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PETITIONER: AMAR SINGH AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RANA BALBAHADUR SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/01/1966

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. SIKRI, S.M. RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1966 AIR 1624            1966 SCR  (3) 423

ACT: Madhya  Pradesh  Land Revenue Code, 1954 s.  185(1)  and  s. 185(3)  read with s. 168(2)-lease of ryotwari land prior  to commencement  of Act--Bhumiswami minor on date of lease  but not  at  commencement of Act--Whether belonged to  class  of disabled  persons within the meaning of s.  168(2)-Therefore whether lessee became occupancy tenant under s. 185(1).

HEADNOTE: In  1936, certain ryotwari lands belonging to the estate  of the respondent in Madhya Bharat were leased for  cultivation to the appellants’ father M by the Court of Wards which  was in  management  of  the estate.  After the  Court  of  Wards released  the estate in 1951 the respondent  terminated  the tenancy and instituted a suit for a decree in ejectment  and for  mesne profits.  The trial Court passed a decree in  the respondent’s favour and this was confirmed in appeal by  the District Court as well as by the High Court. It  was contended on, behalf of the appellants that  on  the coming  into force of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue  Code, 1954,  M  acquired the status of an occupancy tenant  as  he held  land  of the nature described by s.  185(1).   On  the other  hand  it was the respondent’s  contention  that  even though a ryotwari sub-lessee might acquire the status of  an occupancy  tenant;  the  tenant M was  disentitled  to  that status  since  at  the  commencement  of  the  tenancy   the respondent, was subject to a disability of the character set out  in  s. 168(2).  Accordingly, the case fell  within  the exception  to  s.  185(1) provided in  sub-s.  (3)  of  that section. HELD.  By virtue of s. 185(1), M became an occupancy  tenant of  the land when the Code was brought into  operation;  the appeal  must therefore be allowed and the respondent’s  suit dismissed. [426 E] For the exemption from the operation of s. 185(1) to  apply, it  had  to  be  established  that  the  respondent  at  the commencement  of  the code belonged to the  disabled  class. Although being a minor he belonged to the disabled class  at the  time when the lease w ; granted, he did not  belong  to

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the disabled class at the commencement of the Code.  What is decisive for the operation of the exemption under s.  185(3) read with s.   168(2)  is the status at the commencement  of the code. [425 E] Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramgopal [1966] 3 S.C.R. 427, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 354 of 1965 Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated December  18, 1962 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court  (Indore Bench) in Second Appeal No.77 of 1960. B R. L. lyengar, G. L. Sanghi and A.’ G. Ratnaparkhi for the appellants. MIC-Sup.C.I./66-14 424 S.   N.  Andley,  Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for  the respondent. B.   R. L. Iyengar, G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi,  for intervener No. 1. J.   B.  Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder  Narain,  for intervener No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah,  J.  In  1936 certain home farm land  in  Mouza  Belam Bujurg,  Paragana Burwaha, of the estate of  the  respondent were  leased for cultivation to one Mangtya by the Court  of Wards  which was in management of the estate.  The Court  of Wards released the estate on June 14, 1951.  The  respondent thereafter  terminated the tenancy and instituted a suit  in the Court of Civil Judge, Class 11, Burwaha, against Mangtya for a decree in ejectment and for mesne profits.  The  Trial Court  decreed  the suit for possession  and  awarded  mesne profits  at the rate of Rs. 300/per annum from the  date  of the  decree till delivery of possession.  The decree  passed by  the Trial Court was confirmed in appeal by the  District Court, Nimar, and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.  Sons of Mangtya, who died after the judgment of this High Court have preferred this appeal with special leave. The land in dispute is ryotwari land and Mangtya was a ryot- wari  sub-lessee of the land.  It was contended  before  the High  Court in Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramchandra &  Others’  that even  though  a ryotwari sub-lessee of land  in  the  Madhya Bharat region may ordinarily acquire under s. 185 (1)(ii)(b) on  the commencement of the Code the status of an  occupancy tenant,  the tenant Mangtya was disentitled to  that  status since at the commencement of the tenancy the respondent  was subject  to  a  disability of the character set  out  in  S. 168(2).   The High Court upheld the plea of the  respondent; they  held  that  the  expression "holds  the  land  from  a Bumiswami who belongs to any one or mor of the classes" pre- dicates  two  conditions-that the land is held by  a  tenant under  a Bhumiswami, and that at the co ormmencement of  the tenancy the landlord who subsequently acqured the status  of a  Bhumiswami  belonged to any one or more  of  the  classes mentioned in sub-s. (2)  of s. 168 of the Code. The  only  question  which falls to be  determined  in  this appeal  is whether under S. 185 (3) of  the,  Madhya-Pradesh Land  Revenue Code the tenant Mangtya was disqualified  from claiming  the status of an occupancy tenant.  By S.  151  of the  Code there was to be in the State of Madhya  Pradesh  a single  class of tenure holders of land held from the  State to be known as Bhumiswami.  The (1)  L. P. A. No. 14 of 1961 decided on Sgt. 24, 1962. 425

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respondent  may  be by virtue of S. 158(b) deemed  to  be  a Bhumiswami.   The rights of a Bhumiswami under the Code  are heritable,  but in the matter of transfer inter  vivos  they are  subject  to restrictions prescribed by ss. 165  &  168. Land  comprised  in the holding of a Bhumiswami may  not  by virtue of s. 168(1) be transferred by way of a lease, except in the conditions mentioned in sub-ss. (2) & (3) of S.  168. A  Bhumiswanii  subject to one or more of  the  disabilities mentioned  in sub-s. (2) may grant a lease of  his  holding. It  has to be noticed that the provisions which  create  the tenure  of  a Bhumiswami and the  restrictions  thereon  are prospective.   We  have held in Appeal No. 365  of  1965-Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramgopal(1)-that a person whose tenancy rights were determined before the commencement of the Code will  be invested with the status of an occupancy tenant provided he. holds land of the nature described in sub-s. (1) of s.  185. But  upon this rule is engrafted an exception by sub-s.  (3) of S. 185 that nothing in sub-s. (1) shall apply to a person who  at the commencement of the Code holds the land  from  a disabled Bhumiswami. At the commencement of the Code the respondent acquired  the tenure  of a Bhumiswami under S. 158(b) of the Code, but  it cannot  be said that the respondent "belongs to any  one  or more of the classes mentioned in sub-section (2) of  section 168".  For the exemption from the operation of S. 185(i)  it had   to   be  established  that  the  respondent   at   the commencement  of the Code "belongs" to the  disabled  class. He  undoubtedly  did belong to the disabled class  when  the lease was granted, but not at the commencement of the  Code, and  what  is decisive for the operation  of  the  exemption under  sub-s.  (3)  is  the  status  of  Bhumiswami  at  the commencement  of  the Code.  By S.  168(2)  the  prohibition against  a Bhumiswami against transfer by way of a lease  of the land comprised in his holding is inoperative, where  the Bhumiswami  is  subject  to  any  one  of  the  disabilities mentioned in cls. (i) to (ix) of sub-s. (2).  That provision is  undoubtedly prospective.  The Legislature has by  sub-s. (3)  of  S.  185 prohibited  the  acquisition  of  occupancy tenancy rights by a tenant of ’a Bhumiswami who was when the Code  came  into force subject to any  of  the  disabilities mentioned in s. 168 (2).  It is clear from the terms of sub- s. (2) of S. 168 proviso 2 that a lease made by a Bhumiswami who is subject to a disability remains valid only during the disability  and  one year after the  determination  of  that disability,  by  death  or  otherwise.   Therefore  a  lease created by a Bhumiswanii, even if he was at the date when he created  the  lease  subject to a  disability  would  become invalid on the termination of the disability and a period of one year thereafter.  By sub-s. (4) of S.    168    it    is provided that a lease granted in pursuance of sub-ss. (2) or (3)  shall  be held on such terms and conditions as  may  be agreed upon between the lessee and the Bhumiswami and it  is further (1) [1966] 3 S. C.R. 427 426 provided by sub-s. (5) that on the coming into force of  the Code  where any land is held on lease from a Bhumiswami  who belongs to any one or more of the classes mentioned in  sub- s.  (2) such lease shall, on the coming inito force  of  the Code, be deemed to be a lease granted in. pursuance of  sub- s.  (2).   The  lease  granted  by  a  person  who  on   the commencement of the Code acquires the status of a Bhumiswami is  therefore deemed to be a lease granted in  pursuance  of sub-s.  (2)  of s. 168, if the Bhumiswami "belongs"  to  the class  mentioned in sub (2).  Reading s. 185(3) with s.  168

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(2)  and  s. 168 (5) it is clear that to  attract  exclusion from the operation of s. 185 (1) the Bhumiswami must, at the commencement  of  the  Code, be subject  to  the  disability mentioned in sub-s. (2) of s. 168.  What is determinative is not the existence of disability at the date of the grant  of the  lease  before  the commencement of the  Code,  but  the disability  of  the Bhumiswami at the  commencement  of  the Code. On  the date on which the Code was brought into  force,  the respondent was not a Bhumiswami belonging to any one or more of  the classes mentioned in sub-s. (2) of s. 168,  and  the exception provided by s. 185 (3) will not apply.  It is true that  the respondent was a minor at the time when the  lease was  granted by the Court ,of Wards.  But he ceased to be  a minor  in  1951.   By  virtue of  s.  185  (1)  the  tenant, notwithstanding  the  institution  of the  suit,  became  an occupancy tenant of the land when the Code was brought  into operation and the mere fact that the respondent was a  minor at  the  date  of the lease did not  prevent  the  statutory acquisition of the status of an occupancy tenant by  Mangtya under s. 185(1). The  appeal must therefore be allowed and the decree  passed by  the  High  Court  set aside.   The  suit  filed  by  the respondent will :stand dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs-throughout. Appeal allowed 427