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PETITIONER: ALL DELHI CYCLE RICKSHAW OPERATORS UNION ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/01/1987

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR  648            1987 SCR  (1) 905  1987 SCC  (1) 371        JT 1987 (1)    66  1987 SCALE  (1)1

ACT:     Delhi   Municipal   Corporation   Act,   1957,   section 481(1)(L)(5), scope of--Power to make bye law regulating the keeping or plying for hire a cycle rickshaw in Delhi--Wheth- er,  the Bye-law 3(1) of the Cycle Rickshaw  Bye-laws,  1960 restricting the number of licence to only one and the  grant only  to the owner of a cycle rickshaw either to keep or  to ply for hire, is within the scope of the power conferred  on the authority-Whether the said bye-law is opposed to Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

HEADNOTE:     Section  481(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation  Act, 1957 empowers the Corporation to make additional bye-laws to the existing ones. Under the power so conferred the Corpora- tion  introduced Byelaw No.3(i) in the Cycle -Rickshaw  Bye- laws, 1960, under which only an owner of the cycle  rickshaw can obtain a licence to keep a cycle rickshaw or to ply  for hire and only one such licence would be issued to a  person. By  necessary  implication  it excludes persons  who  own  a number  of  cycle rickshaws from applying for  licences  and prohibits the hiring out of the cycle rickshaw by the  owner in favour of a rickshaw puller against payment of considera- tion.     The Writ Petitioners are owners of cycle rickshaws. Some of them own two or more cycle rickshaws which are hired  out by them to rickshaw pullen under a contract under which  the rickshaw pullen have to pay some amount to the owners of the cycle rickshaws at the end of the day out of their  earnings during the day. Being aggrieved by the introduction of  Bye- law No.3(i), they have moved the Supreme Court under Article 32  of the Constitution that the said Bye-law is opposed  to Article  19(1)(g) of the Constitution and also  outside  the scope of section 481 (1)L(5) of the Delhi Municipal Corpora- tion Act, 1957. Dismissing the petitions, the Court, 906     HELD:  1.1 On a consideration of the language of  clause (5)  in section 481(1) L of the Delhi Municipal  Corporation Act,  1957, it is clear that Bye-law 3(1) falls  within  the scope  of  the power conferred on the Corporation  to  frame

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bye-laws  for  the issue of licences in  respect  of  cycle- rickshaws  which  are kept or used for plying in  the  Delhi Municipal Corporation area. While framing bye-laws under the above statutory provision it is permissible for the Corpora- tion to restrict the issue of licences only to the owners of the  rickshaws who themselves act as rickshaw pullers.  This is  apparently done to prevent exploitation of the  rickshaw pullen  by  the owners of the cycle rickshaws.  A  licensing authority  may impose any condition while issuing a  licence which is in the interest of the general public unless it  is either expressly or by necessary implication prohibited from imposing such a condition by the law which confers the power of licensing. The restriction imposed by the Corporation  in the  present case is in the interest of the general  public. [910C-E]     1.2  The Bye-law No.3(1) cannot therefore be said to  be either  outside the scope of section 481 of the  Corporation Act or opposed to the provisions of the Constitution. [911D]     Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union (Regd) Ch. Town Hall, Amrit- sar  & Ors. etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1981] 1  SCR366 and Nanhu & Ors. etc. v. Delhi Administration & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR 373, referred to.     Man Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1985] 4 SCC 146, followed.     (The Court approved the two schemes of financial assist- ance,  put forward, at its instance, by the Bank  of  Baroda and  the  State  Bank of India and the  willingness  of  the Credit  Guarantee  Corporation  of India  (Small  LOans)  to guarantee  the repayment of the loans advanced to the  rick- shaw pullers and directed, accordingly, the several branches of  the  Punjab National Bank, the Bank of  Baroda  and  the State  Bank  of India operating in Delhi to  give  financial assistance  to rickshaw pullers who wish to oWn cycle  rick- shaws and ply them under licences issued by the  Corporation subject to their producing the necessary eligibility certif- icate  issued  by the Corporation and satisfying  the  other terms of the Schemes, namely (i) the scheme for financial to cycle  rickshaw pullers; and (ii) self employment  programme for  urban poor (SEPUP). The court also directed  the  Delhi Administration to comply with the directions issued in Nanhu JUDGMENT: 907

& ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 13688 of 1983 etc. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) T.U. Mehta and S.M. Ashri for the Petitioners.     Dr. Y.S. Chitale, G.L. Sanghi, V.C. Mahajan, R.B. Datar, Miss  Bina Tamta, S.K. Mehta, M.K. Dua, Aman  Vachhar,  H.S. Parihar,  Vipin Chandra, G.D. Gupta, M.L. Kaicker  and  V.B. Saharya for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     VENKATARAMIAH,  J:  In these petitions  the  petitioners have  questioned  the validity of bye-law No.  3(1)  of  the Cycle-Rickshaw  Bye-Laws, 1960 framed under section  481  of the  Delhi  Municipal  Corporation  Act,  1957  (hereinafter referred as ’the Act’). Bye-law No. 3(1) reads as follows: "3(1).  No  person shall keep or ply for the  hire  a  cycle rickshaw in Delhi unless he himself is the owner thereof and holds  a licence granted in that behalf by the  Commissioner on payment of the fee that may, from time to time, be  fixed under sub-section (2) of section 430. Provided  that no person will be granted more than one  such

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licence. No  person shall drive a cycle rickshaw for hire  unless  he holds  a driving licence granted in that behalf by the  Com- missioner on payment of the fee that may, from time to  time be fixed under sub-section (2) of section 430."     The  petitioners are owners of cycle rickshaws. Some  of them own two or more cycle rickshaws which are hired out  by them  to rickshaw pullers under a contract under  which  the rickshaw  pullers have to pay some amount to the  owners  of the  cycle  rickshaws  at the end of the day  out  of  their earnings during the day. In order to eliminate the exploita- tion  of rickshaw pullers by the owners of the  cycle  rick- shaws  the  Delhi Municipal Corporation amended  the  Cycle- Rickshaw  Bye-laws, 1960 by introducing bye-law No.3.  Under that bye-law only the owner of the cycle rickshaw can obtain a licence to keep a cycle rickshaw or to ply 908 for  hire  and only one such licence would be  issued  to  a person. By necessary implication it excludes persons who own a  number of cycle rickshaws from applying for licences  and prohibits the hiring out of the cycle rickshaw by the  owner in favour of a rickshaw puller against payment of considera- tion. The contention of the petitioners is mainly  dependent upon section 48 1(I)L(5) of the Act which reads thus: "481(1). Subject to the provisions of this Act the  Corpora- tion may, in addition to any bye-laws which it is  empowered to make by any other provision of this Act, make bye-laws to provide for all or any of the following matters. namely:-  ...................................................... L. Bye-laws relating to miscellaneous matters--  ....................................................... (5). the rendering necessary of licences--           (a)  for  the proprietors or drivers  of  hackney- carriages;  cycle  rickshaws,  thelas and  rehires  kept  or plying for hire or used for hawking articles;  ..................................................."     It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the above provision in the Act does not permit the Corporation to make a  bye-law  which  prohibits the issue of  licences  to  the owners  of cycle-rickshaws who are not themselves  rickshaw- pullers.  It is also urged that the bye-law is violative  of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The respondentCorpora- tion contends that the impugned bye-law No. 3 is within  the scope  of the authority conferred on it by the Act  to  make the bye-law in question and that it is not opposed to  Arti- cle 19(1)(g). The  constitutional validity of a similar provision  in  the Punjab  Cycle-Rickshaws  (Regulation of Licence)  Act,  1976 (Punjab  Act  41 of 1975) came up for  consideration  before this  Court in Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union (Regd)  Ch,  Town Hail,  Amritsar  & Ors., etc. v. State of Punjab  &  Others, [1981]  1 SCR 366. In the course of its judgment  the  Court approved a scheme flamed for providing financial  assistance to the richshaw-pullers for acquiring cycle rickshaws. The 909 provision  of  the Act which was impugned in  that  petition was,  however, left untouched. On the same date  this  Court pronounced  another judgment in Nanhu & Ors., etc. v.  Delhi Administration  & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR 373 in which  the  very same bye-law with which we are concerned in these cases came up  for  consideration. That case was disposed  of  by  this Court by a short order which reads thus: "We have disposed of today applications from cycle  rickshaw pliers  of  Amritsar Municipality where a  scheme  has  been worked out to help them become owners of cycle rickshaws.  A

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similar scheme, says the Solicitor-General appearing for the Delhi Administration, will be extended to the Delhi territo- ry.  We,  therefore, annex a copy of the  judgment  in  Writ Petitions  Nos. 839 of 1979 and 563 of  1979--Azad  Rickshaw Pullers  Union,  Amritsar and others v. State  of  Punjab  & Others  and  Nanak Chand and Others v. State of  Punjab  and Others, respectively to this judgment. There is another problem which arises in these two cases and that  is that the Delhi Administration has put a ceiling  on the total number of cycle rickshaws permissible to be  plied within   its   territory  perhaps--we  do   not   know   for certain--this number may not accommodate all the  applicants for cycle rickshaws plying licencees. We are told that apart from  the applicants in this Court under Article 32  of  the Constitution,  there are numerous petitioners who  have  ap- proached  the High Court of Delhi under Article 226  of  the Constitution  and yet others who have filed suits  in  civil courts for the same relief. All that we can do is to  accept the  suggestion made by the learned  Solicitor-General  that the  Delhi  Administration will  effectively  publicize  and notify applications for licencees for plying of cycle  rick- shaws  and all those who apply will be considered  on  their merits including length of service as cycle rickshaw pliers. The  criteria that the Delhi Administration will adopt  must be reasonable and relevant; otherwise it will be open to the aggrieved parties to challenge the selection. Likewise we do not  want to fetter the rights of parties aggrieved  if  the ceiling  upon  the  total number  of  rickshaws  permissible within the Delhi territory is arbitrary. On the basis of reasOnable criteria the Delhi Administra- 910 tion  will  direct the concerned  Municipal  authorities  to grant licences for plying rickshaws and if the applicants so chosen are not owners themselves all the facilities we  have indicated  in  the Amritsar order will be extended  to  such cycle  rickshaw pliers fixing reasonable time  limits.  With these directions we dispose of the applications. Until fresh licences  are  issued by the Delhi  Administration  and  the Municipal  authorities the present petitioners will  be  al- lowed to ply their cycle rickshaws."     It is clear from the above order that this Court did not say  anything about the constitutional validity  of  bye-law No. 3. We, however, find on a consideration of the  language of clause (5) in section 481(1)L of the Act that the bye-law falls within the scope of the power conferred on the  Corpo- ration  to frame bye-laws for the issue of licences  in  re- spect  of cycle-rickshaws which are kept or used for  plying in the Delhi Municipal Corporation area. While framing  bye- laws  under the above statutory provision it is  permissible for  the Corporation to restrict the issue of licences  only to  the owners of the rickshaws who themselves act as  rick- shaw  pullers. This is apparently done to prevent  exploita- tion  of  the rickshaw pullers by the owners  of  the  cycle rickshaws.  A licensing authority may impose  any  condition while  issuing  a licence which is in the  interest  of  the general public unless it is either expressly or by necessary implication prohibited from imposing such a condition by the law  which confers the power of licensing.  The  restriction imposed by the Corporation in the present case is  according to  us in the interest of the general public. In  Man  Singh and  Others v. State of Punjab and Others, [1985] 4 SCC  146 the  petitioners contended that the provision in the  Punjab Cycle Rickshaw (Regulation of Licence) Act, 1976 was  viola- tive of Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution as also Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This Court  negativ-

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ing the said contention observed thus: "In  the instant case, section 3 of the Punjab Act  has  the effect of making it possible for the rickshaw puller to  ply the  rickshaw as owner of the vehicle and thereby to be  the full owner of the income earned by him. No longer will he be obliged  to part with an appreciable portion of that  income in favour of another who owns the vehicle. The Punjab Act is beneficial  legislation bringing directly home to the  rick- shaw  puller the entire fruit of his dally toil. The  enact- ment  is  intended as a social welfare measure  against  the exploitation of the poor and unemployed by rapacious 911 cycle rickshaw owners who by reason of their superior finan- cial resources fatten their wealth from the sweated toil  of rickshaw  pullers. Even if we look at the impugned  legisla- tion from the point of view of its impact on the fundamental right  of rickshaw owners who give them on hire to  rickshaw pullers for plying, it is plain that the legislation consti- tutes a reasonable restriction on the right of such rickshaw owners  to carry on the business of hiring out  cycle  rick- shaws  inasmuch as the exercise of the right is excluded  by legislation designed for the economic and social welfare  of rickshaw pullers, who constitute a significant sector of the people,  a sector so pressed by poverty and straightened  by the economic misery of their situation that the guarantee of their full day’s wages to them seems amply justified."     We  do not, therefore, find any ground to set aside  the bye-law in question either on the ground that it is  outside the  scope of section 48 1 of the Act or on the ground  that it  is  opposed to the provisions of the  Constitution.  The above contentions, therefore, fail.     During  the  pendency  of these  proceedings  the  Court issued  notices  to the Punjab National Bank,  the  Bank  of Baroda  and  the  State Bank of India and  also  the  Credit Guarantee  Corporation of India (Small Loans)  to  ascertain whether the banks are willing to extend financial assistance to  the rickshaw pullers to acquire the ownership  of  cycle rickshaws  and to ply them within the Corporation  area  and also  to ascertain whether the Credit Guarantee  Corporation of India Small (Loans) would guarantee the loans advanced to the  rickshaw pullers. The learned counsel for  these  banks and the Credit Guarantee Corporation of India (Small  Loans) have  submitted that the banks are willing to  advance  upto Rs.2,000  by way of loan at reasonable rate of  interest  to the rickshaw pullers on the security of the cycle  rickshaws owned  by  them in order to assist the rickshaw  pullers  to acquire  the  cycle rickshaws. The banks  have  put  forward before the Court two schemes: (1) the scheme for finance  to cycle  rickshaw pullers, and (2)  Self-employment  programme for  urban poor (SEPUP) under which it is possible for  them to  give financial assistance to the rickshaw  pullers.  The Credit  Guarantee  Corporation  of India  (Small  Loans)  is agreeable  to guarantee the repayment of loans  advanced  to the rickshaw pullers. The Corporation authorities are agree- able  to  issue necessary eligibility  certificates  to  the rickshaw pullers to obtain the loan. 912     In view of the above submissions, we direct the  several branches of the Punjab National Bank, the Bank of Baroda and the State Bank of India operating in Delhi to give financial assistance  to rickshaw pullers who wish to own cycle  rick- shaws and ply them under licences issued by the  Corporation subject to their producing the necessary eligibility certif- icate  issued  by the Corporation and satisfying  the  other terms  of the Schemes referred to above. We also direct  the

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Delhi Administration to comply with the directions issued by this Court in Nanhu & Others (supra).     In  the course of the argument the learned  counsel  for the  petitioners  incidentally made a  complaint  about  the seizure  of  cycle  rickshaws by  the  Corporation  officers without  issuing  an acknowledgment to the  owners  whenever they  found that the cycle rickshaws were being used on  the roads  contrary  to the rules. The learned counsel  for  the Corporation  stated  that whenever the cycle  rickshaws  are seized  written acknowledgments will be issued to the  owner if  he is found near the cycle rickshaw at the time  of  its seizure. We record the above statement made on behalf of the Corporation. These petitions are accordingly disposed of. No costs. S.R.                                               Petitions disposed of. 913