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PETITIONER: AIR INDIA STATUTORY CORPORATION.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNITED LABOUR UNION & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       06/11/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, B.L. HANSARIA, S.B. MAJMUDAR

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                THE 6TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1996. Present :               Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Ramaswamy               Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.L. Hansaria               Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Majmudar Ashok Deasai, Attorney General, T.R. Andhyarujuna, Solicitor General, P.P.  Malhotra, Ms.  Indira Jaising,  K.K. Singhvi, Sr. Advs.,  M.D. Sisodia,  K. Swamy,  Lalit Bhasin, Ms. Nina Gupta, Ms.  Kiran Bhardwaj,  Vineet Kr.,  Ms. Ethel Pereira, Ms. Ritu  Makkar, P.P. Singh, G. Nagesware Reddy, C.V.S. Rao Ms. Anil  Katiyar,   Ms. Anita  Shenoi, Sanjay  Parikh, B.N. Singhvi, Sanjay  Singhvi, Anil K. Gupta, Ms. Pushpa Singhvi, T. Sridharan,  P.K. Malhotra,  S.R. Bhat, Brig Bhushan, R.N. Keshwani, and Ms. C. Ramamurthy, and A.K. Sanghi, Advs. with them for the appearing parties.                      J U D G M E N T S      The following Judgments of the Court were delivered"                             WITH       CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 15536-37, 15532-15534 OF 1996 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 7418-19/92 and 12353-55/95)                       J U D G M E N T K. Ramaswamy, J.      Leave granted.      These appeals  by special leave arise form the judgment of the  Division Bench  of the Bombay High Court dated April 28, 1992 made in Appeal No. 146 of 1990 and batch. The facts in appeal  arising out  of S.L.P. 7417/92, are sufficient to decide the  questions of  law  that  have  arisen  in  these appeals. The  appellant initially  was a statutory authority under International  Airport Authority  of India  Act.  1971 (for short,  ’IAAI Act’)  and on  its repeal by the Airports Authority of  India Act,  1994 was amalgamated with National Airport  Authority  (for  short,  the  ’NAA’)  under  single nomenclature, namely, IAAI. The IAAI is now reconstituted as a company under Companies Act, 1956.      The  appellants   engaged,  as   contract  labour   the respondent union’s  members, for  sweeping, cleaning dusting and watching  of the  building  owned  ad  occupied  by  the appellant. The  Contract Labour  (Regulation and  Abolition) Act, 1970  (for Short,  the ’Act’) regulates registration of

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the establishment  of principal   employer,  the  contractor engaging  and   supplying  the   contract  labour  in  every establishment i  which 20  or more workmen are employed o ay day of  the preceding  12 months  as  contract  labour.  The appellant had obtained on September 20,1971 a certificate of registration form  Regional   Labour Commissioner  (Central) under the  Act. The Central Government, exercising the power under Section  10 of the Act, on the basis of recommendation and  in   consultation  with   the  Central  Advisory  Board constituted  under  Section  10(1)  of  the  Act,  issued  a notification on  December 9,1976  prohibiting "employment of contract labour  on and  from December  9,1976 for sweeping, cleaning,  dusting   and  watching  of  buildings  owned  or occupied by  the  establishment  in  respect  of  which  the appropriate government  under the  said act  is the  Central Government". However,  the said prohibition was not apply to "outside cleaning and other maintenance operations of multi- storeyed building  where such cleaning or maintenance cannot be carried out expect with specialised experience." It would appear that  Regional Labour Commissioner(Central) Bombay by letter dated January 20,1972 informed the appellant that the State Government  is the  appropriate Government  under  the Act. Therefore,  by  proceedings  dated  May  22,  1973  the Regional  Labour  Commissioner  (Central)  had  revoked  the registration. By  Amendment Act  46 of  1982, the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947 (for  short,  the  ’ID  Act’)  was  made applicable to  the appellant and was brought on statute book specifying  the  appellant  as  one  of  the  industries  in relation to  which the Central Government is the appropriate Government and  the  appellant  has  been  carrying  on  its business "by or under its authority" with effect form August 21,1982. The  Act was  amended bringing within its ambit the Central Government  as appropriate  Government by  amendment Act 14 of 1986 with effect from January 28,1986.      Since the appellant did not abolish the contract system and failed to  enforce the notification of the Government of India dated  December 9,1976,  the  respondents came to file writ petitions  for direction  to the  appellant to  enforce forthwith the aforesaid notification abolishing the contract labour system  in the  aforesaid services and to direct  the appellant  to  absorb  all  the  employees  doing  cleaning, sweeping, dusting,  washing and  watching  of  the  building owned  or  occupied  by  the  appellant-establishment,  with effect  from  the  respective  dates  of  their  joining  as contract labour  in the  appellant’s establishment  with all consequential rights/benefits,  monetary or  otherwise,  The writ petition  was allowed  by the  leaned single  judge  on November 16,1989  directing that  all  contract  workers  be regularised as  employees of  the appellant from the date of filing of  the writ petition. Preceding thereto, on November 15, 1989,  the Government  of  India referred to the Central Advisory Board   known  as  While  Committee  under  section 10(1), which  recommended to  the Central  Government not to abolish  the   contract  labour   system  in  the  aforesaid services. Under  the impugned  judgment dated  April 3,1992, the learned  judges of  the  Division  Bench  dismissed  the appeal. Similar  was the  fate of  other appeals. Thus these appeals by special leave.      Shri Ashok  Desai, the  learned Attorney  General, Shri Andhyarujina, the  learned Solicitor  General, Appearing for Union of  India and  the appellant  respectively,  contended that the  term  "appropriate  Government"  under  section  2 (1)(a) of  the Act,  as on  December 9,  1976, was the State Government. The  appellant was  not carrying on the business as an  agent of  the  Central  Government  nor  the  Central

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Government  was   its  principal.   This  Court,   in  Heavy Engineering Majdoor  Union v.  The State  of  Bihar & Ors. [ (1969) 3  SCR 995 (for short, the "Heavy Engineering case"], had interpreted  the phrase "the appropriate Government" and held that  the Central  Government was  not the  appropriate Government under  the ID Act. The ratio therein was followed in Hindustan  Aeronautics Ltd. v. The Workmen & Ors. [(1975) 4 SCC  679] and  Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. Model Mills Nagpur &  Anr. [1984  Supp. SCC 443] and food Corp. of India Workers’ Union  v. Food  Corp. Of  India & Ors.[(1985) 2 SCC 294], It  is thus  firmly settled  law that  the appropriate Government until  the  Act  was  amended  with  effect  from January 28,1986.  Therefore, the view of the High Court that the appropriate  Government is the Central Government is not correct in  law. The learned Attorney General Further argued that the  interpretation of  this Court in Heavy Engineering case has stood the test of time and the parties have settled the transaction  its basis.  It  would,  therefore,  not  be correct to  upset that interpretation. The learned Solicitor General contended  that the  notification published  by  the Central Government  under Section  10 of the Act on December 9,  1976   was  without  jurisdiction.  The  Advisory  Board independently should consider whether the contract labour in each of  the aforestated services should be abolished taking into consideration  the perennial  nature of  the work,  the requirement  of   number  of  employees  in  the  respective specified services  in the  establishment of  the appellant. The Advisory  Board  had  not  adverted  to  the  prescribed criteria   of    Section   10   (2)   of   the   appellant’s establishment. Mohile  Committee after detailed examination, had recommended to the Central Government not to abolish the contract labour  system in  the aforesaid   services. It was contended that  the notification  dated December  9, 1976 is without authority of law or, at any rate, is clearly illegal and so  the direction     by the  High Court  to enforce the offending notification  is not  correct in  law. It was come into force  from January  28, 1986,  the Central  Government being  the   appropriate  Government,   had   accepted   the recommendation of  Mohile Committee  of not  abolishing  the contract labour  system. The             notification  dated December 9,  1976 no longer remained  valid for enforcement. The High  Court, therefore  was not  right in  directing the appellant to enforce the notification. Alternatively, it was contended that  even assuming that the notification is valid and enforceable,  it would  be effective  only from January, 1986. However,  by abolition  of contract labour system, the workmen would  not   automatically became  the  employees of the appellant.  In Dena  Nath and  Ors. [(1992)  1 SCC 695], this court  had held that the High Court, in exercise of its power under  Article 226,  has o power to direct  absorption of   the  contract  labour  as  its  direct  employees.  The impugned judgment  was expressly  disapproved in Dena Nath’s case. Therefore,  its legality  has  been  knocked  off  its bottom. It was further  contended that the Act, on abolition of the  contract labour system, does not envisage to c r  ea t e  direct relationship  between the principal employer and the contract  labour. The  erstwhile contract labour have to seek and  obtain industrial award under the ID Act by virtue of which  the appellant  would be  entitled to  satisfy  the Industrial Court  that there  was no  need to absorb all the contract labour  but only  smaller  number  is  required  as regular employees. On recording finding  in that behalf, the industrial court   would  make  his  award  which  would  be enforceable  by   the  workmen.   This  court   in   Gujarat Electricity Board v. Hind Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. [(1995) 5 SCC

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27] had  pointed  out  the  lacuna  in  the  act  and  given directions of the manner in which  the industrial action has to be  take  on abolition of the contract labour system. The High Court,  therefore, was  not right in its direction that the workmen require to be absorbed in the respective service of the  establishment of the appellant. it is also contented that  the   appellant,  though  initially  was  a  statutory Corporation  under  the  IAAI  Act,  on  its  abolition  and constitution as  a company,  is entitled to regulate its own affairs  on  business  principal  and    the  direction  for absorption would lead to further losses in which it is being run. The learned Solicitor General has, therefore, submitted a scheme  under which  its  subsidiary,  namely,  Air  Cargo Corporation would  take the  workmen  ad  absorb  them  into service, subject to the above regulation. It has to consider as to  how   many of  the  contract  labour  require  to  be absorbed.  Prescription  of  qualification  for  appointment was necessary;  the principle  of reservation adopted by the Central Government  requires to  be  followed;  their  names require to  be called  from             Employment Exchange. The workmen should be absorbed o the principle of "last come first go"  subject  to  their  fitness,  qualifications  and probation etc.      Shri K.K.  Singhvi and  Mrs. Indira  Jai Singh, learned senior counsel  and A.K.  Gupta,  learned  counsel  for  the respondents, contended  that the  appellant is  an  industry carrying on its business of Air Transport Services. Prior to the IAAI  Act, it  was under  the control  of Civil Aviation Department, Government  of India;  after the  IAAI Act,  the appellant has  been carrying on its industry by or under the authority of the Central Government. The relevant provisions in the  IAAI   Act would  establish the  deep  and pervasive control the Central Government has over the functions of the appellant. Whether  the appellant is an industry carrying on business  by,   or  under   the  authority  of  the  Central Government, must  be determined keeping in view the language of the  statute that  gave birth to the Corporation, and the nature of  functions under  the IAAI act and the control the Central Government  is exercising  over the  working of  the industry of  the appellant  to indicate  that right form its inception the  appellant has  been carrying on its business, by or under the authority of the Central Government. Rightly understanding that  legal position,  the Central  Government had referred the matter to  the Central Advisory Board under Section 10(1) of the Act  and on the basis of its report had issued the  notification dated   December  9,1976 abolishing the contract  labour system  in  the  aforestated  services. Therefore,  it   is  valid   in  law.  The  Bench  in  Heavy Engineering case  narrowly   construed the  meaning  of  the phrase "the appropriate Government" placing reliance on  the common law doctrine of "principle and agent". The public law interpretation is  the appropriate principle of construction of the  phrase "the  appropriate  Government".  In  view  of internal evidence  provided in    the IAAI Act ad the nature of the  business carried on by the appellant by or under the control  of   the  Central   Government,   the   appropriate Government is  none other  than the  Central Government.  In particular,  after   the  development    of  law  of  "other authority" or  "instrumentality of  the State" under Article 12 of  the Constitution, the ratio in Heavy Engineering case is no  longer good  law. In   Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. and Food Corp  of India cases, this court had not independently, laid any  legal preposition.  Food Corporation of India case was      considered   with   reference   to   the   regional warehouses of  the FCI  situated in  different States and in

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this  functional   perspective,  this   court  came  to  the conclusion that  the appropriate  Government  would  be  the State Government.      This Court  in Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh &  Anr. [(1975)  3 SCR  619]; R.D.  Shetty v.  Airport Authority &  Ors. [(1979)  3 SCR  1014]; Managing  Director, U.P.  Warehousing  Corporation  &  Anr.  v.  V.N.  Vajapayee [(1980)  2  SCR  733];  Ajay  Hasia  etc.  v.  Khalid  Mujib Sehravardi &  Ors. etc.  [(1981)  2  SCR  79]  -  wealth  of authorities -  had held  that settled  legal position  would lend aid  to interpret            the  phrase   "appropriate Government" in  public law interpretation; under the Act the Central Government  is the  appropriate Government to take a decision under section 10 of the Act to abolish the contract labour system.  It is  further contended  that  the  central Government, after  notifying abolition  of  contract  labour system is  devoid of  power under  section 10(1)  to appoint another Advisory  Board to  Consider    whether  or  not  to abolish the  same contract  labour system   in the aforesaid services  in   the  establishments  of  the  appellant.  The recommendation of  the Mohile  Committee and  the  resultant second notification  were, therefore,  without authority  of law.  The  two  Judge  Benches  in  Dena  Nath  and  Gujarat Electricity Board’s  cases have  not   correctly interpreted the law.  After abolition  of the contract labour system, if the principle   employer omits to abide by the law and fails to absorb  the labour  worked in  the establishments  of the appellant on  regular basis,  the workmen have no option but to  seek   judicial  redress   under  Article   226  of  the Constitution. Judicial Review being the basis feature of the Constitution, the  High Court  is to  have the  notification enforced. The  citizen  has  a  fundamental  right  to  seek redressal of  their legal  injury  by  judicial  process  to enforce his rights in the proceedings under Article 226. The High Court,  therefore, was right to dwell into the question and to  give the  impugned direction  in the  judgment.  The workmen have  a fundamental  right to life. Meaningful right to     life  springs  from  continued  work  to  earn  their livelihood.  The  right  to  employment,  therefore,  is  an integral facet  of  right to life. When they were engaged as contract  labour   and  were  continuously  working  in  the establishments of  the appellant,  to make  their  right  to social and  economic justice  meaningful and effective, they are required  to be  continuously engaged as contract labour so long  as the work is available in the establishment. When work is   of  perennial nature  and on abolition of contract labour system,  they are entitled, per force, to be absorbed labour system,  they are entitled, per force, to be absorbed on regular  basis transposing  their  erstwhile  contractual status   into that of an employer - employee relationship so as to  continue to eke out their livelihood by working under the employer  and be  entitled to receive salary  prescribed to that  post. Thereby,  they became entitled to be absorbed without ay hiatus with effect from the date of abolition. If any action  is needed  to   be taken  thereafter against the employee, it  should be  only in  accordance with either the statutory rules  or the  ID Act,  if applicable.  In  either event, the  right to  absorption assures  to the workmen the right   to livelihood  as  economic  empowerment,  right  to social justice  and right to dignity of person which are the concomitants  of   social   democracy.   These   facets   of constitutional rights  guaranteed to  the workmen  as  their Fundamental Rights  should be  kept in  view in interpreting the  expression   "appropriate  Government   enjoined  under Section 10(1) of the  Act and other regulatory provisions in

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relation to  the employment  of the  workmen. Therefore, the view in  Dena Nath’s case is not correct is law and requires to be overruled.      There is  no hiatus  in the  operation of  the  Act  on abolition of  the contract  labour system  under Section 10. The object  and purpose  of the  Act are twofold. As long as the work  in an industry is not perennial, the Act regulates the  conditions   of  the  workmen  employed  through    the contractor registered  under the  Act. The  services of  the workmen  are   channelised  through   the  contractor.   The principle employer  is required  to  submit  the  number  of workmen needed  for  employment  in  its  establishment  who are supplied  by the  contractor, an  intermediary; but  the primary responsibility  lies upon  the principle employer to abide by  law;  the  violation  thereof  visits  with  penal consequences. The  Act regulates systematic operation. Wages to the  contract labour  should be  paid  under  the  direct supervision  of   the  principle   employer.  The  principle employer is  enjoined to  compel the  contractor to pay over the wages  and on his failure, the principle employer should pay and  recover it  from the  contractor/intermediary.  The principle employer  alone is  required  to  provide  safety, health and other amenities to ensure health and safe working conditions in  the establishment  of the principle employer. This  would  clearly  indicate  the  pervasive  control  the principle employer  has over  the contract  labour  employed through intermediary  and regulation  of  the  work  by  the workmen during the period of service. On advice by the Board that the  work is  of perennial  nature etc,  and  on  being satisfied of  the conditions  specified under Section 10(2), the appropriate  Government takes  a decision to abolish the contract  labour  and  have  the  decision  published  by  a notification.  It  results  in  abolition  of  the  contract labour. Consequently, the linkage of intermediary/contractor is removed  from the operational structure under the Act. It creates direct connection between the principle employer and the workmen.  There is  no escape  route for  the  principle employer to  avoid workmen  because it  needs their services and the  workmen are  not meant to be kept in the lurch. The words   "principal    employer"   do   indicate   that   the intermediary/contractor is  merely a  supplier of  labour to the principal  employer. On  effacement of the contractor by abolition  of   the  contract   labour  system,   a   direct relationship between  the principal employer and the workmen stands knitted.  Thereby the workman  becomes an employee of the principal  employer and  it relates  back to the date of engagement as a contract labour. The details of the workmen, the requirement of the work force, duration of the work etc, are regulated  under the  Act and  the Rules.  The Act,  the Rules  and   statutory  forms   do  furnish   internal   and unimpeachable evidence obviating the need to have industrial adjudication; much  less there  arises any dispute. There is no machinery  for workmen  under the  ID  Act  to  seek  any industrial adjudication.  if any  industrial adjudication is to be  sought, it would be only by a recognised union in the establishment of the appellants who are unlikely to  espouse their dispute.  Therefore, the  methodology    suggested  in Gujarat Electricity  Board’s case,  by another  bench of two Judges, apart  from being unworkable and incongruous, is not correct in  law. On  abolition of  the contract  labour, the principle employer  is left   with  no right  but   duty  to enforce the  notification, absorb the workmen working in the establishment   on contract  basis transposing  them as  its regular employee  with all  consequential rights  and duties attached to  a post  on which  the workmen  working directly

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under the  appellant was entitled or liable. The Act gave no option to  pick and  choose the employees at the whim of the principal employer.  The view  of the High Court, therefore, is correct  to the  extent  that the  notification should be enforced with  effect  from    date  of  abolition,  namely, December 9,1976.  The subsequent  amendment with effect from January 28,1986  is only a recognition of ad superimposition of  preexisting   legal  responsibility   of   the   Central Government as  the appropriate  Government. It does not come into being only from the date the amendment        came into force. Consequently, the workmen, namely, the members of the respondent-Union must  be declared  to be the employees with effect from  the    respective  dates  on  which  they  were discharging their  duties in the respective services  of the appellant’s  establishment   either  as   Sweeper,   Duster, Cleaner, Watchman  etc. The  view, therefore,  of  the  High Court to  the   extent that  they should  be  absorbed  with effect from  the date of the judgment  of the learned single Judge, is  not correct  in law.  Therefore, to  do  complete justice, direction  may be given  to absorb the workmen with effect from  the date abolition, i.e. December 9, 1976 under Article 142 of the Constitution.      The respective  contentions  would  give  rise  to  the following questions: 1.   What is the meaning of the word "appropriate Government      under Section 2(1) (a) of the Act, 2.   Whether the  view taken  in Heavy  Engineering case  is      correct in law? 3.   Whether on  abolition the  contract labour are entitled      to be absorbed; if so, from what date ? 4.   Whether the  High Court  under Article  226  has  power      to direct their  absorption; if so, from what date ? 5.   Whether it  is necessary  to  make  a  reference  under      Section 10  of the  ID Act  for adjudication of dispute      qua absorption  of the contract labour? 6.   Whether the  view taken by this Court in Dena  Nath and      Gujarat State  Electricity Board’s  case is  correct in      law ? 7.   Whether the  workmen have  got   a right for absorption      and, if so, what is the remedy for enforcement ?      Section 2  (1) (a)  of  the  Act  defines  "appropriate Government" to mean-      ""(1)    in    relation    to    an      establishment in  respect of  which      the  appropriate  Government  under      the Industrial  Disputes Act,  1947      (Act 14  of 1947),  is the  Central      Government, the Central Government;      ""(2)  in  relation  to  any  other      establishment,  the  Government  of      the   State  in  which  that  other      establishment is situated."      Prior to  the Amendment  Act 14 of 1986, the definition was as under :      "2 (1) (a) "Appropriate Government"      means-      (1) in relation to -      (i) any establishment pertaining to      any industry carried on by or under      the  authority   of   the   Central      Government, or  pertaining  to  any      such controlled  industry as may be      specified in  this  behalf  by  the      Central Government, or      (ii)  any   establishment  of   any

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    railway,  Cantonment  Board,  Major      port, mine or oil-field, or      (iii)  any   establishment   of   a      banking or insurance company,      the Central Government,      (2)  in   relation  to   any  other      establishment the Government of the      State  in   which   that      other      establishment is situate."      Section 2(a)(i)  of the  ID  Act  defines  "appropriate Government" thus :"... Unless there is anything repugnant in the subject  or context,  "appropriate Government" means, in relation to  any Industrial Disputes concerning any industry carried  on  by  or  under  the  authority  of  the  Central Government or  by a  railway company for concerning any such controlled industry  as may  be specified in  this behalf by the Central  Government..." and India Airlines and Air India Corporation  established   under  Section   3  of   the  Air Corporation  Act   1953  are   enumerated  industries  under Amendment Act  46 of 1982  which came into force with effect from 21.8.1984.      In Heavy  Engineering case  (supra), industrial dispute was referred  under Section  10 of  the ID  Act by the State Government of  Bihar to  the  Industrial  Tribunal  for  its adjudication. The  competency of  the State  Government  was questioned  by   the  Mazdoor   Union  contending  that  the appropriate government  to refer the dispute was the Central government. The  High Court negatived the contention and had upheld the  validity of reference, On appeal, a Bench of two Judges had  held that  the words  "under authority of" means pursuant to  the authority,  such as an agent or a servant’s acts under  or pursuant to the authority of its principal or master. The  Heavy Engineering  Company cannot be said to be carrying on   its  business pursuant to the authority of the Central  Government.   Placing  reliance   on   common   law interpretation, the  Bench  was  of  the  opinion  that  the company derived its powers and functions from its Memorandum ad Articles  of Association. Though the entire share capital was contributed by the Central Government and all the shares were held  by the  President and  officers  of  the  Central Government were in-charge of the management, it did not make any difference.  The  company  and  the  share  holders  are distinct entities.  The fact that the President of India and certain officers  hold all  its  shares  did  not  make  the company an  agent either  of the President or of the Central Government. The  power to  decide  how  the  company  should function ;  the power  to appoint Directors and the power to determine the  wages all  salaries payable by the company to its employees,  were all  derived  form  the  Memorandum  of company and  Articles of  Association of the Company and not by the  reason of the Company being the agent of the Central Government. The  learned judges  came to  that conclusion on the basic of concessions and on private law of principal and agent  and   as  regards  a  company  registered  under  the Companies Act,  on  the  basic  of  the  power  of  internal management. In  Hindustan  Aeronautics  Ltd.  case  (supra), learned  judges   merely  followed   the  ratio   of   Heavy Engineering case.  It further concluded that the enumeration of certain  statutory   Corporations in the definition would indicate  that  those  enumerated  Corporations  would  come within  the   definition  of  the  "appropriate  Government" without any  further discussion.  In Rashtriya  Mill Mazdoor Sangh’s case,  a Bench  of three  judges, while interpreting Section 32  (iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act, considered the purpose of  the  expression  "under  the  authority  of  any

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department of  the Central Government for purpose of payment of bonus". The meaning and scope of the expression "industry carried on  by or  under the  authority of any department of the Central  Government", was  examined and it was held that the   industrial    undertaking   retains    its   identity, personality and  status unchanged  though in its management, the  Central  Government  exercised  the  power  to  give  a direction under  section 16  and the management is subjected to regulatory  control. It  is seen  that the above decision was reached in the context in which the payment of bonus was to  be   determined  and   paid  to  the  employees  by  the department. In  Food Corporation  of India’s case (supra), a Bench of  two Judges was to consider whether regional office of the  Food Corporation  of India  and the  warehouses etc. were  an  "establishment"  within  the  meaning  of  Section 2(i)(e) of the Act and whether FCI is an industry carried on by  or  under  the  authority  of  the  Central  Government. Following the  aforesaid three decisions, it was held that a bare reading  of the  definition under  the Act  means inter alia any  place, any industry, trade, business, manufacture, warehouse, godown  or the  place set  up by  the corporation where its  business is carried on. Though for the purpose of industrial disputes the Central Government is an appropriate Government in  relation to  Food Corporation  of India,  its establishment at  various places is not under the control of the Government  of India.  Therefore, appropriate Government under the  Industrial Disputes  Act is the state Government. In that behalf, the learned Judges, undoubtedly, relied upon Heavy Engineering  case. It  would thus  be  seen  that  the construction adopted  on the phrase "appropriate Government" under the  ID Act  was  considered  with  reference  to  its functional efficacy.  The Heavy  Engineering case,  as  held earlier, had  proceeded on  common law  principles  and  the concession by the counsel.      As noted, the appellant, to start with, was a statutory authority but pending appeal in this court, due to change in law and  in order to be in tune with open economy, it became a company  registered under  the Companies  Act. To consider its sweep  on the  effect of  Heavy Engineering  case on the interpretation of  the phrase  ’appropriate Government’,  it would be necessary to recapitulate the Preamble, Fundamental Rights (Part  III)  and  Directive  Principle  (Part  IV)  - trinity setting  out  the  conscience  of  the  Constitution deriving from  the source  "We, the  people", a  charter  to establish an  egalitarian social  order in  which social and economic justice  with dignity  of person  and  equality  of status and  opportunity, are  assured to  every citizen in a socialist democratic  Bharat Republic. The Constitution, the Supreme law  heralds to  achieve the  above goals  under the rule of  law. Life  of law  is  not  logic  but  is  one  of experience, Constitution  provides an  enduring  instrument, designed to  meet the  changing  needs  of  each  succeeding generation altering  and adjusting the unequal conditions to pave way for social and economic democracy within the spirit drawn from  the Constitution.  So too,  the legal  redressal within the said parameters. The words in the Constitution or in an  Act are  but a  framework of  the concept  which  may change more  than words themselves consistent with the march of law. Constitutional issues require interpretation broadly not by  play of  words or without the acceptance of the line of their  growth,  Preamble  of  the  Constitution,  as  its integral part,  is people  including  workmen,  harmoniously blending the  details enumerated  in the  Fundamental Rights and the  Directive Principles.  The Act  is a social welfare measure to  further the general interest of the community of

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workmen  as  opposed  to  the  particular  interest  of  the individual  enterpreneur.  It  seeks  to  achieve  a  public purpose, i.e.,  regulated conditions  of contract labour and to abolish  it when  it is  found to  be of perennial nature etc. The  individual interest can, therefore, no longer stem the forward flowing tide and must, of necessity, give way to the  broader  public  purpose  of  establishing  social  and economic democracy  in which  every workmen  realises socio- economic justice assured in the preamble, Articles 14,15 and 21 and the Directive Principles of the Constitution.      The founding  fathers of the Constitution, cognizant of the reality  of life wisely engrafted the Fundamental Rights and Directive  Principles in  Chapters  III  and  IV  for  a democratic way  of life to every one in Bharat Republic, the State under  Article 38  is enjoined  strive to  promote the welfare  of   the  people  by  securing  and  protecting  as effectively as  it may,  a social  order in  which  justice, social,  economic   and  political   shall  inform  all  the institutions of  the  national  life  and  to  minimise  the inequalities  in  income  and  endeavour  to  eliminate  the inequalities in  status, facilities  and opportunities,  not only amongst  individuals but  also amongst groups of people residing  in   different  areas   or  engaged  in  different vocations, Article  39(a)  provides  that  the  State  shall direct its  policies towards  securing the citizens, men and women equally, the right to an adequate means of livelihood; clause (d)  provides for  equal pay  for equal work for both men and  women; clause (e) provides to secure the health and strength of  workers. Articles  41 provides  that within the limits of  its economic  capacity and development, the state shall make  effective provision  to secure the right to work as fundamental  with just  and human  conditions of  work by suitable legislation  or economic  organisation  or  in  any other way  in which  the worker  shall be  assured of living wages, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full  enjoyment  of  leisure  and  social  and  cultural opportunities to  the workmen.  The poor,  the  workman  and common man  can  secure  and  realise  economic  and  social freedom only through the right to work and right to adequate means of  livelihood, to  just and human conditions of work, to a  living wage,  a decent standard of life. education and leisure. To  them, these  are fundamental  facets  of  life. Article 43A,  brought by  42nd Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1976  enjoins   upon  the   State  to   secure  by  suitable legislation or  in  any  other  way,  the  participation  of workers in the management of undertakings, establishments or other organisations  engaged in  any  industry.  Article  46 gives a positive mandate to promote economic and educational interest   of   the   weaker   sections   of   the   people. Correspondingly, Article  51A imposes  fundamental duties on every citizen to develop the scientific temper, humanism and to strive  towards excellence  in all  spheres of individual and collective activity, so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. To make these rights meaningful  to workmen and meaningful right to life a reality to  workmen,  shift  of  judicial  orientation  from private  law   principles  to   public  law   interpretation harmoniously fusing  the interest  of the community. Article 39A furnishes beacon light that justice be done on the basis of equal  opportunity and no one be denied justice by reason of economic  or other  disabilities. Courts  are sentinal in the quivive  of the  rights of the people, in particular the poor. The  judicial  function  of  a  Court,  therefore,  in interpreting the Constitution and the provisions of the Act, requires  to   build   up   continuity   of   socio-economic

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empowerment to  the poor  to sustain equality of opportunity and status  and the law should constantly meet the needs and aspiration of the society in establishing the egalitarian of the society  in establishing  the egalitarian  social order. Therefore, the  concepts engrafted  in the  statute  require interpretation  from   that  perspectives,   without   doing violence to  the  language.  Such  an  interpretation  would elongate the spirit and purpose of the Constitution and make the  aforesaid   rights  to   the  workmen  a  reality  lest establishment  of  an  egalitarian  social  order  would  be frustrated and Constitutional goal defeated.      Keeping this  broad spectrum  in view,  let us consider whether the  interpretation given  in Heavy Engineering case is  consistent   with  the   scheme  and   spirit   of   the Constitution. In  Rajasthan State  Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal & Ors. [(1967) 3 SCR 377, a Constitution Bench, composing the  learned judges  who formed the Bench in Heavy Engineering case,  considered the  issue  interpretation and Bhargava, J.  speaking on  behalf of  the majority, had held that "other  authority" within  the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution  need no  necessarily be  an  authority  to perform  governmental   functions.  The   expression  ’other authority’  is  wide  enough  to  include  within  it  every authority created by a statute on which powers are conferred to carry  out governmental functions or the "functions under the control  of the  Government". It  is not  necessary that some of  powers conferred be Governmental sovereign function to carry  on  commercial  activities.  Since  the  State  is empowered under  Articles 19 (1) (g) and 298 to carry on any trade  or   business,  it  was  held  that  Rajasthan  State Electricity Board  was "other authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution.  The significance  of the  observation  is that an  authority under  the control  of the State need not carry on  Governmental functions. It can carry on commercial activities. At  this juncture,  it is  relevant keep  at the back of  our mind, which was not brought to the attention of the Bench which decided Heavy Engineering case, that Article 19(2) of  the Constitution  grants to  the State,  by clause (ii) thereof,  monopoly to  carry on,  by the  State or by a Corporation owned  or controlled  by the  State, any  trade, business, industry  or service  whether to  the  execlusion, complete or  partial, of  citizens or  otherwise. The narrow interpretation strips the State of its monopolistic power to exclude citizens from the field of any activity, to carry on any trade,  business, industry or service, total or partial. A reverse  trend  which  would  deflect  the  constitutional perspective was  set in  motion by  the same  Bench in Praga tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual [(1969) 3 SCR 773] decided on February 19,1969,24 days prior to the date of decision in Heavy Engineering  case; in  which it  was held in main that writ under  Article 226  would not  lie  against  a  company incorporated under  Companies Act  and the  declaration that dismissal of  the workmen  was illegal,  given by  the  High Court was  set aside.  But the  operation of the above ratio was put  to stop  by  the  Constitution  Bench  decision  in Sukhdev Singh  & Ors.   v.  Bhagat Ram  & Anr. [(1975) 3 SCR 619]. In that behalf, the interpretation given by Mathew, J. in  a   separate  but   concurrent  judgment   is  of  vital significance taking  away the State action from the clutches of moribund common law jurisprudence; it set on foot forward march under  public law  interpretation. Mathew, J. had held that the  concept of  State had undergone drastic change. It cannot be  conceived  of  simply  as  a  cohesive  machinery yielding the  thunderbolt  of  authority.  The  State  is  a service   Corporation.    It   acts    only   thorough   its

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instrumentalities  or  agencies  of  natural  and  juridical person. There  is a  distinction between  State  action  and private action.  There is  nothing strange  in the notion of the State  acting through  a Corporation  and making  it  an agency or instrumentality of the State with an advent of the welfare  State.   The  framework   of  the   civil   service administration became increasingly insufficient for handling new tasks  which were  often of  a  specialised  and  highly technical  character.   Development  of   policy  of  public administration, through  separate Corporations  which  would operate  largely   according  to   business  principles  and separately  accountable   though  under  the  Memorandum  of Association or Articles of Association become the arm of the Government. Though  their employees  are not civil servants, it  being   a  public   authority  and   State  Corporation, therefore, is  subject to  control of  the  Government.  The public corporation,  being a  corporation of  the State,  is subject  to  the  constitutional  limitation  as  the  State itself. The  governing  power,  wherever  located,  must  be subject to  the fundamental  constitutional limitations. The Court, therefore,  had laid  the test  to  see  whether  the Corporation  is   an  agency   or  instrumentality   of  the Government to  carry on  business for the benefit of public. Thus, the  ratio in  Praga Tools  case, no  writ  would  lie against the  Corporation is  not a  statutory body, as it is not a authority, it is an instrumentality of the State.      In R.D.  Shetty v.  International Airport  Authority of India &  Ors. [(1979)  3 SCR 1014], this Court had held that due to  expansion of  welfare and  social service functions, the State  increasingly  controls  material  and  economical resources in  the society  involving large  scale industrial and commercial  activities with  their  executive  functions affecting  the   lives  of  the  people.  It  regulates  and dispenses special  services and  provides  large  number  of benefits. When  the Government  deals with  the  public,  it cannot  act   arbitrarily.  Where   a  corporation   is   an instrumentality or  agency of  the Government,  it would  be subject to  the same constitutional or public law limitation as the  Government. The  limitations of  the action  by  the Government must  apply equally  when such  action are  dealt with by  Corporation  having  instrumentality  element  with public and  they cannot  act arbitrarily, Such a functioning cannot enter  into relationship  with any person it likes at its sweet  will. Its  action must be in conformity with some principle which  meets the  test of  reason  and  relevance. Therefore, the  distinction between  a statutory corporation and the  company incorporated  under the  Companies Act  was obliterated.      In Managing  Director, U.P.  Warehousing Corpn. v. V.N. Vajpayee [(1980)  2 SCR  773], Chinnappa  Reddy, J.  in this separate but  concurrent judgment  laid  down  the  relevant principles. The  Government  establishes  and  manges  large number of  industries and  institutions  which  have  become biggest employer  and  there  is  no  good  reason  why  the Government should  not be  bound  to  observe  the  equality clause of the Constitution in a matter of employment and its dealings with  its employees;  why the Corporation set up or owned by  the Government  would not equally be bound and why instead such  Corporation would become citadels of patronage and arbitrary  action. Such a distinction perhaps would mock at the  Constitution and  the people; some element of public employment is  all that  is necessary  to take  the employee beyond the  reach of rule which denies him the protection of Articles 14  and  16.  Independence  and  integrity  of  the employees in  the public sector should be secured as much as

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the independence  and integrity  of the  Civil servants.  it was, therefore,  held that  a writ  would  lie  against  the warehousing corporation.      In Ajay   Hasia  etc. v.  Khalid   Mujib  Sehravardi  & Ors. etc.  [(1961) 2   SCR  79], a Constitution Bench was to consider   whether a  Society registered  under the  J  &  K Societies Registration Act would be a State under Article 12 of the  Constitution amenable  to  the  reach  of  the  writ jurisdiction. The  Constitution  Bench  laid  the  following tests to  determine whether the entity is an instrumentality or agency  of the State : (1) if the entire share capital of the corporation  is held  by the  Government, it  would go a long way  towards indicating  that  the  corporation  is  an instrumentality or  agency or  Government ;  (2)  where  the financial assistance  of the  State is  so much  as to  meet almost  entire   expenditure  of   the   corporation   being impregnated with  governmental   character; (3) it must also be relevant  factor whether  the corporation enjoys monopoly status which  is State  conferred of  State  protected;  (4) existence of  deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication  that  the  corporation  is  a  State  agency  or instrumentality (5)  if the functions of the corporation are of public  importance and  closely related  to  governmental functions, it  would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as  a instrumentality  or agency of Government ; (6)  specifically,   if  a   department  of   Government  is transferred to  a corporation,  it would  be a strong factor supportive of  the inference  of the  corporation  being  an instrumentality or  agency of Government. In Delhi Transport Corporation v.  D.T.C. Mazdoor  Corpn.[AIR 1991  SC 101], it was held  that the  State has  a deep  and pervasive control over the  functioning of  the society  and, therefore, is an agency of the state. In Som Prakash Rekhi v.  Union of India & Ors.  [(1981) 2  SCR 111],  it was   held that the settled position in  law is  that any authority under the control of the Government  of India  comes within  the definition  of a State. Burmashell  oil Co, was held to be an instrumentality of the  State  though  it  was  a  Government  company.  The authority  in   administrative  law   is   a   body   having jurisdiction in certain matters of public nature. Therefore, the ability conferred upon a person by a law is to alter his case   own will directed to that end. The rights; duties and liabilities or  other legal  relations, either of himself or other person  must be present to make a person an authority. When the  person is  an agent  or functions on behalf of the State, as  an instrumentality,  the exericse of the power is public.  Sometimes, the test id formulated by asking whether corporation was  formed by  or under  the statute.  The true test is  not how it is founded in legal personality but when it is  created, apart  from discharging  public function  or doing business  as the  proxy of the State, whether there is an element  of ability  in it  to effect  the  relations  by virtue of  power vested  in it  by law. In that case, it was held that the above tests were satisfied and the company was directed to pay full pension.      In  Manmohan   Singh  Jaitla   v.  Commissioner.  Union Territory of  Chandigarh &  Ors. [(1984)  supp. SCC 540], it was held  that an  educational institution  receiving 952 of the grant-in-aid  from the  Government is  "other authority" under Article  12 of  the Constitution.  It was,  therefore, held that the termination of the service without enquiry was without jurisdiction. Dismissal from service without enquiry was declared  illegal under Article 226. In P.K. Ramachandra Iyer &  Ors. v.  Union of  India &  Ors. [(1984) 2 SCC 141], ICAR, a  Society registered under the Societies Registration

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Act, was  held an  adjunct of  the Government  of India. Its budged was  voted as  part of  the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture. It was held that it was the State under Article 12 and  was amenable to jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India which is  subsidiary owned  by State Trading Corporation was held by  this Court  in A.L.  Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corpn. of  India Ltd. [(1984) 3 SCR 316], to be an agency of the Government  within the  meaning of  Article  12  of  the Constitution of  India. In  Central Inland  Water  Transport Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Brojonath Ganguly & Anr. [(1986) 3 SCR 156], a  Government Company incorporated under Companies Act was held  to be  an instrumentality or agency. In this case, this court  construed the  Fundamental rights under Articles 14 to 17, the Director Principle under Article 38,41 and 42, the Preamble  of the  Constitution and  held that  the River Steam Navigation  Co. Ltd, was carrying on the same business as the  corporation was  doing. A  scheme of arrangement was entered into  between the  corporation and the company. They were  managed  by  the  board  of  Directors  appointed  and removable by the Central Government. It was, therefore, held that it  was an agency or instrumentality of the State under Article 12.  In that  behalf this court pointed out that the trade of  business activity  of the State constitutes public enterprise; the  structural forms  in which  the  Government operates in  the field  of public  enterprises are  many and varied.  They   may  consist   of  governmental  department, statutory  body,   statutory   corporation   of   government companies  etc.;  immunities  and  privileges  possessed  by bodies so  set up  by the  Government under  Article 298 are subject to   Fundamental  Rights and Directive Principles to further the State policy. For the purpose of Article 12, the Court  must   see  necessarily  through  corporate  veil  to ascertain behind  the veil  the face  of instrumentality  or agency of  the State  has assumed the garb of a governmental company, as defined in Section 3(7) of the Companies Act, it does  not   follow  thereby   that  it   ceases  to   be  an instrumentality or  agency of  the State. Applying the above test, it  was held  that Inland  Water Transport Corporation was State.      When its  correctness was  doubted and its reference to the Constitution  Bench was  made in  Delhi Transport Corpn. case  (supra),  while  holding  that  Delhi  Road  Transport Authority was  an instrumentality  of the State, it was held that employment  is not  a bounty  from the State nor can it survival be  at their mercy. Income is the Foundation of any Fundamental Rights.  Work is  the sole source of income. The right to  work become  as much fundamental as right to life. Law as  a social  machinery requires  to remove the existing imbalances and  to further the progress serving the needs of the Socialist  Democratic Republic  under the  rule of  law. Prevailing social conditions and actualities of the life are to be  taken into account to  adjudge the dispute and to see whether the interpretation would submerge the purpose of the Society.      In Lucknow  Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta [(1984) 1 SCC  243], the question was whether a Government Authority is amenable to the regulation of Consumer Protection Act. It was held  in paragraph  5 and 6 that a Government or a semi- Government body  or local  authority are amenable to the Act as much as any other private body rendering similar service. This is  a service  to the  society and they are amenable to public accountability  for health  and  growth  of  society, housing construction  or building  activities, by private or statutory body  rendering  service  within  the  meaning  of

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Section 2(0)  of the said Act. In Star Enterprises & Ors. v. C.I.D.C. of Maharashtra Ltd. [(1990) 3 SCR 280], it was held that  the   State  or   its  instrumentality  entering  into commercial field  must act  in consonance  with the  rule of law. In  paragraph 10,  it was  held the  judicial review of administrative action  has become expansive and its scope is becoming wider  day by day. The traditional limitations have been vanishing  and the sphere of judicial scrutiny is being expanded, State  activity too is becoming fast perversive as the State has descended into the commercial  field and joint public sector  undertaking has  grown up.   The State action must be  justified by  judicial review, by opening up of the public law interpretation. Accordingly, it was held that the action of  company registered  under the  Companies Act  was amenable to judicial review.      In LIC  of India & Anr. v. Consumer Eduction & Research Centre &  Ors. [(1995)  5 SCC  482], it was held that in the contractual field  of State  action, the  State    must  act justly,   fairly   and   reasonably   in   public   interest commensurate with  the constitutional  conscience and socio- economic justice;  insurance  policies  of  LIC,  terms  and conditions prescribed  therein involve  public  element.  It was. therefore,  held in  para 23  at page  498  that  every action of  the public  authority or  the  person  acting  in public interest  or  any  act  that  gives  rise  to  public element, should  be guided  by public power or action hedged with public element that becomes open to challenge. If it is shown that  the exercise  of the  power is arbitrary, unjust and unfair,  it should  be no  answer  for  the  State,  its instrumentality, public  authority or person whose acts have the insignia  of public  element, to  say that their actions are in  the field  of private  law  and  they  are  free  to prescribe any  conditions or  limitations in  their actions. They must be based on some rational and relevant principles. It  must   not  be   guided  by   irrational  or  irrelevant considerations. Every administrative decision must be hedged by reasons.  At page  501 in para 28 it was held that though the dispute  may  fall  within  the  domain  of  contractual obligation, it  would not  relieve the  State  etc,  of  its obligation to  comply with the basic requirements of Article 14. To  this extent,  the obligation is of public character, invariably in  every case,  irrespective of  there being any other  right   or  obligation.   An  additional  contractual obligation cannot divest the claimant of the guarantee under Article 14  of non-arbitrariness  at the  hands of the State etc, in any of its actions.      In G.B.  Mahajan &  Ors. v. Jalgaon Municipal Council & Ors. [(1991)  3 SCC 91 at 109, para 38], it was held that in interpretation   of    the   test   of   reasonableness   in Administrative law, the words "void" and "voidable" found in private law  area are  amenable to public law situations and "carry over   with  them meanings  that may be inapposite in the changed  context. Some  such thing  has happened  to the words ’reasonable’ or reasonableness etc." In Shrisht Dhawan (Smt.) v.  M/s. Shaw Brothers [(1992) 1 SCC 534 at 553, para 20] the  private law  principle of  fraud and  collusion  in section 17  of the  Contract Act  was applied  to public law remedy and  it was held "that fraud in public law is not the same as  fraud in private law. Nor can the ingredient, which has established  fraud  and  commercial  transaction  be  of assistance in  determining fraud  in administrative  law. It has been aptly observed in Khwaja vs. Secretary of State for the Home  Department & Ors. [(1983) 1 All. E.R. 765] that it is dangerous  to introduce  maxims of  common law  as to the effect of  fraud while  determining fraud in relation to the

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statutory law".  In  Khwaja’s  case  (supra),  it  was  held "despite the  wealth of  authority on  the subject, there is nowhere to  be found  in  the  relevant  judgments  (perhaps because none  was thought necessary) a definitive exposition of the  reasons why a person who has obtained leave to enter by fraud  is an  illegal entrant.  To  say  that  the  fraud ’vitiates’ the leave or that the leave is not ’in accordance with the  Act’ is,  with  respect,  to  state  a  conclusion without explaining  the steps  by which it is reached. Since we are  here concerned  with purely  statutory law,  I think there are  dangers in  introducing maxims  of the common law as to  the effect  of fraud  on common  law transaction  and still greater  dangers in  seeking to  apply the concepts of ’void and  voidable’. In  a number  of recent  cases in your Lordships’  House,  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  these transplants from  the field  of contract do not readily take root in the field of public law. This is well illustrated in the judgement  of the Court of Appeal in the instant case of Khawaja [1982]  1 WLR 625 at 630; of [1982] 2 All ER 523, at 527, where  Donaldson LJ  spoke of  the appellant’s leave to enter as  being ’voidable  ab initio’,  which I  find,  with respect,  an   impossibly  difficult   legal   category   to comprehend". Thus,  the  limitations  in  private  law  were lifted and public law interpretation of fraud was enlarged.      It must  be remembered  that the  Constitution  adopted mixed  economy   and  control   over  the  industry  in  its establishment, working and production of goods and services. After recent  liberalised free  economy private  and  multi- national  entrepreneurship   has   gained   ascendancy   and entrenched into  wider commercial  production and  services, domestic  consumption   goods  and  large  scale  industrial productions. Even  some of the public Corporation are thrown open to the private national and multi-national investments. It is  axiomatic, whether  or not  industry is controlled by Government or  public  Corporations  by  statutory  form  or administrative clutch  or private  agents, juristic persons, Corporation whole  or corporation  sole, their constitution, control and  working would  also  be  subject  to  the  same constitutional limitation  in the  trinity, viz.,  Preamble, the Fundamental  Rights and  the Directive  Principles. They throw open  an element  of public  interest in  its working. They  share   the   burden   and   shoulder   constitutional obligations to provide facilities and opportunities enjoined in  the   Directive  Principles,   the  Preamble   and   the fundamental rights  enshrined in  the Constitution. The word ’control’, therefore,  requires to  be  interpreted  in  the changing commercial  scenario broadly  in keeping  with  the aforesaid constitutional goals and perspectives.      From the  above discussion,  the  following  principles would emerge: [1]  The constitution  of the Corporation or instrumentality      or agency  or corporation aggregate or Corporation sole      is not  of sole material relevance to decide whether it      is  by   or  under   the  control  of  the  appropriate      Government under the Act. [2]  If  it   is  a   statutory  Corporation,   it   is   an      instrumentality or  agency of  the State.  If it  is  a      company owned  wholly or  partially by a share capital,      floated from public exchequer, it gives indicia that it      is  controlled   by  or  under  the  authority  of  the      appropriate Government. [3]  In commercial  activities carried  on by  a Corporation      established by  or under the control of the appropriate      Government having  protection under  Articles 14 and 19      [2], it is an instrumentality or agency of the State.

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[4]  The State is a service Corporation. It acts through its      instrumentalities,  agencies   or  persons  natural  or      juridical. [5]  The governing  power, wherever located, must be subject      to the fundamental constitutional limitations and abide      by the principles laid in the Directive Principles. [6]  The  framework  of  service  regulations  made  in  the      appropriate rules  or regulations  should be consistent      with and subject to the same public law  principles and      limitations. [7]  Though the  instrumentality, agency  or person conducts      commercial activities  according to business principles      and are  separately accountable under their appropriate      bye-laws or  Memorandum of Association, they become the      arm of the Government. [8]  The existence  of  deep  and  pervasive  State  control      depends upon  the facts  and circumstances  in a  given      situation and  in the  altered situation  it is not the      sole  criterion   to  decide   whether  the  agency  or      instrumentality or  persons is  by or under the control      of the appropriate Government. [9]  Functions of  an instrumentality,  agency or person are      of public importance following public interest element. [10] The instrumentality,  agency or  person  must  have  an      element of authority or ability to effect the relations      with its  employees or public by virtue of power vested      in it  by law, memorandum of association or bye-laws or      articles of association. [11] The  instrumentality,   agency  or  person  renders  an      element of  public service and is accountable to health      and strength  of the  workers men  and women,  adequate      means of livelihood, the security for payment of living      wages, reasonable  conditions of  word, decent standard      of life  and opportunity  to  enjoy  full  leisure  and      social and cultural activities to the workmen. [12] Every  action   of  the  public  authority,  agency  or      instrumentality or the person acting in public interest      or any  act that gives rise to public element should be      guided by  public interest  in exercise of public power      or action  hedged with  public element  and is  open to      challenge. It  must meet  the test  of  reasonableness,      fairness and justness. [13] If the  exercise of  the power is arbitrary, unjust and      unfair, and  public authority,  instrumentality, agency      or the  person acting in public interest, though in the      field of  private law,  is not  free to  prescribe  any      unconstitutional conditions  or  limitations  in  their      actions.      It  must   be  based  on  some  rational  and  relevant principles.  It   must  not   be  guided  by  irrational  or irrelevant  considerations  and  all  their  actions  ****** satisfy the basic law requirements of Article 14. The public law interpretation  is the  basic tools of interpretation in that behalf  relegating  common  law  principles  to  purely private law field.      From this  perspective and  on deeper consideration, we are of the considered view that the two-judge Bench in Heavy Engineering case narrowly interpreted the words "appropriate Government" on  the common  law principles  which no  longer bear any relevance when it is tested on the anvil of Article 14. It  is  true  that  in  Hindustan  Machine  Tool’s  R.D. Shetty’s and  Food Corporation  of India  cases the ratio of Heavy Engineering  case formed  the foundation. In Hindustan Machine Tool’s  case, there was no independent consideration except  repetition  and  approval  of  the  ratio  in  Heavy

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Engineering case.  It is to reiterate that Heavy Engineering case is based on concession. In R.B. Shetty’s case, the need to dwelve  indepth  into  this  aspect  did  not  arise  but reference  was   make  to   the  premise   of  private   law interpretation which was relegated to and had given place to constitutional  perspectives   of  Article   14   which   is consistent with  the view  we have  stated  above.  In  Food Corporation of  India’s case,  the Bench proceeded primarily on  the   within  the   jurisdiction  of   different   State Governments which  led it  to conclude  that the appropriate Government would be the State Government.      In the  light of  the above principles and discussions, we  have   no  hesitation   to  hold  that  the  appropriate Government is  the Central  Government from the inception of the Act.  The notification  published under  Section  10  on December 9,1976,  therefore, was in exercise of its power as appropriate Government.  So it  is valid in law. The learned Solicitor General  is  not  right  in  contending  that  the relevant factors for abolition of the contract labour system in the  establishment of  the appellant  was not  before the Central Advisory  Board before its recommendation to abolish the contact  labour  system  in  the  establishment  of  the appellant. The learned Attorney General has placed before us the minutes  of the  Board which  do show  the  unmistakable material furnished  do indicated  that the  work in  all the establishments including  those of  the  appellants,  is  of perennial nature  satisfying  all  the  tests  engrafted  in Section 10(2)  of the  Act. Accordingly, on finding the work to be  of perennial  nature,  it  had  recommended  and  the Central  Government   had  considered   and   accepted   the recommendation to  abolish the contract labour system in the aforesaid  services.   Having  abolished   it,  the  Central Government was  denuded of  its power under Section 10(1) to again appoint  insofar as  the above  services of the Mohile Committee to  go once  over into  the self-same question and the recommendation  s of  the  latter  not  to  abolish  the contract  labour  system  in  the  above  services  and  the acceptance thereof by the Central Government are without any legal base and, therefore, non est.      The next crucial question for consideration is: whether the High  Court was  right in  directing enforcement  of the notification dated  December 9,1976  issued by  the  Central Government  ?   Before  adverting  to  that  aspect,  it  is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act.      The Constitutionality of the Act was challenged in M/s. Gammon India  Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1974) 1 SCC 596]  on the  touchstone of the Fundamental Rights given by  Articles   14.15,19(1)  (g)  and  of  Article  265.  The Constitution Bench  elaborately considered the provisions of the Act  and had held that the Act in Section 10 empower the Government to  prohibit employment  of contract  labour. The Government, under  that Section,  has to  apply its  mind to various factors,  before publishing  the notification in the official Gazette  prohibiting employment  of contract labour in  any   process,  operation   or   other   work   in   any establishment. The  words " other work in any establishment" were held  to be  important. The  work in  the establishment will  be  apparent  from  Section  10  (2)  of  the  Act  as incidental or  necessary to  the industry,  trade, business, manufacture  or   occupation  that  is  carried  on  in  the establishment. The  Government before  notifying prohibition of  contract   labour  work  which  is  carried  on  in  the establishment, will  consider  whether  the  work  is  of  a perennial nature  in that  establishment  or  work  is  done ordinarily through  regular workmen  in that  establishment.

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The words  "work of  an establishment"  which  are  used  in defining  workmen  as  contract  labour  being  employed  in connected with  the work  of an  establishment indicate that the work  of the  establishment there is the same as word in the establishment contemplated by Section 10 of the Act. The contractor under  takes to  produce a  given result  for the establishment through  contract labour. He supplies contract labour for any work of the establishment. The entire site is the establishment  and belongs to the principal employer who has a  right of  supervision and control; he is the owner of the premises  and the end product and from whom the contract labour receives  its payment  either directly  or through  a contractor. It  is the place where the establishment intends to carry  on its  business,  trade,  industry,  manufacture, occupation after  the construction is complete. Accordingly, the constutionality of the Act was upheld.      The appalling  conditions of  contract labour  who  are victims of  exploitation have been engaging the attention of various committees  for a long tie and in furtherance of the recommendations, the  Act  was  enacted  to  benefit,  as  a welfare measures,  viz., provisions  for canteens rest room, facilities for  supply of drinking water, latrines, urinals, first aid  facilities and amenities for the dignity of human labour,  are   in  larger   interests  of   the   community. Legislature is  the best judge to determine   what is needed as the  appropriate condition  for  employment  of  contract labour. The  legislature is  guided  by  the  needs  of  the general public  in determining  the reasonableness  of  such requirements under  the Act  and the  rules made thereunder. Suffice  it   would,  for  the  purpose  of  this  case,  to concentrate on  the definition  of "contract  labour"  under Section   2(b),    "contractor"    under    Section    2(c), "establishment" under  Section  2(e),  "principal  employer" under Section  2 (g),  "wages" under  Section 2  (h) and  of "workman"  under   Section  2   (i)  Under  Section  2  (c), "contractor" in relation to an establishment, means a person who  undertakes   to  produce   a  given   result  for   the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or articles of  manufacture  to  such  establishment,  through  contract labour of  who supples  contract labour  for any work of the establishment     and     includes     a     sub-contractor. "Establishment", under  Section 2(e),  means any  office  of department of  government of a local authority, or any place where  any   industry,  trade,   business,  manufacture   or occupation  is   carried  on.  "Principal  employer",  under Section 2(g), means, in relation to any office or department of the  Government or  a local authority, as the case may be may specify  in this  behalf; and in a factory, it means the owner or occupier of the factory and where a person has been named as the manager of the factory under the Factories Act, 1948, the  person so named; in a mine, it means the owner or agent of  the mine  and where a person has been named as the manager of  the mine,  the person so named; and in any other establishment, any  person responsible  for the  supervision and control of the establishment, is the principal employer. "Workman", under Section 2 (i), means any person employed in or in  connection with  the work  of any establishment to do any skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or  clerical work  for hire or reward, whether the terms of  employment be  express or  implied, but  does  not include any  such person  categorised in  clauses (a) to (e) which are not relevant for the purpose of this case.      Every principal  employer of an establishment under the Act is  enjoined under  Section 7  to apply for registration and have  it  registered  thereunder.  The  registration  is

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subject to  the revocation  under Section 8 on fulfilment of certain conditions  enumerated therein.  The effect  of non- registration is  enumerated in  Section 9  in the  mandatory language that  no principal  employer shall  employ contract labour in  the establishment  af   ter the specified period. Section 12 enjoins similar obligations on the contractor for registration,  with   mandatory  language,   that  from  the appropriate date,  no contractor  to whom  the Act  applies, hall undertake  or execute  any work through contract labour except under  and in  accordance with  the licence issued in that behalf by the licensing officer. Licence  is   grated  under   Section  13   and  revocation, suspension and  amendment thereof  have  been  provided,  in Section 14 with which we are not concerned in this case. The welfare measures  mandated in  Chapter V be complied with by every  establishment.  Under  Section  21,  every  principal employer shall  nominate his representative to be present at the time  of disbursement of wages by the contractor and the contractor should  be responsible  for payment  of wages  to every such workman. Representative of the principal employer should ensure  and  certify  that  wages  was  paid  in  the prescribed manner.  In case  of  default  committed  by  the contractor in  paying wages  within the prescribed period or for short  payment ,  the principal  employer period  or for short payment of wages in full or the unpaid balance due, as the case  may be,  to the  contract labour  employed by  the recover the  amount so  paid from  the contractor  either by deduction form  any amount  payable to  the contractor under any contract or as a debt payable by the contractor.      Section 10  prohibits  employment  of  contract  labour with a  non obstante  clause.  The  appropriate  Government, after consultation  with the  Central Advisory  Board or, as the case  may be,  State  Board  Prohibit,  by  notification published in  the official  Gazette, employment  of contract labour in  any  establishment.  Before  issue  of  any  such notification, the appropriate Government is enjoined to have regard to  the conditions  of work and benefits provided for the contract  labour in the establishment and other relevant factors, such  as -(a)  whether the  process,  operation  or other work  is incidental to, or necessary for the industry, trade, business,  manufacture or  occupation that is carried on in  the establishment;  (b) whether  it is  of  perennial nature, that  is to say, it is of sufficient duration having regard  to   the  nature   of  industry,   trade,  business, manufacture of  occupation carried on in that establishment; (c) whether it is done ordinarily through regular workmen in that establishment  or an establishment similar thereto; and (d) whether  it is  sufficient to employ considerable number of whole-time  workmen. Section  20 makes  it  mandatory  to provide the  amenities  of  welfare  and  health  facilities enjoined in  Sections 16  and 19.  The expenses  incurred in that behalf  may be  recovered, by  the principal  employer, from the  contractor.  The  penalty  for  non-compliance  is provide in  Sections 23   and  24 of  the Act.  Offences  by companies  are   dealt  with   under  Section  25.  For  the prosecution of  non-cognisable offences,  complaint is to be laid with  previous sanction  of the  Inspector in  writing. Section 27 prescribes limitation for laying prosecution.      Rules have been prescribed in that behalf for effective enforcement of  the Act.  Forms and  terms and conditions of licence have  been prescribed  in Rules 21 to 25.  Chapter V of the  Central Rules  deals with  welfare and health of the contract labour.  Chapter VI  deals with payment of wages to the workmen and the manner of payment has also been provided therein. Form  III referred  to in  Rule 18  (3)  envisages,

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among others,  name and address of the contractor, nature of work in  which contract labour is to be employed on any day, maximum number  of contract  labour to  be employed  on  any date, probable  duration of  employment of  contract  labour etc.  The  licence  issued  in  Form  IV  under  Rule  21(1) indicates the  particulars envisaged in Forms III. Form XIII under Rule 75 requires information as to the list of workmen employed by  the contractor  and also  to be  specified, the name and  surname of  the workmen,  Sl. No.,  age  and  sex, father’s/husband’s name,  nature of employment, designation, permanent home  address of the workmen, date of commencement of employment,  signature/thumb impression  of workmen, date of termination.  Certificate of  completion of  the work has been provided  in form  XV as per Rule 77, Forms XVII as per Rule 78  (1) (a)  (i)  is Register of wages and provides the particulars,  apart  from  other  details,  number  of  days worked, units  of work  done, daily-rate of wages/piece rate etc. Register of wages-cum-Muster Roll is prescribed in Form XVIII referred  to in  Rule 78  (i)  (a)  (i)  and  requires details in  particular as to daily attendance, units worked, designation/nature of  work, total attendance, units of work done, overtime wages etc.      It would  thus be seen that before the Central or State Advisory Board  advises  the  appropriate  Government  under Section 10(1)  on the  issue whether  or not  to abolish the contractor labour  system, it has before it all the relevant factual material  and the  appropriate Government  after the receipt and  consideration of  the recommendations  and  the material and then takes decision.      The  pivotal   question  for   consideration  is  :  on abolition  of  the  contract  labour  by  publication  of  a notification in the Gazette under sub-section (1) of Section 10, what would be the consequences ? It is seen that so long as the  contract  labour  system  continues,  the  principal employer is  enjoined to  ensure payment  of  wages  to  the contract labour and to provide all other amenities envisaged under the  Act and the Rules including provisions  for food, potable water,  health and safety and failure thereof visits with penal consequences.      The 42nd  Constitution (Amendment)  Act, 1976,  brought explicitly in the Preamble socialist and secular concepts in sovereign democratic  republic of  Bharat with  effect  form January  3,1977.   The  Preamble   was  held   as  part   of Constitution   in    His   Holiness    Kesavananda   Bharati Sripadagalavaru vs.  State of Kerala [1973 Supp. SCR 1]. The provisions of  the Constitution including Fundamental Rights are alterable  but the  result thereof  should be consistent with the  basic foundation  and the  basic structure  of the Constitution. Republican  and democratic form of Government, secular character of the Constitution, separation of powers, dignity and freedom to the individual are basic features and foundations easily  discernible, not  only from the Preamble but the whole scheme of the Constitution. In S.R. Bommai vs. Union of  India [(1994)  3 SCC 1], it was held that Preamble of the  Constitution is  the basic  feature. Either prior to 42nd Constitution  (Amendmet) Act, or thereafter, though the word "socialist" was not expressly brought out separately in the main parts of the Constitution, i.e., in the Chapters on Fundamental Rights  or the  Directive Principles,  its seed- beds are  right to participation in public offices, right to seek consideration  for appointment  to an  office or  post; right to  life and right to equality which would amplify the roots of  socialism in  democratic form of Government; right to equality  of status  and of  opportunity, right  to equal access to  public places  and right  to freedoms, protective

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discrimination, abolition of untouchability, its practice in any form  an constitutional  offence, as  guaranteed in Part III &  IV i.e.,  Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles which to  every citizen  are Fundamental  Rights. In Minerva Mills Ltd.  & Ors.  vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1981 (1) SCR 206 =  AIR 1980  SC 1789],  the Constitution  Bench had held that the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles are two wheels  of the  chariot in  establishing the egalitarian social order.  Right to  life enshrined  in Article 21 means something more  than survival  of animal existence. It would include the  right to  live with human dignity [vide Francis Coralie Mullin  vs. The  Administrator, Union  Territory  of Delhi &  Ors. (AIR  1981 SC  746 para  3); Olga  Tellis  vs. Bombay Municipal  Corporation vs.  D.T.C.  Mazdoor  Congress [AIR 1991  SC 101  para 223,234 and 259 = (1991) supp. 1 SCC 600]. Right to means of livelihood and the right to dignity, right to  health, right to potable water, right to pollution free environment  and right to life. Social justice has been held to  be  Fundamental  right  in  consumer  Eduction  and Research Centre  vs. Union  of India [(1995) 3 SCC 42 = 1995 (1) SCALE  354 at  375]. The  Directive  Principles  in  our Constitution are  fore-runners of  the U.N.O.  Convention on Right to  Development as  inalienable human  right and every persons and  all people  are  entitled  to  participate  in, contribute  to  and  enjoy  economic,  social  cultural  and political development  in which all human right, fundamental freedoms   would be fully realised. It is the responsibility of  the  State  as  well  as  the  individuals,  singly  and collectively, for  the development  taking into  account the need  for   fuller  responsibility  for  the  human  rights, fundamental freedoms  as well as the duties to the community which alone  can ensure  free and complete fulfilment of the human being.  They promote and protect an appropriate social and economic  order in  democracy for development. The State should  provide   facilities  and  opportunities  to  ensure development and to eliminate all obstacles to development by appropriate economic  and social  reforms so as to eradicate all social  injustice. These  principles  are  imbedded,  as stated earlier,  as integral part of our Constitution in the Directive Principles.  Therefore ,  the Directive Principles now stand  elevated to inelienable fundamental human rights. Even they are justiciable by themselves. Social and economic democracy is  the foundation for stable political democracy. To make  them a  way of  life in the Indian polity, law as a social engineer,  is to create just social order, remove the inequalities in  social and economic life and socio-economic disabilities with  which  people  are  languishing;  and  to require positive opportunities and facilities as individuals and groups  of persons  for development of human personality in our  civilised democratic set up so that every individual would  strive  constantly  to  rise  t  higher  levels.  Dr. Ambedkar, in  his closing speech in the Constituent Assembly on November  25, 1949, had lucidly elucidated the meaning of social and  political democracy.  He stated  that it means a way  of   life  which   recognised  liberty,   equality  and franternity as the principles of life. They form an integral union. One cannot divorce from the other; otherwise it would defeat the  very purpose  of  democracy.  Without  equality, liberty would  produce supremacy  of the  few over  the many equality  without  liberty  would  kill  the  initiative  to improve  the  individual‘s  excellence,  political  equality without  socio-economic  equality  would  run  the  rusk  of democratic institutions to suffer a set back. Therefore, for establishment of  just social  order  in  which  social  and economic democracy  would be  a way  of life inequalities in

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income should  be removed  and every  endeavour be  made  to eliminate inequalities in status through the rule of law. "Socialism"  brought   into  the   preamble  and  its  sweep elaborately  was   considered  by   this  Court  in  several judgments.  It  was  held  that  the  meaning  of  the  word "socialism"  in   the  Preamble   of  the  Constitution  was expressly  brought  in  the  Constitution  to  establish  an egalitarian social  order through  rule of  law as its basis structure. In  Minerva Mills  Ltd.  case,  the  Constitution Bench had  considered the meaning of the word "socialism" to crystalise  a  socialistic  state  securing  to  its  people socio-economic  justice  by  interplay  of  the  Fundamental rights and  the Directive  Principles. In D.S. Nakara & Ors. v. Union  of India  [(1983) 2 SCR 165], another Constitution Bench had held that the democratic socialism achieves socio- economic revolution  to end  poverty, ignorance, disease and inequality of  opportunity. The basic framework of socialism was held  to provide security from cradle to grave. The less equipped person  shall be assured to decent minimum standard of life  to prevent  exploitation  in  any  form,  equitable distribution of  national cake and to push the disadvantaged to the  upper ladder  of life.  It was further held that the Preamble directs  the centers  of  power,  the  Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, to strive to shift up from a wholly feudal exploited  slave  society  to  a  vibrant,  throbbing socialist welfare  society which is a long march; but during the journey  to the  fulfilment of goal, every State action, whenever taken,  must be directed and must be so interpreted as to  take the  society towards that goal. Dr. V.K.R.V Rao, one of  the eminent  economists  of  India  in  his  "Indian Socialism  -   retrospect  and  prospect"  has  stated  that equitable distribution of the income and maximisation of the production is the object of socialism under the Constitution to solve  the problems  of umemployment, low income and mass poverty and  to bring about a significant improvement in the national standard  of living.  he also  stated that to bring about socialism, deliberate and purposive action on the part of  the   State,  in   regard  to   production  as  sell  as distribution and  the necessary  savings, investment, use of human skills  and use  of science  and technology  should be brought about.  Changes  in  property  relations,  taxation, public expenditure,  education and  the social  services are necessary to  make a socialist State under the Constitution, a reality. It must also bring about, apart from distribution of  income,   full  employment   as  also  increase  in  the production. In State of Karnataka v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy & Anr. [(1978)  1 SCR  641], a  Bench of  nine judges  of this Court,  considering  the  nationalisation  of  the  contract carriages, had  held  that  the  aim  of  socialism  is  the distribution of  the material  resources of the community in such a  way as  to subserve  the commonhood.  The  principle embodied in  Article 39(b) of the Constitution is one of the essential directives  to bring about the distribution of the material  resources.   It  would   give  full  play  to  the distributive justice.  It fulfills  the basic purpose of re- structuring the  economic order.  Article 39(b),  therefore, has a  social  mission.  it  embraces  the  entire  material resources of  the community.  Its task is to distribute such resources. Its  goal is to undertake distribution as best to subserve the  common good. In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Bharat  Cooking Coal  Ltd. &  Anr. [(1983)  1 SCR  1000], another Constitution  Bench interpreted the word "socialism" and Article  39(b) of the Constitution and had held that the broad egalitarian principle of economic justice was implicit in every  Directive  Principle.  The  law  was  designed  to

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promote broader  egalitarian social  goals  to  do  economic justice for all. The object of nationalisation of mining was to distribute  nation’s resources.  In State  of Tamil  Nadu etc. v. L. Abu Kavur Bai & Ors. etc. [(1984) 1 SCR 725], the same interpretation  was given by another Constitution Bench upholding nationalisation  of State  Carriages and  Contract Carriages (Acquisition)  Act. Therefore,  all State  actions should  be   such  to  make  socio-economic  democracy  with liberty, equality  and fraternity,  a  reality  to  all  the people through democratic socialism under the rule of law.      In Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors. v. Union of India  & Ors.  [(1995) 3 SCC 42], a Bench of three Judges (to which  one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J., was a member) had to consider whether  right to health of workers in the Asbestos industries is a fundamental right and whether the management was bound  to provide the same? In that context, considering right to  life under  Article 21,  its  meaning,  scope  and content, this  Court had  held  that  the  jurisprudence  of personhood or  philosophy of  the right  to  life  envisaged under Article  21 enlarges  its  sweep  to  encompass  human personality in  its full  blossom  with  invigorated  health which is  a wealth to the workman to earn his livelihood, to sustain the   dignity  of person  and to  live a  life  with dignity and  equality.  The  expression  "life"  assured  in Article 21,  does  not  connote  mere  animal  existence  or continued drudgery through life. It has a much wider meaning which includes  right  to  livelihood,  better  standard  of living, hygienic conditions in the workplace and leisure.      Right to  health and medical care to protect health and vigour, while  in service  or after  retirement, was  held a fundamental right  of a  worker under  Article 21, read with Articles 39(e),  41,43,48 - A and all related constitutional provisions and  fundamental human rights to make the life of the  workman  meaningful  and  purposeful  with  dignity  of person. The right to health of a worker is an integral facet of meaningful  right to  life, to have not only a meaningful existence but  also robust  health and  vigour without which the worker  would lead  a life  of misery.  Lack  of  health denudes him of his livelihood. Compelling economic necessity to work  in an  industry exposed  to health  hazards, due to indigence for  bread-winning for himself and his dependents, should not  be at  the cost  of the health and vigour of the workman.      The  Preamble   and  Article  38  of  the  Constitution envision social  justice as  the arch  to ensure  life to be meaningful and  livable with human dignity. Jurisprudence is the eye  of law  giving an  insight into  the environment of which it is the expression. It relates the law to the spirit of the  time and kames it richer. Law is the ultimate aim of every civilised  society, as a key system in a given era, to meet the  needs and  demands of its time. Justice, according to  law,   comprehends  social   urge  and  commitment.  The Constitution  commands   justice,  liberty,   equality   and fraternity  as  supreme  values  to  usher  the  egalitarian social, economic  and political  democracy. Social  justice, equality and  dignity of  persons are cornerstones of social democracy.  The   concept  of  "social  justice"  which  the Constitution  of   India  engrafted,   consists  of  diverse principles essential  for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. "Social justice" is thus an integral part  of justice  in the  generic sense. Justice is the genus,  of which  social justice  is one of its species. Social  justice   is  a   dynamic  device  to  mitigate  the sufferings of  the poor,  weak, dalits, tribals and deprived sections of  the society and to elevate them to the level of

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equality to  live a  life with  dignity  of  person.  Social justice is  not a  simple or single idea of a society but is an essential  part of  complex social  change to  relive the poor etc. From handicaps, penury to ward off distress and to make their  life livable, for greater good of the society at large. In  other words,  the aim  of social  justice  is  to attain substantial  degree of social, economic and political equality,  which   is   the   legitimate   expectation   and constitutional goal.    Social  security,  just  and  humane conditions of  work and  leisure to  workman are part of his meaningful right  to life  and to achieve self-expression of his personality  and to  enjoy the  life with  dignity.  The State should  provide facility  and opportunities  to enable them to  reach at least minimum standard of health, economic security and  civilised living  while sharing  according  to their capacity, social and cultural heritage.      In  a   developing  society  like  ours,  steeped  with unbridgeable and  ever-widening gaps of inequality in status and of  opportunity, law  is a catalyst, rubicon to the poor etc, to  reach the  ladder of  social justice.  What is  due cannot be  ascertained by  an absolute  standard which keeps changing, depending  upon the  time, place and circumstance. The constitutional  concern of  social justice as an elastic continuous process  is to  accord justice to all sections of the society  by providing  facilities and  opportunities  to remove handicaps  and disabilities  with which the poor, the workmen etc,  are languishing and to secure dignity of their person. The  Constitution, therefore,  mandates the State to accord justice  to all  members of the society in all facets of human  activity. The  concept of  social  justice  embads equality to  flavour and  enliven the  practical content  of life. Social  justice and equality are complementary to each other so  that both  should maintain their vitality. Rule of law, therefore,  is a potent instrument of social justice to bring about  equality in  results. it  was accordingly  held that right  to social  justice and right to health were held to be  Fundamental Rights.  The management  was directed  to provide health  insurance during  service and  at  least  15 years after  retirement and  periodical tests protecting the health of the workmen.      In LIC of India & Anr. v. Consumer Education & Research Centre &  Ors. [(1995)  5 SCC  482],  considering  the  Life Insurance Corporation’s  right to  fix the rates of premium, this court  had held that the authorities or private persons or industry are bound by the directives contained in Part IV and the  Fundamental Rights  in Part III and the Preamble of the Constitution.  The right to carry on trade is subject to the directives  contained in the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, European Convention of Social, Economic and  Cultural Rights and the Convention on Right to Development for  Social Economic Justice. Social security is a facet  of socio-economic justice to the people and a means to livelihood.  In Murlidhar  Dayandeo Kesekar V. Vishwanath Pandu Barde  & Anr.[1995  supp (2) SCC 549] (to which two of us, K.  Ramasway, and  B.L. Hansaria JJ., were members), the question arose; whether the alienation of the lands assigned to Scheduled  Tribes was  valid in  law ?  In  that  context considering the  Preamble, the  Directive Principles and the Fundamental Rights  including the  right to life, this court had held  that economic  empowerment and  social justice are Fundamental Rights  to the  tribes. The  basic  aim  to  the welfare State  is the  attainment of  substantial degree  of social, economic  and political  equalities and  to  achieve self-expression in his work as a citizen, leisure and social justice. The  distinguishing characteristic  of the  welfare

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State is  the assumption  by community  acting  through  the State and  as its  responsibilities to  provide  the  means, whereby all  its  members  can  reach  minimum  standard  of economic security,  civilised  living,  capacity  to  secure social status  and culture  to keep good health. The welfare State, therefore, should take positive measure to assist the community at  large  to  act  in  collective  responsibility towards its  member and  should  take  positive  measure  to assist them  to achieve  the above.  It was, therefore, held thus:      "Article  21  of  the  Constitution      assures  right  to  life.  To  make      right  to   life   meaningful   and      effective,  this   court   put   up      expansive    interpretation     and      brought within  its ambit  right to      education,  health,  speedy  trial,      equal  wages   for  equal  work  as      fundamental rights. Articles 14, 15      and 16  prohibit discrimination and      accord equality.  The  Preamble  to      the  Constitution  as  a  socialist      republic   visualises   to   remove      economic   inequalities    and   to      provide       facilities        and      opportunities for  decent  standard      of  living   and  to   protect  the      economic  interest  of  the  weaker      segments   of   the   society,   in      particular, Scheduled  Castes  i.e.      Dalits and the Scheduled Tries i.e.      Tribes and  to  protect  them  from      "all forms  of exploitations". Many      a day  have  come  and  gone  after      26.1.1950 but  no leaf is turned in      the lives  of the  poor and the gap      between the  rich and  the poor  is      gradually widening  on the brink of      being unbridgeable.      Providing   adequate    means    of      livelihood for all the citizens and      distribution   of    the   material      resources  of   the  community  for      common welfare,  enable  the  poor,      the Dalits  and Tribes  to  fulfill      the basic  needs to  bring about  a      fundamental change in the structure      of the  Indian  society  which  was      divided  by   erecting  impregnable      walls  of  separation  between  the      people on  grounds of  caste,  sub-      caste,   creed,   religion,   race,      language  and   sex.  Equality   of      opportunity and State thereby would      become  the   bedrocks  for  social      integration.  Economic  empowerment      thereby is  the foundation  of make      equality  of   status,  dignity  to      person  and   equal  opportunity  a      truism. The  core of the commitment      of the  Constitution of  the social      revolution through rule of law lies      in effectuation  of the fundamental      right   directive   principles   as      supplementary and  complementary to

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    each    other.     The    Preamble,      fundamental  rights  and  directive      principles -  the trinity - are the      conscience  of   the  Constitution.      Political  democracy   has  to   be      stable.  Socio-economic   democracy      must take  strong roots  and should      become a  way of  life. The  State,      therefore, is  enjoined to  provide      adequate means of livelihood to the      poor,  weaker   sections   of   the      society, the  Dalits and Tribes and      to distribute material resources of      the community  to them  for  common      welfare etc".      It  was   accordingly  held   that  right  to  economic empowerment  is  a  fundamental  right.  The  alienation  of assigned land  without permission of competent authority was held void.      In R.  Chandevarappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. [(1995)  6 SCC  309] (to  which two of us, K. Ramaswamy and B.L.  Hansaria, JJ.,  were members)  this Court  was  to consider whether the alienation of Government lands allotted to  the   Scheduled  Castes   was  in   violation   of   the Constitutional objectives  under Article  39(b) and  46.  It was held that economic empowerment to the Dalits, Tribes and the poor  as a part of distributive justice is a Fundamental Right; assignment  of the  land to  them under Article 39(b) was to  provide  socio-economic  justice  to  the  Scheduled Castes. The  alienation of  the land, therefore, was held to be in  violation of  the Constitutional  objectives. It  was held thus:      "In fact,  the cumulative effect of      social and  economic legislation is      to  specify  the  basic  structure.      Moreover, the  social system shapes      the wants  and aspirations  and its      citizens   come    to   have.    It      determines  in  part  the  sort  of      persons they  want to be as well as      the sort  of persons they are. Thus      an economic  system is  not only an      institutional device for satisfying      existing wants  and needs but a way      of creating and fashioning wants in      the    future.     The     economic      empowerment,  therefore,   to   the      poor,  dalits   and  tribes  as  an      integral constitutional  scheme  of      socio-economic democracy  is a  way      of  life  of  political  democracy.      Economic empowerment is, therefore,      a   basic   human   right   and   a      fundamental right  as part of right      to live, equality and of status and      dignity   to   the   poor,   weaker      sections, dalits and tribes.      The prohibition  from alienation is      to  effectuate  the  constitutional      policy  of   economic   empowerment      under Article 14, 21, 38, 39 and 46      read  with   the  Preamble  of  the      Constitution.  Accordingly  refusal      to   permit    alienation   is   to      effectuate    the    constitutional

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    policy. the alienation was declared      to be void under sections 23 of the      Contract Act being violative of the      constitutional scheme  of  economic      empowerment of  accord equality  of      status,  dignity   of  persons  and      economic empowerment."      It was  further held  that providing  adequate means of livelihood for  all the citizens and the distribution of the material resources  of the  community  for  common  welfare, enable the  poor, the  dalits and the tribes, to fulfill the basic needs  to bring  about the  fundamental change  in the structure of the Indian society. Equality of opportunity and status  would   thereby  become   the  bedrocks  for  social integration. Economic  empowerment is,  therefore,  a  basic human right  and fundamental right as apart of right to life to make political democracy stable. Socio-economic democracy must take  strong route and become a way of life. The state, therefore,  is   enjoined  to   provide  adequate  means  of livelihood to  the poor, weaker sections of the society, the dalits and  the tribes  and distribute material resources of the community  to them  for common  welfare. Justice  is  an attribute of  human conduct and rule of law is indispensable foundation to establish socio-economic justice. The doctrine of political  economy must  include interpretation  for  the public good  which is  based on justice that would guide the people when  questions of  economic and  social  policy  are under  consideration.   In  Peerless   General  Finance  and Investment Co.  Ltd. & Anr. v. Reserve Bank of India [(1992) 2 SCC  343 at  389  para  55],  this  court  had  held  that stability of  the political  democracy  hinges  upon  socio- economic democracy.  Right to  development  is  one  of  the important facets  of basic  human  rights.  Right  to  self- interest is inherent in right to life. Mahatma Gandhiji, the Father of Nation said that "every human being has a right to live and, therefore, to find the wherewithal to feed himself and where  necessary to  clothe and  house himself". In D.K. Yadav v.  J.M.A. Industries  Ltd. [(1993)  3 SCC  259],  the question was  whether the workman for absence in service for 7 days  can be removed without an enquiry. In that context a bench of three judges had held thus:      "Article   21   clubs   life   with      liberty,  dignity  of  person  with      means of  livelihood without  which      the glorious contents of dignity of      person would  be reduced  to animal      existence. When  right to  life  is      interpreted in  the  light  of  the      colour  and  content  of  procedure      established  by   law  must  be  in      conformity   with    the    minimum      fairness and processual justice, it      would      relieve      legislative      callousness  despising  opportunity      of    being    heard    and    fair      opportunities of  defence.  Article      14 has pervasive processual potency      and versatile quality, equalitarian      in  its   soul  and   allergic   to      discriminatory   dictates. Equality      is      the      antithesis      of      arbitrariness".      In Dalmia  Cement (Bharat)  Ltd. &  Anr. vs.  Union  of India &  Ors. etc.  [JT 1996  (4) SC  555], a Bench of three judges (to  which one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J., was a member)

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was  to  consider  the  constitutionality  of  Jute  Packing Material  Act,  1987.  The  law  was  made  to  protect  the agriculturists cultivating  jute and  jute products. In that context if was held thus:      "thus      agriculturists      have      fundamental   rights    to   social      justice and  economic  empowerment.      The Preamble of the Constitution is      the epitome  of the basic structure      built    in     the    Constitution      guaranteeing  justice   -   social,      economic and  political -  equality      of status  and of  opportunity with      dignity of  person and  fraternity.      To establish  an egalitarian social      order, the  trinity, the  Preamble,      the Fundamental  Rights in Part III      and Directive  Principles of  State      Policy (for short, ’Directives’) in      Chapter  IV   of  the  Constitution      delineated    the    socio-economic      justice. The  word justice envision      in the  Preamble is  used in  broad      spectrum  to  harmonise  individual      right with  the general  welfare of      the society.  The  Constitution  is      the supreme law. The purpose of law      is  realisation  of  justice  whose      content and  scope  vary  depending      upon    the    prevailing    social      environment.   Every   social   and      economic change  causes  change  in      the law. In a democracy governed by      rule of  law, it is not possible to      change the  legal basis  of  socio-      economic  life   of  the  community      without       bringing        about      corresponding change in the law. In      interpretation of  the Constitution      and the  law, endeavour needs to be      made to  harmonise  the  individual      interest   with    the    paramount      interest of  the community  keeping      pace with  the realities  of  every      changing social  and economic  life      of the  community envisaged  in the      Constitution.   Justice    in   the      Preamble      implies      equality      consistent   with   the   competing      demands    between     distributive      justice with  those  of  cumulative      justice. Justice  aims  to  promote      the  general   well-being  of   the      community as  well as  individual’s      excellence. The  principal  end  of      society is to protect the enjoyment      of the  rights of  the  individuals      subject   to  social  order,  well-      being and  morality.  Establishment      of priorities  of  liberties  is  a      political judgment.      Law is  the foundation on which the      potential of  the  society  stands.      Law is  an instrument  for  society      stands. Law  is an  instrument  for

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    social change  as also defender for      social change.      Social justice is the comprehensive      form to remove social imbalances by      law harmonising the rival claims or      the interests  of different  groups      and/or  sections   in  the   social      structure or  individuals by  means      of which alone it would be possible      to build  up a  welfare State.  The      idea of economic justice is to make      equality of  status meaningful  and      the life  worth living  at its best      removing inequality  of opportunity      and of  status -  social,  economic      and political.      Law is  the ultimate  aim of  every      civilised society,  as a key system      in a  given era,  to meet the needs      and demands  of its  time. Justice,      according   to   law,   comprehends      social   urge    and    commitment.      Justice,  liberty,   equality   and      fraternity       are        supreme      constitutional values  to establish      the  egalitarian  social,  economic      and  political   democracy,  Social      justice, equality  and  dignity  of      person are  cornerstones of  social      democracy. Social  justice  consist      of diverse principles essential for      the orderly  growth and development      of personality  of  every  citizen.      Justice is  its  facet,  a  dynamic      device to  mitigate the  sufferings      of   the   disadvantaged   and   to      eliminate  handicaps   so   as   to      elevate  them   to  the   level  of      equality to  live life with dignity      of person.  Social justice is not a      simple or  single idea of a society      but it an essential part of complex      social change  to relieve  the poor      etc.  From  handicaps,  penury,  to      ward the  off from  distress and to      make  their   lives   livable   for      greater  good  of  the  society  at      large. Social  justice,  therefore,      gives substantial degree of social,      economic  and  political  equality,      which is  the constitutional  right      of every  citizen. In  para 19,  it      was further  elaborated that social      justice is  one of  the disciplines      of justice  which  relates  to  the      society.  What  is  due  cannot  be      ascertained  by  absolute  standard      which keeps changing depending upon      the time,  place and circumstances.      The   constitutional   concern   of      social  justice,   as  an   elastic      continuous process, is to transform      and accord  justice to all sections      of   the   society   by   providing      facilities  and   opportunities  to

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    remove handicaps  and  disabilities      with  which   the  poor   etc,  are      languishing.  It   aims  to  secure      dignity of  their person. It is the      duty of the State of accord justice      to all  members of  the society  in      all facts  of human  activity.  The      concept of  social  justice  embeds      equality to  flavour  and  enlivens      practical content  of life.  Social      justice    and     equality     are      complementary to each other so that      both    should    maintain    their      vitality. Rule  of law,  therefore,      is a  potent instrument  of  social      justice to  bring about equality in      result.      Social and  economic justice in the      context of  our Indian Constitution      must, therefore, be understood in a      comprehensive sense go remove every      inequality  to   all  citizens   in      social   as    well   as   economic      activities and  in  every  part  of      life. Economic  justice  means  the      abolition   of    those    economic      conditions which  ultimately result      in  the   inequality  of   economic      values between  men.  It  means  to      establish a  democratic way of life      built upon socio-economic structure      of the  society to make the rule of      law dynamic.      The  Fundamental   Rights  and  the      Directive      are,      therefore,      harmoniously be interpreted to make      the  law   a  social   engineer  to      provide flesh  and blood to the dry      bones of  law. The Directives would      serve the  Court as  a beacon light      to   interpretation.    Fundamental      Rights are  rightful means  to  the      end,  viz.,   Social  and  economic      justices provided in the Directives      and the  Preamble. The  Fundamental      Rights and the Directives establish      the trinity  of  equality,  liberty      and fraternity  in  an  egalitarian      social    order     and     prevent      exploitation.      Social  justice,  therefore,  forms      the basis  of progressive stability      in the  society and human progress.      Economic justice  means  abolishing      such  economic   conditions   which      remove the  inequality of  economic      value   between    man   and   man,      concentration of  wealth and  means      of production in the hands of a few      and are  detrimental to  the  vast.      Law, therefore,  must seek to serve      as a  flexible instrument of socio-      economic adjustment  to bring about      peaceful socio-economic  revolution      under    rule     of    law.    The

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    Constitution,    the    fundamental      supreme   lex    distributes    the      sovereign   power    between    the      Executive, the  Legislature and the      Judiciary.  The  Court,  therefore,      must  strive   to  give  harmonious      interpretation  to  propel  forward      march    and    progress    towards      establishing an  egalitarian social      order."      The validity of the Act was accordingly upheld.      It is  already seen  that in D.T.C’s case (supra), this Court had held that right to life to a workman would include right to  continue in  permanent employment  which is  not a bounty of  the employer  nor can  its  survival  be  at  the volition and mercy of the employer. Income is the foundation to enjoy  many Fundamental right and when work is the source of income,  the  right  to  work  would  become  as  such  a fundamental right.  Fundamental Right  can ill-afford  to be consigned to  the limbo  of undefined premises and uncertain application. In  Bandhu Mukti  Morcha  vs.  Union  of  India [(1984) 3  SCC 161],  this Court  had held that the right to life with  human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath  from the  Directive Principles  of State Policy and that  opportunities and facilities should be provided to the people.  In Olga Tellis’s case, this court had held that the right  to livelihood  is an important facet of the right to life  . Deprivation  of the  means  of  livelihood  would denude the life itself. In C.E.S.C Ltd. & Ors. vs. S.C. Bose & Ors.  [(1992) 1  SCC 441],  it was  held that the right to social and economic justice is a fundamental right. Right to health of a worker is a fundamental right. The right to live with human  dignity at  least with  minimum  sustenance  and shelter and all those rights and aspects of life which would o to  make a  man’s life   complete  and worth living, would form part  of the  right to  life. Enjoyment of life and its attainment -  social, cultural  and intellectual  -  without which  life   cannot  be   meaningful,  would   embrace  the protection  and   preservation   of   life   guaranteed   by Article 21.  In life Insurances Corporation case, a Bench of two Judge  had held  that right  to economic  equality is  a fundamental right.  In Dalmia Cement Bharat Ltd. case, right to economic  justice was  held to  be a  fundamental  right. Right to  shelter was held to be a fundamental right in Olga Tellis’s case;  P.G. Gupta  vs.  State  of  Gujarat  &  ors, [(1995) Supp.(2)  SCC  182];  M/s.  Shantisar  Builders  vs. Narayan Khimlal  Totame &  Ors. [(1990)  1 SCC 520]; Chameli Singh &  ors. vs.  State of  U.P. &  Anr. [(1996) 2 SCC 549] etc.      It would,  thus, be  seen that all essential facilities and opportunities  to the  poor people are fundamental means to  development,   to  live  with  minimum  comforts,  food, shelter, clothing  and health.  Due to economic constraints, though right  to work  was not  declared  as  a  fundamental right, right  to work  of workman, lower class, middle class and poor  people is  means to development and source to earn livelihood. thought, right to employment cannot, as a right, be claimed but after the appointment to a post or an office, be it  under the State, its agency instrumentality, jurisdic person or  private interpreneur  it is  required to be dealt with as  per public  element and  to act  in public interest assuring equality,  which is  a genus  of Article 14 and all other concomitant  rights emanating therefrom are species to make their  right to  life and  dignity of  person real  and meaningful. The  democracy offers  to everyone  as doer,  an

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exerter and  developer and  enjoyer of his human capacities, as stated  by Justice  K.K. Mathew,  in his  "The  Right  to Equality and Property under the Indian Constitution" at page 47-48. These  exercises of  human capacity require access to the material  resources and  also continuous  and sufficient intake of  material means  to maintain human energy. Lack of access to  the material  resources is  an impediment  to the development of human personality. This impediment, as a lack of access  to means  of labour,  if we  take  labour  i  its broadest sense  of human  resources, requires  removal  only under the  rule of  law. To the workmen, right to employment is the  property, source of livelihood and dignity of person an means  of enjoy  life, health and leisure. Equality, as a principle of  justice, governs  leisure, the distribution of material resources  including right  to employment.  Private property   ownership    has    always    required    special justifications   and   qualifications   to   reconcile   the institution with  the public interest. It requires to thrive and, at  the same  time, be  responsive to  social weal  and welfare. St.  Thomas Acquinas,  in his  "Selected  Political Writings" (1948  Edn.) at  page 169,  has  stated  that  the private rights  and public  needs are to be balanced to meet the public  interest "the  common possession of things is to be attributed  to natural law, not in the sense that natural law decrees  that all  things are  to be  held in common and that there  is to be no private possession, but in the sense that there  is no  distinction of property on the grounds of natural law,  but only by human agreement, and this pertains to positive  law, as  we have  already shown.  Thus, private property is  not opposed  to natural law, but is an addition to it,  devised by human reasons. If, however, there is such urgent and  evident  necessity  that  there  is  clearly  an immediate need  to necessary  sustenance, if, for example, a person is  in immediate  danger of  physical privation,  and there is  no other  way of  satisfying his need, then he may take what  is necessary from another person’s  goods, either openly or by stealth. Nor is this strictly speaking fraud or robbery." Property  is a  social institution  based upon  an economic need  in a  society organised  through division  of labour, as  propounded  by  Dean  Rosco  Pound  in  his  "An Introduction to  Philosophy of law" (1954 Edn.) page 125, at 129. M.R.  Cohen  in  his  "Property  and  Sovereignty"  [13 Cornell Law  Quarterly page  8 at  12 had  stated that " the principle of freedom of personality certainly cannot justify a legal  order wherein  a few  can, by virtue of their legal monopoly over  necessities,  compel  others  to  work  under degrading  and   brutalizing  condition."  If  there  is  no property or of one does not derive fruits and means of one’s labour, no  one would  have any  incentive to  labour in the broader sense,  Social progress  receives set  back  without equality of  status,  fraternity  would  not  be  maximised. Edward Kent  in his  "Property, Power  and Authority", Prof. Herald Laski  in his  "Congress Socialist"  dated April  11, 1936, had stated that "those who know the normal life of the poor will  realise   enough that  without economic security, liberty is  not worth  living". Brooklyn Law Review page 541 at 547  has  stated  that  "In  modern  translation,  public officers and  others  who  promulgate  polices  designed  to increase unemployment or to deny or diminish benefits to the poor are  accountable for  the consequences  to  free  human personality." It  would, thus,  be clear that in a socialist democracy governed  by the  rule of  law, private  property, right of  the citizen  for  development  and  his  right  to employment and his entitlement for employment to the labour, would all  harmoneously be  blended to  serve larger  social

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interest and public purpose.      Mahatma Gandhiji, the Father of the Nation, in his book "Socialism of my concept", has said thus:      "To a  people famishing  and  idle,      the only  acceptable form  in which      God can  dare appear  is  work  and      promise  of   food  as  wages.  God      created man  to work  for his food,      and said that those who ate without      work were  thieves. Eighty per cent      of  India  are  compulsory  thieves      half the  year. Is it any wonder if      India has become one vast prison?"      Again, he stressed:      No  one  has  ever  suggested  that      grinding  pauperism   can  lead  to      anything    else     than     moral      degradation. Every  human being has      a right  to live and, therefore, to      find  the   wherewithal   to   feed      himself and,  where  necessary,  to      clothe and  society the securing of      one’s livelihood  should be, and is      found to  be the  easiest thing  in      the  world.  Indeed,  the  test  of      orderliness in a country is not the      number of millionaires it owns, but      the absence of starvation among its      masses.      Working for economic equality means      abolishing  the   eternal  conflict      between  capital   and  labour.  it      means the levelling down of the few      rich in whose hands is concentrated      the bulk of the nations’s wealth on      the one  hand, and the levelling up      of the  semi-staved, naked millions      of the  other. A non-violent system      of   Government   is   clearly   an      impossibility so  long as  the wide      gulf  between   the  rich  and  the      hungry   millions   persists.   The      contrast between the palaces of new      Delhi and  the miserable  hovels of      the poor  labouring class   nearby,      cannot last  tone day in free India      in which  the poor  will enjoy  the      same power  as the  richest in  the      land.   A    violent   and   bloody      revolution is  a certainty one day,      unless    there     is    voluntary      abdication of  riches and the power      that riches give a sharing them for      the common good".      Pandit Jawahar  Lal Nehru,  the architect of social and economic planned  democracy, in this "Independence and After That" (Collection of Speeches 1946-49) Publication Division, Government of  India 1949  Edn, at  page 28, had stated that social  equality   in  the  widest  sense  and  equality  of opportunity for every one, every man and woman must have the opportunity to  develop to  the best  of his or her ability. However, Merit  must come from ability and hard work and not because of  cast of  birth or  riches. Social equality would develop the  sense of  fraternity among  the  members  of  a social groups  where each  would consider  the other  as his

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equal, no  higher or  lower. A society, which does not treat each of  its members  as equals, forfeits its right to being called a  democracy. All  are equal partners in the freedom. Every one  of our  ninety four  hundred million  people must have equal right to opportunities and blessings that freedom of India  has to  offer. To bring freedom in a comprehensive sense to  the common man, material resources and opportunity for appointment  be made  available to secure socio-economic empowerment which  would ensure justice and fullness of life to workmen,  i.e., every  man and woman. In "Beyond Justice" by Agnes  Heller at  page 80,  the distribution  of material goods, he had stated on distributive justice thus:      "The distribution of material goods      had  always   been  of  concern  in      images  and  theories  of  justice,      but, even  when the issue was given      the  highest  importances,  it  was      subjected to  and understood within      a general  theory of  justice,  and      addressed within the framework of a      complete socio-political concept of      justice.   As we  have seen, in the      prophetic concept  of  justice  the      misery  of   the  poor  called  for      dividne   retribution,        since      alleviating misery  was believed to      be a matter not of optional charity      but of  moral duty, To neglect this      duty was  to  sin,  to  breach  the      divine  laws.  Plato  proposed  the      abolition of  private property  for      the caste  of guardians in order to      make the  Republic as a whole just.      Aristotle,  who   coined  the  term      ’distributive justice’, recommended      a relative  equality  of  wealth  -      neither too  much nor  too  little,      but  ’medium   wealth’   -   as   a      condition of  the good  life of the      good citizen  and  the  good  city.      Even    Roussseau.,     the    most      egalitarian philosopher  in respect      of  distribution,    subjected  the      solution of  this problems  to  the      general  patterns   of  an   socio-      political concept of justice.      Locke did not completely break with      this longstanding tradition either.      As we  have seen, he contributed to      the  emergence   of  the   concept’      retributive  justice’  rather  than      ’distributive justice.  However, he      had     already     presented     a      sophisticated  theory  legitimizing      inequality in  property owner ship,      a  theory  deriving  property  from      work. I  have mentioned  that Locke      did not  support the  idea ’to each      according to  his entitlement’, for      he but  ’entitlement’ into  the ’to      each    category,    whereas    the      ’according to  category was defined      by ’work’ (mixing work and nature).      But  Locke   never   claimed   that      entitlement was the main issue, let

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    alone the only issue of justice.      Humane is  undoubtedly the founding      father of  that branch  of socio  -      political   justice    now   called      ’distributive’.  He   even  claimed      that property and property alone is      the subject  matter of  justice. He      asserted   too   that   retribution      (negative   sanctions)    in    the      suspension of  justice for the sake      of social  utility: ’When  any man,      vein in  political society, renders      himself by his crimes, obnoxious of      the   public, he is punished by the      law in  his goods  and person; that      is, the  ordinary rules  of justice      are, with  regard to  him suspended      for a moment.      Humane also  deduced  justice  from      ’public  utility’.   Inequality  in      property ownership  is just because      it is  useful. We  can imagine  two      cases -  and extreme  cases-  where      property  (inequality  in  property      ownership) qua  justice  loses  its      social usefulness: the situation of      absolute    abundance    and    the      situation of  absolute scarcity. In      the former,  property  is  useless,      redundant because, if all needs can      be   satisfied,   we   are   beyond      justice. In  the  latter  situation      property rules  are violable,  thus      justice must  be be  suspended. Yet      we   live in a situation of limited      abundance  (or  limited  scarcity).      This   is    Humane   the   concept      ’justice’ reduces  to the  idea ’to      reach  according  to  his  property      entitlement’; all other uses of the      notion  ’justice’   are   seen   as      relating  to   the  ’suspension  of      justice’  )   although   the   term      ’equity’  can  remain  relevant  in      these other  contexts). Humane,  an      extremely  sincere   man,  did  not      shirk from facing proposal alien to      his own.  He stated,  nature is  so      liberal to  mankind, that. were all      her presents  equally divided among      the species,  and improved  by  art      and  industry,   every   individual      would enjoy  all  the  necessaries,      and even  most of  the comforts  of      life. It  must also  be  confessed,      that, wherever  we depart from this      equality, we  rob the  poor of more      satisfaction than  we  add  to  the      rich."      Justice K.K.  Mathew in  his  "Democracy  Equality  and Freedom"  at   page  55  has,  therefore,  stated  that  the singlemost important problem in constitutional law for years to come in this court will be how to implement the Directive Principles and  at the  same time  give  full  play  to  the Fundamental Right.  It is only by implementing the Directive

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Principle that  distributive justice will be achieved in the society. Justice,  as Aristotle said, "is the bond of men in society" and  "States without justice" are, as St. Augustine said, "robber-bands".      In Keshvanand  Bharti’s case,  Jaganmohan Reddy, J. had held that  "what is  emplicit in  the Constitution  is  that there is a duty one the courts to interpret the Constitution and the laws to further the Directive Principles which under Article  37   are  fundamental  in  the  governance  of  the country". The majority had held in favour of the way for the implementation of  the Directive  Principles under  rule  of law. Justice  Palekar, in  particular had  laid emphasis  on social and  economic justice  to make  fundamental Rights  a reality.      Coming to the meaning of "regulation" under the Act, in Blacks law  Dictionary (sixth edition) at page 1286 the word "regulation" is defined as "the act of regulating; a rule or order prescribed  for management or government; a regulating principle; a  precept. Rule  or order prescribed by superior or competent authority relating to action of those under its control". In  Corpus Juris  Secunderon (Vol.76) at page 612, the power  to regulate  carries with  it full  power or  the thing  subject   to  regulation   and  in   the  absence  of restrictive words,  the power must be regarded as plenary or the interest  of public.  it has been held to contemplate or employ the  continued existence  of the  subject matter.  In "Craise on  Statute Law"  (7th Edition)  at page  258, it is stated that if the legislation enables something to be done, it gives  power at  the same time "by necessary implication, to do  everything which  is indispensable for the purpose of carrying out  the purposes in view". In D.K.V. Prasada Rao & Ors. vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by its secretary, Home  Department  Secretariat  Buildings,  Andhra Pradesh Hyderabad & Anr. [(1983) 2 AWR 344 - AIR 1984 AP], a Division Bench  of the  Andhra Pradesh High Court, (to which one of  us, K.  Ramaswamy, J., was a member) had to consider the question  elaborately  whether  the  power  to  regulate cinematograph   Act   and   Andhra   Pradesh   Cinematograph Regulation would  include power  to fix  rates of  admission under the  cinema/theaters. Though  there  was  no  specific power under  the Act  or the  Regulation  to  fix  rates  of admission, it  was held  at page 360 that "power to regulate would include  power to  fix the  rate of admission into the cinema/theaters". Lord  Justice hale  of England about three centuries ago  in his  treatise "De Portibus Moris" reported in Harg  law tracts  78 had  stated that  "when the  private property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be "juris privati"  only and  it becomes  clothed with a public interest when  used  in  a  manner  to  make  it  of  public consequence and  affect the community at large; and so using it, the  owner grants to the public an interest in that use, and must  submit to  be controlled  by the public for common good". This  Statement  was  quoted  with  approval  by  the Supreme court of United States of America in 1876 in leading judgment, munn  vs the  people  of  Illinois  [94  US  115]. Justice   whaite   dealing   with   question   whether   the legislature can  fix the  rates for  storage  of  grains  in private  warehouses   by  a   statue  of   1871   when   its interpretation had  come up  for consideration  of right  to property and  its enjoyment  and of  the public interest, it was held  that "under  such circumstances it is difficult to see why,  if the  common  carrier  or  the  miller,  or  the ferrymen or the innkeeper or the wharfinger or the baker, or the cartmen,  or  the  chakney-coachman,  pursues  a  public employment and  exercise "a  sort of  public office,"  these

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plaintiffs in  error do  not. They  stand, to  use again the language  of   their  counsel,   in  the  very  "gateway  of commerce," and  take toll  from all who pass. Their business "most certainly tends to be a common charge and has become a thing of  public interest  and use."  Therein,  there  is  a specific observation  which is apposite to the facts in this case. It was held that the statute simply extends the law so as to  meet this  new development  of  commercial  progress. There is no attempt to compel the owners to grant the public an interest   in  their property, but the Act declares their obligations, if  they use it in the particular manner. It is immaterial whether  the plaintiffs  therein had  built their warehouses  and   established  their   business  before  the regulation was  made. It was held that after, the regulation has come  into force,  they are  enjoined to  abide  by  the regulation to carry on the business. This Court had approved the ratio  in Prasadrao’s  case; when  it  was  followed  by Karnataka High  Court against  which an  appeal came  to  be filed and  the power  to regulate  rates of  admission  into cinema/theaters was upheld by this court.      In Horatio J. Olcott vs. County Board of Supervisors of Fond Du Lac County [21 L. Ed. 382 at 388], the Supreme Court of united  states of  America  had  held  that  whether  the railroad is  a   private or  a  public  one,  the  ownership thereof is  not material  that the  owners  may  be  private company but they are compellable to permit the public to use their works in the manner in which such work can be used. In John D.  Graham, Commissioner, Department of Public Welfare, State of  Arizona vs.  Carmen Richardson  etc. [29 L.Ed. 2nd 534], the  question was  whether  the  respondent  alien  in Arizona will  be denied  of welfare  benefits offending 14th Amendment to  the American  Constitution. Interpreting  14th Amendment, the Supreme court of united states of America had held that  the word  "person"  in  the  context  of  welfare measures encompasses  lawfully resident  aliens as  well  as citizen of  the United States and both citizen and alien are entitled to the equal protection of the laws of the state in which they reside. The power to deny the welfare benefit was negated by  judicial pronouncement. In Grace Marsh vs. State of  Alabama   [90  L.Ed.   265],  when   the  appellant  was distributing pamphlets  in privately  owned colony,  be  was convicted of  the offence  of trespass on albama Statute. On writ of  certiorary, the  Supreme Court  of United States of America deciding  the right to pass and repass and the right of freedom  of expression and equality under 14th amendment, had held  by majority  that the corporate’s right to control the inhabitants  of the  colony is subject to regulation but the ownership  does not  always mean  absolute denomination. The more  an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property in use  by public  in general,  the more do his right become circumscribed by  statutory  and  constitutional  rights  of those who use it. The conviction was in violation of Ist and 14th  Amendment.   In  Republic   Aviation  Corporation  vs. National Labour  Relations Board  [324 US  793  =  89  L.Ed. 1372],  the   owner  of  privately  held  bridges,  ferries, turnpikes and railroads etc. may operate them as freely as a farmer does  his farm,  but when  it operated  privately  to benefit the  public, their operation is essentially a public function. It  was subject  to State  regulation. The Supreme court, therefore,  had held  that when  the  rights  of  the private  owners   and  the  constitutional  rights  requires interpretation, the  balance has  to be struck and the court would, mindful  of the  Fact  that  the  right  to  exercise liberties  safeguarded  by  the  Constitution  lies  at  the foundation of  free government  by free  men, in  all  cases

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weigh the  circumstances and appraise the reasons in support of the  regulations of  the rights  etc. It  was accordingly held that  for interpretation  of the  rights, it is but the duty of  the Court  to weigh the balance and to consider the case in  the dropback. In Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. vs. James  M.   Smith   [128   US   377   =   32   L.Ed.   174], it was  held that  in the  absence of  any provision  in the charter, legislature  has power  to prescribe rates when the property is  put to public use and the statue was held to be constitutional. German  Aliance Insurance  Co. vs.  IKL Lews [58 L.Ed.  1011 = 233 US 387], per majority it was held that a business  may be as far as affected with a public interest as  to  permit  legislative  regulation  of  its  rates  and charges, although  no  public  trust  is  imposed  upon  the property and  although public  way not have a legal right to demand and receive service.      It is  true that  in Dena  Nath’s case,  a Bench of two judges was  to consider  the question  whether  or  not  the persons appointed  as  contract  labour  in    violation  of section 7  and 12  of the  Act should be deemed to be direct employees of  the principal  employer. The  Bench on literal consideration of  the provisions, had concluded that the act merely regulates  condition s  of  service  of  the  workmen employed by  a  contractor  and  engaged  by  the  principal employer. On abolition of such contract labour altogether by the appropriate  Government nether  the Act  nor  the  rules provide that  labour should  be  directly  absorbed  by  the principal employer.  It was,  therefore, concluded  that the High Court  exercising the  power under  Article 226  of the Constitution cannot  give direction  for absorption.   True, Court cannot  enquire into  and decide  the question whether employment of  contract labour  in any  process operation or any other  work in  establishment should be abolished or not and it  is for  the appropriate Government to decide it. The Act does  not provide total abolition of the contract labour system under  the Act.  The Act  regulates  contract  labour system to  prevent exploitation  of the contract labour. The Preamble of  the Act  furnishes the  key to  its  scope  and operation. The Act regulates not only employment of contract labour in  the establishment  covered under  the act and its abolition in  certain circumstances covered under section 10 (2) but  also "matters  connection  therewith".  The  phrase "matters connected therewith" gives clue to the intention of the Act. WE have already examined in detain the operation of the provisions  of the  Act obviating  the need to reiterate the same  once over.  The enforcement  of the  provisions to establish canteen in every establishment under Section 16 is to supply  food to the workmen at the subsidised rates as it is a  right to  food, a  basic human  right. Similarly,  the provision in Section 17 to provide rest rooms to the workmen is a  right to  leisure  enshrined  in  Article  43  of  the Constitution.   Supply    of   wholesome   drinking   water, establishment of  latrine  and  urinals  as  enjoined  under Section 18  are part  of basic human right to health assured under Article  39 and  right to just and human conditions of work assured  under Article  42. All of them are fundamental human rights  to the workmen and are facets of right to life guaranteed under  Article 21. When the principal employer is enjoined to  ensure those  rights and payment of wages while the contract labour system is under regulation, the question arises whether after abolition of the contract labour system that workmen  should be left in a lurch denuding them of the means  of   livelihood  and   the  enjoyment  of  the  basic fundamental rights provided while the contract labour system is  regulated   under  the   Act?  The   Advisory  Committee

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constituted under section 10(1) requires to consider whether the process,  operation and  other work  is incidental to or necessary for the industry,, trade, business, manufacture or occupation that  is carried on in the establishment, whether it is  of perennial  nature, that  is to  say, whether it is substantive  duration   having  regard   to  the  nature  of industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation carried on in  that establishment,  whether it  is  done  ordinarily through  regular   workmen  in   the  establishment   or  an establishment similar  thereto, whether  it is sufficient to employ considerable  number  of  whole  time  workmen.  Upon consideration  of   these  facts   and  recommendation   for abolition was  made by  the advisory  Board, the appropriate Government examines  the question  and takes  a decision  in that behalf. The explanation to Section 10 (2) provides that when any  process or operation or other work is of perennial nature, the  decision of  the appropriate Government thereon shall be  final. It  would thus  give indication that on the abolition of  the contract  labour system  by publication of the notification  in the  official  Gazette,  the  necessary concomitant is  that the whole time workmen are required for carrying on  the process, operation or other work being done in the  industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation in that  establishment. When the condition of the work which is of perennial nature etc., as envisaged in sub-section (2) of Section  10, thus  are   satisfied,  the  continuance  of contract  labour   stands  prohibited   and  abolished.  The concomitant  result   would  be   that  source   of  regular employment became open.      What  would   be  the   consequence  that  ensure  from abolition is  the question?  It is  true  that  we  find  no express provision  in the  Act declaring the contract labour working in  the establishment  of the  principal employer in the particular  service to  be the  direct employees  of the principal employer.  Does the Act intend to deny the workmen to continue  to work  under the  Act or  does it  intend  to denude him of the benefit or permanent employment and if so, what would  be the  remedy  available  to  him.  The  phrase "matters connected  therewith" in the Preamble would furnish the consequence  of abolition  of contract  labour. In  this behalf, the  Gujarat Electricity  Board case,  attempted, by interpretation, to fill in the gap but it also fell shout of full play  and got beset with insurmountable difficulties in its working  which were  not brought to the attention of the Bench. With  due respect,  such scheme  is  not  within  the spirit of  the Act.  As seen,  the object is to regulate the contract labour  so long  as  the  contract  labour  is  not perennial. The  labour is required to be paid the prescribed wages and are provided with other welfare benefits envisaged under the  Act under  direct supervision  of  the  principal employer. The  violation  visits  with  penal  consequences. Similarly, when  the appropriate  Government finds  that the employment is  of   perennial nature  etc,  contract  system stand abolished,  thereby, it  intended that  if the workmen were performing  the duties  of the post which were found to be of  perennial nature  on par  with regular  service, they also require  to be  regularised. The  Act did not intend to denude them  of their  sources of  livelihood and  means  of development, throwing  them out  from  employment.  as  held earlier, it  is a  socio-economic welfare legislation. Right to socio-economic justice and empowerment are constitutional rights. right  to means of livelihood is also constitutional right. Right  to facilities  and opportunities are only part of and  means of  livelihood and  resultant right  to  life, leaving them  in the  lurch since  prior to  abolition, they

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had the  work and  thereby earned  livelihood. The  Division Bench in  Dena Nath’s  case has  taken too  narrow a view on technical consideration  without keeping  at the back of the mind the  constitutional animations  and the  spirit of  the provisions and  the object  which the  Act seeks to achieve. The operation  so  the  Act  is  structured  on  an  unbuilt procedure leaving  no escape  route. Abolition  of  contract labour   system   ensures   right   to   the   workmen   for regularisation of  them as employees in the establishment in which they  were hitherto working as contract labour through the contractor.  The  contractor  stands  removed  from  the regulation  under   the  Act   and  direct  relationship  of "employer and  employee" is  created between  the  principal employer and  workmen. Gujarat  Electricity’s case, being of the co-ordinate  Bench, appears  to have  softened the rough edges of  Dena Nath’s  radio. The  object of  the Act  is to prevent exploitation  of labour.  Section 7  and section  12 enjoin the principal employer and the contractor to register under the  Act, to  supply the  number of labour required by the principal  employer through  the contractor; to regulate their payment  of wages  and  conditions  of  serve  and  to provide  welfare   amenities,  during   subsistance  of  the contract labour.  The failure  to get the principal employer and the  contractor registered  under the  Act  visits  with penal consequences under the Act. The object, thereby, is to ensure  continuity   of  work   to  the  workmen  in  strict compliance of law. The conditions of the labour are not left at the whim and fancy of the principal employer. He is bound under the  Act to  regulate and  ensure payment  of the full wages, and  also to provide all the amenities enjoined under Section 16  to 19  of the Act and the rules made thereunder. On abolition  of contract  labour, the  intermediary,  i.e., contractor, is  removed from  the field  and direct  linkage between  labour   and  principal  employer  is  established. Thereby, the  principal employer’s obligation to absorb them arises. The  right of  the employee  for  absorption    gets ripened and fructified. If the interpretation in Dena Nath’s case is  given acceptance, it would be an open field for the principal employer to freely flout the provisions of the Act and engage  workmen in  defiance of  the Act  and adopt  the principle of hire and fire making it possible to exploit the appalling conditions  in which  the workmen  are placed. The object of  the Act,  thereby gets  rudely shattered  and the object of  the Act easily defeated. Statutory obligations of holding  valid  licence  by  the  principal  employer  under Section 7  and by the contract under Section 12 is to ensure compliance of  the law.  Dena Nath’s ratio falls foul of the constitutional goals of the trinity; they are free launchers to exploit  the workmen.  The contractor  is an intermediary between the  workmen and  the principal employer. The moment the contract  labour system  stands prohibited under Section 10(1), the  embargo to  continue as a contract labour is put an end  to and direct relationship has been provided between the  workmen   and  the  principal  employer.  Thereby,  the principal employer  directly becomes responsible for  taking the services  of the  workmen hitherto regulated through the contractor. The  object  of  the  penal  provisions  was  to prevent the  prohibition of the employer to commit breach of the provisions  of the act and to put an end to exploitation of the  labour and  to deter him from acting in violation of constitutional right  of the  workmen to his decent standard of life, living, wages, right to health etc.      The founding fathers placed no limitation or fetters on the power  of the  High  Court  under  Article  226  of  the Constitution except self-imposed limitations. The arm of the

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Court is  long enough  to reach  injustice  wherever  it  is found. The  Court as  reach injustice  wherever it is found. The court  as sentinal   in  the qui  vive is  to  mete  out justice in  given facts.  On finding that either the workmen were engaged  in violation  of the  provisions of the Act or were continued  as contract  labour, despite  prohibition of the contract labour under Section 10(1), the High Court has, by judicial  review as  the basic  structure, constitutional duty to enforce the law by appropriate directions. The right to  judicial   review  is   no  a  basic  structure  of  the Constitution by  catena of  decisions of this Court starting from Indira  Gandhi vs.  Raj Narayan  [AIR 1975 SC 2299] and Bommai’s  case.  It  would,  therefore,  be  necessary  that instead of leaving the workmen in the lurch, the Court would properly mould  the relief  and grant the same in accordance with law.      The public  law remedy  given by  ’Article 226  of  the Constitution is  to issue  not only  the  prerogative  writs provided therein  but also any order or direction to enforce any of  the fundamental  rights and "for any other purpose". The distinction between public law and private law remedy by judicial adjudication  gradually  marginalished  and  became obliterated. In  L.I.C. v.  Escort Ltd. & Ors. [(1986) 1 SCC 264 at  344]. this  Court in  paragraph 102  and pointed out that the  difficulty will  lie in  demarcating  the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. The question must  be decided in each case with reference to the particular action,  the activity  in which  the State or the instrumentality of  the State is engaged when performing the action, the  public law  or private  law  character  of  the question and  the  host  of  other  relevant  circumstances. Therein, the  question was  whether the  management  of  LIC should record  reasons for  accepting the  purchase  of  the shares? It  was in  that fact  situation that his court held that there  was no need to state reasons when the management of the  shareholders buy  resolution reached  the  decision. This court  equally pointed out in other cases that when the State’s power  as economic  power and  economic entrepreneur and  allocator  of  economic  benefits  is  subject  to  the limitations of  fundamental rights,  a  private  Corporation under the  functional control  of the  State engaged  in  an activity  hazardous   to  the   health  and  safety  of  the community, is  imbued with  public interest  which the State ultimately  proposes   to  regulate   exclusively   on   its industrial   policy. It  would also  be subject  to the same limitation as  held in M.C. Mehta & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.[(1987) 1 SCC 395].      The legal  right of an individual may be founded upon a contract or  a statue  or an  instrument having the force of law. For  a public  law remedy enforceable under Article 226 of the  Constitution, the  action of  the authority  need to fall in  the realm  of public law-be it a legislative act of the  State,   an  executive   act  of   the  State   or   an instrumentality or  a person or authority imbued with public law element.  The question requires to be determined in each case. However,  it may  not be  possible to  generalise  the nature of  the action  which would  come either under public law remedy  or private law field nor is it desirable to give exhaustive list  of such  actions. As  held by this Court in Calcutta Gas  Co. Ltd.  v. State of West Bengal [Air 1961 SC 1044, para  5] that  if the  legal right  of  a  Manager  of company is  denuded on  the basis  of recommendation  by the Board of  Management of the company, it would give him right to enforce  his right  by  filling  a  writ  petition  under Article 226  of the  Constitution. In  Mulchand v.  State of

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M.P. [AIR  1968 SC  1218], this  court had  held  that  even though the  contract  was  void  due  to  non-compliance  of Article 229,  still direction  could be given for payment of the amount  on the  doctrine of restitution under Section 70 of the  Act, since  the had  derived benefit  under the void contract. The  same view  was reiterated  in State  of  West Bengal v.  V.K. Mandal  & SOrs. [AIR 1962 SC 779 of 789] and in New  Marine Coal Co. Ltd, v. Union of India [(1964) 2 SCR 859]. In Gujarat State Financial Corporation. v. Lotus Hotel [(1983) 3 SCC 370], a direction was issued a to release loan to the  respondent to comply with the contractual obligation by applying  the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In Mahabir Auto Store  v. Indian  Oil Corporation.  [(1990) 3 SCC 752], contractual obligation were enforced under public law remedy of Article 226 against  the instrumentality of the State. In Shreelekha Vidyarthi  v. State  of U.P.  [(1991) 1  SCC 212] contractual  obligations   were  enforced  when  public  law element was  involved, Same  Judicial approach is adopted in other jurisdictions, namely, the House of Lords in Gillic v. West Norfolk  and Wisbech  Area health  Authority [(1986) AC 112] wherein  the House  of Lords held that though the claim of the  plaintiff was negatived but on the anvil of power of judicial review,  it was held that the public law content of the claim  was so  great as to make her case an exception to the general  rule. Similarly  in Dr.  Roy v. Kensinstone and Chelsea Family  Practioners Committee  [(1992) IAC 624], the House of  Lords reiterated  that though  a matter of private law is enforceable by ordinary actions, a court also is free from the  constraints of judicial review and that public law remedy is  available when  the remuneration  of Dr.  Roy was sought to  be curtailed. In L.I.C. v. Consumer Education and Research Centre  & Ors.  [(1995) 5 SCC 482], this court held that  each   case  may   be  examined   on  its   facts  and circumstances to  find out  the  nature  and  scope  of  the controversy. The  distinction between public law and private law remedy has now become thin and practically obliterated.      In write  petitions  filed  under  Article  32  of  the Constitution of  India, the  petitioners, in  R.K. Panda vs. Steel  Authority  of  India  &  Ors.  [(1994)  5  SCC  304], contended that  they had   been working in Rourkela plant of the Steel  authority of  India for period ranging between 10 and 20  years as  contract labour.  The  employment  was  of perennial  nature.  The  non-regularisation  defeated  their right to a job. The change of contractors under the terms of the agreement  will not  have any effect o  their continuing as a  contract labour  of the  predecessor contractors.  The respondent  contended  that  due  to  modernisation  of  the industry, the  contract labour  are likely to be retrenched. The were  prepared to allow the contract labour to retire on voluntary basis  or to  be absorbed  for local employment. A Bench of  three judges  of this  court  had  held  that  the contract labour  were continuing  the    employment  of  the respondent  for  last  10  years,  in  spite  of  change  of contractors, and hence they were directed to b e absorbed as regular  employees.  On  such  absorption,  their  inter  se seniority be  determined, department  or  job-wise,  on  the basis of continuous employment; regular wags will be payable only for the period subsequent to absorption and not for the period prior  thereto. Such  of  those  contract  labour  is respect of  whom the  rate of wages have not been fixed, the minimum, rate  of wages  would be payable to such workmen of the wages  of the  regular employees.  The establishment was further directed  to pay the wages. If the staff is found in excess of  the requirement, the direction for regularisation would not  stand in  their way  to reached  the  workmen  in

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accordance with  law. If there arises any dispute as regards the identification  of the  contract labour  to be absorbed, the  Chief   Labour  Commissioner,  Central  Government,  on evidence,  would  go  into  that  question.  The  retrenched employees shall  also be  entitled to  the  benefit  of  the decision. The  10 years  period mentioned by the Court would count to calculate retrenchment benefits. This also of there being no  report by  the Advisory  Board under section 10(2) and no prohibition under section 10(1), the Act was enforced and this Court directed to absorb them within the guidelines laid down  in the  judgment. This ratio also is an authority for the proposition that the jurisdiction of the court under Article 32,  pari materia  with Article  226 which is much a wider than  Article 32  " for any other purpose" under which suitable directions  are required  to have  given  based  on factual  background.   Therein  the   need  to  examine  the correctness of  Dena Nath’s  radio did not arise nor is it a case of  abolition of  contract labour.  So,  its  reference appears to  be as  a statement  if laying  the law  in  Dena Nath’s case.      Prior to  the Act  came into  force, in  The  standard- Vacuum Refining Co. of India vs. Its Workmen & Ors. [(1960 3 SCR 466],  a Bench  of three  judges of  this court had held that the  contract labour,  on reference under section 10 of the ID  Act  was  required  to  be  regularised,  after  the industrial disputes  was adjudicated,  under section 2(k) of the ID  Act. Since  workmen had  substantial interest in the dispute, it  was  held  that  the  direction  issued  b  the Tribunal that  the contract  labour should  be abolished was held just  in the  circumstances of  the case  and should be abolished was held just in the circumstances of the case\and should to  be interfered  with. In  other words,  this court upheld the  jurisdiction  of  Tribunal  after  deciding  the dispute as  an industrial  dispute  and  gage  direction  to abolish the  contract labour.  The Power of the Court is not fettered by the absence of any statutory prohibition.      In Security  Guards Board  for Greater Bombay and Thane District vs.  Security &  Personnel Service Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. [(1987) 3  SCC 413],  the question  as regards absorption of security guards  employed in  any factory  or  establishment etc. under  Maharashtra Private  Security Guards (Regulation of Employment  and  welfare)  Act,  1981  had  come  up  for consideration. It  was held that the exemption under Section 23 is  in regard  to the  security guards  employed  in  the factory or  establishment or  in any  class  or  classes  of fabricating factory’s  establishment. The co-relationship of the security guards of classes of security guards who may be exempted for the operation of the Act is with the factory or establishment sin  which they  work and  not with  agency or agent through  and by  whom they  were  employed.  In  other words., the ratio of that case is that it is not material as to  through   which  contractor  the  employee  came  to  be appointed  or   such  labour  came  to  be  engaged  in  the establishment  concerned.   The  direct  relationship  would emerge after the abolition of the contract labour. In Sankar Mukherjee &  Ors. vs.  Union of  India &  Ors. [ AIR 1990 SC 532],  the  State  Government  exercising  the  power  under Section 10  of the  Act prohibited  employment  of  contract labour in cleaning and stacking and other allied jobs in the brick department.  Loading  and  unloading  of  bricks  from wagons and  trucks was  not abolished.  Writ petition  under Article 32  of the  Constitution of India was filed. A Bench of three judges of this court had held that the act requires to be  construed liberally so as to effectuate the object of the act.  The bricks  transportation to the factory, loading

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and unloading  are continuous  process; therefore,  all  the jobs are  incidental to  or allied  to each  other. All  the workmen performing  these jobs  were to  be  treated  alike. Loading  and  unlading  job  and  the  other  jobs  were  of perennial nature.  There fore, there was no justification to exclude the  job of  loading and  unloading of  bricks  from wagons and trucks from the purview of the notification dated February 9,  1980. Thus,  this Court  had given direction to abolish  the  contract  labour  system  and  to  absorb  the employees working  in loading and unloading the bricks which is of  perennial nature.  In National  Federation of Railway Porters, Vendors & Bearers vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1995) 3 SCC  152], a  Bench of  two judges  to which one of us (K. Ramaswamy, J.)  was a  member, was  to consider  whether the Railway Parcel  Porters working  in  the  different  railway stations were  contract labour  for several years, when they filed  write   petition,  the   Central   Assistant   Labour commissioner was  directed to  enquire and  find out whether the job  is of  a permanent and perennial nature and whether the petitioners  were working  for a long period. On receipt of the report, with findings in favour of favour of workers, the  Bench   had  directed  the  Railway  Administration  to Regularise them  into the  service. This  case  also  is  an authority for  the proposition  that in  an appropriate case the Court  can give  suitable directions  to  the  competent authority, namely,  central labour  Commissioner to  enquire and submit  a report.  The perennial  nature of the work and other related aspect are required to be complied with before directions are given under of Section 10(1) and 10(2) of the Act. On  receipt of  the report,  the Court  could mould the relief in an appropriate manner to meet the given situation. In Praga  Tools case,  this Court  held that mandamus may be issued to enforce duties and positive obligation of a public nature even  though the  persons or  the authorities are not public officials  or authorities.  The same view was laid in Anadi Mukta  v. V.R.  Rudani [(1989)  2 SCC  691]  and  Unni Krishna v.  State of A.P. [(1993) 1 SCC 645]. In Comptroller & Auditor General of India v. K.S. Jagannathan [(1986) 2 SCC 679], this  court held  that a  mandamus would  be issued to implement Directive  Principles when Government have adopted them. They are under public obligations to give preferential treatment  implementing   the  rule   of  reservation  under Articles 14  and 16  (1) and  (4) of  the  Constitution.  In L.I.C.  case,  directions  were  issued  to  frame  policies accessible to common man.      Thus, we hold that though there is no express provision in the  Act for  absorption of  the employees whose contract labour  system   stood  abolished   by  publication  of  the notification under  section 10  (1) of  the Act, in a proper case, the  court as  sentinal in the qui vive is required to direct the  appropriate authority  to act in accordance with law and  submit a  report to  the court  and  based  thereon proper relief should be granted.      It is  true that  learned counsel for the appellant had given alternative  proposal, but  after  going  through  its contents, were  are of  the view  that  the  proposal  would defeat, more often than not, the purpose of the Act and keep the workmen at the whim of the establishment. The request of the learned   Solicitor  General that  the management may be left with that discretion so as to absorb the workmen cannot be accepted. In this behalf, it is necessary to recapitulate that  on   abolition  of  the  contract  labour  system,  by necessary  implication,  the  principal  employer  is  under statutory obligation  to absorb  the  contract  labour.  The linkage  between  the  contractor  and  the  employee  stood

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snapped  and  direct  relationship  stood  restored  between principal employer and the contract labour as its employees. Considered from  this perspective,  all the  workmen in  the respective services  working on contract labour are required to be absorbed in the establishment of the appellant. Though there exists  no specific scale of pay to be paid as regular employees, it is for the establishment to take such steps as are necessary  to prescribe  scale of  pay  like  class  ’D’ employees.  There  is  no  impediment  in  the  way  of  the appellants to  absorb them  in the last grade, namely, grade IV employees  on regular basis. It is seen that the criteria to abolish the contract labour system is the duration of the work, the  number of  employees working on the job etc. That would be  the indicia  to absorb  the employees  on  regular basis. It  is seen that the criteria to abolish the contract labour system  is the  duration of  the work,  the number of employes working  on the  job etc. That would be the indicia to absorb  the employees  on regular basis in the respective services  in  the  establishment.  Therefore,  the  date  of engagement will  be the criteria to determine their inter se seniority. In case, there would be any need for retrenchment of any  excess staff,  necessarily, the  principle of  "last come,  first   go"  should   be  applied   subject  to   his reappointment as  and when  the vacancy  arises.  Therefore, there is no impediment in the way of the appellants to adopt the above  procedure. The  award proceedings as suggested in Gujarat  Electricity  Board  case  are  beset  with  several incongruities and  obstacles in  the  way  of  the  contract labour for  immediate absorption. Since, the contract labour gets into  the service  of the principal employer, the Union of the  existing employees  may not  espouse their cause for reference under  section 10  of the ID Act. The workmen, who no abolition of contract labour system have no right to seek reference under  section of  10 of  ID  Act.  Moreover,  the workmen immediately  are kept  out of  job to endlessly keep waiting  for  award  and  thereafter  resulting  in  further litigation and  delay in  enforcement. The  management would always keep them at by for absorption. it would be difficult for them  to work  out their  right. Moreover, it is a trade and time-consuming  process and years would role by. Without wages, they cannot keep fighting the litigation endlessly. The right  and remedy  would be a teasing illusion and would be rendered otiose and practically compelling the workman at the mercy  of the  principal employer.  Considered from this pragmatic perspective,   with  due respect  to  the  learned judges, the  remedy valuable  assistance given  by  all  the learned counsel in the appeals.      The appeals  are  accordingly  dismissed,  but  in  the circumstances, without costs.