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PETITIONER: AMBIKA PRASAD MISHRA ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/05/1980

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. TULZAPURKAR, V.D. SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR 1762            1980 SCR  (3)1159  1980 SCC  (3) 719  CITATOR INFO :  R          1981 SC 271  (66)  F          1988 SC1194  (9)  RF         1990 SC1480  (52)  RF         1990 SC1789  (96)

ACT:      Uttar Pradesh  Imposition of  Ceiling on  Land Holdings Act, 1960-Constitutional  Validity-Value of  stare  decisis- vis-a-vis judicial review.

HEADNOTE:      Dismissing the  appeals and  the  Writ  Petitions,  the Court ^      HELD:  (1).-It   is  fundamental   that  the   nation’s Constitution is not kept in constant uncertainty by judicial review every  season  because  it  paralyses,  by  perennial suspense, all legislative and administrative action on vital issues deterred  by the  brooding interest of forensic blow- up. This,  if permitted,  may well  be a  kind  of  judicial destabilisation of State action too dangerous to be indulged in save  where national  crisis of great moment to the life, liberty and  safety of  this country and its millions are at stake, or  the basic  direction of  the nation  itself is in peril of  a shake  up. The decision in Kesavananda Bharati’s case, therefore,  upholding the  vires  of  Article  31A  in unequivocal terms  binds the  court on  the simple  score of stare decisis  and the constitutional ground of Article 141. Further, fatal  flaws silenced  by  earlier  rulings  cannot survive after  death because  a decision  does not  lose its authority "merely  because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and  fallaciously reasoned".  And none  of  these misfortunes can  be imputed  to Bharati’s  case. [1164  C-G, 1165 C-D]      (2). The  sweep of  Article 31A is wide and indubitably embraces   legislation    on   land    ceilings.   Equitable distribution of lands, annihilation of monopoly of ownership by imposition  of ceiling  and  regeneration  of  the  rural economy by  diverse planning  and strategies  are covered by

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the armour  of Article 31A. Article 31A repulses, therefore, all invasions on ceiling legislation armed with Articles 14, 19 and 31. [1165 D-E, 1166 D-E]      Ranjit Singh  and ors.  v. State  of  Punjab  and  Ors. [1965] 1  S.C.R. 82, State of Kerala and Anr. v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk  Manufacturing (Weaving)  Co. Ltd.  etc. [1974] 1 S.C.R. 671, reiterated.      (3).  The  decision  in  Maneka  Gandhi’s  case  is  no universal nostrum  or cure  all. Nor can it be applicable to the  land   reform  law   which  is  in  another  domain  of constitutional jurisprudence  and quite  apart from personal liberty in  Article 21.  To contend that land reform law, if unreasonable violates Article 21 as expansively construed in Maneka Gandhi case is incorrect. [1168 E-G]      (4). Section  5(6) d  the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings  Act, 1960 is fair, valid and not violative of Article 19(1)(f)  of the  Constitution. There  is no blanket ban  by  it  but  only  qualified  invalidation  of  certain sinister assignments  etc. There  is nothing in this section which is  morally wrong  nor is  such an embargo which comes into force  only on  a well  recognised  date  not  from  an arbitrarily retrospective past constitutionally anathematic. Article  19(1)(f)  is  not  absolute  in  operation  and  is subject, under Article 19(6), to 1160 reasonable restrictions such as the one contained in Section 5(6). Further  it is  perfectly open  to the  legislature as ancillary to  its main  policy to  prevent activities  which defeat the statutory purpose, to provide for invalidation of such action.  When the  alienations are  invalidated because they are  made after  a statutory date fixed with a purpose, there is sense in this prohibition. Otherwise, all the lands would have  been transferred and little would have been left by way of surplus. [1169 A-B, D, F-G, 1170 C, E-F]      (5). Articles  14 and  15 and  the humane spirit of the Preamble rebel  against the  defacto denial  of  proprietory personhood or  womanhood. But this legal sentiment and jural value must  not run riot and destroy the provisions which do not discriminate between man and woman qua man and woman but merely organise a scheme where life realism is legislatively pragmatised. Such  a scheme  may  marginally  affect  gender justice but  does not abridge, wee-bit, the rights of women. If land-holding  and ceiling  thereon are organised with the paramount purpose  of maximizing  surpluses without  maiming women’s ownership, any plea of sex discrimination as a means to sabotage  what is  socially desirable  measure cannot  be permitted.. [1173 D-F]      From a  reading of  Section 3(7) read with Section S(3) it is  clear that no woman’s property is taken away any more than a  man’s property.  Section 5(3)  does not  confer  any property on  an adult  son nor  withdraw any  property  from adult  daughter.   Legal  injury   can  arise  only  if  the daughter’s  property  is  taken  away  while  the  son’s  is retained or  the daughter  gets no  share while the son gets one. The  legislation has  not done either. [1171 G, 1173 F, H, 1174 C-D]      (6). Section  3(17) of  the Act  is not  discriminatory Land does  not offend  Articles 14 & 15 of the Constitution. True, Section  3(17) makes  the husband a tenure holder even when the wife is the owner. This is a legislative device for simplifying dealings  and cannot therefore be faulted. [1174 E, F-G]      (7).  Neither  ceiling  proceedings  abate  nor  taking surplus land  from the  tenure holder  is barred  under  the provisions  of  Section  4  of  the  U.P.  Consolidation  of

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Holdings Act,  1953 read  with Section  5(2) of  the Ceiling Act. [1177 C]      The whole  scheme of  consolidation of  holdings is  to restructure agrarian  landscape of  U.P. so  as  to  promote better  farming   and  economic   holdings  by  ’eliminating fragmentation  and   organising  consolidating.  No  one  is deprived of  his land.  What happens  is, his scattered bits are  taken   away  and   in  lieu   thereof   a   continuous conglomeration equal in value is allotted subject to minimal deduction for  community use  and better enjoyment. Whatever land  belongs   to  the  tenure  holder  at  the  time  when consolidation proceedings  are in  an on-going stage, may or may not  belong to  him after  the consolidation proceedings are completed. Alternative allotments may be made and so the choice that  he may make before the prescribed authority for the purpose  of surrendering  surplus lands  and  preserving ’permissible holding’  may have  only tentative  value.  But this factor  does not  seriously prejudice the holder. While he chooses  the best  at the  given time  the  Consolidation Officer will  give him  its equivalent  when a  new plot  is given to him in tho place of the old. There is no diminution in the  quantum of land and quality of land since the object of consolidation is not deprivation but mere substituting of scattered pieces with a consolidated plot. The tenure holder may well  exercise his  option before the prescribed officer and if,  later, the  Consolidation Officer  takes away there lands, he will allot a real equivalent thereof to the tenure holder elsewhere.  There is  no reduction or damage or other prejudice by this process of statutory exchange. [1177 C-G] 1161      When  land   is   contributed   for   public   purposes compensation is  paid in  that behalf,  and in  the event of illegal or  unjust orders  passed,  appellate  and  revisory remedies are  also provided.  On such  exchange or  transfer taking  place,   pursuant  to   the  finalisation   of   the consolidation  scheme,   the  holding,   upto  the   ceiling available to  the tenure-holder,  will be converted into the new allotment  under the consolidation scheme. Thus there is no  basic   injustice  nor   gross  arbitrariness   in   the continuance  of  the  land  reforms  proceedings  even  when consolidation proceedings are under way. [1178 B-D]      Agricultural &  Industrial Syndicate  Ltd. v.  State of U.P. and Ors., [1974] 1 S.C.R. 253, distinguished.      Khetarpal Singh  v. State  of U.P.  (High Court) [1975] Recent Decisions p. 366, approved.      8. There  is no  time-wise arbitrariness  vitiating the statute in  that various  provisions in the Act were brought into force on random dates without any rhyme or reason, thus violating, from the temporally angle, Article 14. It is true that neither  the legislature  nor  the  Government  as  its delegate  can   fix  fanciful   dates  for  effectuation  of provisions affecting  the rights  of citizens.  Even  so,  a larger latitude  is allowed  to the State to notify the date on which  a particular  provision may come into effect. Many imponderables may  weigh with the State in choosing the date and when  challenge is  made years  later, the factors which induced the  choice of  such dates  may be  buried under the debris of  time.  Parties  cannot  take  advantage  of  this handicap and audaciously challenge every date of coming into force of  every provision  as capriciously picked out. [1179 B-D]

JUDGMENT:

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    ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 1543 of 1977.      Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.                             WITH      W.P. No. 1542/77 and C.A. No. 1379/77, W.P. No. 838/78. 2360-2363/78 and  S.L.P. (C)  Nos. 1727/79  & 2333 & 2530 of 1978                             AND      S.L.P. (C) No. 2539 of 1978 and W.P. No. 228 of 1979.      M.S. Gupta  for the petitioners in WPs. 1542, 1543, 838 & CA 1379/77.      Arvind Kumar,  Mrs. Lakshmi  Arvind & Prakash Gupta for the petitioners in SLPs. 1727, 2333 & 2530.      P.R.  Mridul,   R.K.  Jain   &  Sukumar  Sahu  for  the petitioners in WPs 2360-63.      Veda  Vyasa,   S.K.  Gupta   &  A.K.   Sharma  for  the petitioners in SLP 2599 and WP 228.      B.P. Singh  Chauhan, Addl Adv. Genl. U.P. and O.P. Rana the appearing respondents. 1162      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA, IYER,  J.-This judgment  deals with a flood of cases  from   Uttar  Pradesh   relating  to   limitation  on agricultural land  holdings and specifically disposes of the writ petitions,  civil appeals  and  petitions  for  special leave listed below.      The pervasive  theme of  this litigative  stream is not anti-land-reform as  such but the discriminatory laws in the relevant  legislation   which  make   it  ’unlaw’  from  the constitutional angle.      The march  of the Indian nation to the Promised Land of Social Justice  is conditioned by the pace of the process of agrarian reform. This central fact of our country’s progress has made  land distribution  and its  inalienable ally,  the ceiling  on   land  holding,  the  cynosure  of  legislative attention. And  when  litigative  confrontation  with  large holders has  imperilled the  implementation  of  this  vital developmental  strategy,  Parliament,  in  exercise  of  its constituent power,  has sought  to pre-empt  effectively and protect impregnably such statutory measures by enacting Art. 31A as the very first amendment in the very first year after the  Constitution   came  into   force.  Consequent  on  the Constitution  (First   Amendment)  Act,   1951,  this  court repelled the  challenges to land reform laws as violative of fundamental rights  in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh but the constant  struggle between  agrarian reform  legislation and never-say-die  litigation has  led to  a situation where every such  enactment has  been  inevitably  accompanied  by countless writ  petitions assailing  its vires  despite Art. 31A, not  to speak  of the more extensive Chinese walls like Arts. 31B,  31C and 31D. The forensic landscape is cluttered up in  this  court  with  appeals  and  writ  petitions  and petitions for leave to appeal, the common feature of each of which is  a challenge to the validity of one or other of the State  laws   imposing  ceiling   on  land   holding  in  an inegalitarian milieu  of the  landed few  and  the  landless many. Of  course, the court is bound to judge the attack. On the legislative  projects for  acquisition and distribution, on their  constitutional merits and we proceed to as say the task with  special reference to the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (abbreviated hereafter as  the   Act).  Several  counsel  have  argued  and  plural objections have  been urged  but we  will grapple  with only those contentions which have been seriously pressed and omit others which  have either  been only  formally mentioned  or left to lie in silent

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1163 peace, or but feebly articulated. In this judgment, we side- step the  bigger issue  of the  vires of  the constitutional amendments in  Articles 31  A, 31  and 31  as they are dealt with in  other  cases  disposed  of  recently.  Indeed,  the history of  land reform,  in its  legislative dimension  has been a  perennial race  between judicial  pronouncements and constitutional amendments.      The anatomy of the Act must be scanned as a preliminary exercise so  that the Constitutional infirmities alleged may be appreciated  in the  proper setting. The long title gives the primary  purpose of the Act as imposition of ceilings on land holdings in Uttar Pradesh and the Preamble amplifies it further. All  this is  tersely spelt out in the Statement of objects and Reasons which runs thus:-           "With  a   view  to  provide  for  more  equitable      distribution of  land by  making the  same available to      the extent  possible to landless agricultural labourers      and to provide for cultivation on cooperative basis and      to conserve  part of the available resources in land so      as to  increase the  production and up reserve stock of      foodgrains  against   lean   years   by   carrying   on      cultivation on  scientific lines  in State-owned farms,      it is  expedient to  impose Ceiling  on existing  large      land holdings.  It is necessary to provide some land to      the village communities for their common needs, such as      establishment of  fuel and fodder reserves. The Bill is      therefore being  introduced  to  promote  the  economic      interest of  the weaker  section of  community  and  to      subserve the common good."      Thus we  get  the  statutory  perspective  of  agrarian reform and  so, the  constitutionality of  the Act has to be tested on  the touchstone  of Art  31A which is the relevant protective armour  for land  reform laws. Even here, we must state that  while we do refer to the range of constitutional immunity Art.  31A confers on agrarian reform measures we do not rest  our decision  on that  provision. Independently of Art.   31A,   the   impugned   legislation   can   withstand constitutional invasion and so the further challenge to Art. 31A  itself   is  of   no  consequence.   The  comprehensive vocabulary of  that purposeful  provision obviously  catches within its  protective net  the  present  Act  and,  broadly speaking,  the   antiseptic  effect   of  that   Article  is sufficient to  immunise the  Act against invalidation to the extent stated  therein. The  extreme argument  that Art. 31A itself is  void as  violative of  the basic structure of the Constitution has  been  negatived  by  my  learned  brother, Bhagwati, J.  in a kindred group of cases of Andhra Pradesh. The amulet  of Art.  31A is, therefore, potent, so far as it goes, but  beyond its ambit it is still possible, as counsel have endeavoured, to 1164 spin out  some sound  argument to nullify one section or the other. Surely,  the legislature cannot run amok in the blind belief that  Art. 31A  is omnipotent.  We will  examine  the alleged infirmities  in due  course. It  is significant that even apart from the many decisions upholding Art. 31A, Golak Nath’s case  decided by a Bench of 11  Judges, while holding that the  Constitution (First  Amendment) Act  exceeded  the constituent power still categorically declared that the said amendment and a few other like amendments would be held good based  on  the  doctrine  of  prospective  over-ruling.  The result, for  our purpose, is that even Golak Nath’s case has held  Art.  31A  valid.  The  note  struck  by  later  cases reversing Golaknath  does not  militate against the vires of

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Art.  31A.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  in  the  Kesavananda Bharati’s case.  Article 31A  was challenged  as beyond  the amendatory power of Parliament and, therefore, invalid. But, after listening  to  the  marathon  erudition  from  eminent counsel, a 13 Judges Bench of this Court upheld the vires of Article 31A  in unequivocal  terms. That  decision binds, on the simple  score of  stare decisis  and the  constitutional ground of  Art. 141.  Every now  discovery or  argumentative novelty cannot  undo or  compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. In  this view,  other submissions  sparkling with creative  ingenuity   and   presented   with   high-pressure advocacy, cannot  persuade us to re-open, what was laid down for the guidance of the nation as a solemn pre-posion by the epic Fundamental Rights case. From Kameshwar Singh and Golak Nath (supra)  through Kesavananda (supra) and Kanan Devan to Gwalior  Rayons  and  after  Art.  31A  has  stood  judicial scrutiny although,  as stated  earlier, we  do not  base the conclusion on  Art. 31A. Even so, it is fundamental that the nation’s Constitution is not kept in constant uncertainty by judicial  review  every  season  because  it  paralyses,  by perennial  suspense,   all  legislative  and  administrative action on  vital issues  deterred by  the brooding threat of forensic blowup.  This, if  permitted, may well be a kind of judicial destabilisation of State action too dangerous to be indulged in  save where  national. crisis of great moment to the life,  liberty  and  safety  of  this  country  and  its millions are  at stake, or the basic direction of the nation itself is in peril of a shakeup. It is surely wrong to prove Justice Roberts  of the  United States  Supreme Court  right when he said. 1165           "The reason  for my  concern is  that the  instant      decision, overruling  that announced  about nine  years      ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into      the same class as a restricted railroad ticket good for      this day  and train only.. It is regrettable that in an      era  marked  by  doubt  and  confusion,  an  era  whose      greatest need  is steadfastness of thought and purpose,      this Court  which has  been  looked  to  as  exhibiting      consistency in  adjudication, and  a  steadiness  which      would hold  the balance  even in  the face of temporary      ebbs and flows of opinion. should now itself become the      breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind      as to the stability of our institutions".      It is  wise to  remember that  fatal flaws  silenced by earlier  rulings   cannot  survive  after  death  because  a decision does  not lose its authority "merely because it was badly  argued,   inadequately  considered  and  fallaciously reasoned". And  none of  these misfortunes can be imputed to Bharati’s case  (supra). For  these reasons,  we proceed  to consider the  contentions of counsel on the clear assumption that Art.  31A is  good. Its  sweep is  wide and indubitably embraces legislation  on land  ceilings. Long  years ago, in Ranjit v.  State, a  Constitution  Bench,  speaking  through Hidayatullah, J.,  dwelt on  the wide amplitude of Art. 31A, referred to  Precedents of this Court on agrarian reform vis a vis  Art. 31A and concluded that equitable distribution of lands, annihilation  of monopoly  of ownership by imposition of ceiling  and regeneration of the rural economy by diverse planning and  strategies are  covered by  the armour of Art. 31A. We may quote a part:           The scheme  of rural  development today  envisages      not only  equitable distribution  of land so that there      is  no  undue  imbalance  in  society  resulting  in  a      landless class  on the  one hand and a concentration of

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    land in  the hands of a few on the other, but envisages      also the  raising of  economic standards  and bettering      rural health  and social conditions. Provisions for the      assignment of lands to village Panchayat for the use of      the  general  community,  or  for  hospitals,  schools,      manure pits, tanning grounds etc. which (sic) enure for      the benefit  of rural  population must be considered to      be an  essential part of the redistribution of holdings      and open  lands to  which no  objection  is  apparently      taken.  If   agrarian  reforms  are  to  succeed,  more      distribu- 1166      tion of lands to the landless is not enough. There must      be a  proper planning  of rural  economy and conditions      and a  body like the village panchayat is best designed      to promote  rural welfare  than  individual  owners  of      small portions  of lands. Further the village panchayat      is an  authority  for  purposes  of  part  III  as  was      conceded before  us and  it has  the protection of Art.      31A because  of this  character even if the taking over      of Shamlat  deb  amounts  to  acquisition.  ......  The      setting of a body or agricultural artisans (such as the      village carpenter,  the village blacksmith, the village      tanner, ferrier,  wheelwright, barber,  washerman etc.)      is a  part of rural planning and can be comprehended in      a scheme of agrarian reforms. It is a trite saying that      India lives  in villages  and a scheme to make villages      self-sufficient cannot  but be  regarded as part of the      larger reforms  which consolidation of holdings, fixing      of ceiling  on lands, distribution of surplus lands and      utilising of vacant and waste lands contemplate.      This  review   has  been   reinforced  by   the   later pronouncement of  a Constitution  Bench in the Gwalior Rayon Case, emphatically  expressing support  for  the  conceptual sweep  of   agrarian  reform   vis-a-vis   Art.   31A.   The proposition,  therefore,   is  invulnerable  that  Art.  31A repulses all  invasion on  "ceiling legislation" (armed with Arts. 14, 19 and 31).      The professed  goal of  the legislation  is to maximise surplus lands for working out distributive justice and rural development,  with   special  reference   to   giving   full opportunity to  the agrarian  masses to become a major rural resource of  the nation.  How to  maximise surplus land ? By imposition of  severe ceiling  on ownership of land holdings consistently with  the pragmatics of rural economies and the people’s way  of life.  The pervasive, pivotal concepts are, therefore, ceilings  on holdings  and surrender  of  surplus land. The  working unit  with reference  to which  the legal ceiling is  set is  the realistic  family. So,  the flexible concept  of  ’family’  also  becomes  a  central  object  of legislative definition.  Having regard  to the  diversity of family units  among the various communities making up Indian society and  having the  object of  the legislation  as  the guiding principle, the statute under consideration has given a  viable   and  realistic   definition  of  ’family’,  with provision for  some variables  and special  situations.  The machinery for  implementing the  statute is also set up with adjudicative powers, including appeals. Compensation, with- 1167 out invidious  discrimination, has  to be paid, according to the scheme,  when surplus  land is  taken away  and for  the determination and  payment  of  such  compensation  a  whole chapter is  devoted. The disposal of land secured as surplus is, perhaps, the elimination of the legislative project. and so,  Chapter   4  stipulates  the  manner  of  disposal  and

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settlement of  surplus land.  Thus, we have the definitional provision in Chapter 1, followed by imposition of "ceilings" with  ancillary   provisions  for  exemption.  The  judicial machinery for enforcement and the provisions for pre-emption of manipulation  and prevention of fraud on the statute, the assessment of compensation and its payment and the like have also been  enacted in  Chapters 2  and  3.  A  miscellaneous chapter deals  with a variety of factors, including offences and penalties,  mode of  hearing and  appellate  powers  and kindred matters.  Inevitably, such a progressive legislation runs drastically  contrary to the feudal ethos of the landed gentry and  the investment intancts of the nouveau riche and green revolutionists. Therefore, the holders who are hurt by the provisions  of the  Act have  chosen to  challenge their vires and they must succeed if the ground is good. Since the legislature has  plenary power  to tile  extent conferred by the Constitution,  the attack has to be based, and, deed has been on  constitutional infirmities  which  If  sound,  must shoot down the Act. By way of aside, one might query whether agrarian reform,  with all  the  fanfare  and  trumpet,  has seriously taken  off the  ground or  is still in the hangar? Any way,  the court  can only  pronounce, the Executive must execute.      We will  now proceed  to formulate  the  points  which, according to  counsel, are  fatal  to  the  legislation  and proceed to scan them in due course.      Various miniscule  matters  have  been  raised  in  the plethora of  cases largely  founded on  some real or fancied inequity, inequality,  legislative arbitrariness or sense of injustice. Speaking  generally and  with a  view to  set the record straight,  injustice is  conditioned by the governing social philosophy,  the prevailing  economic  approach  and, paramountly, by the constitutional parameters which bind the court and the community.      The  Indian  Constitution  is  a  radical  document,  a charter or  socio-politico-economic  change  and  geared  to goals spelt  out in  the objectives Resolution which commits the nation to a drive towards an egalitarian society, a note struck more articulately by the adjective ’socialist’ to our Republic introduced by a recent Amendment and survives after Parliament,  differently  composed,  had  altered  the  42nd Amendment. This backdrop suggests that agrarian legislation, organised  as  egalitarian  therapy,  must  be  judged,  not meticulously for every indi- 1168 vidual injury  but by  the larger  standards of abolition of fundamental  in  equalities,  frustration  of  basis  social fairness  and   shocking  unconscionableness.  This  process involves detriment  to vested  interests. The perfect art of plucking the  goose with  the least squealing is not a human gift. A  social surgery,  supervised by  law, minimises, not eliminates,  individual   hurt  while   promoting  community welfare. The  court, in its interpretative role, can neither be pachydermic  nor hyperreactive when landholders, here and there  lament   about  lost   land.  We   will  examine  the contentions form  this  perspective,  without  reference  to Arts. 31B,  C and  D. Justice  Cardozo has  a message for us when he says:           Law and  obedience  to  law  are  facts  confirmed      everyday to  us all  in our  experience of life. If the      result of  a definition  is to  make them  seem  to  be      illusions, so  much the  worse for  the definition;  we      must enlarge  it till  it is  broad enough to answer to      realities.      Shri Mridul,  who led  the arguments,  mounted a three-

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point attack.  Article 31A(1)  (ii) was  the  target  of  an obscure  submission   which  counsel,   with  characteristic fairness, did  not press at a later stage. Linked up with it was queer  nexus between Art. 21 and. the right to property, deprivation of  which was  contended to  be an  unreasonable procedure somehow  falling within  the lethal  spell of Art. 21.      Proprietary  personality   was  integral   to  personal liberty and  a may  hem inflicted on a man’s property was an amputation of  his personal  liberty. Therefore, land reform law,  if  unreasonable,  violates  Art.  21  as  expansively construed in  Maneka Gandhi.  The dichotomy between personal liberty, in Art. 21, and proprietary status, in Arts. 31 and 19  is   plain,  whatever   philosophical  justification  or pragmatic  realisation   it  may  possess  in  political  or juristic theory.  Maybe, a  penniless proletarian, is unfree in his  movements and has nothing to lose except his chains. But  we   are  in   another  domain  of  constitutional  the jurisprudence. Of  course, counsel’s  resort to  Art. 21  is prompted by  the absence  of mention  of Art. 21 in Art. 31A and the  illusory hope of inflating. Maneka Gandhi to impart a healing touch to those whose property is taken by feigning loss of personal liberty when the State takes only property. Maneka Gandhi  is no universal nostrum or cure-all, when all other arguments fail!      The last  point which  had a  quaint moral  flavour was that transfers  of landed  property, although executed after the dates specified in the 1169 Act were unreasonably invalidated by the Act even when there was no  "mens rea"  vis a vis the ceiling law on the part of the transferor  and this was violative of Art. 19(1) (f) and of Art. 14 as arbitrary. A facet of over-inclusiveness which breaches Art. 14 was also urged. It is perfectly open to the legislature, as  ancillary to  its main  policy  to  prevent activities which  defeat the  statutory purpose,  to provide for invalidation  of such  actions. When the alienations are invalidated because  they are  made after  a statutory  date fixed with  a purpose,  there is  sense in this prohibition. Otherwise, all  the lands  would have  been transferred  and little would  have been  left by way of surplus. Let us read the text  of s.5(6)  which is  alleged to be bad being over- inclusive or  otherwise anomalous. The argument, rather hard to follow  and too subtle for the pragmatic of agrarian law, may be  clearer when the provision is unfurled. Section 5(6) runs thus:           In determining  the ceiling  area applicable  to a      tenure holder,  any transfer  of land  made  after  the      twenty-fourth day  of January,  1971, which but for the      transfer would  have been  declared surplus  land under      this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account .      Provided that  nothing in  this sub-section shall apply to:           (a)  a transfer  in favour of any person(including                Government) referred to in sub-section(2);           (b)  a transfer  proved to the satisfaction of the                prescribed authority  to be in good faith and                for  adequate   consideration  and  under  an                irrevocable instrument  riot being  a  benami                transaction  or  for  immediate  or  deferred                benefit  of   the  tenure-holder   or   other                members of the family.      There  is  no  blanket  ban  here  but  only  qualified invalidation of  certain sinister  assignments etc.  Counsel weaves gossamer webs which break on mere judicial touch when

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he argues  that transfer  ’in good  faith and  for  adequate consideration’ have  been unconstitutionally  exempted.  The bizarre submission  is that  ’adequate consideration’  is an arbitrary test.  We reject  it without  mere discussion. The second limb  of the  submission is that while s. (6) directs the authority  to ignore  certain transfers it does not void it. The  further spin-off  adroitly presented  by counsel is that the  provision violates  the second proviso to Art. 31. It is  a little  too baffling  to follow  and we dismiss the submission as  hollow. The provision in s.5(6), when read in the light of the Provisos, is fair and valid. 1170      Counsel’s further  argument is  to quote  his own words that "the  impugned provisions do not establish a reasonable procedure" because:           "The expression  ’in good faith’ is over-inclusive      and takes  within its  sweep situations  which are  not      only very different but which may not have any nexus or      legitimate relationship  with the  objects and purposes      of the ceiling law .. " We are hardly impressed by it and find no substance on it.      There is  no question  of morality or constitutionality even if  the clause  may be  a  little  over-drawn.  On  the contrary, it  is  legislative  folly  not  to  preserve,  by appropriate  preventives  and  enacted  contraceptives,  the ’surplus’ reservoir  of land  without seepage or spill-over. It is  legal engineering, not moral abandonment. Indeed, the higher morality  or social  legitimacy of the law requires a wise legislature  to prescribe  transfers, lest  the surplus pool be  drained off  by  a  rush  of  transactions.  Maybe, individual hardship  may happen, very sad in some instances. But every great cause claims human martyrs! Poor consolation for the  victim but yet a necessary step if the large owners are not to play the vanishing trick or resort to manipulated alienations! After  all, this ban comes into force only on a well-recognised date,  not  from  an  arbitrary  retroactive past.      We cannot  discover anything  which is morally wrong or constitutionally anathematic  in such  an  embargo.  Article 19(1) (f) is not absolute in operation and is subject, under Art.19(6),  to  reasonable  restrictions  such  as  the  one contained in  s.5(6). We  do not think there is merit in the triple submissions spun by Shri Mridul.      Even on  the merits,  the transfers  have been  rightly ignored, the vendees who are the grandsons have been held to be not bona fide transferees for adequate consideration; and the findings  are of  fact and  concurrent. We over-rule the grounds of  grievance  as  unsustainable.  In  sum,  without reliance on  Art. 31A,  Shri  Mridul’s  contentions  can  be dismissed as without merit.      We will  now consider  the mini-arguments  of the other counsel some  of them  do merit serious consideration by the court -  and even where direct relief does not flow from the judicial process,  State action  to avoid anomalies may well be called for in the light of genuine hardships.      Shri Veda  Vyas, appearing  in W.P. No. 228 of 1979 and SLP No.  2599 of 1978, pleaded powerfully for gender justice and sex 1171 equity because,  according to  his reading,  the Act  had  a built-in masculine  bias in  the definition of ’family unit’ and  allocation  of  ceiling  on  holdings,  and  therefore, perpetrated  unconstitutional  discrimination.  Indeed,  his case illustrated  the anti-woman  stance of  the statute, he claimed.  The   submission  is   simple,  the  inference  is

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inevitable but the invalidation does not follow even if Art. 31A is not pressed into service to silence Art. 14.      We will  formulate the  objections  and  examine  their merit from  the constitutional  perspective. Maybe, there is force in  the broad generalisation that, notwithstanding all the boasts  about the legendary glory of Indian womanhood in the days  of yore  and the  equal status  and  even  martial valour of  heroines  in  Indian  history,  our  culture  has suffered a traumatic distortion, not merely due to feudalism and  medievalism,  but  also  due  to  British  imperialism. Indeed, the  Freedom. Struggle  led by  Mahatma Gandhi,  the story of  social reforms  inspired by spiritual leaders like Swami Vivekananda  and  engineered  by  a  galaxy  of  great Indians like  Raja Rammohan  Roy, Swami  Dayananda Saraswati and Maharishi  Karve and  the brave chapter of participation in the  Independence Movement  by hundreds  and thousands of woman patriots  who flung aside their unfree status and rose in revolt  to overthrow  the foreign  yoke, brought  back to Indian womanhood  its lustrous  status of  equal partnership with Indian  manhood when  the country  decided to shape its destiny and enacted a Constitution in that behalf. Our legal culture and  Corpus juris, partly a heritage of the past, do contain strands  of discrimination  to  set  right  which  a commission  elaborately   conducted  enquiries  and  made  a valuable report  to the  Central Government.  Shri Veda Vyas may be  right in  making sweeping  submissions only  to this limited extent  but when  we reach  the  concrete  statutory situation and tackle the specific provisions in the Act, his argument misses the mark.      A  better   appreciation  of  his  contention  must  be preceded by  excerption of two definitions and consideration of the  concepts they  embody. Section 3(7) defines ’family’ thus:           ’family’ in  relation to  a  tenure-holder,  means           himself or herself and his wife or her husband, as           the case may be (other than a judicially separated           wife or  husband), minor  sons and minor daughters           (other than married daughters); This definition  is incomplete  without contextually reading s. 5(3)  and so we quote the provision which, in the view of Shri Veda  Vyas, enwombs  the vice of discrimination against women. Sec.5(3)(a) & (b) & Explanation: 1172      Sec. 5(3):  Subject to  the provisions  of sub-sections (4), (5),  (6) and (7) the ceiling area for purposes of sub- section (1) shall be      (a)  In the  case of a tenure-holder having a family of           not more  than  five  members,  7.30  hectares  of           irrigated  land  (including  land  held  by  other           members  of   his  family)   plus  two  additional           hectares of irrigated land or such additional land           which  together   with  the   land  held   by  him           aggregates to  two hectares, for each of his adult           sons,  who  are  either  not  them  selves  tenure           holders or  who hold  less than  two  hectares  of           irrigated  land,  subject  to  a  maximum  of  six           hectares of such additional land;      (b)  in the  case of  a tenure-holder  having family of           more than five members, 7.30 hectares of irrigated           land (including  land held by other members of his           family), besides,  each of  the members  exceeding           five and  for each  of his  adult sons who are not           themselves tenure  holders or  who held  less than           two hectares  of irrigated  land,  two  additional           hectares of irrigated land or such additional land

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         which together  with the  land held  by such adult           son  aggregates  to  two  hectares  subject  to  a           maximum of six hectares of such additional land Explanation: The  expression ’adult  son’ in  clause (a) and           (b) includes an adult son who is dead and has left           surviving behind him minor sons or minor daughters           (other  than   married  daughters)   who  are  not           themselves tenure  holders or  who hold  land less           than two hectares of irrigated land;      The  anti-female  kink  is  patent  in  that  the  very definition of  family discloses prejudice against the weaker sex by  excluding adult  daughters without providing for any addition to  the ceiling on their account. In the case of an adult son,  s. 5(3) (a) of the Act provides for the addition of two  hectares of  irrigated land  for each  of his tenure holder’s) sons  where the family has a strength of less than five. Section  5(3)(b) similarly provides for two additional hectares of irrigated land for each of his (tenure holder’s) adult sons  where the strength of the family is more than 5. It must  be remembered  that this  addition is on account of the fact that there are adult sons, even though they are not tenure holders  or held less than two hectares or none. This previlege of adding to the total extent that the family of a tenure 1173 holder may  keep is denied to an adult daughter, even though unmarried, and,  therefore, dependent on the family for that a married  son stands  on a different footing from a married daughter, what  justice  is  there  in  baring  a  dependent unmarried daughter  in the cold? Assuming without admitting, Shri Veda Vyas further urges that having regard to the Child Marriage Restraint  Act, 1929  and the increasing prevalence of unmarried  adult daughters  in families  these days,  the discrimination is  not theoretical but real because no minor girl can now marry.      Another similar  invidious provision  is the definition of  tenure   holder.  Ceiling  on  holdings  is  fixed  with reference to tenure-holders.      We wonder whether the Commission on the Status of Women or the  Central Governments  or the  State Governments  have considered this  aspect of  sex discrimination  in most land reforms laws,  but undoubtedly  the  State  should  be  fair especially to  the weaker  sex. Adult  damsels should not be left in  distress by progressive legislations geared to land reforms. This criticism may have bearing on the ethos of the community and  the attitude  of the  legislators, but we are concerned  with  the  constitutionality  of  the  provision. Maybe, in  this age  of nuclear families and sex equal human rights it  is illiberal  and contrary  to the  zeit geist to hark back to history’s dark pages nostalgically and disguise it as the Indian way of life with a view to deprive women of their undeniable half. Arts. 14 and 15 and the humane spirit of the  Preamble  rebel  against  the  de  facto  denial  of proprietary  personhood   of  woman-hood.   But  this  legal sentiment and  jural value  must not  run riot  and  destroy provisions which  do not  discriminate between man and woman qua man  and woman but merely organise a scheme where life’s realism is  legislatively pragmatised.  Such  a  scheme  may marginally affect  gender justice but does not abridge, even a wee-bit,  the rights of women. If land-holding and ceiling thereon  are   organised  with   the  paramount  purpose  of maximising surpluses  without maiming  woman’s ownership  no submission to  destroy this  measure can  be permitted using sex discrimination  as a  means to sabotage what is socially desirable. No woman s property is taken away any more than a

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man’s property.      Section 5(3)  reduces daughters  or wives to the status of stooges.  It forbids  excessive holdings having regard to rural realities  of agricultural  life. ’Family’  is defined because it  is taken  as the unit for holding land-a fact of extant societal  life which  cannot be  wished away. This is only a  tool of social engineering in working out the scheme of setting limits to ownership. Section 5(3) does not confer any property  on an adult son nor withdraw any property from an adult  daughter. That  provision shows  a concession to a tenure-holder who has propertyless 1174 adult sons  by allowing  him to  keep two  more hectares per such son.  The propertyless  son gets  no right to a cent of land on  this score but the father is permitted to keep some more of  his own  for feeding  this  extra  mouth.  If    an unmarried daughter  has her  own land, this legislation does not    deprive  her  any  more  than  a  similarly  situated unmarried son.  Both are  regarded  as  tenure-holders.  The singular grievance of a chronic spinster vis a vis a similar bachelor may  be that  the father  is allowed  by s. 5(3) to hold an  extra two hectares only if the unmarried major is a son. Neither  the daughter  nor the  son gets  any  land  in consequence and a normal parent will look after an unmarried daughter with  an equal  eye. Legal injury can arise only if the daughter’s  property is  taken away  while the  son’s is retained or  the daughter  gets no  share while the son gets one. The  legislation has  not done  either. So, no tangible discrimination can be spun out. Maybe, the legislature could have allowed  the tenure-holder to keep another two hectares of his  on this basis of the existence of an unmarried adult daughter. It  may have  grounds rooted in rural realities to do so.  The court may sympathize but cannot dictate that the land-holder  may   keep  more  land  because  he  has  adult unmarried daughters.  That  would  be  judicial  legislation beyond permissible process.      The same  perspicacious analysis salvages the provision regarding a  wife. True,  s. 3(17) makes the husband tenure- holder even  then the wife is the owner. So long as the land is within  the sanctioned  limit it  is retained  as  before without affecting ownership or enjoyment. But where it is in excess, the  compensation for  the wives land, if taken away as surplus,  is paid  to her  under Chapter III, And even in the choice  of land, to declare surplus, the law, in s. 12A, has taken  meticulous care  to protect the wife. The husband being treated  as tenure-holder  even when  the wife  is the owner is  a legislative  device for  simplifying  procedural dealings. When  all is  said and  done, married woman in our villages do  need their husband’s services and speak through them in  public places,  except,  hopefully  in  the  secret ballot expressing  their independent  political choice. Some of us  may not  be happy  with the masculine flavour of this law but  it is  difficult to  hold that  rights of women are unequally treated,  and so,  the war for equal gender status has to be waged elsewhere. Ideologically speaking, the legal system, true to the spirit of the Preamble and Art. 14, must entitle the  Indian women  to be  equal in dignity, property and personality,  with man.  It is wrong if the land reforms law denudes woman of her property. If such be the provision, it may  be unconstitutional  because we  cannot expect  that "home is  the girl’s  prison and the woman’s work-house" But it is not. 1175      It must be said in fairness, that- the legislature must act on  hard  realities, not on glittering ideals which fail

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to work.  Nor can  large landholders  be allowed  to  outwit socially imperative  land  distribution  by  putting  female discrimination as  a  mask.  There  is  no  merit  in  these submissions of Sri Veda Vyas.      In the  view we  have taken,  we need  not discuss  the soundness of  the reasoning  in the ruling in Sucha Singh v. State(1). The  High Court  was right,  if we may say so with respect,  in  its  justification  of  the  section  when  it observed:           The subject of legislation is the person owning or      holding land and not his or her children.           Section 5  provides for the measure of permissible      are that  a person  with one or more adult sons will be      allowed to  select out of the area owned or held by him      and his  children,- whether  male or  female, have  not      been given any right to make a selection for himself or      herself.  It  cannot.  therefore,  be  said  that  this      section makes  a discrimination  between a  son  and  a      daughter in  respect of  his or her permissible area on      the ground  of sex  alone. The  legislature is the best      Judge to  decide  how  much  area  should  be  left  as      permissible area  with each  owner or  holder of  land.      Insofar as  no distinction  between a male and a female      holder or owner of the land has been made in respect of      the permissible  area in any given circumstances? there      is no violation of Article 15 of the Constitution. This      section does  not provide  for any  succession  to  the      land;  it   only  provides   for  the  measure  of  the      permissible area  to be  retained by  every  holder  or      owner of  the land out of the area held or owned by him      or her  on the appointed day on the basis of the number      of adult  sons he or she has. It is for the legislature      to prescribe  the measure  of permissible  area and  no      exception can  be taken  because only  adult sons  have      been taken into consideration.      Shri Veda  Vyas objected to the further observations of      Tuli, J.           It. is  evident that  distinction between an adult      son and an adult daughter has been made not only on the      ground of  sex but  also for the reason that a daughter      has to  go to  another family after her marriage in due      course,  marriage   being  a  normal  custom  which  is      universally practised. This 1176      is an  institution of  general prevalence  which is the      foundation of  organised and  civilised  societies  and      communities. Our rapidly  changing times,  when women after long domestic servitude, seek  self-expression,  cannot  forge  new  legal disabilities and  call it  legislative wisdom.  But, without assent or dissent, we may pass by these observations because no  property   right   of   women   is   taken   away,   and discrimination. if  any, is  not inflicted  on  rights,  but sentiments. Shri  Arvind Kumar, who followed, also made some persuasive points  and seeming dents in the legislation when read in the light of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter  called the Consolidation Act). In general terms, the  submission turned  on the  operation of  the law relating to consolation of holdings.      It is  a great  pity that  a benign  agrarian  concept- abolition of fragmentation and promotion of consolidation of agricultural holdings-  has  proved  in  practice  to  be  a litigative  treachery   and  opened   up  other  vices.  The provision for  appeals  and  revisions  and  the  inevitable temptation of the vanquished to invoke Art. 226 and Art. 136

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of  the  Constitution  has  paved  the  protracted  way  for improvident lay-out  on speculative litigation. More farmers are cultivating  litigation than  land, thanks to the multi- docket procedure  in the  concerned law.  Even so, we see no force in counsel’s contention which we may now state.      The  thrust   of  his   argument,  omitting  subsidiary submissions which we will take up presently, is that so long as consolidation  proceedings under the sister statute (U.P. Consolidation of  Holdings Act,  1953) are  under  way,  two consequences follow.  Firstly, all  other legal  proceedings including the ceiling proceedings must abate. A notification under s.  4 of  the Consolidation  Act has  been  issued  in regard to  many areas  in the  State. Consolidation has been completed in  most places  but  is  still  pending  in  some places. Counsel’s argument is that once a notification under s.4 has  been  issued,  s.  5(2)(a)  operates.  This  latter provision states that           every proceeding for the correction of records and      every suit  and proceeding in respect of declaration of      rights or  interest in any land laying in the area, or,      for declaration  or ad judication of any other right in      regard to  which proceedings  can or  ought to be taken      under this  Act, pending  before any court or authority      whether of  the first  instance or of appeal, reference      of revision, shall, on an order being passed in that 1177      behalf by  the court or authority before whom such suit      or proceeding is pending, stand abated;           Provided  that  no  such  order  shall  be  passed      without giving  to the parties notice by post or in any      other manner  and after  giving them  an opportunity of      being heard:           Provided  further   that  on   the  issue   of   a      notification under  sub-section (1)  of  Section  6  in      respect of  the said  area or  part thereof, every such      order in  relation to  the land  lying in  such area or      part as the case may be, shall stand vacated; Thus the  ceiling proceeding  has abated  and  surplus  land cannot be  taken from  him. This  plea has only meretritious attraction and superficial plausibility as we will presently see.       The  whole scheme  of consolidation  of holding  is to restructure agrarian  landscape of  U.P. so  as  to  promote better  farming   and  economic   holdings  by   eliminating fragmentation  and   organising  consolidation.  No  one  is deprived of  his land.  What happens  is, his scattered bits are  taken   away  and   in  lieu   thereof   a   continuous conglomeration equal in value is allotted subject to minimal deduction for  community use and better enjoyment. Once this central  idea  is  grasped,  the  grievance  voiced  by  the petitioner becomes  chimerical. Counsel  complains that  the tenure-holder will  not be  able to  choose  his  land  when consolidation proceedings  are in an on-going stage. True, , whatever land  belongs to  him at  that time, may or may not belong  to  him  after  the  consolidation  proceedings  are completed. Alternative  allotments may  be made  and so  the choice that  he may make before the prescribed authority for the purpose  of surrendering  surplus lands  and  preserving ’permissible holding’  may have  only tentative  value.  But this factor  does not  seriously prejudice the holder. While he chooses  the best  at the  given time  the  Consolidation officer will  give him  its equivalent  when a  new plot  is given to him in the place of the old. where is no diminution in the  quantum of land and quality of land since the object of consolidation is not deprivation but mere substitution of

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scattered pieces with a consolidated plot. The tenure-holder may well  exercise his  option before the prescribed officer and if,  later, the  Consolidation officer  takes away these lands, he  will allot  a  real  equivalent  thereof  to  the tenure-holder elsewhere.  There is no reduction or damage or other prejudice by this process of statutory exchange.      Chapter III of the Consolidation Act provides, in great detail, for  equity and  equality,  compensation  and  other benefits when  finalising the  consolidation scheme. Section 19(1) (b) ensure that 16-610 SCI/80 1178           "the valuation  of plots  allotted  to  a  tenure-      holder subject  to deductions,  if any, made on account      of contributions  to public  purposes under this Act is      equal to the valuation of plots originally held by him.           Provided that,  except with  the permission of the      Director of  Consolidation, the  area of the holding or      holdings allotted  to a  tenure-holder shall not differ      from the  area of  his original  holding or holdings by      more then twenty five percent of the latter." When land ii contributed for public purposes compensation is paid in that behalf in the event of illegal or unjust orders passed, appellate  and revisory  remedies are also provided. On such  exchange or  transfer taking place, pursuant to the finalisation of  the consolidation scheme, the holding, upto the  ceiling   available  to  the  tenure  holder,  will  be converted into  the new  allotment under  the  consolidation scheme .  Thus,  we  see  no  basis  in  justice  nor  gross arbitrariness  in   the  continuance  of  the  land  reforms proceedings even  when consolidation  proceedings are  under way. We are not all impressed with counsel’s citation of the ruling in  Agricultural & Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. State of UP  and others,(l), particularly because there has been a significant amendment to s. S subsequent thereto. The law as it stood then was laid down by this Court in the above case; but precisely  because of  that decision  an explanation has been added  to s.  5 of  the Consolidation  Act which  reads thus:           Explanation:- For  the purposes of subsection(2) a      proceeding  under   the  Uttar  Pradesh  Imposition  of      Ceiling on  Land Holdings  Act, 1960  or an uncontested      proceeding under  Sections  134  to  137  of  the  U.P.      Jamindari Abolition  and Land  Reforms Act, 1950, shall      not  be  deemed  to  be  a  proceeding  in  respect  of      declaration of rights or interest, in any land. The view  of the Allahabad High Court in Kshetrapal Singh v. State of  U.P.(2) (H.C.) is correct, and in effect negatives the submission  of Shri  Arvind Kumar that there should be a stay  of   ceiling   proceedings   pending   completion   of consolidation  proceedings.  The  head  note  in  Kshetrapal Singh’s case  (Supra) brings out the ratio and for brevity’s sake, we quote it;           By adding  the Explanation after sub-section(2) of      Section 5  of the Act a legal fiction has been created.      What is 1179      otherwise a  proceeding in  respect of  declaration  of      rights   or interest  in any  land is  deemed not to be      such a proceeding. That is the clear legislative intent      behind the  Explanation. ordinarily  an Explanation  is      intended to  explain the  scope of the main section and      is not expected to enlarge or narrow down its scope but      where the  legislative intent clearly and unambiguously      indicates an  intention to  do so, effect must be given      to the legislative intent notwithstanding the fact that

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    the legislature named that provision as an Explanation.      A feeble  submission was  made that there was time-wise arbitrariness  vitiating   the  statute   in  that   various provisions in  the Act  were brought  into force  on  random dates without  any rhyme or reason, thus violating, from the temporally angle,  Art. 14.  It is  true  that  neither  the legislature nor  the Government  as  its  delegate  can  fix fanciful dates  for effectuation of provisions affecting the rights or citizens. Even so, a larger latitude is allowed to the State to notify the date on which a particular provision may come  into effect. Many imponderables may weigh with the State in  choosing the  date l)  and when  challenge is made years later, the factors which induced ’7 the choice of such dates may be buried under the debris of time. Parties cannot take advantage  of this  handicap and  audaciously challenge every date  of coming  into  force  of  every  provision  as capriciously picked out. In the present case, s.6(1) (g) has been brought  into force  on  8.6.73,  s.6(3)  on  10.10.75, s.3(4) on  15.8.72, s.16 on 1.7.73 and s.(l) (e) on 24.1.71. This last  date which  was perhaps  the one  which gave  the learned Advocate  General some puzzlement was chosen because on that date the election manifesto of the Congress Party in all the  States announced a revised agrarian policy and that party was  in power  at the  Union level  and in most of the States. Although  a mere  election manifesto  cannot be  the basis for  fixation of  a date,  here  the  significance  is deeper in  that it  was virtually  the announcement  of  the political government  of its  pledge to  the people that the agrarian policy  would be  revised  accordingly.  The  other dates mentioned  above  do  not  create  any  problem  being rationally related  to the  date of a preceding ordinance or the date  of introduction  of the  bill. The details are not necessary  except   to  encumber  this  judgment.  We  would emphasise  that   the  brief   of  the  State  when  meeting constitutional challenges  on the  ground  of  arbitrariness must be  a complete  coverage, including  an explanation for the date of enforcement of the provision impugned. Court and counsel cannot dig up materials to explain fossil dates when long  years   later  an  enterprising  litigant  chooses  to challenge. 1180      A few  other minor  infirmities were  faintly mentioned but not  argued at  all or seriously, such as, for instance, the contention  that s.  38B of the Act which understandably excludes res  judicata is  challenged as  violative  of  the basis structure  of the  Constitution and  otherwise exceeds legislative competence.  We do  not think  there is  need to dilate on  every little point articulated by one or other of the numerous  advocates who  justify their writ petitions or civil appeals by formal expression of futile submissions.      We dismiss  all the  appeals and all the writ petitions and all  the special  leave petitions  with costs one set in all the cases together which we quantify as Rs. 5,000/-. S.R.                      Appeals and Petitions dismissed. 1181