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PETITIONER: AMARJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/12/1974

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1975 AIR  984            1975 SCR  (3)  82  1975 SCC  (3) 503  CITATOR INFO :  R          1979 SC1628  (10)  F          1984 SC 363  (22)

ACT: Civil Service-Integration of two services-Metnoratdum issued by Government fixing inter se seniority-"Continuous Service" and "date of appointment" meaning of.

HEADNOTE: With  effect  from  15th July,  1964  the  Provincial  Civil Medical  Service and the Public Health Service of the  State were integrated into one service.  After integration,  class I  and  class  11 posts in the  respective  services  before integration  were  equated to class I and it  posts  in  the combined cadre.  While the post of District Medical  Officer corresponded  to class 11 in the combined cadre the post  of Assistant Director of Health corresponded to class I in  the combined cadre.  Before integration the State Government  by its order dated April 8, 1964 promoted with immediate effect respondents  3  to  19  who were class  II  officer  in  the Provincial  Medical Service to class I but since  the  order could not be conveyed to them immediately, they joined their posts on different dates between April 27, 1964 and May  11, 1964.  At the time of integration the appellant, a class  11 officer,  though working in the post of  Assistant  Director with  effect from April 25, 1964, was not promoted  to  that post  but  was merely working in that post on  his  own  pay scale   as   District  Medical  officer  of   Health.    His representation  that  he should be promoted to the  post  of Assistant Director with retrospective effect from April  25, 1964,  since he was working in that post was  considered  by the State Government and he was allowed to continue in  that post on the date of integration.  He was absorbed in a class I post but his place in the combined cadre was below that of respondents 3 to 19. For  the  purpose  of determining  inter  se  seniority  (if officers belonging to, the two services the State Government issued  a memorandum on October 25, 1965, clause (2)(ii)  of which   stated  that  seniority  of  Deputy  Directors   and Assistant  Directors on the cadre of the Public  Health,  on integration  in PCMS-1 should be termined with reference  to

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the   length  of  continuous  service  from  the   date   of appointment  in the group subject to the condition that  the seniority  of a person in parent seniority list will not  be disturbed. The  appellant  claimed that on the basis of  the  principle laid  down in clause 2(ii) of the office memorandum  he  was entitled to seniority over respondents 3 to 19, because  his continuous service started from April 25. 1964 while that of respondents 3 to 19 started only after that date.  The State Government  rejected this claim of the appellant and  issued orders  that the seniority of respondents 3 to 19 should  be reckoned from the date of their appointment namely, April 8, 1964. In  a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution  a  single Judge  of  the High Court accepted this  contention  of  the appellant  that  he was senior to respondents 3  to  19  and allowed  the  writ petition.  On appeal the  division  bench held  that the memorandum dated October 25, 1965  laid  down the   principle  determining  seniority  only   for   Deputy Directors  and  Assistant  Directors in  the  Public  Health Service  on  integration  in PGMS in Class  I  and  did  not provide  as to how seniority of medical officers already  in the  Provincial  Civil  Medical Service  Class  I  shall  be determined   vis-a-vis   Deputy  Directors   and   Assistant Directors  on integration.  The High Court upheld the  order of   the  Government  determining  that  the  seniority   of respondents  3 to 19 shall be reckoned from the date of  the order of appointment, namely, April 8, 1964 irrespective  as to when they assumed charge of their higher Posts. On  appeal  to this Court it was contended  that  continuous service  in  a post could commence only when  the  incumbent took charge of the post and not 83 earlier  and  as such respondents 3 to 19  who  took  charge after  the appellant were junior to him.  The State  on  the other  hand contended that it was competent to it to fix  an assumed date on which the continuous service of  respondents 3 to 19 shall be deemed to have commenced for the purpose of determining seniority in the integrated service. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : (1) On a proper interpretation of clause 2(ii) of the memorandum dated October 25, 1965 the principle of length of continuous   service  from  the  date  of  appointment   was applicable to officers coming from both the services for the purpose of fixing their inter se seniority in the integrated service. [88D] (2)It  was competent to the State Government to issue  cl. (2)(ii) of the memorandum dated October 25, 1965 in exercise of  its  executive power.  It is well-setted that  where  no statutory   rules   are  made  regulating   recruitment   or conditions  of service, the State Government always can.  in exercise  of  its  executive  power,  issue   administrative instructions  providing  for  recruitment  and  laying  down conditions of service. [88E-F] B.N. Naswaian v. State of Mysore [1966] 3 S.C.R. 682  and Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. [1968] 1 S.C.R. 111, referred to. (3)(a) The contention of the State that it was competent  to it to fix an assumed date on which continuous service should be deemed to have commenced for determining seniority is not well  founded.  Under cl. 2(ii) of the memorandum  what  was required  to be taken into account was the actual length  of continuous service from the date of appointment and not  the length  of  continuous service reckoned from  an  artificial date given by the State Government. [88H; 89B]

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(b)Although the memorandum dated 25th October, 1965 was in the  nature  of  an administrative  instruction,  the  State Government  could not, at its own swee will, depart from  it without  rational justification and fix an  artificial  date for commencing the length of continuous service in the  case of  some individual officers only for the purpose of  giving them seniority in contravention of that clause.[89C] (c)Where the State Government departs from a principle  of seniority laid down byit,   albeit   by    administrative instructions,  and  the  departure  is  without  reason  and arbitrary,  it  would  directly infringe  the  guarantee  of equality under Arts. 14 and 16. [89D] Vitaralli  v.  Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 at 546-547;  3  Law  Ed. (Second Series) 1012 referred to. (4)Where  the order of appointment appoints a person  with effect  from  the date he assumes charge of  the  post,  the appointment   would  be  effective  only  when  the   person appointed  assumes charge of the post and that would be  the date  of  his  appointment.   Where  he  is  appointed  with immediate   effect,  the  appointment  would   be   effected immediately,irrespective  as  to when the  person  appointed assumes charge of the post. [90C-D] In  the  instant  case so far as respondents 3  to  19  were concerned,  the date of their appointment was April 8,  1964 and  the length of their continuous service in PCMS Class  I was required to be reckoned from that date.  Even though the respond-ants  joined their respective posts after April  25, 1964, that did not make any difference because the length of continuous  service  was  to be counted  from  the  date  of appointment. 84

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE     JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 624  of 1971. Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment and  order  dated the  8th April, 1970 of the Punjab & Haryana High  Court  in L.P.A. No. 433/1969. B.   R. L. Iyengar, S. K. Mehta for the appellant. H.   R. Khanna and O. P. Sharma for Respondents Nos.  1  and 1. Hardev Singh, R. S. Sodhi for Respondent No. 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI,  J.-This  appeal raises the question  whether  the appellant  has  been  given his proper  rank  in  the  joint seniority list of officers belonging to the Provincial Civil Medical  Service, Class I after its reorganisation  on  15th July, 1964. There were, in the State of Punjab prior to 15th July, 1964, two  separate and independent services,  namely,  Provincial Civil  Medical Service (hereinafter for the sake of  brevity referred  to  as  PCMS) and  Public  Health  Service.   Both services  comprised two classes, Class I and Class  II,  and each had its own separate ranking for seniority and  channel of  promotion.   The  post of District  Medical  Officer  of Health was a post in Class 11 of the Public Health  Service, while  the post of Assistant Director Health Services was  a post in Class I of that Service.  The appellant and one  Dr. Jagjit Singh were, until their promotion with  retrospective effect  from 25th April, 1964, District Medical Officers  of Health  in  Class II of Public Health Service.   Dr.  Jagjit Singh  was  admittedly  senior to  the  appellant  in  rank.

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Respondents, Nos. 3 to 19 were’ until their promotion by  an order  dated  8th  April, 1964, in Class  II  of  PCMS.   It appea rs that some posts in Class I of PCMS fell vacant  and it was, therefore, decided to make promotions to these posts from  amongst officers belonging to Class II of PCMS and  an order  dated 8th April, 1964 was accordingly issued  by  the State Government. promoting inter alia respondents Nos. 3 to 19  to  Class 1, PCMS with immediate  effect.   Though  this order was made on 8th April, 1964, it could not be  conveyed to  respondents  Nos.  3 to 19 until 23rd  April,  1964  and respondents Nos. 3 to 19 could, therefore, assume charge  of the  higher posts of promotion only after 27th April,  1964. In fact they took charge of the higher posts of promotion on different dates between 27th April, 1964 and 11th May, 1964. It may be pointed out that under the order dated 8th  April, 1964 several other officers belonging to Class 11, PCMS,  in addition  to respondents Nos. 3 to 19 were also promoted  to Class  1,  PCMS, but it is not necessary to  refer  to  them since  on  bifurcation  of the State  of  Punjab  they  were allotted  to  the State of Haryana and they  are  no  longer contestants with the appellant in the ranking for seniority. So far as Dr. Jagjit Singh and the appellant are concerned, Dr.  Jagjit  Singh  was  on  deputation  with  the   Defence Department,  while the appellant was appointed to  work-  in the  post of Assistant Director Health Services on  his  own pay  scale  from 25th April, 1964.  This  was  the  position which  obtained  when PCMS and Public  Health  Service  were integrated  as part of the administrative reorganisation  of the  State  Medical and Health Department with  effect  from 15th July, 1964. 85 The  PCMS  and Public Health Service  were  integrated  with effect from 15th July, 1964 and common combined cadres, both in  Class I and Class 11, were created which were  known  as PCMS  Class  I  and  PCMS Class 11  cadres.   The  cadre  of District Medical Officers of Health, which constituted Class 11  in Public Health Service was equated with PCMS Class  11 cadre,  while  the cadre of Assistant Directors  and  Deputy Directors,  which  constituted  Class  I  of  Public  Health Service,  was equated with PCMS Class I cadre.  Now  at  the time  of integration Dr. Jagjit Singh belonged to the  cadre of  District Medical Officers of Health and  the  appellant, though  working  in the post of Assistant Director  was  not promoted to that post but was merely working in that post on his own pay scale, of District Medical Officer of Health and they  would,  therefore, have ordinarily  been  equated  and absorbed  in  the integrated PCMS Class 11 cadre.   But  the appellant  made  a representation to the  St-ate  Government that since he was working in the post of Assistant Director, since  25th April, 1964, he should be promoted to that  post with  retrospective  effect  from  that  date.   The   State Government  considered the representation of  the  appellant and decided that the appellant should be given promotion  to the post of Assistant Director with effect from 25th  April, 1964.   But Dr. Jagjit Singh was senior to the appellant  in the  cadre  of District Medical Officers of  Health  and  it would,  therefore, be unfair to him to ignore his claim  and give  promotion  to the appellant who was his  junior.   The State  Government therefore, "with a view to protecting  his right  of promotion by virtue of his parent seniority  which could not be disturbed passed an order dated 24th July, 1965 granting absentia promotion to Dr. Jagjit Singh to the  post of  Assistant  Director, with effect from 25th  April,  1964 and since  Dr.  Jagjit Singh was on  deputation  with  the Defence Department, the State Government, by the same order,

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promoted  the appellant to, the post of  Assistant  Director with  effect  from the same date vice Dr. Jagjit  Singh  Dr. Jagjit  Singh  and the appellant were thus promoted  to  the posts  of Assistant Director with retrospective effect  from 25th  April,  1964  and  they  were  accordingly   Assistant Directors on 15th July, 1964 when integration took place and were, therefore, equated and absorbed as such in PCMS  Class I cadre. Now, one question which arose consequent on the  integration of Class I of Public Health Service with PCMS Class I was as to  how the inter se seniority of the officers  coming  from the  two  services should be determined  in  the  integrated service.   The State Government by a memorandum  dated  25th October,  1965  decided  that  the  inter  se  seniority  of officers belonging to the two integrating services should be determined on the following principle vide clause 2(ii) :               "The   seniority,of   Deputy   Directors   and               Assistant Directors on the cadre of the Public               Health  on  integration in  PCMS-1  should  be               determined  with  reference to the  length  of               continuous   service   from   the   date    of               appointment  in  the  group  subject  to   the               condition  that the seniority of a  person  in               parent seniority list will not be disturbed.,, This  principle for determination of inter se seniority  was communicated by the Director, Health Services, Punjab to the appellant in a letter 86 dated 27th October, 1964.  The appellant was given an option in  regard to integration in PCMS Class I and was told  that on  receipt  of his opinion his seniority in  PCMS  Class  I would  be  fixed  in  accordance  with  the  length  of  his continuous  service from the date of his  appointment.   The appellant  opted  in favour of integration and  he  was  ac- cordingly, as stated above, integrated in PCMS Class 1.  The question then arose as to how the seniority of the appellant vis-a-vis respondents Nos. 3 to 19 should be arranged.  The appellant  claimed  that on the basis of  the  principle  of seniority laid down in clause 2(ii) of the memorandum  dated 25th  October,  1965  he  was  entitled  to  seniority  over respondents  Nos.  3  to 19  since  his  continuous  service started from 25th April, 1964, while the continuous  service of  respondents Nos. 3 to 19 did not start until after  25th April,  1964  when they assumed charge of  their  respective posts.  The State Government, however, issued an order dated 4th  December,  1967  determining  that  the  seniority   of respondents Nos. 3 to 19 shall be reckoned from the date, of their   order  of  appointment,  namely,  8th  April,   1964 irrespective  as  to  when  they  assumed  charge  of  their respective  posts and on this basis, rejected the  claim  of the appellant.  Subsequently, a provisional joint  seniority list  of PCMS Class I was published by the State  Government and  in  this list, respondents Nos. 3 to 19 were  shown  as senior to Dr. Jagjit Singh and the appellant. The  appellant being aggrieved by the decision of the  State Government giving seniority to respondents Nos. 3 to 19 over Dr.  Jagjit Singh and the appellant, filed a petition  under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana  challenging  the seniority list  published  by  the State  Government.   The main ground of challenge  was  that according  to  the principle of seniority laid down  by  the State  Government  in clause 2(ii) of the  memorandum  dated 25th October, 1965 the inter se seniority of the integrating officers  was to be determined with reference to the  length of  continuous service from the date of appointment  and  if

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this  principle was properly applied, Dr. Jagjit  Singh  and the  appellant would be senior to respondents Nos. 3 to,  19 as  their  continuous  service in  the  posts  of  Assistant Director   commenced  from  25th  April,  1964,  while   the continuous  service  of  respondents Nos. 3  to  19  in  the corresponding  posts in PCMS Class I did not commence  until after  25th  April,  1964 when they  took  charge  of  their respective  posts and the continuous service put in by  them was,  therefore,  longer  in duration that that  put  in  by respondents  Nos. 3 to 19.  This ground was accepted by  the learned  Single Judge who heard the petition and taking  the view that Dr. Jagjit Singh and the appellant were senior  to respondents  Nos. 3 to 19 the learned Single  Judge  allowed the  petition  and directed that the seniority  list  should revised  by the State Government so as to give seniority  to the appellant over respondents Nos. 3 to 19. The  State Government and the Director of  Health  Services, Punjab thereupon preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 446  of 1969 before a Division Bench of the High Court.  Some of the respondents  Nos.  3 to 19 also preferred  separate  letters Patent  Appeal No. 433 of 1969.  Both these  Letters  Patent Appeals were heard by a Division Bench of the 87 High  Court.  The learned Judges constituting  the  Division Bench took the view that the memorandum dated 25th  October, 1965 laid down the principle determining seniority only  for Deputy  Directors  and  Assistant Directors  in  the  Public Health  Service on integration in PCMS Class I and  did  not provide  as to how seniority of Medical Officers already  in PCMS Class I shall be determined vis-a-vis Deputy  Directors and Assistant Directors on integration.  It was,  therefore, competent  to the State Government to issue the order  dated 4th  December,  1967  determining  that  the  seniority   of respondents Nos’ 3 to 19 shall be reckoned from the date  of their   order  of  appointment,  namely,  8th  April,   1964 irrespective as to when they assumed charge of their  higher posts.   The  seniority  of respondents Nos.  3  to  19  was accordingly  liable to be reckoned from 8th April, 1964  and since  the seniority of Dr. Jagjit Singh and  the  appellant commenced only from 25th April, 1964, respondents Nos. 3  to 19 were rightly shown as senior to Dr. Jagjit Singh and  the appellant:  The  learned  Judges on this  view  allowed  the appeal  and upheld the provisional joint seniority list  of, PCMS  Class  I showing respondents Nos. 3 to  19  above  Dr. Jagjit  Singh and the, appellant in seniority.  That led  to the filing of the present appeal with special leave obtained from this Court. We  must consider what was the true scope and ambit  of  the principle  of seniority laid down in clause (2)(ii)  of  the memorandum  dated  25th  October, 1965.   Did  it  apply  in relation  to  officers  coming from both  services  for  the purpose  of  determining  their inter se  seniority  in  the integrated service or was it intended to provide a principle for  determining  seniority only for Deputy  Directors-  and Assistant  Directors on their integration in PCMS Class I  ? To  answer this question it is necessary to understand  what was  the problem before the State Government which  it set out  to solve by issuing clause (2) (ii) of  the  memorandum dated 25th October, 1965.  The position which then  obtained was that with effect from 15th July, 1964 Class I of  Public Health Service, consisting of the posts of Deputy  Directors and  Assistant Directors, was integrated with PCMS  Class  I and since officers coming from these two different  services were to be absorbed and fitted into one integrated  service, it  was  necessary to evolve a fair and just  principle  for

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determining  their  inter  Se seniority  in  the  integrated service. It was for this purpose    that   the    State Government  issued clause (2) (ii) of the  memorandum  dated 25th  October, 1965. What clause (2) (ii) provided was  that on  integration  in PCMS Class I, the  seniority  of  Deputy Directors  and  Assistant  Directors  vis-a-vis  the   other officer in that service should be determined by reference to the   length  of  continuous  service   from  the  date   of appointmentthat  is,  the  continuous  service  of  such integrating officer shouldbe  reckoned from the date  of his  appointment in his group-whether it be in PCMS Class  I or  in  Public  Health  Service Class  I-and  the  inter  se seniority should be arranged according to the length of such continuous service.  The measure or yard-stick for adjusting inter  se  seniority  of the officers coming  from  the  two services should be the length of continuous service of  each from  the  date of appointment in his group.  This  was  the principle  laid  down in clause (2) (ii) of  the  memorandum dated  25th October, 1965 for bringing about integration  of the two services by adjusting the inter se seniority of  the officers in 88 the  integrated service.  There was no occasion or  need  at that  time  to  lay  down  any  principle  for   determining seniority inter se Deputy Directors or Assistant  Directors. The  seniority  of Deputy Directors or  Assistant  Directors inter  se  in  Public Health Service  Class  I  was  already determined  and known and clause (2)(ii) of  the  memorandum dated   25th  October,  1965  in  fact  provided  that   the adjustment  of inter se seniority in the integrated  service according to the length of continuous service from the  date of appointment should be subject to the condition that  "the seniority of persons in the present seniority list will  not be  disturbed." Clause (2)(ii) of the memorandum dated  25th October,  1965, was, therefore, not intended to provide  for seniority  of Deputy Directors or Assistant Directors  inter se  in  their parent service.  What ever was  the  inter  se seniority  of  Deputy Directors or  Assistant  Directors  in their parent service was not to be disturbed while adjusting the, seniority of the officers in the integrated service and so  also was the inter se seniority of the officers  already in PCMS Class I not to be violated while fixing seniority in the integrated service.  There can, therefore, be. no  doubt that  on  a proper interpretation of clause (2)(ii)  of  the memorandum dated 25th October, 1965 the principle of  length of  continuous  service  from the date  of  appointment  was applicable to officers coming from both the services for the purpose of fixing their inter se seniority in the integrated service. Now, it is true that clause (2) (ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October, 1965 Was not a statutory provision having  the force  of law and was merely an  administrative  instruction issued by the State Government in exercise of its  executive power.  But that does not present any difficulty, for it  is now well settled by several decisions of this Court that %IV no statutory rules are made regulating recruitment or condi- tions  of  service;  the  State  Government  always  can  in exercise   of  its  executive  power  issue   administrative instructions,  providing  for recruitment  and  laying  down conditions of service.  Vide B. N. Nagarajan v.   State   of Mysore(1)  and Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan &  Anr. (2) It was, therefore, competent to the State Government  to issue  clause (2)(ii) of the memorandum dated 25th  October, 1965  in  exercise of its executive power  laying  down  the principle to be followed in adjusting inter se seniority  of

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the officers in the integrated service. But  the question then arises whether the  State  Government could  issue  the order dated 4th December,  1967  providing that  the  seniority of respondents Nos. 3 to  19  shall  be reckoned   from  the  date  of  issue  of  their  order   of appointment, namely, 8th April, 1964 irrespective as to when they  assumed charge of the higher posts, if such order  was in contravention of the principle of seniority laid down  in clause (2) (ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October,  1965. The  argument  urged on behalf of the State  Government  was that  it was competent toit to fix an assumed date on  which the continuous service of respondents Nos. 3 to 19 should be deemed  to  have commenced for the  purpose  of  determining their  seniority  in the integrated service, and  the  order dated  4th  December, 1967 was, therefore,  not  beyond  its power. (1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 682. (2) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 111. 89 But  we do not think this argument is well founded.   Clause (2) (ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October, 1965 provided that the seniority of the officers in the integrated service shall be determined by reference to the length of continuous service  from  the date of appointment in the  group  within their respective service.  What was, therefore, required  to be  taken into account was the actual length  of  continuous service  from the date of appointment and not the length  of continuous service reckoned from an artificial date given by the, State Government.  Now, it is true that clause (2) (ii) of  the  memorandum  dated. 25th October, 1965  was  in  the nature  of administrative instruction, not having the  force of law, but the State Government could not at its own  sweet will  depart from it without rational justification and  fix an  artificial date for commencing the length of  continuous service  in the, case of some individual officers  only  for the  purpose of giving them, seniority in  contravention  of that clause.  That would be clearly violative of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.  The sweep of articles 14 and 16 is  wide  and  pervasive.  These  two  articles  embody  the principle  of  rationality and they are intended  to  strike against  arbitrary and discriminatory action-taken  by  the, ’State’ Where the State Government departs from a  principle of  seniority  laid  down by it,  albeit  by  administrative instructions,  and  the  departure  is  without  reason  and arbitrary,  it  would  directly infringe  the  guarantee  of equality  under  articles 14 and 16.  It is  interesting  to notice that in the United States it-is now well settled that an executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by  which it professes its actions to be judged and it  must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of  an  act in violation of them. vide the judgment  of  Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Vitaralli v. Seton(1) This view is of course not based on the equality clause of the United  State Constitution  and it is evolved as a rule of  administrative law.    But  the  principle  is  the  same,   namely,   that arbitrariness  should  be eliminated in State  action.   If, therefore,  we find that the order dated 4th December,  1967 gave an artificial date from which the continuous service of respondents Nos. 3 to 19 shall be deemed to have  commenced, though  in  fact  and  in  truth  their  continuous  service commenced  from  different  dates and it was  thus  in  con- travention of the principle of seniority laid down in clause (2)  (ii)  of the memorandum dated 25th  October,  1965,  it would  have  to  be held to be void as  being  violative  of articles 14 and 16.

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We do not, however, think that the order dated 4th December, 1967  providing that the seniority of respondents Nos. 3  to 19  shall  be reckoned from the date of  their  appointment, namely,  8th  April, 1964 constituted a departure  from  the principle  of seniority laid down in clause (2) (ii) of  the memorandum   dated  25th  October,  1965.   The   test   for determining  seniority in the integrated cadre laid down  by clause  (2) (ii) of the memorandum dated 25th October,  1965 was  the  length  of continuous service  from  the  date  of appointment  in  the group.  The  appellant  contended  that continuous  service in a post could commence only  when  the incumbent  took  charge  of the post and  not  earlier  and, therefore,  though  respondents Nos. 3 to 19  were  promoted under  the  order dated 8th April,  1964,  their  continuous service (1) 359 U.S. 535 at 546-5473 Law.  Sd. (Second Series) 1012. 90 in  the posts of promotion in PCMS Class I did not  commence until after 25th April, 1964 when they took charge of  their respective posts of promotion and hence the length of  their continuous service in PCMS Class I was less than that of Dr. Jagjit  Singh  and the appellant in Public  Health  Service, Class  1. This contention is fallacious in that it fails  to give  sufficient importance to the words "from the  date  of appointment  and ignores the true meaning and effect of  the order  dated  8th April, 1964.  First let us  see  what  the words  "date  of the order of appointment" mean.   Are  they synonymous  with  "date of the order of  appointment"  ?  We think  not.  An order of appointment may be of three  kinds. It may appoint a person with effect from the date he assumes charge  of  the post or it may appoint  him  with  immediate effect  or it may appoint him simpliciter without saying  as to when the appointment shall take effect.  Where the  order of  appointment is of the first kind, the appointment  would be  effective only when the person appointed assumes  charge of  the post and that would be the date of his  appointment. It would be then that he is appointed.  But in a case of the second  kind, which is the one with which we  are  concerned since the order dated 8th April, 1964 appointed  respondents Nos.  3 to 19 to PCMS Class I "with immediate  effect",  the appointment  would be effective immediately irrespective  as to  when  the person appointed assumes charge of  the  post. The date of his appointment in such a case would be the same as the date of the order of appointment.  It is,  therefore, obvious  that  so  far  as respondents Nos.  3  to  19  were concerned, the date of their appointment was 8th April, 1964 and  the length of their continuous service in PCMS Class  I was required to be reckoned from that date.  It is true that respondents  Nos.  3 to 19 did not assume  charge  of  their respective posts of promotion until after 25th April,  1964, but   that  makes  no  difference  because  the  length   of continuous  service  is  to  be counted  from  the  date  of appointment  on the hypothesis that once the appointment  is effective  the  person  concerned is in  the  post  and  his service  in  the  post is deemed to  have  commenced  though under  the rules governing his conditions of service he  may not be entitled to the salary and allowances attached to the post  until he assumes charge of the post.   The  continuous service  of  respondents  Nos.  3 to 19  in  PCMS  Class  1, therefore, commenced from 8th April, 1964 and since that was longer  than the continuous service of Dr. Jagjit Singh  and the  appellant  in  Public Health  Service  Class  I,  which commenced only on 25th April, 1964, respondents Nos. 3 to 19 were  entitled to be placed senior to Dr. Jagjit  Singh  and the appellant in the joint seniority list of the  integrated

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PCMS Class 1. We,  therefore,  uphold  the joint  seniority  list  of  the integrated  PCMS  Class I prepared by the  State  Government giving seniority to respondents Nos. 3 to 19 over Dr. Jagjit Singh and the appellant and dismiss the appeal.  There will be no order as to costs. P.B.R.                           Appeal dismissed. 91