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PETITIONER: AMBA PRASAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ABDUL NOOR KHAN AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/04/1964

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1965 AIR   54            1964 SCR  (7) 800  CITATOR INFO :  R          1968 SC 466  (3)  F          1968 SC1351  (13)  RF         1976 SC1485  (15)  R          1979 SC 413  (8,10,11)  RF         1981 SC1005  (3)  F          1990 SC 471  (5,9,10,13,14)  RF         1990 SC 723  (9)

ACT: U.   P.  Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950,  s. 20-Explanation  II to s. 20-Suit for possession by  occupant on  the  basis  of  entry in  Khasra  for  1356F--Entry  not corrected   before   date  of   vesting-Its   effect-Whether correctness  of  entry  be  questioned  subsequently-Whether plaintiff required to prove actual possession.

HEADNOTE: On  October 10, 1953, the respondents filed suits  under  s. 232  read with s. 20 of the U. P. Zamindari  Abolition,  and Land Reforms Act, 1950 against the appellant before the Sub- Divisional Officer.  Before the coming into operation of the Abolition  Act the appellant (Amba Prasad) was  Zamindar  of the  disputed  land.   The names  of  the  respondents  were recorded in column 23 (miscellaneous) in the Khasra for  the year  1356  Fasli as persons in possession of  the  disputed land.   The respondents claimed adhivasi rights under s.  20 of the Abolition Act because they were recorded as occupants of the fields in dispute in the Khasra for 1356 Fasli.   The common case of the respondents was:     (i)  that they  were in  possession  of  the  suit  land  (ii)  that  they   were dispossessed   after  June  30,  1948  by   the   appellant, (iii)  that  as they were recorded occupants in  1356F  they were  not required to prove actual possession.  The case  of the appellant was that the entry was fraudulently made after July  1,  1949.   These suits were  dismissed  by  the  Sub- Divisional officer.  On appeal, the Additional  Commissioner held that the respondents had acquired the adhivasi -fights. Against  this order Amba Prasad (the appellant) appealed  to the  Board of Revenue.  The Board of Revenue  dismissed  the appeals.  The appellant then filed appeals in this Court. Held:(i)  Under  s.  20 of the Abolition  Act  (U.   P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act) a person continues

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as  an  adhivasi  after  July 1, 1952.  provided  he  is  in possession  or was evicted after June 30, 1948.  If  he  was evicted  after  June  30,  1948 he  is  entitled  to  regain possession in spite of any order or decree to the contrary. (ii)The words "recorded as occupants" in s. 20 of the  Abo- lition Act mean persons recorded as occupants in the  Khasra or  Khatauni  for  1356 Fasli  (1-7-48  to  30-6-49).   Such persons do not include an intermediary.  The word "occupant" must mean a person holding the land in possession or  actual enjoyment.   Mediate possession (except where  he  immediate possessor holds on behalf of the mediate possessor) is of no consequence. (iii)The appellant was not entitled to raise the plea of the correctness of the entry in Khasra because the entry was not corrected before the date of vesting (1-7-52) as required by Explanation (ii) to s. 20 of the Abolition Act. (iv)The  title  to possession as adhiwasi  depends  on  the entries  in the Khasra or Khatauni for the year 1356  Fasli. Section  20 of the Abolition Act does not require the  proof of actual possession.  Therefore, s. 20 eliminates inquiries into  disputed  possession by accepting the  record  in  the Khasra  or Khatauni of 1356F. or its correction before  July 1, 1952. 801 The  Upper  Ganges  Sugar Mills  Ltd.  v.  Khalil-ul-Rehman, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 564, referred to. Lala  Nanak  Chand v. Board of Revenue, U. P.,  1955  A.L.J. 408, Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukh Ram, 1963 A.L.J. 667, Bhal Singh v. Bhop and Anr., 1963 A.L.J. 288 and Sugriva v. Mukhi etc., 1963 A.L.J. 17 (Rev.), approved.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 680 to  682 of  1963.   Appeals by special leave from the  judgment  and decree dated February 8, 1960 of the Board of Revenue, U. P. in petitions Nos. 203 to 205 of 1958-59. J. P. Goyal, for the appellant (in all the appeals). Brijbans Kishore and Ramesh B. Saxena, for respon,dents Nos. I to 3 (in all the appeals). April 17, 1964.  The judgment of the Court was delivered ,by HIDAYATULLAH,   J.-This  judgment  shall  also  govern   the disposal of C. A. 681 of 1963.  These are appeals by special leave  of this Court against a common order of the Board  of Revenue,   U.P.   dated  February  8,  1960   disposing   of three  .appeals.   Civil  Appeal  No.  682  of  1963  (since compromised)  was  also  against  the  same  decision.   The appellant  in each ’of these appeals is one Amba Prasad  who was  the  Zamindar  of village Rhonda,  Pargana  and  Tehsil Khurja,   District  Bulandshahr,  before  the  coming   into operation of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land  Reforms Act, 1950.  The opposite parties (who will be referred to as the  answering  respondents in this  judgment)  are  persons whose  names were recorded in column 23  (miscellaneous)  in the Khasra for the year 1356 Fasli, as persons in possession and  who claim, by reason of the entry, to be the  recorded, occupants  of the fields in dispute, and to  have  ’obtained adhivasi  rights in the fields under s. 20 of the  Abolition Act.   Though the point in dispute appears to lie  within  a very narrow compass the history of litigation in respect  of these  plots  is  as  tedious  as  it  is  long.   It   must unfortunately  be  told  to  get  a  true  measure  of   the ,arguments in the appeals. Amba  Prasad  brought  two suits under s. 180  of  the  U.P.

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Tenancy Act, 1939 for ejectment from the fields now in  dis- pute  and  for  damages,  against  Mohammad  Ali  and   Mst. Sharifan respectively because their names A-ere recorded  in the Khasra as tenants ’bila tasfia lagan’.  These suits were dismissed  by the trial Judge and Aniba Prasad’s  appeal  to the Commissioner failed on November 30, 1943.  Amba  Pra.sad then  appealed to the Board of Revenue, U.P. and  succeeded. The order of the Board of Revenue, U. P. is dated March  19, 1949 (item No. 25).  Mohammad Ali had died by L/P(D)ISCI-26 802 then  and was represented by one Faivazali and  six  others. Mst.  Sarifan had also died and was represened by one  Abdul Sattar alias Chunna Khan and two others.  As a result of the decision  of the Board of Revenue possession of  the  fields was delivered to Amba Prasad on July 1, 1949-the day of  the commencement  of the year 1357 Fasli.  The  dakhalnamas  are items Nos. 44 and 45 in this record and they mention  fields Nos. 427/2, 428/2, 429, 430 and 380 (item No. 44) and fields Nos.  416, 418/1 and 418/2 (item No. 45) of village  Rhonda, Pargana and Tehsil Khurja, District Bulandshahr. Immediately  after obtaining possession of the  fields  Amba Prasad  was required to commence proceedings under  s.  145, Criminal  Procedure  Code before the  Sub-Divisional  Magis- trate,  Anupshahr  against Faiyazali and  Abdul  Sattar  and others and on January 13, 1951 these proceedings  terminated in favour of Amba Prasad (item No. 28).  The Sessions  Judge Bulandshahr made a reference to the High Court of  Allahabad recommending  that the order be vacated but the  High  Court declined to interfere.  The order of the High Court is dated October  20,  1951  (item No. 29).   Meanwhile  Amba  Prasad started  a  prosecution  under s.  218,  Indian  Penal  Code against the Lekhpal alleging that he had made false  entries in the Revenue papers but the Magistrate, 1st Class, Buland- shahr discharged him by his order dated July 24, 1950  (item No. 26).  An application for revision of the order filed  by Amba Prasad was dismissed by the Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr on October 10, 1950 (item No. 27). During  the  pendency  of the  proceedings  under  s.  145,. Criminal  Procedure Code these fields remained  under  atta- chment  from August 23, 1949 (1358 F.) to November  6,  1951 (1359 F.). Two suits were then commenced in the court of the Munsif,  Khurja  for declaration that crops  of  the  fields under  attachment belonged to the plaintiffs.  One suit  (97 of 1951) was filed by Abdul Noor Khan and others  (answering respondents) and the other (67 of 1952) was filed by Sarfraz Ali Beg and 8 others (respondents in C. A. 682 of  1963since compromised).  These suits were directed against Amba Prasad and the plaintiffs claimed to be in possession of the fields by virtue of entries to this effect in the remarks column of the  Khasras of the relevant years.  These suits  failed  on August  9, 1952 and August 8, 1953 respectively (vide  items Nos. 30 and 32).  It appears that proceedings under s. 107,, Criminal  Procedure Code were also started against A.  Noor- khan and others before Magistrate, 1st Class, Bulandshahrand they  were  bound over to keep the peace.  There is  on  the file  of this case an order of the Sessions  Judge,  Buland- shahr  dismissing their application in revision on  February 24, 1953 (item No. 31). 803 Meanwhile,  the  answering respondents and Sarfraz  Ali  and others commenced on November 6, 1951 three suits under s. 61 read  with  s.  183  of the U. P.  Tenancy  Act,  1939  .for declaration of Sirdar rights and to claim hereditary  rights under s. 180/2 ibid.  These suits were decreed against  Amba

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Prasad by the Judicial Officer, Anupshahr on July 14,  1953. He  held that the Dakhaldehi of July 1, 1949 did not  affect the plaintiffs and since they were shown to be in possession they  were entitled to succeed (item No. 33).   Amba  Prasad filed  an appeal and the Commissioner, Meerut  Division  re- versed  the decision by his order dated April 1, 1954  (item No.  35).   The Board of Revenue, U. P. also  dismissed  the -appeal  of the plaintiffs on September 17, 1955  (item  No. 38). On  October 10, 1953 two suits were filed by  the  answering respondents  in  these two appeals and a third by  the  res- pondents  in  C. A. No. 682 of 1963 which has  been  compro- mised.  These suits were under s. 232/2O of the U. P. Zamin- dari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.  It is with these suits -that we are concerned in the appeals.  Two suits also under s.  232/20 of the Abolition Act were filed by Ayub Ali  Khan and  Abdul Sattar Khan and others against Amba Prasad.   The answering respondents and Sarfraz Ali and others were joined as  defendants  in those suits.  The plaints  in  these  two suits  are  dated December 28, 1954 and  December  20,  1954 (items  Nos.  36 and 38).  They were dismissed by  the  Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Khurja on %-lay 16, 1955.  The  Addi- tional Commissioner, Meerut, dismissed the appeals on  Janu- ary 30, 1950 in default of appearance (item No. 39). On  September  4, 1958 the  Sub-Divisional  Officer,  Khurja dismissed the three suits filed by the answering respondents ,and  the  respondents in the companion  appeal.   In  these suits -the answering respondents relied on extracts from the Khasras -of 1355F, 1356F, 1357F, 1358F and 1359F as  showing their   possession.   These  lands,  however,   were   under attachment from August 23, 1949 (1358F) to November 6,  1959 (1359F) and could not be in the possession of the  answering respondents  in  the years 1358F and 1359F.  This  fact  was noticed  by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, in his  order dated  April  1, 1954 and he cast doubts on the  entries  in 1355F  ,and 1356F.  The Sub-Divisional Officer took  up  the same  line  of  reasoning and pointed  ’out  that  in  years subsequent  to  1355F the entry would have  found  place  in column  6  of  the Khasra and not the  remarks  column.   He accordingly held that the entries of 1355 F and 1356 F  were unreliable  and .the answering respondents had not  acquired adhivasi  rights.  On Appeal, the  Additional  Commissioner, Meerut, reversed ,the decision on April 19, 1959 and decreed the   suits.    Before  the   Commissioner   the   answering respondents claimed that as L /P(D)ISCI-26(a) 804 they were recorded occupants in 1356F they were not required to  prove actual possession.  This proposition, it  appears, was conceded by the counsel for Amba Prasad.  He only argued that the entries were not in accordance with paragraph 87 of the Land Records Manual and they were considered spurious in earlier  litigation.   He also claimed  that  the  answering respondents  were  barred by the principle of  res  judicata because  though they were parties to the suits of  Ayub  Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar they did not claim adhivasi rights  in those suits. The  learned Commissioner pointed out that the entries  were no  doubt  suspected to be spurious by the  Commissioner  on April 1, 1954, but this was after July 1. 1952 which was the date  of vesting and the case therefore was  outside  Expla- nations  11 and III of s. 20(b) of the Abolition  Act.   The learned  Commissioner,  therefore, was of the  opinion  that them  entries could not be discarded as they must have  been completed under the rules before April 30, 1949, that is  to

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say, even before the Dakhaldehi.  He held that the answering respondents  (appellants before him) had  acquired  adhivasi rights. Amba  Prasad  appealed to the Board of Revenue.   The  Board dismissed  his appeal on February 8, 1960 by the  order  now impugned.   This  time the learned counsel for  Amba  Prasad conceded  that the entry was made but contended that it  was fraudulently  made  after July 1, 1949 and referred  to  the prosecution  of the Lekhpal.  The Board ’of Revenue  pointed out that there was no order for the correction of the  entry before the date of vesting and the Lekhpal was acquitted of’ the  charge  under  s. 218, Indian Penal  Code.   Since  the entries were not corrected as required by Explanation 11  to s.  20 the conditions of s. 20(b) of the Abolition Act  were held to be satisfied and the appeal was dismissed. Mr. Goyal on behalf of Amba Prasad contends that these suits were  barred  by  res  judicata.  He  submits  that  in  the previous  suits filed by Ayub Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar  and others,  the answering respondents were made defendants  and could  have raised the plea that they had acquired  adhivasi rights and as they did not raise such a plea they cannot now raise it.  We do not accept this Contention.  The  answering respondents had filed these suits even before Ayub Ali  Khan and Abdul Sattar had filed their suits.  Further, the  suits filed  by  Ayub  Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar  did  not  decide anything  because they were dismissed owing to  a  technical flaw  in  the  plaint.  Even the  appeal  was  dismissed  in default  of appearance.  Lastly, the  answering  respondents and Amba Prasad were co-defendants and no issue between them was tried or decided even if one was necessary to be tried. 805 Mr. Goyal next contends that the answer in- respondents must show that they were in possession and that under Explanation I  to  s.  20 they were evicted after  June  30,  1948.   He submits  that  these conditions are not fulfilled  by  them. Mr.  Goyal  also wishes to withdraw the concession  made  on behalf  of Amba Prasad before the Tribunals below  that  the answering  respondents need not prove their possession.   He says that the concession was made because there were rulings of  the  Allahabad High Court which bound the  Revenue  Tri- bunals.  He submits that these rulings should be  considered and  urge that possession in 1356 Fasli must be proved.   He further submits that even entries in the Khasra and Khatauni to be of value must be made in accordance with ss. 28 and 33 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act and he relies on paragraph  87 of  the  Land Record Manual to contend that the  entries  in favour  of the answering respondents were irregular.   These contentions  though they appear to be many are  really  two. The first questions the entry and the other the right of the answering respondents even if the record be correct to claim adhivasi rights under s. 20 of the Abolition Act.  We  shall consider them separately. The  first question is whether these entries were  regularly made.   It  is  pointed out that they were  doubted  by  the Revenue  Tribunals  in some other proceedings and  that  the Lekhpal was also prosecuted under s. 218, Indian Penal Code. That, however, does not prove in these proceedings that  the entries  are spurious.  The Lekhpal was discharged  and  the Additional Commissioner has held here:               "By making the entry in the remarks column  it               is   also  not  possible  to   attribute   any               dishonest or collusive entry.  It appears that               Shri  Amba  Prasad had filed a  criminal  case               against  the  patwari but this was  after  the               entries  in  the remarks column in  favour  of

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             appellants  had been made.  The entry in  1356               fasli  cannot be discarded on the  remarks  in               the judgments referred by the learned  counsel               for  the  respondent.   It  appears  that  Sri               Mohammad  Ali  and Srimati Sharifan  were  the               proprietors  and  they mortgaged  their  share               with  present respondents and Sri Amba  Prasad               purchased the equity of redemption and got the               share   partitioned.  There   was   litigation               between  Sri Amba Prasad and Sri Mohammad  Ali               and  Srimati  Sharifan upto High  Court.               Sri Amba Prasad and others filed suits against               Srimati  Sharifan and Sri Mohammad  Ali  under               section  180  and it was decreed  in  the  2nd               appeal   on  19-3-49.   The   possession   was               delivered  on  1-7-1949, in execution  of  the               decree.  The Khasra for 1356 fasli under               806               the  rules may have been deposited  some  time               before  31st July 1950 but the entries in  the               Khasras  had to be completed upto  30th  April               1949" Mr.  Goyal  relies  upon paragraph 87 of  the  Land  Records Manual  and argues that the names of persons occupying  land without  the consent of persons whose names are recorded  in column 5 of the khasra should have been entered in column  6 but  column  6 is crossed out.  It is, however, to  be  seen that when a tenant leaves the neighbourhood without  leaving in charge of his holding, a person responsible for the  pay- ment  of  his  rent as it falls due  and  without  giving  a written  notice to the land holder of such arrangement,  the Lekhpal  is  required  to  show  the  name  of  the   actual cultivator  in  the column of remarks preceded by  the  word ’qabiz’ (see Para. 85(c)).  That is how the entry stands and there is nothing on the record of this case on the  strength of  which  it can be said that the entry in  1356F  was  not regularly  made.  If it was wrong Amba Prasad ought to  have got it corrected but the doubts cast on the entry cannot  be said to have corrected it .as required by Explanation III to s. 20 of the Abolition Act. There  is thus no doubt that the answering respondents  were recorded  as ’qabiz’ in 1356F.  There is also no doubt  that if  they were ’qabiz’ they were dispossessed after June  30, 1948.  The possession of Amba Prasad did not begin  ,earlier than  July  1,  1949.  There is nothing  to  show  that  the possession  of the answering respondents was disturbed  bet- ween  these  two  dates, because the  attachment  came  much later.   Mr. Goyal, however, contends that the burden is  on ,the  answering  respondents to prove their  possession  and eviction  after  June  30,  1948  before  they  can   regain possession as adhivasis under s. 20.  Mr. Brij Bans Kishore, however,   joins  issue  and  claims  that   the   answering respondents  have done enough when they show that  they  are recorded as ’occupants’ in the year 1356F.  He contends that it  is not necessary to show possession though he  does  not admit that the Ian were not in his clients’ possession. We  have pointed out above that the eviction could not  have taken place before July 1, 1949.  The Dakhalnamas show  that possession was given to Amba Prasad on July 1, 1949.  In  so far  as the appellant is concerned he was not in  possession before  that  date and the khasra for 1356F shows  that  the answering  respondents were ’qabiz’ (in possession).  It  is ,contended  that the suit is for possession and the date  of dispossession  has not been given as required by  rule  183. No  -such objection appears to have been made at  any  time.

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In  -any  event,  that  date is  useful  only  to  calculate limitation  and it is not Amba Prasad’s cases that there  is any such bar. 807 The real dispute thus is whether a person who is recorded as ’qabiz’  but  not as a tenant or a sub-tenant  can  get  the advantage of s. 20 of the Abolition Act and claim rights  as an adhivasi.  It is convenient at this stage to set out  the material portions of s. 20:               "20.  Every person who               (a) *               (b)   was recored as occupant-               (i)of  any land (other than grove  land  or               land  to  which  section 16  applies)  in  the               khasra  or  khatauni of 1356F  prepared  under               sections  28 and 33 respectively of  the  U.P.               Land Revenue Act, 1901, or who was on the date               immediately  preceding  the  date  of  vesting               entitled  to regain possession  thereof  under               clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 27  of               the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment)  Act,               1947, or               (ii)  *    *    *     *               be  called  adhivasi of the  land  and  shall,               subject  to  the provisions of  this  Act,  be               entitled to take or retain possession thereof.               Explanation  I-Where a person referred  to  in               clause  (b) was evicted, from the  land  after               June   30,  1948,  he  shall   notwithstanding               anything in any order or decree, be deemed  to               be  a person entitled to regain possession  of               the land.               Explanation II-Where any entry in the  records               referred  to in clause (b) has been  corrected               before  the  date  of  vesting  under  or   in               accordance  with the provisions of the  U.  P.               Land Revenue Act, 1901, the entry so corrected               shall  for  the purposes of the  said  clause,               prevail.               Explanation    III-For   the    purposes    of               explanation  11  an entry shall be  deemed  to               have been corrected before the date of vesting               if  an  order or decree of a  competent  court               requiring  any correction in records has  been               made before the said date and had become final               even  though the correction may not have  been               incorporated in the records.               Explanation   IV-For  the  purposes  of   this               section " occupant" as respects any land  does               not  include a person who was entitled  as  an               intermediary to the land or any share  therein               in the year l356 Fasli.  " The scheme of the section may now be noticed.  The  section, speaking generally says that certain persons "recorded"  a,, "occupants"  of  lands (other than grove lands or  lands  to which section 16 applies) shall be known as adhivasis and. 808 shall be entitled to retain or to regain possession of them, after  the  date of vesting which was July  1,  1952.   Such persons  do  not include an intermediary  (Explanation  IV). Such persons must be recorded as occupants in the khasra  or khatauni for 1356F (1-7-48 to 30-6-49).  If such a person is in possession be continues in possession.  If he is  evicted after  June  30,  1948 he is to be put  back  in  possession notwithstanding anything in any order or decree.  By fiction

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such persons are deemed to be entitled to regain  possession (Explanation  1).  The emphasis has been laid on the  record of  khasra  or khatauni of 1356F and June 30,  1948  is  the datuni  line.   The  importance of an  entry  in  these  two documents is further apparent from explanations 11 and  111. Under the former, if the entry is corrected before the  date of  vesting (1-7-52), the corrected entry is to prevail  and under  the latter the entry is deemed to be corrected  (even though  not actually corrected) if an order or decree  of  a competent court ordering the correction had been made before the  date  of  vesting and the order or  decree  had  become final.   There are thus two date lines.  They are  June  30, 1948  and  July  1, 1952, and the  title  to  possession  as adhivasi  depends on the entries in the khasra  or  khatauni for the year 1356F. Before   we   proceed  to  decide  whether   the   answering respondents satisfy the above tests we must consider what is meant  by  the terms ’occupant’ and  ’recorded’.   The  word ’occupant’ is not defined in the Act.  Since khasra  records possession  and  enjoyment the word ’occupant’ must  mean  a person  holding the land in possession or actual  enjoyment. The khasra, however, may mention the proprietor, the tenant, the sub-tenant and other person in actual possession, as the case  may be.  If by occupant is meant the person in  actual possession  it  is  clear that between a  proprietor  and  a tenant  the tenant, and between a tenant and the  sub-tenant the  latter  and between him and a person  recorded  in  the remarks column as "Dawedar qabiz" the dawedar qabiz are  the occupants.   This is the only logical way to  interpret  the section which does away with all intermediaries.  If  rights are  not to be determined except in the manner laid down  by the  section, the entries must be construed as explained  by the four explanations.  Once we find out the right person in the  light of the explanations, that person continues as  an adhivasi after July 1, 1952, provided he is in possession or was  evicted after June 30, 1948.  If he was  evicted  after June  30, 1948 he is entitled to regain possession in  spite of any order or decree to the contrary.  The word ’occupant’ thus signifies occupancy and enjoyment.  Mediate possession, (except where the immediate possessor holds on behalf of the mediate possessor) is ,of no consequence.  In this way  even persons  who got into Occupation when lands  were  abandoned get recognition.  The 809 section eliminates inquiries into disputed possession by ac- cepting  the records in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F,  or its correction before July 1, 1952.  It was perhaps  thought that  all such disputes would have solved themselves in  the four years between June 30, 1948 and June 30, 1952. There  was, however, for some time a difference of  opinion, on  the point whether possession in 1356F should be  proved, between  the  High  Court  of Allahabad  and  the  Board  of Revenue.   Section  20 came before this Court in  The  Upper Ganges  Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil-ul-Rehman  and  others(1) where  the correctness of Lala Nanak Chand v. The  Board  of Revenue,  U.P.(2) was challenged oil the ground that it  had held  that a mere entry in 1356F without possession in  that year was sufficient.  This Court did not decide the question and left it open.  Subsequently, the Allahabad High Court in several  decisions including the Full Bench decision in  Ram Dular  Singh and another v. Babu Sukh Ram and others(3)  has endorsed the earlier view in Nanakchand v. Board of Revenue, U.P.(2)  In  L.  Bhal  Singh  v.  Bhop  and  another(4)  the following  passage  from Nanak Chand’s  case  was  expressly approved: -

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             "It  seems  to  us  that  clauses  (b)(i)  and               (b)(ii) of Sec. 20 do not require the proof of               actual  possession  in the year  1356F.   What               they require merely is the entry of a person’s               name as an occupant in the Khasra or  Khatauni               of 1356F.  The words of the section are clear.               (Every person who was recorded as occupant  in               the               Khasra or Khatauni in 1356F. etc.).               The  words  are not "every person who  was  an               occupant  in 1356F": nor are the words  "every               person who was recorded as an occupant in  the               year  1356F and who was also in possession  in               that   year".    There  is  no   warrant   for               introducing words in the section which are not               there.  This conclusion is reinforced by  what               is stated in Explanation 11". The  Board of Revenue in Sugriva v. Mukhi etc.(5)  has  also adopted the same view.  In view of the long established line ’of  cases  we see no justification for  reopening  of  this question.   The  decision  of  the  Board  of  Revenue   was therefore  right.   The appeal fails and is  dismissed  with costs.  One set of hearing fees. Appeal dismissed. (1) [1961] 1, S.C.R. 564. (2) 1955 A.L.J. 408. (3) 1963 A.L.J. 667. (4) 1963 A.L.J. 288 at p. 291. (5)  1963 A.L.J. 17 (Rev.). 810