albumin nil) before the    Laguoperation. According  to  Dr.  Gharpure,  the  operation  was  not  for hysterical  fits,  and  along with  hysterectomy  the  right -ovary  was  cysticpunctured  and  the  appendix  was   also removed.   A  certificate was issued by  Dr.  Gharpure  (Ex. 121), in which the same history is given.  Laxmibai  was  next  examined  by  Dr.  Ramachandra   Sathe (P.W.25)  on June 15, 1950.  He deposed from the  case  file which he had maintained about her complaints.  A copy of the case  papers  shows that she was introduced to  him  by  the appellant.   At that time, her weight was 120 lbs.  and  her blood pressure, 140/90.  Dr. Sathe noticed that diabetes had existed for four years, and that she was being given insulin for  8  months prior to his examination.   He  also  noticed hysterectomy  scar, and that she had a tubercular lesion  on the  left apex 20 years ago.  According to the statement  of the  patient,  she had trouble with  tuberculosis  from  May 1949, and her teeth were extracted on account of  pyorrhoea. She  was  getting intermittent  temperature  from  September 1949,  and was receiving streptomycin and  PAS  irregularly. She  was then suffering from low temperature,  slight  cough and  expectoration.  On examination, the doctor  found  that there was infiltration in the left apex but no other  septic focus  was found.  The evidence does not show the  treatment which  was given, and the doctor merely stated that he  must have recommended a line of treatment to the patient,  though he had no record of it.  On  July 13, 1950, Laxmibai entered the Wanlesswadi  T.  B. Sanatorium,  and stayed there till November 15,  1950.   Her condition is noted in two certificates which were issued  by the Sanatorium -and proved by Dr. Fletcher (P.  W. 16),  the Medical Superintendent.  In describing the previous  history

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of  the  patient,  the case papers showed  that  she  had  a history  of  Pott’s disease (T. B. of the  spine)  20  years before.   She  had diabetes for five years  and  history  of hysterectomy operation two years before.  It was also  noted that she had 469 T.   B. of the lungs 15 years back, but had kept well for 14 years  and  a  new  attack began  in  or  about  1949.   The certificate  describes the treatment given to her  in  these words: "  Patient  was  admitted  on 13th  July,  1950.   X-Ray  on admission showed extensive filtration on the left side  with a large cavity in the upper zone; the right side was  within normal limits.  She had diabetes with high blood sugar which was  controlled  by insulin.  Two  stages  of  thoracoplasty operations  on  the left side were done and there  was  good clearing  of disease but there was a small  residual  cavity seen and the third stage operation was advised.  The patient is  leaving at her own request against medical advice.   Her sputum is positive.  " From   the  above,  it  appears  that   Laxmibai’s   general complaints   were  menstrual  irregularities  corrected   by hysterectomy,  tuberculosis  of the lungs  controlled  to  a large extent by thoracoplasty and medicines and diabetes for which  she  was  receiving treatment.   In  the  later  case papers, there is no mention of hysterical fits, and it seems that she had overcome that trouble after the performance  of hysterectomy and the cysticpuncture of the ovary, for  there is  no evidence of a recurrence after 1948.   Diabetes  was, however, present, and must have continued till her death.  Next, we come to the evidence of some witnesses who saw her immediately  prior to her departure for Bombay  on  November 12,   1956.   The  first  witness  in  this  connection   is Ramachandra  (P.W.  1),  son  of  Laxmibai.   He  has  given approximately the same description of her many ailments  and the treatment she underwent.  He last saw her in June, 1956, when  his  marriage was performed.  According  to  him,  the general condition of his mother was rather weak, but  before that,  her condition had not occasioned him any concern  and he  had not noticed anything so radically wrong with her  as to  prompt him to ask her about her ailments.  When he  last saw  his mother in June 1956, lie found her in good  health. Dr. Madhav Domadhar Bhave (P.W. 9), who knew Laxmibai           470 intimately  stated  that  he saw her last in  the  month  of October,  1956,  and that the condition of  her  health  was good. No question was asked from him in cross examination at all. His brother, G. D. Bhave, (P.W. 8),  who is a landlord, had  gone to Laxmibai’s house on November 8, 1956,  and  met her  in  the presence of the appellant.  Laxmibai  had  then told him that she was going to Bombay with the appellant  to consult  Dr. Sathe in connection with her health.   She  had also  stated  that she would be returning in  four  or  five days. According to the witness, she was in good health,  and was  moving about and doing her own work.  The next  witness is Champutai Vinayak Gokhale (P.W. II), who met Laxmibai  on November 10 or 11, 1956.  Champutai is a well-educated lady. She  is  a  B.Sc. of the Bombay University and  an  M.A.  of Columbia (U.S.A.) University.  She said that she had gone to Laxmibai’s house to invite her for the birthday party of her son,  which  was to take place on November  13,  1956.   She found  Laxmibai  in  good  state  of  health,  and  Laxmibai promised that though she would be going to Bombay, she would return soon enough to join the party. Similarly, Viswanath Janardhan Karandikar, pleader of Poona,

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met  Laxmibai  on November 10 or,11 ,  1956.   Laxmibai  had herself gone in the afternoon to him to ask him whether  her presence was necessary in Poona in connection with the  suit filed  by  Vishnu, to which we have referred  earlier.   The witness stated that Laxmibai was in good state of health ’at that time, and that he informed her that he did not  propose to  examine  her  as  a witness.   She  was  again  seen  by Dattatreya  Vishnu Virkar (P.W. 6) on the night of  November 12,  1956,  an hour before she left her  house  for  Bombay. Virkar,  who  is a Graduate in Electrical Mechanics  and  in Government  service, was a tenant living in the same  house. Laxmibai, according to the will of her husband, was entitled to  Rs.  50  out of the rents from  tenants.   She  went  to Virkar’s Block at 8 p.m. and told him that she was going  to Bombay  to consult a doctor in the company of the  appellant and needed money.  Virkar gave her Rs. 50 and 471 Laxmibai went back to her Block saying that she would give a receipt.  Later, she brought the receipt to Virkar seated at his  meals, asked him not to get UP and left the receipt  in his room.  The receipt signed by Laxmibai is Ex. 70, and  is dated November 12, 1956.  Shantabai (P.W. 14), a servant  of Laxmibai,   was  deaf  and  dumb,  and  her   evidence   was interpreted  with  the help of  Martand  Ramachandra  Jamdar (P.W.  13),  the Principal of a Deaf and  Mute  School.   It appears that Shantabai had studied Marathi, and was able  to answer  questions  written on a piece of paper,  replies  to which  questions  she wrote in her own hand.   Some  of  the questions  were not properly answered by Shantabai, but  she stated  by pantomime that on the day on which she left,  the appellant had given two injections to Laxmibai.  The learned Sessions Judge made a note to the following effect: In  the morning the accused gave Laxmibai one injection  and in  the evening he gave the second one. (The signs  were  so clear that I myself gathered the meaning and the interpreter was not asked to interpret the signs).  " Next,  Laxmibai was seen by Pramilabai Sapre (P.W. 12) at  8 p.m.  on  November 12,1956.  Laxmibai had told  the  witness that  she  was  going  to Bombay to  consult  a  doctor  and Laxmibai  again’  passed  her door at 9-15  p.m.,  when  the witness  was at her meals.  Though Laxmibai told her not  to disturb  herself, the witness did get up and saw  her.   The witness stated that Laxmibai did not suffer from T. B. after the ,operation but was suffering from diabetes, and that she sometimes  used to give Laxmibai her injections  of  insulin but  only  till  1953.  The last witness  on  the  state  of Laxmibai’s  health  is  K. L. Patil (P.   W.  60),  who  saw Laxmibai  immediately before her departure for the  station. He saw her standing at the Par in front of her house with  a small  bag and a small bedding.  He then saw  the  appellant arriving  there, and Laxmibai presumably left in a  rickshaw or a tonga, because there was a stand for these vehicles  in the  neighbourhood.   All this evidence was  not  questioned except  to point out-that Dr. Datar in his petition  to  the Chief Minister had stated that Laxmibai was a 472  frank case of tuberculosis of both lungs and an invalid(Ex. 68).   But Dr. Datar explained that he had so stated  there, because  it was being " circulated " that she had gone on  a long  pilgrimage  alone, and that it  was  most  improbable. Indeed, Dr. Datar said that   Laxmibai was well enough to do all her work and even cooked for herself. From  this mass of evidence given by persons from  different walks  of  life and most of them well-placed,  it  is  clear enough that Laxmibai was not in such a state of health  that

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she would have collapsed in the train, unless something very unusual  took place.  She was not in the moribund  state  in which  she undoubtedly was, when she reached  the  hospital. Her  general  health,  though  not  exactly  good,  had  not deteriorated  so radically as to prevent her from  attending to  her normal avocations.  She appeared to have been  quite busy  prior to her departure arranging for this  matter  and that,  and  she did not rely upon other  persons’  help  but personally attended to all that she desired. Right up to  9- 15  or  so  in the night, she was  sufficiently  strong  and healthy  to go about her affairs, and indeed, she must  have boarded  the  train also in a fit state of  health,  because there  is  nothing  to  show that she  was  carried  to  the compartment in a state of collapse or unconsciousness.   We  have  stated  earlier  that  the  appellant  who   was presumably treating her for her ailments had maintained case papers to show what treatment he was giving her from time to time.   These  case, papers are Ex.’ 305,  and  commence  on February  27, 1956.  The medicines that have been  shown  as prescribed in these case papers show treatment for diabetes, general debility, tuberculosis, rheumatism and  indigestion. Much reliance cannot, however, be placed upon this document, because  these  case  papers significantly  enough  stop  on November  12,-1956,  and continue again  from  February  13, 1957, when Laxmibai was no more.  There are four entries  of treatment given to Laxmibai between February 13 and February 28,  1957, when Laxmibai had already died and her  body  had undergone postmortem examination and been cremated. 473 The  extent  to  which her treatment, if any,  went  in  the period  covered by the case papers may or may not  be  truly described  by  the  appellant in these papers,  but  we  are definitely  of the opinion that the entries there cannot  be read  without suspicion, in view of the  extraordinary  fact described  by us here.  It appears, however, that  the  last insulin  injection was given to her on September  27,  1956, though the appellant stated in his examination as accused in the  case that she was put on Nadisan tablets for  diabetes. The appellant was questioned by the Sessions Judge as to the State of her health, and he stated that Laxmibai on the  day she left for Bombay had a temperature of 100 degrees and was suffering  from laryngitis, pharyngitis, and  complained  of pain  in the ear.  What relevance this has, we  shall  point out subsequently when we deal with the medical evidence  and the conclusions of the doctors about it.  The next question which falls for consideration is  whether the appellant and Laxmibai travelled in the same compartment on  the train.  The train left Poona at 10 p.m., and  it  is obvious  enough  that  it  was  a  comparatively  slow   and inconvenient  train.  We have no evidence in the case as  to whether  the appellant travelled with Laxmibai in  the  same compartment,  but both the Courts below have found from  the probabilities  of the case that he did.  The best person  to tell us about this journey is necessarily the appellant, and reference  may  now be made to what he stated in  regard  to this   journey.    The  appellant  had  arranged   for   the examination of Laxmibai by Dr. Sathe at Bombay.  He was  the family physician and also a friend.  Laxmibai was an elderly lady  and the appellant was for some time previous  to  this journey  living in the main room of her block.  There  would be  nothing to prevent the appellant from travelling in  the same  compartment  with  his patient,  who  might  need  his attention during the journey.  The appellant denied in Court that  he  had  travelled in the same  compartment,  but  his statements  on this part of the events have not  been  quite

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consistent.   After  Laxmibai died and  the  question  arose about the disposal of her body, the police at 474 Poona  were  asked  to contact the  appellant  to  get  some information  about  her.  On November 16, 1956,  before  any investigation into ail offence of any kind was started,  the appellant was questioned by the police, and   he   gave    a written statement in Ex. 365.  He stated there as follows:   "I, Anant Chintaman Lagu, occupation Medical practitioner, age  40  years,  residing at H.  No.  431/5,  Shukrawar  and dispensary  at H. No. 20, Shukrawar Peth, Poona 2, on  being questioned, state that on the night of 12th November,  1956, 1  left Poona for Bombay by the train which leaves Poona  at 10  p.m.  I reached Victoria Terminus at 5-15 a.m.  on  13th November, 1956.  In my compartment I bad a talk with a woman as  also with other passengers.  On getting accomodation  in the  train  almost all of us began to doze and at  about  12 p.m.  we slept.  As Byculla came, -we  started  preparations for  getting  down.  At that time one woman was  found  fast asleep.  From other passengers I came to know that her  name was Indumati Panse, about 36 years old and she had a brother serving in Calcutta.  Other passengers got down at V. T. The woman,  however, did not awake. 1, therefore, looked at  her keenly  and  found that she was senseless.  Being  myself  a doctor,  I thought it my duty to take her to  the  hospital. I,  therefore, took her to the G.T. Hospital in a  taxi.   I know  that that hospital was near.  As I had taken the  said woman  to the hospital, the C.M.O. took my address.  I  have no more information about the woman.  She is not my relation and I am not in any way responsible for her."   It  will  appear from this that he was travelling  in  the same compartment as Laxmibai, though for reason’s of his own he  did not care to admit that he was taking her to  Bombay. Similarly, in the hospital when he was questioned about  the patient he had brought for admission, he stated to Dr. Ugale (P.   W.  18), Casualty Medical Officer, that the  lady  had suddenly  become  unconscious in the train.  This  fact  was noted by Dr. Ugale in the bed-head ticket, and Dr. Ugale has stated on oath that the information was supplied by 475 the  appellant  himself.  To Dr. Miss Aneeja,  who  was  the House Physician on the morning of November 13, the appellant also stated the same thing.  Dr. Miss Aneeja had also made a separate  note of this, and stated that the information  was given  by the appellant.  In view of these statements  ’made by the appellant at a time when he was not required to  face a charge, we think that his present statement in Court  that he travelled in a separate compartment cannot be accepted.  The train halted at various stations en route, and evidence was led in the case, of the Guard, K. Shamanna (P.  W.  37), who  deposed from his memo book (Ex. 214).  This train  made 26 halts en route before it arrived at V. T. Station.   Some of  these  halts  were  of as many as  20  minutes.   It  is difficult  to think that the appellant would not have  known till  he arrived at Victoria Terminus that his  patient  was unconscious, and the fact that he mentioned that she  became suddenly unconscious shows that be knew the exact manner  of the  onset.   Without, however; speculating as to  what  had actually happened, it is quite clear to us that Laxmibai was in  the same compartment as the appellant, a fact which  was not  denied by the learned counsel in the  arguments  before us.  If we were to accept what the appellant stated as true, then  Laxmibai  lost  her consciousness  suddenly.   It  is, however,  a little difficult to accept as true all that  the appellant  stated in this behalf, because be told  a  patent

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lie  to  the  police when he was questioned,  that  he  knew nothing about the woman or Who she was, but took her to  the hospital   as  an  act  of  humanity  when  he   found   her unconscious.  There is nothing to show beyond this statement to the police in Ex. 365 that there were other passengers in the  compartment;  but if there had been, the  attention  of these  passengers would have been drawn to the condition  of Laxmibai,  and some’ one would have advised the  calling  of the  Guard  or  the  railway authorities  at  one  of  these stations  at which the train halted.  The  circumstances  of the  case,  therefore, point to the appellant  and  Laxmibai being in the compartment together, and the preponderance of 476 probabilities  is that the compartment was not  occupied  by any other person.     We  shall leave out from consideration for  the  present the   circumstances  under  which  Laxmibai   was   admitted in  the  G. T. Hospital and the treatment given to  her.  We shall now pass on to her death and what happened  thereafter and  the connection of the appellant with the  circumstances resulting in the disposal of the dead body.  We have already stated  that the appellant was present in the hospital  till her death.  We next hear of the appellant at Poona.  On  the afternoon of November 13, 1956, Dr’ Mouskar (P.  W. 40), the Resident  Medical Officer of the Hospital, sent  a  telegram (Ex.  224)  to  the appellant, and it conveyed  to  him  the following information: " Indumati expired.  Arrange removal reply immediately." The telegram was sent at about 2 p.m. The appellant in reply did not send a telegram, but wrote an inland letter in which  he stated  that  the name of the woman admitted by him  in  the hospital had been wrongly shown as "Paunshe", and that there was an extra "u" in it.  He also stated that he had informed her  brother  at  Calcutta about the  death,  and  that  the brother  would  call  at the hospital for the  body  of  his sister.   The name of the brother was shown as Govind  Vaman Deshpande.   The letter also stated that the  appellant  was writing  in  connection with the woman aged 30 to  35  years admitted in the hospital at 6 a.m. on November 13, 1955, and who  had  expired the same day at 11 a.m. The  name  of  the brother  in this letter is fictitious, because Laxmibai  bad no  brother,  much less a brother in Calcutta  and  of  this name.   Thereafter, the appellant took no further action  in the  matter till the police questioned him on the 16th,  two days after he had sent the letter.  It seems that the appel- lant  did  not expect the police to appear so soon,  and  he thought it advisable to deny all knowledge about the lady he had taken to the hospital by telling the police that he  did not know her.  The inference drawn from these two pieces  of conduct by the Courts below is against the appellant, and we also agree.  We have already stated that from then  onwards, the 477 appellant  did  not  care  to  enquire  from  the   hospital authorities  as to what had happened to his  patient’s  dead body,  and whether it had been disposed Of or not.  He  also did not go to Bombay, nor did he inform Dr. Sathe about  the cancellation  of the appointment.  In his  examination,  he, however, stated that he attempted to telephone to Dr. Sathe, but could not get through, as the instrument was engaged  on each occasion.  One expects, however, that he would have  in the  ordinary  course  written a letter of  apology  to  Dr. Sathe, because he must have been conscious of the fact  that he had kept the Specialist waiting for this appointment; but he  did  not.  It is said that the appellant need  not  have

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taken  this  appointment  and  could  have  told  a  lie  to Laxmibai; but the appointment with Dr. Sathe had to be  real because  if the plan failed, Laxmibai would have  been  most surprised why she was brought to Bombay.  With this ends the phase  of  events resulting in the death  of  Laxmibai.   We shall  deal  with the events in the hospital later,  but  we pursue the thread of the appellant’s conduct. Prior  to  the  fateful journey,  Laxmibai  had  passed  two documents to the appellant.  They are Exs. 285 and 286.   By the  first,  Laxmibai  intimated the  Bank  of  Maharashtra, Poona, that she was going to withdraw in the following  week from  her  Savings Bank account a sum of money  between  Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 5,000.  The other document was a bearer cheque for  Rs. 5,000, also signed by Laxmibai but written  by  the appellant.  The appellant presented the first on November 17 after writing the date, November 15, on it and the second on November  20,  after  writing the  date,  November  19,  and received payment.  Prior to this, on November 12, 1956, when Laxmibai was alive and in Poona he had presented to the Bank of  Maharashtra  a  dividend warrant for  Rs.  2,607-6-0  to Laxmibai’s account writing her signature himself.  This  was hardly  necessary if he was honest.  The signature  deceived the Bank, and it is obvious that he was a consummate  forger even  then.   Of course, he put the  money  into  Laxmibai’s account, but he had to if he was to draw it out again on the strength of these 61 478 two  documents.   The question is, can we say  that  he  was honest on November 12, 1956?  The answer is  obvious.    His dishonest  intentions  were, therefore, fully  matured  even before he left Poona.  Thereafter, the  appellant  converted all the property of Laxmibai to his own use.  He removed the movables   in  her  rooms  including  the  pots  and   pans, furniture,  clothes, radio, share scrips and so on,  to  his own  house.   He  even went to the  length  of  forging  her signature  on securities, transfer deeds, letters  to  banks and  companies,  and  even  induced  a  lady  magistrate  to authenticate the signature of Laxmibai for which he obtained the  services of a woman who, to say the  least,  personated Laxmibai.  So clever were the many ruses and so cunning  the forgeries that the banks, companies and indeed, all  persons were  completely deceived.  It was only once that  the  bank had occasion to question the signature of Laxmibai, but  the appellant promptly presented another document purporting  to be signed by Laxmibai, which the bank accepted with somewhat surprising  credulity.   The long and short of  it  is  that numerous persons were imposed upon, including those who  are normally careful and suspicious, and the appellant by  these means  collected a sum of no less than Rs. 26,000  which  he disposed of in various ways, the chief, among them being the opening  of a short term deposit account in the name of  his wife  and  himself and crediting some other amounts  to  the joint  names of his brother, B.C. Lagu, and himself.  We  do not  enter into the details of his many stratagems  for  two reasons.   Firstly  because,  all  this  conduct  has   been admitted  before us by his counsel, and next because he  has received  life imprisonment on charges connected with  these frauds.Suffice  it to say that if the appellant were  to  be found  guilty  of the offence, sufficient  motive  would  be found in his dealings with the property of this  unfortunate widow  after  her  death.  If murder  there  was,it  was  to facilitate the action which he took regarding her  property. If the finding of his guilt be reached, then his  subsequent conduct would be a part of a very deepseated plan  beginning almost from the time when he

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479 began  to  ingratiate himself into the good opinion  of  the lady.   The  fact, however, remains that  all  this  conduct cannot avail the prosecution, unless it proves  conclusively some other aspects of the case. We cannot, however, overlook one or two other  circumstances which  are  part of this conduct.  We  have  already  stated briefly that the appellant cause all persons to believe that Laxmibai  was  alive and living at Rathodi  as  the  happily married  wife  of one Joshi.  Both Joshi  and  Rathodi  were equally  fictitious.  In this connection, the  pleader,  the son,  the  friends  and  the  relations  of  Laxmibai   were receiving   for   months  after  her   death   letters   and communications  purporting  to  be  signed  by  her,  though written  at the instance of the -appellant by  persons,  who have come and deposed before the Court to this fact.   These letters  were  all  posted  in  R.  M.  S.  vans,  and   the prosecution  has  successfully  proved that  they  were  not posted  in  any  of the regular post offices in  a  town  or village.   These  letters  show a  variety  of  details  and intimacies  which  made them appear genuine except  for  the handwriting  and  the signature of Laxmibai.   For  a  time, people  who received them, though suspicious, took them  for what they were worth, and it appears that they did not worry very  much  about the truth. -It has now  been  successfully proved  by the prosecution and admitted -by the  appellant’s counsel  before us that these letters were all sent  by  the appellant with the sole object of keeping the people in  the dark  about the fact of death, so that the  appellant  might have  time  to  deal  with the  property  at  leisure.   The appellant  asserts  that he thought of this only  after  the death  of Laxmibai.  It seems somewhat surprising  that  the appellant   should   have  suddenly   gone   downhill   into dishonesty, so to speak, at a bound.  The maxim is very  old that  no one becomes dishonest suddenly; nema  fuit  repente turpissimus.   What inference can be drawn from his  conduct after the death of Laxmibai is a matter to be considered  by us.   And in this connection, we can only say at this  stage that if some prior conduct is connected intrinsically,  with conduct after death, then the motive of the appellant  would be very clear indeed. 480 We  now  pass  on to the evidence of what  happened  in  the hospital  and  the total medical evidence on  the  cause  of death.   This evidence has to be considered  from  different angles.  Much of it relates to the condition of Laxmibai and the treatment given to her; but other parts of it relate  to the conduct of the appellant and the information supplied by him.   There is also further evidence about the disposal  of the  body  and the enquiries made into the cause  of  death. These  must be dealt with separately.  For the  present,  we shall  confine ourselves to the pure medical aspect  of  the case of Laxmibai during her short stay in the hospital. When  Laxmibai  was  admitted in  the  hospital,  Dr.  Ugale (P.W.18),  the Casualty Medical Officer, was in charge.   He made a preliminary examination and recorded his  impressions before he sent the patient to Ward No. 12.  He obtained from the appellant the history of the attack, and it appears that all  that  the  appellant told him was  "  Patient  suddenly became  unconscious in train while coining from up  country. History  of  similar attacks frequently  before".   It  also appears that the appellant told him that the lady was liable to hysterical fits, and that was set down by Dr. Ugale as  a provisional  diagnosis.   So much of  Dr.  Ugale’s  evidence regarding the health of Laxmibai as given by the  appellant.

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Now,  we  take  up his own examination.   According  to  Dr. Ugale,  there were involuntary movements of the right  hand, which he noticed only once.  Only the right hand was moving. He  found  corneal reflex absent.  Pupils  were  normal  and reacting  to  light.  So far as central nervous  system  and respiration  were concerned, he detected  nothing  abnormal. According to him, there was no evidence of a hysterical fit, and  he  stated that he queried that  provisional  diagnosis which,  according  to him, was supplied  by  the  appellant. According to Dr. Ugale, the name of the patient was given as lndumati Paunshe. The  patient  was  then made over to the care  of  Dr.  Miss Aneeja (P.  W. 19).  Dr. Miss Aneeja was then a raw  Medical Graduate, having passed the M.B.B.S. in June, 1956.  She was working as the House Physician, 481 and was in charge of Ward No. 12.  She was summoned from her quarters to the Ward at 6-15 a.m. and she examined Laxmibai. We leave out of account again the conversation bearing  upon the   conduct  of  the  appellant,  which  we   shall   view subsequently.   He told her also about the sudden  onset  of unconsciousness,  and  that there was a history  of  similar attacks  before.  We are concerned next with the  result  of the examination by Dr. Miss Aneeja, bearing in mind that she was not a very experienced physician.  She found pulse  100, temperature 99-5, respiration 20.  The skin was found to  be smooth  and elastic nails, conjunctiva and tongue were  pink in colour lymphatic glands were not palpable; and bones  and joints had nothing abnormal in them.  The pupils of the eyes were equal but dilated, and were not then reacting to light. She  found  that  up to the abdomen and  the  sphincter  the reflexes  were absent.  The reflexes at knee and ankle  were normal, but the plantar reflex was Babinsky on one foot, and there was slight rigidity of the neck. It  appears  that Laxmibai was promptly given a  dose  of  a stimulant  and oxygen was started.  Dr. Miss.   Aneeja  also stated  that  she gave an injection of  insulin  (40  units) immediately.  Much dispute has arisen as to whether Dr. Miss Aneeja  examined  the urine for sugar, albumin  and  acetone before starting this treatment.  It is clear, however,  from her  testimony that no blood test was made to determine  the level  of  sugar in the blood.  A lumbar puncture  was  also made  by  Dr. Miss Aneeja and the cerebro-spinal  fluid  was sent  for chemical analysis.  That report is available,  and the  fluid  was normal.  According to Dr. Miss  Aneeja,  the Medical Registrar who, she says, was Dr. Saify,  recommended intravenous injection of 40 units of insulin with 20 C.C. of glucose,   which  were  administered.   According  to   her, Laxmibai was also put on glucose intragastric drip. Dr.  Miss Aneeja stated that the urine was examined  by  her three times, and in the first sample, sugar and acetone were present in quantities.  The first examination, according  to her, was at 6-30 a.m., the next at 8-30 a.m. and the last at 11 a.m. She stated that she 482 had  used  Benedict test for sugar and  Rothera’s  test  for acetone.   In all the examinations, according to her,  there was no albumin present.  Dr. Miss Aneeja also claims to have phoned to Dr. Variava, the Honorary Physician, at 6-45 or  7 a.m.,  and consulted him about the case. According  to  her, Dr. Saify, the Registrar of the Unit, visited the Ward at 8- 30  a.m.  and wrote on the case papers that  an  intravenous injection  of  40 units of insulin with 20 C.C.  of  glucose should  be  administered.   According to  her,  Dr.  Variava visited the Ward at 11 a.m., and examined Laxmibai, but  the

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patient expired at 11-30 a.m. We do not at this stage  refer to  the instructions for postmortem examination left by  Dr. Variava which were noted on the case papers, because that is a  matter with regard to the disposal of the dead body,  and we  shall deal with the evidence in that behalf  separately. The  evidence of Dr. Miss Aneeja shows only this  much  that she  was  put in charge of this case, examined  urine  three times  and finding sugar and acetone present, she started  a treatment   by  insulin  which  was  also  supplemented   by administration  of  glucose  intravenously  as  well  as  by intragastric  drip.  Apart from one dose of stimulant  given in  the  first  few  minutes,  no  other  treatment   beyond administration of oxygen was undertaken.  She had also noted the  observations of the reflexes and the condition  of  the patient as they appeared to her on examination. There is a considerable amount of contradiction between  the evidence  of Dr, Miss Aneeja and that of Dr. Variava  as  to whether  acetone  was found by Dr. Miss  Aneeja  before  Dr. Variava’s  visit.   According to the learned Judges  of  the Court  below, the first urine examination deposed to by  Dr. Miss  Aneeja  and said to have been made at  6-30  a.m.  was never  performed.  The other two examinations were made,  as the urine chart (Ex. 127) shows.  It is, however, a question whether they were confined only to sugar and albumin but did not include examination for acetone.  We shall discuss  this point after we have dealt with the evidence of Dr. Variava. 483 Dr. Variava (P.W. 21) was the Honorary Physician, and was in charge  of  this  Unit.  According to him, he  went  on  his rounds at 11 a.m., and examined Laxmibai from 11 a.m. to 11- 15  a.m.  He questioned Dr. Miss Aneeja about  the  line  of treatment  and  told  her that she could  not  have  made  a diagnosis  of  diabetic  coma without  examining  urine  for acetone.   Dr.  Variava  deposed that  the  entry  regarding acetone  on  the case papers was not made when  he  saw  the papers  at 11 a.m. He then asked Dr. Miss Aneeja to take  by catheter  a  sample  of  the urine and  to  examine  it  for acetone. Dr.  Miss  Aneeja brought the test-tube with  urine  in  it, which showed a light green colour, and Dr. Variava  inferred from it that acetone might be present in traces.   According to  Dr.  Variava, Laxmibai’s case was not  one  of  diabetic coma,  and he gave two reasons for this  diagnosis,  namely, that  diabetic coma never comes on suddenly, and that  there are  no convulsions in it, as were described by  Dr.  Ugale. Dr. Variava also denied that the phone call to him was  made by Dr. Miss Aneeja.  Dr. Variava stated that before he  left the  Ward he told Dr. Miss Aneeja that he was not  satisfied that the woman had died of diabetic coma and instructed  her that postmortem examination should be asked for. In connection with the evidence about the examination of the urine,  we have to see also the evidence of  Marina  Laurie, nurse  (P.W.  59), who stated how the entries in  the  urine chart came to be made.  It may be pointed out that the urine chart  showed only two examinations for sugar, at 8-30  a.m. and  11  am., and not the one at 6-30 a.m. The  entry  about that was made on the case papers under the head "  treatment " by Dr. Miss Aneeja, and it is the last entry I acetone + + ’ which Dr. Variava stated was not on the papers at the time he  saw  them.  Indeed, Dr. Variava would not  have  roundly questioned  Dr.  Miss  Aneeja  about  the  examination   for acetone,  if this entry had been there, and Dr. Miss  Aneeja admits  a portion of Dr. Variava’s statement when  she  says that  she examined the urine on Dr.  Variava’s  instructions and

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484 brought  the test-tube to him, in which the urine was  of  a light green colour. Now,  the  urine chart does not show an examination  of  the urine  at  6-30  a.m.  According to  Dr.  Miss  Aneeja,  she examined the urine, carried the impression of colour in  her mind,  and  noted the result on the case  papers.   She  was questioned  why she adopted the unusual course,  but  stated that it often happened that the urine chart was not prepared and the result was not taken to the case papers.  However it be,  Dr.  Variava  is quite positive that  the  entry  about acetone did not exist on the case papers, and an examination of the original shows differences in ink and pen which would not have been there, bad all the three items been written at the  same time.  It also appears that even at 8-30 a.m.  the urine  was examined for sugar only because the entry in  the urine  chart shows brick-red colour which is  the  resulting colour   in  Benedict  test  and  not  in  Rothera’s   test. Similarly, at II a.m. the urine chart shows only a test  for sugar  because the light green colour is not  the  resulting colour  of  Rothera’s test but also of  the  Benedict  test. Indeed,  Dr. Variava was also shown a  test-tube  containing the  urine of slight greenish colour, and his own  inference was that acetone might be present in traces.  There is  thus nothing  to  show  that  Dr. Miss  Aneeja  embarked  upon  a treatment for diabetic coma after ascertaining the existence of  acetone.   All  the circumstances  point  to  the  other conclusion,  namely, that she did not examine the urine  for acetone’ and that seems to be the cause of the questions put by Dr. Variava to her.  We have no hesitation, therefore, in accepting  Dr. Variava’s evidence on this part of the  case, which is supported by the evidence of the course, the  urine chart  and the interpolation in the case papers.  From  all  that we have said, it is quite  clear  that  the treatment  given  to  her for diabetic  coma  was  based  on insufficient  data.   There was also no  Kussmaul  breathing (Root & White, Diabetes Mellitus, p. 118); her breathing was 20  per minute which was normal.  Nor was there any sign  of dehydration, 485 because  the skin was smooth and elastic, and  the  Babinsky sign  was  a contra indication of diabetic  coma.   This  is borne  out  by  the diagnosis of Dr.  Variava  himself,  who appears positive that Laxmibai did not suffer from  diabetic coma,  and is further fortified by the reasons given by  Dr. H. Mehta (P.W. 65), to whose evidence we shall have occasion to refer later. Two  other  doctors  from  the  hospital  were  examined  in connection  with Laxmibai’s stay.  The first was Dr.  J.  C. Patel, who was then the Medical Registrar of Unit No. 1.  It seems  that Dr. Saify, the permanent Medical Registrar,  was on  leave  due to the illness of his father, and Dr.  J.  C. Patel  was  looking after his Unit.  Dr. J.  C.  Patel  went round with Dr. Variava at 11 a.m., and in his presence,  Dr. Variava examined Laxmibai.  He has no contribution to  make, because  he  says he does not remember anything.   The  only piece of evidence which he has given and which is useful for our enquiry is that in the phone book (Ex. 323) in which all calls are entered, no call to Dr. Variava on the morning  of the 13th was shown.  The evidence of Dr. J. C. Patel is thus useless,  except in this little respect.  The other  doctor, Dr.  Hiralal Shah (P.  W. 72) was the Registrar of Unit  No. 2. After Laxmibai entered the hospital, Dr. Miss Aneeja sent a  call to him, and he signed the call book (Ex. 322).   Dr. Hiralal  Shah pretended that he did not remember  the  case.

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He  stated that if he was called, he must have  gone  there, and  examined the patient; but he stated in the  witness-box that  he did not remember anything.  All the three  doctors, Dr.  Miss  Aneeja, Dr. Patel and Dr.  Hiralal  Shah,  denied having made the entry " Insulin 40 units 1. V. with 20 C. C. glucose."  Dr. Miss Aneeja says that it was written  by  Dr. Saify,  who, as we shall show presently, was not present  in Bombay at all on that day. We  do  not  propose to deal with the cause  of  the  death, before adverting to the findings of Dr. Jhala (P.W. 66), who performed  the  autopsy and Dr. H. S. Mehta (P. W.  65),  to whom  all the case papers of Laxmibai were handed  over  for expert   opinion.   Dr.  Jhala  performed   the   postmortem operation on November 23, 62 486 and  he was helped by his assistants.  Though the  body  was well-preserved  and  had been kept  in  the  air-conditioned morgue,  there  is  no denying the fact that  10   days  had passed  between  the death and the  postmortem  examination. The findings of Dr. Jhala were that the body and the viscera were  not decomposed, and that an examination of  the  vital organs could be made.  Dr. Jhala found in the stomach 4  oz. of  a  pasty  meal and,’ oz.of whitish  precipitate  in  the bladder.  He did not find any other substance which could be said  to have been introduced into the system.  He  examined the  brain and found it congested.  There were no  marks  of injury on the body; the lungs were also congested and in the upper  lobe  of the left lung there was a  tubercular  focus which,  in  his opinion, was not sufficient to  cause  death ordinarily.   He  also found Atheroma of  aorta  and  slight sclerosis  of the coronary.  He stated that the presence  of the  last  meal in the stomach indicated that there  was  no vomitting.  He found no pathological lesion in the pancreas, the  kidney,  the  liver  and  any  other  internal   organ. He  gave  the  opinion after the  receipt  of  the  Chemical Analyser’s  report  that death could have  occurred  due  to diabetic coma. It must be remembered that Dr. Jhala was not out to discover whether  any  offence had been committed.  He was  making  a postmortem examination of a body which, under the  Coroner’s order, had been handed over to the medical authorities  with a certificate from a hospital that death was due to diabetic coma.   It  was not then a medico-legal case; the  need  for postmortem had arisen, because the peon had noticed  certain marks  on the neck, which had caused some suspicion.   After discovering  that  the  mark on the neck  was  a  postmortem injury,  all  that he had to do was to  verify  whether  the diagnosis  made by the G.T. Hospital that death was  due  to diabetic  coma was admissible.  He examined the body,  found no  other  cause  of death, and the  Chemical  Analyser  not having  reported the administration of poison,  he  accepted the diagnosis of the G. T. Hospital as correct.  Dr.  Jhala, however, stated that there were numerous poisons which could 487 not  be  detected on chemical analysis even in the  case  of normal, healthy and undecomposed viscera.  He admitted  that his  opinion that death could have occurred due to  diabetic coma  was  an  inaccurate way  of  expressing  his  opinion. According  to  him, the proper way would have been  to  have given the opinion death by diabetes with complications." As we have said, all these papers were placed before Dr.  H. S.  Mehta for his expert opinion.  It is to his evidence  we now  turn  to  find  out what was  the  cause  of  death  of Laxmibai.   In  the  middle of March  1958,  Dr.  Mehta  was

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consulted about this case, and he was handed over copies  of all the documents we have referred to in connection with the medical  evidence,  together  with the  proceedings  of  the Coroner’s  inquest  at  Bombay.   According  to  Dr.  Mehta, opinion  was  sought from him about the cause  of  death  of ’Indumati  Paunshe’ and whether it was from  diabetic  coma, any  other disease or the administration of a  poison.   Dr. Mehta was categorical that it was not due to diabetic  coma. He  was  also of the opinion that no natural cause  for  the death was disclosed by the autopsy, and according to him, it was   probably   due   to   the   administration   of   some unrecognisable poison or a recognisable poison which, due to the  lapse  of  time, was incapable  of  being  detected  by analysis.   He  gave  several  reasons  for  coming  to  the conclusion that Laxmibai did not suffer from diabetic  coma. Each of his reasons is supported by citations from  numerous standard  medical  authorities  on the subject,  but  it  is unnecessary to cite them once again.  According to him,  the following reasons existed for holding that Laxmibai did  not suffer from diabetic coma: (1)  Convulsion  never  occur  in  diabetic  coma  per   se. According to Dr. Mehta, the involuntary movements  described by Dr. Ugale must be treated as convulsions or tremors.   We are of opinion that Dr. Ugale would not have made this  note on  the  case  papers if he had  not  seen  the  involuntary movements.  No doubt, these involuntary movements had ceased by the time the patient was carried to Ward No. 12,  because Dr. Miss Aneeja made a note that they were not observed in 488 the Ward.  But Dr. Ugale was a much more experienced  doctor than Dr. Miss Aneeja, and it, is possible    that  Dr.  Miss Aneeja  did  not  notice the symptoms  as  minutely  as  the Casualty Medical Officer.      (2)  Diabetic  coma never occurs all of  a  sudden  and without a warning.  There are premonitary signs and symptons of  prodromata.  In the case, there is no evidence  to  show how  Laxmibai  became  unconscious. We  have,  however,  the statement  of the appellant made both to Dr. Ugale  and  Dr. Miss Aneeja that the onset was sudden.  Dr. Mehta was cross- examined  with  a view to eliciting that a sudden  onset  of diabetic coma was possible if there was an infection of  any kind.   A  suggestion  was put to him that  if  the  patient suffered   from  Otitis  Media,  then  sometimes   the   un- conciousness  came on suddenly.  It may be pointed out  that the  appellant in his examination stated that on the day  in question,  Laxmibai  had  a  temperature  of  100   degrees, laryngitis, pharyngitis, and complained of pain in the  ear. That  statement was made to bring his defence in  line  with this  suggestion.  Dr. Mehta pointed out that Dr. Jhala  had opened  the skull and had examined the interior  organs  but found no pathological lesion there.  According to Dr. Mehta, Dr.  Jhala  would  have detected pus in the  middle  ear  if Otitis  Media  had  existed.   The  fact  that  no  question suggesting this was put to Dr. Jhala shows that the  defence is  an afterthought to induce the Court to hold  that  death was  due  to diabetic coma, or, in other words,  to  natural causes.  We are inclined to accept the evidence of Dr. Jhala that he and his assistants did not discover any pathological lesion  in the head or the brain.  Otitis Media  would  have caused  inflammation of the Eustachian tube, and  pus  would have  been  present.  No such question having been  put,  we must  hold that there was no septic focus which  might  have induced  the  sudden onset of diabetic coma.   It  was  also suggested to Dr. Mehta that there was a tubercular infection and  sometimes in the case of tubercular infection  diabetic

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coma suddenly supervened.  The tuberculosis in this case was not  of  such severity as to have caused  this.   Dr.  Jhala referred 489 to  the  septic focus in the apex of the left lung,  but  he stated that it was riot sufficient to have caused the  death of Laxmibai.  Illustrative cases of sudden diabetic coma  as a  result  of tubercular infection were not shown,  and  the condition  of Laxmibai, as deposed to by witnesses right  up to  9  p.m.  on the night of November  12,  1956,  does  not warrant-  the inference that she had diabetic coma  suddenly as a result of this infection. (3)  Dr.  Mehta also stated from the case papers  maintained by  the  appellant from February 15, 1956, to  November  12, 1956, that during that time, Laxmibai did not appear to have suffered from any severe type of acidosis.  The appellant in his  examination in Court stated that Laxmibai was prone  to suffer  from  acidosis, and that he had treated her  by  the administration  of Soda Bi-carb.  In the case  papers,  Soda Bicarb  has  been administered only in about 8 to  10  doses varying between 15 grains to a dram.  It is significant that on  most  of  the occasions it was  part  of  a  Carminative mixture.   The  acidosis,  if any, could not  have  been  so severe   as  to  have  been  corrected  by  such   a   small administration  of  Soda Bi-carb, because  the  acidosis  of diabetes is not the acidity of the stomach but the formation of  fatty  acids in the system.  Such a  condition,  as  the books show, may be treated by the administration of Soda Bi- carb  but  in  addition to some  other  specific  treatment. (Joslin,  Root & White, Treatment of Diabetes  Mellitus,  p. 397). (4)  A  patient  in diabetic coma  is  severely  dehydrated. (Root  & White-Diabetes Mellitus p. 118).  We  have  already pointed out that there was no dehydration, because the  skin was soft and elastic and the tongue was pink.  The eye balls were  also  normal and were not soft, as is  invariably  the case in diabetic coma.  Dr. Mehta has referred to all  these points. (5)  Nausea and vomiting are always present in true diabetic coma.   There is nothing to show either from her clothes  or from  the  smell  of vomit in the mouth or  from  any  other evidence that Laxmibai had vomitted in the train. Dr.  Jhala who performed the 490 postmortem  examination had stated that Laxmibai  could  not have vomitted because in her stomach 4 oz. of pasty meal was found.  The same fact is also emphasised by Dr. Mehta. (6)  In diabetic coma, there will befall of blood  pressure, rapid   pulse;   there  will  be   Kussmaul   breathing   or air  hunger.  The respiration of Laxmibai was found  by  Dr. Ugale  and  Dr. Miss Aneeja to be normal.   The  temperature chart  in the case, Ex. 129, gives in parallel  columns  the respiration  corresponding to a particular temperature,  and the  temperature of 99.5 degrees (Fahrenheit) found  by  Dr. Miss  Aneeja  corresponds  to respiration at  20  times  per minute.  Dr. Variava, Dr. Ugale or Dr. Miss Aneeja also  did not say anything about the Kussmaul breathing, and the pulse of  100 per minute according to Dr. Mehta was  justified  by the temperature which Laxmibai then had.  Indeed,  according to  Dr. Mehta, in diabetic coma the skin is cold, and  there was no reason why there should be temperature.  According to Dr. Mehta, there was no evidence of any gastric disturbance, because the condition of the tongue was healthy.  Dr.  Mehta also  pointed  out  that the  Extensor  reflex  called  the, Babinsky  sign  was  not present  in  diabetic  coma,  while

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according  to Dr. Miss Aneeja it was present in  this  case. Dr. Mehta then referred to the examination of the urine  for sugar and acetone, and stated that the examination for sugar was  insufficient  to determine the presence  of  Ketonuria, which  is  another name for the acidosis  which  results  in coma.   We  have  already found that  the  examination   for acetone  was  not made and there was no mention  of  acetone breath  either  by Dr. Ugale or by Dr.  Miss  Aneeja,  which would  have  been present if the acidosis was  so  advanced. (Root & WhiteDiabetes Mellitus, p. 118). (8)  Lastly, the examination of cerebro-spinal fluid did not show  any  increase  of  sugar  and  no  affection  in   the categories  of  meningial irritation was  disclosed  by  the chemical analysis of the fluid. (Physician’s Hand. book, 4th Edn., pp. 115-120).  The neck rigidity which was noticed  by Dr. Miss Aneeja did not have, therefore, 491 any  connection with such irritation, and it is  a  question whether such a slight neck rigidity existed at all. These  reasons of Dr. Mehta are prefectly valid.  They  have the support of a large number of medical treatises to  which he has referred and of even more. which were referred to  us during  the arguments, all which we find it  unnecessary  to quote.   We accept Dr. Mehta’s testimony that diabetic  coma did not cause the death of Laxmibai.  It is significant that the  case  of  the appellant also has changed,  and  he  has ceased  to insist now that Laxmibai died of  diabetic  coma. The  treatment  which was given to Laxmibai would  have,  if diabetic  coma had existed, at least improved her  condition during  the 5 hours that she was at the hospital.  Far  from showing  the slightest improvement, Laxmibai died  within  5 hours -of her admission in the hospital, and in view of  the contra  indications catalogued by Dr. Mehta and accepted  by us  on  an examination of the medical  authorities,  we  are firmly of opinion that death was not due diabetic coma. We  now deal with events that took place  immediately  after Laxmibai  expired.  We have already shown that at that  time Dr. Variava was present and was questioning Dr. Miss  Aneeja about  her diagnosis of diabetic coma.  Before  Dr.  Variava left  the  Ward,  he told Dr. Miss Aneeja that  he  was  not satisfied about the diagnosis, and that a postmortem examin- ation  should be asked for.  This endorsement was, in  fact, made  by Dr. Miss Aneeja on the case papers, and  the  final diagnosis  was left blank.  Dr. Miss Aneejia says  that  she left  the  Ward at about 11-30 a.m. and was  absent  on  her rounds  for an hour, then she returned to the Ward from  her quarters  at  about 1 p.m. and went to the  office  of  Dr.’ Mouskar,  the Resident Medical Officer.  According  to  her, she  met Dr. Saify, the Registrar, at the door, and  he  had the  case papers in his hands.  Dr. Saify told her that  the Resident Medical Officer thought that there was no need  for a postmortem examination, as the patient was treated in  the hospital  for  diabetic coma.  Dr. Saify  ordered  Dr.  Miss Aneeja to cancel the endorserment about 492 postmortem and to write diabetic coma as the cause of death, which  she did, in Dr. Saify’s presence.  This is  Dr.  Miss Aneeja’s explanation why the postmortem was not made, though ordered by Dr. Variava. Dr. Mouskar’s version is quite different.  According to him, the case papers arrived in his office at 1 p.m.  He had seen the  endorsement about the postmortem and the fact that  the final  diagnosis  had not been entered  in  the  appropriate column.   Dr.  Mouskar admitted that he did not  proceed  to make arrangements for the postmortem examination.  According

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to him, the permission of the relatives and the Coroner  was necessary.   He also admitted that he did not  enquire  from the  Honorary  Physician  about  the  need  for   postmortem examination.   He was thinking, he said, of  consulting  the relatives  and  the person who had brought Laxmibai  to  the hospital.   Dr.  Mouskar sent a telegram at 2  p.m.  to  the appellant, which we have quoted earlier.  He explained  that he  did not mention the postmortem examination,  because  he was  waiting for the arrival of some person  connected  with Laxmibai.   He further stated that between 4 and 5  p.m.  he asked  the police to remove the body to the J.  J.  Hospital morgue  and  to  preserve  it,  and  sent  a  copy  of   his requisition  to the Coroner.  According to him, on the  15th the  Coroner’s  office  asked the  hospital  for  the  final diagnosis  in the case.  He stated that he asked one out  of the  three: Honorary Physician, the Registrar or  the  House Pbysician,-about  the final diagnosis, though he  could  not say which one.  He had sent the papers through the  call-boy for  writing the final diagnosis, and he received  the  case papers from the Unit, with the two corrections, namely,  the cancellation  of the requisition for postmortem  examination and  the entry of diabetic coma as the final diagnosis.   He denied  that  he had any talk with Dr. Saify  regarding  the postmortem examination. It,would  appear from this that there are vital  differences in  the  versions of Dr. Miss Aneeja and Dr.  Mouskar..  The first  contradiction  is the date on which the  case  papers were   corrected   and  the  second,   about   Dr.   SaifY’s intervention in the matter.  Dr. SaifY, 493 fortunately for him, had obtained leave orders and had  left Bombay on November 8, 1956, for Indore, where his father was seriously ill.  He was, in fact, detained at Indore, because his  father suffered from an attack of coronary  thrombosis, and  he  had to extend his leave.  All the  relevant  papers connected  with his leave have been produced, and  it  seems that  Dr.  Saify’s name was introduced by  Dr.  Miss  Aneeja either to avoid taking responsibility for correction, on her own, of the papers, or to shield some other person, who  had caused  her to make the corrections.  Here, the  only  other person, who could possibly have ordered her was the Resident Medical Officer, Dr. Mouskar, who at 1 p.m. had received the papers  and  had seen the endorsement about  the  postmortem examination.   Dr.  Mouskar’s explanation that he  sent  the telegram  to  the  appellant for the  removal  of  the  body without  informing him about the postmortem  examination  is too ingenious to be accepted by any reasonable person.   Dr. Mouskar  could not ordinarily countermand what the  Honorary Physician had said without at least consulting him, which he admits  he  did not do.  This is more so, if it was  only  a matter   of   the  hospital’s   reputation.    Whether   the corrections  were made by Dr. Miss Aneeja in the wards  when the  call-boy took the papers to her (a most  unusal  course for  Dr. Mouskar to have adopted) or whether they were  made by Dr. Miss Aneeja in the office of Dr. Mouskar, to the door of which, she admits she had gone, the position remains  the same.  Dr. Miss Aneeja no doubt told lies, but she did so in her  own  interest.  She could not  cancel  the  requisition about  postmortem  examination on her own without  facing  a grave  charge  in  which Dr. Mouskar  would  have  played  a considerable  part.  The fact that this correction  did  not trouble Dr. Mouskar and that his dealings with the body were most  unusual  points  clearly  to its  being  made  at  his instance.   Dr.  Miss Aneeja invented the  story  about  Dr. Saify  as  a  last  resort knowing  that  unless  she  named

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somebody the responsibility would be hers.  The  corrections were  made  at  the instance of  Dr.  Mouskar,  because  Dr. Mouskar admits that he sent the papers to the 63 494      Ward for final diagnosis in the face of the endorsement for  postmortem  examination,  and Dr.  Miss  Aneeja  admits making the corrections at the door of Dr. Mouskar’s  office. In  our  opinion,  both of them  are  partly  correct.   Dr. Mouskar made the first move in getting the papers corrected, and  Dr. Miss Aneeja corrected them not at the door  of  the office,  because  there was no Dr. Saify there  but  in  the office,  though she had not the courage to name Dr.  Mouskar as the person who had ordered the correction.  Dr. Mouskar’s telegram and his sending the body to another morgue  without the postmortem examination show only too clearly that it was he who caused the change to be made.  It is also a  question whether the correction about ’acetone + + ’was not also made simultaneously.  We do not believe that the corrections were made  as late as November 15, because his telegram  for  the removal  of the dead body and its further removal to the  J. J.  Hospital  would  not fit in  with  the  endorsement  for postmortem examination on the case papers. Now,  the  question  is not whether  Dr.  Mouskar  made  the correction or Dr. Miss Aneeja, but whether the appellant had anything  to  do with it.  Dr. Miss Aneeja stated  that  the appellant was present till the visit of Dr. Variava was over and this is borne out by the reply of the appellant, because in  the  inland letter he mentioned the time  of  the  death which the telegram did not convey to him and which he  could have  only  known  if he was present in  the  hospital.   We believe Dr. Miss Aneeja when she says that the appellant was present  at the hospital, and the circumstances of the  case unerringly  point  to  the conclusion that he  knew  of  the demand for a postmortem examination.  Though Dr. Mouskar and the  appellant  denied  that they met, there  is  reason  to believe  that  the  appellant  knowing  of  the   postmortem examination  would  not  go away  without  seeing  that  the postmortem examination was duly carried out or was given up. Dr.  Mouskar and the appellant both admitted that they  were together  in  the same class in 1934 in the  S  P.  College, Poona, though both of them denied that 495 they were acquainted with each other.  Dr. Mouskar stayed in Poona from 1922 to 1926, 1931 to 1936 and 1948 to 1951.  The appellant  was  practising at Poona as a doctor, and  it  is improbable  that  they  did not get  acquainted  during  Dr. Mouskar’s   stay,  belonging,  as  they  do,  to  the   same profession.   Dr.  Mouskar  further  tried  to  support  the appellant  by  saying that at 1 p.m. when he  saw  the  case papers  the entry about acetone was read by him.  He  forgot that   in  the  examinationin-chief  he  had   stated   very definitely  that he had not read the case papers  fully  and had  only  seen  the top page.  When he was  asked  for  his explanation,  he  could not account for his conduct  in  the witness-box, and admitted his mistake.  There are two  other circumstances  connected  with  Dr.  Mouskar,  which  excite considerable  suspicion.   The first is  that  he  mentioned hysterical fits as the illness from which Laxmibai  suffered when  Dr.  Ugale had questioned it and postmortem  had  been asked for to establish the cause of death.  The next is that the  call  book  of  the hospital for  the  period  was  not produced  by  him  as long as he was  in  office.   When  he retired, the call book was brought in by his successor,  and it  established the very important fact that it was not  Dr.

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Saify, the Registrar, who was summoned but Dr. Shah, who had also  signed the call book in token of having  received  the call.  Dr. Mouskar’s conduct as the Resident Medical Officer in  having the postmortem examination cancelled was a  great lapse, and it is quite obvious to us that the finding by the two  Courts below that this was done at the request  of  the appellant  is the only inference possible in the case.   The alternative  suggestion in the argument of  the  appellant’s counsel that Dr. Mouskar thought that Dr. Variava was making " a mountain out of a mole hill " and that " the  reputation of  the  hospital  was involved " does  not  appeal  to  us, because if that had been the motive, Dr. Mouskar would  have talked  to  Dr.  Variava and asked him  to  revise  his  own opinion.  The cancellation of the requisition for postmortem examination  came to Dr. Variava as a surprise,  because  he stated that he had heard nothing about it. 496 From  the  above  analysis of the evidence,  we  accept  the following  facts: The appellant was present in the  hospital till the death of Laxmibai, and in his presence, Dr. Variava examined Laxmibai and questioned the    diagnosis   of   Dr. Miss  Aneeja  and gave the instructions for  the  postmortem examination.   Dr. Variava’s stay was only for  15  minutes, and  at the end of it, Laxmibai expired.  The  statement  of the appellant that he caught the 10-30 train from Bombay  to Poona because he was asked by the Matron to leave the female ward,  and that he was going back to get a female  attendant from  Poona, is entirely false.  He took no action  about  a female attendant either in Bombay or in Poona, and he  could not  have left by the 10-30 train if he was present  in  the hospital till 11-30 a.m. We are also satisfied that Dr. Miss Aneeja  did not cancel the endorsement about the  postmortem examination  on her own responsibility.  She was ordered  to do so.  We are also satisfied that it was not Dr. Saify  who had given this order, but it must have been Dr. Mouskar, who did  so.   We are also satisfied that Dr.  Mouskar  did  not induce  Dr. Miss Aneeja to cancel the postmortem by  sending the  case papers through the call-boy of her Ward,  but  she was summoned to the office, to the door of which she  admits she had gone.  We are, therefore, in agreement with the  two Courts  below  that Dr. Mouskar caused these changes  to  be made,  and that Dr. Miss Aneeja did not have the courage  to name  the Resident Medical Officer, and lied by  introducing the  name  of  Dr. Saify.  We are also  satisfied  that  Dr. Mouskar  and the appellant were acquainted with  each  other not  only when they were in College together but  they  must have  known  each other, when Dr. Mouskar  was  residing  at Poona.   The cancellation of the postmortem examination  was caused  by the appellant, because Dr. Mouskar’s  explanation on  this part of the case is extremely  unsatisfactory,  and his  failure  to  consult  Dr. Variava, if  it  was  only  a hospital matter, is extremely significant.  The  appellant’s immediate exit from the hospital and the telegram to him  at Poona show that Dr. Mouskar knew where the appellant was  to be 497 found.   The  telegram conveyed to the  appellant  that  the postmortem was not to be held, because it said that the body should be immediately removed. Now,  the appellant, as we have said, took no  action  about Laxmibai’s  death and kept this information to himself.   He did  not also arrange for the removal of the body.  He  sent an  inland letter which, he knew would take a day or two  to reach  the hospital.  He knew that the body would  be  lying unclaimed  at the hospital, and that the hospital could  not

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hold  the  body for ever without taking  some  action.   The appellant   is  a  doctor.   He  has  studied   in   medical institutions   where  bodies  are  brought  for   dissection purposes, and he must be aware that there is an Anatomy Act, under  which  unclaimed bodies are handed over  to  Colleges after 48 hours for dissection.  He also knew that the  cause of  death would become more and more difficult to  determine as time passed on, and it is quite clear that the  appellant was banking on these two circumstances for the avoidance  of any detection into the cause of death.  He had also seen  to it that the postmortem examination would not be made, and he knew  that if the body remained unclaimed, then it would  be disposed of in accordance with the Anatomy Act.  He wrote  a letter  which he knew would reach the hospital  authorities, and  he named a fictitious brother who, he said,  could  not arrive before the 16th from Calcutta.  This delay would have gained  him  three valuable days between the death  and  any likely examination, and if the body remained unclaimed, then it  was likely to be disposed of in the manner laid down  in the Anatomy Act.  The anticipations of the appellant were so accurate  that the body followed the identical course  which he  had planned for it, and it is an accident that ten  days later   a  postmortem  examination  was  made,  because   an observant  peon  noticed  some mark on  the  neck  which  he thought,  was suspicious.  But for this, it would have  been impossible  to trace what happened to Laxmibai, because  the hospital papers would have been filed, the body dissected by medical  students  and  disposed of and  the  relatives  and friends  kept in the dark about the whereabouts of  Laxmibai by spurious letters. 498 This brings us to another piece of conduct which we have  to view.   When Laxmibai boarded the train, she had  a  bedding and  a bag with her, which she was seen carrying at the  Par by Patil (P.  W. 60) on the night she left Poona.  There  is a   mass   of  evidence  that  Laxmibai  was   in   affluent circumstances, and always wore on her person gold and  pearl ornaments.  There is also evidence that she had taken Rs. 50 from -Virkar the night she travelled, and presumbly she  was carrying  some  more  money with her,  because  she  had  to consult  a specialist in Bombay and money would be  required to pay him.  When she reached the hospital in the company of the appellant, she had no ornaments on her person, no  money in  her  possession  and  her  bag  and  bedding  had   also disappeared.   As  a matter of fact, there  was  nothing  to identify  her or to distinguish her from any other  indigent woman  in  the street.  There is no  explanation  which  any reasonable  person  can accept as to what  happened  to  her belongings.   It  is possible that the bag and  the  bedding might  have been forgotten in the hurry to take her  to  the hospital, but her gold ornaments on her person could not  so disappear.   The  appellant stated that he noticed  for  the first  time  in the taxi that she had no  ornaments  on  her person;  but there would be no need for him to  notice  this fact if Laxmibai started without any ornaments whatever.  In view of the fact that Laxmibai’s entire property soon passed into  the hands of the appellant, it is reasonable  to  hold that  he  would  not overlook the valuable  gold  and  pearl ornaments  in  this context.  Further, the  absence  of  the ornaments and other things to identify Laxmibai rendered her anonymity complete, in so far as the hospital was concerned, unless  information  to  that  end  was  furnished  by   the appellant  only.   In the event of Laxmibai’s death  in  the hospital, no complication would arise if she did not possess any property and the body would be treated as unclaimed,  if

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none appeared to claim it.  In addition to the stripping of the lady of her belongings, the appellant took measures to keep her 499 identity  a close secret.  No doubt, he gave her name  as  " Indumati  ",  but  he added to it her maiden  surname  in  a garbled form.  According to Dr. Ugale, the name given was  " Paunshe  ".  - In every one of the other  papers,  the  name appears  to  have  been corrected by the  addition  of  some letter  resembling  Ilk " but not in the case  papers.   Dr. Ugale  swore  that  he had not heard the name  "  Paunshe  " before,  though  his  mother-tongue is Marathi,  and  he  is himself a Maharashtrian.  He, therefore, asked the appellant to  spell the name, and he was definite that -the  name  was written as spelt by the appellant.  There is, however, other evidence  coming from the appellant himself to show that  he did  not  give  the correct  maiden  surname  of  -Laxmibai, because  in  the  letter he wrote to the  hospital  he  only stated that there was an extra " u " in the name as  entered in the papers but did not mention anything about " k ".  His solicitude  about  the  name and its spelling  in  the  case papers clearly shows that his mind even under the stress  of these  circumstances  was upon one fact only that  the  name should  remain  either  " Paunshe " or " Panshe  "  and  not become  " Ponkshe ". Indeed, one would expect the  appellant to  have  given the name " Laxmibai Karve "  or  "  Indumati Karve  " instead of " Indumati Ponkshe ", and much  less,  " Indumati  Paunshe  ".  There must be  some  reason  for  the appellant  choosing the maiden surname, even if he gave  the correct maiden name.  The reason appears to be this:  Either he had to say at the hospital that he did not know the name, or  he  had to give some name.  If he said that he  did  not know the name, it would have caused some suspicion, and  the matter would then have been entered in the emergency  police case  register.   This is deposed to by the doctors  in  the hospital.  By giving the name, he avoided this  contingency. By  giving  a garbled name, he avoided the identity,  if  by chance  that  name came to the notice of some one  who  knew Laxmibai.   His  intention can only be  interpreted  in  the light of his subsequent conduct and the use to which be  put this  altered  name.  We have already seen that he  did  the fact of death from every 500 one and wrote to people that the woman was alive. He had two opportunities of correcting this name  which he had  noticed very  carefully on the case papers.  The first was  when  he wrote the letter to the hospital in which he insisted that " u  " should be omitted but did not add " k ". The other  was when  on  the 16th the police questioned him and  he  stated that  he did not know who the woman was.  He also  gave  the age  of the woman wrongly, and perhaps,  deliberately  :-see the  correction  and overwritings in the  inland  letter  he wrote  on November 14, 1956. Immediately after the death  of Laxmibai,   he  misappropriated  a  sum  of  Rs.  5,000   by presenting   two  documents,  Exs.  285  and  286,   without disclosing  to the Bank that the person who had  issued  the cheque  was no more.  All this subsequent conduct gets  tied to his conduct in giving the name as " Indumati Paunshe " or "  Panshe  "; and it shows a foreknowledge of  what  was  to happen  to  Indumati  at  the hospital.   It  also  shows  a preparation  for keeping the fact of her death  hidden  from others  to facilitate the misappropriation of her  property, which  as  we  know, eventually  took  place  starting  from November  15, that is to say, two days following her  death. No  explanation worth considering exists why this  name  was

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given, and the effort of the counsel for the appellant  that he was probably on intimate terms with Laxmibai and chose to call her by her maiden name rather than her married name  is belied by the fact that in every document in which the  name has been mentioned by the appellant, he has adderssed her as Laxmibai  Karve  and not as Indumati Ponkshe.  There  is  no evidence  that  this elderly lady was anything more  than  a foolishly trusting friend of this man who took advantage  of her in every way. Then,  there  is  the  conduct  of  the  appellant  in   not disclosing  to  the  hospital authorities  the  entire  case history  of  Laxmibai and the treatment which  he  had  been giving her as her medical attendant.  Instead of telling the doctor all the circumstances of her health, he told him that the  woman was suffering from hysterical fits,  which  fits, according to the 501 evidence in the case, did not recur after 1948.  He also did not give any particulars of the onset of unconsciousness  in the  train.  Even the fact that Laxmibai had  suffered  from diabetes  for some years was not mentioned, and  this  shows that  he  was  intent upon the  medical  attendants  in  the hospital  treating the case from a scratch and fumbling  it, if  possible.  To him, it appears to us, it was a matter  of utter  indifference  what  treatment was given  to  her,  an attitude  which  he  continued to  observe  even  after  his patient had died.  In our opinion, therefore, the conduct at the hospital appears significantly enough to suggest that he anticipated that Laxmibai was doomed, and he was intent upon seeing  to  it that no one but himself should  know  of  her death  and  that a quiet disposal of her  body  should  take place. We  may  mention here one other fact, and that is  that  the G.T. Hospital, is situatted at a distance of 5 or 6 furlongs from the Victoria Terminus Station, whereas the St. George’s Hospital  is  said to be only 50 feet away  from   the  main entrance.   Why an unconscious woman was carried first on  a stretcher  and then in a taxi to this distant hospital  when she could have been carried straight to the hospital on  the stretcher  itself,  is not explained.  There is  of  course, this  significant fact that at the St. George’s Hospital  he would not have been able to pull his weight with the medical authorities,  which  he  was able to  do  with  Dr.  Mouskar because of his acquaintance with him.  This choosing of  the hospital is of a piece with the choosing of an  inconvenient train  which would make detection difficult, arrival at  the hospital when it would be closed except for emergency cases, and  the  patient  likely to be waited upon  by  a  raw  and inexperienced doctor in the early hours of the morning.  We, however, cannot say this too strongly, because it is  likely that Laxmibai herself chose to travel by a night train.  But the whole of the conduct of the appellant prior to the death of Laxmibai appears to be of a piece with his conduct  after her  death, and we are satisfied that even before her  entry into  the hospital, the appellant had planned this  line  of conduct. 64      502 Our  findings thus substantially accord on all the  relevant facts  with  those  of  the two  Courts  below,  though  the arrangement  and consideration of the relevant  evidence  on record  is  somewhat  different.  It  is  now  necessary  to consider the arguments which have been advanced on behalf of the  appellant.  The first contention is that the  essential ingredients required to be proved in all cases of murder  by

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poisoning were not proved by the prosecution in this case. Reference  in this connection. is made to a decision of  the Allahabad High Court in Mst.  Gujrani v. Emperor (1) and two unreported decisions of this Court in Chandrakant  Nyalchand Seth  v.  The, State of Bombay(2) decided  on  February  19, 1958, and Dharambir Singh v. The State of Punjab (3) decided on November 4, 1958.  In these cases, the Court referred  to three propositions which the prosecution must establish in a case  of poisoning: (a) that death took place by  poisoning; (b) that the accused had the poison in his possession ;  and (c)  that the accused had an opportunity to  administer  the poison to the deceased.  The case in Dharambir Singh V.  The State  of Punjab (3) turned upon these  three  propositions. There,  the  deceased had died as a result of  poisoning  by potassium  cyanide,  which  poison was  also  found  in  the autopsy.  The High Court had disbelieved the evidence  which sought to establish that the accused had obtained  potassium cyanide,  but  held, nevertheless, that  the  circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the accused in that case. This  Court  did  not, however,  accept  the  circumstantial evidence  as complete.  It is to be observed that the  three propositions  were laid down not as the invariable  criteria of  proof  by  direct  evidence  in  a  case  of  murder  by poisoning,  because evidently if  after  poisonidgthevictim, the  accused  destroyed all traces of the  body,  the  first proposition  would  be incapable of being proved  except  by circumstantial  evidence.  Similarly, if the accused gave  a victim something: to eat and the victim died immediately  on the ingestion of that food with symptoms of poisoning and (1) A.I.R. 1933 All. 394.       (2) Cr.  A. No. 120 Of 1957. (3) Cr. k. No. 98 of 1958. 503 poison,  in fact, was found in the viscera, the  requirement of  proving  that the accused was possessed  of  the  poison would  follow  from the circumstance that accused  gave  the victim  something to eat and need not be separately  proved. There  have been cases in which conviction  was  maintained, even   though  the  body  of  the  victim   had   completely disappeared,  and  it  was  impossible  to  say,  except  on circumstantial evidence, whether that person was the  victim of foul play, including poisoning.  Recently, this Court  in Mohan  v.  State of U. P. (1) decided on November  5,  1959, held that the proof of the fact of possession of the  poison was rendered unnecessary, because the victim died soon after eating  pedas given by the accused in that case, and he  had not  partaken any other food likely to contain  poison.   In Dr. Palmer’s case (2) , strychnine was not detected, and the accused  was convicted by the jury after Lord Chief  Justice Campbell (Cresswell, J. and Mr. Baron Alderson-, concurring) charged  the  jury  that  the discovery  of  the  poison  on autopsy,  was not obligatory, if they were satisfied on  the evidence  of  symptoms  that death had been  caused  by  the ministration  of  the strychnine.  The  conduct  of  Palmer, which was also significant, was stressed inasmuch as he  had attempted  to thwart a successful chemical analysis  of  the viscera,  and had done suspicious acts to achieve that  end. In  Dr. Crippen’s case (3), the conduct of the  accusedafter the  death  of  Mrs.  Crippen  in  making  the  friends  and relatives believe that Mrs. Crippen was alive was considered an  incriminatory  circumstance pointing to his  guilt.   No doubt,  in  Dr. Crippen’s case (3), the body was  found  and poison was detected, but there was no proof that Dr. Crippen had administered the poison to her, that being inferred from his  subsequent conduct in running away with Miss  Le  Neve. In the second case of this Court, the poison was  availiable

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to the victim, and it was possible that she had taken it  to end an unhappy life. The  cases of this Court which were decided, proceeded  upon their own facts, and though the three (1) Cr.  A. No. 108 of 1959.    (2) Notable Trials Series. (3) Notable Trials Series. 504 propositions must be kept in mind always, the sufficiency of the evidence, direct or circumstantial, to establish  murder by poisoning will depend on the facts of each case.  If  the evidence  in  a  particular case does  of  not  justify  the inference  that death is the result of poisoning because  of the   failure   of  the  prosecution  to  prove   the   fact satisfactorily,   either  directly  or   by   circumstantial evidence,  then  the benefit of the doubt will  have  to  be given   to  the  accused  person.   But  if   circumstantial evidence,  in  the  absence of direct  proof  of  the  three elements,  is so decisive that the Court can  unhesitatingly hold  that  death was a result of administration  of  poison (though  not  detected) and that the poison must  have  been administered by the accused person, then the conviction  can be rested on it. In a recent case decided in England in the Court of Criminal Appeal  (Regina v. Onufrejczyk- (1), the body of the  victim was  not found at all.  And, indeed, there was  no  evidence that  he  had died, much less was murdered.   The  accused’s conduct  in  that  case which was held  decisive,  was  very similar to the conduct of the present appellant.  He was  in monetary difficulties, and the victim was his partner,  whom he  wished to buy out but did not have the money to  do  so. One fine day, the partner disappeared, and his body was  not found,  and it was not known what had happened to him.   The activities  of  the accused after the disappearance  of  his partner were very -remarkable.  To people who enquired  from him about his partner, he told all manner of lies as -to how a large and dark car had arrived in the night and that three men bad carried off his partner at the point of a  revolver. To a sheriff ’s officer he stated that his partner had  gone to see a doctor.  He also asked a lady to send him some sham registered  letters and forged other documents.  Lord  Chief Justice  Goddard  stated the law to be that in a  trial  for murder, the fact of death could be proved by  circumstantial evidence  alone,  provided  the jury were  warned  that  the evidence  must  lead to one conclusion only, and  that  even though  there  was no body or even trace of a  body  or  any direct evidence as to (1)  [1955] 1.Q.B 388. 505 the  manner  of the death of a victim,  the  corpus  delicti could  be  held  to be proved by a number  of  facts,  which rendered  the commission of the crime certain. pertinent  to remember  that  Lord Goddard observer during the  course  of argument  that  there was no virtue in the  words  "  direct evidence ", and added: "It would be going a long way, especially these days when we know what can be done with acid, to say that there cannot be a conviction without some proof of a body.  If you are right you  have  to admit that a successful disposal of  the  body could prevent a conviction." It is obvious that Lord Goddard had in mind the case of John George Haigh (1) who, as is notorious, disposed of bodies by steeping  them in acid bath, destroying all traces.  It  is, in this context, instructive to read a case from Now Zealand to  which Lord Goddard also referred, where the body of  the victim  was  never  found,  The King  v.  Horry  (2  ).  The

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statement of the law as to proof of corpus delicti laid down by Gresson,J. (concurred in by Fair, A.C.J., Stanton, J. and Hay,  J.)  was  approved by Lord  Goddard  with  one  slight change.  The statement of the law (head-note) is as  follows : " At the trial of a person charged with murder, the fact  of death    is    provable    by    circumstantial    evidence, notwithstanding  that neither the body nor any trace of  the body  has  been  found, and that the  accused  has  made  no confession of any participation in the crime.  Before he can be  convicted,  the fact of death should be proved  by  such circumstances as render the commission of the crime  morally certain  and  leave  no ground  for  reasonable  doubt:  the circumstantial  evidence should be so cogent and  compelling as to convince a jury that upon no rational hypothesis other than murder can the facts be accounted for." Lord Goddard did not agree with the words " morally  certain "  and  stated that he would have preferred to  say  "  such circumstances as render the commission of the crime certain." (1)  Notable Trials Series. (2) [1952) N.Z.L.R. 111. 506 The  same  test  has been applied by Wills in  his  Book  on Circumstantial Evidence, and the author has quoted the  case of  Donellan (1), where the conduct of Donellan  in  rinsing out a bottle in spite of the wife of  the victim asking  him not to touch those bottles, was    treated    as   a    very significant evidence of guilt.  Butler, J., charged the jury that:    "  if there was a doubt upon the evidence of the  physical witnesses  they must take into their consideration  all  the other  circumstances  either to show that there  was  poison administered  or that there was not, and that every part  of the prisoner’s conduct was material to be considered." Similarly,  in Donnall’s case (2 ), Abbot, J., according  to Wills, in summing up, said to the jury that: "there were two important  questions: first did the deceased die of  poison? and if they should be of opinion that she did, then  whether they  were satisfied from the evidence that the  poison  was administered  by the prisoner or by his means.   There  were some  parts  of the evidence which appeared to  him  equally applicable  to  both questions, and those  parts  were  what related  to the conduct of the prisoner during the  time  of the  opening and inspection of the body; his  recommendation of a shell and the early burial; to which might be added the circumstances,  not much to be relied upon, relative to  his endeavours  to  evade his apprehension.  His  Lordship  also said,  as  to  the question whether  the  deceased  died  by poison, I in considering what the medical men have said upon the  one side and the other, you must take into account  the conduct  of the prisoner in urging a hasty funeral  and  his conduct  in throwing away the contents of the jug  into  the chamber utensil’." In  Rex v. Horry (3), where the entire case law  in  England was  presented  for the consideration of the Court,  it  was pointed  out by the Court that there was no rule in  England that  corpus  delicti  must be  proved  by  direct  evidence establishing the death of the person (1) Gurneys Rep. (1781)         (2) (1817) 2 C. & K 308n. (3) [1952] N.Z.L.R. 111. 507 and further, the cause of that death.  Reference was made to Evans  v.  Evans(1),  where it was ruled  that  that  corpus delicti  might  be  proved  by  direct  evidence  or  by   "

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irresistible grounds of presumption ". In the same case,  it has  been pointed out that in New Zealand the  Court  upheld numerous convictions, where the body of the victim was never found. The  rule of law stated by Sir Matthew Hale in Pleas of  the Crown Vol. 2, p. 290 that " I would never convict any person of murder or manslaughter, unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the body found dead " was not accepted  in this  and  other  bases.  Lord  Goddard  also  rejected  the statement  as one of universal application, in the  case  to which we have already referred. The  case  of  Mary  Ann  Nash(2)  is  illustrative  of  the proposition  that  even though the cause of  death  may  not appear   to   be  established  by   direct   evidence,   the circumstances of the case may be sufficient to infer that  a murder  has been committed.  In that case, the prisoner  had an illegitmate son, 5 years old.  There was evidence to show that  the  mother desired to put the child out of  her  way. One  day  in  June,  1907, the mother  left  the  house  and returned without the child.  She made several statements  as to  what had happened to the child, which were found  to  be untrue.   As  late as April 1908, the body of  a  child  was discovered  in  a well.  Decomposition had so  far  advanced that  even  the sex of the child could  not  be  determined. There  was  nothing  therefore to  show  whether  death  was natural  or  violent, or whether it had occurred  before  or after the body was put into the well.  The case was left  to the  jury.  On appeal, it was contended that there being  no proof  how death took place, the judge should not have  left the  case to the Jury but ought to have withdrawn it.   Lord Chief Justice delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal referred to the untrue statements of the prisoner about  the wherebouts of the child, and observed as follows: "  All these statements were untrue.  She bad an  object  in getting rid of the child, and if it had been (1) 161 E.R. 466, 491. (2) (1911) 6 Cr.  App.  R. 225. 508 lost or met with an accidental death, she had every interest in  saying so at once.  It is said there is no  evidence  of violent death, but we cannot accept that Mr. Goddard  cannot have meant that there must be proof from the body itself  of a  violent death. . . . In view of the facts that the  child left  home  well  and was afterwards found  dead,  that  the appellant was last seen with it, and made untrue  statements about it, this is not a case which could have been withdrawn from the jury." There is no difference between a trial with the help of  the jury and a trial by a Judge in so far as the appraisement of evidence  is concerned.  The value of the evidence  in  each case must necessarily be the same.  If the case of Mary  Ann Nash  (1) could be left to the jury, here too the  case  has been  decided by the two Courts below  concurrently  against the  appellant on evidence on which theY could  legitimately reach  the conclusion whether an offence of murder had  been established or not. A  case  of  murder by administration of  poison  is  almost always  one of secrecy.  The poisoner seldom  takes  another into his confidence, and his preparations to the  commission of the offence are also secret.  He watches his  opportunity and  administers the poison in a manner calculated to  avoid its  detection.  The greater his knowledge of  poisons,  the greater  the  secrecy,  and  consequently  the  greater  the difficulty of proving the case agaisnt him.  What assistance a  man of science can give he gives; but it is too  much  to

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say  that  the guilt of the accused must, in all  cases,  be demonstrated  by  the isolation of the poison, though  in  a case  where  there is nothing else such a  course  would  be incumbent  upon the prosecution.  There are various  factors which militate against a successsful isolation of the poison and  its recognition.  The discovery of the poison can  only take  place either through a postmortem examination  of  the internal organs or by chemical analysis.  Often enough,  the diagnosis of a poison is aided by the information which  may be furnished by relatives and friends as to the symptoms 1 161 E R. 466  491 509 found on the victim, if the course of poison has taken  long and  others have had an opportunity of watching its  effect. Where,  however, the poision is administered in secrecy  and the  victim  is rendered unconscious effectively,  there  is nothing  to show how the deterioration in the  condition  of the  victim  took  place and if not poison  but  disease  is suspected,  the  diagnosis  of  poisoning  may  be  rendered difficult.   In Chapman’s case(1), the victim  (Maud  Marsh) was sent to Guy’s Hospital, where the doctors diagnosed  her condition  to be due to various- maladies  including  cancer umatism  and acute dyspepsiaIt is clear that doctors can  be deceived by thesymptoms  of poison into believing  tHat they  have  a  genuine case of sickness  on  hand.   In  Dr. Palmer’s  case  (2), two medical witnesses for  the  defence diagnosed the case from the symptoms as being due to  Angina Pectoris or epilepsy with tetanic complications. The  reason  for all this is obvious.  Lambert in  his  book "The  Medico-Legal Post-Mortem in India (pp. 96,99.100)  has stated  that  the  pathologist’s part in  the  diagnosis  of poisoning  is  secondary,  and  has  further  observed  that several poisons particularly of the synthetic hypnotics  and vegetable  alkaloids groups do not leave any  characteristic signs  which can be noticed on postmortem examination.   See Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 13th Edn.,  pp. 450-451  and  Taylor’s Principles and  Practice  of  Medical Jurisprudence,  Vol. ll,p. 229.  The same is stated by  Otto Saphir  in  his  book  " Autopsy " at pp.  71  and  72.   In Dreisbach’s  Handbook  of Poisons. 1955, it is  stated  that pathological findings in deaths from narcotic analgesics are not characteristic.  He goes further and says that even  the laboratory  findings are non-contributory.  The position  of the  pathologist who conducts a postmortem  examination  has been  summed  up  by  Modi  in  Medical  Jurisprudence   and Toxicology, 13th edn., p. 447 as follows: "  In  order to make a probable guess of the poison  and  to look  for its characteristic postmortem appearances,  it  is advisable that a medical officer, before (1)  Notable Trials Series. (2) Notable Trials Series. 65 510 commencing  a  postmortem  examination  on  the  body  of  a suspected    case    of   poisoning,   should    read    the police  report and endeavour to get as much  information  as possible    from    the   relatives    of    the    deceased regarding   the   quality  and  quantity   of   the   poison administered,  the character of the symptoms with  reference to their onset and the time that elapsed between the  taking of the poison and the development of the first symptoms, the duration  of the illness, nature of the  treatment  adopted, and the time of death.  He will find that in most cases  the account  supplied  by the police and the relatives  is  very meagre,   or  incorrect  and  misleading.   His   task   is,

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therefore,  very  difficult,  especialy  when  many  of  the poisons  except  corrosives and irritants do  not  show  any characteristic  postmortem signs and when bodies are  in  an advanced state of decomposition . . . ". Similarly, Gonzales in Legal Medicine and Toxicology  states at p. 629: "  The  question of whether or not  a  negative  toxicologic examination  is  consistent  with death  by  poison  can  be answered  affirmatively, as may persons overcome  by  carbon monoxide die after twenty-four hours, at which time the  gas cannot  be  determined  in  the  blood  by  chemical  tests. Likewise,  the organs of individuals who have been  poisoned by  phosphorus may not contain the toxic substance  respons- ible  for death if they have managed to survive its  effects for several days. Many  conditions  seriously interfere with  the  toxicologic examination, such as postmortem decomposition . . . . ". We  need  not multiply authorities, because  every  book  on toxicology  begins  with  a statement of such  a  fact.   Of course,  there is a chemical test for almost  every  poison, but  it is impossible to expect a search for  every  poison. Even  in  chemical analysis, the chemical  analyser  may  be unsuccessful for various reasons.  Taylor in his  Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, Vol. 11, p. 228 gives -three  possible explanations for negative  findings,  viz., (1) the case 511 may have been of disease only; (2) the poison may have  been eliminated  by  vomitting or other means or  neutralised  or metabolised;  and  (3) the analysis may have  been  faultily performed.  Svensson Wendel in Crime Detection has stated at p. 281 that: "  Hypnotics are decomposed and disappear very  quickly-some even  in the time which elapses between  the  administration and the occurrence of death. Circumstantial evidence in this context means a  combination of  facts  creating  a net-work through which  there  is  no escape  for the accused, because the facts taken as a  whole do  not  admit of any inference but of his guilt.   To  rely upon  the  findings  of the medical man  who  conducted  the postmortem  and of the chemical analyser as decisive of  the matter  is to render the other evidence entirely  fruitless. While the circumstances often speak with unerring certainty, the  autopsy and the chemical analysis taken  by  themselves may be most misleading.  No doubt, due weight must be  given to the negative findings at such examinations.  But, bearing in  mind  the  difficult task which  the  man.  of  medicine performs  and  the  limitations under which  he  works,  his failure  should not be taken as the end of the case, for  on good and probative circumstances, an irresistible  inference of guilt can be drawn. In the present case, the effort of the appellant has been to persuade  the Court that the death of Laxmibai was  possibly the  result  of disease rather than by poison.   During  the course  of  the case and the appeal, various  theories  have been  advanced and conflicting diagnoses have  been  mooted. The  case  of  the appellant has wavered  between  death  by diabetic  coma and by hypoglycemia, though relying upon  the condition of the arteries and the aorta and the rigidity  of the  neck-, suggestions of coronary complications and  renal failure have also been made.  We have shown above that  this was  not a case of diabetic coma, because of the absence  of the  cardinal symptoms of diabetic coma.  This also  is  the opinion of Dr. Variava and Dr. Mehta, though Dr. Jliala, for reasons which we have indicated, accepted it.  The appellant

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argued again the case 512 from the angle of diabetic coma, but later veered in  favour of  hypoglycemia.   This change noticeable not only  in  the arguments before us but also throughout  the conduct of  the case  is  merely  to  confuse  the  issue,  and  create,  if possible, a doubt, which would take the  mind away from  the surrounding  circumstances,  and  focus  it  only  upon  the medical aspect of the case. Full advantage has been taken of the findings of Dr. Ugale and Dr. Miss Aneeja, which suggest partly  an onset of diabetic coma, partly  of  hypoglycemia, and  partly of renal failure.  There is no true  picture  of any one disease.  The rigidity of the neck was not reflected in the chemical analysis of the cerebro-spinal fluid and was negatived,  in so far as renal failure is concerned, by  the negative findings about albumin.  Diabetic coma stood  ruled out by the presence of the Babinsky sign and the  suddenness of the onset, the negative aspect of acetone breath and  the rather  remarkable failure of the specific  treatment  given for  it  to  have  worked any  change.   Driven  from  these considerations  to  -such doubtful suggestions  as  coronary complications of which no physical evidence was found by Dr. Jhala,  the  appellant put his case  ’on  hypoglycemia,  and relied  upon  the  fact that at the  hospital  40  units  of insulin  intravenously and another 40  units  subcutaneously were  administered.  Medical text-books were quoted to  show that  in the case of hypoglycemic coma the  introduction  of even  a  small quantity of insulin sometimes  proves  fatal. The  learned  AdvocateGeneral stoutly  resisted  this  move, which  was at variance with the case as set out  before  the High  Court,  because  it  is obvious  enough  that  if  one accepted   the  theory  of  hypoglycemic  coma,   the   only injections of insulin causing such shook would be proved  to have  been given at the hospital and not by  the  appellant. Here,  the  position, however, is not so difficult  for  the State,  because  Laxmibai was found to have 4 oz.  of  pasty meal  in  her  stomach,  and  with  food  inside  her,   the possibility  of  hypoglycemia  taking  place  naturally  was extremely  remote.   If  it was  hypoglycemic  coma  due  to excessive administration of insulin, then it must have  been administered prior to its onset, and who could have 513 given  it  but the appellant ? Even though  coma  supervenes suddenly, the patient passes through symptoms of discomfort, and  Laxmibai would have told the appellant about it in  the train.   The  appellant  mentioned nothing of  this  to  Dr. Ugale.   If  an excessive dose of insulin was given  by  the appellant,  the  question  of intent would  arise,  and  the conduct  shows  the  intention.  There  were  no  pronounced symptoms of hypoglycemia either.  Laxmibai just passed  from unconsciousness to death without the manifestation of any of the  signs  associated  with the  syndrome  of  hypoglycemic death.   It is also to be remembered that hypoglycemic  coma is generally overcome by the administration of a very  small quantity  of  glucose  (5 or10  grams  of  glucose  orally): Treatment of Diabetes Mellitus by Joslin, Root and White, p. 350.  The 40 units given intravenously were mixed with 20 C. C.  of glucose and carried the palliative with  them.   Even otherwise,  Laxmibai was receiving glucose  by  intragastric drip,  and during the three and a half hours,  there  should have  been an improvement.  The surprising part is that  the administration  of the insulin and glucose brought about  no visible  symptoms  in the patient either for better  or  for worse.  She passed into death, and the inference can only be that  she  did not die of these diseases of  which  she  was

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either  suspected  or  for  which she  was  treated  but  of something  else,  which could not answer  to  the  treatment given to her. Dreisbach in his Handbook on Poisons at p.  27 has stated that coma also results from the action of several poisons.     Depressants,  sedatives and hypnoties all cause death  by coma (ibid. p. 201).  The symptoms, according to the author, are  sleepiness,  mental  confusion,  unsteadiness   rapidly followed  by  coma with slow  shallow  respiration,  flaccid muscles  and absent deep reflexes.  The  difference  between coma  due  to disease and coma as the result of  poisons  is stated by him in the following words: Coma   from   poisoning   presumably   results   from   some interference  with brain cell metabolism.  In attempting  to combat the effects of drugs which induce coma, remember that no agents are known 514 which will specifically overcome the metabolic  derangements of  drug-induced coma.  The mechanism of action of  cerebral stimulant drugs is also unknown, but these drugs  presumably act  by  depressing some inhibiting function  in  the  cell. There is no evidence that any stimulants specifically oppose the cellular metabolic depression induced by the  depressant drugs such as the barbiturates." No specific antidote is known for the sedative and  hypnotic drugs. (Ibid. p. 202). The condition of Laxmibai clearly indicated an impairment of the  central  nervous system.  It is no doubt true  that  in some  cases of coronary thrombosis, coma supervenes; but  it is  idle  to suggest in the present case that  Laxmibai  was afflicted  by  this  type of coma,  because  Dr.  Jhala  who performed the postmortem examination and opened the coronary arteries found no evidence of thrombosis.  According to Otto Saphir,  a myocardial infarct is easily detected.  (Autopsy, pp.  301-302).   Coma in Laxmibai’s case, as we  have  shown above, was not the result either of acidosis,  hypoglycemia, renal failure or meningial irritation.  Her liver,  pancreas and  kidney were found to have no pathological lesions,  and it  is  significant that no question was even  attempted  to establish that the opinion of Dr. Jhala on this part of  the case  was  incorrect.   Learned counsel  for  the  appellant suggested that the examination by Dr. Jhala might have  been superficial,  and  might not have included  a  microscopical examination of sections of some of the vital organs normally affected  by  diabetes.  This suggestion,  in  our  opinion, ought to have been put forward during the  cross-examination of  the  witness, and it is unfair now to suggest  that  the opinion  that  no  lesions were found was  based  on  either improper or inadequate examination.  We hold that Dr.  Jhala performed the examination adequately, and he was also helped by his assistants. Here,  we pause to ask a question why the appellant  brought up  the question of hysterical fits at all.  He  could  have said  that Laxmibai was a diabetic, and that it  was  likely she had coma by reason of that 515 disease.  The suggested diagnosis given by the appellant was so  unlikely  that Dr. Ugale questioned it then  and  there. There  is nothing in the Wanlesswadi T.B. Sanatorium  papers or  in  Dr.  Sathe’s  evidence to  show  that  Laxmibai  had hysterical  fits  after  her  hysterectomy  operation.    No suggestion  was made to the doctors in Court  that  Laxmibai might  have  had  hysterical fits.   The  condition  of  the muscles  and the absence of deep reflexes clearly show  that this  was  just  another  piece of  deception.   It  is  not

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possible   to  hold  that  the  appellant  gave   the   full particulars  to Dr. Miss Aneeja.  No suggestion was made  to her or to Dr. Ugale that any information other than what was noted  in the case papers was furnished.  There is  no  case for holding ’that Laxmibai had a relapse of hysterical fits. It  would, therefore, appear that Laxmibai’s  condition  was not  due  to  any disease, because  diseases  inducing  coma generally  leave  some  trace behind, and  also  respond  to medication.   No  doubt,  in  some  cases  the  pathological findings after death from diabetic coma have been  negative, but  the question is if this was such a case.  We  have,  on the  one hand, the fact that numerous poisons  causing  coma leave no identifiable trace in the victim after death,  and, on  the other, that sometimes the autopsy does not  disclose any discoverable signs in a patient who dies after an attack of diabetic coma or disease.  The appellant can be  presumed to  have  had  knowledge of these  poisons.   The  appellant challenged  the Advocate-General to show from  any  standard book  that the symptoms found by the doctors  accorded  with any  known poison.  Here, it must also be remembered that  a man with knowledge may manipulate not one but more drugs  to achieve his purpose, and the cardinal signs of poisoning  on the  victim may, as a result, be either obliterated  or,  at least significantly modified.  We give one example on ,which a  certain amount of knowledge is possessed even by  laymen. A  poison  of  which  one  of  the  symptoms  would  be  the contracting of the pupils of the eyes may be side-tracked by putting  into the eyes of the victim a drug  like  atropine, which by its local 516 action  dilates the pupils.  We give this  example,  because most  of  us know the action of atropine on  the  eyes,  and because  the  example also shows how easily  a  person  with knowledge  may confuse the symptoms by a simple  trick.   We are  not suggesting that this is what has happened  in  this case; but when we have to  deal with a case of crime  versus natural  death, we cannot overlook the possibility  of  some ingenious artifice having been used to screen the action. If Laxmibai died in circumstances which prima facie admit of either disease or homicide by poisoning, we must look at the conduct  of the appellant who brought her to  the  hospital, and  consider  to what conclusion  that  conduct  unerringly points.  If the appellant as an honest medical man had taken Laxmibai  to  the  hospital and she had died  by  reason  of disease, his conduct would have been entirely different.  He would not have taken her to the hospital bereft of  property with which she started from home; he would not have given  a wrong or misleading name to cover her identity; he would not have given a wrong age and wrong history of her ailments; he would  not have written a letter suggesting that she  had  a brother  in Calcutta, which brother did not exist; he  would not  have  abandoned  the corpse to be  dealt  with  by  the hospital  as an unclaimed body; he would not have  attempted to  convince  the  world  that she  was  alive  and  happily married;  he  would  not  have  obtained  her  property   by forgeries,  impersonation and other tricks indulged in  both before  and after her death; but he would have informed  her relatives  and done everything in his power to see that  she was properly treated and stayed on to face whatever  inquiry the hospital wished to make into the cause of death and  not tried to avoid the postmortem examination and would not have disappeared,  never to reappear.  His  prevarications  about where’  Laxmibai was, make a big and much varied  list,  and his  forgeries cover scores of documents.  In the  words  of Baron Parke in Towell’s case (1):

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Circumstantial  evidence is the only evidence which  can  in cases of this kind lead to discovery. (1)(1854) 2 C. & K. 309. 517 There  is no way of investigating them except by the use  of circumstantial evidence; but it most frequently happens that great  crimes  committed in secret leave  behind  them  some traces, or are accompanied by some circumstances which  lead to  the discovery and punishment of the  offender...  Direct evidence  of  persons  who saw the fact, if  that  proof  is offered upon the testimony of men whose veracity you have no reason  to doubt is the best proof; but, on the other  hand, it  is equally true with regard to  circumstantial.evidence, that  the circumstances may often be so clearly  proved,  so closely  connected  with  it, or leading to  one  result  in conclusion, that the mind may be as well convinced as if  it were proved by eye-witnesses." The appellant in this case took some risk in taking Laxmibai to  the  hospital arid in giving his name there;  and  these aspects  were, in fact, stressed as arguments in  the  case. As regards the first part, the argument overlooks that  what appears to us to be a risk might not have so appeared to the appellant,  who might have been sure of his own  ability  to screen  himself.   To  him, the death  of  Laxmibai  at  the hospital  without discovery of poison would be the  greatest argument  in  his favour that he had  acted  honestly.   The second   argument  is  equally  unacceptable  to  us.    The appellant  could  not  take the risk of  a  false  name  and address,  if  he  was  intending that  the  body  should  be disposed  of  as unclaimed.  By giving his  own  address  he could  keep  the strings in his own hands.  If  he  gave  an address  and no reply came from that address,  the  hospital would  suspect  foul  play.   If  he  gave  the  address  of Laxmibai,  people  in Poona would know  of  this  mysterious death, and they would remember the death of Purshottam alias Arvind in 1954.  At that time also a postmortem  examination on the body of Arvind was held (see, evidence of Ramachandra (P.  W. 1)), and the explanation of the appellant  given  in writing  on  January 22, 1954, is set out below in  his  own words: " My name is Anant Chihtaman Lagu, age... years, residing at No. 431/5, Madiwale Colony, Poona, on 66 518      being questioned state that I am the family doctor of  Karve family in H. No. 94-95, Shukrawar.   The  deceased Purshottam Anant Karve belongs to that family.  He came from Bombay to Poona on Saturday, the 16th January, 1954.  He had come to me on Sunday, the 17th February, 1954, for  medicine for weakness.  I treated him for 2 clays, on 17th and  18th. He  had  neither  told me that there was  poisoning  in  his stomach,  nor  did  I detect any even when  I  examined  and treated  him.   He  became unconscious 5  hours  before  his death.   He was taken to the Sassoon Hospital at 9  p.m.  on 18th  January, 1954.  He was taken to the  Sassoon  Hospital because  his  disease was increased in  unconsciousness  and also because his mother as also myself and Dr. Joshi were of the same opinion.  He died there in about 30 to 45  minutes. The  fact that there was deliberate poisoning  by  somebody, was  neither revealed in my examination nor  did  Purshottam Karve  speak  to  me anything about it  during  the  time  I treated  him 2 days before.  What exactly was the  cause  of death  could not be revealed during my treatment.  I do  not know  if  somebody  is on bad terms  with  him.   There  are rumours  about  suicide  but  there  is  no  reason  or  any

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circumstance whatsoever for doing so. " A false address would have started enquiries at the hospital end.  Laxmibai’s own address would have started  speculation in Poona.  It was for this reason that the appellant had  to choose another place and to trim between fact and fiction so that  he  might be able to deal with the matter  himself  Of course, Laxmibai did have an address of her own which  could have  been given, and which did not cease to be her  address because she had got an attack of coma, from which people are known to recover. These  arguments, however, are of no avail, in view  of  the appellsnt’s entire conduct now laid bare, which conduct  has been proved to our satisfaction to have begun not after  the death  of  Laxmibai but much ,earlier.  This conduct  is  so knit  together  as  to  make  a  net-work  of  circumstances pointing only to his guilt, 519 The  case is one of extreme cunning and premeditation..  The appellant,  whose duty it was to care for  this  unfortunate lady  as a friend and as her medical  adviser,  deliberately set  about first to ingratiate himself in her good  opinion, and becoming her confidant, found out all about her affairs. All  this time he was planning to get at her property  after taking her life.  He did not perpetrate his scheme at Poona, where the death might have brought a host of persons to  the hospital.   He devised a diabolical scheme  of  unparalleled cunning and committed an almost perfect murder.  But murder, though it hath no tongue, speaks out sometimes.  His  method was   his  own  undoing;  because  even  the  long  arm   of coincidence  cannot explain the multitude  of  circumstances against  him, and they destroy the presumption of  innocence with which law clothed him.  In our judgment, the two Courts below  were perfectly correct in their conclusion  that  the death  of Laxmibai was the result of the  administration  of some  unrecognised  poison  or drug which  would  act  as  a poison,   and  that  the  appellant  was  the   person   who administered it.  We, accordingly, confirm the conviction.  As regards the sentence of death passed on the appellant by the  Sessions Judge and confirmed by the High Court,  it  is the only sentence that could be imposed for this planned and cold-blooded  murder for gain, and we do not interfere  with it. The appeal fails, and it will be dismissed. SARKARJ.-In my opinion this appeal should be allowed. The  appellant was tried by the Sessions Judge, Poona, on  a charge under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the  murder of  Laxmibai  Karve on November 13, 1956,  by  administering poison,  to  her and was convicted and sentenced  to  death. His  appeal  to  the  High  Court  at  Bombay  against   the conviction and sentence failed.  He has now appealed to this Court with special leave. The  evidence against the appellant is  all  circumstantial. The question to be decided in this appeal is 520 whether  that  evidence  is such that  the  only  reasonable conclusion  from it is that the appellant was guilty of  the charge  brought against him.   Laxmibai  Karve, the deceased, was the widow of one  Anant Karve  who was a businessman of Poona. Laxmibai was  married in 1922 at the age of eleven to Anant Karve, then a widower. Her  maiden name was Indumati Ponkshe.  After  her  marriage she was given the name Laxmibai but was also called Indumati or  Indutai or Mai Karve or simply Mai.  It does not  appear that  after her marriage she had been known by her  father’s surname  of Ponkshe, a fact the significance of  which  will

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appear later. Anant  Karve had a son named Vishnu by his first  wife.   By Laxmibai  he  bad two sons, Ramchandra and  Purshottam  also called Arvind. Anant  Karve  died in 1945 leaving a will.  By his  will  he gave  Laxmibai  a right of residence in tree  rooms  in  his dwelling  house  at No. 93-95, Shukrawar Peth, Poona  and  a right  to  receive Rs. 50 per month from the  rent  of  that house  which  was in part let out, and  made  certain  other bequests  to her.  He devised the rest of his properties  to his  sons.  Besides what she had received from her  husband, Laxmibai in 1954 inherited the properties of Purshottam  who had died interstate and unmarried in that year.  She further inherited  a  large  sum  of money  and  gold  ornaments  of considerable  value from her mother, Girjabai, who had  died in  1946  or  1947.   She  bad  also  considerable  valuable ornaments of her own.  Her total assets amounted in 1956  to about  Rs. 80,000.  Part of her liquid assets were  held  in shares  and debentures in limited companies.  She  had  also certain  moneys  in an account in her name in  the  Bank  of Maharashtra.   A  considerable sum was due to her  from  one Joshi to whom she had given a loan.  After  the  death of her husband,  differences  cropped  up between  Laxmibai  and her elder SOD, Ramchandra.   In  1946 Ramchandra started living separately from his mother in  the same  house and used to take his food in a hotel In  October 1952, Ramchandra joined military 521 service  as  a  craftsman and  left  Poona.   Since  joining service  till the death of Laxmibai he was not  residing  at Poona  but came there now and then.  In May  1956,  Laxmibai got Ramchandra married. After her husband’s death Laxmibai lived in the three  rooms in  premises No. 93-95, Shukrawar Peth, Poona, in which  she had  been given a right of residence by her husband’s  will. Her younger son Purshottam also appears to have gone out  of Poona  on  service  in 1953, and he died  in  January  1954. Since then Laxmibai had been living all by herself.  She had however certain relatives in Poona. The appellant is a medical doctor.  He and his brother B. C. Lagu, also a doctor, had been the family physicians of Anant Karve  during  his life time and attended him  in  his  last illness.   After  his death the appellant  continued  to  be Laxmibai’s  family  doctor.  It is clear from  the  evidence that  Laxmibai  had  great  trust  and  confidence  in   the appellant and depended on him in all matters concerning  her moneys and investments.  It was he who went to the Bank  for withdrawing  and  depositing  moneys for her.   In  1955  he actually  took  on rent a big hall in  premises  No.  93-95, Shukrawar  Peth  for  his  personal  use  and  had  been  in occupation of it since then. Laxmibai  did  not  possess  very  good  health.   She   had developed a tuberculous lesion some twenty years before  her death but it had healed.  She was a chronic diabetes patient since  1946 and started having hysterical fits  since  1939. She  suffered from menorrhagia and metrorrhagia since  1942. On  April  11, 1948, Dr. Ghorpure, a  surgeon  performed  an operation on her which is described in these terms: Abdomen  opened by mid-line sub-umbilical  incision-Subtotal hysterectomy     done.     Rt.    ovary     cysticpunctured- Appendicectomy.    Abdomen  closed  after  exploring   other viscera which were normal. In 1949 she suffered from pyorrhoea and had her teeth  taken out.  In 1950 the tuberculous affection became active and on June  15, 1950, she consulted Dr. Sathe, a lung  specialist,

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who found that there was tuberculous 522 affection  of  the left lung and he recommended  a  line  of treatment.  This treatment was carried out by the  appellant but  apparently  did not achieve much result.  On  July  13, 1950,   she  got  herself  admitted  into  the   Wanlesswadi Tuberculosis Sanatorium at Miraj in Bombay for treatment  of the   tuberculosis.   Two  thoracoplasty   operations   were performed  on the left lung and she was recommended a  third such  operation which she was unwilling to undergo and  left the  hospital  at her own desire.  In the  course  of  these operations  nine of her ribs on the left side were  removed. The  report  given by this hospital on  November  17,  1950, reads thus: Patient was admitted on 13th July, 1950.  X-Ray on admission showed  extensive filtration on the left side with  a  large cavity  in the upper zone; the right side was within  normal limits.   She had diabetes with high blood sugar  which  was controlled   by  insulin.   Two  stages   of   thoracoplasty operation  on  the left side were done and  there  was  good clearing  of disease but there was a small  residual  cavity seen and the third stage operation was advised.  The patient is  leaving at her own request against medical advice.   Her sputum is positive. There  is  no  evidence  that  after  she  left  Wanlesswadi Sanatorium  she  had  any relapse of  any  of  her  previous illnesses  earlier recounted.  It appears from the  evidence of her relation one Datar, a medical man, that Laxmibai  had been  completely invalid being a frank case of  tuberculosis of both the lungs but in November 1956, her health was  good and she was cooking her food and moving about in the  house. The  other evidence also shows that she was carrying on  her daily  avocations  of’ life in a normal way  at  that  time. After  her  death her body was found to be  well  nourished. She   had  however  to  have  ordinary   medical   attention constantly and the diabetes had continued though controlled. The appellant treated her all along and the fees paid to him appear debited to Laxmibai’s account. I  have so far been stating the earlier history of the  case and  now come to the more immediate events.  On November  8, 1956, Laxmibai had Rs. 5,275-09 in her 523 account  in  the  Bank of Maharashtra.  On  a  date  between November 8 and 10, she signed two papers the first of  which was  a  notice to the Bank reading I desire to  withdraw  an amount exceeding Rs. 1,000 up to about Rs. 5,000 in the next week  from  My  savings Bank Account" and the  other  was  a withdrawal slip or cheque and it read, " Pay Bearer the  sum of  Rupees  Five  thousand only which please  debit  to  the 2account  of  Laxmibai Anant Karve".  None of  these  papers bore  any  date  and  the,  bodies  of  them,  were  in  the appellant’s  handwriting.   These papers were made  over  by Laxmibai to the appellant and he did not present them to the Bank  till  after  her death.  On  November  12,  1956,  the appellant  paid to the credit of Laxmibai’s account  in  the Bank  a  dividend warrant dated November 10, 1956,  for  Rs. 2,607-6-0  drawn in her favour by a company on the  Bank  of Maharashtra,  after  signing  her name on  the  back  of  it himself. The  appellant had fixed up an engagement with Dr. Sathe  of Bombay,  who has been named earlier, for November 13,  1956, at  3  p.m. for examining Laxmibai.  On  November  8,  1956, Bhave, a relation of Laxmibai, called on Laxmibai and  found the appellant there.  Laxmibai told him that she proposed to go to Bombay with the appellant for consulting Dr. Sathe for

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her  health and that she would be returning in four or  five days.   On November 10 or 11, she saw a  lawyer  Karandikar, also a relation, and informed him that she intended to go to Bombay with the appellant for consulting a physician.  About the  same  time  Champutai,  daughter  of  Bhave   mentioned earlier,  came to Laxmibai’s house to invite her  to  attend the  birthday  party  of her son which had  been  fixed  for November 13.  Laxmibai told Champutai that she was going  to Bombay  and if she was able to come back in time, she  would attend the party.  At about 8 p.m. on November 12,  Laxmibai went  to  Virkar, who was a tenant of the  house  where  she lived, and informed him that she was going to Bombay by  the night train to consult a doctor and requested him to pay Rs. 50 on account of the rent then due for meeting the  expenses of the 524 journey  to Bombay.  The amount was paid by Virkar  to  her. She   told   Virkar   that  she  expected   to   return   to Poona after three or four days.  About the same time she met Pramilabai,  another tenant of the house, and told her  that she  was  going to Bombay with the appellant  by  the  night train to consult Dr. Sathe.  A little later she was seen  by a  third  tenant Krishnaji, standing in front of  the  house with  a   small  bag and bedding.  Krishnaji  also  saw  the appellant on the road going away from the house.  All  these people have said that they found Laxmibai in a good state of health  and going about performing her normal avocations  of life.  There was a passenger train leaving Poona for  Bombay at 10 p.m. Laxmibai and the appellant went by this train  to Bombay  on November 12, 1956.  Though the  appellant  denied this, the Courts below have found that they travelled in the same  compartment.   The  train  reached  Victoria  Terminus Station, Bombay, at 5-10 a.m. on November 13.  Laxmibai  had then gone into a comatose condition.  The appellant procured a  stretcher  and carried her into a taxi with the  help  of porters  and took her to Gokuldas Tejpal  Hospital,  usually called for short G.T. Hospital, which is about six  furlongs from  the station.  They reached the hospital at about  5-45 a.m. Laxmibai was taken to the Outdoor Department where  Dr. Ugale,  the Casualty Officer in charge, admitted  her  ’into the  hospital.  According to Dr. Ugale, the  appellant  told him  that  the name of the unconscious  woman  was  Indumati Paunshe  and her age was forty.  The appellant gave  as  the address of the patient the address of his own dispensary  at Poona, namely, " C/o Dr. Lagu 20-B, Shukrawar, Gala No.  12, Poona 2 ". Dr. Ugale said that the appellant at his  request spelt the name "Paunshe" and he took it down as spelt by the appellant.   On enquiry about the history of the patient  by Dr.  Ugale the appellant told him that the patient  suddenly became unconscious in the train while coming from  upcountry and  that there was a history of similar attacks  frequently before.   Dr.  Ugale also said that the appellant  told  him that he thought that the case was one of hysterical fit from 525 which  she frequently suffered.  He did not tell  Dr.  Ugale that  the patient suffered from any other disease.  He  said that  he  had brought the unconscious woman  to  Bombay  for getting  her examined by a specialist and that she  was  his patient.  Dr. Ugale entered in the appropriate record of the hospital called the case paper, all that the appellant  told him and what he himself had noticed.  As a result of his own examination Dr. Ugale found that the patient was making some involuntary  movement,  the corneal reflex was  absent,  the pupils were normal and reactive.  He found nothing  abnormal in the cardiovascular system or the respiration.  There  was

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a clerk sitting by the side of Dr. Ugale when the  appellant was  speaking  to him and he made the necessary  entries  in another record of the hospital.  In that record the name  of the patient appears as Indumati Pankshe.  Dr. Ugale examined the person of Laxmibai and found no ornament or cash on her. Within four or five minutes of the time that she arrived  at the  Out  door  Department of  the  hospital,  Laxmibai  was removed to Ward No. 12. Dr.  Anija,  a young woman doctor, who had  passed  out  the previous June, was then the House Physician in attendance at that  ward.  The appellant accompanied Laxmibai to the  ward and  introduced himself to Dr. Anija as Dr. Lagu,  which  is his name.  He told her that while travelling in a train from upcountry  the patient had got unconscious and therefore  he had  brought her straight from the station to  the  hospital and  that  before the journey the patient was  alright.   He further  said that the patient had similar  attacks  before. The  appellant  also told Dr. Anija that he was  the  family physician  of the patient and a family friend and  spoke  of some  of  the illnesses from which the patient  had  earlier suffered.   Dr. Anija made some notes in the case  paper  of what  she  heard from the appellant and  then  examined  the patient, the result of which she also similarly noted in the case paper.  Thereafter, according to Dr. Anija, she  tested the patient’s urine in a laboratory attached to the ward and recorded   the  finding  on  the  case  paper.    She   then administered some stimulant and oxygen and also 67 526      gave  an  injection  of  40 units  of  insulin  as  she thought,’  as a result of the urine test, that the case  was one  of diabetic coma.  There is some dispute as to  whether the  urine was examined by Dr. Anija at this time and as  to when  the  entries on the case paper of the results  of  the examination  had been made.  This will be  discussed  later. Dr.  Anija examined the urine of the patient for the  second time  at about 8-30 a.m. and that also disclosed  a  certain quantity  of Sugar.  She said that she then sent a  call  to the  Registrar of the ward, who was her immediate  superior, to come and see the case.  The Registrar came and, according to Dr. Anija, directed that the patient be given another  40 units  of  insulin with 20 c.c. of  glucose  by  intravenous injection and that she be also given " intra-gastric glucose drip  " and this was done at about 9 a.m. At about  11  a.m. the  HonorarY Visiting Physician, Dr. Variava, came  to  the hospitals Dr. Anija told him that it was a case of  diabetic coma.   Dr.  Variava then himself examined the  patient  and thereafter  asked Dr. Anija why she thought it to be a  case of diabetic coma, to which Dr. Anija replied that she did so because  there was sugar present in the urine.  Dr.  Variava then  asked  her  whether she had  examined  the  urine  for acetone to which she replied that she had not.  Dr.  Variava thereupon reprimanded her by saying " How can you diagnose a case  of diabetic coma without ascertaining acetone  in  the urine ?" Thereafter under the directions of Dr. Variava, Dr. Anija  again tested the urine and showed it to  Dr.  Variava who  thought  that  the urine contained a  slight  trace  of acetone.   Shortly after this urine test the  patient,  that is,  Laxmibai  expired.  It was then about  11-30  a.m.  Dr. Variava  then told Dr. Anija that he did not think that  the case was one of diabetic coma and that therefore he wanted a postmortem  examination  of the body of the  deceased.   Dr. Anija then made a note on the case paper stating " Asked for postmortem " and put her signature below the entry.  She did not  then  put down anything in the column there  about  the

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final  diagnosis. Dr. Variava did not wait to see the  entry about 527 postmortem being made by Dr. Anija but left to attend  other cases.   It is clear that the appellant was present  in  the hospital  up to the time of the death Of Laxmibai though  in his statement in the trial Court he had denied this.   There is  no evidence as to how long he remained in  the  hospital after Laxmibai’s death but it is clear that he was in  Poona on November 14. There  was  arrangement  in  the  hospital  for   conducting postmortem examinations.  The case papers along with note  " Asked  for  postmortem " had been sent by Dr. Anija  to  the Resident  Medical Officer of the hospital, Dr. Mouskar.   It was his duty to arrange for the postmortem examination.  The case paper came to Dr. Mouskar’s office at 1 p.m. but he did not proceed to make any arrangement for having a  postmortem examination  held.   Instead, at about 2 p. m.  he  sent  an official  telegram to the appellant at Poona at the  address which  he had given to Dr. Ugale and which was  recorded  in the case paper.  The telegrams was in these words: " Indumati expired arrange removal reply immediately." On  November 14, the appellant wrote from Poona a letter  in reply to the telegram.  This letter was in these terms: "  I  have already telegraphed to the  brother  of  Shrimati Indumati  Panshe at Calcutta, earliest he will reach  Bombay on  the 15th November, 1956, Thursday.  His name  is  Govind Vaman Deshpande; he will enquire as Indumati Panshe.  I have seen  the  name of the patient entered in the Ward  Book  as Indumati  Pannshe  as ’n’ extra.  Please correct’ it.  I  am writing all these things in connection of a case woman  aged 30-35 years admitted in G. T. Hospital at 6 a.m. on  Tuesday 13th  November, 1956, and expired the same day at  about  11 a.m.  Shri Govind Vaman Deshpande will take the body and  do the  necessary funeral function according to  Hindu  rites." Laxmibai had in fact no brother of the name of Govind  Vaman Deshpande and in fact the appellant 528 had  sent  no  telegram as he stated  in  the  letter.   The statements  in  the letter were all false.  The  letter  was received  in the office of Dr. Mouskar in the  afternoon  of November 15. Not  having  received any reply from the  appellant  to  his telegram, Dr. Mouskar on November 14, at about 4 p. m., sent the  following  information  to the  Inspector  of  Police-A Esplanade P. S., Bombay. Sir, I  am to state that Smt.  Indumati Paunshe,  Hindu,  female, aged  40 years was admitted in Ward No.Xll for treatment  of hysterical  fits on 13th November, 1956, at 5-45 a.  m.  She died on the same day at 11-30 a.m. The address given at the time of admission is as follows: C/o Dr. Lagu, 20B, Shukrawar, Gala No. 12, Poona-2. A  telegram on the above address has already been sent,  but without any response. It  is  therefore  requested that the  body  may  please  be removed and taken to the J. J. Hospital Morgue for  avoiding decomposition." A  copy  of  this  letter  was  sent  to  the  Coroner   for information.   The  letter  was  written as  in  the  G.  T. Hospital  there was no air conditioned morgue and there  was one in the J. J. Hospital. On  receipt of this letter the police immediately  wrote  to

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the Coroner for permission to remove the body from the G. T. Hospital to the J. J. Hospital.  The permission was  granted by the Coroner at about 7-50 p.m. on the same day.  The body was  thereupon removed from the G. T. Hospital to the J.  J. Hospital morgue at about 9 p.m. on November 14. On  the same day, that is, November 14, at about 9-30 p.  m. the  police again wrote to the Coroner stating that  it  had received  a report from the Resident Medical Officer, G.  T. Hospital  of  the death of one Indumati  Paunshe,  referring evidently to the letter which Dr. Mouskar had earlier on the same day written to the                             529 police,and  that Indumati appeared to have no  relatives  in Bombay and further that the cause of death was not certified and requesting in the circumstances that an inquest over the death might be held.  What happened about this request  will be stated later. On November 15, the Bombay police sent a wireless message to the  police  at Poona intimating that on  November  13,  one Indumati Paunshe, who had been admitted to the G.T. Hospital for  treatment of hysterical fits, had died on the very  day in  the  hospital and her address was " C/o Dr.  Lagu,  20B, Shukrawar,  Gala No. 12, Poona 2 " and asking that  enquires might  be made at the above address and the relatives  might be  asked to claim the dead body which was lying  unclaimed. Pursuant  to this message, the Poona police interviewed  the appellant  at  Poona  on  November  16,  when  he  made  the following statement: "On  November  12 he left Poona for Bombay by  the  10  p.m. train  and  had gone off to sleep.  Towards the end  of  the journey when he started preparing to get down at Bombay,  he found one woman fast asleep.  From other passengers he  came to know that her name was Indumati Paunshe about 35 years of age  and she had a brother serving in Calcutta.  When  other passengers got down at Victoria Terminus Station in  Bombay, the woman did not awake.  He thereupon looked at her  keenly and found her senseless.  Being himself a doctor he  thought it  his duty to take her to the hospital and so took her  to the G. T. Hospital in a taxi.  As he had taken that woman to the hospital, the Casualty Medical Officer took his address. He had no more information about the woman.  She was not his relation and he was not in any way responsible for her." The  statement so made by the appellant was received by  the Bombay police from the Poona police on November 17. I now come back to the events that were happening at Bombay. I have earlier stated that the case paper had not  initially given the final diagnosis as to the 530  cause  of Laxmibai’s death but bore the endorsement  "Asked for  postmortem ". At some stage, as to  which the  evidence is conflicting and which I will  have to discuss later,  the endorsement " Asked for postmortem " was crossed out and the words  "diabetic  coma " were written on the case  paper  as the  caus  of  the  death of the  patient.   Both  of  these alterations had been made by Dr. Anija who put her signature under  the crossed out entry.  Dr. Mouskar on  November  15, sent  to  the  Coroner a certificate of  the  death  of  the patient  Indumati  in  the G. T.  Hospital  stating  therein diabetic  coma as the cause of her death.  By this time  the alteration in the case paper had clearly been made, crossing out  the direction as to postmortem examination and  stating therein  diabetic coma as the cause of death.  On  the  same day, that is, November 15, the police wrote a letter to  Dr. Mouskar,  apparently in ignorance of the  death  certificate issued  by him, requesting him to send per bearer the  cause

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of  the death of " Indumati ". This letter was sent  with  a copy, the idea being that the original would be retained  by the  Hospital and the copy returned with an  acknowledgement of the receipt of the original made on it.  Both these  were however  produced  from  the  police  custody  without   any endorsement  by  the hospital acknowledging the  receipt  of either.  The copy bore the following remark, "Diabetic coma, Dr.  N.  S.  Variava, G. T. Hospital." It is  clear  on  the evidence  that  the  endorsement had not been  made  by  Dr. Variava.  Dr. Anija also denied having made it though before the police she admitted that the words " Diabetic coma " had been  written  by her.  Dr. Mouskar said  that  neither  the original  nor the copy had ever come to him and  he  thought that the endorsement "Diabetic coma" might be in Dr. Anija’s hand  writing  but he could not say by whom the  words  "Dr. N.S.  Variava, G. T. Hospital" had been written adding  that the words " Dr. N. S. Variava " had not been written by  Dr. Variava.   The question as to who made the endorsement  will be discussed later. On  receipt of the death certificate from Dr.  Mouskar,  the Coroner’s office made on the letter of the police 531 dated  November  14, asking an inquest to be made,  which  I have  earlier  mentioned, an endorsement directing  that  no inquest was necessary as the Resident Medical Officer, G. T. Hospital had certified the cause of death and had issued the death  certificate.   On November 19, the  Coroner’s  office directed  that  the  dead  body  might  be  disposed  of  as unclaimed after taking a photograph of it.  A photograph  of the dead body was duly taken on the same day.  In the  mean- time the Grant Medical College had written to the Coroner on November  17, for authority to take over  certain  unclaimed dead  bodies  lying  in  the  J.J.  Hospital  mortuary,  for dissection purposes and thereupon the Coroner made an  order directing  that  the dead bodies might be made over  to  the Grant  Medical  College.  Pursuant to this order,  the  dead bodies, which included that of Laxmibai, were then made over to  the Grant ,Medical College on November 20,  1956.   When the  dead  body  of Laxmibai was about to be  taken  to  the dissection  hall, some scratches on the neck were  detected. The  Professor of Anatomy of the College did  not  thereupon allow the body to be dissected and brought the discovery  to the  notice  of the police.  The police then  wrote  to  the Coroner  that in view of this, a postmortem and  an  inquest might  be held.  Accordingly, under the instructions of  the Coroner,   Dr.  Jhala,  Police  Surgeon,  Bombay,   held   a postmortem  examination of the body of Laxmibai on  November 23.   He found no sign of decomposition in the body nor  any characteristic  smell of any recognisable poison.   He  also found the scratches on the neck to be postmortem.  Dr. Jhala sent  the  viscera to the Government Chemical  Examiner  who sent  the  report of his examination on December  19,  1956, wherein he stated that he was unable to detect any poison in the viscera.  Thereupon, Dr. Jhala submitted his  postmortem report stating that in his opinion death could have occurred on  account  of diabetic coma.  In the meantime,  after  the postmortem  examination, the body of Laxmibai had been  made over  to the Hindu Relief Society for cremation on  November 24 and the cremation had been duly carried out. 532 It is now necessary to go back to Poona and relate what  the appellant  did  after  Laxmibai’s  death.   To  describe  it summarily,   the  appellant  did  not  give  any   one   the information  of  Laxmibai’s  death  but  on  the   contrary. represented that she was alive and moving    about      from

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place  to place and in the meantime misappropriated most  of her moneys.      I  will  now  give some details of  his  activities  in relation  to Laxmibai’s moneys.  It will be remembered  that about  November 8, the appellant had taken from  Laxmibai  a notice to the Bank for withdrawal of money and a  withdrawal slip,  none of which bore any date.  The appellant  inserted on the notice of withdrawal the date November 15, 1956,  and lodged  it in the Bank on the same day or  soon  thereafter. On  the  withdrawal slip he inserted the date  November  19, 1956, and on November 20, presented it to the Bank and  drew out  a  sum  of  Rs.  5,000  from  Laxmibai’s  account.   He subsequently  put  in to the credit of her  account  diverse cheques  and  by April 1957, bad drawn out  by  forging  her signature  practically  the  whole  amount  in  her   credit totalling  about Rs. 10,000 including the sum of  Rs.  5,000 withdrawn on November 20, 1956.  The appellant also embarked on  a  systematic course of forgeries of  the  signature  of Laxmibai  on various fabricated documents,  including  share transfer  deeds,  as a result of which, before  the  end  of 1957,  he misappropriated a large part of the liquid  assets belonging  to  Laxmibai’s estate.  When some of  the  forged signatures  of Laxmibai had been doubted by the  authorities to  whom  they had been presented with the object  of  being acted upon, the appellant even went to the length of getting a woman to falsely impersonate Laxmibai before a  Magistrate and thereby procured the latter to certify forged signatures of  Laxmibai as genuine signatures.  He  also  clandestinely denuded Laxmibai’s flat of its entire contents.  None of her ornaments  has  been  recovered after  her  death.   In  the meantime,  he  had  been  falsely  representing  to  various persons,  including all friends and relatives  of  Laxmibai, that he had met her on several dates after November 13, when she was already 533 dead.   He  manufactured  various letters  purported  to  be written by her from distant places in India and addressed to her relatives in Poona stating that she was going round on a pilgrimage.  Eventually, he fabricated letters purported  to have  been written by her to her relatives in which  it  was stated  that she had married one Joshi and bad settled  down in a place called Rathodi near Jaipur -and did not intend to return  to Poona.  There is in fact no place of the name  of Rathodi.   His  idea in manufacturing these letters  was  to create a false impression in the minds of Laxmibai’s friends and relatives that she was still alive and this he did  with the object of gaining time to misappropriate her properties. It  is not necessary to go into the details of this part  of the  conduct.  The substance of it is that he made full  use of  the  situation  arising  out  of  Laxmibai’s  death   to misappropriate  by all kinds of dishonest means most of  her properties   and   to   facilitate   the    misappropriation assiduously spread the story that she was alive.  It may  be stated  that the appellant was put on -his trial on  charges of  misappropriation  and  other allied  charges  and  found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The  long  absence  of  Laxmibai  had  gradually  made   her relatives grow suspicious about her fate and they approached the police but no trace of Laxmibai could be found.  Several petitions  were sent to the higher police officers and  also to the Chief Minister of Bombay.  In the end, the matter was entrusted to Mr. Dhonde, Deputy Superintendent of Police, C. I.  D.,  Poona,  for  enquiry.   Mr.  Dhonde  made   various investigations   and   eventually   on   March   13,   1958, interrogated  the  appellant.  The appellant then  told  him

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that  be had taken Laxmibai to the G. T.  Hospital,  Bombay, and admitted her there, and that she died there on  November 13,  1956.  The police made enquiries at the G. T.  Hospital and  was able to find the clothes which Laxmibai  wore  when she  died.  These were identified by  Laxmibai’s  relations. The  photograph of the dead body of Laxmibai also helped  to prove  her identity.  After certain further  enquiries,  the police sent up the 68 534 appellant  for trial on a charge of murder of Laxmibai  with the result I have earlier mentioned. The  prosecution case is that the appellant caused  the death of Laxmibai by administering to her a poison which was undetectable.   On  the evidence in this case it has  to  be held, as the Courts below have done, that there are  poisons which cause death but are undetectable.  I do not wish to be understood  as  saying  that death by  poisoning  cannot  be proved without proof of detection of poison in the  deceased person’s  system  after his death.  I quite agree  that  the circumstances   may  be  such  that  the   only   reasonable conclusion that can be drawn is that death was an  unnatural death.   In  this view of the matter, I do not  consider  it necessary  to discuss the cases cited at the bar and in  the judgments of the Courts below.  They are all illustrative of the proposition that a crime can be proved by circumstantial evidence,  a  proposition which I fully accept.  In  one  of them, namely, Regina v. Onufrejczyk(1) guilt was held proved from  the  circumstances of the  case  notwithstanding  that there was no body or trace of a body, or any direct evidence as  to  the  manner  of  death  of  a  victim.   The   legal proposition  that arises in the present case may be  put  in the  words  of  Wills  in  his  treatise  on  Circumstantial Evidence  which has been quoted in the judgment of the  High Court: It  would  be  most unreasonable and lead  to  the  grossest injustice,  and  in some circumstances to impunity  for  the worst  of crimes, to require, as an imperative rule of  law, that  the  fact  of poisoning shall be  established  by  any special  and  exclusive medium of proof, when that  kind  of proof is unattainable, and specially if it has been rendered so  by  the act of the offender himself.  No  universal  and invariable rule, therefore, can be laid down; and every case must  depend upon its own particular circumstances; and  the corpus  delicti must, like anything else, be proved  by  the best  evidence reasonably capable of being adduced,  and  by such  an amount and combination of relevant  facts,  whether direct  or  circumstantial,  as  to  establish  the   factum probandum (1)  [1955] 1 Q. B. 388. 535 to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis.  (7th Ed., p.,385) ". In  the present case, therefore, the circumstances  must  be such  that  no other conclusion than that Laxmibai  died  of poisoning  and  that  the poison  was  administered  by  the appellant,  can reasonably be drawn.  The Courts below  have found  that the circumstances of this case  fully  establish this.   I have come to a different conclusion.  In my  view, the  circumstances  are  not such that from  them  the  only reasonable  conclusion to be drawn is that Laxmibai died  of poisoning.  If that conclusion cannot be drawn, of course no question of the appellant having poisoned her arises.  I may also  say  that if Laxmibai could be said to  have  died  of poisoning, I would have no reason to disagree with the  view

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of  the  Courts  below that it was  the  appellant  who  had administered the poison. I proceed now to consider the question whether Laxmibai  had died  of poisoning.  I do not suggest that poison had to  be found in her system.  In my view, if it could be established in  this case that Laxmibai had died an unnatural death  the conclusion would be inevitable that that unnatural death had been  brought  about by poison; no other kind  of  unnatural death could be possible on the facts of this case. The real question in this case then is whether Laxmibai  had died  an  unnatural death.  I think the  Courts  below  also considered  that  to be the only question in this  case.   I have  earlier  said  that  no poison  was  detected  in  the postmortem  examination.  So far as direct evidence  of  the cause  of  death  goes, which in this case  is  all  opinion evidence,  we have the evidence of three doctors.  All  that Dr.  Variava  said was that death was not  due  to  diabetic coma.   The Courts below have accepted this evidence  and  I find no reason to take a different view.  Then there is  Dr. Jhala,  who  conducted the postmortem examination.   He  had stated in the port-mortem examination report that the  cause of  death  was diabetic coma.  In his evidence in  Court  he said that the opinion stated in his report was not based  on his  pathological  findings  and  that  the  proper  way  of describing the cause of 536 death  would  be  by  stating  "  death  by  diabetes   with complications  ". He also referred to certain  complications such  as,  atheroma  of  aorta  with  slight  sclerosis   of coronary.  In the end he was asked by the Court, " Would you agree  with  the  view  that  the  proper  opinion  on   the pathological data available before you should have been that the  cause  of death was not ascertainable or could  not  be ascertained  ?"  His  answer was, " My  answer  is  that  on pathological data I would agree to the answer proposed.   We have  however  to  see the clinical data  also.   "  On  the clinical  data  he  would have said that death  was  due  to diabetes  with  complications,  but he  conceded  that  that opinion was somewhat speculative.  These two doctors  there- fore  did  not suggest that death was due to  any  unnatural cause.  Dr. Variava did not in his evidence say that he  had directed  the postmortem examination to be done  because  he suspected  any foul play.  It would appear that be  did  not suspect any foul play for he did not require the case to  be marked as a medico-legal case. The most important direct evidence as to the cause of  death and  on  which the prosecution has greatly relied,  is  the, opinion of Dr. Mehta who appears to be a medical man of some eminence.   All the papers connected with the  illnesses  of Laxmibai  and  the postmortem examination  report  bad  been given to him and he had made a thorough study of them.   The net result of this study would appear from his evidence, the relevant part of which I think it right now to set out.   He said: "  On a careful consideration of the entire material  placed before  me I am definitely of the opinion that the cause  of death  of Indumati Paunshe as mentioned in the  case  record and  the Coroner’s inquest, viz., diabetic coma,  cannot  be true.  In my opinion, the cause of death may probably be due to: (1)Administration of some unrecognisable poison, i.e.,  some poison  for  the detection of which there  are  no  definite chemical tests. (2)Administration  of  some recognisable  poison  for  which there are chemical tests, but which tests

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537 could  not  be obtained on account of deterioration  of  the poison  remaining  in the dead body which was  kept  in  the morgue for considerable time after death without  postmortem being   performed   and   which   was   already   undergoing decomposition prior to the actual postmortem examination  as is clear from the absence of rigor mortis.  Rigor mortis  is means  stiffening  of muscles.  The above opinion  that  the probable  cause  of death may be due  to  administration  of poison is further fortified by the fact that the  postmortem did  not reveal any definite pathological lesion to  account for the sudden rapid death of the deceased. The  question then arises whether she died a natural  death, i.e.,  due to any other disease or diseased condition.   The postmortem  notes  do  not  show  anything  abnormal  beyond congestion  of  organ is and tubercular focus  in  the  left lung.  Congestion of organs occurs in majority of the  cases after  death of the person and particularly more so when  so many   days  have  elapsed  between  death  and   postmortem examination.  Some decomposition is bound to be going on. There  is still possibility of death being due to poison  in spite  of the fact that the poison was not detected  in  the postmortem  examination.   Two reasons can be  assigned  for non-detection of poison: (1) There are no definite  chemical tests  for  each and every poison.  There are  some  poisons which cannot be detected on chemical analysis. (2) There may be  a recognisable poison in the sense that there are  tests for  its detection.  But the poison may not be  detected  on account of deterioration of the poison remaining in the body for  a considerable time before the  postmortem  examination and it has undergone decom. position or oxidation........... The  possibility of death being due to poisoning  cannot  be ruled out." 538 I  do  not  think that the Courts  below  thought  that  the evidence of Dr. Mehta established that death must have  been due  to  an  unnatural cause.  If they did,  I  find  myself unable  to agree with them.  The substance  of  Dr.  Mehta’s evidence  is  that  death may " probably be due  to  "  some poison,  "  the  probable  cause  of  death  maybe  due   to administration  of  some poison", the  posibility  of  death being  due to poisoning cannot be ruled out.  It  will  have been  seen that Dr. Mehta posed a question whether  Laxmibai had  died a natural death. That question he did  not  answer beyond stating that the postmortem examination did not  show anything   abnormal  beyond  congestion  of  organs  and   a tubercular  focus in the left lung and that such  congestion of organs occurs in the majority of cases after death. It is clear  that  Mr. Mehta could not say  with  conviction  that death had been caused by poisoning nor that death could  not have  been  due to natural causes.  The net  result  of  the evidence of the medical experts is clearly that it cannot be said with definiteness how death was caused.  In this  view, nothing  really turns on the fact that shortly prior to  her death Laxmibai was found to have been in good health,  which of  course  can only mean as good a health  as  a  confirmed invalid  like  her  could have.   It  cannot  be  definitely inferred from the fact that she was in good health that  she had  not  died a natural death.  If such  an  inference  was possible,  the doctors who gave evidence would have given  a clear  opinion but this they did not.   In  this  state  of the evidence  the  Courts  below  have founded  themselves  on various circumstances of  the  case, most  of  which  I have earlier related, in  coming  to  the conclusion  that Laxmibai bad met with an  unnatural  death.

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These circumstances I now proceed to consider. The  first  thing that I wish to discuss is  the  fact  that after Laxmibai’s death the appellant started on a systematic career  of  misappropriating  her assets.  I  am  unable  to conclude from this that the appellant had caused her  death. It  is reasonably possible to think that he made use of  the opportunity  that  came  is  way  on  Laxmibai’s  death   to misappropriate her                        539 properties and had not caused her death.  The fact that  the appellant   deliberately  kept  back  the   information   of Laxmibai’s death from her relatives and falsely created  the impression  in  their  minds that she was  alive,  does  not advance  the matter.  This was clearly done with a  view  to give  him  time  in  which  to  carry  out  his  scheme   of misappropriating  her properties.  I quite  concede  however that these circumstances may take on a different colour from other circumstances, but I have found no such circumstance.. The  next  circumstance is the conduct of the  appellant  in obtaining from Laxmibai her signatures on the undated notice of  withdrawal  to the Bank and the  withdrawal  slip.   The bodies  of  these documents are in the  handwriting  of  the appellant.  The Courts below have thought that the appellant obtained  the  signatures of Laxmibai on  blank  papers  and filled  them in the forms they now stand after the death  of Laxmibai  and  utilised them to misappropriate  her  moneys. They  came  to  this conclusion from  the  fact  that  these documents  were  admittedly  without  dates  and  had   been subsequently  dishonestly utilised.  It has been  held  from this that the appellant had during her life time a design on her  moneys and therefore it becomes likely that  he  caused her  death.  I am unable to agree with this conclusion.   It would be difficult to hold from the fact that the  appellant had a design on Laxmibai’s moneys that he had also a  design on her life or that her death was, an unnatural death.   But apart from that there is reason to think that when  Laxmibai signed these documents their bodies had already been written up.   That  reason is this.  It will be remembered  that  on November  12, 1956, the appellant had put to the  credit  of Laxmibai’s  account  in the Bank a dividend warrant  in  her favour for Rs. 2,607-6-0.  The balance to the credit of  her account  on  November 12, 1956, became as a result  of  this deposit,  Rs.  7,882-15.   Now it is  obvious  that  if  the appellant  had  filled  in  the  bodies  of  the  notice  of withdrawal  and  the  withdrawal slip  after  the  death  of Laxmibai he would not have mentioned the amounts therein  as Rs. 5,000 but would have increased it to a 540 figure  nearer  the balance because he undoubtedly  had  set about  to misappropriate the moneys in that account  and  in fact he actually withdrew almost the entire balance in  that account  later  by forging Laxmibai’s  signatures  on  other appropriate  documents. Therefore, it seems to me  that  the bodies  of the notice of withdrawal and the withdrawal  slip had  been written out before Laxmibai put her signatures  on them. Furthermore,  the  evidence clearly  establishes  that  even during Laxmibai’s life time the appellant used to present to the Bank cheques signed by Laxmibai for withdrawal of moneys and signed on the reverse of such cheques in acknowledgement of receipt of the moneys.  He also used to deposit moneys in the Bank to the credit of her account.  It is quite possible that   the  two  documents  mentioned  had  come  into   the appellant’s  possession  in  the usual  course  of  managing Laxmibai’s banking affairs.  The fact that Laxmibai had  not

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put  dates on the documents would indicate that it  was  not intended   that  they  would  be  presented  to   the   Bank immediately  for there is no reason to think  that  Laxmibai had  not noticed that the documents did not-bear  any  date. She  seems to have been quite a capable woman  managing  her own affairs well.  The Courts below have thought that  there was no need for her to have wanted to withdraw such a  large amount.   The appellant said that she wanted to  invest  the money  if),  some fixed deposit which would have  yielded  a higher  return  but  he actually lent it to  a  friend  whom however   he  refused  to  name.   The  Courts  below   have disbelieved the appellant’s case.  Even so it does not  seem to  me  possible  to  hold that Laxmibai  did  not  want  to withdraw  any moneys and the appellant had fraudulently  got her  to put her signatures on blankpapers.  I  have  earlier given  my  reason for this.  It was not  necessary  for  the appellant to have got her to sign blank papers and there  is nothing  to show that she would have done that even  if  the appellant had asked her. I  may here mention that no adverse inference can  be  drawn from the fact that the appellant put in the 541 dividend  warrant  to the credit of Laxmibai’s  account:  it proves  no guilt.  But it is said that the appellant  forged the  name  of Laxmibai on the back of it.   The  High  Court thought  that  this forgery proves that  the  appellant  had during the lifetime of Laxmibai entertained the intention to misappropriate her property.  I am wholly unable to see  how that  conclusion could be reached from this or how  in  fact the  forgery proves anything against the appellant.  By  the forgery,  as  it is called, the appellant  was  putting  the money into the account to which it lawfully belonged; he did not ,thereby give it a different destination.   Furthermore, he  need  not have signed her name himself.  In  the  normal course Laxmibai would have signed it herself if asked to  do so  and  given  it to the appellant for being  sent  to  the credit of her account.  There is no reason to think that she would  not have signed it if the appellant had asked her  to do  so.  The dividend warrant was in Laxmibai’s  favour  and had been drawn on the Bank of Maharashtra.  It was being put to her credit in the same Bank.  The Bank was therefore  not likely to scrutinise with any care the payee’s signature  on the dividend warrant.  That may have been nature reason  why it was left to the appellant to sign Laxmibai’s name on  the dividend warrant for putting it into the Bank.  But whatever view  is taken I cannot see how it helps at all  in  solving any  question  that arises in this case.   The  trial  Court found it a riddle and did not rely on it. Next,  it is said that the appellant falsely denied that  he travelled  in  the same compartment with Laxmibai  on  their journey  to Bombay.  The denial was no doubt false.  But  it had  been  made  at the hearing.  He  had  admitted  to  the doctors at the hospital and to the Poona police on  November 16, 1956, that he and the deceased had travelled in the same compartment.   This falsehood therefore does  not  establish that  the  death  of  Laxmibai was  an  unnatural  death,  a question  which I am now investigating.  The fact that  they travelled  in the same compartment may no doubt  have  given him  an opportunity to administer poison to her and to  that extent it is of course relevant, 542      It  is also said that there was a hospital  called  St. George’s  Hospital  within  a  few  yards  of  the  Victoria Terminus  Station  but the appellant  took  the  unconscious Laxmibai to the more distant G. T. ofHospital   with   an

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ulterior  purpose.  That purpose it is said was that in  the G.  T.  Hospital his friend Dr. Mouskar,  was  the  Resident Medical Officer and the appellant wanted to secure his help, if necessary, in preventing the discovery of the crime  that he  had committed.  The appellant said that he chose the  G. T. Hospital as he was familiar with it but not with the  St. George’s Hospital.  This seems to me to be too insignificant a thing.  The St. George’s Hospital was no doubt very  near, but the G. T. Hospital was not very far away either.   There is nothing to show that the appellant knew that Dr.  Mouskar was  on duty on the day in question.  There is  neither  any evidence  to show how much the two were friendly or how  far Dr.   Mouskar  would  have  gone  to  help  the   appellant. Furthermore,  as  the appellant had  administered  a  poison which  was  undetectable,  it  is not  clear  what  help  he anticipated  he would require from Dr. Mouskar.   Again,  he must  have known that as the Resident Medical  Officer,  Dr. Mouskar  was not in charge of the treatment of  patients  in the hospital but only performed administrative functions and that  the unconscious Laxmibai would have to be  treated  by other  doctors.   It  cannot be said  that  if  these  other doctors  found anything wrong, Dr. Mouskar could  have  done much to help the appellant.  So it seems to me impossible to draw any inference against the appellant from the fact  that he  had taken the unconscious Laxmibai to the  comparatively distant  G. T. Hospital.  It is then pointed out  that  when Laxmibai  was  admitted to the G. T. Hospital,  she  had  no ornaments on her person and no moneys with her and even  her bag  and bedding had disappeared.  It is suggested that  the appellant  had removed them and that this again proves  that he had conceived the idea of misappropriating her properties even during her life time which supports the theory that  he caused her death.  Now the bedding and bag can be  dismissed at once, 543 There  is no evidence as to what they contained.  They  were of  small sizes.  It is reasonable to think that in the  bag Laxmibai  had taken a few wearing apparels which  she  might need  for  her stay in Bombay which the evidence  shows  she thought  would not be of more than four days.  The  box  and the   bedding,   must,   therefore,  have   been   of   very insignificant value.  As regards ornaments, the evidence  is that  usually she wore certain ornaments which might  be  of some value.  None of the witnesses, however, who saw her the day  she left Poona, has said that they found  ornaments  on her person.  It is not at all unlikely that as she was going to  Bombay and was not sure where she would have to  put  up there,  she  had  as  a measure of  safety,  taken  off  the ornaments  she  usually wore, before she left  Poona.   Then again, if the appellant had taken off the ornaments from the person  of  Laxmibai he must have done it in  the  train  or while  taking  her to the hospital.  Now it is too  much  to assume that in the compartment in which they were travelling there  were  no  other  passengers.   The  removal  of   the ornaments would have been noticed by the other passengers or if done later, by the stretcher bearers or the taxi  driver. None  of  these persons was called.  Neither  is  there  any evidence that any search for them had been made.  Therefore, it  seems to me that on the evidence on record it cannot  be said  definitely  that the appellant removed  any  ornaments from the person of the unconscious Laxmibai.  With regard to the  money, she must have brought some with her to meet  her expenses  in  Bombay.  It is more than likely that  she  had entrusted  the moneys to the appellant for safety which  the appellant never returned.  There is no evidence that she had

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more  than Rs. 50 with her and there is no reason  to  think that she was carrying a large sum.  The disappearance of the money  does not prove that the appellant had  conceived  the design of getting rid of her. Then  we  find  the appellant  describing  Laxmibai  in  the Hospital by the name ’Indumati Paunshe’.  It is said he  did this  to  prevent her identity being  discovered  after  her death and that this shows that he had 544 already  poisoned  her and knew that she was going  to  die. Now, so far as the name Indumati is concerned, that was  one of her names.  The -papers that the appellant maintained  in connection  with  Laxmibai’s treatment show that  he  mostly called  her by that name and never called her Laxmibai.   He said  that he was used to calling her by her maiden name  of Indumati  Ponkshe and gave that name to Dr. Ugale  by  sheer force  of habit.  Dr. Ugale however said that as he did  not follow  the surname he asked the appellant to spell  it  and took  it  down  as  spelt, namely,  as  "  Paunshe  ",.  The Appellant  denies that he gave the name Paunshe but says  he said  " Ponkshe ". The appellant’s version receives  support from the fact that the hospital clerk who also took down the name for another record of the hospital as the appellant was giving  it to Dr. Ugale, took it down as " Indumati  Pankshe ".  Therefore, there is some doubt whether Dr.  Ugale  heard the name correctly. However that may be, I doubt if the name Paunshe indicates that the appellant gave it with a view  to prevent  disclosure of identity.  It is said that  his  plan was  to  disappear after Laxmibai’s death so that  her  body would become unclaimed and be disposed of as such.  If  that were  Bo, then nothing would turn on the name.  It  is  only when  people  came  to  know that a woman  of  the  name  of Indumati  Paunshe had died that the question as to  who  she was  would  have  &risen.   In view of  the  fact  that  the appellant had given Indumati’s address as care of himself at Poona,  it would be known that she belonged to Poona.  I  am very  doubtful  if  an enquiry made at  Poona  for  Indumati Paunshe would have kept back the real identity.  Indumati or Laxmibai  had disappeared mysteriously; her maiden name  was Ponkshe.   People interested in her would surely  have  been led  by  the  name Indumati Paunshe to  enquire  if  it  was Laxmibai Karve.  So it seems to me that if the appellant had really wanted that the woman he took to the hospital  should never  be  discovered to have been Laxmibai, he  would  have used a totally different name.  I am unable to hold that the use  of the name " Indumati Paunshe " is any clear  evidence of   the  guilty  intention  of  the  appellant.   In   this connection I have to refer to the 545 appellants  letter  of  November 14, 1956,  to  the  G..  T. Hospital in which he pointed out that in the hospital record the name had been taken down as " Pannshe " that is s,  with an  extra " n " and this should be corrected. By  this  time the  appellant had clearly conceived the idea that the  news of  the death of Laxmibai should be prevented from  becoming public.   He  had also misled the  hospital  authorities  by informing them that Indumati’s brother would arrive to  take over  her  body;  as already stated,  she  had  no  brother. Therefore this attempted correction in the name by  deleting the extra " n " is really irrelevant; the extra " n "  would not in any event have made the discovery of the identity  of the dead person easier.  What led the appellant to make this attempt cannot however be ascertained. Then I have to consider the fact that the appellant told Dr. Ugale  that Laxmibai had become unconscious of a  hysterical

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fit and she had a history of similar attacks before.  It  is said  that this story about hysterical fit is false and  had been conceived to hide the fact that she had been  poisoned. The  appellant had denied that he had  mentioned  hysterical fit  to Dr. Ugale and said that he had only stated that  she had  suddenly  become unconscious.  That  he  had  mentioned sudden onset of unconsciousness in the train is admitted  by Dr. Ugale.  It is somewhat curious that the appellant  would have  mentioned  both  "  hysterical fit  "  and  "  patient suddenly   became  unconscious  in  the  train  ".   It   is significant  that "hysterical fit" was entered in  the  case paper by Dr. Ugale under the head " Provisional Diagnosis  " a  thing, for which I think, the doctor in charge  has  some responsibility.   It may also be stated that Dr.  Anija  did not, say that the appellant mentioned hysterical fit to her. In  these circumstances I have some doubt if  the  appellant had in fact mentioned hysterical fit " to Dr. Ugale. I  will however proceed-on the basis that the appellant  did mention hysterical fit to Dr. Ugale.  Now, there is evidence that  for  nine years upto 1948 Laxmibai had  suffered  from hysterical fits.  There is no 546 evidence  one  way or the other whether she  had  such  fits thereafter.   If  she had not, the  prosecution  could  have easily produced evidence of it.  The only evidence on  which the   prosecution  relied  was  that  of   Laxmibai’s   son, Ramachandra.   All  that he said was that between  1943  and 1948 his mother suffered from fits and that in 1956 when  he had  come  to  Poona for his marriage  his  mother  was  not suffering -from fits.  ’Now, Ramachandra does not appear  to have much knowledge of his mother’s health.  He did not even know  what  kind  of fits these were  nor  that  his  mother suffered  from  diabetes.   Apart from  the  nature  of  his evidence,  it  has  to  be remembered  that  he  was  living separtely from his mother since 1946 and was away from Poona since 1952.  It cannot therefore be said that it would  have been  improbable  for  the appellant to  have  thought  that Laxmibai had a relapse of a hysterical fit. I now come to the fact that the address of Laxmibai given by the  appellant  to  the hospital  authorities  was  his  own address.   It is said that he did so deliberately to  ensure all  communications concerning her from the hospital  coming to  him;  that he knew that Laxmibai was going  to  die  and wanted  that  nobody else would know of her death.   I  find some  difficulty  in appreciating this.  I do not  see  what communication could be addressed by the hospital authorities to Laxmibai after her death or when she was lying ill in the hospital.   Further  there was no other  address  which  the appellant  could  have given.  Laxmibai lived alone  in  her flat  and when she was away, there would be no one there  to receive any communication addressed to her at that  address. Her  only  son  Ramachandra was away  from  Poona.  She  was clearly more friendly with the appellant than with her other relatives, none of whom was a very near relative.  In  these circumstances  and particularly as he had taken Laxmibai  to Bombay  it  seems only natural that he would  give  his  own address.  Again if he had given Laxmibai’s own address, that would  have served his purpose as well for he had a room  in her house and because of his friendly relation with 547 Laxmibai,  would  have  been in charge of her  flat  in  her absence as he in fact was.  It would not have been difficult for  him to ensure that any letters that came ’for  Laxmibai would reach him.  He could also have given an entirely false name and address and disappeared from the scene  altogether;

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the   body  of  Laxmibai  would  then,  whether  there   was postmortem examination or not, have been disposed of in  due time  as an unclaimed body and nobody would have ever  known what   had  happened  to  Laxmibai.   Indeed,  it   is   the prosecution  case  that this was the  appellant’s  plan  and things  happened just as he had planned and that is  why  he deliberately  brought Laxmibai to the hospital and gave  his own  address.  What strikes me is that this plan would  have worked with any false address given.  I am therefore  unable to  think  that  the fact that the appellant  gave  his  own address is a circumstance which can be reasonably  explained only on the hypothesis of his guilt. I  come now to the most important circumstance on which  the Courts  below have strongly rested their conclusion.  It  is said  that the endorsement made on the hospital  case  paper reading " Asked for postmortem " under the direction of  Dr. Variava  had been crossed out and under the heading "  Cause of  death  " in that paper the entry " diabetic coma  "  had been  interpolated.  The Courts below have found that it  is the appellant who had procured these alterations to be  made with  the  help of his friend Dr. Mouskar.  If this  is  so, then  no  doubt  it  would be  a  very  strong  circumstance pointing  to  the  guilt  of  the  appellant  for  the  only reasonable  explanation of this act would be that he  wanted to prevent a postmortem examination which might reveal  that Laxmibai  had  been poisoned.  As I have already  said,  the alterations  had no doubt been made.  But in my view,  there is  no  evidence  whatever to show that  the  appellant  had anything to do with them. Before  state my reasons for this view, it  is necessary  to set  out  the relevant evidence on this  point.   Dr.  Anija admits  that she made the alterations but she says that  she did it in these circumstances: After 548 she had made the endorsement "Asked for postmortem " on  the case  paper, she asked the sister in charge of the  ward  to send ’the case -paper to Dr. Mouskar whose duty it was to do the  needful  as  regards the  postmortem  examination,  and herself followed Dr. Variava on a round of the wards,  which took  her about an hour.  About 12-30 p.m. she proceeded  to Dr.  Mouskar’s  office  to make enquiries  as  to  when  the postmortem  examination was to be held. She met  Dr.  Saify, the  Registrar of Unit No. 1 of the hospital in  which  Ward No.  12  was included, outside Dr.  Mouskar’s  office.   Dr. Saify  had the case paper in his hand and he told  her  that Dr.  Mouskar  thought that there was no need for  holding  a postmortem  examination as the case had been treated as  one of diabetic coma and also asked her to cancel the  direction about  the postmortem examination and to show in the  column meant  for cause of death, " Diabetic coma ". As  Dr.  Saify was  her official superior, she accordingly carried out  his directions  and  made the alterations in the case  paper  as required. I will now refer to Dr. Mouskar’s evidence on this aspect of the  case which was as follows: The case paper  relating  to Laxmibai  came to his office at 1 p.m. on November  13.   At that time the endorsement " Asked for postmortem " was still there  and diabetic coma had not been shown as the cause  of death.  There was arrangement in the hospital for postmortem examination  but  he  did  not proceed  to  arrange  for  it immediately  as on the face of it it was not a  medico-legal case  nor a road-side case.  It was the invariable  practice to  ask  for the permission of the Coroner for  holding  the postmortem  examination in all cases but before doing so  it was necessary in nonmedico-legal cases to get the permission

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of the relatives of the deceased for holding the  postmortem examination.   In that view of the matter at 2 p.m. he  sent the telegram to the appellant at his address as appearing in the case paper.  He never met the appellant in the hospital. On the next day, that is, November 14, about 4 p.m. he wrote to  the  police  to  remove the  dead  body  to  their  air- conditioned morgue in the J. J. Hospital 549 for better preservation as no reply to the telegram had been received.  till then.  He sent a copy of this letter to  the Coroner.   On the morning of November 15, somebody from  the Coroner’s  office rang him up and asked him about the  final diagnosis.  He thereupon sent the case paper through a  ward boy  to  Unit  No.  1 with an oral  message  either  to  the Honorary physician,, the Registrar or the Assistant Houseman as  to  whether they were able to tell him about  the  final diagnosis  and  whether they still  insisted  on  postmortem examination.   He did this as there was no  final  diagnosis uptil  then and as the physicians often changed their  minds in  a non-medico-legal case.  After about half an  hour  the case  paper  came back to him and he found  that  the  final diagnosis  had  been  stated as " Diabetic coma  "  and  the endorsement "Asked for postmortem" had been crossed out.  He then  wrote  out the death certificate and sent  it  to  the Coroner. The  Courts  below have disbelieved both Dr. Anija  and  Dr. Mouskar as to their respective versions regarding the manner in  which  the, case paper had been altered.  It has  to  be noticed  that a art from the evidence of these two  doctors, there  is  no other evidence on this question.   The  Courts below have held that the alteration was made by Dr. Anija at the  direction of Dr. Mouskar and that Dr. Mouskar had  been persuaded  to  give that direction by  the  appellant  whose friend he was, on a representation that he, the’  appellant, was the patient’s old family doctor and knew the case to  be one  of  diabetic  coma and that it would  save  the  family humiliation if the dead body was not cut up for a postmortem examination.  They also held that the alteration was made on November 13, soon after the death of Laxmibai and before the appellant had left Bombay for Poona.  They have further held that Dr. Mouskar- got the alteration made as a friendly  act for the appellant and that he was in no way a conspirator in the  crime.   There is no direct evidence  to  support  this finding  but it has been inferentially arrived at  from  the evidence of these two doctors.  The  reasons  on which this finding is based  may  be  thus stated: (a) Dr. Mouskar was an old friend of the 70 550 appellant;  (b) both Drs.  Anija and Mouskar had  lied  with regard  to  this part of their evidence; (c)  Dr.  mouskar’s conduct  after  the death of Laxmibai and  his  evidence  in court showed that he wanted to assist the appellant; (d) Dr. Anija  being  very  much  junior to  Dr.  Mouskar  had  been prevailed upon by the latter to give false evidence; and (e) lastly, that no ’one excepting the appellant could have been interested in avoiding the postmortem examination. As  to the first reason, the only evidence on this  question is  that of Dr. Mouskar.  All that he said was that in  1934 he and the appellant had studied Inter Science in a  college in Poona together and that he had stayed in Poona for  three different periods, namely 1922-26, 1931-36 and 1948-51.   He also  said that while studying together he had come to  know the  appellant by name but had never talked to him  and  had never come in contact with him since 1934.  The Courts below

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have  disbelieved  the  later part of the  evidence  of  Dr. Mouskar  and  have  held  that he  and  the  appellant  were friendly.   This finding does not seem to me to be based  on strong  grounds.   No reason has been given as  to  why  Dr. Mouskar  should  be  disbelieved.  The  prosecution  led  no evidence to show that the two were friendly.  No witness has been  found  to say that the two were seen talking  to  each other  in the hospital.  It has not been noticed,  that  the difference in age between the two was twelve years. I will take the, next three reasons together.  They are that Drs.   Anija and Mouskar had both lied and that the  conduct and  the  evidence of Dr. Mouskar showed that he  wanted  to help  the. appellant and lastly, that Dr. Anija  gave  false evidence only as she dared not estrange Dr. Mouskar who held a  much higher position.  There is no doubt that  Dr.  Anija told lies.  The first lie was that she had tested the  urine at  6-30 a.m. for acetone.  She also interpolated  into  the case  paper an entry showing that she had found  acetone  in the  urine  which  she said she examined at  6-30  a.m.  Dr. Variava  said  that he took her to task for  diagnosing  the case  as diabetic coma without having tested the  urine  for acetone, which she told him she had not 551 that  acetone  had been found on the  first  examination  of urine  was  not there when he saw it at about  11  a.m.  The second  lie which Dr. Anija said was that she put through  a telephone  call  to Dr. Variava about 7 a.m.  and  told  him about  the  symptoms  she had found and that  she  had  been giving  insulin.  She said that Dr. Variava agreed with  her diagnosis  and asked her to continue the treatment  she  had started.   That  this is untrue, will appear from  the  fact that Dr. Variava denied that this talk had taken place.  Dr. Variava’s  recollection  is supported by the  fact  that  on arrival  at  the  hospital he doubted if  the  case  was  of diabetic  coma and the treatment given was the correct  one. Further,  there  is  a call book in the  hospital  on  which telephone  calls made by the house physicians  are  entered. There  is no entry there showing a call having been made  by Dr.  Anija  on Dr.Variava. The third lie that she  said  was that  it  was Dr. Saify who told her outside  Dr.  Mouskar’s office  to  make the alteration in the case paper.   It  has been clearly established that Dr. Saify was not on  November 13 in Bombay at all.  He was then on leave and in Indore. I come now to Dr. Mouskar.  No’ art of his evidence has been directly   found  to  be  false.   The  Courts  below   have disbelieved him on improbabilities.  The first improbability they found was in Dr. Mouskar’s explanation that he did  not arrange  for  the postmortem examination immediately  as  he considered  the permission of the Coroner and the  relatives of  the  deceased necessary before  holding  the  postmortem examination  and  that this was the invariable  practice  in non-medico-legal cases.  I do not know why it should be said that  this practice is improbable.  The prosecution did  not lead any evidence to show that there was no such practice as spoken  to by ’Dr.  Mouskar.  That the Coroner’s  permission had to be taken would be borne out by the fact as  appearing in the correspondence, that the police asked the Coroner  to hold  an inquest as the cause of death was not  known.   The Courts below referred to the telegram that Dr. Mouskar  sent to the appellant at about 2 p.m. on November 13 and observed that  if Dr. Mouskar had delayed the postmortem  examination only in order to obtain the 552 consent  of the relatives, then the telegram would not  have asked  the appellant to arrange for the removal of the  dead

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body.  Dr. Mouskar said that he had intended to ask for  the permission  to  hold  the postmortem  examination  when  the appellant  appeared on receipt of his telegram.  The  Courts below have not accepted this explanation.  It does not  seem to  me  that this explanation is so absurd that it  must  be rejected.  No other view would fit in with the circumstances of the case.  This I will explain now. It has to be remembered that the finding of the Courts below is that Dr. Mouskar was not in any sense a conspirator  with the appellant in the crime.  The learned Advocate General of Bombay, who appeared for the respondent, also made it  clear that  he  did  not  suggest that  Dr.  Mouskar  was  in  any conspiracy.   On  the  evidence on the record  it  would  be impossible  to hold that Dr. Mouskar was in  any  conspiracy with the appellant.  There is no reason whatever for him  to have  done  that.  There is no evidence of  such  friendship between  the  appellant and Dr. Mouskar from  which  it  can possibly  be inferred that Dr. Mouskar would have  become  a party  to  secreting  a diabolical crime  committed  by  the appellant.  The trial Court expressly held, "I do not  think that  at  that  time Dr. Mouskar  realised  that  there  was anything  suspicious about the death of Laxmibai, nor  do  I think  that  he was aiding or abetting  the  suppression  of truth by cancelling the postmortem examination.  " The  High Court also took the same view.  We then come to this that if Dr.  Mouskar had procured the cancellation of the  direction for postmortem examination, he had done so without  thinking that  there  was  anything suspicious  about  the  death  of Laxmibai,  and only to oblige his friend, the appellant,  by saving  the  family  of the; deceased  from  humiliation  by cutting  up her body.  Now that being so, when  Dr.  Mouskar got  the direction cancelled at the appellant’s request,  he would  naturally expect the appellant to take charge of  the body  and  to  remove  it  for  cremation.   Evidently,  the appellant  had disappeared for otherwise Dr.  Mouskar  would not have sent him a telegram to Poona.  What would.have been the normal reactions then of an 553 innocent man in Dr. Mouskar’s position?  He would have  been very much surprised.  He would have thought that he had been let  down.  It is not too much to think that he  would  have grown suspicious.  As an innocent man, as he has been  found to  be, the only thing he could then possibly have done  was to  have restored the direction for  postmortem  examination and  to  proceed to take steps to have it  held.   I  cannot imagine  that  an innocent man in such  circumstances  would have  acted  otherwise.   It will  be  remembered  that  the appellant’s reply to the telegram was not received for  over two days and in the meantime Dr. Mouskar did nothing in  the matter.   I  find it impossible to hold  that  Dr.  Mouskar, innocent as he was, would have waited all this time and done nothing  about the postmortem examination at all.  It  would have  been  impossible  for him then to have  asked  if  the doctors  in  charge of the case still  wanted  a  postmortem examination  as he actually did.  If he was not a  party  to any  conspiracy  with  the  appellant,  I  cannot  think  it possible  for him to have sent the telegram to Poona  asking the  appellant  to  remove  the  body  after  he  had   been innocently  made to obtain a cancellation of  the  direction and  found that the appellant had disappeared.  I  may  also add that if the appellant had duped Dr. Mouskar and procured him to obtain a cancellation of the direction for postmortem examination, it would be extremely unlikely for him to  have taken  the  risk of disappearing from the  hospital  without making any arrangement for the disposal of the body for then

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he  could not be sure ,whether the postmortem would be  held or  not.   It would have been more natural for him  to  have taken  over the body and cremated it.  That would  not  have affected his design, as alleged by the prosecution, to  have evidence  of  the natural death of Laxmibai created  and  to have  kept  back  the  know]-edge  of  her  death  from  her relatives.   I therefore think that the telegram instead  of showing that Dr. Mouskar had already obtained a cancellation of the direction for postmortem examination rather indicates that  that direction had not till then been cancelled as  is Dr. Mouskar’s own evidence.  This makes the explanation 554 of  Dr.  Mouskar  as  to why he sent  the  telegram  a  very probable explanation.   Now,  there  are other things which would  support  Dr. Mouskar’s  evidence.  On November 14, about 4 p.m. he  wrote to  the  police intimating them that a  Hindu  female  named Indumati  Panshe who had been admitted into the hospital  on November  13 at 5-45 a.m. for treatment of  hysterical  fits had  died the same day at 11-30 a.m.’ He further  stated  in that  letter  that a telegram had been sent to  the  address given  at  the  time of the admission  of  the  patient  but without a response and requested that the dead body might be removed  to the J. J. Hospital morgue.  This would  indicate two things.  First, that Dr. Mouskar was surprised at having received  no answer from the appellant to his  telegram  and that being so, if he had been innocently induced to get  the case  paper  altered,  he  would  not  have  permitted   the alteration  to remain there.  The second thing it  shows  is that  Dr.  Mouskar  even in the  afternoon  of  November  14 referred  to hysterical fits as the illness of the  patient. This  would be impossible if the prosecution case  is  true, namely, that at about 1 p.m. on November 13, Dr. Mouskar had procured Dr. Anija to state in the case paper that the cause of death was diabetic coma. The next thing that the Courts below have found against  Dr. Mouskar  is  that his story of having received  a  telephone call from the Coroner’s office on the morning of November 15 asking for the final diagnosis of the case was unbelievable. I find no reason to disbelieve Dr. Mouskar.  His evidence is strongly supported by the death certificate which he  issued on  that date stating diabetic coma as the cause  of  death. There  is  no reason to think that Dr.  Mouskar  would  have issued this certificate on the 15th unless he had been asked about  the cause of death.  Furthermore, the police on  that date had actually wanted to know the cause of death as  will appear  from  their letter of November 15.   If  the  police could ask, I do not see why the Coroner’s office could  not. In  that  letter the police asked Dr. Mouskar  to  send  per bearer  the cause of death to enable them to dispose of  the dead body. I have earlier referred to this letter.  It is on a copy 555 of  this  that the endorsement " Diabetic coma,  Dr.  N.  S. Variava,  G. T. Hospital" had been made.  There is no  other explanation as to why Dr. Mouskar sent the death certificate on  this date and not on any other date.  Indeed, if he  was under the impression that the appellant or a relative of the deceased  would  come  and  take  charge  of  the-body   for cremation,  as the prosecution case must be, then  he  would not  have issued the death certificate for that  was  wanted only  to  enable  the police to dispose of  the  dead  body. Therefore  it seems to me likely that Dr. Mouskar  had  been asked  by the Coroner about the cause of death.  Now  if  he was  so  asked, it does not strike me as  wholly  improbable

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that  he  asked the physicians in charge whether  they  were then  in  a position to state the cause of  death  or  still insisted  on  a  postmortem  examination.   It  has  to   be remembered  that  till  then no suspicion  attached  to  the case..  Dr.  Mouskar said that he had  seen  the  physicians change their opinion in such matters and had therefore asked whether a postmortem examination was still required.  It has also to be remembered that Dr. Mouskar had no knowledge that the  direction for postmortem examination had been given  by Dr.  Variava.   All that he knew was that such  a  direction appeared over the signature of Dr. Anija.  It does not  seem to  me  improbable that Dr. Mouskar on being  asked  by  the Coroner  to state the cause of death would have enquired  of the  physicians in charge about it.  If this version is  not true, then the only other probable theory would be that  the alteration  in  the case paper had been made at  1  p.m.  on November  13,  which  as  I have  earlier  said,  cannot  be accepted  in view of the telegram and the other  records  in this  case.   It was also said that  Dr.  Mouskar’s  version cannot  be accepted for it was not possible for him to  make enquiries  about the cause of death through a ward  boy.   I think   this  would  be  too  insignificant  a  ground   for disbelieving Dr. Mouskar. I may now deal with the letter of the police dated  November 15  to  Dr. Mouskar asking for the cause of the  death.   It will  be remembered that this letter was sent along  with  a copy of it and on the copy the endorsement " Diabetic  coma, Dr. W. S. Variava. 556 G.  T.  Hospital " had been made.  Dr. Mouskar  denied  that these letters ever came to him.  The Courts below have  been unable  to accept his denial.  Their view is that it is  Dr. Mouskar  who got the endorsement set out above, to  be  made and  is falsely denying it.  I am unable to  appreciate  why Dr.  Mouskar should falsely deny it.  He was  innocent.   He had  on  that date issued the death certificate.   He  could easily   have  admitted  the  fact,  if  he  had  made   the endorsement  or got it made.  Now it seems to me that  there is  no  evidence  that the letter was  produced  before  Dr. Mouskar.  In normal course, as spoken to by police Inspector Kantak, who had written this letter, the original would have been retained at the office of Dr. Mouskar and only the copy would have come back to the police with an acknowledgment of the  receipt of the original endorsed on it.  That  did  not happen.   Both the copy and the original were received  back by  Kantak.  The bearer who was sent to deliver  the  letter was  not  called.  There is therefore no  evidence  whatever that  the  letters  were  actually  delivered  or  what  had actually  happened.   On the contrary, the  return  of  both copies  to  the  police would show that they  had  not  been delivered to Dr. Mouskar for if the letter had been deliver- ed,  then there is no reason why Dr. Mouskar would not  have given  a formal reply to it stating that diabetic  coma  was the  cause  of death.  He would have had  no  difficulty  in doing  so  because  on  the  same  day  he  sent  the  death certificate mentioning diabetic coma as the cause of  death. He had no reason to take to subterfuge and to get the  words "  Diabetic  coma.   Dr. N. S. Variava.   G  T.  Hospital  " written on the copy by somebody.  It would therefore  appear that  there is no reason to disbelieve Dr. Mouskar  when  he said that he bad not received the letters and had nothing to do  with  the endorsement made on the copy  of  the  letter. What  might  have happened was that  the  death  certificate having  been  earlier  issued,  some  clerk  in  the  office returned   these   letters  and  by  way  of   an   informal

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communication  of the cause of death made the endorse.  ment on the copy.  It may be stated here that Dr. Anija  admitted to  the  police  that the words " Diabetic  coma  "  in  the endorsement had been written by her 557 but in court she denied that she had written them.  This  is another instance which makes me greatly doubt her  veracity. It  may be that she had written the words " Diabetic coma  " and  got  some  one  else  to write  out  the  rest  of  the endorsement. I  come  now to the last fact which the  Courts  below  have thought  fit to disbelieve, in the evidence of Dr.  Mouskar. I  have  earlier  mentioned that  when  Laxmibai  was  lying unconscious  in  Ward  No. 12, Dr. Anija had  sent  for  the Registrar.   Dr.  Anija stated that the Registrar  whom  she sent  for  was  Dr. Saify.  This is untrue for,  as  I  have already said, it has been proved clearly that Dr. Saify  was not  in Bombay at all on that day.  Now it appears that  the hospital kept a call book in which a House Physician wanting to call the Registrar would make an entry and send it to the Registrar.   This  call book was produced  on  September  2, 1958, and it showed that Dr. Anija had herself written  down the name of Dr. Shah as the Registrar whom she was  calling. What therefore had happened was that Dr. Saify being away on leave  to the knowledge of Dr. Anija, she had sent the  call to  Dr. Shah.  This call book conclusively proves  that  Dr. Anija’s  statement that she had been told by Dr. Saify,  the Registrar,  to  make  the alteration in the  case  paper  is false.   Dr. Mouskar had said in his evidence that he  could not  trace  this call book.  The Courts below  have  thought that he was lying and was deliberately preventing this  call book  from  coming to light so that Dr. Anija might  not  be contradicted  by her own writing that it was Dr.  Shah  whom she had sent for which in its turn would show that her story that  it  was  Dr.  Saify who had  asked  her  to  make  the alteration  in the case paper was false.  Now Dr.  Mouskar’s evidence  was  concluded  on August 25,  1958,  and  he  had retired  from the office of the Resident Medical Officer  on August 14 preceding.  Dr. Anija’s evidence was taken down on August 18 and August 19, 1958. 1 do not see why if the  call book  was  considered to be of that importance,  the  police could not produce it after Dr. Mouskar had left office.   It was  actually produced from the hospital and must have  been lying  there all the time.  The next thing to be noticed  is that there is 558 nothing  on  the  record  to  show  that  Dr.  Mouskar   was interested  in  establishing that Dr. Saify was on  duty  on November 13 and therefore prevented the call book from being produced.   In fact, Dr. Mouskar in his evidence  about  Dr. Saify  stated that " he was not working in the  hospital  on the  13, 14 and 15 November., I think also that he  was  not staying in his quarters during that period and I did not see Dr.  Saify  on these days at all." Therefore,  there  is  no basis for suggesting that Dr. Mouskar deliberately prevented the  production  of the call book.  I may  here  state  that there  is nothing in the evidence of Dr. Mouskar which  goes to show that he was supporting Dr. Anija in any of her lies. The  Courts below have excused the lies of Dr. Anija in  the view  that she had told them as she dared not  estrange  Dr. Mouskar.   Again, there seems to me to be no basis for  this finding.   There is nothing on the record to show  that  Dr. Anija expected anything from Dr. Mouskar or would have  been in any difficulty if she had told the truth even at the risk of  putting Dr. Mouskar in a difficult situation.  There  is

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no  evidence that Dr. Anija had any talk directly  with  Dr. Mouskar concerning the case of the unconscious Laxmibai  and therefore  she  could not and did  not  directly  contradict anything that Dr. Mouskar said.  Again, it is clear from the evidence that Dr. Anija had left the hospital on January 31, 1957.  She had worked there without any remuneration.  There is no evidence that she had anything to do with the hospital or  its  Resident Medical Officer, after she  had  left  the hospital.  Again, on the date that Dr. Anija gave  evidence, Dr.  Mouskar  had  already retired from his  office  at  the hospital.   In these circumstances, I find no  justification for the conclusion that Dr. Anija had lied only out of  fear of Dr. Mouskar.  I might also point out that the only lie in Dr. Anija’s evidence which the Courts below thought she said out  of  fear or at the persuasion of Dr.  Mouskar  was  her statement  that it was Dr. Saify who had told her  that  Dr. Mouskar   had   wanted  the  direction  as   to   postmortem examination  crossed  out and diabetic coma written  as  the cause of death.  I have earlier stated that dr. Mouskar  has gone against this part of 559 Dr.  Anija’s  evidence by saying that Dr. Saify was  not  in Bombay  on the day in question.  It is clear therefore  that it was not Dr. Mouskar who had wanted that Dr. Anija  should interpose Dr. Saify between him and her in the matter of the direction  for  altering the case paper.   Further,  if  Dr. Mouskar  really wanted that Dr. Anija should put  the  blame for  the alteration on somebody else, then Dr.  Anija  would not have mentioned that Dr. Saify told her that Dr. Mouskar, had wanted the alteration.  She would simply have said  that it  was  at  Dr.  Saify’s  order  only  that  she  made  the alteration  or  put  the responsibility on  Dr.  Shah.   The Courts  below  have  been unable to explain  why  Dr.  Anija brought in Dr. Saify at all.  I think this is capable of  an explanation  as  I  will  show  later.   The  net   position therefore  is that Dr. Anija was clearly lying; there is  no clear  proof  that  Dr. Mouskar had lied  at  all.   On  the contrary,  his  evidence  and  conduct  would  seem  to   be consistent  with the contemporaneous record and there is  no material  on which it can be found that Dr. Anija  told  the lies as she was afraid of Dr. Mouskar. I  come  now to the last reason on which  the  Courts  below found that it must have been the appellant who procured  the alteration in the case paper.  It has been said that no  one else  was interested in getting that done.  I take  it  that this  does  not  mean  a  finding  that  the  appellant  was interested in getting the alteration made for then of course his guilt would already have been assumed.  What it means is that  if it is not possible to find reasonably that any  one else was interested in getting the alteration made, then  it would  fit  in  with  the  theory  that  the  appellant  had committed the crime and therefore was interested in  getting the  alteration  made.   The real question  is,  can  it  be reasonably said on the evidence that there was no one  other than  the appellant who could be interested in  getting  the alteration  made  ?  I  think  it  cannot.   On  the   facts established and without making any assumption one way or the other,  it seems to me very probable that it was  Dr.  Anija who was interested in preventing the postmortem  examination and  therefore  in  making the interpolations  on  the  case paper.  I will now state m reasons for this view.           560 I  have earlier stated that Dr. Anija examined the urine  of the  patient at 6-30 a.m. on November 13. There is an  entry with regard to it in the case paper, which reads ’Sugar +  +

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+  Albumin-Acetone + + There is little reason to doubt  that Dr. Anija did examine the urine at that time for sugar,  for otherwise  she  was not likely to have started  the  insulin injections. She gave two of these, one at 6-30 a.m. and  the other  at  about 9 a.m. Dr. Variava’s recollection  is  that when the case paper was shown to him about 11 a.m. the entry "Sugar + + + Albumin-" was there but the entry " Acetone + + " was not there and that Dr. Anija told him that she had not examined  the urine for acetone. The entry " Acetone +  +  " was  clearly  interpolated  in  the  case  paper  later.  It wasbecause she had not tested the urine for acetone but  had none  the less started the treatment for diabetic coma  that Dr. Variava had taken her to task and asked her to test  the urine for acetone. All this clearly shows that Dr. Anija had interpolated  the entry " Acetone + + " at some later  time. The trial Court thought that Dr. Mouskar having invented the theory  of  diabetic  coma  "  must  have  also  thought  it necessary  to make entries regarding the presence of acetone +  +. in the case record " to support this false  diagnosis. This is nobody’s case. Such a finding would necessarily mean that  Dr.  Mouskar was in conspiracy with the  appellant  to hide  the crime by creating evidence in support  of  natural death  of the patient. The findings of the trial Court  that Dr. Mouskar was innocent and that he had procured Dr.  Anija to  make the -entry " Acetone + + " cannot  stand  together. The  latter  ending  must  be  rejected  as  it  is   purely inferential.  The High Court did not find that the  entry  " Acetone  + + " had been made by Dr. Anija at the  persuasion of  Dr. Mouskar. But it appears to have taken the view  that Dr.  Anija  having  been induced by  Dr.  Mouskar  to  state diabetic  coma as the cause of death,  herself  incorporated before  the  papers were submitted to the Coroner  an  entry with  regard  to the examination of the urine  in  the  case paper  and in that entry included " Acetone + +  ".  Whether the High Court is right in its view that the entire entry as to the result 561 of  urine test at 6-30 a.m. of November 13, 1956,  had  been made  in the case paper later is a matter which I  need  not discuss.  The only question is who made the entry "  Acetone + + " and when.  I may state here that the papers were  sent to  the Coroner at the time Of the  postmortem  examination, namely,, on November 22, 1956.  According to the High Court, therefore,  the entry " Acetone + + " had been made  by  Dr. Anija  on her own and Dr. Mouskar had nothing to do with  it and  that  Dr. Anija made the entry not at about 1  p.m.  on November  13, 1956, when she crossed out the  direction  for postmortem  examination and wrote out diabetic coma  as  the cause  of death but almost nine days later.  The High  Court did not accept that part of Dr. Mouskar’s evidence where  he said that he was positive that the entry " Acetone + + " was in the case paper when it reached him at 1 p.m. on  November 13.  Earlier he had said that he had not read the case paper fully  when it first came to him.  Dr. Mouskar  was  plainly making  a  mistake.  It is nobody’s case that  it  was  then there.   Even on the prosecution case it was added  sometime later, that is, when after the receipt of the case paper Dr. Mouskar  had  been persuaded by the appellant to  procure  a cancellation as to the direction for postmortem examination. We then come to this that the entry " Acetone + +" had  been made  by  Dr. Anija on her own.  If she did this,  she  must have  had some reason for it.  I cannot imagine that  reason being anything else excepting to create evidence in  support of  her diagnosis of diabetic coma.  The next lie which  Dr. Anija  spoke  and which I wish now to refer,  is  the  false

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story of her telephone talk with Dr. Variava at about 7 a.m. She  said  that  she then informed  Dr.  Variava  about  the condition  of the patient and that she had  started  insulin injection and further that Dr. Variava told her to  continue the treatment.  I have earlier said that this statement  was a  clear falsehood and given reasons for this view.   It  is nobody’s  case,  and it could not be, that Dr.  Mouskar  had asked her to tell this lie.  Why then did she do so?  Again, the  only  possible reason that I can think of is  the  same that  I  have given earlier, namely, that she  was  keen  on ’creating evidence in support of the line of treatment  that she had given to 562 the patient.  She had been treating the patient as a case of diabetic coma.  It is clear from her evidence and of  course from  that of Dr. Variava, that he had reprimanded  her  for adopting  that line of treatment without having  tested  the urine  for acetone.  She had clearly made a mistake  in  the treatment  of  the  case and this might have put  her  in  a difficulty  with  the hospital authorities and also  in  her future professional career.  It was clearly her interest  to see that her mistake was not finally established as a result of the postmortem examination which had been directed by Dr. Variava.   In  these circumstances, she was  under  a  great temptation to prevent the postmortem examination which might have  revealed her mistake.  It must be remembered that  she had  just started on her professional career and was a  very young  person.   I am unable therefore to hold  that,  apart from the appellant there was no one else who could have been interested  in crossing out the direction as  to  postmortem examination  and  inserting diabetic coma as  the  cause  of death.  In the circumstances that I have mentioned, it seems quite probable that Dr. Anija had made the alteration in the case paper entirely on her own and to save herself from  the possible effects of her mistake.  It also seems probable  to me  that Dr. Anija had made the alterations on November  15, when  Dr. Mouskar had sent the case paper through  the  ward boy for ascertainment of the cause of death. I  have earlier said that Dr. Anija had  falsely  introduced Dr.  Saify as the person who had told her that  Dr.  Mouskar had wanted the direction as to postmortem examination to  be crossed  out and diabetic coma to be stated as the cause  of death.   I have also said that Dr. Mouskar did  not  support Dr. Anija as to the presence of Dr. Saify in the hospital on the  day in question.  Why then did Dr. Anija introduce  the name  of Dr. Saify ? I have said that the Courts below  have not  been able to find any explanation as to why  Dr.  Anija introduced the name of Dr. Saify.  It seems to me that  when the alteration which she had made on her own, was found  out in  the  course of the investigation, she had to  give  some explanation  as  to  why she had made it.   She  thought  of saying  that she did it under the orders of Dr. Mouskar  who was very 563 much  her  senior and whom she was bound to obey.   But  she also realised that Dr. Mouskar was sure to deny that he  had asked  her  to make the alteration and as against  his,  her evidence  was  not likely to be accepted. It  was  therefore that  she  hit  upon the idea of interposing  Dr.  Saify  in between her and Dr. Mouskar in the hope that Dr. Saify being also  a  very  young person, there was some  chance  of  her evidence  being  accepted as against his.  Apart  from  that there does not appear to be any other explanation as to  why Dr. Anija introduced the name of Dr. Saify.  She had clearly forgotten while inventing this story that Dr. Saify was away

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on  leave but that of course makes no difference for if  she had  remembered  it,  she might have  named  somebody  else, probably  Dr. Shah or Dr. Patel who worked in Unit No. 2  of the  Hospital.  Then it has to be remembered that Dr.  Anija admitted to the police that she had written out the words  " Diabetic  coma " on the letter from the police  of  November 15, asking for the cause of death and this she later denied. All  this would make more probable the view that it was  Dr. Anija  who in order to prevent the detection of the  mistake made by her in the treatment of Laxmibai had the endorsement "Asked  for post-, mortem " crossed out and inserted in  the case paper diabetic coma as the cause of death and that  she had not been asked by Dr. Mouskar to make the alteration  in the case paper. I  think it right to state here that it cannot be said  that Dr.  Shah  was  also to blame for  the  wrong  diagnosis  of diabetic coma.  Dr. Anija said that pursuant to her call the Registrar  came  at  about 8-45 a.m.  and  approved  of  her diagnosis  and  advised a further insulin  injection  of  40 units.   She also said that the Registrar wrote on the  case paper the words "Inj.  Insulin 40 units Iv. glucose 20 c.c." By  "  the Registrar " she was of course  referring  to  Dr. Saify.  It is clear from the call book that it was Dr. Shah, who was the Registrar of Unit No. 2 who had been sent for by Dr. Anija.  Dr. Shah said in his evidence that he must  have gone  to  the  patient pursuant to the call but  he  had  no recollection of the case at all.  He denied that the entry " Inj.   Insulin 40 units Iv. glucose 20 c.c."was in his  hand writing. Dr. Patel who was 564 officiating as the Registrar of Unit No. 1 in the absence of Dr.  Saify on leave, also denied that that entry was in  his handwriting.   Dr. Shah said from the sequenceof time  noted in the call book and the case paper, that he must have  gone to the ward before 6-30 a.m. According to Dr. Shaw he  could not  have seen the case paper when he called because he  was not  the Registrar of Unit No. 1. He admitted that  he  must have advised Dr. Anija, about the case.  What the advice was we  do  not know.  It is clear however that  Dr.  Anija  had started  treating  the case as diabetic coma  and  given  40 units of insulin before she sent for the Registrar.   Indeed according  to  her, the Registrar, who must  have  been  Dr. Shah, arrived at 8.45 a.m. So we get that Dr. Anija  started treatment  of diabetic coma and gave insulin prior  to  6-30 a.m.  and  her statement that the Registrar wrote  down  the direction for a second insulin injection of 40 units at 8-45 a.m.  is  false.  It is therefore clear that  the  treatment given  to  the  unconscious  Laxmibai  had  been  under  the judgment  of Dr. Anija alone.  It would follow that  Dr.Shah had  no  responsibility for that treatment.   This  is  also supported  by  the  fact that Dr. Anija  did  not  tell  Dr. Variava  that Dr. Shah had also thought it to be a  case  of diabetic coma. There  is another circumstance against the  appellant  which must now be noticed, and that is that the appellant left the hospital  soon after the death of Laxmibai  without  showing the least care as to what happened thereafter.  This conduct considered  with  the appel. lant’s letter of  November  14, 1956, stating falsely that " Indumati’s " brother would come to  take  over  her body and  further  considered  with  the subsequent   conduct  of  the  appellant   in   fraudulently misappropriating  the  deceased  Laxmibai’s  money   clearly indicates  that immediately after the death of Laxmibai  the appellant  had  conceived the idea of  misappropriating  her properties.  It has been suggested that it would be somewhat

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strange  that  the  dishonest intention cropped  up  in  the appellant’s mind so suddenly and therefore it is  reasonable to think that he had entertained that design even during the lifetime  of Laxmibai.  The Courts below have accepted  that suggestion.  I cannot say that that is an unreasonable  view to take. 565 But  supposing the appellant had during Laxmibai’s  lifetime cast a covetous eye on her properties, would that be  enough to  justify a finding that her death had been  an  unnatural death  ? I do not think it would.  The design may provide  a motive for murder; but the murder, that is, in this case  an unnatural  death, cannot be proved by it.  That design  does not  exclude  the possibility that Laxmibai died  a  natural death  and  the appellant made full use of  the  opportunity thereby provided to carry his design into effect. I think I should mention here one other aspect of the  case. The  trial  Court observed that the symptoms  found  in  the record  as  to the last illness and death  of  Laxmibai  all clearly  pointed  to the conclusion that death  was  due  to hypoglycemia  and  that  hypoglycemia might be  one  of  the possible causes of her death.  The trial Court however  held that  there  was  nothing  to  show  in  the  symptoms  that hypoglycemia  could have been of spontaneous  origin  though the matter was not very clear.  It would seem that the trial Court thought that the hypoglycemia had been induced by  two injections  of  insulin given by the appellant  to  Laxmibai sometime  on November 12.  The trial Court for this  purpose relied on the evidence of Shantabai a maid servant  employed by  Laxmibai,  who said that on November 12,  the  appellant gave  Laxmibai two injections.  This maid servant  was  deaf and  dumb  and  her  evidence must  be  of  doubtful  value. However that may be, there is nothing to show that death was caused  by hypoglycemia brought about by the two  injections given by the appellant, assuming that he had given them.  It has to be remembered that in the hospital Laxmibai was given two further injections of insulin of 40 units each.  It  may be that these injections really caused her death.  That is a possibility  which on the finding of the trial Court  cannot be  brushed  aside.  Now, if that is so,  then  clearly  the appellant is not responsible for the death of Laxmibai.   He had  done  nothing to induce Dr. Anija or any of  the  other doctors  in the hospital to give more insulin  to  Laxmibai. There is no evidence to that effect.  Dr. Anija was clear in her evidence that she never consulted Dr. Lagu regarding the diagnosis that death was due to diabetic. I need not further into this aspect of the 566 matter  for all that I wish to point out is that  the  trial Court  had thought that hopoglycemia might be the  cause  of death.  The High Court, thought that it  was not possible in view  of  the absence of evidence about the time  taken  for insulin to induce hypoglycemia to hold that death was due to hypoglycemia induced by a massive dose of insulin.  It seems to  me that if there was no evidence, that was the fault  of the prosecution and not of the appellant.  In all cases  and particularly  in a case of this kind, it is the duty of  the prosecution  to prove that the death was an unnatural  death and exclude by evidence completely, the possibility of death having  been caused by some instrumentality other  than  the appellant.   This is another reason for saying that  it  has not  been clearly established in this case  that  Laxmibai’s death  was  an  unnatural death or has been  caused  by  the appellant. I have so long been discussing the facts which are  supposed

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to  lead towards the guilt of the appellant.  I propose  now to  deal  with  some of the facts which seem to  be  in  his favour.   The prosecution case is that the appellant had  in the  train administered to her an undetectable poison  which caused  her death.  Now, if the appellant had done that,  he must  have  made  a plan for it before  he  started  on  the journey  to Bombay with her from Poona.  It  seems  unlikely that  if he had done that, he would have made no  effort  to keep  it  a secret that he was taking her  to  Bombay.   The evidence  is  clear that he made no such effort.   The  next fact  that  has to be faced by the prosecution is  that  the railway compartment would be a most unusualplace in which to administer a poison.  The appellant could not have  expected that  there would be a compartment for Laxmibai and  himself in  which  there would be no other  passenger.   Indeed  the trial  Court  thought  that  there  must  have  been   other passengers  in that compartment.  That being so, it  becomes improbable  that the appellant had planned to poison her  in the train.  Again, it has been proved as a fact by Dr. Sathe himself that the appellant had made an appointment with  him for November 13. Was it necessary for him to have done  this if  he  knew that Laxmibai would die before the  hour  fixed with Dr. Sathe ? Further, if he had administered 567 a  poison to Laxmibai, would he have taken her to a.  public hospital?   That  would  have  been  impossible  unless  the appellant   was  perfectly  certain  that  the  poison   was absolutely  undetectable.   That requires a  great  deal  of knowledge  of poisonous drugs which there is no evidence  to think   the  appellant  possessed.   But  assume  that   the appellant  was  so certain that the poison  would  never  be detected,  why  then  should  he  have  worried  about   the postmortem  examination  at all?  If it is  found  that  the appellant had not prevented the postmortem examination being held,  there  would  be very little on  which  to  base  his conviction for the murder of Laxmibai by poisoning.  Nor can it  be  said  that the appellant was not  sure  whether  the poison would be detected or not, but none the less took  the risk of taking the unconscious Laxmibai to the G. T.hospital in the hope that if any difficulty arose, he could  rely  on Dr. Mouskar to help him.  There is no   evidence on which we can  hold  that  Dr. Mouskar would have helped  him  if  any suspicion  as  to  Laxmibai’s death having  been  caused  by poision  had  arisen.   It has to  be  remembered  that  Dr. Mouskar  was  not  doing  the work of  a  physician  in  the hospital but was in charge only of the administration.   All these  are  very strong circumstances  indicating  that  the appellant had not administered any poison to Laxmibai on the train.  Very cogent reasons would be required to dispel  the presumption in favour of the appellant arising from them.  I find no such reasons in the case. In  the  net  result the circumstances appear to  me  to  be these.  First, the appellant had a design during  Laxmibai’s lifetime  to  misappropriate  her  properties.   This   only supplies the motive for causing her death but does not prove that  the  death  which occurred, was  an  unnatural  death. Secondly,  the  appellant did not give to the  hospital  the correct  name of Laxmibai : the name given however  was  not such  as  from  it  her  identity  could  never  have   been discovered.   Thirdly,  the appellant gave his  own  address instead of that of Laxinibai.  It seems to me that that  was a natural thing for him to have done in the circumstances of the case for there would have been no one in Laxmibai’s flat to receive her letters and there there was no other  address which the appellant could have

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568 given.  Further, the address given necessarily connected the appellant  with the last hours of  Laxmibai’slife-a  conduct not  very  probable in a person who had  brought  about  her death.   The  theory  that that address was  given  only  to ensure that communications from the hospital concerning  the dead  Laxmibai  should  reach  the  appellant  is  not  very plausible.  It is clear that if the appellant had not  given his  own address, the only other address he  could  possibly have given would have been Laxmibai’s address.  I am  unable to  appreciate  what communication the hospital  could  have sent to Laxmibai at her address after her death or when  she lay in the hospital.  In any event, the appellant would have had no difficulty in getting hold of any such  communication sent  to  Laxmibai’s own address.  Fourthly,  the  appellant told  Dr. Ugale that Laxmibai had had a hysterical fit.   It is doubtful whether he said so, and also whether, if he did, it  was purposefully false.  What purpose it served  is  not clear.  The appellant did not mention hysterical fit to  the doctor in charge of the treatment nor did he do anything  to induce  her to take a different line of treatment from  that which she had adopted.  He did nothing to induce any idea in her mind as to the cause of the illness or the disease.   In these  circumstances it does not seem possible to hold  that hysterical  fit  had  been mentioned  by  the  appellant  to prevent  detection  of  the  fact  that  Laxmibai  had  been poisoned.   Lastly, come the series of the appellant’s  acts from  immediately  after  Laxmibai’s  death  indicating  his intention  to  acquire her properties  and  the  acquisition thereof  by deception and forgery.  These cannot prove  that Laxmibai  died  an unnatural death.   Considering  them  all together,  I  am unable to think that  the  only  reasonable conclusion  possible  is  that Laxmibai  died  an  unnatural death. In my view the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt  of the appellant. In the result I would allow the appeal. BY  COURT.  In accordance with the opinion of the  majority, the appeal is dismissed.                                    Appeal dismissed. 569