http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 17  

PETITIONER: AJANTHA TRANSPORTS (P) LTD.  COIMBATORE ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S.  T. v.  K. TRANSPORTS, PULAMPATTTI, COIMBATORE,DISTT.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/09/1974

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH KHANNA, HANS RAJ KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1975 AIR  123            1975 SCR  (2) 166  1975 SCC  (1)  55  CITATOR INFO :  F          1975 SC 818  (6)  D          1978 SC 349  (6)

ACT: Motor Vehicles Act 1939-S. 47-scope of.

HEADNOTE: Decisions of this Court have made it clear that an  exercise of  the  permit  issuing power, under s.  47  of  the  Motor Vehicles Act, must rest on facts and circumstances  relevant for decision on the question of public interest which has to be   always   placed  in  the   forefront   in   considering applications for grant of permits.  Consideration of matters which  are  not relevant to or are foreign to the  scope  of powers  conferred  by s. 47 will vitiate the  grant  of  the permit.  A fact which, in certain circumstances, is relevant for  a  decision on what, the public  interest  demands  may become  irrelevant where in other circumstances, it  is  not connected  with  such  public  interest.   Every  class   of consideration specified in s. 47(1) of the Act is correlated to  the  interests of public  generally.   Section  47(1)(a) gives the dominant purpose and sub-cls. (b) to (f) are  only its  sub-categories or illustrations.  If any  matter  taken into  consideration  is not shown to be  correlated  to  the dominant  purpose  or, the relationship or the effect  of  a particular  fact, which has operated in favour of  grant  is such  as to show that it is opposed, on the face of  it,  to public interest, the grant will be bad.  The power to  grant permits under S. 47 of the Act is limited to the purpose for which it is meant to be exercised.  Considerations which are relevant  for  applying  Articles 14  and  19(1)(g)  of  the Constitution  could  not  be  foreign to  the  scope  of  s. 47(1)(a). [178 D-G] All Powers conferred by the Act including those given by  s. 47  must be deemed to be confined to the limits  imposed  by constitutional guarantees to citizens.  Hence, the manner in which a grant would affect guaranteed fundamental rights  of citizens could also be considered.  Even where powers to  be exercised by authorities which are organs of the State.  are not clearly defined, the Constitutional guarantees contained in  Articles  14  and 19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution  would

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 17  

certainly limit the scope and regulate the exercise of  much powers. [177 C-D] Maharashtra  State Road Transport Corporation v.  Mangrulpir Jt.   Motor Service (P) Ltd. & Ors. [1971] Supp.   1  S.C.R. 561  @  570;  Patiala Bus (Sirhinad)  Pvt.   Ltd.  v.  State Transport Appellate Tribunal Punjab & Ors. AIR 1974 SC  1174 @ 1177 followed. Pal  Singh  v. State Transport Authority Tribunal  U.P.  and Ors.  A.I.R. 1957 All P. 254 @ 256 referred to. The observations of Andhra Pradesh High Court in M/s.  N. S. Ghouse  Miah  &  Abdullaha  Sharoff  v.  Regional  Transport Authority, Cuadapah AIR 1963 A.P. 167 263  @ 266 to the effect that even matters not specified  in the  section  can be taken into account must  therefore,  be understood to mean that powers contained in s. 47 of the Act as  well  ’as the rule-making powers of the  State  must  be exercised  conformably  with the  Constitutional  guarantees given  to  citizens  by  articles 14  and  19(1)(g)  of  the Constitution,  and,  if  this is all that is  meant  by  the observation, the view is unobjectionable. [177B; C] (1)  Therefore, the relevance of the previous possession  or grant  of  a  permit  appears  only  when  other  facts  and circumstances,  connecting it with, and showing  either  the adverse or beneficial effects of its impact, in a particular case,  on  the interests of the public are shown  to  exist. Unless  and  until  these  other  facts  and  circumstances, indicating the nexus or connection with the public interest, appear,  such  a  fact,  by itself,  should  not  affect  an application for a permit:     and [180 C-D] (2)  the weight to be attached to such a consideration  will obviously  depend  upon the totality of all such  facts  and circumstances viewed in a proper perspective. [180D] In  C.A.  1402  of 1974  the  Regional  Transport  Authority granted a stage carriage permit to the appellant.  On appeal the  State  Appellate Tribunal set aside the  claim  of  the respondent on the ground inter alia that the appellant was a recent  grantee  and that it had three permits  whereas  the respondent  had  only  a  single  permit.   The  High  Court rejected the revision petition of the appellant under s. 115 C.P.C. Allowing the appeal, HELD  : (1) Ordinance 4 and 6 of 1971. having been  repealed by Motor Vehicles Tamil Nadu (Amendment) Acts, 10 and 16  of 1971,  the provisions of s. 47(1)(e) of the  Motor  Vehicles Act were applicable to the grant. [180G] (2)  Section   47(1)(a)  is  wide  enough  to  include   all categories  of public interest including those laid down  by valid  rules.   Clause ’(f)’ of sub-rule (3) of  rule  155A, framed   by  the  State  Govt.  under  s.  133(1),   should, therefore,  have been taken into account, and, unless  there was  good enough reason to depart from it, the  rule  should have been followed.  Had this been done every stage carriage upto  four would give an applicant an additional mark so  as to help him to make up the ’Viable Unit’ of five.  A  recent grant  could  not.  considered  by  itself  and  singly,  be converted into a demerit as the Appellate Tribunal seems  to have done.  In as much as the Appellate Tribunal acted in  a mechanical  fashion, by ignoring clause (f) of sub-rule  (3) of  Rule  155A and without showing  the  correlationship  of facts  mentioned  by it to any of the categories  of  public interest   found  in  s.  47(1)  of  the  Act  or   to   the Constitutional  guarantee  contained  in  Articles  14   and 19(1)(g)  of the Constitution, the observance of which  must also be presumed to be in public interest, the order of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 17  

Appellate Tribunal was vitiated by a material  irregularity. The  High Court should, therefore. have interfered  even  in the exercise of its power under s. 115 C.P.C. which has been made applicable to Such cases. [181 E-G] Relevancy  or otherwise of one or more grounds of  grant  or refusal  of  a permit could be a jurisdictional  matter.   A grant or its refusal on totally irrelevant grounds would  be ultra  vires or a case of excess of power.   a ground  which is  irrelevant is taken into account with others  which  are relevant,   or,   a  relevant  ground.  which   exists,   is unjustifiably  ignored,  it could be said to be  a  case  of exercise  of power under s. 47 of the Act, which  is  quasi- judicial,  in  a  manner  which  suffers  from  a   material irregularity.  Both will be covered by s. 115 C.P.C. [180B] In  C.A.  2254 of 1968 the respondent was  granted  a  stage carriage permit by the Regional Transport Authority oil  the ground  that  it was better acquainted with the  routes  and rejected  the  claim of the appellant that it was  a  recent grantee  of a stage carriage permit.  ’the  State  Transport Appellate Tribunal 168 preferred  the claim of the appellant on the ground that  it was a local enterprise of persons and did not consider grant of a permit on another route as a disqualification. The High Court   remanded   the  case  to  the   Tribunal   for   its reconsiderations to whether it would be consistent with  the public interest to grant further permits to the appellant. Dismissing the appeal, HELD:     The  High  Court only held that the fact  that  an applicant   is   a  recent  grantee  may   be   a   relevant consideration.  As the order was not a final one it was  not a  case for a certificate under Art. 133 (1) (c).   Further, it  is  not a fit case on merits for the  grant  of  special leave under Article 136.  Relevance or irrelevance of such a consideration  will  depend upon the totality of  facts  and circumstances  which must correlate such a ground to  public interest. [182E] In  C.A. 1481-83 of 1970, the Regional  Transport  Authority granted  a  stage  carriage permit to  the  respondent.   On appeal the State Transport Appellate Tribunal granted to the appellant  overruling  the objection the lie  was  a  recent grantee.   The  High Court held that the  Tribunal  had  not understood  he  ratio  of  the  decisions  relating  to  the relevancy of recent grants and there had in reality been  no selection and remitted the matter to the Tribunal. Dismissing the appeals, HELD:     The High Court has rightly observed that, when the results exercise of power to grant permit shows that permits are,  without  Sufficient  ground for  a  discrimination  or preference   based   on  an  appraisement   of   merits   or requirements of public interest. being invariably granted to one   particular  party  the  powers  are  not   fairly   or impartially  exercised.  Quasi-judicial powers have  ’to  be exercised fairly, reasonably and impartially. [183B]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1402 OF 1974 (Appeal  by special leave from the Judgment and order  dated the  30th April 1974 of the Madras High Court in  C.  Revsn. Petn.  No. 576 of 1974. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2254 OF 1969 Appeal from the Judgment and order dated the 17th  September

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 17  

1959  of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No.  282  of 1969. CIVIL APPEALS NOS. 1481 TO 1483 OF 1970 (Appeal  by special leave from the Judgment and order  dated 9th October 1969, of the Madras High Court in W. Appeal Nos. 437439 of 1969). SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1376 OF 1970 (From  the Judgment and order dated 2nd September,  1969  of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W. A. No. 312 of 1969). Y.   S.  Chitale and Vineet Kumar; for the Appellant (in  CA No. 1402/74). T.   S.  Krishnamurthi Iyer, K. Jayaram and G. S.  Prakasrao for the Appellant in CA No. 2254/69. K. JaYaram for the Appellant (in CAs.  No. 1481-83/70). 169 M.   K. Ramamurthi, A.  S. Namibiar and Vineet Kumar for the Petitioner (In SLP 1376/70). K.   S.  Ramamurthi and A. T. M. Sampath for the  Respondent in CA No. 1402//69). A. S. Nambiar for the Respondent (In CA No. 2254/69). A.   S. Nambiar for Respondents (In CAs.  Nos. 1481-83/70). M.   K.  Ramamurthi,  Mrs. Shyamala Pappu,  A.  S.  Nambiar, Vineet Kumar, and S. Srinivasan for Respondent No. 1 (In  CA No. 1481/ 70). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG,  J. We will detail facts leading up to the  five  Civil Appeals,  which were heard together, before formulating  and deciding the common questions of law raised by them. Civil  Appeal  No.  1402  of 1974  arises  out  of  fourteen applications,  including that of the appellant  before  Lis, Ajantha  Transports (P) Ltd.. which were considered on  29th December   1971   by  the  Regional   Transport   Authority, Coimbatore, for the grant of a stage carriage permit to  ply an   additional  bus  on  the  route  from   Coimbatore   to Sathyamangalam via Koilpalayam and some other places.   Five of  these were rejected on the preliminary ground  that  the prescribed  fees had not been paid.  One was  withheld  from consideration for want of Income-tax Clearance  certificate. One applicant was found disqualified, under Section 62(A)(c) of  the  Motor  Vehicle Act as amended  by  the  Tamil  Nadu Amendment Act 16 of 1971. because lie already had more  than ten  permits.   Out of the remaining seven  applicants,  the highest  scorer, according to the marking system adopted  by the  Regional  Transport Authority of the  region,  was  one Palaniappa  Gounder who obtained nine marks.   But,  Gounder was "by-passed" in favour of the appellant who secured  8.69 marks  because Gounder had already been granted a permit  on 8th  October 1971.  Three appeals, including one by  Gounder were  then  preferred  to  the  State  Transport   Appellate Tribunal   against   the  Regional   Transport   Authority’s resolution.   Only  the  appeal  of  P.  V.  K.  Transports, described  as  "the second appellant",  succeeded,  although this  party was awarded only 7.42 marks as against  8.69  of the  appellant  before  Lis.   The break  up  of  the  marks allotted,  in accordance with rule 155(A) of the Tamil  Nadu Motor Vehicle Rules, was given as follows ------------------------------------------------------------ "Resi- BO          Work- Exper- Sector      Viable    Total  dence             shop  rence              Unit. ------------------------------------------------------------ 2nd appellant2      2      2      0 .42        1    7 .42 Respondent2         2      1.63   0 .06        3    8 .69 ------------------------------------------------------------ It appears, from the order of the State Transport  Tribunal, that  the  parties did not dispute the  correctness  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 17  

marks actually assigned under various heads.  The contention of the second appellant 170 M/s.   P. V. K. Transports, before the State Tribunal,  that two  additional marks should also have been allotted  to  it for  its Branch Office, was rejected on the ground that  the R.T.A.  had  rightly refused to grant additional  marks  for this  reason as the Branch Office had not  been  functioning continuously  and  was  meant only for  buses  plying  under temporary  permits.   The Tribunal then  observed  that,  if operational qualifications only were taken into account,  P. V.  K. Transports had secured 6.42 marks as against 5.69  of the  Ajantha  Transports (P) Ltd.  It pointed out  that  the respondent  before it was given two additional  marks  under the  heading ’Viable Unit’ only because it had  three  buses running as against one of P. V. K. Transports.  It set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and  preferred the  claims of P. V. K. Transports on two grounds stated  as follows :-               "The  R.  T.  A. had not  borne  in  mind  the               relevant considerations under Section 47(1) of               the  M V Act in choosing the best one for  the               permit.   I am of the view that the  claim  of               the 2nd appellant should be upheld as  against               the  respondent  on two  substantial  grounds.               Firstly,  the respondent was a recent  grantee               on the date of meeting, it aaying obtained its               third  permit on 31st Jul,, 1971,  about  five                             months  prior to it.- The 2nd appellan t’s  only               permit was got by it on 8th December 1970.  As               already noticed, the R. T. A. has chosen to by               pass applicant No. 6 (K. Palaniappa  Gounder),               the top scorer on the only ground that he  was               a  recent  grantee.   This  is  a  matter  for               surprise  as to why he did not apply the  same               test to the respondent, also a recent grantee.               That recent grant is a relevant  consideration               is beyond dispute.  Secondly the 2nd appellant               is  a single permit holder and the  respondent               is a three permit bolder.  This being a medium               route,   the  claim  of  the   former,   whose               qualifications are almost the same as those of               the  latter should be preferred.  In W  P  No.               120/71  and 2028/71 the Madras High Court  has               upheld the judgment of the Tribunal Preferring               a single permit holder as against a two permit               holder (vide also Judgment in WP No. 482/ 71).               1  therefore  find that the 2nd  appellant  is               best suited for the grant of the permit." The   High  Court  of  Madras  had  rejected   the   Ajantha Transports’ Revision Petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure code which was made applicable to decisions of the Tribunal by the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicle Amendment Act 16 of 1971.  It held that there was no error  of  jurisdiction  or material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction  since the   Tribunal   had   based  its   decision   on   relevant considerations.     Against this decision the appellant  was granted special leave to appeal to this Court. Civil  Appeal  No.  2254 of 1969 arises out  of  twenty  one applications  which  came up for  consideration  before  the Regional  Transport Authority.  South Arcot, Cuddalore,  for grant of a stage carriage permit for- the route from  Porto- Novo to Puliyangudi.  The R. T. A. 171

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 17  

rejected five applications on the ground that they were from new  entrants  who  had  no  previous  experience  of   this business, One was rejected on the ground that it was from  a dissolved   company.   Another  was  rejected  because   the applicant  was  dead.  Six were eliminated  because  of  bad entries  on their permits during the preceding  year.   Five were  rejected on the ground that they held either no  work- shops  or not sufficiently equipped workshops.  Out  of  the three  remaining applicants, one was considered inferior  in merit in comparison with the remaining two, as his knowledge of the route was not so good as of the other two.  The joint applicants  Chettiar and Another at No. 6 were preferred  to Natarajan,  applicant No. 13, on two grounds : firstly,  the applicants  at  No.  6 were considered  as  somewhat  better acquainted with the routes; and, secondly, the applicant No. 13 had secured a recent grant of a permit on another  route. Hence,  it was considered more equitable to drop him  to  as "not tot inflict strain on the same operator by granting him more than one permit at a time". Against  the above mentioned decision of the R. T. A,  there were  three  appeals before the  State  Transport  Appellate ’Tribunal,  which elaborately considered the claims of  each appellant   vis-a-vis   the  successful   respondents.    It preferred  the  claim of Karmen Motor  Transport  (P)  Ltd., principally on the ground that it was a local enterprise. of persons  residing  along the route.  It seemed to  take  the view that the mere fact that Kannon Motor Transport (P) Ltd. had  been  granted  a permit on another route  at  the  same meeting of the R.T.A.. was no disqualification.  It did  not actually  hold  such a ground to be  irrelevant.   But,  its remarks  showed  that a recent grant of a  permiton  another route  was not considered by it to be really material.   It, however,  made  it clear that the principal  ground  of  its preference  was that M/s.  Kannon Motor Transport  (P)  Ltd. was "a local enterprise" of persons who could be expected to be better acquainted with the needs of the locality. A  learned Judge of the Madras High Court refused  to  quash the. order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal because the  main  ground  for the preference  was  that  the  local residence  of the parties whose appeal had been  allowed  by the Tribunal gave them a better claim.  In the course of his judgment,  however,  the learned Judge.  observed  that  the State  Tribunal could not be compelled to take into  account matters which were "external" or irrelevant for the purposes of  exercising  the power of granting permits.   A  Division Bench of the Madras High Court, disagreeing with this  view, set  aside  the  judgment of the learned  Single  Judge  and remanded the case for reconsideration to the Tribunal on the ground               "The  Tribunal  could  well  have   considered               whether  in all the circumstances,  the  first               respondent  before its, should, having  regard               to  public interest, be granted more than  one               permit  at  the same meeting of  the  Regional               Transport Authority.  That would be a relevant               question".               172               It pointed out               "The,  first respondent altogether  got  three               permits at the hands of the Tribunal.  Whether               he  having  got a permit before  the  Regional               Transport  Authority  it would  be  consistent               with public interest to grant further  permits               at  the  stage of appeals  was  undoubtedly  a               matter relevant to the consideration and  that

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 17  

             having  not been decided by the Tribunal,  its               order is vitiated". The  Civil Appeal No. 2254 of 1969 has come up  before  this ’Court  after certification of the case by the  Madras  High Court under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution as ;it one for an appeal to this Court. Civil  Appeals Nos. 1481-1483 of 1970 have resulted from  42 applications  made for the grant of a permit to ply  on  the route  Chidambaram to Tirukoilur via Vedalur,  Kadampuliyur, Panruti,  and some other places, by the  Regional  Transport Authority,   South  Arcot.   It  appears  that,  after   the elimination  of a number of applications on various  grounds of disqualification, the R. T. A. embarked, ultimately, on a comparison of the relative merits of three applicants 1.   M/s.  Prabhu Transport (P) Ltd.; 2.   Sri Dhanalakshmi Bus Service; 3.   M. R. S. Motor Service. The   R.   T.  A.  found,  on  23rd   December   1965,   the qualifications  of M/s.  Prabhu Transports (P) Ltd.,  to  be superior,  to those of its rivals and ordered the  grant  of the  permit to it.  Fifteen appeals were filed  against  the order of the R.T.A. After setting out the qualifications  of each  of  the appellants before it  elaborately,  the  State Transport  Appellate  Tribunal considered the  case  of  the appellant before us, M/s.  Kannon Motor Transports (P) Ltd., to  be best and overruled the objection that a recent  grant on  a different route altogether should also  be  considered material.  It said :                "The  9th  appellant is  M/s.   Kannon  Motor               Transports  (P) Ltd., Chidambaram.  It owns  2               route buses. its main     office and residence               are at Chidambarain.it has afully  equipped               workshop  at that place and  arrangements  for               effecting repairs have been made at theother               end  of  the route  i.e.,  Tirukoilur.     Its               experience  is from about   the  beginning  of               1961. Its  history  sheet  is   perfectly               clean.  Its route knowledge islimited  to  7-               1/2   miles.   This  appellant  is   a   local               enterprise  who  is trying to  have  a  viable               unit.  It has a fully equipped workshop at one               of  the  terming  and  at  the  other  terming               arrangements  for effecting repairs have  been               made.  Ithas sufficient experience and  some               knowledge of the route.It thus possesses basic               qualifications for the grant.  Butthen    it               was  pointed  out  that this  appellant  is  a               recent  grantee of another permit.  In  W.  P.               No.  852  and 1049 of 1962, it has  been  held               that  where  the  recent grant  relates  to  a               different route altogether and if that is  the               only circumstances present that in itself  may               not be relevant as the               173               sole ground for declining the grant of permit.               It  is not the case of any of  the  appellants               that grant for this appellant is in respect of               this identical route.  This appellant who  has               the basic qualifications and who is trying  to               build up a viable unit in my view is the  most               suited person to receive this permit, for each               of  the remaining appellants owns  more  route               buses than what he has". Three  connected  writ petitions were filed  in  the  Madras High,  Court  against the judgment and order  of  the  State

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 17  

Transport  Appellate  Tribunal  preferring  the  appellant’s claim over those of others on the ground that the  appellant should have an opportunity to build up a viable unit as each of  "the remaining appellants owns more route  buses"’  than what  the  appellant  had.  A learned Single  Judge  of  the Madras  High Court, after examining the orders of the  State Tribunal  in  the  light of all the facts of  cases  of  the claimants  as set out by the Tribunal itself, concluded  and ordered :               ’"  There  has in reality been  no  selection,               considering  the  claims  of  the   applicants               together.    A  comparative  assessment   with               reference  to relevant and material  facts  is               lacking   and  the  ratio  of  the   decisions               relating to the relevancy of recent grants not               understood.   In the circumstances, the  order               of  the  State  Transport  Appellate  Tribunal               cannot be sustained it is therefore,  quashed.               The Tribunal has no\,,, to take up the  matter               and  consider  the  claims  of  the  aggrieved               applicants,   the  petitioners  in  the   Writ               Petitions  and the 1st Respondent, afresh,  in               the light of the observations contained The  matter  was then taken before a Division Bench  of  the Madras’  High  Court in these appeals.  The  Division  Bench quoted  the  following  passage from  the  judgment  of  the learned Single Judge setting out The main  grievance of  the petitioners in the High Court               "Counsel  pointed  out that,  in  the  instant               case, it is not even a case of recent grant in               favour  of the common first  respondent,  and,               that,  ignoring  the  salutary  and  essential               principle  of  giving  equal  opportunity   to               competent operators, the common 1st respondent               has been made to build up his viable unit  out               of permits granted at the same sitting of  the               Regional  Transport  Authority,-  one  by  the               Regional  Transport Authority and two  by  the               Tribunal.    It   is   submitted   that    the               petitioners  have not been found to  be  unfit               and  if they were not  otherwise  disqualified               their  claims to build up viable  units  along               with  the  1st  respondent  should  have  been               considered and the permits distributed." It then gave the following justification of the view of  the learned  Single  Judge and the dismissal in  limine  of  the appeals before it                "Now  it is pointed out to us that the  grant               of  the permits for the routes Porto  Novo  to               Puliyangudi and Chidam-                174               baram to Perambalur has been set at large  for               fresh  consideration  of  the  merits  of  the               applicants,  by the State Transport  Appellate               Tribunal.  What the learned Judge has done  in               the present case relating to the grant of  the               permit   for   the   route   Chidambaram    to               Thirukoilur,  is to set at large the grant  of               the permit for the route also, that the claims               of  the  rival applicants  can  be  considered               bearing   in   mind  also   the   circumstance               mentioned  above,  which was considered  as  a               relevant  circumstance for ’the grant  of  the               permits  more  or less at the same  time,  for               different   overlapping  routes   as   between

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 17  

             competing operators.  It is this reason  which               appears  to  have weighed primarily  with  the               learned  Judge in setting aside the  order  of               the  State  Transport Appellate  Tribunal  and               remanding the matter to the same Tribunal  for               fresh   disposal.    In   our   opinion    the               correctness of the principle relied on by  the               learned Judge for setting the matter at  large               in  the  present  case  cannot  be   seriously               disputed.   It was clearly necessary  to  have               the  matter regarding the grant of the  permit               for the route Chidambaram to Thirukoilur  also               considered  afresh,  since the  grant  of  the               permits  ’for the other routes also  has  been               set at large.  The learned Judge in the  order               now impugned has also restricted the scope  of               the  lower Appellate Tribunal’s order  to  the               claims   of   the  petitioner  and   the   1st               Respondent  in  the Writ  petition.   To  this               extent the scope of the fresh enquiry has been               narrowed and this will be an advantage to  the               appellant.  In the above circumstances, we see               no  ground to interfere with the order of  the               learned  Judge in the Writ Petition  in  these               writ appeals which are dismissed in limine". Against the Division Bench judgment and order we have  three appeals  Nos.  1481-71483  of 1976 before  us  by  grant  of Special leave. The  questions which fall for consideration upon  the  facts set out above are (1)Is  possession by at recent grant of another permit  to an applicant for a stage carriage permit, either by  itself, or,  in conjunction with. other facts and  circumstances,  a relevant  consideration  in either refusing  or  granting  a permit to an applicant ? (2)If  it  is, in any particular set of  circumstances,  a relevant consideration, what is the weight to be attached to it  in  the assessment of the comparative  merits  of  rival claims ? (3)Does  the High Court’s judgment or order in any of  the cases  dealt with by it call for interference by us  in  any respect  in exercise of our powers under Article 136 of  the Constitution ? The questions posed above must, we think, be answered having regard to the provisions of Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act  and such relevant and valid rules as may be framed  for laying down the 175 mode  of exercising power to grant of permits.  Section  4-/ (1) of the Act reads as follows :                "A  Regional  Transport Authority  shall,  in               considering   an  application  for   a   stage               carriage permit, have regard to the  following               matters, namely               (a)   the interests of the public generally:               (b)   the  advantages  to the  public  of  the               service to              be provided, including               the  saving  of  nine likely  to  be  effected               thereby  and  any  convenience  arising   from               journeys not being broken;               (c)   the   adequacy   of   other    passenger               transport  services  operating  or  likely  to               operate in the near future, whether by road or               other means, between the places to be served;               (d)   the  benefit to any particular  locality

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 17  

             or  localities  likely to be affected  by  the               service;               (e)   the operation by the applicant of  other               transport services, including those in respect               of which applications from him for permits Are               pending;               (f)   the  condition of the roads included  in               the proposed route or area;               and  shall  also take into  consideration  any               representations   made  by   persons   already               providing  passenger transport  facilities  by               any means along or near the proposed route  or               area,  or  by  any  association   representing               persons  interested in the provision  of  road               transport facilities recognised in this behalf               by.  the  State Government, or  by  any  local               authority  or  police authority  within  whose               jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or               area lies :               Provided that other conditions being equal, an               application for a stage carriage permit from a               cooperative  society registered or  deemed  to               have been registered under any enactmentin               force for the time being shall, as far as  may               be,   given preference over applications   from               individual powers". One of thesubmissions  before us was that the  Regional Transport Authority canact on considerations falling clear outside the purview of Section 47of  the  Motor   Vehicles Act.  But, no case decided by this Court, where such a  view may  have  been taken, was placed before us.  Reliance  was, however,  placed  on M/s.  N. S. Ghouse Miah  and  Abdullaha Shroff  v. Regional Transport Authority.  Cuddapah,(1)  and, Pal  Singh v.  State Transport Authority Tribunal  U.P.  and Ors.(2) (1) AIR 1963 A. P. 263 @ 266. (2) AIR 1957 All p. 254 Ca 256. 176 In Ghouse Miah’s case (supra) the Andhra Pradesh High  Court had  while considering the validity of a rule observed  (,at page 266)               "The  State Government is surely competent  to               lay  down by way of general  guidance  certain               fundamental   principles,   which   will    be               according to them in the interests of the pub-               lic  generally.   The heading will  cover  any               ground  which  might not have  been  expressly               mentioned  in  Section  47.   It  is   neither               possible  nor is it desirable to restrict  the               discretion of the Regional Transport Authority               to grant or refuse a stage carriage permit  on               consideration of public interest.               It went on to express (at page 266)               "Even otherwise we do not think that the scope               of the section is limited to the factors to be               taken  into  consideration  while   orienting,               stage carriage permit mentioned in Section  4-               7. It is not correct to say that Section 47 of               the  Act  forms a complete code  or  that  the               factors mentioned therein are exhaustive.   In               our  view that is clear from the words  ’shall               have   regard   to’  in   Section   47.    The               requirement of the section is that the  matter               specified in the section may not be taken into               consideration.   In other words,  the  primary

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 17  

             duty  of the- Regional Transport Authority  is               to   take  into  consideration   the   matters               specified  but  it does not  follow  that  the               hands, of the Regional Transport Authority are               tied  to  the consideration of  these  matters               alone  and  they  must  shut  their  eyes   to               everything else".               In  Pal  Singh’s case (supra),  the  Allahabad               High Court had observed (at page 256)               "The  law on the subject is  not  exhaustively               contained  in Section 47; any direction  given               by  the  State  transport  Authority  in   its               appellate jurisdiction is also to be  complied               with by the Regional Transport Authority.   If               the State Transport Authority has jurisdiction               to pass an order, it must be complied with  by               the  Regional Transport Authority.   Therefore               our  learned brother Gopalji Mehrotra was  not               correct  when he observed that an  application               for renewal cannot be dismissed except on  any               of  the grounds mentioned in Section  47,  and               that  when  a permit had been granted  to  the               petitioner  the renewal application cannot  be               refused on the around that the original permit               itself was illegal". pal Sinh’s case (supra) was decided before this Court  held, in  M/s.   Raman & Raman Ltd. v. The State  of  Madrass  and Ors.(1)  that  the administrative  directions  issued  under Section  43A or the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended  by the  Motor  vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948,  did  not have  the force of law in regulating the rights of  parties. In Ghouse Miah’s case (supra), the Andhra Pradesh High Court had, after indicating the amplitude of the "interest of  the public generally", mentioned in Section 47(1)(a), held that (1)  [1959] 2 Suppl.S.C.R. 227. 177 the  use of the words "shall have regard to in  Section  47" meant  that the Section did not exhaustively  specify  every kind  of  matter which may be taken to  account.   The  High Court had then tested the rules framed under the Act by  the norms  provided  by  Articles  19(1)  (g)  and  14  of   the Constitution.   It  struck down a part of Rule 153  (d)  for violating Article 14. What  the Andhra Pradesh High Court seems to have meant  was that  powers contained in Section 47 of the Act as  well  as the  rule  making  powers of the  State  must  be  exercised conformably  with  the Constitutional  guarantees  given  to citizens  by Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of  the  Constitution which  are certainly not mentioned specifically anywhere  in the  Act.  All powers conferred by the Act, including  those given  by Section 47, must be deemed to be confined  to  the limits  imposed  by Constitutional guarantees  to  citizens. Hence,  the manner in which a grant would affect  guaranteed fundamental rights of citizens could also be considered.  if this  is all that is meant by laying down that even  matters not  specified  in Section 47 of the Act can be  taken  into account,  we think that the view is  unobjectionable.   Even where  powers  to  be exercised by  authorities,  which  are organs   of  the  State,  are  not  clearly   defined,   the Constitutional  guarantees contained in Articles 14  and  19 (1) (g) of the Constitution would certainly limit the  scope and regulate the exercise of such powers. This  Court  recently, in Maharashtra State  Road  Transport Corporation  v.  Mangrulpir Jt.  Motor Service  (P)  Ltd.  & Ors.(1),  after setting out the provisions of Section 47  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 17  

the  Act,  observed about the manner in which  the  Regional Transport Authority has to function (see p. 570)               "It  is a statutory body.  It is  to  exercise               statutory powers in the public interest.  Such               public  interest would have to  be  considered               with  regard to particular matters  enumerated               in  Section 47 of the Act and the  particulars               of  an  application  are  to  be  judged  with               reference to sections 46 and 47/ in particular               of the Act". More recently, in Patiala Bus (Sirhind) Pvt.  Ltd. v.  State Transport  Appellate  Tribunal Punjab & Ors.(2)  this  Court said with regard to the provisions of Section 47 of the  Act (at p. 1 177)               "The main considerations required to be  taken               into account are the interest of the public in               general  and the advantages to the  public  of               the  service to be provided, and  these  would               include  inter alia consideration  of  factors               such as the experience of the rival claimants,               their  past performance, the  availability  of               stand-by  vehicles with them, their  financial               resources,  the  facility  of  well   equipped               workshop  possessed  by them etc.   The  State               Transport Appellate Tribunal, however,  failed               to   take   into   account   any   of    these               considerations  and proceeded as if the  stage               carriage permits were a largess to be  divided               fairly   and  equitably  amongst   the   rival               claimants.  We do not find in the order of the               State   Transport   Appellate   Tribunal   any               discussion of the               [1971] Supp.  S. C. R. 561 @ 570.               13-L251-Sup.CI/75               (2) A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1174 Ca, 1177.               178               question as to what the interest of the public               in  general requires and who from amongst  the               rival  claimants would be able to provide  the               most efficient and satisfactory service Lo the               public.   None  of  the  relevant  factors  is               considered, or even adverted to, by the  State               Transport   Appellate  Tribunal.   The   State               Transport  Appellate Tribunal merely seems  to               have considered what would be fair as  between               the  appellant  and the third  respondent  and               thought  that  it would be most  fair  if  one               stage carriage permit with a return trip  were               granted   to  the  appellant  and  one   stage               carriage permit with return trip were  granted               to  the  third respondent.  That is  a  wholly               erroneous approach.  The question that has  to               be considered is not as to what would be  fair               as   between  the  appellant  and  the   third               respondent, but what does the interest of  the               public,  which  is  to  be  provided  with  an               efficient  and satisfactory  service,  demand.               The  order  of the State  Transport  Appellate               Tribunal,   therefore,   suffered   from    an               infirmity,  in  that it failed  to  take  into               account relevant considerations and  proceeded               on the basis of an irrelevant consideration." Thus,  decisions  of this Court have made it clear  that  an exercise  of the permit issuing power, under Section  47  of the  Act, must rest on facts and circumstances relevant  for

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 17  

decision on the question of public interest, which has to be always placed in the fore-front in considering  applications for  grant of permits.  Consideration of matters  which  are not relevant to or are foreign to the scope (if powers  con- ferred  by  Section 47 will vitiate the grant  of  a  permit under Section 47. A fact which, in certain circumstances, is relevant for a decision on what the public interest  demands may  become irrelevant where it is not connected  with  such public  interest.   Instead, every  class  of  consideration specified  in Section 47(1) of the Act seems  correlated  to the  interests  of the public generally.   It  appears  that Section  47(1)  (a) gives the dominant purpose  and  Section 47(1)   (b)   to  (f)  are  only   its   sub-categories   or illustrations.   If any matter taken into  consideration  is not  shown to be correlated to the dominant purpose or,  the relationship  or the effect of a particular fact, which  has operated in favour of a grant is such as to show that it  is opposed,  on the face of it, to public interest,  the  grant will be bad.  The power to grant permits under Section 47 of the Act is limited to the purposes for which it is meant  to be   exercised.   Considerations  which  are  relevant   for applying Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution  could not  be foreign to the scope of Section 47(1) (a)  which  is fairly wide. Where the power to grant permits shows that its exercise  is meant to be judged on the touchstone of the interests of the public  generally,  the test being broad enough to  take  in applications  of  Articles 14 and 19(1)(g),  read  with  the relevant  proviso,  which  require a  just   and  reasonable balancing  and  reconciliation  of  general  and  individual interests,  we  think that it would not be correct  to  hold that  the power contained in Section 47 can go beyond it  or against  it,  because, to take such a view, would  make  the provision  itself Constitutionally invalid.   Therefore,  we hold that permit issuing power under Section, 179 47  is  restricted  to service of interests  of  the  public generally in a broad enough sense to include due respect for guaranteed fundamental rights of citizens.  Indeed,  service of interests of the public generally is the expressed object of  even Section 68C in Chapter IVA of the  Act  authorising framing of schemes of nationalisation of transport services. Such  an object underlies the whole machinery of  regulation by issue of permits for plying. motor vehicles on hire. It  should  be clear, when the main object, to  which  other considerations  must  yield  in cases of  conflict,  of  the permit  issuing  powers under Section 47 of the Act  is  the service  of  interests  of the public  generally,  that  any particular fact or circumstances, such as a previous  recent grant  in  favour of an applicant of the  holding  of  other permits  by an operator, cannot, by itself, indicate how  it is  related to this object.  Unless, there- are other  facts and  circumstance which link it with this object  the  nexus will not be established.  For instance, an applicant may  be a  recent  grantee  whose capacity to  operate  a  transport service  efficiently  remains to be tested so that  a  fresh grant  to  him may be premature.  In such  a  case,  another applicant  of  tested efficiency may be preferred.   On  the other hand, a fresh grantee may have, within a short period, disclosed  such  superiority  or efficiency  or  offer  such amenities to passengers that recent grant in his favour  may be  no obstacle in his way at all.  Again, the fact that  an applicant is operating other motor vehicles on other permits may, in one case, indicate that he had exceeded the optimum, or,  has  a position con parable to a  monopolist,  but,  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 17  

another case, it may enable the applicant to achieve  better efficiency  by moving towards the optimum which seems to  be described  as a "Viable Unit" in the rules framed in  Madras in  1968.  Thus, it will be seen that, by itself,  a  recent grant  or  the  possession of other  permits  is  neither  a qualification  nor  a disqualification divorced  from  other circumstances  which  could  indicate how  such  a  fact  is related  to  the interests of the public generally.   It  is only   if   there   are   other   facts   establishing   the correlationship and indicate its advantages or disadvantages to  the  public  generally that it will  become  a  relevant circumstance.   But,  in  cases  where  everything  else  is absolutely  equal  as  between two  applicants,  which  will rarely be the case, it could be said that an application  of principle of equality of opportunity, which could be covered by Article 14, may enable a person who is not a fresh  gran- tee  to  obtain a preference.  Such a consideration,  as  we have  indicated  above could not be said to be  outside  the broad view of the interest of the public generally which ’we are  taking so as to include within its purview  application of tests underlying provisions giving fundamental rights  to citizens under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. We  think  that the Madras High Court  while  rejecting  the application  for  a certificate of fitness of the  case  for appeal to this Court in cases which form the subject  matter of Civil Appeals Nos. 1481-1483 of 1970 rightly observed :               "Whether a particular circumstance is relevant               or  not  has to depend on the  facts  of  each               case.  What is not relevant in                180               particular  circumstances of grant or  refusal               of a permit may be relevant in another set  of               circumstances". Relevancy  or otherwise of one or more grounds of  grant  or refusal  of  a permit could be a jurisdictional  matter.   A grant or its refusal on totally irrelevant grounds would  be ultra vires or a case of excess of power.  If a ground which is  irrelevant is taken into account with others  which  are relevant,   or,   a  relevant  ground,  which   exists,   is unjustifiably  ignored,  it could be said to be  a  case  of exercise of power under Sec. 47 of the Act, which is  quasi- judicial,  in  a  manner  which  suffers  from  a   material irregularity.   Both  will  be covered  by  Sec.  115  Civil Procedure Code. Therefore,  our  answers to the three  questions  formulated above are (1)The relevance of the previous possession or grant of  a permit  appear,  only when other  facts  and  circumstances, connecting  it  with  and  showing  either  the  adverse  or beneficial  effects of its impact, in a particular case,  on the interests of the public, are shown to exist.  Unless and until  these other facts and circumstances,  indicating  the nexus  or  connection with public interest, appear,  such  a fact,  by  itself, should not affect an  application  for  a permit. (2)The weight to be attached to such a consideration will, obviously,  depend upon the totality of all such  facts  and circumstances viewed in a proper perspective. (3)The  answer  to the third question has  been  indicated already  by the broad and general propositions which we  now proceed to apply to each case before us. In  Civil Appeal No. 1402 of 1974, Mr.  Chitaley,  appearing for the appellant, contended that, as Section 47(1) (e)  was omitted  altogether  by  a Madras State  amendment,  at  the relevant time, the State Appellate Tribunal should not  have

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 17  

taken  into account the alleged disadvantage, almost  raised to the level of a disqualification, of a recent or  previous grant of a permit. We, therefore, examined the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Tamil Nadu (Amendment) Acts 10 and 16 of 1971 and found that they do not omit Section 47 ( 1) (e) at all, although  there were  two  ordinances  Nos.  4  and  6  of  1971  which  had substituted amended provisions of Section 47 from which Sec. 47(1) (e) was omitted.  But, the ordinances were repealed by the Tamil Nadu Acts 10 and 16 of 1971 so that the provisions of  Section  47(1) (e) of the Act in  their  application  to Madras were intact at the time of the grant.  The contention was, therefore, unsound. It  was  then contended, in Civil Appeal No. 1402  of  1974, that  the  State Transport Appellate Tribunal had  held  two extraneous  or  irrelevant  circumstances  to  be  decisive. These  were  : that the respondent grantee before it  was  a recent  grantee  and that he held three  permits  altogether whereas the second appellant before it, to which the  permit was granted by it, held only one permit.  It was urged  that these  considerations  were  applied  mechanically   without showing their correlationship 181 at all with the interests of the public. generally as though the  Appellate  Tribunal  was entrusted  with  the  task  of distribution favors and bad to do this equitably on  grounds which, however, laudable, are extraneous to the purposes  of Section  47  of the Act.  Furthermore, it  was  pointed  out that,  at the relevant time, certain rules had been  validly framed  by the State Govt. under Section 133(1) of  the  Act the effect of which was, inter-alia, that possession of more than one vehicle was, an item, so to say, on the credit side instead  of an item on the debit side of the  balance  sheet prepared on the basis of marks.  The grievance was that  the Tribunal had converted into a demerit what was, according to the  rules,  an additional ground to support a  grant.   The relevant sub-rule (3) of Rule 155A, providing for giving the marks, contains the provision               "(F) Viable Unit : The applicant who  operates               not  more than four stage carriages  excluding               spare  buses,  shall be awarded marks  at  the               rate  of one mark for each stage  carriage  in               order to have a viable unit of five  carriages               excluding spare buses". In reply, it was pointed out that, although Rule 4  required that  the applicants shall be ranked according to the  total numbers  of  marks obtained by them, yet,  "the  application shall  be disposed of in accordance with the  provisions  of sub  S. (1) of Section 47".  This contention presupposes  an indication  of the relevance of any fact taken into  account to  matters  all of which seem to us to be  covered  by  the broad class of "interests of public generally".  On the view we are adopting, Section 47(1) (a) is wide enough to include all  categories  of public interest   including  those  laid down  by  valid rules.  Clause (F) of sub-rule (3)  of  rule 155-A,  set out above, should, therefore., have  been  taken into  account, and, unless there was good enough  reason  to depart  from  it, the rule should have been  followed.   Had this  been  done, it is clear that  every  additional  stage carriage  upto  four would give an applicant  an  additional mark so as to help him to make up the "Viable Unit" of five. A  recent grant could not, considered by itself and  singly, be  converted    into a demerit as  the  Appellate  Tribunal seems  to  us  to have done.  Inasmuch as  disposal  of  the claims  before  the Appellate Tribunal seems to us  to  have

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 17  

taken  place  in  a rather mechanical  fashion  by  ignoring clause (F) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 155A and without  showing the  correlationship of facts mentioned by it to any of  the categories of public interest found in Section 47 (1) of the Act  or  to  the  Constitutional  guarantees  contained   in Articles  14  and  19  (1)  (g)  of  the  Constitution,  the observance  of which must also be presumed to be  in  public interest,  the order of the Appellate Tribunal was,  in  our opinion,  vitiated  by a material  irregularity.   The  High Court  should,  therefore,  have  interfered  even  in   the exercise of its power under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code which has been made applicable to such cases. In  Civil Appeal No. 2254 of 1969, a  preliminary  objection was  taken to the grant of a certificate of fitness  of  the case under Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution in such a case when there was no final order passed by the High Court. Reliance was placed upon M/s. 182 Raman  & Raman (Private) Ltd.  Kumbakonam v. Sri Rama  vilas Service Ltd.  Kumbakonam & Ors.,(1) where this Court said :               "We are of the view that the High Court was in               error in granting the certificate when nothing               was decided by their judgment.  The order  was               not  final.  The order of the High  Court  did               not  determine the rights and  obligations  of               the parties : it merely set aside the order of               the   Appellate  Tribunal  and  directed   the               Tribunal to deal with and dispose of the ques-               tion  according to law.  The appeal is  liable               to fail on that limited ground alone No  satisfactory  answer has been given to  the  preliminary objection.  But, as we could, if the case deserved its grant special  leave to appeal, even at this stage, we will  refer to the merits also. In this case, we find that the Division Bench of Madras High Court  had  only  sent back the case  to  the  Tribunal  for disposal  after  determining  the impact  of  considerations placed before the Tribunal on public interest.  The relative merits of rival claimants must be compared after testing the very  criterion  of  merit adopted on the  anvil  of  public interest.   The High Court only held that the fact  that  an applicant   is   a  recent  grantee  may   be   a   relevant consideration.   As  we have pointed out, the  relevance  or irrelevance  of  such a consideration will depend  upon  the totality  of  facts and circumstances which  must  correlate such  a  ground to public interest.  It was  contended,  not without force, that the Appellate Tribunal had discussed all the   relevant  facts  and  circumstances  sufficiently   to indicate  the impact of each of these upon  public  interest without expressly saying so and that the Division Bench need have  done  no  more  than to  have  pointed  out  that  the observation of the learned Single Judge, to the effect  that the  question of a recent grant of a permit in favour of  an applicant was extraneous to the considerations contained  in Section  47 of the Act was incorrect, or, to have  explained that what this really meant was that, without showing  other facts  and  circumstances  connecting a  recent  grant  with public  interest,  a  recent  grant  of  a  Permit  was  not material.  However, as the Division Bench had sent back  the case  to  the Appellate Tribunal,  without  determining  the rights of the parties, we think that the mere fact that  two views  could be taken on the advisability of such  a  course would  not, justify interference by us under Article 136  of the  Constitution.  Therefore, we are not disposed to  grant special  leave  at this stage-on the question  raised.   The

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 17  

question  whether the order is a final one  determining  the rights of the parties is material even when considering  the question  of propriety of interference under Article 136  of the  Constitution.   We have no doubt that, in view  of  the clarification  of  the  law by us here,  the  Tribunal  will dispose of the case in accordance with law and deal with all the  facts and circumstances which have a bearing on  public interest,  including facts and circumstances which may  have come into existence between the time when the grant was made and  the  time when the Tribunal reconsiders the  claims  to which the case is confined. (1)  C. A. No. 995 of 1965-decided on 3-5-1968. 183 In  Civil Appeals Nos. 1481-1483 of 1970, we find  that  the High  Court  has  given  good  enough  grounds  to   justify reconsideration  of  the  claims  by  the  State   Transport Appellate  Tribunal.   The High Court seems to  us  to  have rightly hinted that, where the results of exercise of  power to  grant permit shows that permits are, without  sufficient grounds  for  a  discrimination or preference  based  on  an appraisement  of merits or requirements of public  interest, being invariably granted to one particular party the  powers are not fairly or impartially exercised.  Quasi powers  have to  be exercised fairly, reasonably, and impartially.   Cap- ricious or dishonest preferences on purely personal  grounds are  necessarily excluded here.  We have no doubt  that  the Tribunal will reconsider claims in conformity with needs  of public interest as they exist at the time of reconsideration by  the Tribunal.  We do not think that these cases  justify interference  by this Court in exercise of its  power  under Article 136 of the Constitution. The  result is : We allow Civil Appeal No. 1402 of 1974  and set  aside the order and judgment of the High Court as  well as  of  the  State  Appellate  Tribunal  and  direct  it  to reconsider  the cases of the parties concerned in the  light of the law on the subject as laid down and explained by  us. Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 6852 of 1974 for an interim order  has become infructuous and is hereby dismissed.   The parties will bear their own costs throughout. We  dismiss Civil Appeals Nos. 2254 of 1969, and Nos.  1481- 1483 of 1970 with costs.                        C.     A. 1402 of 1974 allowed.                   C.     A. 2254 of 1968 dismissed.                  C.As. 1481-83 of 1970 dismissed.                            ORDER In  view  of the law laid down by us in Civil  Appeals  Nos. 1481-1483 of 1970 by a judgment delivered today, we  dismiss the Special Leave Petition.  We make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. P.B.R. 184