IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 854 of 2004  

Amar Singh              …… Appellant

Versus

State of Rajasthan                                      …… Respondent

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1411         of 2010  (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4389 of 2004)

State of Rajasthan                    …… Appellant

Versus

Jagdish & Anr.                                              …… Respondents

J U D G M E N T

A.K. PATNAIK, J.

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 854 of 2004  

This is an appeal against the judgment dated 07.10.2003  

of  the  High  Court  of  Rajasthan,  Jaipur  Bench,  in  D.B.  

Criminal Appeal No.816 of 1998.

2. The  facts  very  briefly  are  that  on 05.05.1992  Santosh  

(the  deceased)  was  married  to  the  appellant  and  on  

08.03.1993 she was found dead in her in-laws house.  On the  

same day, a written report was lodged with the police at the  

Shivaji  Park  Police  Station  at  Alwar,  by  the  uncle  of  the  

appellant, Ganga Sahai Saini, saying that while the deceased  

was boiling the water she got engulfed in flames and died.  On  

the  same  day,  another  written  report  was  lodged  with  the  

police  by  the  father  of  the  deceased,  Babu  Lal,  that  the  

deceased used to be harassed and humiliated in connection  

with demand of dowry and on receiving the information that  

she has died in an electric current accident, he rushed to the  

spot and found the body of Santosh in charred condition.  On  

the basis of such information given by Babu Lal, the police  

registered FIR No.53 of 1993 for the offences under Sections  

498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’).  The  

investigation was carried out and charge-sheet was filed by the  

police  in  the  Court  of  Additional  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  

No.2, Alwar, against the appellant, Jagdish (younger brother of  

the appellant), Smt. Gordhani (mother of the appellant), Khem  

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Chand (sister’s husband of the appellant), Gyatri Devi (wife of  

Khem Chand) and Girdhari Lal (father of Khem Chand).  The  

case was committed to the Sessions Court and tried by the  

Additional  Sessions  Judge  No.2,  Alwar,  as  Sessions  Case  

No.32 of 1998.  The Additional Sessions Judge framed charges  

under  Section  147,  304B  and  498A  IPC  against  all  the  

accused persons.  At the trial, the prosecution examined 16  

witnesses and exhibited 31 documents.  After statement of the  

accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure  

(for short ‘Cr.P.C.’),  no defence witness was examined.  The  

Additional  Sessions  Judge  convicted  the  appellant,  Jagdish  

and  Gordhani  under  Sections  498A  and  304B  IPC  and  

imposed  the  sentence  of  three  years  rigorous imprisonment  

and  a  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-,  in  default  to  suffer  further  three  

months’  simple  imprisonment  for  the  offence  under  Section  

498A IPC and imposed the sentence of imprisonment for life  

and a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default further six months’ simple  

imprisonment  for  the  offence  under  Section 304B IPC.   On  

appeal, the High Court acquitted Jagdish and Gordhani but  

confirmed the conviction of the appellant under Section 498A  

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and 304B IPC.

3. Mr.  Tara  Chandra  Sharma,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant, submitted that the appellant has already served out  

the  sentence  under  Section  498A  IPC  and,  therefore,  his  

challenge  in  this  appeal  is  confined  to  the  conviction  and  

sentence  under  Section  304B  IPC.   He  submitted  that  the  

main ingredient of the offence under Section 304B IPC is that  

the  deceased  must  have  been  subjected  to  cruelty  or  

harassment in connection with any “demand for dowry” and in  

this  case  the  prosecution  has  not  established  that  the  

deceased  was  subjected  to  cruelty  or  harassment  by  the  

appellant  in  connection  with  any  demand  for  dowry.   In  

support of his submission, he relied on the decisions of this  

Court  in  Biswajit  Halder   alias  Babu  Halder  and  Others v.  

State of West Bengal [(2008)1 SCC 202] and Durga Prasad and  

Another v.  The State of M.P. [2010(6) SCALE 18].  He referred  

to the evidence of PW-2 (father of the deceased), PW-4 (mother  

of the deceased) and PW-5 (brother of the deceased) to show  

that there was no demand for dowry made by the appellant  

and  that  the  appellant  only  wanted  Rs.10,000/-  to  start  a  

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shop and this request for a sum of Rs.10,000/- cannot be held  

to be a demand for dowry.

4. He further submitted that there were,  in fact,  material  

contradictions in the testimony of PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5 with  

regard to the demand for dowry and, therefore, their evidence  

cannot  be  relied  upon  to  sustain  the  conviction  of  the  

appellant.  He submitted that in any case the evidence of PW-

2,  PW-4 and PW-5 on whatever  was stated  to them by the  

deceased  regarding  demand  for  dowry  and  harassment  or  

cruelty  were  at  best  hearsay  evidence  and  not  admissible  

either under Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or  

under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.  In support  

of his submission, he cited Rattan Singh v. State of H.P. [(1997)  

4 SCC 161].   

5. He finally submitted that the court while recording the  

statement of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. did not  

put  any  question  to  enable  the  appellant  to  explain  any  

circumstances  appearing  in  the  evidence  against  him.   He  

relied  on  Latu  Mahto  and  Another v.  State  of  Bihar  (Now  

Jharkhand) [(2008) 8 SCC 395] to contend that circumstances  

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about which the accused was not asked to explain cannot be  

used against him.  According to learned counsel Mr. Sharma,  

this  is  not  a  case  where  the  prosecution  has  been able  to  

establish  the  offence  under  Section  304B  IPC  against  the  

appellant and hence the judgment of the High Court should be  

set aside.

6. Dr.  Manish Singhvi,  learned counsel  appearing for  the  

State of Rajasthan, in reply submitted that the facts of this  

case would show that the deceased did not die under normal  

circumstances.  He referred to the  post-mortem report (Ex.P-

21) which indicated that the deceased suffered 100% burns.  

He  submitted  that  Dr.  Mahendra  Kr.  Gupta  (PW-9),  who  

performed  the  autopsy,  has  opined  that  the  burns  on  the  

deceased were after strangulation and throttling inasmuch as  

there were fractures of larynx and trachea and the larynx was  

found congested.  He submitted that the deceased got married  

on 05.05.1992 and died on 08.03.1993 within ten months of  

the marriage and there was sufficient evidence to show that  

she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the appellant  

and other members of his family.   

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7. He submitted that the evidence of PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5  

establishes that there was demand for dowry of a Scooter or  

Rs.25,000-/.  He referred to the evidence of PW-4 and PW-5 to  

show that  the  appellant  used to  taunt  the  deceased saying  

that she has come from a hungry house and that the appellant  

had himself visited the house of PW-4 and demanded a sum of  

Rs.10,000/-.   He  vehemently  submitted that  this  is  a  clear  

case of continuous harassment of the deceased in connection  

with demand of dowry not only by the appellant but also by  

his other family members.  He cited Pawan Kumar and Others  

v.  State of Haryana [(1998) 3 SCC 309] to contend that such  

taunting and teasing of a bride for not bringing dowry amount  

to harassment or cruelty within the meaning of Section 304B  

IPC.

8. In reply to the submission of Mr. Sharma that statements  

made by the deceased before PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5 regarding  

harassment and demand of dowry were not admissible either  

under Section 60 or under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, he  

submitted  that  this  Court  in  Sharad  Birdhichand  Sarda v.  

State of Maharashtra [(1984) 4 SCC 116] has held that Section  

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32 of the Indian Evidence Act is an exception to the rule of  

hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who  

dies, provided the statement related to the cause of death or  

exhibits  circumstances  leading to  the  death.   He submitted  

that in the present case the statements made by the deceased  

to PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5 related to the cause of her death,  

namely, demand for dowry and therefore would be admissible  

under  Section  32  of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,  even  if  the  

deceased while making the statement was not expecting the  

death.  He submitted that in the present case the prosecution  

has firmly established that soon before her death the deceased  

has been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellant  

in connection with demand for dowry and therefore the Court  

has to presume under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act  

that  the  appellant  has  caused  the  dowry  death  and  this  

presumption  has  not  been  rebutted  by  the  appellant  by  

leading any evidence.   

9. Dr.  Singhvi  finally  submitted  that  since  there  were  

concurrent findings of fact rendered by the trial court and the  

High Court that the deceased died due to asphyxia and was  

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burnt after strangulation so as to make out a case of accident  

and the burns on the body of the deceased were found to be  

100%, this was a case of ghastly murder and therefore not a fit  

case in which this Court should either set aside the conviction  

of the appellant or reduce the sentence imposed on him by the  

High Court.

10.  We  find  that  the  evidence  of  PW-4  (mother  of  the  

deceased)  is  that after  marriage,  the deceased came several  

times and she also came about one month prior to her death  

and she used to complain about the demand of a Scooter and  

harassment by her mother-in-law Gordhani and that she had  

also told that the appellant used to taunt her that she has  

come from a hungry house and brought nothing and the last  

time when she came she stayed for two days and returned and  

one  month  thereafter  she  was  murdered.   Similar  is  the  

evidence of PW-5 (brother of the deceased) that whenever the  

deceased used to come home she used to complain that her  

in-laws have been teasing her and she had also stated that  

they demanded Scooter  or Rs.25,000/-  for  a shop and that  

one month prior to her death she came home and complained  

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that her mother-in-law and all other in-laws used to torture  

her and taunt her that she did not bring anything and that the  

appellant  also used to tease her.   It  is  thus clear from the  

evidence of  PW-4, as corroborated by the evidence of PW-5,  

that the deceased has made statements before them that her  

in-laws  as  well  as  the  appellant  have  been  demanding  a  

Scooter or Rs.25,000/- for a shop and have been taunting and  

teasing  her  for  not  meeting  the  demand of  dowry  within  a  

couple of months before her death.  Such evidence of PW-4  

and PW-5 with regard to the statements made by the deceased  

is  no  doubt  hearsay  but  is  admissible  under  clause  (1)  of  

Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.   

11.  Clause  (1)  of  Section  32  of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act  

provides that statements made by a person as to the cause of  

his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction  

which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of  

that  person’s  death  comes  into  question,  are  themselves  

relevant facts.  In the present case, the cause of death of the  

deceased was a  question to  be  decided and the  statements  

made  by  the  deceased  before  PW-4  and  PW-5  that  the  

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appellant  used  to  taunt  the  deceased  in  connection  with  

demand of a Scooter or Rs.25,000/- within a couple of months  

before  the  death of  the  deceased are  statements  as to  “the  

circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death”  

within the  meaning of  Section 32(1)  of  the  Indian Evidence  

Act.

12. In Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor [AIR 1939 PC 47]  

Lord Atkin held that circumstances of the transaction which  

resulted  in  the  death of  the  declarant  will  be  admissible  if  

such  circumstances  have  some  proximate  relation  to  the  

actual occurrence.  The test laid down by Lord Atkin has been  

quoted in the judgment of Fazal Ali, J. in Sharad Birdhichand  

Sarda v.  State  of Maharashtra  (supra) and His Lordship has  

held that Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act is an exception  

to the rule  of  hearsay evidence and in view of  the  peculiar  

conditions in the Indian Society has widen the sphere to avoid  

injustice.  His Lordship has held that where the main evidence  

consists  of  statements  and  letters  written  by  the  deceased  

which are directly connected with or related to her death and  

which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statements would clearly  

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fall  within  the  four  corners  of  Section  32  and,  therefore,  

admissible and the distance of time alone in such cases would  

not  make  the  statements  irrelevant.   The  difference  in  the  

English Law and the Indian Law has been reiterated in Rattan   

Singh v. State of H. P. (supra) and it has been held therein that  

even if the deceased was nowhere near expectation of death,  

still her statement would become admissible under Section 32  

(1)  of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,  though  not  as  a  dying  

declaration  as  such,  provided  it  satisfies  one  of  the  two  

conditions set forth in this sub-section.  The argument of Mr.  

Sharma,  therefore,  that  the  evidence  of  PW-4  and  PW-5  

regarding the statements made by the deceased before them  

are hearsay and are not admissible is misconceived.   

13. The prosecution, therefore, has been able to show that  

soon before her death the deceased has been subjected by the  

appellant to taunt in connection with demand for dowry.  This  

Court  has  held  in  Pawan  Kumar  and  Others v.  State  of  

Haryana (supra) that a girl dreams of great days ahead with  

hope  and  aspiration  when  entering  into  a  marriage,  and  if  

from the very next day the husband starts taunting her for not  

1

bringing dowry and calling her ugly, there cannot be greater  

mental torture, harassment or cruelty for any bride and such  

acts of taunting by the husband would constitute cruelty both  

within the meaning of Section 498A and Section 304B IPC.     

14. Once it is established by the prosecution that soon before  

her  death  the  deceased  was  subjected  by  the  appellant  to  

harassment or cruelty in connection with demand for dowry,  

the Court has to presume that the appellant has committed  

the offence under Section 304B IPC.  This will be clear from  

Section  113B of  the  Indian Evidence  Act  which  states  that  

when the  question  is  whether  a  person has  committed  the  

dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her  

death  such  woman has  been  subjected  by  such  person  to  

cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand  

for  dowry,  the  Court  shall  presume  that  such  person  had  

caused the dowry death.  The prosecution in this case had led  

sufficient  evidence  before  the  Court  to  raise  a  presumption  

that the appellant had caused the dowry death of the deceased  

and  it  was,  therefore,  for  the  appellant  to  rebut  this  

presumption.

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15. Mr. Sharma has, however, argued that the appellant was  

not  given  such  opportunities  to  personally  explain  any  

circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.  But we  

find  from  the  statement  of  the  appellant  recorded  under  

Section  313  Cr.P.C.  that  the  evidence  of  PW-4  that  the  

deceased came to her house many times after marriage and  

lastly  came  to  her  house  prior  to  her  death  saying  that  

Girdhari and Khem Chand demanded a Scooter and that the  

appellant said that she came from a poor family, was brought  

to the notice of the appellant but the appellant simply denied  

the same.  The appellant has also chosen not to examine any  

defence  witness  to  rebut  the  presumption  of  dowry  death  

against him under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act.  

The trial court and the High Court were thus right in holding  

that  the  appellant  was  guilty  of  the  offence  under  Section  

304B IPC.

16. For the offence under Section 304B IPC, the trial court  

has imposed the maximum punishment of life imprisonment  

saying that the appellant has sacrificed the newly-wed bride  

with cruelty and harshness to satisfy his lust of dowry illegally  

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and hence he does not deserve any mercy and considering the  

nature of the offence committed by him and his conduct, he  

deserves the maximum punishment of life imprisonment.  The  

High Court has only sustained the conviction and punishment  

of life imprisonment imposed on the appellant under Section  

304B IPC.  Dr. Singhvi,  however, suggested that this was a  

case of strangulation of a bride before she was burnt and for  

this  reason,  the  High  Court  sustained  the  maximum  

punishment of life imprisonment.   

17. The fact remains that the appellant was not charged for  

the  offence  of  murder  under  Section  302  IPC  presumably  

because  during  investigation  no  materials  were  available  to  

establish  the  offence  under  Section  302  IPC  against  the  

appellant.   In  Smt.  Shanti  and  Another v.  State  of  Haryana  

[(1991) 1 SCC 371] cited by Mr. Sharma, this Court has held  

that where there is no evidence as to the actual part played by  

the accused, a minimum sentence of seven years would serve  

the  ends of  justice.   In the  present case,  since  there  is  no  

evidence as to the actual role played by the appellant in the  

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death  of  the  deceased,  a  punishment  of  ten  years’  

imprisonment would suffice in the ends of justice.

18. In  the  result,  the  appeal  is  partly  allowed  and  the  

sentence of life imprisonment imposed on the appellant under  

Section 304B IPC is reduced to ten years and the impugned  

judgment of the High Court is modified accordingly.  In case  

the  appellant  has  undergone  the  period  of  ten  years  

imprisonment,  he  shall  be  released  forthwith  unless  he  is  

wanted in any other case.         

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.  1411       of 2010  (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4389 of 2004)

Leave granted.  

2. This is an appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan against  

the  judgment  dated  07.10.2003  of  the  High  Court  of  

Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, in D.B. Criminal Appeal No.816 of  

1998 acquitting Jagdish and Gordhani of the charges under  

Sections 498A and 304B IPC.

3. The  only  contention  raised  by  Dr.  Manish  Singhvi,  

learned counsel for the State of Rajasthan, is that although  

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the  evidence  on  record  against  Amar  Singh,  Jagdish  and  

Gordhani  was the same, the High Court  took the view that  

Jagdish  and  Gordhani  have  been  implicated  because  they  

were members of Amar Singh’s family and that the charges  

against  them are not  proved beyond reasonable  doubt.   He  

vehemently submitted that no reasons whatsoever have been  

indicated  by  the  High  Court  in  the  impugned  judgment  to  

show how the cases of Jagdish and Gordhani were different  

from that of Amar Singh.  According to him, the High Court  

should have sustained the order of the trial court convicting  

Jagdish and Gordhani.

4. We are unable to accept this submission of Dr. Singhvi.  

The evidence of PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5 shows that Jagdish and  

Gordhani played a role in the demand of dowry of a Scooter or  

Rs.25,000/- for Amar Singh, but demand of dowry by itself is  

not  an  offence  under  Section  498A  or  Section  304B  IPC.  

What is punishable under Section 498A or Section 304B IPC is  

the act of cruelty or harassment by the husband or the relative  

of  the  husband  on  the  woman.  It  will  be  also  clear  from  

Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act that only when it is  

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shown  that  soon  before  her  death  a  woman  has  been  

subjected by any person to cruelty or harassment for,  or in  

connection  with,  any  demand  for  dowry,  the  Court  shall  

presume that such person had caused the dowry death within  

the meaning of  Section 304B IPC.   The act  of  subjecting  a  

woman to cruelty or harassment for,  or in connection with,  

any  demand  for  dowry  by  the  accused,  therefore,  must  be  

established by the prosecution for the Court to presume that  

the accused has caused the dowry death.   

5. PW-2  (father  of  the  deceased)  has  not  stated  in  his  

evidence before the Court that Jagdish and Gordhani, in any  

way,  subjected  the  deceased  to  any  harassment  or  cruelty.  

PW-4 (mother of the deceased), however, has stated that the  

deceased used to complain about the demand of a Scooter by  

Girdhari and harassment by her mother-in-law Gordhani, but  

PW-4 has not stated what was the exact act of Gordhani by  

which  the  deceased  felt  harassed.   The  evidence  of  PW-5  

(brother of the deceased) is that whenever the deceased used  

to  come home she used  to  complain  that  her  in-laws have  

been  teasing  her  and  they  were  demanding  a  Scooter  or  

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Rs.25,000/-  for  a  shop  and  that  when  the  deceased  came  

home one month prior to her death, she complained that her  

mother-in-law and all other in-laws used to torture her and  

taunt her that she did not bring anything, but PW-5 has not  

described the exact conduct of the mother-in-law and other in-

laws  on  account  of  which  the  deceased  felt  tortured  and  

taunted.  On the other hand, the evidence of PW-4 is clear that  

Amar  Singh  used  to  taunt  her  that  she  has  come  from  a  

hungry house.  Thus, there was evidence in the case of Amar  

Singh about his exact conduct which caused harassment to  

the deceased but there was no such evidence in the case of  

Jagdish  and  Gordhani.   A  prosecution  witness  who  merely  

uses the word “harassed” or “tortured” and does not describe  

the  exact  conduct  of  the  accused which,  according  to  him,  

amounted to harassment or torture may not be believed by the  

Court in cases under Section 498A and 304B IPC.  For this  

reason,  the  High  Court  has  taken  a  view  that  the  charges  

against  Jagdish  and  Gordhani  have  not  been  established  

beyond  reasonable  doubt  and  that  their  case  is  

distinguishable from that of Amar Singh and that Jagdish and  

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Gordhani appear to have been implicated because they were  

members of Amar Singh’s family.   

6. In Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Others [(2000) 5 SCC  

207], this Court cautioned that in cases where accusations of  

dowry deaths are made, the overt acts attributed to persons  

other  than  the  husband  are  required  to  be  proved  beyond  

reasonable doubt and by mere conjectures and implications  

such relations cannot be held guilty for the offence relating to  

dowry  deaths.   In  the  aforesaid  case,  this  Court  further  

observed  that  a  tendency  has  developed  for  roping  in  all  

relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of  

dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the  

case of the prosecution even against the real culprits.  

7. We,  therefore,  do  not  find  any  substance  in  the  

contention  of  Dr.  Singhvi  that  the  High  Court  should  have  

sustained  the  conviction  of  Jagdish  and  Gordhani  and  we  

accordingly dismiss this appeal.      

……………………..J.                                                                   (R. M. Lodha)

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……………………..J.                                                                   (A. K. Patnaik) New Delhi, August 03, 2010.    

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