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PETITIONER: AJAIB SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JOGINDER SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/04/1968

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1968 AIR 1422            1969 SCR  (1) 145  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1988 SC 805  (13)

ACT: Code  of Criminal Procedure (5 of 1898) ss. 195  (1)(b)  479 A(6) and 559-Complaint under ss. 193, 195, 211 and 120B IPC- Filed by successor-in-office of Magistrate-Validity-s.  559, scope of. Indian  Penal Code (45 of 1860) ss. 193, 195, 211  and  120B complaint-Filed   by  successor-in-office   of   Magistrate- Validity. Police Act (5 of 1861) s. 42-Applicability.

HEADNOTE: A magistrate acquitted Bhagwant Rai of the charge under  ss. 325/34  I.P.C.  and  observed  that  he  had  been   falsely implicated.    The  magistrate’s   successor-in-office   the respondent  filed  a complaint under ss. 193, 195,  211  and 120B  I.P.C., against the appellants.  The  appellants  con- tended  that (i) prosecution for offences under ss. 193  and 195  I.P.C.,  was barred under s. 479A(6)  Cr.   P.C.;  (ii) according  to  s. 195(1)(b) Cr. P.C.,  only  the  Magistrate before  whom the original proceedings were taken could  file the complaint in respect of ss. 193, 195 and 211 IPC;(iii)s. 42  of  the  Police Act barred the  prosecution  as  it  was commenced   after  the  period  prescribed;  and  (iv)   the complaint only disclosed two offences under ss. 193 and  195 I.P.C. and no other. HELD:The appeal must be dismissed. (i)  In  view of the ruling of this Court in  Shabir  Husain Bholu  v.  State of Maharashtra and Baban Singh  v.  Jagdish Singh,  the prosecution for offences under ss. 1913 and  195 IPC was barred under s. 479A(6) Cr.  P.C. [148 B] (ii)  The complaint was properly filed by the  successor-in- office  of the Magistrate.  Section 559 Cr.  P.C. enables  a successor-in-office  of a Magistrate do file,  a  complaint. This  section  applies to all Magistrates. and there  is  no reason  to limit it to Magistrates whose courts  are  perma- nent.  Sub-s. (2) has not the effect of limiting s.  559(1). Section  559(2) applies when there is a doubt as to who  the successor  is, and that doubt can be resolved in the  manner laid  down in sub-s.(2). The subsection does not  mean  that until a successor is determined under sub-s.(2)   there   is

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no successor for the purpose of sub-s. (1). [148 F-H;149  A] Behram  v.Emperor,  37 Cr.  L.J. 776-Lah.  108;  Bara  Bapen Manihi v. Gopi  Manjhi,  A.I.R.  1927  Pat.  327.  (In   re: Subramanian Chettiar, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 442, followed. (iii)  Section  42  of  the police Act  does  not  apply  to prosecutions under the Indian Penal Code or other Acts. [149 C] Mulad Ahmad v. State of U.P., [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 38,  44- 45 followed. (iv) As  the complaint on the face of it mentioned ss.  193, 195, 211 and 120B, so there was no force. in the  contention that the complaint only disclosed two offences under ss. 193 and 195 I.P.C. and no other F149 F] 146

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 157  of 1965. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated February 1, 1965 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal  Misc. No. 8 of 1964 in Cr.  Revision No. 1375 of 1963. Nishat  Singh Grewal, Ravindra Bana and O. P. Rana, for  the appellants. R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri,  J. This appeal by special leave is directed  against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab dismissing Criminal Miscellaneous  Petition No. 8 of 1964.  This petition  arose out  of  the following facts.  Bhagwant Rai and  Chhota  Ram were  tried, under s. 325, I.P.C., read with s. 34,  I.P.C., in  the  Court of Shri Harish Chander Gaur,  Magistrate  1st Class,  Patiala.   Ajaib Singh, Sub Inspector,  one  of  the appellants  before  us,  had  investigated  the  case.   The Magistrate, by his order dated April 5. 1957, acquitted both the accused and, inter alia, observed that Bhagwant Rai  had been  falsely  implicated  in the case as he  was  not  even present  on the, day of the occurrence at Patiala.   On  the application  of  Bhagwant Rai, Shri Joginder  Singh  ’Karam- garhia’,  Magistrate 1st Class, Patiala, who succeeded  Shri Harish  Chander Gaur, filed a complaint under ss. 193,  195, 211  and  120B,  I.P.C., on October 31,  1958,  against  six persons  including the appellants, Ajaib Singh  and  Malkiat Singh.   Shri  O. P. Gaur.  Magistrate First Class,  by  his order  dated June 1, 1959, discharged the  accused,  holding that  the  complaint was not competent as it was  barred  by sub-s. (6) of S. 479A, Cr.  P.C., because the, complaint had not  been  filed by or directed to be filed by  Shri  Harish Chander  Gaur,  who had disposed of the case ending  in  the acquittal  of Bhagwant Rai.  In the revision  filed  against this  order the Additional Sessions Judge upheld this  view. The   High  Court  (Capoor,  J.),  on  revision,  found   it unnecessary  to consider the, scope of s. 479A,  Cr.   P.C., vis-a-vis  s.  476, Cr.  P.C., because two of  the  offences mentioned  in  the  complaint, namely. s.211  and  s.  120B, I.P.C.,  did not fall within the purview of s.479A.  Capoor, J.,  further held that s. 42 of the Police Act.1861, had  no application  to a case in which a complaint was made by  the Court under s. 476, Cr.  P.C. Capoor, J., also held that  as the order of Shri Joginder Singh, Magistrate, directing  the making  of  the complaint against the  respondents  was  not appealed  from and had become final, the competency  of  the Court  to make the complaint under s. 211,  I.P.C.,  against Jaswant  Singh, one of the accused, could not be  considered

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at that stage.  The High 147 Court  accordingly  set  aside  the  order  of  the  learned Additional Sessions Judge and directed that the  respondents be proceeded against according to law. On  the case going back fresh objections were  filed  before the  Magistrate  trying the case but these  were  overruled. Revision was filed before the Additional Sessions Judge  who accepted  the prayer of Kirpal Singh and recommended to  the High Court that the criminal proceedings pending against him in  the Court of Magistrate First Class, Patiala.  might  be quashed.   He,  however,  declined  to  interfere  with  the proceedings  pending  against the appellants mainly  on  the ground  that  the objections now taken by  them  before  the Trial  Magistrate had been heard and finally disposed of  by Capoor, J., in his order dated April 4, 1961. In the meantime, the appellants put in Criminal  Miscellane- ous  Petition  No. 8 of 1964, in criminal revision,  in  the High Court, praying that along with the recommendation  made by  the  learned  Additional Sessions  Judge,  Patiala,  for quashing the criminal proceedings against Kirpal Singh,  the grounds   urged   by   them  might  also   be   taken   into consideration.  Capoor, J., accepted the recommendation made by  the  learned  Additional Sessions  Judge,  Patiala,  and quashed the criminal proceedings against Kirpal Singh.   He, however, directed that Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 8 of 1964 should be placed before another Bench for  disposal. The matter was then placed before Sharma, J., who held  that all the points urged in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition  had been taken into consideration and repelled by Capoor, J., in his order dated April 4, 1961.  Sharma, J., observed :               "The learned counsel, however, omitted to take               note  of the fact that the  revision  petition               finally  was  accepted in the terms,  ’As  the               order   under   revision   is   not    legally               sustainable,  it  must be set  aside  and  the               respondents  must be proceeded with  according               to law.’ Therefore, what the order (said)  was               that  the  criminal  case as a  whole  was  to               proceed against all the respondents and so the               petitioners could not be heard now to say that               the  case was remanded to the trial court  for               trial   of   the  respondents   for   offences               punishable under sections 211 and 120-B of the               Indian Penal Code.  In the circumstances,  the               trial   Court   cannot   be   said   to   have               misconstrued  the  order of  Capoor,  J.,  The               other  grounds urged by them in  the  Criminal               Miscellaneous  as  already pointed out  by  me               were  taken into consideration by Capoor,  J.,               and findings given against the petitioners and               that being so, these cannot be agitated  again               at this stage." 148 He   accordingly   dismissed  the   Criminal   Miscellaneous Petition.  The appellants having obtained special leave, the appeal is now before us. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that on  the facts  prosecution  for  offences under  ss.  193  and  195, I.P.C.,  was  barred  under s. 479A(6),  Cr.   P.C.  In  our opinion,  this  contention must be accepted in view  of  the ruling  of  this Court in Shabir Hussain Bholu v.  State  of Maharashtra(1) and Baban Singh v.Jagdish Singh(2). The  learned counsel next contends that the complaint  could only  be  filed by the Magistrate before whom  the  original

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proceedings  were taken.  He says that according to  s.  195 (1)  (b), Cr.  P.C., a complaint in respect of ss. 193,  195 and  211 I.P.C., can only be made by the Court in which  the proceedings out of which the offences arose took place.   We see  no  force in this contention.  Section  559  enables  a successor-in-office  of  a Magistrate to file  a  complaint. The relevant portion of s. 559 reads as follows :               "559.  (1) Subject to the other provisions  of               this Code, the powers and duties of a Judge or               Magistrate  may be exercised or  performed  by               his successor in office.               (2)   When there is any doubt as to who is the               successor  in  office of any  Magistrate,  the               Chief  Presidency Magistrate in  a  Presidency               town, and the District Magistrate outside such               towns, shall determine by order in writing the               Magistrate who shall, for the purposes of this               Code   or   of  any.  proceedings   or   order               thereunder,  be deemed to be the successor  in               office of such Magistrate." This section was substituted for the original s. 559 by  the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (XVIII of  1923). Since the amendment it has been held, and we think  rightly, that  a  successor  in office of a  Magistrate  can  file  a complaint under s. 476, Cr.  P.C., in respect of an  offence under s. 195, I.P.C., committed before his predecessor. (See Behram v. Emperor(3) Bara Bapen Manjhi v. Gopi Manjhi(4) and In re: Subramaniam Chettiar(5).  This section applies to all Magistrates  and there is no reason why the plain  terms  of the section should be cut down to limit it, as suggested  by the learned counsel for the appellant, to Magistrates  whose courts  are  permanent.  It seems to us further  clear  that sub-s.(2)  has not the effect of  limiting  s.559(1).Section 559(2) applies when there is a doubt as (1)  [1963] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 501. (3)  27 Cr.  L. J. 776-Lah. 108. (2)  A.I. R. 1967 S.C. 68. (4)  A. 1. R. 1927 Pat. 327. (5)  A. 1. R. 1957 Mad. 442. 149 to  who the successor is, and that doubt can be resolved  in the  manner laid down in sub-s. (2).  The  sub-section  does not mean, as contended by the learned counsel, that until  a successor  is  determined  under  sub-s.  (2)  there  is  no successor  for the purposes of sub-s. (1).  If there  is  no doubt  about  who  the successor is, then  that  person  can exercise  the powers under sub-s. (1).  We accordingly  hold that the complaint was properly filed by Shri Joginder Singh ’Karamgarhia’, Magistrate. There is equally no force in the third point raised by -,,he learned  counsel that s. 42, Police Act, creates a  bar  and the  prosecution  is time-barred under this  section.   This Court held in Mulud Ahmed, v. State of U.P. (1) that s.  42, Police Act, does_not apply to prosecutions under the  Indian Penal  Code or other Acts.  Subba Rao, J., as he  then  was, observed               "The  period  of three months  prescribed  for               commencing a prosecution under this section is               only  with respect to prosecution of a  person               for  something done or intended to be done  by               him under the provisions of the Police Act  or               under general Police powers given by the  Act.               Section  42  does  not  apply  to  prosecution               against any person for anything done under the               provisions of any other Act. . . . A  combined

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             reading  of  these  provisions  leads  to  the               conclusion  that  s.  42  only  applies  to  a               prosecution  against a person for  an  offence               committed  under the Police Act.. ..  but  the               prosecution  in  the present case was  for  an               offence under s. 212 of the Indian Penal  Code               which is an offence under a different act  and               for  which a much higher punishment  is  pres-               cribed.  By reason of s. 36 of the Police Act,               section  42  thereof cannot apply  to  such  a               prosecution." The fourth point which the learned counsel urges is that the complaint  only discloses two offences under s. 193  and  s. 195,  I.P.C.,  and  no other, and it was  an  abuse  of  the process of the Court.  There is no force in this  contention as the complaint on its face mentions ss. 193, 195, 211  and 120B. The  learned  counsel finally urges that the  complaint  had been  filed because of a private feud and it is not  in  the interest  of justice that the complainant should be  allowed to proceed with the complaint.  This point was not taken  in the  High  Court at any stage and we do not allow it  to  be raised at this stage. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. Y.P.                        Appeal dismissed. (1) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 38, 44-45. 150