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PETITIONER: AMARSARJIT SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB(AND CONNECTED PETITIONS AND APPEALS)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/02/1962

BENCH: AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA BENCH: AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SUBBARAO, K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1962 AIR 1305            1962 SCR  Supl. (3) 346

ACT: Resumption   of  jagirs-Cis-Sutlej    jagirs-Jagirdars,   if sovereigns-Assignment  of revenue by British  Government-Im- plied  grant-Legislative competence of enactment-The  Punjab Resumption  of  Jagirs Act, 1957 (Punjab 39  of  1957),  ss. 2(1), 2(5)-Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, List II, entries 18,45.

HEADNOTE: The  Punjab Resumption of jagirs Act, 1957, came into  force on  November 14, 1957, and the State of Punjab proceeded  to take  action  thereunder  for  resuming  the  jagirs.    The petitioners who were holders of certain jagirs in that State known  as the Cis-Sutlej jagirs claimed that they could  not be resumed under the provisions of the Act because they  did not fall within the definition of jagir contained in s. 2(1) of  the  Act on tile grounds that there was at no  time  any grant  of the Cis-Sutlej jagirs to their holders  much  less any  assignment  of land revenue to them, and that  even  if there was such a grant, it was not one made by or on  behalf of  the State Government as required by s. 2(1) (a)  of  the Act.  The history or these jagirs showed that the  jagirdars were  originally  rulers of the territories when  they  took possession  of  them by conquest in 1763, but in  course  of time  after  the  British  came  on  the  scene,  they  were gradually stripped of all their powers as sovereigns, and in 1852 the British took over the collection of revenue of  the jagir  land-, and out of the collections the jagirdars  were paid their share.  Subsequent to 1852 there was a course  of legislation  relating  to  the  jagirs.   The  question  was whether  the  assignment of land revenue to  the  Cis-Sutlej jagirdars  was made on the basis of an implied  grant.   The petitioners  case  was that as the  Cis-Sutlej  Chiefs  were never conquered, the payment of land revenue to them must be related   to  their  status  as  sovereigns  and  that   the collection  of the land revenue was made only under all  im- plied arrangement with them. Held,  that the status of the Cis-Sutlej jagirdars was  only that of subjects and that the payment of revenue to them by

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                           347 the  British Government was only on the basis of an  implied grant to them. Though  the  Cis-Sutlej  Chief were  not  conquered  by  the British, since the latter were in fact exercising  sovereign powers  over the area it must be held that  sovereignty  had passed to them otherwise than by conquest. M/s.   Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. The  Commissioner  of Income-tax, [1959] S. C. R. 729, Thakur Amar Singji v. State of  Rajasthan, [1953] 2 S. C.R. 303 and  Vajesingji  Jorawar Singji  v.  Secretary  of State, [1924] L.R.  51  I.A.  357, relied on. Held,  further that the British Government which - had  made the  grant was the "State Government" within the meaning  of s.  2(5)  of the Punjab Resumption of jagirs Act  1957,  and that  the jagirs in question were within the  definition  of "jagir" in s.2(1) of the Act. Held,  also,  that the Act was within the  legislative  com- petence  of the State of Punjab under entries 18 and  45  of List  11  of  the Seventh Schedule to  the  Constitution  of India.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 82 of 1960  and  148, 168 to 174 and 357 to 361 of 1961. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for  the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.                             WITH Civil Appeals Nos. 453 to 474 of 1961. Appeals from the,, judgment and order dated May 25. 1959, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ Nos. 428, 303, 398, 402, 459  to  462, 421, 472, 473, 475, 490, 503, 509,  519,  520, 555, 590, 710 and 712 of 1958.                             AND Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1962. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and order  date(] May 25, 1959, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 347 of 1958. Achhru Ram and Naunit Lal,for the petitioner (in Potn.   No. 82 of 60) and the appellant (in C. A. No. 50 of 62). 348 I.   N.  Shroff, for the petitioners (in Petn.  No.  148  of 61) and the appellants (in C. As.  Nos. 457 to 474. of 61). Hardev  Singh  and Y. Kumar, for the petitioers  (in  Petns. Nos. 168 to 174 and 357 to 361 of 61). C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, K. L.  Gosain, B.  R. L. Iyengar, Lakshmi Chand and I. N. Shroff,  for  the appellants (in C.As. Nos 453 and 456    of 1961). K.   L.  Gosain, B. R. L. Iyengar, Lakshmi Chand and  I.  N. Shroff, for the appellants I in C. A. No. 454 of 196 I). B.   R.  L. Iyengar, Lakshmi, Chand and I.N.Shroff, for  the appellants (in C. A. No. 455 of 1961). S.M. Sikri, Advocate-General, for the State of Punjab N.  S. Bindra  and  P.  D.  Menon,  for  the  respondents  (in  all petitions and Civil Appeals). M.   C.   Setalvad,   Attorney-General  of  India,   J.   B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for Intervener No.1 (Satinder Singh). K.   L.  Mehta, for Intervener No. 2 (Raghuvinder Singh  and others). 1962.  February 20.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA  AIYAR,  J.-The  question  that  rises  for  our

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decision in the above writ petitions and appeals is  whether certain  jagirs  in the State of Punjab known as  the  "Cis- Sutlej" jagir are liable to be resumed under the  provisions of the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957 (Punjab Act No. 39 of 1957), hereinafter referred to as "the Act".  This Act came  into  force on November 14, 1957, and  the  respondent State then proceeded to take action thereunder for  resuming the  jagirs.  A number of petitions were thereupon filed  in the                             349 High  Court  of Punjab under Art. 226  of  the  Constitution challenging  the validity of the Act and of the  proceedings taken  by  the respondent State thereunder  on  the  ground, firstly,  that  the Act was ultra vires the  powers  of  the State    Legislature   and   that   its   provisions    were unconstitutional and void ; and, secondly, that even if  the -Act was intra vires the jagirs held by the petitioners were not  "jagirs" as defined in the Act, and were therefore  not liable to be resumed under its provisons.  By their judgment dated  May  25,  1959,  the learned  Judges  held  that  the legislation was within the competence of the State, and that it did not contravence any of the constitutional provisions. They  further held that the jagirs held by  the  petitioners fell  within  the definition of "jagir" under the  Act,  and were  liable to be resumed thereunder, and that  accordingly no  writ  could be issued against the State  for  proceeding under  the  provisions  of the Act.  By  their  Order  dated January 27, 1960, the learned Judges granted leave to appeal to  this Court under Art.. 133 (1) (a), and pursuant to  the same, Civil Appeals Nos. 453 to    474  of  1961  have  been preferred  to this Court. Appeal No. 50 of 1962  by  special leave is also  directed  against the judgment of the  Punjab High Court in a Writ Petition tinder Art. 226.  Some of  the jagirdars have also filed petitions in this Court under Art. 32) of the Constitution, impugning the Act and the action of the State thereunder on the same grounds as those raised  in the appeals.  We have accordingly heard arguments of learned Counsel  both in the writ petitions and in the appeals,  and this Judgment will govern all of them. Though a number of grounds have been taken in the pleadings, impugning  the  Act  as ultra vires and  its  provisions  as unconstitutional,  in  the  argument before  us,  -the  only contention  that was pressed was that the Cis-Sutlej  jagirs do not fall 350 within  the  definition of jagirs contained in the  Act  and that  accordingly the State had no authority to resume  them under  the  provisions of the Act.  And this  contention  is sought to be sustained on two ground: (i) that there was  at no time any grant of the Cis-Sutlej jagirs to their holders, much  less any assignment of land revenue to them; and  (ii) that even if there was such a grant, it was not one made  by or  on  behalf of the State Government as required by  s.  2 (1).   It  is  argued that if either  of  these  contentions succeeds,  the  jagirs in question would  fall  outside  the purview of the Act, and the State would have no right  under its provisions to resume them. It will be convenient at this stage to set out the  relevant provisions  of  the Act.  Section 2 (1) defines  "jagir"  as follows:-               " "jagir" means-               (a)   any  assignment of land revenue made  by               or on behalf of the State Government; or               (b)   any  estate in land created or  affirmed               by  or  on  behalf  of  the  State  Government

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             carrying with it the right of collecting  land               revenue  or receiving any portion of the  land               revenue; or               (c)any grant of money made or continued by  or               on  behalf  of  the  State  Government   which               purports  to be or is expressed to be  payable               out of the land revenue; or               (d)   any  grant of money  including  anything               payable on the part of the State Government in               respect of any right, privilege, perquisite or               office; and               includes any such grant or assignment existing               in favour of Cis-Sutlej jagirdars."                                    351               "Jagirdar"  is defined in s. 2 (2) as  meaning               the holder of a jagir.  Section 2 (5)  defines               State Government as follows:-               "State Government"-                (a)  as  respects any period before  the  1st               November   1956, shall mean:-                (i)  the Government of the Patiala  and  East               Punjab State Union or any of the Indian States               which formed into the Patiala and East  Punjab               States Union on the 20th August, 1948 and               (ii)  the  Government of the State  of  Punjab               and  all  predecessor Governments  thereof  by               whatever name called, the Governor-General  or               the  Governor-General in Council, as the  case               may  be,  and the Sikh Rulers, but  shall  not               include  the Central Government as defined  in               the  General  Clauses  Act,  1897,  after  the               period commencing on the 15th August, 1947.               (b)   as  respects  any period after  the  1st               November,  1956 shall mean the  Government  of               the State of Punjab."               Section 3 enacts that-               "Notwithstanding  anything  to  the   contrary               contained  in  any  law  or  usage  any  grant               settlement, sanad or other instrument, or  any               decree or order of any Court or authority, all               jagirs shall, on and from the commencement  of               this Act, be extinguished and stand resumed in               the name of the State Government. It  is common ground that the jagirs which are concerned  in the present writ petitions and appeals consist of a right to the revenue payable, on lands, and not of any estate such as will  fall under s. 2 (1) (b) of the Act and that they  must fall,  if  at  all  within s.  2  (1)  (a).   Therefore  the discussion narrows 352 itself to the question whether there was, as required by  s. 2 (1) (a) of the Act, any assignment of the revenue of these jagirs  and  whether  such  assignment  was  by  the   State Government. On the first question, as to whether there was assignment of land  revenue, the contention of the petitioners and of  the appellants-and   they   will  hereafter   be   referred   to compendiously as jagirdars-is that the so called jagirs  are not jagirs as ordinarily understood, that they were not  the subject matters of any grant by any State that they were  in fact  originally  independent  States held  by  rulers  with sovereign  rights,  that  in  course  of  time  the  British Government imposed their sovereignty over them, and  finally took  over  the  administration of the State  and  paid  the revenue collected therefrom to the rulers, not as person  to

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whom  the land-revenue had been assigned, because there  was no  such  assignment  but  as  sovereigns  of  the   States. Therefore,  it  is contended, the co-called jagirs  are  not within the definition of s. 2 (1). That brings us on to the question of the true status of  the Cis-Sutlej jagirdars.  The origin of these jagirs goes  back to  1763.  The collapse of the Moghul Empire had  created  a void in the political ,stage of this country, and many  were the powers which stepped in with the ambition of  establish- ing  their sovereignty.  The British had  established  their rule  and bad extended their dominion up to the Jumna.   The Sikhs  had  also developed during this period from  being  a purely  religious  sect into a  military  Organisation,  and established several States beyond the Sutlej.  The tract  of territory between the Jumna and the Sutlej was at this  time under  the administration of a weak Afghan  Governor  called Zain Khan.  The policy of the British during this period was to  hold  the  Jumna  as the  frontier,  and  so  they  were indifferent  to the fate of this Cis-Sutlej area.   But  the Sikh Chiefs 353 beyond  the  Sutlej  could  not  resist  the  temptation  of overthrowing the Afghan Governor, seizing his territory  and establishing  themselves as its rulers.  In 1763  the  storm burst when a number of them crossed the Sutlej,  overwhelmed the  Afghan  Governor and occupied the  whole  country  upto Jumna.  "Tradition still describes", says Cunningham in  his History of the Sikhs, P. I 10, I ’how the Sikhs dispersed as soon as the battle was won and how riding day and night each horseman would throw his be-It and scabbard, his articles of dress  and  acooutrement,  until he was  almost  naked  into successive villages to mark them as his." when the  conquest was  over  each  Chief declared himself  the  ruler  of  the territory  which  he  was able to  occupy,  and  constituted himself its sovereign. This  state of affairs continued until 1806.  By this  time, Ranjit  Singh  the ’,’Lion of the Punjab", had  built  up  a powerful  State across the Sutlej.  He had  already  subdued the  petty  rulers  within that area  and  was  turning  his attention  to the territories ’south of the Sutlej  and  had occupied some of them.  The Cis-Sutlej rulers became alarmed about  their  future  and appealed  for  protection  to  the British, who had, by this time, changed their policy of non- intervention.   The appeal was welcome, and met with  prompt response.   The result was that in 1809 the British  entered into  a treaty with Ranjit Singh whereby he surrendered  his acquisitions  south  of Sutlej and agreed not  to  interfere with  the  Cis-Sutlej States.  And this was  followed  by  a proclamation  by Colonel Ochterlony in May 1809 whereby  the Cis-Sutlej  Chiefs  were  assured of their  rights  as  sole owners  of  their possessions and exempted from  payment  of tribute,  but  were  required to  furnish  supplies  to  the British  Government and assist them against  their  enemies. The British Government also promulgated a rule that whenever any of the rulers died without issues, his State would lapse to the British Government. 354 This  was the position until 1846 when a drastic  change  in the  situation took place.  In 1845, there was  war  between the  British and the Sikhs, and in that war  the  Cis-Sutlej rulers far from helping the British against the Trans Sutlej Sikhs,  were  either unsympathetically neutral  or  actively hostile  to  them, and that brought about a  change  in  the policy of the British Government towards them.  The position is  thus stated by Kensington in the Ambala Gazetteer at  p.

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26:-               "Having  thus already lost the  confidence  of               the  Government the Sikh Chiefs in the  Sutlej               campaign forfieted all claim to consideration.               It was seen that the time had arrived for  the               introduction  of sweeping measures  of  reform               and  the  Government  unhesitatingly  resolved               upon a reduction of their privileges.  Several               important measures were at once adopted.   The               police jurisdiction of most of the chiefs  was               abolished,  the  existing  system  being  most               unfavourable  to the detection and  punishment               of crime.  All transit and customs duties were               also abolished; and thirdly, a commutation was               accepted for the personal service of the chief               and  his  contingent.   The  despatch  of  the               Governor General embodying this resolution was               dated November 7th, 1846." While the sweeping changes aforesaid were being  introduced, the  second  Sikh  War  broke out  and  that  ended  in  the annexation  of  the  Punjab.  And with  that  the  Deed  for maintaining  appearances and for recognizing the  Cis-Sutlej Chiefs  as  rulers came to an end.  The  British  Government then proceeded to act swiftly and firmly, and in June, 1849, they  made  a declaration that the Chiefs should  "cease  to hold  sovereign powers, should lose all criminal, civil  and fiscal  jurisdiction,  and should be considered as  no  more than  ordinary  subjects of the British  Government  in  the possession of certain exceptional  355 privileges"  (1).  Pursuant to this declaration, the  Chiefs were  stripped of all their governmental functions  and  the final  denouement took place in 1852 when the  British  took over  the  collection of revenue for the jagir  lands.   The rules  for settlement of revenue were made by them, and  the actual settlement and collection of revenue were made  under their  authority, and out of the collections  the  jagirdars were paid their share. On these facts, the question is whether it can be said  that their  was  an  assignment  of  the  land  revenue  to   the jagirdars.   Express grants to them, there were  none.   The point  in  debate before us is whether grants  of  the  land revenue could be implied from the facts stated above. A somewhat similar question came up for decision before this Court in Thakar Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (2)  with reference to a class of jagirdars in the State of  Rajasthan known  as  Bhomicharas.  They were once the  rulers  of  the territories  which were claimed to be jagirs, and  later  on the  State of Jodhpur imposed its suzerainty over  them  and exacted an annual payment called "Foujbal".  The Bhomioharas contended  that  they  had  come  into  possession  of   the territories  as  rulers and held them as rulers and  not  as jagirdars under grants made by any ruler.  In repelling this contention,  this Court held that a grant may be implied  as well  as express, and that on the facts which  were  Proved, the Bhomicharas, though they held originally as rulers, must be held to have been reduced to the status of subjects,  and that  their position was that of jagirdars under an  implied grant.   The  position of the Cis-Sutlej jagirdars  bears  a close  analogy  to that of the Bhomicharas  in  Thakur  Amar Singji’s  case     (2).       They  became  rulers  of   the territories when they took possession of them by conquest in 1763.  The first inroads into their (1 ) Griffin’s "Rajas of that Punjab", P. 199. (2)  [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303.

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356 sovereignty  were made in 1809 when the British  established their  suzerainty  over them and further declared  that  the territories  of  the  rulers who died  without  heirs  would escheat  to  them.   Then in  1846  the  British  Government deprived them of police jurisdiction, and the power to  levy customs, and in 1849, of all their sovereign functions.   It is not disputed that as a result of all these acts they were reduced  to the position of ordinary subjects,  that  indeed being  the objective of the British Government as avowed  in their  declaration of June, 1849.  It is with  reference  to this  background that we must examine the true character  of the  revenue settlement made in 1852.  If the jagirdars  had sunk to the position of subjects on that date the payment of revenues  to them by the British Government can only  be  on the basis of an implied grant to them. Learned  Counsel  for the jagirdars however  demur  to  this conclusion.   They  contend that the position  of  the  Cis- Sutlej  jagirdars  differs fundamentally from  that  of  the Bhomicharas  in  Thakur Amar Singhji’s case  (1),  that  the latter were conquered by the rulers of Jodhpur and compelled to pay to them a tribute called "Foujbal", but that the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs were never conquered by the British, and never paid  any tribute to them, that they were receiving  revenue from  the  lands as rulers before the British  came  on  the scene, and that they continued to receive the same without a break even after the British had established themselves, and that there was nothing which the British Government did from which a resumption and a re-grant could be inferred.  -Under the circumstances, it is said, the, payment of land  revenue to  them must be related to their status as sovereigns,  and if  the British Government took upon themselves the work  of settlement and collection of land revenue, it was (1)  [ 1955] 2. S. C. R. 303.                             357 oh  their  behalf  and under their authority  and  under  an implied arrangement with them. The assumption underlying this argument is that, as the cis- Sutlej  Chiefs  ;are-not  conqaered by  the  British,  their status  must necessarily be that of sovereigns, and that  in consequence the payment of land revenue to them could not be as jagirdars holding under an implied grant from the Govern- ment.   That,  however, is not correct.  It is  settled  law that  conquest is not the only mode by which one  State  can acquire  sovereignty  over  the  territories  belonging   to another  State, and that the same result can be achieved  in any  other  mode which has the effect  of  establishing  its sovereignty.   Thus, discussing what is an ,’act of  State", the Judicial Committee observed in Cook v. Sir James Gordon Sprigg (1) :-               "The taking possession by Her Majesty, whether               by  cession  or by any other  means  by  which               sovereignty  can  be acquired, was an  act  of               State’ " To  the same effect are the ’following observations of  Lord Danedin in Vajesing Jaravarsingji v. Secretary of State  for India in Council (2) : -               "When  a territory is acquired by a  sovereign               State  for the first time, that is an  act  of               State.  It matters not how the acquisition has               been brought about.  It may be by conquest, it               may be by cession following on treaty, it  may               be   by  occupation  of   territory   hitherto               unoccupied by a recognised ruler." Laying down the law in similar terms, this Court observed in

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M/s.  Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd.v.    The Commissioner  of Income-tax (3) :-                "The  expression  act  of State’  is,  it  is               scarcely  necessary  to  say  not  limited  to               hostile               (1)   (1899) A.C. 572.               (2)    (1923-24) L. R. 51 I. A. 357,               (3) [1959]   R. 729, 739.               358               action between rulers resulting in the occupa-               tion   of territories.   It includes all               acquisitions of torritory by a sovereign State               for the first time, whether it be by  conquest               or cession. Vide Vajesingji Joravar Singji  V.               Secretary  of State and Thakur Amar Singji  v.               State of Rajasthan . " And,  more  recently, this question has been  considered  by this Court in Promod Chandra Deb v. The State of Orissa (1), and the result was thus stated :-               "  ’Act  of  State’  is  the  taking  over  of               sovereign  powers  by a State  in  respect  of               territory  which was not till then a  part  of               its  territory, either by conquest; treaty  or               cession, or otherwise." The fact, therefore, that the Cis-Sutlej jagirdars were  not conquered  by the British does not conclude the question  as to  whether  they arc to be regarded as sovereigns  or  not. That  must depend on who were in fact  exercising  sovereign powers over the territories in the States-the Chiefs or  the British.  If the latter, then it must be held that the sove- reignty over the area had passed to them, otherwise than  by conquest, and that the true status of the Chiefs was that of subjects. Viewed  in this light, the case does not present much  of  a problem.   It has been already seen that from 1809  onwards, the  Chiefs had been gradually stripped of their  powers  as sovereigns  and  that  the  process  of  disintegration  was completed  in 1849.  It is indeed conceded on behalf of  the jagirdars that after that date it was the British Government which  was exercising sovereign powers over the  territories and  that the Chiefs had been rodaced to the status  of  its subjects.   But  the contention that is urged is  that  even when every thing else had been (1)  Writ Petitions Nos. 79 of 1957, 167 and 168 of 1958 and 4 of 1959 decided on November, 16, 1961. 359 lost,  there  was still one relie of sovereignty  left  with them and that was the right to receive the land revenue.  If this  were  the true position, the status of  the  jagirdars would  be that of subjects of the British in respect of  all matters  except  as  to the right  to  receive  revenue,  in respect  of  which alone they would have to be  regarded  as sovereigns.   This  is clearly untenable, because  a  person cannot  be both a sovereign and a subject at the same  time. Dealing with this identical contention, this Court  observed in Thakur Amar Singhji’s case (1) :               "The status of a person must be either that of               a sovereign or a subject.  There is no tertium               quid.    The   law  does  not   recognise   an               intermediate status of a person being partly a               sovereign and partly a subject, and when  once               it  is admitted that the Bhomicharas had  ack-               nowledged  the  sovereignty of  Jodhpur  their               status  can  only  be that of  a  subject.   A               subject  might occupy an exalted position  and

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             enjoy  special privileges, but he is none  the               less  a  subject ; and even if the  status  of               Bhomicharas  might be considered  superior  to               that  of ordinary jagirdars, they  were  also               subjects." (pp. 336-337) If  the status of the Cis-Sutlej jagirdars is in  all  other respects that of subjects, the right to receive the  revenue collections  must  also be ascribed to  their  character  as subjects, and that can only be under an implied grant. But  it  is  contended that the implication of  a  grant  in favour  of  the jagirdars could not be made here as  in  the case  of  Bhomicharas  in Thakur Amar  Singhji’s  case  (1), because  a  proposal  for resumption  and  re-grant  of  the territories  of  the  Cis-Sutlej  Chiefs  was  actually  put forward  in 1846 but was negatived.  Reference was  made  to the following (1)  [19551 2 S. C. R. S03. 360 account  thereof  given  in  J.  M.  Douie’s  "Punjab   Land Administration Manual", 1931, p. 45 para 102:-               "It  was  indeed proposed in  1846  after  the               first  Sikh  War to declare  all  the  estates               forfeit  on  account of the  laches  of  their               holders,  and  to re-grant them  under  sanads               from   the  British  Government.    But   Lord               Hardinge  deemed it impolitic to  proclaim  to               -all  India the misconduct of  the  Cis-Sutlej               Chiefs and negatived proposal.In a, sense then               the Cis-Sutlej jagirdars, great and small, are               mediatized rulers, and    little  though  they               have  as  a body deserved at our  hands,  this               fact  should  not  be lost  sight  of  in  our               dealings with them." The  argument  is that though a grant could  be  implied  in certain   circumstances   where   no   express   grant   was forthcoming,  that  could not be done when  a  proposal  for grant  is  shown  to  have  been  actively  considered   and rejected.  This contention sounds plausible but breaks  down when  the  reason  for  the rejection  of  the  proposal  is examined.   That  was,  as stated in the  despatch  of  Lord Hardinge dated November 17, 1846, that "a general measure of resumption  would  create alarm and must be  preceded  by  a public declaration of the disloyalty of the largest  portion of  the  Sikh  protected States explaining  the  grounds  of forfeiture,"   and   this   was   considered    inexpedient. Consistently with this reason it is impossible to hold  that the  British Government, in declining to make  a  resumption and  re-grant, intended to continue the recognition  of  the Chiefs  a,,  sovereigns.   On  the  other  hand,  the   true inference to be drawn is that the British wanted to give the chieftains  only the status of jagirdars but for reasons  of policy  they  sought  to do it in such manner  as  to  avoid publicity,   and  that  is  why  the  proposal  for   making resumption  and  regrant  was  not  adopted.   In  the  very despatch of                             361 Lord Hardinge dated November 17, 1346, wherein the  proposal for resumption and re-grant was dropped, it was stated  that there was no need for it as the same ends could be  obtained by adopting certain measures such as the taking over of  the police administration and customs and the like.  The reason, therefore, for not making a resumption and an express  grant is one which would support an inference of implied grant. An  argument is also sought to be built on  the  description given of the Cis-Sutlej jagirdars as "mediatized rulers"  in

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the  extract from J. M. Douie’s "Punjab Land  Administration Manual"  already  given,  that  their  status  is  that   of sovereigns.   This  expression  was  originally  used   with reference to German Princes in Holy Roman Empire who, having been  at one time vassals of the Emperor, were  subsequently subjugated  by  other Princes who were also vassals  of  the Emperor.   The  meaning of the word  "mediatise"  in  modern usage  is given in The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol.   VI, P.  292, as "annex (Principality) to another State,  leaving former  sovereign  his title and (usually) more or  less  of Ilia rights of Government".  It might be ’correct to   speak of  the  Chiefs as mediatized rulers in 1846,  when,  though deprived  of their powers in matters of police and  customs, they  continued  to exercise civil and fiscal  powers.   But when  they were divested in 1849 of all  their  Governmental powers   they  (,-eased  to  be  rulers,   "mediatized"   or otherwise,  and  when the revenue settlements were  made  in 1852,  they had no vestige of sovereignty left in them,  and had  become  ordinary  subjects of  the  British  with  some privileges. The true character of the revenue settlements made with  the Cis-Sutlej  jagirdars  is  brought  out  correctly,  in  our opinion,  in  the following observations in  Baden  Powell’s "Land Systems of British India", Vol. 11 at p. 701:- 362               "Under   our  Settlement   arrangements,   the               jagirdar   now  receives  the   revenue,   the               original    land   holding   communities    or               individuals  being settled with and  retaining               full proprietary rights.  He in fact is a mere               assignee  of the revenue, taking.part of  what               otherwise would go to the State." Even  more  explicit  is the statement of  the  position  by Kensington in the Ambala Gazetteer, pp.27-28:-               "The  final step necessitated by the march  of               events  was  taken in 1852  when  the  revenue               settlement begun for British villages in  1847               was  extended to the villages of  the  chiefs.               Thereafter  the chiefs have ceased  to  retain               any  relies of their former power except  that               they  are  still permitted  to  collect  their               revenues direct from their villages, the  cash               assignment of revenue.  They have sunk to  the               position  of  jagirdare but as such  retain  a               right to the revenue assigned to them in  per-               petuity." It  was argued by the learned Advocate-General who  appeared for the respondent that subsequent to 1852 there has been  a course of legislation relating to the jagirs which  proceeds on the basis that their holders were subjects.  The preamble to the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1871 (Act 33 of 1871), under which land revenue was settled is as follows:-               "Whereas  the  Government of India is  by  law               entitled to a proportion of the produce of the               land  of  the Punjab to be from time  to  time               fixed by itself and whereas it is expedient to               consolidate and define the law relating to the               settlement and collection thereof, and to  the               duties of the Revenue Officers in the Punjab." It  is under this Act that the revenue settlements  for  the jagir  lands are also made.  This shows that  in  exercising fiscal jurisdiction, the British Government  363 considered itself as acting in its sovereign capacity.  Then there is Punjab Descent of Jagirs Act,, 1900 (Punjab Act  IV

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of 1900), which introduced in the Punjab Laws Act, 1872, as. 8 to 8C enacting rules of descent "in respect of  succession to  any  assignment of land revenue" and providing  for  the recognition  of successors to the deceased jagirdars by  the Provincial  Government  on  certain  -conditions   specified therein.   We  have  then the Punjab Jagire Act  V  of  1911 dealing with the same topic.  The preamble to the Act states that  "it is expedient to consolidate the law governing  the assignments of land revenue and other grants hitherto  known as jagirs, and to make more precise provisions regarding the manner in which such assignments are to be made or continued in  the  future."  Jagir  is  defined  in  s.  2  in   torms substantially  the same as under the present Act.  This  Act repeals as. 8 to 80 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872, which were inserted by the Punjab Descent of Jagirs Act IV of 1900, and reproduces  them in as. 7 to 10.  Section  7(1)(b)  provides for the acceptance by the jagirdars of the rules of  descent framed by the Government by executing a written  instrument, and  it  has been stated before us that the  jagirdars  have accepted  the rules in the manner provided in  the  section. By way of sample, the copy of the acceptance executed by the petitioner  in Writ Petition No. 82 of 1960 has been  marked as  part of the record.  Oa these materials, the  conclusion would  appear  to  be irresistible that  the  right  of  the Jagirdars to raceive land revenue rests on implied grants by the British Government. It must be mentioned that in Abdul Ghafoor Khan v. Amar arji Singh,  Regular Second Appeal No. 561 of 1946 in the  Punjab High  Court there are ob. servations of the learned  Judges. Mahajan  and Teja Singh, JJ., that there was no-gift of  the jagir lands or assignment of the land revenue by the British Government to the Cis-Sutlej -jagirdars, and they are relied on as authority for the contention that 364 there  was no grant to them express or implied.     But  the point  for  decision  in  that  case  was  whether     these jagirdars  could  alienate  their  interests  beyond   their lifetime.   It was held that they could not and  the  reason therefor was thus stated:               "After the annexation of the Punjab they (Cis-               Sutlej jagirdars) were deprived of vestiges of               sovereignty  that still remained in  them  and               they were transformed and given the status  of               jagirdars, but their possessions, holding  and               dominions whether in land or other  properties               like  forts and buildings were not in any  way               disturbed  or taken away.  They held  them  in               the same status and position as before." The dispute in that appeal related to properties of the kind mentioned  above and not to land revenue, and we are  unable to  regard the observations relied on for the  jagirdars  as authority  for the position that no grant in respect of  the assignments  of the land revenue could be implied  in  their favour. In the resultwa must hold that the jagirs which are subject- matter  of these proceedings fall within s. 2(1)(a)  of  the Act. It  is  next contended that even if an  assignment  of  land revenue  could be. implied in favour of the jagirdars,  that could  only  be  held  to hive, been  made  by  the  British Government and not by the State Government as required by s. 2(1)(a),  and  that, in consequence, the respondent  had  no right to resume the jagirs in question under the  provisions of the Act. Whateverforce there might   have  been   in this contention, if I hequestion had to to  be decided only

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on the. terms of s.2(1)(a), we have in s. 2(5) a  definition or’ State Government which  365 is decisive of the question.  According to that  definition, "State Government" includes "the Government of the State  of Punjab,  and  all predecessor Gevernments thereof,  by  what ever  name  called, the Governor-General  or  the  Governor- Generalin-Council  as the case may be." It is  not  disputed that  these  words are wide enough to  include  the  British Government  which made the grant, but it is  contended  that this definition was not in the Act as originally enacted and was inserted by the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs  (Amendment) Act,  1959,  and that the rights of the  parties  should  be determined  in accordance with the law as it stood prior  to the  amendment.   There  is no  force  in  this  contention, because  under s. 1(2) of the Amendment  Act,  retrospective operation is given to it as from November 14, 1957. But  then it is urged that the amendment was not within  the legislative  competence of the Legislature of the  State  of Punjab and is null and void.  The grounds therefor are  thus stated in Petition No. 82 of 1960 : -               "This is nothing but a colourable legislation.               The  State  legislature has  no  authority  to               convert   Central   Government   into    State               Government  and legislate on Central  subject.               The  so-called jagir being not a grant by  the               State  Government,  the impugned  Act  has  no               application  and  the  amended  definition  of               State  Government is a fraud on the  Constitu-               tion." (para 17). There  is no substance in the contention that the  Amendment Act  is colourable and incompetent.  The  subject-matter  of the  legislation  is  resumption  of  jagirs.   Though   the contention was raised. in the petitions that this was not  a topic  within  the competence of the State  Legislature,  as there  was  no  such  entry  in  List  II  to  the   Seventh Schedule,no 366 argument  was  advanced in support, of it.  And  clearly  it could not be, as legislation on resumption of jagirs in  one relating  to lands, and land revenue and would clearly  fall under entries 18 and 45 of List II, which are as follows :               Entry 18 , -,’Land, that is to say, rights  in               or  over  land,  land  tenure  including   the               relation  of  landlord  and  tenant,  and  the               collection of rents transfer and alienation of               agricultural lands; land improvement and agri-               cultural loans; colonization."               Entry 45 :- "Land revenue., including the    assessment               and  collection of revenue,the maintenance  of               lands records, survey for revenue purposes and               records of rights, and alienation of revenue." If the principal legislation is intra vires, it is difficult to  see  how an amendment thereof with  respect  to  matters properly  pertaining  to the subject-matter  covered  by  it could  be ultra vires.  It is immaterial for the purpose  of resumption,  whether  the lands sought to  be  resumed  were granted  by the State of Punjab as it is now constituted  or by  any Government which preceded it. So long as  the  lands are  within the, State of Punjab, the legislature  has  full competence  to  enact a law providing for  their  resumption under entries 18 and 45. Indeed if the words "made by or  on behalf  of  the State Government" in 3. 2  (1)(a)  had  been omitted  in the, principal Act and jagir defined  simply  as "any assignment of land revenue" the legislation would  have

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been  intra  vires, and in that case the  State  could  have resumed  the  jagirs  by whomsoever  they  might  have  been granted.   But  it  chose to add the words "made  by  or  on behalf of the State Government", and that gave occasion  for the  contention that the legislation did not in  fact  reach jagirs granted by the British Government.  Then, with a view to clarify the position,                             367 and set the controversy at rest,, the legislature intervened and  enacted  the  Amendment  Act  of  1959,  inserting  the impugned definition of "State Government".  We are unable to see  what  the lack of vires is under which  this  amendment suffers.  We must reject this contention also. This disposes of all the points raised on the merits in  the Writ Petitions and Civil Appeals. In Civil Appeal No. 453 of 1961 preferred by one of the jagirdars, Umrao Singh, his son Satinder  Singh  intervened,  and  he  asks  that   suitable directions  might be given for protecting his interests  in. the  compensation amount which is payable to  the  appellant Under the Act.  He states that under the law the  Cis-Sutlej jagirdar is not an absolute owner of the jagir, that he  has only a right to enjoy it without any power of alienation and that  after his life time the next lineal  descendant  would take  it free from all encumbrances created by the  previous owner, that the rights of the jagirdar over the compensation amount  due  on resumption under the Act could only  be  the same as over the jagir, and that if that is paid to him, his reversionary rights would be Jeopardised and that  therefore adequate provision should be made for protecting them.   Our attention  has been invited to the decision of this  Courtin Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh(1), where compensation awarded on  the acquisition of jagir lands was  apportioned  equally between  the jagirdar and his son.  But there the lands  had been  acquired under the Land Acquisition Act,  1894,  which contains  provisions  for deciding who is  entitled  to  the compensation  amount.   But here we are  hearing  an  appeal against an order dismissing a Writ retition- under Art. 226, challenging  ire  vires  and  applicability  of  the  Punjab Resumption  of Jagirs Act, 1957, and adjudication  of  rival claims to the compensation amount will be wholly foreign  to its scope. (1)  A. I. R. .961) S. C. 908 368 But  it  is  pointed  out for the  intervener  that  on  his application this Court has ordered stay of payment of a part of  the  compensation amount to the  appellant  pending  the disposal of the, appeal, and that a similar direction  might now  be made in the Judgment, staying payment of a  part  of the  amount for a specified period, so as to enable  him  to take  steps to protect his rights.  But that was an  interim order  made pending the appeal, and no such order  could  be passed in the appeal unless it follows on a decision of  the rights of the parties, which is, an already stated,  outside the  scope  of the present proceedings, vide  the  state  of Orissa  v.  Madan  Gopal Rungta 0).   We  do  not  therefore propose  to say anything on the rights of the intervener  or give  any  directions with reference to the payment  of  the compensation  amount.  It is open to the intervener to  take other and appropriate proceedings to vindicate his rights. Before concluding, it has to be noted that in Writ  Petition No.  148 of 1961 there, are as many as 72 Petitioners.  some of  whom  are stated not to belong to the category  of  Cis- Sutlej  jagirdars.  Their joinder is clearly improper.   ’It is also said that three of them, Petitioners Nos. 66, 68 and 69,  had  filed Writ Petitions under Art. 226 of  the  Cons-

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tituation  in  the  Punjab  High  Court,  raising  the  same contentions  as in the present, that the said petitions  had been  dismissed  on  the  merits, and  no  appeal  had  been preferred   against   the  Orders  of  dismissal,   and   in consequence,  the  concerned  petitioners  cannot,  on   the decisions of this Court, maintain this petition.  But as  we are  dismissing  these petitions on the merits,  no  further notice  need be taken of these points.  In the  result,  the petitions are dismissed with costs, one hearing fee, and the appeals are dismissed with costs one set. Petitions and appeals dismissed. (1) [1952] S.C.R. 28.  369