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PETITIONER: AMARJIT SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. KHATOON QUAMARAIN.

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/11/1986

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) SINGH, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR  741            1987 SCR  (1) 275  1987 SCC  (1) 736        JT 1986   912  1986 SCALE  (2)827  CITATOR INFO :  D          1991 SC 266  (9)  RF         1991 SC1760  (24)

ACT:     Delhi  Rent  Control Act,  1958,  s.  14(1)(e)--Bonafide Personal  necessity  of landlord--’Has no  other  reasonable suitable      residential      accomodation’--Interpretation of--Events  and  developments subsequent  to  initiation  of eviction  proceedings--Whether Court should take  cognizance of.     Statutory  Interpretation-- Rent Control  Legislations-- Interpretation of--Duty of Courts.

HEADNOTE:     The  respondent-landlady  was the owner  of  a  premises consisting of ground floor and first floor. Both the  floors had been let out on rent and she was living with one of  her relatives.  She filed a petition for eviction of the  appel- lant-tenant  from  the first floor of the  premises  on  the ground of bonafide personal necessity. She had stated in the petition that she needed one floor for her residence and the other one i.e. the ground floor to let out to have income to support herself because that was her only source of  liveli- hood. During the pendency of the petition, the ground  floor in the house fell vacant twice and she let it out on  higher rent.     The  Trial  Court  allowed the  eviction  petition  u/s. 14(1)(e)  of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 on the ground  (i) that  the landlady must have some income; and (ii)  that  it was landlady’s choice to occupy the first floor premises and there  was no mala fide, her requirement was bona fide.  The High Court upheld the aforesaid order of eviction. In  appeal to the Supreme Court, it was contended on  behalf of the appellant-tenant that the second limb of the  defini- tion contained in s.14(1)(e) of the Rent Act was not  satis- fied  since  the respondent-landlady  had  other  reasonably suitable  accommodation  and  by her own  conduct,  she  had disentitled herself of the user of the same inasmuch as  the accommodation of ground floor fell vacant twice when  tenant left during the pendency of the proceeding for eviction  but she  chose  not to go into that possession but let  out  the

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same  to fetch higher income. Therefore, taking-these  facts into question which indubitably could he taking 276 into  account, it cannot be said that the landlady  had  ’no other reasonably suitable accommodation’. Allowing the appeal,     HELD:  (1) The order and judgment of the High Court  are set aside. In view of the undisputed facts that the landlady had  in her choice to go into the premises in  question  but she  did  not, she had become disentitled to  the  right  of eviction. [287A, 286H]     (2)(i) The Rent restriction laws are both beneficial and restrictive,  beneficial for those who want protection  from eviction  and  rack renting, but restrictive so far  as  the landlord’s  right or claim for eviction is  concerned.  Rent restriction laws would provide a habitat for the landlord or landlady  if  need be, but not to seek comforts  other  than habitat-that  right  the landlord must seek  elsewhere.  The philosophy and principle of rent restriction law have  noth- ing  to do with the private exploitation of property by  the owners of the property in derogation of the tenant’s need of protection from eviction in a society of shortage of  accom- modation. [285F, 286G]     (2)(ii)  Administration  of  justice  demands  that  any changes either in fact or in law must be taken cognizance of by  the Court but that must be done in a cautious manner  of relevant  facts.  Therefore subsequent events can  be  taken cognizance of if they are relevant and material. [283G]     Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, [1975]  3  SCR 958, Hasmat Rai & Anr. v.  Raghunath  Prasad, [1981] 3 SCR 605 and Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd.  Ibra- him Naina, [1985] 1 SCC 251, relied upon.     Firm Ram Sewa Hari Ram v. Sain Datt Mal, AIR 1967  Delhi 113  and Abdul Hamid and another v. Nur Mohammad,  AIR  1976 Delhi 328, approved.     Bishambhar  Dayal Chandra Mohan and Others etc. etc.  v. State  of Uttar Pradesh and Others etc. etc., [1982]  1  SCC 39, referred to.     (3) In a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground  of personal requirement under a statute  controlling the  eviction of tenants, unless the statute  prescribes  to the  contrary the requirement must continue to exist on  the date when the proceedings was finally disposed of either  in appeal or revision by the relevant authority.[284D] 277     In  the instant case, if cognizance is taken  of  events and  developments subsequent to the initiation  of  proceed- ings, it must be held that the landlady had the  opportunity of occupying a floor in the house which fell vacant not once but  twice subsequent to arising of her need for  reasonable accommodation-  She chose not to occupy the  said  premises. Therefore. it cannot be said that the landlady had no  other reasonably  suitable accommodation and thus the second  limb of s. 14(1)(e) of the Act is not satisfied. [283D-E, 285A-B]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3378  of 1983     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.3.1983 of the Delhi High Court in C.R. No. 1047 of 1981. Dr. Shanker Ghosh and H.K. Puri for the Appellant.     S.N.  Kacker, Arvind Minocha and Mrs. Veena Minocha  for the Respondents.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.     SABYASACHI  MUKHARJI,  J- This appeal by  special  leave arises  out of the order of the High Court of Delhi dated  2 1st March, 1983.     On  or  about 3rd January, 1977, the landlady,  the  re- spondent  herein, had filed a petition for eviction  of  the appellant, the tenant, from the first floor of the  premises situated  at  C-62, Maharani Bagh, New Delhi  along  with  a garage on the ground floor with a servant quarter above  the garage as per the plan annexed with the petition’ (hereinaf- ter  referred to as the disputed flat). The ground of  evic- tion  was the bona fide personal necessity of the  landlady. The  premises had been let out on a monthly rent  of  Rs.950 and Rs.50 per month as facility for booster  pump--totalling to  Rs.1,000 per month, exclusive of water  and  electricity charges.     The  respondent claimed to be the owner of the  premises and stated that she required the premises for her  residence and.  for  the residence of the members of  her  family  and further  she  was not in possession of  any  other  suitable residential accommodation. She was at the time of filing  of the  petition, living, according to her, as a guest  of  her niece in her house in D-36, Nizammuddin East, New Delhi. She 278 had  asserted  that she could not  continue  residing  there permanently or indefinitely and that the accommodation  with her niece was limited being only two bed rooms with a common bath  room and that her niece wanted her own mother to  stay with  her  and would like the landlady to shift as  soon  as respondent  could. It was further averred that the niece  of the respondent landlady was a working woman and for  meeting her  clients  she  needed accommodation as she  was  at  all relevant  time  working as an executive  in  an  advertising agency.  It was also stated that the landlady was  a  social worker and had her own sphere of activities. There were  two flats  in the building in question. The landlady,  according to  her,  needed one floor to let out one of the  floors  of that  building  to  have income to  support  herself  which, according to her, was her only source of livelihood and  the ground  floor of the premises at the time of the  filing  of the  petition  was in occupation of New Zealand  Embassy  at Rs.2,500 per month as rent. It was her case that she  wanted to  keep  the  ground floor let out to a tenant  to  draw  a decent  amount  of rent and the only premises left  for  her residence was therefore the premises--the disputed flat.     The learned single judge of the Delhi High Court in  the order under appeal has stated that on 14th March, 1974,  the landlady  had  earlier also filed  on  eviction  application against M/s Jaaj Timber Products (P) Ltd. on the ground that the  said company was her tenant of the first floor  of  the suit premises and it was required for her residence. In  the earlier  petition,  a  written statement was  filed  by  the tenant/  appellant  who was the Managing  Director  of  that company.  The landlady had also on 17th April, 1976 filed  a suit  for recovery of Rs.35,000 as arrears of rent  for  the period  1st May, 1973 to 31st March, 1976. But in  both  the earlier  eviction petition and the suit for the recovery  of rent,  the aforesaid company took up the position  that  the company  was  not a tenant but the appellant alone  was  the tenant  and this contention of the appellant was  upheld  by judgment  of  the learned Additional  District  Juge,  Delhi dated 1st November, 1976 and it was found that the appellant alone was a tenant in his individual capacity. This fact was relevant  only from one point of view, namely, the  argument that  the appellant was a troublesome tenant. This is  noted

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for  this purpose because a contention was advanced by  Shri Kacker, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent  here- in,  in support of his contention that in judging  the  bona fide and reasonableness of the requirement of the  landlord, the  conduct of the tenant is a relevant factor to be  borne in mind. To continue with a narration of events, however, it has  to  be  noted that the earlier  eviction  petition  was dismissed  though  a  decree. for Rs.34,050  for  rent  with proportionate costs was passed against the 279 appellant  herein.  But  the suit against  the  company  was dismissed.     It  would  be  necessary to complete  the  narration  of events  by  stating that in the subsequent  affidavit  dated 27th  October, 1986 filed by the appellant herein before  us with  our permission during the hearing of this  appeal,  it was  brought  to  our notice that the appeal  was  filed  in January, 1977 when the ground floor of the premises had been let  out  to the New Zealand Embassy.  New  Zealand  Embassy vacated the premises in July, 1977 and the same was relet by the landlady, the respondent herein to one Shri G.N.  Dalmia on 27th July, 1977 at a higher rent- Shri Dalmia in his turn had  again vacated the premises in July, 1979 and the  prem- ises  was  let out again by the landlady at a  still  higher rent  M/s Indian Express Newspaper Private Limited.  It  was stated  that M/s Indian Express Newspapers  Private  Limited had vacated and thereafter the ’same was let out to one Shri Pradeep  Kumar  Ganeriwal at a still higher rent  in  April, 1985.  There were allegations made saying that initially  it was occupied by one Shri Mulgaokar and then Shri Nihal Singh and  then  Shri  Ganeriwal. These were  controverted  by  an affidavit filed by the respondent landlady on 30th  October, 1986.  According to her, Indian Express was the  lessee  but the others were the officers or the executives of the Indian Express  and as such were allowed to occupy the premises  in question.     But to revert back to the events leading to the  present appeal,  it  must  be noted that the  earlier  petition  for eviction was dated 1st November, 1976 and the present  peti- tion  was  filed on 3rd January, 1977  against  the  tenant- appellant.  The  appellant  had filed  a  written  statement before the Trial Court and admitted the relationship between the  parties and had also admitted that the  respondent  was also  the owner of the premises. It was contended,  however, that  the premises were not taken for  residential  purposes and there was no mention of the members of the family of the landlady. It was denied that the landlady was not in posses- sion of suitable alternative accommodation. It was  asserted that she was alone and preferred to live with her niece  who was  alone and that the petition for eviction was  not  bona fide and was mala fide and in fact the landlady only  wanted to increase the rent for which the tenant-appellant was  not prepared.  There was some allegation about the  alleged  at- tempt  to increase the rent from Rs.1500 to Rs.2500  and  it was  stated that in the earlier petition which  was  against M/s Jaaj Timber Products Pvt. Ltd., the landlady had  stated that she did not have any residential accommodation and  was putting  up  as a temporary guest at a premises  at  Pandara Road, New Delhi and it was not made clear as to why she  did not occupy the 280 portion  which was in occupation previously of the New  Zea- land  Embassy after it was vacated and she had  stated  that she  needed one floor to draw income to support herself.  It was  pleaded that the landlady was an old and rich lady  and

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had  huge bank balances and did not have to depend upon  the rentals  of  the  house only. The respondent’s  son  was  an officer in the Indian Foreign Service and was posted in  New Delhi  since 1976 and living at the External Affairs  Hostel and the landlady would normally like to stay in her old  age with  her  only son. She could not afford to live  alone  in such a big house, according to the appellant, and the  story of  the niece wanting to stay with her old mother,  and  the need of the niece for her mother’s occupation was not a true story.     In the trial before the Additional Rent Controller,  the landlady examined her son and also examined herself and gave details of the various places where she had lived from  1958 till the filing of the present petition. It is not necessary for  our  present  purpose to refer in detail  to  the  said depositions.  The landlady had, at one point of time,  lived at the Indian Council for Child Welfare, Ladies Hostel at 4, Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Marg, New Delhi and the requirement for her  flat there upto her assignment with Indian Council  for Child Welfare which ended in May, 1970 and in May, 1970, the respondent-landlady  went to Aligarh and stayed  there  till March,  1971  as  she had no place to live  in  Delhi.  From March, 1971 to July, 1974, she had lived at Pandata Road  as a guest of one Mrs. Gufran and her niece Miss Shahila Haider had also lived there as a guest of Mrs. Gufran. Mrs.  Gufran went  away  to U.S.A. and the premises  was  surrendered  to Directorate.  of  Estate. On 1st July,  1974,  the  landlady shifted to Nizammuddin, in New Delhi along with Miss Shahila Haider who took the premises on rent. The  landlady-respond- ent was a graduate from the Leads University and her  father was a leading lawyer, who was pioneer in women education  in India.  She founded Women’s College in  Aligarh  University. The husband of the landlady was the Manager of Reserve  Bank of India. The landlady was connected with various  organisa- tions such as Y.W.C.A., All India Women’s Conference, Indian Council for Child Welfare and some such other organisations. One  Mrs.  Vinita  Nagar proved various  documents  to  show association  with the Social Welfare Advisory Board  and  at the  relevant time when the deposition was being taken,  she was  staying at-5-A, Artand Lok, New Delhi with one  Suleman Haider  who was then Ambassador to Bhutan. Her son was  also examined  and she stated that he joined the  Indian  Foreign Service  in July, 1964 and was in Jordan. It is also  stated that during the period January, 1969 to August, 1973, he was in Poland 281 and  again  on  short leave he stayed  in  External  Affairs Hostel  when his mother--respondent stayed at Pandara  Road. The son was posted at Quater. It is not necessary to discuss in  detail all these. The landlady respondent  herein  comes from  a fairly well to do family. She has house  income  and she  has bank balances. The learned trial court  also  found that the landlady had one daughter who was married in  Delhi and  landlady was a social worker and worked for  number  of institutions  and had large social circle. She comes from  a respectable family and a family of high status. The  learned trial  judge  was of the view that she  requires  additional accommodation. It was also found that somehow the habits and taste  of  her niece Miss Shahila Haider  and  the  landlady differed and she had no other reasonably suitable accommoda- tion in Delhi. It is this second aspect which is the  impor- tant  question in this appeal which will have to be  consid- ered herein.     The  question as to why the landlady did not occupy  the ground  floor premises which was vacated and relet  in  1974

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and 1977 at a Higher rent was also considered by the learned trial Court. It was found that the landlady needed money for her  sustenance and maintenance and she had no other  source of income and therefore it was held that she would naturally like to let one portion of the house. The house consisted of two  portions,  the ground floor and the  first  floor.  The ground floor portion was not preferred by the landlady as it fetched  a  higher  rent as compare to first  floor  of  the premises.  It was also found that funds were  required  even for  payment of house tax and other charges. Therefore,  the trial court was of the view that the landlady must have some income.  The  trial court was also of the view that  it  was landlady’s  choice  to occupy the first floor  premises  and there was no mala fide, her requirement was bona fide.     Being  aggrieved  by the said  decision,  the  appellant moved in revision before the High Court and the question was examined. It was pleaded before the High Court on behalf  of the appellant that the respondent had only one son and  that she  should ,live with him. So far as the requirement  being bona fide was concerned, the learned High Court examined the evidence  and found that the appraisal and analysis  of  the evidence  by the trial court were correct. The  High  Court, therefore,  found  no reason to differ from  the  Additional Rent Controller that landlady had no other reasonably  suit- able  accommodation  and  the landlady was in  need  of  the accommodation  in question bona fide and reasonably. It  was further  found  that there was no mala fide on her  part  in letting out the premises in question when it fell vacant  as mentioned  hereinbefore. It was further held that there  was no ques- 282 tion  of financial difficulty being an afterthought  as  the previous petition was dismissed on the ground that there was no relationship between the landlord and the tenant  between the  parties in that case Therefore, under section  14(1)(e) of  Delhi  Rent Control Act, 1958  (hereinafter  called  the ’Act’),  eviction was upheld. In the premises  the  revision was dismissed and the decree for eviction was upheld.     The  appellant challenges this decision.  The  appellant contends  that  on the undisputed facts of this  case  under section  14(1)(e) of the Act, the landlady was not  entitled to eviction. Section 14 of the said Act gives protection  to the tenant against eviction and stipulates that no order  or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises  shall be  made  by any court in favour of the landlord  against  a tenant.  Proviso to sub-section (1) of the section  14  pro- vides that the Controller may on an application made to  him in  the  prescribed  manner make an order  for  recovery  of possession  of  the premises on one or more of  the  various grounds mentioned in different sub-clauses of section  14(1) and sub-section (e) is to the following effect:               "(e)  that  the premises let  for  residential               purposes  are required bona fide by the  land-               lord for occupation as a residence for himself               or  for any member of his family dependent  on               him,  if he is the owner thereof, or  for  any               person for whose benefit the premises are held               and  that the landlord or such person  has  no               other reasonably suitable residential accommo-               dation:"     The contention of the appellant is that the landlady  in this case had other reasonably suitable accommodation and by her  own conduct had disentitled herself of the user of  the same, Therefore, the landlady cannot contend that she had no other reasonably suitable accommodation. In support of  this

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contention  reliance was placed by the appellant on a  deci- sion of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The  Motor &  General  Traders, [1975] 3 SCR 958. The  case  was  under Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)  Control Act,  1960  and was dealing with the provisions  of  section 10(3)(iii)(a)  &  (b) of that Act. The Court held  that  the court was entitled to take subsequent facts into  considera- tion  in a case of this nature. At pages 959-60 of  the  re- port,  this Court set out the findings of the learned  trial court where it was observed:               "If the fact of the landlord having come  into               possession during the pendency of the proceed-               ings of Shop No. 2 is to               283               be  taken into account, as indeed it must  be,               then  clearly the petition is no longer  main-               tainable under Section 10(3)(iii) of the  Act,               as the requisite condition for the invoking of               that provision has ceased to exist viz.,  that               the landlord was not occupying a  non-residen-               tial  building  in the  town.  ’Building’,  of               course  means a portion of a building. As  the               prerequisite for the entitlement of the  peti-               tioner  to institute and continue  a  petition               has  ceased to exist, it must follow that  ABA               No.5/1967  is no longer maintainable and  must               be dismissed."     This Court upheld that finding. This Court affirmed  the proposition  that for making the right or remedy claimed  by the  party just and meaningful as also legal and factual  in accord  with the current realities, the court could  and  in many  cases  must  take cautious cognizance  of  events  and developments  subsequent to the institution of the  proceed- ings,  provided  rules of fairness to both  the  sides  were scrupulously  obeyed. In the instant case there is no  ques- tion  of  violation  of any principle of  rules  of  natural justice. If cognizance are taken of events and developments, subsequent  to  the initiation of proceedings, it  must.  be held  that the landlady had the opportunity of  occupying  a floor  in  the house which fell vacant not  once  but  twice subsequent to arising of her need for reasonable  accommoda- tion. She chose not to occupy the said premises. The landla- dy  asserts that she must have means to live before she  can utilise her living space to live. The landlady asserts  that in  order to have her means to live, she must let one  floor on  rent. According to her, that is the only source  of  her income.  But it is not clear from the learned Rent  Control- ler’s  findings or the High Court adjudication  whether  the huge  bank balances alleged to belong to the landlady  yield any income or not or is insufficient income for her to live. Therefore,  for the purpose of this appeal, we must  proceed on the assumption that the landlady needed money to live and the  income from her house letting was a source of  her  in- come.  But the question is, is it a sufficient ground  which will  bring her out from the second limb of  the  conditions imposed by section 14(1)(e) of the Act? There is no  dispute that  subsequent  events can be  taken  into  consideration. There  is no dispute that administration of justice  demands that  any  changes either in fact or in law  must  be  taken cognizance  of by the court but that must be done in a  cau- tious manner of relevant facts.     Hasmat  Rai & Anr. v. Raghunath Prasad, [1981] 3  S.C.R. 605,  which  was a case under Madhya  Pradesh  Accommodation Control Act. 1961 is relevant. There the question was wheth- er the applicant after

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284 filing  of two eviction suits and acquiring possession of  a major portion of the suit premises through an eviction order passed in one of them-amounts to the landlord "has a reason- ably  suitable non-residential accommodation of his  own  in his  occupation  in the city or town concerned"  within  the meaning of section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Act of 1961. It  was reiterated  that when an action was brought by the  landlord under  Rent  Restriction Act for eviction on the  ground  of personal  requirement,  his need must not only be  shown  to exist at the date of the suit but must exist on the date  of the  appellate  decree or on the date when  a  higher  court deals with the matter. Even at the last stage the tenant was entitled to show that the need or requirement no more exist. Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage.  It was  further held that in order to obtain  possession  under section 12(1)(h) of the Madhya Pradesh Act, the landlord had to establish his bona fide requirement of the  accommodation in  possession  of the tenant. At page 624,  of  the  report Pathak, J. reiterated that the High Court was bound to  take the fact into consideration because, it is well-settled that in a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the  ground of  personal  requirement under a  statute  controlling  the eviction  of tenants, unless the statute prescribes  to  the contrary the requirement must continue to exist on the  date when the proceeding was finally disposed of either in appeal or revision by the relevant authority. Therefore, subsequent events  can be taken cognizance of if they are relevant  and material.  In the instant case the fact that the other  flat in  the premises fell vacant which the landlady  could  have occupied  but  she did not and let it out  to  fetch  higher income was a relevant factor. It can be taken cognizance of.     Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina’s, [1985] 1 SCC 251 case was with regard to Rent Control and  Eviction and  dealt with the question of bona fide personal  require- ment, wherein in paragraphs 15 and 16, the Court referred to the decision of Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, (supra)  and observed  that the subsequent events could be taken  account of  and the distinction between ’desire’ and ’need’ must  be kept in view.     This  view was also applied by the Delhi High  Court  in respect of the identical Act in question, in the decision in Firm  Ram Sewak Hari Ram v. Sain Datta Mal, AIR  1967  Delhi 113 as well as in Abdul Harnid and another v. Nur  Mohammad, AIR 1976 Delhi 328.     The  position therefore that emerges in that there  must be bona fide need of the landlady for occupation of a  resi- dence  for  herself  and further it must be  held  that  the land-lady has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. 285     Shri  Shankar Ghosh, learned counsel appearing  for  the appellant, contended before us that in this case the landla- dy  had reasonably suitable accommodation thrice or  if  not thrice  at least twice when tenant left during the  pendency of the proceeding for eviction but she chose in view of  the facts mentioned hereinbefore not to go into that  possession but  let  out the same to fetch  higher  income.  Therefore, taking  the facts into question which indubitably  could  be taken into account, it cannot be said that the landlady  had no other reasonably suitable accommodation, having regard to the  size of her family and her need. Therefore  the  second limb  was not satisfied. There is no dispute and  Shri  S.N. Kacker  for the respondent did not dispute  that  subsequent events  if they are relevant could be taken account of  cau- tiously. But he contended as mentioned hereinbefore that the

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landlady the owner of a house, has to live. He further urged that  there was a distinction between self-induced  disenti- tlement  and  disentitlement forced by  surrounding  circum- stances. He submitted in this case the landlady had to  live and  for  this  by the surrounding  circumstances.  she  was forced to let out the floor which fell vacant. It is irrele- vant  whether  it fell vacant once, twice or thrice  but  it indisputably  fell  vacant during the  proceedings  and  she chose  not  to occupy the same. Better exploitation  of  the house  or  the  premises in possession of  the  landlady  or landlord  was  not impermissible. He drew our  attention  to Article 300A of the Constitution and urged that the  Consti- tution  provided  that no person should be deprived  of  the property  save by authority of law. Therefore, according  to Shri  Kacker,  the landlady had to live and had a  right  of property in the rental income. The logic of the argument  of Shri  Kacker  is attractive, but the legality  of  the  said submission is unsustainable- Rent restriction laws are  both beneficial  and restrictive, beneficial for those  who  want protection from eviction and rack renting but restrictive so far  as the landlord’s right or claim for eviction  is  con- cerned.  Rent restriction laws would provide a  habitat  for the  landlord or landlady if need be, but not to  seek  com- forts other than habital--that right the landlord must  seek elsewhere.     Our  attention was drawn to the decision in the case  of Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and Others etc. etc. v. State of  Uttar Pradesh and Others etc. etc., [1982] 1 SCC 39  and our attention was drawn to the observations at pages 66  and 67  of the said case in aid of the submission that right  to property  is still a constitutional right and  therefore  in exercise of that right if a landlord or an owner of a  house lets  out  a premises in question there was  nothing  wrong. Shri  Kacker  submitted  that the  second  limb  of  section 14(1)(e) of the Act should be read in such a way that it was in consonance with Article 14 and Article 286 21 of the Constitution. Otherwise it would be void as  being unconstitutional.  As a general proposition of law  this  is acceptable.     We  are unable to accept the submissions of Shri  Kacker in  the way he urged us to read the second limb  of  section 14(1)(e) of the Act.     The Act in question is the authority of law. There is no denial of equality nor any arbitrariness in the second  limb of section 14(1)(e) of the Act read in the manner  contended for  by the appellant. Article 21 is not violated so far  as the  landlord  is concerned. The rent restricting  acts  are beneficial  legislations  for the protection of  the  weaker party  in the bargains of letting very often. These must  be so  read that these balance harmoniously the rights  of  the landlords  and  the  obligations of the  tenants.  The  Rent Restriction  Acts deal with the problem of rack renting  and shortage  of  accommodation. It is in  consonance  with  the recognition  of the right of both the landlord and the  ten- ant’that a harmony is sought to be struck whereby the  bona- fide  requirements of the landlords and the tenants  in  the expanding  explosion of need and population and shortage  of accommodation are sought to be harmonised and the conditions imposed  to evict a tenant are that the landlord  must  have bona  fide need. That is satisfied in this case. That  posi- tion is not disputed. The second condition is that  landlord should not have in his or her possession any other  reasona- bly  suitable  accommodation. This does not  violate  either Article 14 or Article 21 of the Constitution.

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   Shri  Kacker submitted that this section should to  read literally  and  we should ask ourselves the  question  today whether  can  it be said that the  landlady  had  reasonably suitable  other accommodation. We are unable to read  it  in that  sense.  If  the landlady or the  landlord  could  have reasonable accommodation after his or her need arose and she by  her own conduct disentitled herself to that property  by letting  it out for higher income, she would be  disentitled to  evict her tenant on ground of her need.  The  philosophy and  principle  of rent restriction law have nothing  to  do with  the private exploitation of property by the owners  of the  property in derogation of the tenant’s need of  protec- tion  from eviction in a society of shortage  of  accommoda- tion.     In  the  premises we are of the opinion  that  the  High Court was wrong in the view and the approach it took and  in view  of the undisputed facts that the landlady had  in  her choice to go into the premises in question but she did  not, she  has  become disentitled to the right of  eviction.  The fact that the tenant was a troublesome tenant inasmuch 287 as  that  he  questioned the liability to  the  landlord  is irrelevant.     In  the  premises the appeal is allowed. The  order  and judgment  of the High Court are set aside. In the  facts  of this case the parties will pay and bear their own costs. M.L.A.                                          Appeal   al- lowed. 288