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PETITIONER: AMAR CHANDRA CHAKRABORTY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COLLECTOR OF EXCISE, GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/05/1972

BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) RAY, A.N. PALEKAR, D.G. BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH

CITATION:  1972 AIR 1863            1973 SCR  (1) 533  1972 SCC  (2) 442  CITATOR INFO :  R          1975 SC 360  (22)  R          1975 SC1121  (46,53)  R          1980 SC 614  (15)  RF         1988 SC 771  (5)  RF         1990 SC1927  (28)  F          1991 SC 506  (9)

ACT: Bengal    Excise   Act,   1909,   s.    43--Withdrawal    of licence--Collector whether has power to withdraw licence  to sell liquor-Principle of ejusdem generis, application  of-S. 43  whether  violative  of Ar.  14  of  Constitution-Section whether  requires separate order withdrawing  licence  after expiry of notice period-Show cause notice whether necessary- Natural  justice requirements of-S. 43 whether violates  Art 19  of Constitution Grant of licence without  public  notice under s. 22(1) of Act whether valid.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was granted a licence on March 13, 1968 by the Excise  Collector to establish a warehouse for’ the  storage in  bond and wholesale vend of country spirit by import  and for supply to the excise vendors in the territory of Tripura for five years commencing April 1, 1968 and ending March 31, 1973.   The mode of granting the licence was  criticised  by the  Committee  of Estimates.  As a result the  Governor  of Tripura  on  July 2, 1970 inserted r. 164-A in  the  Tripura Excise  Rules  of  1962 whereby fees  for  licence  for  the wholesale  vend of country spirit were required to be  fixed by tender-cum-auction.  On July 6, 1970 the Excise Collector exercising  his power under s. 43 of the Bengal Excise,  Act 1909 as extended to the Union Territory of Tripura  withdrew the  licence granted to the appellant after 15 days’  notice and remission of 15 days fee.  The appellant challenged  the Excise Collector’s order in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.   The  Judicial  Commissioner  dismissed   the petition. Intr alia the Judicial Commissioner held that  the licence granted to the appellant was invalid because it  was granted without public notice as required by the proviso  to

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s.  22(1)  of the Act.  In appeal by special  leave  it  was contended  by  the appellant that (i) the Collector  had  no power to pass the impugned order; (ii) the words "any  cause other  than" in s. 43 must be read ejusdem generis with  the causes in mentioned in s. 42; (iii) s. 43 was arbitrary  and violative  of Art. 14 of the Constitution; (iv)the terms  of s. 43 had not been complied with; (v) the impugned order was passed  without a show cause notice and was against  natural justice;  (vi)  s. 43 being arbitrary  imposed  unreasonable restrictions on the appellant’s right to carry on business. HELD : (i) Under s. 22, Sub-s. (1) the Chief Commissioner is no  doubt  given  the  power  of  granting  the:   exclusive privilege  of  manufacturing and selling country  liquor  or ’intoxicating  drugs as mentioned in clauses (a) to (e)  but subs. (2) of this section in express terms provides that no, grantee of any privilege under sub-s. (1) shall exercise the same  unless or until he has received a licence in that  be- half from the Collector or the Excise Commissioner.  In view of this provision it is obvious that it is the Collector who grants the licence 534 within the contemplation of s. 43 and therefore it was  this very  officer  who  rightly  granted  the  licence  to   the appellant and is empowered to withdraw the licence under  s. 43. [538 F-G] (ii)The  ejusdem  generis  rule strives  to  reconcile  the incompatibility  between specific and general  words.   This doctrine   applies   when  (1)  the  statute   contains   an enumeration  of  specific words; (2) the  subjects  ,of  the enumeration constitute- a class or category; (3) that  class or  ,category is not exhausted by the enumeration;  (4)  the general  term  follows the enumeration and (5) there  is  no indication  of  a  different  legislative  intent.   In  the present case it was not easy to construe the various clauses of s. 42 as constituting one category or class.  But that .- apart  the very language of the two sections 42 and  43  and the  object intended to be achieved by them  also,  negative any  intention  of the legislature to attract  the  rule  of ejusdem generis.  Therefore the expression ’any cause  other than’  in s. 43(1) could not be considered  ejusdem  generis with  the causes specified in clauses (a) to (g)  of  42(1). [540 F-H] (iii)Trade  or business in country liquor has from  its inherent  nature, been treated by the State and the  society as  a special category requiring legislative  control  which has  been  in  force in the whole  of  India  since  several decades.     In   view   of   the   injurious   effect    of excessive  .consumption  of liquor on health this  trade  or business must be treated as a class by itself and it  cannot be  treated  on  the  same  basis  as  other  ’trades  while considering Art.. 14. [541 A-B] (iv)The  submission that a separate order  withdrawing  the licence  after the expiry of 15 days period from  the  order dated  July  6, 1970 was necessary could  not  be  accepted. Section  43 does not provide for ,any such  procedure.   All that  this section contemplates is that ever  the  authority concerned considers that the licence should be withdrawn for any  cause  other  than  those specified in  s.  42  it  may withdraw the same but to do so it must remit a sum equal  to the amount of fees payable in respect of the licence for  15 days.   It  was  not complained that  this  amount  was  not remitted in the present case. [541 C--D] (v)The order dated July 6, 1970 could not be attacked on the ground that a show cause notice was not given.  The contents of this order show that the appellant had ample  opportunity

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of  showing cause against the intention of the Collector  to withdraw  the  licence from September 1,  1970.   Rules  of natural  justice  vary  with the  varying  constitutions  of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the legislature ,under which they have to act and the question whether in  a particular  case  the  rules of natural  justice  have  been contravened  must be judged not by any preconceived  opinion of  what  they  may be but in the  light  ,of  the  relevant statutory provisions.  Applying this test the impugned order could not be considered to violate any principle of  natural justice. Gullapalli  Nageswara  Rao  v.  A.P.  State  Road  Transport Corporation,  [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 319 and K. K. Narula  v. State of J.    & K., [1967] 3 S.C.R. 50 referred to. (vi)It  is no doubt true that in s. 43 there is no  express mention  of  the precise grounds on which a licence  may  be withdrawn.  But keeping in view ’the nature of the trade or business  for which the grant of licence under ’the  Act  is provided the cause contemplated by s. 43 must be such as may have  reasonable  nexus with the object of  regulating  this trade or business in the general interest of the Public.  In                             535 the determination of reasonableness of restrictions on trade or business regard must be had to its nature, the conditions prevailing in it and its, impact on the society as a  Whole. Art.  47 of our Constitution directs the State to  endeavour to prohibit consumption of intoxicating drinks, and of drugs which are injurious to health except for medicinal purpose. The  cause  for withdrawing the appellant’s licence  was  in terms  of a major policy decision of the Tripura  Government and this was a cause which while keeping in view the purpose and  object  of  granting  such.  exclusive  privileges  and licences could not be considered to be either irrelevant  or collateral to that purpose and object. [543 B-E] K.K. Narula v. The State of J. & K. [1967] 3 S.C. R.  60, referred to. (vii)The  public notice under s. 22(1) is  a  condition precedent to the grant of the exclusive privilege of selling liquor.   The underlying policy of s. 22 seems to be not  to allow such an important matter to. be decided in the secrecy of office without giving it publicity.  Failure to give such public  notice  was  therefore  rightly  considered  by  the Judicial  Commissioner  to  be fatal to  the  grant  of  the exclusive privilege to the appellant. [544 G-545 A] The appeal must accordingly be dismissed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1063 of 1971. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated June  25,  1971 of the Court of  Judicial  Commissioner  for Tripura in Civil Matter No. 2 of 1970. A. K. Sen and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant. Govind Das and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua,  J.  This appeal is by special  leave.   The  appellant assails  the  order of the  Judicial  Commissioner,  Tripura dated  June 25, 1971 dismissing his petition under Art.  226 of  the Constitution challenging the order of the  Collector of Excise, Tripura, dated July 5, 1970. The  appellant was granted licence for the period  April  1, 1963 to March 31, 1966 for running a warehouse for supply of country  liquor  to  excise  vendors  in  the  territory  of Tripura.   The Bengal Excise Act, 1909  (hereinafter  called

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the  Act) had been extended to that territory on  August  1, 1962.  The appellant’s licence was subsequently extended for a  further  period of two years ending March  31,,1968.   On November  6,  1967  the  appellant  applied  to  the  Excise Collector  praying that he should be permitted  to  continue the  supply  of country liquor for a period  of  five  years commencing  April  1, 1968.  The Collector  recommended  the appellant’s case to the Government on November 18, 1967  for extension  of his licence for a further period of  only  two years.  On 536 December 22 1967 the Collector of Excise, Tripura,  Agartala wrote  to  the appellant that he had been appointed  by  the Chief  Commissioner a contractor for the supply  of  country liquor  to the excise vendors for the territory  of  Tripura for five years i.e., from 1-4-68 to 31-3-73 at the  existing rate i.e., Rs. 2.25 only being the cost of one L.P. litre of country  liquor of 40 U.P. strength for sale to  the  excise vendors"  of  that territory from the Central  Warehouse  at Agartala.   On ’January 13, 1963 the appellant was asked  by the Collector of Excise to deposit Rs. 1,000/as security and Rs. 2,500/- as licence fee for five years at the rate of Rs. 5001-  per  year.   On  March 13,  1968  the  appellant  was accordingly  granted a licence to establish a warehouse  for the storage in bond and wholesale vend of country spirit  by import and for supply to the excise vendors in the territory of  Tripura  for  five years commencing April  1,  1968  and ending  March  31,  1973.   It was  granted  by  the  Excise Collector. The  Committee of Estimates in their Fifth Report about  the working of Excise Department in the territory of Tripura  in general  and about the procedure adopted in giving  contract to  the appellant for a period of five years from  1968  to. 1973  in  particular made some adverse  observations  critic sing the method of appointment by means of selection because this  method  according to the report,  left  loopholes  for corruption.  As a result of this report the Lt. Governor  of Tripura  on  July 2, 1970 inserted r. 164-A in  the  Tripura Excise  Rules of 1962 in exercise of the power conferred  by s.  86  of  the Act.  According to the now  rule,  fees  for licence  for  the  wholesale vend  of  country  spirit  were required to be fixed by tender-cum-auction.  On July 6, 1970 the  Excise  Collector  issued the following  order  to  the appellant :                    "GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA           OFFICE OF THE COLLECTOR OF EXCISE No. 810/DM/EX/5(19)/70-71 dated, Agartala the 6-7-1970 Whereas  it  has been decided by the Government  of  Tripura that the licenses for the wholesale of country spirit  shall hence  forwards  be  granted by the  method  of  tender-cum- auction  and  to different persons for  different  specified areas  as far as practicable, instead of the present  system of  selection  of one licensee for the  whole  territory  of Tripura, in the interests of excise revenue. And  whereas  1,  Sri Omesh  Saigal,  Collector  of  Excise, Tripura  consider that for the aforesaid reason the  license               no.   1 dated the 13th March, 1968  issued  to               Sri Amar Chandra Chakraborty for the wholesale               vend                             537 of  Country   spirit in the Union Territory of  Tripura  for the,  period from the 1St April, 1968 to 31 St  March,  1973 should be withdrawn. Now,  therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred  on  me

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under  Section 43  of  the  Bengal  Excise,  Act,  1909,  as               extended  to the Union Territory  of  Tripura,               remit  a sum of Rs. 20.84 equal to the  amount               of  the  fees payable in respect of  the  said               license  for  15  days  and  hereby  give  the               licensee  15 days’ notice of my  intention  to               withdraw  the said license and order that  the               said license be withdrawn with effect from 1st               September, 1970. Any  fee paid in advance or deposit made by the licensee  in respect thereof shall be refunded to him after deducting the amount, if any due to the Government. Sd/- Omesh Saigal 5-7-70 Collector of Excise." Feeling aggrieved the appellant challenged this order in the court  of  the  Judicial Commissioner by  means  of  a  writ petition  under  Art.  226 of  the  Constitution  which  was dismissed by the impugned order. The order of the Collector dated July 6, 1970 was challenged by   the  appellant  on  a  number  of  grounds,   including invalidity of s.    43  of the Act and r. 164A of the  Rules framed thereunder.  The learned Judicial Commissioner in  an exhaustive  order came to the conclusion that the  appellant had been given a contract for five years on the basis of his application dated November 6, 1967 without issuing a  public notice  as required by the proviso to S. 22(1) of  the  Act. This  violation of the statutory provision  invalidated  the contract or the privilege of selling country liquor  secured by  the appellant.  According to the  Judicial  Commissioner this  ground  by itself was enough for throwing out  of  the appellant’s writ petition.  The contention that s. 43 of the Act  does  not envisage withdrawal by the Collector  of  the licence  pertaining to, the privilege granted by  the  Chief Commissioner  of  Tripura under s. 22 of the  Act  was  also negatived by the Judicial Commissioner as in his opinion the Collector who had issued the licence was fully competent  to withdraw  the  same.   Similarly  challenge  to  the   cons- titutionality  of s. 43 of the Act was repelled and  it  was held   that   this   section   merely   imposes   reasonable restrictions in the matter of trade in liquor.  The argument that 15 days’ notice as contemplated by s. 43 of the Act had not  been  given was also rejected because in  the  Judicial Commissioner’s opinion notice had actually been given to the appellant but he had not cared to avail of it as 538, he  never  approached  against the  action  withdrawing  the licence.   Rule 164A was held to be intra vires  and  within the terms of s. 86 of the Act. In this Court the principal contention raised by Shri A.  K. Sen,  on behalf of the appellant, is that s. 43 of  the  Act contemplates  a show cause notice which has not  been  given and  that  in any event this section clothes  the  authority granting the licence with unguided and uncanalised power  to withdraw the licence and is, therefore, violative of Art. 14 and also Art. 19 of the Constitution as it encroaches on the appellant’s  fundamental  right  of  carrying  on  trade  or business. Shri  Sen further submitted that the authority granting  the licence was the Chief Commissioner but the order dated  July 6,  1970 was issued by the Collector of Excise.   The  order withdrawing  the licence, according to the  learned  counsel could only be made by the authority granting the licence and that  too  after the expiry of 15 days.  The  counsel  added that   withdrawal  of  licence  virtually  amounts  to   its

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forfeiture with the result that the provisions dealing  with such withdrawal calls for a strict construction. The  contention that the authority granting the licence  was the Chief Commissioner and, therefore, the notice issued  by the  Collector  of Excise is bad, cannot be  accepted.   The licence  dated March 13, 1968 was issued from the office  of the  Collector  of Excise, Agartala and was signed  by  that officer.   Even in the appellant’s writ petition in para  15 there  is an express averment that the licence  dated  March 13,  1968  had  been  issued under  the  signatures  of  the Collector of Excise, Tripura.  No doubt, it is added in  the same  paragraph that the Collector is not the  authority  to exercise  power under s. 43 of the Act but  this  submission has not been substantiated at the bar and is contrary to the statutory  provisions.  Under s. 22, sub-s. (1),  the  Chief Commissioner  is  no doubt given the power of  granting  the exclusive  privilege  of manufacturing and  selling  country liquor or intoxicating drugs as mentioned in cls. (a) to (e) but  sub-s.  (2) of this section in express  terms  provides that  no  grantee of any privilege under  sub-s.  (1)  shall exercise the same unless or until he has received a  licence in  that  behalf from the Collector or  the  Excise  Commis- sioner.  In view of this provision it is obvious that it  is the   Collector   who   grants  the   licence   within   the contemplation  of  s. 43 and, therefore, it  was  this  very officer who rightly granted the licence to the appellant and is empowered to withdraw the licence under s. 43. As  sec.  43 provides for withdrawal of a  licence  for  any cause  other  than those specified in s. 42 of  the  Act  we consider  it proper to reproduce both these sections.   They read 539 "42.  Power to cancel or suspend license, permit or  pass. (1)’ Subject to such restrictions as the Chief  Commissioner may prescribe, the authority who granted any license, permit or pass under this Act may cancel or suspend it- (a)  if  it is transferred or sublet by the  holder  thereof without the permission of the said authority; or (b)  if any duty or fee payable by the holder thereof be not duly paid; or (c)  in the event of any breach by the holder thereof, or by any of his servants, or by any one acting on his behalf with his  express or implied permission, of any of the  terms  or conditions thereof; or (d)  if  the  holder  thereof is convicted  of  any  offence punishable  under  this Act or any other law  for  the  time being  in  force relating to revenue, or of  any  cognizable and.  non-bailable  offence, or of  any  offence  punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930, (II of 1930), or  under the  Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958),  or under any section which has been introduced into the  Indian Penal Code by Section 3 of that Act (Act XLV of 1860); or (e)  if  the  holder  thereof is punished  for  any  offence referred  to in clause 8 of section 167 of the  Sea  Customs Act, 1878 (VIII of 1878); or (f)  where a licence, permit or pass has been granted on the application of the holder of an exclusive privilege  granted under  section  22, on the requisition in  writing  of  such holder; or (g)  if  the  conditions of the license, permit  or  pass:,. provide for such cancellation or suspension at Will. (2),  When  a license permit or pass held by any  person  Is cancelled  under  clause  (.a),  clause  (b),  clauser  (c), clause’  (d) or clause (e) of sub-section (1) the  authority

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aforesaid  may  cancel  any other licence,  permit  or  pass granted to such person by, or by the authority of" the Chief Commissioner  under this Act, or ’under the Opium Act,  1878 (1 of 1878). ,1286Sup.Cl/72 540 (3)The  holder of a license, permit or pass shall  not  be entitled  to  any  compensation  for  its  cancellation   or suspension  under this section, or to the refund of any  fee paid or deposit made in respect thereof. 43.Power to withdraw licenses.-(1) Whenever the  authority who  granted any license under this Act considers  that  the license  should be withdrawn for any cause other than  those specified  in section 42, it shall remit a sum equal to  the amount  of the fees payable in respect thereof  for  fifteen days, and may withdraw the license either- (a)  on the expiration of fifteen days’ notice in writing of its intention to do so, or (b)  forthwith, without notice. (2)  If any license be withdrawn under clause (b) of sub-section  (1), the said authority shall, in  addition  to remitting  such sum as aforesaid, pay to the  licensee  such further sum (if any), by way of compensation, as the  Excise Commissioner may direct. (3)When a license is withdrawn under sub-section (1),  any fee  paid  in advance, or deposit made by  the  licensee  in respect thereof shall be refunded to him after deducting the amount (if any) due to the Government." Before  dealing with the contention relating to Art.  19  we consider it proper to dispose of the argument founded on the ejusdem  generis rule and Art. 14 of the  Constitution.   It was  contended by Shri Sen that the only way in which s.  43 can  be  saved  from the challenge of  arbitrariness  is  to construe  the expression "any cause other than" in s,  43(1) ejusdem generis with the causes specified in cll. (a) to (g) of  s. 42 (1).  We do not agree with this  submission.   The ejusdem    generis    rule,strives    to    reconcile    the incompatibility  between specific and general  words.   This doctrine   applies   when  (i)  the  statute   contains   an enumeration  of  specific words; (ii) the  subjects  of  the enumeration  constitute  a class or  category-,  (iii)  that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;  (iv) the general term follows the enumeration and (v) there is no indication  of  a  different  legislative  intent.   In  the present case. it is not easy to construe the various clauses of  S. 42 as constituting one category or class.   But  that apart, the very language of the two sections and the objects intended  respectively to be achieved by them also  negative any  intention  of the legislature to attract  the  rule  of ejusdem generis. Trade  or business in country liquor has from  its  inherent nature  been  treated  by the State and  the  society  as  a special category 541 requiring legislative control which has been in force in the whole  of  India  since several decades.   In  view  of  the injurious  effect  of  excessive consumption  of  liquor  on health this trade or business must be treated as a class  by itself  and it cannot be treated on the same basis as  other trades  while  considering Art. 14. this  classification  is founded  on  an intelligible differentia having  a  rational relation to the object to be achieved by the control imposed on the trade or business in country liquor.  Art. 14, it may be   pointed  out,  only  forbids  class   legislation   but reasonable   classification   does  not  come   within   the prohibition.   Nothing  convincing was urged at the  bar  to

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attract the prohibition embodied in Art. 14. The submission that a separate order withdrawing the licence after  the  expiry of 15 days’ period from the  order  dated July  6,  1970 was necessary has also not appealed  to  us. Section  43 does not provide any such procedure.   All  that this  section  contemplates is that whenever  the  authority concerned considers that the licence should be withdrawn for any  cause  other  than  those specified in  s.  43  it  may withdraw the same but to do so it must remit a sum equal  to the amount of fees payable in respect of the licence for  15 days.   It  is  not  complained that  this  amount  was  not remitted as required.  Now if the licence is withdrawn under s. 43 (1 ) (a) on the expiration of 15 days’ written  notice of  the authority’s intention to do so then nothing  further need be done.  It is only when the licence is desired to  be withdrawn forthwith without notice as contemplated by s.  43 (1 ) (b) that the authority is under a further obligation to pay   compensation  as  may  be  directed  by   the   Excise Commissioner.  Here the licence stood withdrawn on September 1,  1970 as stated in the intimation contained in the  order dated July 6, 1970.  That intimation fully complies with the provisions of s. 4 3. The  argument  that no show cause notice was  given  to  the appellant   before  withdrawing  the  licence  is   equally. unacceptable for reasons just stated.  The section does  not contemplate  two separate notices.  The order dated July  6, 1970  also  clearly state, that 15 days’  notice  was  being given  to,’the  licensee  regarding  the  intention  of  the Collector  of Excise to withdraw his licence and it is  also specifically  mentioned in the order that the  said  licence would be withdrawn with- effect from September 1, 1970.  The fact that tinder the notice the licence was to be  withdrawn more  than  15 days after the date of the  notice  did  not cause  the appellant any prejudice and indeed  no  objection was  raised on this score.  The contents of this order  also quite clearly show that the appellant had ample  opportunity of showing- cause against the intention of the Collector  to withdraw  the  licence with effect from September  1,  1970. Rules  of natural justice on which the  appellant’s  counsel relied for his grievance vary with the varying consti- 5 4 2 tutions of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by  the legislature  under which they have to act and  the  question whether  in a particular case the rules of  natural  justice have been contravened must be judged not by any preconceived opinion of what they may be but in the light of the relevant statutory  provisions  : Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v.  A.  P. State Road Transport Corporation(1).  Applying this test  to the  present  case the order dated July 6, 1970  cannot  be, considered to violate any rule of natural justice. According  to  Shri Sen the business of  selling  liquor  is protected  by Art. 19 of the Constitution as  a  fundamental right and reliance for this submission has been placed on K. K. Narula v. The State of J & K(2).  This fundamental  right has  been illegally infringed, said the counsel.  It  is  no doubt  true  that  this Court in the case  cited  held  that dealing  in liquor is business and a citizen has a right  to do  business  in that commodity but it was  added  that  the State can make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the said  right in public interest.  In dealing with  reasonable restrictions  no  abstract standard or general  pat-tern  is possible to lay down.  In each case, regard has to be had to the  nature of trade or business, the conditions  prevailing in  such trade or business, the nature of  the  infringement alleged, and the underlying purpose of the restrictions the

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imposition   of   which  is  alleged   to   constitute   ant infringement. According  to  Shri  Sen  the licence  was  granted  to  the appellant  for  five years and withdrawal  of  this  licence before  ’die  expiry of five years has  caused  him  immense financial loss.  The licence was withdrawn without any fault on his part,.  Unreasonableness of’ the provision  contained in  S. 43, according to him, is manifest because it  permits the  licensing  authority to withdraw the  licence  for  any reason  whatsover  not falling under s. 42.  This  wide  and arbitrary  power  being unreasonable, is, violative  of  the appellant’s fundamental right under Art. 19.  Let us see  if this submission is, well-founded. Section 42 empowers the authority granting a licence, permit or  pass under the Act to cancel or suspend it  subject  to such   restrictions  as  may  be  imposed by   the   Chief Commissioner.    The   grounds  oh  which   the   order   of cancellation  or  suspension may be based are  contained  in cll.(a)  to (g) of sub-s.  Except for cll. (f) and  (g)  all other  clauses suggest’ some impropriety or default  on  the part of the licensee.  Clause (f) speaks of cancellation  or suspension on the written. requisition by the holder of  the exclusive   privilege  under  s.  22  and  cancellation   or suspension   under  cl.  (g)  is  in  accordance  with   the conditions  of  the licence,, pen-nit or pass  in  question. Sub-section (3) expressly negatives 1) [1959] SUPP.  1 S.C.R. 319.           (2) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 50. 5 4 3  the  right to, compensation and also to refund of  fee  and deposit.authority  granting  a  licence  under  the  Act  to withdraw the same for anycause    other   than    those specified in s. 42 on remitting a sum ,equal to  the  amount of fee payable for 15 days.  It is no doubt true that in  s, 43  there, is no express mention of the precise  grounds  on which  the  licence can be withdrawn.  But  in  our  opinion keeping  in  view the nature of the trade  or  business  for which  the  grant of licence under the Act is  provided  the cause  contemplated  by  s.  43 must be  such  as  may  have reasonable nexus with the object of regulating this trade or business  in  the general interest of the  public.   In  the determination of reasonableness of restrictions on      trade or business regard must be had to its nature, the conditions prevailing in it and its impact on the societ  as a whole.  These factors must inevitably differ from trade to trade   and  not  general  rule  governing  all  trades   or businesses  is possible to lay down.  The right to carry  on lawful  trade  or  business is subject  to  such  reasonable conditions  as  may be considered essentials by  the  appro- priate  authority for the safety, health, peace,  order  and morals  of  the  society.  Article 47  of  our  Constitution directs  the  State  to endeavour  to  prohibit  consumption intoxicating  drinks of drugs which are injurious to  health except  for  medicinal  purposes.  In the  case  of  country liquor,    therefore,    the   question    of    determining reasonableness  of  the  restriction  may  appropriately  be considered  by giving due weight to the increasing evils  of excessive consumption of country liquor in the interests  of health and social welfare.  Principles applicable to  trades which all persons carry on free from regulatory, controls do not  apply to trade or business in country liquor : this  is so because of the impact of this trade on society due to its inherent nature. In  the  present case, according  to  the  counter-affidavit after the   Committee of Estimates had in their Fifth Report

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criticised  the  working  of the Excise  Department  in  the territory of Tripura in general and the procedure adopted in granting five years licence to the appellant in  particular, the  Council  of  Minister,,,,  as  a  consequence  of  this criticism,   resolved  that  the  exclusive   privilege   of supplying countery liquor by wholesale should be allowed  to three     persons   and  not  to  one  and  that   also   by tender-cum-auction.  Pursuant to this decision r. 164A  was inserted  in the Tripura Excise Rules on July 2, 1970.   The Union  Territory  of Tripura was  accordingly  divided  into three  districts  for the purpose of licence  for  wholesale supply  of  country liquor with effect   from  September  1, 1970. .,It was for implementing this policy decision of  the State  Government  that  on july 6, 1970  the  Collector  of Excise informed the appellant by the impugned order that his licence would be withdrawn on september 1, 1970, at the same time  remitting  to him 15 days licence fee as  required  by statute. 544 The  Government then took steps to invite tenders and fix  a date  for  auction of. wholesale supply of  country  liquor. The  cause  for withdrawing the appellant’s  licence  is  in terms  of  the major policy decision taken  by  the  Tripura Government  and  this,  in our opinion, is  a  cause  which, keeping  in  view the purpose and object  of  granting  such exclusive  privileges and licences, cannot be considered  to be  either  irrelevant  or collateral to  that  purpose  and object.  The appellant had, it may be recalled, secured  his licence for the maximum period of five years as provided  by r.  22(4)  of the Tripura Excise Rules, 1962 for  a  nominal annual  sum.  On the withdrawal of the licence, fee  for  15 days was remitted to him and the fee paid in advance and the deposit  made were also directed to be refunded as  provided by s. 43(3). But  this apart, the learned Judicial Commissioner has  also held  in the judgment under appeal that since  the  contract for  five years had been given to the appellant in  complete violation of the statutory provision enacted in the  proviso to s. 22(1) of the Act he could not claim to be a holder  of any   valid  contract  or  of.  a  valid  conclusion.   Shri Mukherjee,   however,   did  make  a   faint   attempt   the conclusions   of  the  learned  Judicial   Commissioner   by submitting  that  the  appellant  was  not  aware  of   non- compliance  with the proviso to, s. 22 (1 ) of the  Act  and that he could not be penalised for any such  non-compliance. We are not impressed by this submission. Section  22  contemplates the grant of  exclusive  privilege which  amounts  to  a  virtual  monopoly  for  manufacturing supplying and selling at wholesale or retail country  liquor or  intoxicating  drugs  within  a  specified  local   area. Keeping  in  view  the  nature of  this  trade  or  business particularly the unhealthy effects of intoxicants on certain important  sections of the society it cannot be denied  that the  residents of the local area concerned would be  vitally interested  in the matter of grant of  exclusive  privileges and  licences  for sale of liquor  as  unless  appropriately regulated  such  trade  or business may prove  a  source  of nuisance  and  annoyance  to the persons  presiding  in  the vicinity.   It  is apparently in recognition of  this  vital interest of the residents of the locality that public notice of  the  intention  to grant  such  exelusive  privilege  is provided  so  that  objections  thereto,,  if  any,  may  be preferred   before  the  exclusive  privilege  is   actually granted.  The, public notice ’is thus a condition  precedent to the grant of exclusive privilege.  The underlying  policy

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of  s. 22 seems to be not to allow such an important  matter to  be  decided in the secrecy of office without  giving  it proper publicity.  All the conditions of the proposed  grant including  its duration are expected to be  notified.   Such notification  would  serve  also  to  eliminate  chances  of favouritism, nepotism and corruption.  Section 22 seems also to have its roots in these deeper considera-  545 tions.   Failure to give such public notice was,  therefore, in  our opinion, rightly considered by the learned  Judicial Commissioner  to  be fatal to the grant,  of  the  exclusive privilege  to  the appellant.  Nothing convincing  has  been said  at the bar against this view.  If non compliance  with the  proviso to s. 22 ( 1 ) is by itself fatal to the  grant of exclusive privilege than the impugned order dated July 6, 1970  is  sustainable  on this ground  alone  and  the  writ petition  was  thus rightly dismissed.  In any  event,  this ground, along with the others already noticed, would, in our opinion,  constitute,  a  good  cause  for  withdrawing  the licence  under s. 43 of the Act.  On this view the  impugned judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner does not  seem to us to be open to challenge particularly under Art. 136 of the  Constitution.   This appeal accordingly  fails  and  is dismissed with costs. G.C.                                                  Appeal dismissed 546