10 September 1999
Supreme Court
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ALLAHABAD BANK, CALCUTTA Vs RADHA KRISHNA MAITY

Bench: A.P.MISRA,M.J.RAO
Case number: C.A. No.-004999-004999 / 1999
Diary number: 12154 / 1998
Advocates: Vs SARLA CHANDRA


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PETITIONER: ALLAHABAD BANK, CALCUTTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RADHA KRISHNA MAITY AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       10/09/1999

BENCH: A.P.Misra, M.J.Rao

JUDGMENT:

M.  JAGANNADHA RAO,J.

Leave granted.

     The  Allahabad  Bank, Calcutta has filed  this  appeal against  the order of the Calcutta High Court dated  19.6.98 in C.O.  1238/98.  By that order passed under Article 227 of the  Constitution  of  India, the High Court set  aside  the order  dated 30.4.98 passed by the Presiding Officer,  Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta (under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, (Act No.51 of 1993) (hereinafter  called the ’Act’).  .pa The facts of the  case are  that  the Bank filed a suit under Section 19(1) of  the Act before the Tribunal on 27.3.97 for recovery of monies in a  sum of Rs.46.54 lakhs and odd from respondents 1 to 3 and for  other  reliefs.  Pending the case, the Bank applied  on 29.3.97   seeking  temporary   injunction  restraining   the respondents  from  taking  any  monies  or  sums  from  M/s. Braitewaite  and  Co.  When the advance copy of the  IA  was sought  to be served on the learned counsel for respondents, the  same was refused.  The Tribunal then passed an  interim order of injunction on 30.4.98 as follows:

     "In  the  meantime,  the respondents 1, 2  and  3  are restrained  from  recovering any money from M/s  Braitewaite and Co.  Ltd., till disposal of the interim matter".

     The   respondents   moved  the   High  Court,  in   an application  under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The  High  Court in its order dated 19.6.98 held that  under Section  19(6) the Tribunal had only limited powers to  pass interim  orders  of  certain types but that  the  injunction granted  was  not of the type enumerated in  Section  19(6). The  High Court, therefore, set aside the Tribunal’s  order. The  Bank  has  filed this appeal.  We  have  heard  learned counsel on both sides.  We shall first refer to the relevant statutory provisions.

     The  provisions of Sub-clause (6) of Section 19 of the Act read as follows:

     "Section  19(6):   The  Tribunal may make  an  interim order  (  whether by way of injunction or stay) against  the defendant  to  debar  him from transferring,  alienating  or

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otherwise  dealing  with, or disposing of, any property  and assets  belonging to him without any prior permission of the Tribunal".

     It will be noticed that the above provision in Section 19(6)  refers to certain types of injunction or stay  orders and the injunction order passed in this case is no doubt not one  of  the types mentioned in Section 19(6).  It  is  next necessary to refer to the important provisions in Sub-clause (1) and (2) of Section 22 of the Act and Rule 18 of the Debt Recovery  Tribunal  (  Procedure) Rules, 1993.   Section  22 reads as follows:

     "Section 22:  Procedure and Powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal-

     (1)  The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be  bound  by the procedure laid down by the Code  of  Civil Procedure,  1908  ( 5 of 1908), but shall be guided  by  the principles  of  natural  justice and, subject to  the  other provisions  of  this Act and of any rules, the Tribunal  and the  Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate  their own  procedure including the places at which they shall have their sittings;

     (2)  The  Tribunal  and the Appellate  Tribunal  shall have,  for the purposes of discharging their functions under this  Act,  the same powers as are vested in a  civil  court under  the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( 5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:-

     (a)  summoning  and  enforcing the attendance  of  any person and examining him on oath;

     (b)   requiring  the  discovery   and  production   of documents;

     (c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

     (d)  issuing  commissions  for   the  examination   of witnesses or documents;

     (e) reviewing its decisions;

     (f)  dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte;

     (g)  setting  aside  any  order of  dismissal  of  any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte;

     (h) any other matter which may be prescribed.

     Rule 18 of the Rules states as follows:

     "Rule 18:  Orders and directions in certain cases- The Tribunal may make such orders to give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent  abuse  of  its  process or to secure  the  ends  of justice.

     It  will be noticed that Section 22(1) deals with  the powers  of the Tribunal and Section 22(2) deals with certain specified  powers.  Rule 18 also deals with the power of the

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Tribunal to pass orders.

     In  a recent decision of this Court under this Act  in Industrial  Credit and Investment Corporation of India  Ltd. Vs.   Grapco  Industries Ltd.  and Ors.  (1994(4) SCC  710), this  Court  considered  the provisions of the Act  and  the powers  of  the Tribunal.  The question that arose  in  that case  was whether the Tribunal could pass an order  granting ex-  parte injunction.  In that context, reference was  made to  Section  22  of the Act.  This Court observed  that  the Tribunal’s  powers  were  ( except as stated  in  sub-clause (2)),  wider  than the powers of a Civil Court and the  only limitation  was that it should observe principles of natural justice.  Wadhwa,J.  stated as follows:  (P.716, para 11)-

     "We,  however, do not agree with the reasoning adopted by the High Court.  When Section 22 of the Act says that the Tribunal  shall  not be bound by the procedure laid down  by the  Code of Civil Procedure, it does not mean that it  will not  have  jurisdiction  to exercise powers of  a  Court  as contained  in  the  Code of Civil  Procedure.   Rather,  the Tribunal  can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure  and the  only fetter that is put on its powers is to observe the principles of natural justice."

     After  contrasting the provisions of the Act with  the restrictions  imposed  upon  certain other  Tribunals  under other statutes, this Court observed:  (P.717)-

     "It  will,  thus,  be  seen that while  there  are  no limitations on the powers of the Tribunal under the Act, the Legislature  has  thought fit to restrict the powers of  the authorities   under  various   enactments  while  exercising certain  powers  under  those enactments...   Further,  when power  is given to the Tribunal to make an interim order  by way  of injunction or a stay, it inheres in it the power  to grant  that order even ex parte, if it is so in the interest of justice...."

     It  is true that in the above case this Court was  not concerned with the power of the Tribunal to pass an order of injunction  or  stay (or an ex-parte interim order or  stay) other  than  the  type of injunction or stay  enumerated  in Sub-clause  (6)  of Section 19 of the Act.  But that in  our opinion makes no difference, for the following reasons.

     The scope and the extent of the powers of the Tribunal are  mainly  referred to in Sub-clause (1) of Section 22  of the  Act which says that the Tribunal shall not be bound  by the  procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure  but shall be guided by principles of natural justice.  As stated in  Grapco  by this Court, the Tribunal can exercise  powers contained  in  the Code of Civil Procedure and can  even  go beyond  the  Code as long as it passes orders in  conformity with principles of natural justice.  We may add that Section 19(6)  does  not in any manner limit the generality  of  the powers  of  the  Tribunal under Section  22(1).   It  merely states  that certain types of injunction or stay orders  may be  passed  by  the  Tribunal.  It is  to  be  noticed  that Sub-clause  (6)  of Section 19 starts with the words -  "The Tribunal  may make an interim order..." The provision is  an

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enabling  provision and merely states that certain types  of injunction or stay orders mentioned therein can be passed by the Tribunal but such an enumeration cannot, in our opinion, be  deemed  to be exhaustive nor restricting the  Tribunal’s powers  only  to those types of injunction or  stay  orders. The  width  and amplitude of the powers are to  be  gathered from  Section 22(1) as stated in Grapco.  In addition,  Rule 18 enables the Tribunal to pass orders to secure the ends of justice.   Thus,  we  are  of the  view  that  the  Tribunal certainly  has  powers  to pass other  types  of  injunction orders  or stay orders apart from what is stated in  Section 19(6).   It may issue notice and after hearing the  opposite side,  pass  orders.   Or,  it may pass  ad  interim  orders without hearing the opposite side and then give a subsequent hearing to the opposite party and pass final orders.  We may also  point  out that Section 22(2) too does not  limit  the general  powers  referred  to in Section  22(1).   All  that Section  22(2)  states  is that in respect of  the  type  of applications falling under (a) to (h), the Tribunal has only powers  as are vested in a Civil Court.  On the facts of the case  before us, we have already stated that the counsel for the  respondents refused to accept notice and that therefore the  Tribunal  proceeded to pass the impugned order.   Thus, the Tribunal had conformed to principles of natural justice. The  Tribunal was, therefore, very much within its powers in passing  the order in question.  The High Court,  therefore, erred  in  holding  that  the   Tribunal  had  exceeded  its jurisdiction  and its order is, therefore, liable to be  set aside.  A point was raised before us that a notice was given to  the  Bank about the death of one of the debtors  and  no steps  were  taken by the Bank in that behalf.   This  point does  not arise in this appeal.  It will be for the  parties to raise it before the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to deal with  the same, in accordance with law.  In the result,  the appeal  is  allowed and the order of the High Court  is  set aside  and the order of the Tribunal is restored.  We should not be understood as having stated anything on the merits of the interlocutory application or in regard to the main case. There will be no order as to costs.