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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3380 of 2005

PETITIONER: Ajendraprasadji Narendraprasadji Pandey          

RESPONDENT: Swami K. Narayandasji and Ors.                           

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/05/2005

BENCH: RUMA PAL, ARIJIT PASAYAT & C.K. THAKKER

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15386 of 2004) WITH  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3381 OF 2005 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16128 of 2004)

AND  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3382 OF 2005 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 17836 of 2004)

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

       Leave granted.

       When litigants come before courts raising disputes as  to who shall function as Head of a religious or financial  institutions, and they travel through the corridors of  various courts and come before this Court, one wonders when  do these persons get time to think of purity sublime  essences of religion and their duties as religious leaders.  It has a sad reflection on the credibility of the religious  institutions. Materialistic pursuits increasingly replace  divine pursuits. The present case at hand is no exception.

       The dispute centres round the question as to whether  the removal of Ajendraprasadji Narendraprasadji Pandey from  the post of Acharya on the basis of a purported resolution  dated 11.5.2002 passed by a body calling itself Satsangha  Maha Sabha was valid. Intimately linked with this core issue  is the legality of the action taken to install Rakesh  Prasadji Mahendra Prasadji. The dispute relates to Shri  Swaminarayan Sampradaya, Vadtal Gaddi. The concerned suit  was filed before the 3rd Joint Civil Judge, Senior  Division, Nadiad numbered as Special Civil Suit No.156/2002.  An application in terms of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the ’CPC’) was filed  and the same was allowed by order dated 1.10.2002 with the  following directions:

"The application Exh.5 filed by the plaintiff

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against the defendant is hereby allowed till  final disposal of the application and I pass  further order that the defendant herein  himself or his supporters be restrained from  entering in the Temple at Vadtal and  subordinate Temples-Gadhada, Junagadh.  Moreover, they shall not arrange any meeting  without prior permission of the Government.  Moreover, the defendant No.1 is removed from  the post of Acharya therefore he shall not  perform duty of Acharya.

The aforesaid interim order is granted till  the final disposal of the suit.                  Further, I pass order that the defendant, his  relatives or his followers shall not enter in   any temple of the Vadtal Trustee Board to  perform "Darshan" or "Puja". Further, they  are directed not to act against the aforesaid  order. They can perform "Darshan" like other  common man. They cannot perform "Darshan" or  "Puja" in the capacity of Acharya."

                It is to be noted that an application in terms of Order  7 Rule 11 CPC was filed which was rejected by the common  order dated 1.10.2002. An appeal was filed before the  Gujarat High Court for staying operation of the order of the  Trial Court and seeking injunction restraining the  appointment of any other person as Acharya of the Southern  Diocese. The appeal was admitted but no interim protection  was given. In the meantime, on 31.1.2003 the new Acharya was  appointed by the Committee constituted pursuant to the  resolution on 11.5.2002. An application was filed  questioning the appointment of the new Acharya i.e.  RakeshprasadJi Mahendraprasadji. Certain Satsanghis filed  Special Civil Suit No.17 of 2003 questioning appointment of  the new Acharya.

       Special Leave Petition (C) No.3351 of 2003 was filed  before this Court questioning order of the Gujarat High  Court in C.A. No.7520 of 2002 in A.O. No.421 of 2002. This  Court requested the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the Gujarat  High Court to ensure early disposal of the appeal. The  Appeal from Order No.421/2002, Appeal from Order No.69/2003  and Civil Application No.611/2003 and other miscellaneous  applications were filed and by the impugned judgment the  Appeal from Order No.421/2002 was dismissed while no order  was passed on other applications.           In support of the appeals, primary stand taken is that  the suit is misconceived in view of the provisions contained  in the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (in short the ’Act’),  more particularly in the background of Sections 50 and 51 of  the said Act. The purported resolution of 11.5.2002 has no  legal sanctity and the removal of the erstwhile Acharya was  done without any authority by a group of people who were  small in number compared to the large number of devotees and  persons belonging to the Sampradaya. The plaintiff had not  established prima facie case to show that the so-called body  which had passed the resolution had any authority or power  to remove an Acharya. The High Court did not express any  view in those aspects and held that it was not the proper  stage to decide the issues. Though the present appellant’s

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application in terms of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was rejected  that cannot and has not been taken as a ground to grant  injunction.  As the order was a combined one, the appeal can  be said to be against the order rejecting the application in  terms of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The High Court’s order suffers  from various infirmities as the earlier direction given to  take up all the connected matters together was not kept in  view. While disposing of the matter, the High Court did not  decide the points raised by a group of Satsanghis in the  connected matters.

       Learned counsel appearing for the respondents pointed  out that the two courts have been satisfied about the prima  facie case and the suit which has been filed by the group of  Satsanghis supporting the erstwhile Acharya is a red-herring  to confuse the issues. The concerned appeal i.e. A.O.69/2003  was on board when the appeal filed by Ajendraprasadji i.e.  A.O.421/2002 was taken up. This according to them is not a  matter where any interference is called for under Article  136 of the Constitution of India, 1950.

       It is to be noted that the legality of the appointment  of Rakeshprasadji as Acharya was questioned. So, as noted  above the basic controversy revolves round the question of  the legality of the decision taken to remove Ajendraprasadji  and the legality of the appointment of Rakeshprasadji.  

       It has been argued by learned counsel for the appellant  that the trial Court and the High Court did not even examine  the authority of the group of persons calling itself  Satsangh Mahasabha who passed the resolution to remove  Ajendraprasadji. It has been submitted by learned counsel  for the respondents that in the past it has been done by the  Satsangh Mahasabha and, therefore, the plea that the  resolution was without authority cannot be sustained. In any  event, the previous Acharya - Ajendraprasadji himself had  written a letter wanting opportunity to place his side of  the version before the body. It was pointed out by learned  counsel for the appellant that the letter in no way  indicated a concession to the position that the meeting  convened could take a decision to remove the Acharya. Even  if it is accepted that the body passing the resolution could  in a given case adopt a resolution to remove the Acharya,  the modalities and the nature of the exercise of the power  has to be proved by evidence. This position appears to have  been highlighted in the suit which forms the subject matter  of A.O.69/2003 before the High Court. Unfortunately, the  High Court contrary to its earlier directions that the  connected matters are to be heard together does not appear  to have dealt with the pleas raised in that appeal.  

       Had both the appeals been taken up together, the stand  of the parties would have become clearer before the High  Court. Additionally the High Court does not appear to have  dealt with the relevant aspects while affirming the order  passed by the trial Court.  

The appellant in appeal relating to SLP(C)  NO.17836/2004 submitted that the arguments were heard in  respect of the appeal A.O.69/2003 but no findings have been  recorded. The High Court on the said appeal had practically  rendered the same infructuous by its decision in AO  No.421/2003. We find that lot of confusion has been created  and the requisite care has not been taken to ensure that all  the connected matters were taken up together for effective

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adjudication. The impugned judgment which forms the subject  matter in appeal relating to SLP(C) No.15386/2004 lacks  clarity, analysis and precision. The basic issues have not  been addressed. On this score alone, we think it appropriate  to direct the High Court to hear the matter afresh along  with the appeal AO No.69/2003.  

       It is needless to note that while deciding the issue of  injunction the Courts have to consider the cumulative  factors i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and  irreparable loss. Definite findings have to be given on  these aspects, on a prima facie basis. The impugned judgment  of the High Court which forms the subject matter of appeal  relating to SLP(C) No.15386/2004 does not meet the  requirements. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on  the merits and the acceptability of the various issues, we  deem it appropriate to remit the matter to the High Court  for fresh consideration.  

       Since the controversy is continuing unabated, it would  be in the interest of the parties if the appeals and  connected matters are disposed of by the end of September,  2005. It would also be proper for the trial Court to dispose  of the matter as was directed by the High Court earlier to  dispose of the matter expeditiously preferably by the end of  November, 2005. Learned counsel for the parties had assured  us that they shall cooperate for early disposal of the  suits. We make it clear, as noted above, we have not  expressed any opinion on the merits and we have interfered  primarily on the ground that the impugned order of the High  Court has been passed without taking note of the relevant  aspects and, therefore, deserves to be set aside for fresh  consideration.

       The appeals are disposed of with no order as to costs.