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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1246 of 2007

PETITIONER: All Bengal Excise Licensees Association

RESPONDENT: Raghabendra Singh & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/03/2007

BENCH: Dr. AR. Lakshmanan & Altamas Kabir

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising Out of SLP (C) NO. 15224 OF 2006)

Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, J.

Leave granted. The above appeal was filed by All Bengal Licensees  Association, Kolkata against 1) Raghabendra Singh,  Principal Secretary, Excise Department, Govt. of West  Bengal 2) Tallen Kumar, Excise Commissioner, Excise  Department, 3) Manoj Kumar Panth, District Magistrate  and Collector, 24-Parganas 4) Parvez Siddique, Addl.  District Magistrate, 24-Parganas as contesting  respondents and 5) Pradyut Kumar Saha, General  Secretary of All Bengal Excise Licensees Association,  Kolkata as proforma respondent.  The above appeal is directed against the final  judgment and order dated 29.08.2006 of the Calcutta  High Court passed in CC No. 62 of 2005 arising out of  Writ Petition No. 2248 of 2004 whereby a learned Single  Judge of the said High Court has dismissed the  application for contempt filed by the appellant herein.   According to the appellant, the contesting respondents  have deliberately and willfully violated and were in utter  disregard of the solemn order dated 04.01.2005,  19.01.2005 and 20.01.2005 passed by Hon’ble Mr.  Justice Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay in Writ Petition  No. 2248 of 2004 filed by All Bengal Excise Licensees  Assn. & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.  The background facts are as under: By an order dated 04.01.2005, a learned Single  Judge passed an interim order to the effect that the  respondent-authorities will be at liberty to process the  applications in respect of grant of licenses for excise  shops but no final selection in respect of such shops  shall be made without obtaining specific leave of the  Court.  The High Court made it clear that the  respondent-authorities will not hold any lottery for the  purpose of final selection of the excise shops in question  without obtaining further orders from the High Court.   The said order dated 04.01.2005 was passed after  hearing and in the presence of the learned advocate for  the respondents.  The said interim order dated 04.01.2005 was  extended by the order dated 19.01.2005 until further  orders by the High Court.  Thereafter, on 28.01.2005 a learned Single Judge  gave direction for filing the affidavit and the said interim  order was further extended until further orders and the

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said interim order is still continuing.  The said orders dated 04.01.2005, 19.01.2005 and  20.01.2005 were communicated by the appellant’s  advocate’s letter dated 15.03.2005 enclosing therewith  the Xerox copies of the signed copies of the said dictated  order.  In spite of full knowledge about the said order  each of the respondents, in deliberate and wilful  disregard of the orders, caused an advertisement to be  published in the newspapers for holding lottery for final  selection of excise shops to be held on 20.03.2005,  21.03.2005 and 22.03.2005. Pursuant to the said advertisement, a lottery has  been held on 20.03.2005 for the purpose of final selection  of the excise shops.  It was submitted by the appellants  that from the act and conduct of the respondents, it is  evident that each of them have no regard for the orders  dated 04.01.2005, 19.01.2005 and 20.01.2005 passed by  this Court and are deliberately violating the said orders  passed by the High Court and are thus guilty of contempt  of Court.  With these allegations, the appellants filed CC  No. 62 of 2005 in the High Court.   The appellant is an Association of Excise Licensees  including the country spirit shop owners.  Challenging  the policy decisions for issuance of thousands of excise  licenses for opening of new foreign liquor off shop and  country spirit shops in the State of West Bengal in  violation of the provisions of the Bengal Excise Act, 1909  and the rules framed thereunder, the appellant, amongst  others, moved a writ petition being No. 1982 of 2004 in  the High Court upon notice to the respondents.  A copy of  the writ petition was also filed and marked as annexures  in this civil appeal.  The High Court (Hon’ble Mr. Justice  Pinaki Chander Ghosh), after hearing the advocates for  the parties on 24.11.2004 passed an order, inter alia as  follows: "\005that the respondent authorities will process the  matter but will not finalise and issue the licence  without the leave of the court.

The matter will appear on 9th December, 2004.

Thereafter, the above-mentioned matter appeared in  the list on 09.12.2004 before the very same Judge.  The  learned Judge, after hearing the advocates for the  parties, gave a direction to file affidavit and the matter  was directed to appear 4 weeks after vacation and also  further directed that the interim order already passed in  the matter will continue.  Although there was no direction for making any  further advertisement by the respondent-authorities  inviting any application for obtaining excise licenses for  the new excise shops proposed to be give on or about  20.12.2004, some of the members of the appellant came  to know that an advertisement was published on  30.11.2004 in the Bengali Daily newspaper Janashakti  by the Excise Department, Government of West Bengal,  whereby applications had been invited for giving new  licenses for excise including country spirit shops within  the Districts of Coochbehar, Jalpaiguri, North 24  Parganas and Hooghly.  The members also came to know  that the Excise Authorities have issued a memo No. 23- 5(XX)/2003-04 3268 (21E) dated 07.12.2004 and rest to  the District Magistrates and Collectors that there has  been a proposal for granting supplementary country  spirit license to the existing tari shop owners.  The

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appellants made representations before the Excise  Authorities and contended that since the matter is sub- judice, the respondent authorities cannot publish the  said advertisement on 30.11.2005 and cannot issue the  said memo.  However, the Excise Authorities have further  decided to hold lottery on 05.01.2005 for allotment of  excise shops including the country spirit and foreign  liquor shops.  Immediately after coming to know about  the above-mentioned fact, the North 24 Parganas Excise  Licenses Assn. have moved a writ petition on 30.12.2004  before the vacation Judge of the High Court.  In the said  writ petition, the appellant No.1 herein was made a party  respondent.  The vacation Judge did not pass any interim  order on the said writ petition against the said order  dated 30.12.2004.  The North 24 Parganas Excise  Licencees Assn. preferred an appeal on 30.12.2004 and  the Division Bench of the High Court passed an interim  order on 30.12.2004 to the effect that the processing in  respect of grant of issuance of country spirit license will  continue but finalization and selection will not be made  till 3 weeks after the vacation.  However, they made it  clear that finalisation include holding of lottery.  The said  order was restricted to only in the case of District North  24 Parganas.  It was submitted that the subject-matter of  writ petition No. 2248 of 2004 is that during the  pendency of earlier writ petition, the respondent- authorities cannot issue any advertisement for inviting  applications for obtaining new excise license including  the country spirit shops and foreign liquor shops and  cannot hold any lottery and further they cannot give the  effect to the proposal for giving supplementary excise  licensees to the tari shops.  It was submitted that in  order to frustrate the order dated 24.11.2004, the  respondent authorities have made an advertisement  dated 30.11.2004 and thereby invited applications from  intending candidates from obtaining new licenses in  respect of 4 Districts and further making attempt to hold  lottery in respect of applications already received.  In  spite of repeated requests, the respondents have pre- determined to hold the lottery on 05.01.2005 which  amounts to finalization of the applications for granting of  licenses and they are also trying to issue supplementary  licenses to the existing shop owners.  On 04.01.2005, the Court passed the following  order:- "Let this matter be listed before the regular bench one  week after the Christmas vacation.  In the meantime, let there be an interim order only to  the effect that the respondent authorities herein will be  at liberty to process the applications in respect of  grant of licence for excise shops but no final selection  in respect of such shops shall be made without  obtaining specific leave of this court.  I also make it clear that the respondent authorities will  also not hold any lottery for the purpose of final  selection of the aforesaid excise shops in question  without obtaining further orders from this court.  All parties are to act on a Xerox signed copy of this  dictated order on the usual undertaking." Again, the interim order was directed to continue  until further orders on 28.01.2005.  As already stated,  the counsel for the appellant communicated the said  orders and served upon the respondents the Xerox copies  of the signed copies of the order dated 04.01.2005,  19.01.2005 and 20.01.2005.  Although the said interim

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order dated 04.01.2005 which has been extended from  time to time and is still continuing the respondents in  utter disregard caused publication of the advertisement  of the newspapers for holding lottery for the purpose of  final selection of excise shops in question.  It is also  pertinent to mention here that both the Division Bench of  the High Court order dated 15.03.2005 in APOT No.  770/2004 vacated the interim order passed in the appeal  preferred by the North 24 Parganas Excise Licensees  Assn. but the interim order passed in the writ petition  being No. 2248 of 2004 is relating to any proposed new  excise licenses through out the State of West Bengal is  still continuing.  However, in pursuance to the  advertisement, the respondent authorities on 20th March  held lottery for final selection of the aforesaid excise  shops and shall hold further lottery on 22nd and 23rd  March, 2005.  It was, therefore, submitted that each of  the respondents deliberately and willfully and in utter  disregard to the orders dated 04.01.2005 held lottery for  final selection of excise shops.  It is further submitted  that the respondents are guilty of deliberate and willful  violation of the 3 orders passed by this Court and  committed contumacious act and in spite of full  knowledge about the orders.  It was further submitted  that the respondents have scant respect for the orders  passed on all the 3 days in January, 2005 and are  deliberately ignoring the said orders and are thus guilty  of contempt of court.  According to the appellant, by the  above-mentioned act and conduct of the  contemnors/respondents the majesty and dignity of the  High Court have been lowered down and, therefore, the  respondents should be suitably dealt with and punished.   It was also further submitted that having regard to the  facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents  should be restrained from holding any further lottery  and/or from giving any effect and/or further effect of the  lottery already held and/or from taking any further steps  for issuance of any excise license to any person so that  the majesty and dignity of the High Court is not lowered  down.  In the circumstances, they requested the High  Court to issue rule nisi calling upon the respondents and  each of them to show cause as to why the respondents  and each of them should not be committed to prison or  otherwise be suitably dealt with and/or punished for  deliberate and willful violation and utter disregard of the  solemn orders dated 04/19 and 20.01.2005 passed in  writ petition No. 2248 of 2004.  In the contempt petition, rule was issued on  23.03.2005.  The respondents filed an application  praying for discharge of the rule issued in the contempt  proceedings on 02.05.2005 North 24 Parganas Excise  Licensees Assn. filed SLP (C) No. 10820 of 2005 against  the order dated 15.03.2005 passed by the Division Bench  of the High Court.  The State of West Bengal filed an  application for vacating the interim order dated  04.01.2005 passed in writ petition No. 2248 of 2004.  On  26.07.2005, a learned Single Judge allowed the  application and vacated the interim order but, however,  directed the Government that they would be free to take  steps in issuing license in terms of the policy but it will  be mentioned in the license that it is subject to the result  of the writ petition and further directed that all steps  taken for issuing excise license would abide by the result  of the writ petition.   Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single

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Judge dated 26.07.2005, the appellant preferred an  appeal being APOT No. 494 of 2005 on 10.08.2005.  A  Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the said  appeal and confirmed the order of the single judge dated  26.07.2005.  The Appellant’s Assn. preferred SLP No.  17371 of 2005 against the said judgment.  This Court on  29.08.2005 issued notice with an interim direction to the  effect that no license be issued in terms of the circular  dated 20.01.2004 and the matter was directed to be  listed along with SLP No. 10820 of 2005.  Both the SLPs  were dismissed by this Court on 07.11.2005.  In the contempt application filed by the appellants,  the learned Advocate General appearing for the  contemnors submitted that there is a violation of the  order passed earlier on 04.01.2005 but the said violation  is not willful as the contemnor wrongly understood the  implications of the orders passed by the High Court on  04.01.2005 and extended subsequently on 19th and 20th  January, 2005 and also by the Division Bench on  15.03.2005, 18.03.2005 in two other different  proceedings.  It was further submitted that in order to  hold a person guilty of contempt of court two things have  to be proved. Firstly, disobedience of the order passed by  the court and secondly such disobedience must be  willful.  The Advocate-General submitted that in the  instant case there is no willful violation and, therefore,  the contempt application should be dismissed.  Some  rulings were relied on by the learned Advocate General in  support of his aforesaid contention.  A learned Single Judge of the High Court was of the  opinion that the contemnors did not understand the  implications and consequences of a prohibitory order  passed in an independent proceedings and by sheer mis- conception thought that there is no bar to issue excise  license in view of the orders dated 15.03.2005 and  18.05.2005 and that failure to understand the  implications and/or consequences of the order passed by  the High Court cannot be construed as an act of  contempt.  In the light of the decisions cited, the High Court  examined whether the alleged contemnors have  committed any contempt of the High Court.  While  examining so, the High Court has observed as follows:- "Undisputedly this Bench on 4th January, 2005 passed  an interim order restraining the alleged contemnors  from holding any lottery for the purpose of final  selection of the excise shops in question without  obtaining further order from this court but the alleged  contemnors published an advertisement in the daily  newspaper for holding lottery for the purpose of final  selection of excise shops in question. Therefore, there  is no doubt that the alleged contemnors have  disobeyed the specific direction passed earlier by this  Bench.   The Division Bench of this Hon’ble court in two  different proceedings passed two separate orders on  15th March, 2005 and 18th March, 2005 respectively  whereby and whereunder the alleged contemnors  herein were permitted to grant excise licenses. The  alleged contemnors herein reasonably understood that  the orders passed by the Division Bench will have  overriding effect on the order passed by the learned  Single Judge of this Hon’ble court and thus committed  mistake by not realising the implication of the order

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passed by this Bench which remained operative at the  relevant time.

If there is any doubt regarding interpretation and/or  understanding of the orders passed by the courts of  law, the alleged contemnors are entitled to have the  benefit or advantage of such a doubt, as the act of  contempt must be established beyond all reasonable  doubt.

In the aforesaid circumstances, it cannot be said that  the alleged contemnors herein willfully and  deliberately violated the solemn order passed by this  Bench on 4th January, 2005. Mere disobedience of an  order is not sufficient to hold any one guilty under the  Contempt of Courts Act unless such obedience is  deliberate and willful."

The High Court also observed as under: "Although the alleged contemnors in their respective  affidavits have tendered unqualified apology after  categorically stating therein that they had no intention  to willfully or deliberately violate the order passed  earlier by this Bench but in view of the observations  made hereinbefore, I am not inclined to go into the  question of apology."

For the aforementioned reasons, the contempt  petition was dismissed by the High Court. Aggrieved by  the dismissal of the contempt petition, the appellant  preferred the above appeal arising out of SLP No. 15224  of 2006.  This Court on 18.09.2006 issued notice and in  the meanwhile directed that no license shall be granted  on the basis of the lottery and pursuant to the circular  dated 20.01.2004.  We heard Mr. K.K.Venugopal, Mr. L.N. Rao, Mr.  Pradip Ghosh, Mr. Joydip Gupta, learned senior counsel  for the appellant and Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned  Addl. Solicitor General and Mr. Bhaskar P. Gupta,  learned senior counsel for R1-R4 and Mr. Aman Vachher  for R5 and Mr. P.N. Misra and Mr. M.N. Krishnamani,  learned senior counsel in I.A. 3 and I.A.4. We dismissed all applications for  impleadments/intervention on 21.02.2007 and heard the  arguments of the appellants on merits.  Elaborate and  lengthy submissions were made by the respective parties  with reference to the entire pleadings and various orders  passed by the High Court and of this Court and also  other annexures and case laws.  Learned senior counsel  appeared for the appellant submitted that in view of the  finding of the learned Judge "that there is no doubt that  alleged contemnor have disobeyed the specific direction  passed earlier by this Bench", the learned Judge of the  High Court was not justified in holding that the alleged  contemnor committed mistake by not realising the  implication of the order passed by the High Court which  remain operative at the relevant time and on that basis  dismissing the application for contempt without making  any order for restoration of the status quo ante to undo  the mischief caused by such violation of the interim  order.  According to the learned senior counsel for the  appellant, the impugned order is not sustainable in law  and should not be allowed to operate as a precedent and  the wrong perpetrated by the respondent/contemnors in  contumacious disregard of the orders of the High Court

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should not be permitted to hold.  Likewise, the High  Court also committed a grievous error of law in holding  that the alleged contemnors did not understand the  implication and consequences of a prohibitory order  passed in an independent proceedings and by sheer mis- conception thought that there is no bar to issue excise  licenses in view of the order dated 15.03.2005 and  18.03.2005 by two different Division Benches of the High  Court.  In support of their contention, they cited the  following rulings: 1. Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. Vs. State of  Bihar & Ors., (1999) 7 SCC 569 2) Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. Vs. Hind  Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (1997) 3 SCC  443 3) Eastern Trust Company vs. MaKenzie Mann &  Co., Ltd., AIR 1915 Privy Council 106 4) Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. Vs. Hirak Ghosh &  Ors., (2002) 4 SCC 21 5) All India Regional Rural Bank Officers  Federation & Ors. Vs. Govt. of India and Ors.  (2002) 3 SCC 554 6) Ravi S. Naik vs. Union of India & Ors. 1994  Supp (2) SCC 641 7) Surjit Singh and Ors. Vs. Harbans Singh and  Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 50 8) T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. Vs. State of  Karnataka & Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 1  9) Vidya Charan Shukla vs. Tamil Nadu Olympic  Assn. & Anr. AIR 1991 Madras 323 10) Century Flour Mills Ltd. vs. S. Suppiah and  Ors. AIR 1975 Madras 270 Mr. Gopal Subramanium and Mr. Bhaskar P. Gupta  appearing for the contesting respondent Nos. 1-4  reiterated the same contentions which have been urged  before the High Court and since the learned single Judge  clearly found that there was no willful and deliberate  violation of the order of the learned Single Judge  pursuing the same in the further appeal does not arise  and inasmuch as it was held that there was no deliberate  and willful violation as such, this Court may not issue  direction of setting aside the lottery already held.  It was  also denied that lottery was held in breach of the interim  orders passed as alleged or at all.  On the contrary, the  learned single Judge held that there was no willful and  deliberate violation of the order.  It was further submitted  that the entire judgment of the single Judge is required  to be read and not in bits and pieces and that it would  appear from the judgment that the single Judge has  unequivocally held that there was no deliberate and  willful violation of the order and thus has rightly  dismissed the contempt application.  We have carefully considered the rival submissions  made by learned senior counsel appearing for the  respective parties.  It is not in dispute that an injunction  order was passed on 04.01.2005 and on subsequent  extension is still subsisting.  Respondent Nos.1-4  admittedly are highly qualified and highly placed  government officials.  Admittedly, by advocate’s letter  dated 15.03.2005, it was pointed out to them that the  injunction order dated 04.01.2005 and its subsequent  extensions are still subsisting.  They have also  acknowledged the receipt of the communication dated  15.03.2005.  Under such circumstances, the High Court  is not justified in holding that the highly qualified and

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well placed government officials did not understand the  implication and/or consequence of prohibitory order in  an independent proceedings and by sheer mis-conception  though that there is no bar to issue excise licenses as  was held by the learned Judge in the impugned order.   This Court can only say it is rather unfortunate that  such officers who are not capable of or not able to  understand the implication of the prohibitory orders  passed by the High Court should be allowed to hold such  high offices.  During the course of the hearing of the  contempt application, the matter was adjourned by the  High Court to enable the respondent to consider whether  the contemnors was prepared to cancel the lottery held  on 20, 21 and 22.03.2005 in violation of the Court’s  orders and on such adjourned date, the contemnors did  not agree to cancel the lottery.  Under such  circumstances, the plea of mistake of understanding the  order cannot at all be accepted.  Likewise, the High Court  also was not justified in not directing the contemnors to  cancel the lottery held on 20, 21 and 22.03.2005 in  violation of the solemn orders passed by the very same  Judge and in view of the clear finding of the Court that  they had acted in clear violation of the said interim order  made by the High Court. Even assuming that there was any scope for bona  fide misunderstanding on the part of the respondents,  once it was found that the respondent had disobeyed the  specific order passed earlier by the Court, the High Court  should have directed the contemnors to undo the wrong  committed by them which was done in clear breach of the  order of the Court by restoring the status quo ante by  canceling the lottery wrongfully held by them.  The  learned Judge found that the respondent-contemnors  had held the lottery in violation of the Court’s order and  the results of the said lottery should not be permitted to  take effect and should be treated as unlawful and invalid  for the purpose of grant of license.  The learned Single  Judge for the purpose of upholding the majesty of law  and the sanctity of the solemn order of the court of law  which cannot be violated by the executive authority  either deliberately or unwittingly  should have set aside  the lottery held and should not have allowed the  respondents to gain a wrongful advantage thereby.   In our opinion, a party to the litigation cannot be  allowed to take an unfair advantage by committing  breach of an interim order and escape the consequences  thereof.  By pleading misunderstanding and thereafter  retaining the said advantage gained in breach of the  order of the Court and the wrong perpetrated by the  respondent-contemnors in contumacious disregard of the  order of the High Court should not be permitted to hold  good.  In our opinion, the impugned order passed by the  High court is not sustainable in law and should not be  allowed to operate as a precedent and the wrong  perpetrated by the respondent-contemnors in utter  disregard of the order of the High Court should not be  permitted to hold good.  The High Court has committed a  grievous error of law in holding that failure to understand  the implication and consequences of the order passed by  the High Court by highly placed government officers  cannot be construed as an act of contempt.  The High  Court has failed to understand that the highly educated  and highly placed government officials have competent  legal advisors and it was not open to them to allege and  contend that the respondent-contemnors did not

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understand the implication of the order dated  04.01.2005.  In our opinion, such officers are required to  be dealt with effectively to uphold the dignity of the High  Court and the efficiency of the system itself.  The High  Court committed a grave error of law by not taking into  consideration the most important fact that in the course  of the hearing of the contempt application the matter was  adjourned in order to enable the contemnor to consider  whether they were prepared to cancel the lottery held on  20, 21 and 22.03.2005 and on the adjourned date, the  respondents did not agree to cancel the lottery.  In such  view of the matter, the significant stand being the plea of  mistake of understanding cannot, in our opinion, prevail.   The High Court in that view of the matter committed a  grave mis-carriage of justice by not taking into  consideration another most important fact that if actually  the lottery was held by mistake or by misunderstanding  of the orders, then the respondent would have  immediately rectified it and would have cancelled the  lottery but in the instant case, instead of canceling the  lottery, the respondents have justified their conduct from  which the determined declination of obeying the order is  clearly proved.  In other words, if there was a doubt  about the implication of the order of the Court, the  respondents should have approached the Court and  should have clarified their alleged confusion.  But in the  instant case, the respondents have not only violated the  order but when the contempt application was moved and  opportunity was given by the Court to cancel the lottery  they refused to cancel the said lottery from which it is  proved that they deliberately held the lottery in clear  violation of the order dated 04.01.2005 having regard to  the admissions made on behalf of the contemnors that  there is violation of the order dated 04.01.2005 and also  having regard to the learned Single Judge’s own finding  that "there is no doubt that the alleged contemnor  disobeyed the specific directions passed earlier by this  Bench".  The High Court should have directed the  contemnor to cancel the lottery held on these 3 dates.   The High Court also failed to consider the effect of the  appellant’s learned advocate’s letter dated 15.03.2005  whereby it was clearly pointed out about the subsistence  of the order dated 04.01.2005 and its subsequent  extension.  By the said letter, the appellant’s advocate  categorically pointed out further that in spite of the above  if the lottery is held or further action is taken for issue of  excise license, the appellant shall be compelled to take  legal action.  In our opinion, the judgment and order passed by  the High court are bad in law and is liable to be set aside.           LAW ON THE SUBJECT: 1. Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar &  Ors., (1999) 7 SCC 569 "For holding the respondents to have committed  contempt, civil contempt at that, it has to be shown  that there has been willful disobedience of the  judgment or order of the court.  Power to punish for  contempt is to be resorted to when there is clear  violation of the court’s order.  Since notice of contempt  and punishment for contempt is of far-reaching  consequence, these powers should be invoked only  when a clear case of willful disobedience of the court’s  order has been made out.  Whether disobedience is  willful in a particular case depends on the facts and  circumstances of that case.  Judicial orders are to be

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properly understood and complied with.  Even  negligence and carelessness can amount to  disobedience particularly when the attention of the  person is drawn to the court’s orders and its  implications.  Disobedience of the court’s order strikes  at the very root of the rule of law on which Indian  system of governance is based.  Power to punish for  contempt is for the maintenance of effective legal  system.  It is exercised to prevent perversion of the  course of justice.  Jurisdiction to punish for contempt  exists to provide ultimate sanction against the person  who refuses to comply with court’s order or disregards  the order continuously. No person can defy court’s  order.  Wilful would exclude casual, accidental, bona  fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to  comply with the terms of the order.  A petitioner who  complains breach of the court’s order must allege  deliberate or contumacious disobedience of the court’s  order."  2) Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. Vs. Hind  Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 443 "16. According to this section, if an objection is raised  to the jurisdiction of the court at the hearing of an  application for grant of, or for vacating, interim relief,  the court should determine that issue in the first  instance as a preliminary issue before granting or  setting aside the relief already granted. An application  raising objection to the jurisdiction to the court is  directed to be heard with all expedition. Sub-rule (2),  however, says that the command in Sub-rule (1) does  not preclude the court from granting such interim  relief as it may consider necessary pending the  decision on the question of jurisdiction. In our opinion,  the provision merely states the obvious. It makes  explicit what is implicit in law. Just because an  objection to the jurisdiction is raised, the court does  not become helpless forthwith - nor does it become  incompetent to grant the interim relief. It can. At the  same time, it should also decide the objection to  jurisdiction at the earlier possible moment. This is the  general principle and this is what Section 9-A  reiterates. Take this very case. The plaintiff asked for  temporary injunction. An ad-interim injunction was  granted. Then the defendant came forward objecting to  the grant of injunction and also raising an objection to  the jurisdiction of the court. The court over-ruled the  objection as to jurisdiction and made the interim  injunction absolute. The defendants filed an appeal  against the decision on the question of jurisdiction.  While that appeal was pending, several other interim  order were passed both by the Civil Court as well as by  the High Court. Ultimately, no doubt, High Court has  found that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to  entertain the suit but all this took about six years.  Can it be said that orders passed by the Civil Court  and the High Court during this period of six years were  all non-est and that it is open to the defendants to  flout them merrily, without fear of any consequence.  Admittedly, this could not be done until the High  Court’s decision on the question of jurisdiction. The  question is whether the said decision of the High Court  means that no person can be punished for flouting or  disobeying the interim/interlocutory orders while they  were in force, i.e., for violations and disobedience  committed prior to the decision of the High Court on

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the question of jurisdiction Holding that by virtue of  the said decision of the High Court (on the question of  jurisdiction, no one can be punished thereafter for  disobedience or violation of the interim orders  committed prior to the said decision of the High Court,  would indeed be subversive of rule of law and would  seriously erode the dignity and the authority of the  courts. We must repeat that this is not even a case  where a suit was filed in wrong court knowingly or  only with a view to snatch an interim order. As pointed  out hereinabove, the suit was filed in the Civil Court  bonafide. We are of the opinion that in such a case the  defendants cannot escape the consequences of their  disobedience and violation of the interim injunction  committed by them prior to the High Court’s decision  on the question of jurisdiction." 3) Eastern Trust Company vs. MaKenzie Mann & Co.,  Ltd., AIR 1915 Privy Council 106  "There is a well-established practice in England in  certain cases where no petition of right will lie, under  which the Crown can be sued by the Attorney -General,  and a declaratory order obtained, as has been recently  explained by the Court of Appeal in England in Dyson v.  Attorney-General, 1911 (1) KB 410 and in Burghes v.  Attorney-General 1912 (1) Ch. 173 . It is the duty of the  Crown and of every branch of the Executive to abide by  and obey the law. If there is any difficulty in  ascertaining it, the courts are open to the Crown to sue,  and it is the duty of the Executive in cases of doubt to  ascertain the law, in order to obey it, not to dis-regard  it. The proper course in the present case would have  been either to apply to the Court to determine the  question of construction of the contract, and to pay  accordingly, or to pay the whole amount over to the  Receiver and to obtain from the Court an order on the  Receiver to pay the sums properly payable for labour  and supplies, as to the construction of which their  Lordships agree with Supreme Court of Nova Scotia.

The duty of the Crown in such a case is well  stated by Lord Abhinger Chief Barren in Deare v.  Attorney General 1835 (1) y. & C.197.  After pointing out  that the Crown always appears (in England) by the  Attorney- General in a Court of Justice-especially in a  Court of Equity- where the interest of the Crown is  concerned, even perhaps in a bill for discovery, he goes  on to say:

"It has been the practice, which I hope never will be  discontinued, for the officers of the Crown to throw no  difficulty in the way of any proceeding for the purpose of  bringing matters before a court of Justice where any  real point of difficulty that requires judicial decision has  occurred." 4) Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. Vs. Hirak Ghosh & Ors.,  (2002) 4 SCC 21 "20. Similar is the situation in the counter-affidavit filed  presently in this matter as well : Is this fair ? The  answer having regard to the factual backdrop cannot  but be in the negative. It is neither fair nor reasonable  on the part of a senior Civil Service Personnel to feign  ignorance or plead understanding when the direction of  this Court stands crystal clear in the judgment.  Government employees ought to be treated on a par  with another set of employees and this Court on an

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earlier occasion lent concurrence to the view of the  learned Single Judge that the Circulars issued by the  State Government cannot but be ascribed to be  arbitrary : Government is not a machinery for  oppression and ours being a welfare State as a matter of  fact be opposed thereto. It is the people’s welfare that  the State is primarily concerned with and avoidance of  compliance with a specific order of the Court cannot be  termed to be a proper working of a State body in terms  of the wishes and aspirations of the founding fathers of  our Constitution. Classless, non- discriminate and  egalitarian society are not meaningless jargons so that  they only remain as the basic factors of our socialistic  state on principles only and not to have any application  in the realities of every-day life : one section of the  employees would stand benefited but a similarly placed  employee would not be so favoured why this attitude ?  Obviously there is no answer. Surprisingly, this attitude  persists even after six rounds of litigation travelling from  Calcutta to Delhi more than once the answer as appears  in the counter-affidavit is an expression of sorrow by  reason of the understanding cannot be countenanced in  the facts presently under consideration. A plain reading  of the order negates the understanding of the  Respondent State and the conduct in no uncertain  terms can be ascribed to be the manifestation of an  intent to deprive one section of the employees being  equally circumstanced come what may and this state of  mind is clearly expressed in the counter-affidavit though  however in temperate language. The question of bona  fide understanding thus does not and cannot arise in  the facts presently. Is it a believable state of affairs that  the order of the learned Single Judge as early as the  first writ petition, has not been properly understood by  the senior most bureaucrat of the State Government :  the same misunderstanding continues in terms of the  appellate Court’s order and the third in the line of order  is that of the apex Court. The understanding again  continues even after the second writ petition was filed  before the learned Single Judge in the High Court and  the similar understanding continues even after the so to  say clarificatory order by this Court, as appears from  the order dated 20th April, 2001. Even in the counter- affidavit, filed in Contempt Petition, the understanding  still continues we are at a loss as to what is this  understanding about : the defence of ’understanding’  undoubtedly is an ingenious effort to avoid the rigours  of an order of Court but cannot obliterate the action the  attempted avoidance through the introduction of the so- called concept of lack of understanding cannot,  however, be a permanent avoidance, though there may  be temporary and short-lived gains. The order of this  Court cannot possibly be interpreted as per the  understanding of the Respondents, but as appears from  the plain language used therein. Neither the order is  capable of two several interpretations nor there is any  ambiguity and the same does not require further clarity.  The order is categorical and clear in its context and  meaning. The Court’s orders are to be observed in its  observance, rather than in its breach." 5) All India Regional Rural Bank Officers Federation &  Ors. Vs. Govt. of India and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 554 "4. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, the learned Additional Solicitor  General, however tried to impress upon us the  circumstances under which the notification had been

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issued, the same being severe financial crisis and the  learned Additional Solicitor General further urged that  the monetary benefits of the employees of the banks will  have to be so modulated so that the banks should be  ultimately be closed down by merely paying the salary of  the employees. Even though the financial position of the  banks may not be disputed, but having regard to the  directions issued by this Court, while disposing of the  civil appeal and having regard to the circumstances  under which such directions had been given, it would be  difficult for us to sustain the plea of the union  Government that the Notification is in compliance with  the judgment and directions of this Court. The financial  capacity of the Government cannot be pleaded as a  ground for non-implementation of the directions of the  Court inasmuch as even in the matter of determination  of the pay-scale of the employees of the Regional Rural  Banks and maintenance of parity with their  counterparts, serving under the sponsorer commercial  banks, Justice Obul Reddi had not accepted the said  plea and that award reached its finality. Since the  financial capacity of the employer cannot be held to be a  germane consideration for determination of the wage  structure of the employees and the Parliament enacted  the Act for bringing into existence these regional rural  banks with the idea of helping the rural mass of the  country, the employees of such rural banks cannot  suffer on account of financial incapacity of the  employer. We have no hesitation in coming to the  conclusion that the issuance of notification dated  1.4.2001, by the Government of India cannot be held to  be in compliance with the judgment and directions of  this Court in S.M.G. Bank.  But at the same time, we  are of the opinion that the appropriate authority need  not be punished under the provisions of the Contempt  of Courts Act, even if the notification is in direct  contravention of the judgment of this Court, as we do  not find a case of deliberate violation. While, therefore,  we do not propose to take any action against the alleged  contemnors, we direct that the employees of the  Regional Rural Banks should be paid their current  salaries on the basis of determination made under the  notification dated 11.4.2001, the new basic pay having  arrived at, as on 1.4.2000 forthwith Paragraph (i) of the  aforesaid notification dated 11.4.2001 should be  immediately implemented and the employees should be  paid accordingly. Paragraphs (ii) and (iii) of the  notification are quashed and the Central Government is  directed to issue a fresh notification for proper  implementation of the Judgment of this Court. We make  it clear that the period of moratorium with regard to the  payment of arrears, since is going to be over on  31.3.2002, the arrear salary accruing to the employees  be paid to them in three equal annual installments, the  first being on 30th of April, 2002, the second on 30th of  April, 2003 and the third on 30th April, 2004. This  payment has to be made as aforesaid without being any  way dependant upon any other considerations and there  cannot be any distinction between the regional rural  banks incurring loss and the regional rural banks,  making profit. Further, the question of anticipated cash  out-flow on account of increase in salary if exceeds 50%  of the operating profit, then the current payment would  be restricted only upto 50% is absolutely of no  relevance, which was indicated in the impugned

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notification dated 11.4.2001. Having regard to the  financial condition of the Government as well as these  banks, the installment to be paid on 30.4.2002,  pursuant to this order of ours, the same may be  deposited in the employees’ provident fund account. But  all other installments will have to be paid in cash." 6) Ravi S. Naik vs. Union of India & Ors. 1994 Supp  (2) SCC 641 "40. We will first examine whether Bandekar and  Chopdekar could be excluded from the group on the  basis of order dated December 13, 1990 holding that  they stood disqualified as members of the Goa  Legislative Assembly. The said two members had filed  Writ Petition No. 321 of 1990 in the Bombay High Court  wherein they challenged the validity of the said order of  disqualification and by order dated December 14, 1990  passed in the said writ petition the High Court had  stayed the operation of the said order of disqualification  dated December 13, 1990 passed by the Speaker. The  effect of the stay of the operation of the order of  disqualification dated December 13, 1990 was that with  effect from December 14, 1990 the Declaration that  Bandekar and Chopdekar were disqualified from being  members of Goa Legislative Assembly under order dated  December 13, 1991 was not operative and on December  24, 1990, the date of the alleged split, it could not be  said that they were not members of Goa Legislative  Assembly. One of the reasons given by the Speaker for  not giving effect to the stay order passed by the High  Court on December 14, 1990, was that the said order  came after the order of disqualification was issued by  him. We are unable to appreciate this reason. Since the  said order was passed in a writ petition challenging the  validity of the order dated December 13, 1990 passed by  the Speaker it, obviouly, had to come after the order of  disqualification was issued by the Speaker. The other  reason given by the Speaker was that Parliament had  held that the Speaker’s order cannot be a subject- matter of court proceedings and his decision is final as  far as Tenth Schedule of the Constitution is concerned.  The said reason is also unsustainable in law. As to  whether the order of the Speaker could be a subject  matter of court proceedings and whether his decision  was final were questions involving the interpretation of  the provisions contained in Tenth Schedule to the  Constitution. On the date of the passing of the stay  order dated December 14, 1990, the said questions were  pending consideration before this Court. In the absence  of an authoritative pronouncement by this Court the  stay order passed by the High Court could not be  ignored by the Speaker on the view that his order could  not be a subject-matter of court proceedings and his  decision was final. It is settled law that an order, even  though interim in nature, is binding till it is set aside by  a competent could and it cannot be ignored on the  ground that the Court which passed the order had no  jurisdiction to pass the same. Moreover the stay order  was passed by the High Court which is a Superior Court  of Record and "in the case of a superior Court of Record,  it is for the court to consider whether any matter falls  within its jurisdiction or not. Unlike a court of limited  jurisdiction, the superior Court is entitled to determine  for itself questions about its own jurisdiction." (See:  Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 413 at  p. 499).

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42. In Mulraj v. Murti Raghonathji Maharaj, this Court  has dealt with effect of a stay order passed by a court  and has laid down:  In effect therefore a stay order is more or less in  the same position as an order of injunction with one  difference. An order of injunction is generally issued to a  party and it is forbidden from doing certain acts. It is  well settled that in such a case the party must have  knowledge of the injunction order before it could be  penalised for before disobeying it. Further it is equally  well-settled that the injunction order not being  addressed to the court, if the court proceeds in  contravention of the injunction order, the proceedings  are not a nullity. In the case of a stay order, as it is  addressed to the court and prohibits it from proceeding  further, as soon as the court has knowledge of the order  it is bound to obey it and if it does not, it acts illegally,  and all proceedings taken after the knowledge of the  order would be a nullity. That in our opinion is the only  difference between an order of injunction to a party and  an order of stay to a court. This would mean that the Speaker was bound by  the stay order passed by the High Court on December  14, 1990 and any action taken by him in disregard of  the said stay order was a nullity. In the instant case the  Speaker, in passing the order dated February 15, 1991  relating to disqualification, treated Bandekar and  Chopdekar as disqualified members. This action of the  Speaker was in disregard of the stay order dated  December 14, 1990 passed by the Bombay High Court." 7) Surjit Singh and Ors. Vs. Harbans Singh and Ors.  (1995) 6 SCC 50 "4. As said before, the assignment is by means of a  registered deed.  ’The assignment had taken place after  the passing of the preliminary decree in which Pritam  singh has been allotted 1/3rd share. His right to  property to that extent stood established. A decree  relating to immovable property worth more than  hundred rupees, if being assigned, was required to be  registered, that has instantly been done. It is per se  property, for it relates to the immovable property  involved in the suit. It clearly and squarely fell within  the ambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did not make  any appreciable-difference whether property per se had  been alienated or a decree pertaining to that property.  In defiance of the restraint order, the  alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go  as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the  prelavent public policy, When the court intends a  particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seizin of a  lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be  maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court  orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has  the duty, as also the right, to treat the  alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all  for its purposes. Once that is so, Pritam singh and his  assignees, respondents herein, cannot claim to be  impleaded as parties on the basis of assignment.  Therefore, the assignees-respondents could not have  been impleaded by the trial court as parties to the suit,  in disobedience of its orders. The principles of lis  pendens are altogether on a different footing. We do not  propose to examine their involvement presently. All  what is emphasised is that the assignees in the present  facts and circumstances had no cause to be impleaded

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as parties to the suit. On that basis, there was no cause  for going into the question of interpretation of  paragraphs 13 and 14 of the settlement deed. The path  treated by the courts below was, in our view, out of their  bounds. Unhesitatingly, we upset all the three orders of  the courts below and reject the application of the  assignees for impleadment under Order 22 Rule 10  C.P.C.} 8) Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper  Construction Co. (P) Ltd. and Anr. (1996) 4 SCC 622 "17. The principle that a contemnor ought not to be  permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his  contempt is well-settled. In Mohd. Idris v. R.J. Babuji,  this Court held clearly that undergoing the punishment  for contempt does not mean that the Court is not  entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and  rectifying the things done in violation of its Orders. The  petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the  Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A  learned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and  imposed a sentence of one month’s imprisonment. In  addition thereto, the learned Single Judge made  appropriate directions to remedy the breach of  undertaking. It was contended before this Court that the  learned Judge was not justified in giving the aforesaid  directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for  contempt of court. The argument was rejected holding  that "the Single Judge was quite right in giving  appropriate directions to close the breach (of  undertaking)". 18. The above principle has been applied even in the  case of violation of orders of injunction issued by Civil  Courts. In Clarke v. Chadbum [1985] 1 All. E.R. 211, Sir  Robert Megarry V-C observed : I need not cite authority for the proposition that it is of  high importance that orders of the court should be  obeyed. Willful disobedience to an order of the court is  punishable as a contempt of court, and I feel no doubt  that such disobedience may properly be described as  being illegal. If by such disobedience the persons  enjoined claim that they have validly effected some  charge in the rights and liabilities of others, 1 cannot  see why it should be said that although they are liable  to penalties for contempt of court for doing what they  did, nevertheless those acts were validly done. Of  course, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by  pointing out that it was done in breach in law. If a  meeting is held in breach of an injunction, it cannot be  said that the meeting has not been held. But the legal  consequences of what has been done in breach of the  law may plainly be very much affected by the illegality.  It seems to me on principle that those who defy a  prohibition ought not to be able to claim that the fruits  of their defiance are good, and not tainted by the  illegality that produced them."

9) Vidya Charan Shukla vs. Tamil Nadu Olympic  Assn. & Anr. AIR 1991 Madras 323 (FB) "56-57. Adverting to the facts of this case, we knew that  the main relief in the suit to declare that the notice dated  26-5-1990 issued by the first and second defendants on  the basis of the requisition notices convening a Special  General Meeting of the Association on 15-6-1990 is  illegal, null and void cannot be said to have become  infructuous merely because the Court instead of granting

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an injunction to hold the meeting on 15-6-1990, gave a  direction to consider an agenda of no-confidence against  the Executive Council and election of new President and  members of the Council in a particular manner. It can  still be found in the suit that the notice was illegal, null  and void and as a consequence, the Court may suitably  modulate the relief or permit the plaintiffs to amend the  relief. Besides this the trial Court will have jurisdiction to  consider the grant of a mandatory injunction even in a  suit which stood disposed of if its decree is found to have  been violated or frustrated. The trial Court being a Court  of Record will have special jurisdiction/inherent power to  pass such orders as are deemed necessary to meet the  ends of justice since this power is saved for it under  Sections 4 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and  Articles 215 and 225 of the Constitution. The instant suit  which is still pending, shall give to the Court power to  consider the desirability to grant a mandatory injunction,  for the reason of its interim injunction having been  violated, to remove the violation and until the suit is  finally decided to preserve the property in dispute in  Status Quo." 10) Century Flour Mills Ltd. vs. S. Suppiah and  Ors. AIR 1975 Madras 270 (FB) "9. In our opinion, the inherent powers of this court  under Section 151 C.P.C. are wide and are not subject  to any limitation. Where in violation of a stay order or  injunction against a party, something has been done in  disobedience, it will be the duty of the court as a policy  to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of  the wrong doing. In our view, the inherent power will  not only be available in such a case, but it is bound to  be exercised in that manner in the interests of justice.  Even apart from Section 151, we should observe that as  a matter of judicial policy, the court should guard  against itself being stultified in circumstances like this  by holding that it is powerless to undo a wrong done in  disobedience of the court’s orders. But in this case it is  not necessary to so to that extent as we hold that the  power is available under Section 151. C.P.C." 11) T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. Vs. State of  Karnataka & Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 1  In this case, suo motu contempt proceedings was  initiated by the Court against Secretary, Deputy  Secretary and Under Secretary to Medical Education  Department and few other officers of the State.   Explanation was given by these officers admitting bona  fide error made in interpreting this Court’s order.  This  Court having regard to the sequence of events,  extraordinary speed in processing the representation of  the Association and conduct of the officers, held,  explanation not acceptable.  Since the order of this Court  was explicit and clear but it was subverted on an ex facie  faulty and deliberately distorted interpretation at the  instance of the Association.  Hence, this Court felt that to  accept their unconditional apology would be travesty of  justice and officers were thus held guilty of contempt of  Court and their conduct censured by the Court.  This  Court also held that unconditional apology is not a  complete answer to violations and infractions of the  orders of this Court.  12) Satyabrata Biswas and Ors. Vs. Kalyan Kumar  Kisku and Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 266 This Court held thus: 4.From the above it is seen that in relation to the properties an  order of status quo as of today, that is, 15th September, 1988,

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had been passed by the court. It is complained that there is a  violation of these three orders by the six respondents,  Satyabrata Biswas, Rev. Bilash Chandra Das, Salil Biswas,  Sushil Sharma, Rt. Rev. Dinesh Chandra Gorai and Rt. Rev.  John E. Ghosh. The contempt was for: (1) putting a padlock to  the main entrance of the premises on 3.7.1993; (2)  disconnecting water supply, (3) obstructing sewerage line; and  (4) preventing the appellants from getting the rooms repaired. 10. Under these circumstances the present civil appeal by  special leave has come to be preferred. It is urged on behalf of  the appellants that in view of status quo order dated 15th  September, 1982 regarding the fixed property in possession of  the Durgapur Diocese no tenancy or sub-tenancy rights could  be created. It was also urged that the said Somani Builders  became sub-tenant under an agreement dated 10th May, 1993.  Such a sub-tenancy cannot be valid in view of the status quo  order. It is somewhat strange that Somani Builders should  made an oral application before the learned Single Judge. On  the basis of the oral application, the order came to be passed  in favour of the Somani Builders directing the Special Officer to  remove the padlock. As to what was the nature of the prayer,  that too by a person who was not a party to any one of these  proceedings, is not known. Therefore, the removal of padlock  on its instance, as directed by the learned Single Judge, was  not warranted. As though to add insult to injury when the  appellant was complaining about this order, the Division  Bench goes one step further and directs possession be given to  Somani Builders. This direction would amount to putting a  premium on the illegality committed by the former alleged  tenant A.K. Ghosh. 23. Apart from the fact whether A.K. Ghosh had a legal  authority to sub-lease or not it was not open to him to grant a  sub-lease in violation of the order. It is no use contending as  Mr. Chidambaram, learned Counsel for the respondents does,  that there was a bar to such a sub-lease under the terms of the  status quo order. It has the effect of violating the preservation  of status of the property. This will all the more be so when this  is done without the leave of the court to disturb the state of  things as they then stood. It would amount to violation of the  order. The principle contained in the maxim: ’Actus Curiae  Neminem Gravabit’ has no application at all to the facts of this  case when in violation of status quo order a sub-tenancy has  been created. Equally, the contention that even a trespasser  cannot be evicted without recourse to law is without merit,  because the state of affairs in relation to property as on  15.9.1988 is what the Court is concerned with. Such an order  cannot be circumvented by parties with impunity and expect  the court to confer its blessings. It does not matter that to the  contempt proceedings Somani Builders was not a party. It  cannot gain an advantage in derogation of the rights of the  parties, who were litigating originally. If the right of sub- tenancy is recognised, how is status quo as of 15.9.1988  maintained? Hence, the grant of sub-lease is contrary to the  order of status quo. Any act done in the teeth of the order of  status quo is clearly illegal. All actions including the grant of  sub-lease are clearly illegal.

In our opinion, the respondent Nos.1-4 had  deliberately and with mala fide motive have committed  contempt of the High Court in conducting the lottery  quite contrary to the order of injunction passed by the  High Court on 04.01.2005 and its subsequent  extensions.  When the auction was held, the order passed  by the High Court remain operative at the relevant time.   The High Court has miserably failed in not issuing

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direction to the contemnors to cancel the lottery held on  20, 21 and 22.03.2005 in violation of the solemn order  passed by the High Court.  In view of the clear finding of  the Court that the respondent had acted in clear violation  of the order made by the High Court.  It is settled law  that a party to the litigation cannot be allowed to take an  unfair advantage by committing breach of an interim  order and escape the consequences thereof by pleading  misunderstanding and thereafter retain the said  advantage gained in breach of the order of the Court.   Such violations should be put an end with an iron hand.   We are unable to accept the argument advanced by  learned Addl. Solicitor General that the respondents did  not understand the implication and consequences of a  prohibitory order passed by the High Court.  We have  already explained their conduct and the refusal to cancel  the order when they were advised to do so by the High  Court during the pendency of the contempt proceedings.   The act of the respondent is not only willful but also  deliberate and contumacious.  The High Court committed  a grave error of law by not holding that if there was a  doubt about the implication of the order of the Court, the  alleged contemnors should have approached the Court  and have clarified their alleged confusion.  Likewise, this  Court while ordering notice in the present appeal @ SLP  No. 15224 of 2006 have clearly directed on 18.09.2006  that no license shall be granted on the basis of the lottery  and pursuant to the circular dated 20.01.2004.  Even  after the receipt of the order, the respondents have not  cancelled the license, but allowed them to continue the  business.  The reason is obvious.  The respondents  though tendered unqualified apology before the High  Court, the High Court was not inclined to go into the  question of apology in view of the observations made by it  in the order impugned in this civil appeal.  Even before  us no apology whatsoever was tendered by respondent  Nos.1-4.  We, therefore, hold them guilty of willful and  deliberate act of contempt.  As it is evident that  respondent Nos.1-4 have no regard for the orders passed  by this Court on 4, 19 and 20.01.2005 and have scant  respect for the Court’s orders and have deliberately and  willfully and with utter disregard violated all the 3 orders  and are thus guilty of contempt of Court.  However,  taking a lenient view and taking into consideration of the  future prospects of the officers, respondent Nos. 1-4 we  are not imposing any punishment for their willful  violation of the order of the High Court and accept the  unqualified apology filed before the High Court.   Respondent Nos. 1-4 are severely warned that they shall  not involve themselves or violate the order passed by any  Court of law and will not resort to the unacceptable plea  that the said highly placed and highly qualified  government officials did not understand the implication  and/or consequences of a prohibitory order passed by  the Courts of law.  They shall not hereafter also take the  plea of inventing an innovative defence that they did not  realise the implications of the order passed by the High  Court which remained operative at the relevant time.  In the instant case, the respondents have conducted  the auction quite contrary to and in violation of an  injunction order passed by the High Court.  Courts have  held in a catena of decisions that where in violation of a  restraint order or an injunction order against a party,  something has been done in disobedience, it will be the  duty of the Court as a policy to set the wrong right and

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not allow the perpetuation of the wrong doing.  In our  opinion, the inherent power will not only be available  under Section 151 CPC as available to us in such a case  but it is bound to be exercised in that manner in the  interest of justice and public interest.  As rightly  observed by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in  AIR 1975 Madras 270, that as a matter of judicial policy  the Court should guard against itself being stultified in  circumstances like this by holding that it is powerless to  undo a wrong done in disobedience of the Court’s orders.   We, therefore, cancel all the auctions held on 20, 21 and  22.03.2005 and direct the respondent Nos.1-4 not to  allow the successful bidders to continue the business  and shall stop them forthwith and submit a report to this  Court of strict compliance.  We make it clear that we are  not expressing any opinion on the merits of the claim  made by the appellant Association in the writ petition  filed by them before the High Court which is pending.  All  the respondent Nos.1-4 are senior and experienced  officers and must be presumed to know that under the  constitutional scheme of this country orders of the High  Court have to be obeyed implicitly and that orders of this  Court \026 for that matter any Court should not be trifled  with.  We have already found hereinabove that they have  acted deliberately to subvert the orders of the High Court  evidently.  It is equally necessary to erase an impression  which appears to be gaining ground that the mantra of  unconditional apology is a complete answer to violations  and infractions of the orders of the High Court or of this  Court.  We, therefore hold them guilty of contempt of  Court and do hereby censure their conduct. Though a  copy of this order could be sent which shall form part of  the annual confidential record of service of each of the  said officers, we refrain from doing so by taking a lenient  view of the matter considering the future prospects of the  officers.  As already stated, the officers shall not indulge  in any adventurous act and strictly obey the orders  passed by the Courts of law.  The civil appeal stands  allowed.  Though this is a fit case for awarding exemplary  costs, again taking a lenient view, we say no costs.