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PETITIONER: AIR INDIA CORPORATION, BOMBAY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: V. A. REBELLOW & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/02/1972

BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. MITTER, G.K.

CITATION:  1972 AIR 1343            1972 SCR  (3) 606  1972 SCC  (1) 814  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1973 SC2650  (14)  D          1975 SC 661  (13,17)  RF         1976 SC2062  (30)  D          1991 SC 101  (17,154,170,226,278)

ACT: Industrial  Disputes Act (14 of 1947), ss. 33(1) (b),  33(2) (b)  and 33A--Termination of services of  employee--Not  for misconduct--Approval of Tribunal not obtained--legality.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent  had bean employed by the  appellant  as  an Assistant  Station  Superintendent.   An  order  was  passed terminating his services with immediate effect With  payment of  one  month’s  salary  in lieu of  notice.   He  filed  a complaint under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947 before the Labour Court before which, in industrial  dispute was pending alleging that the termination of his service was illegal for the reason inter alia that the approval of’  the Labour  Court  for such termination was not  obtained.   The appellant  contended that the respondent was not  a  workman and  that  he was not concerned in  the  industrial  dispute pending in the Labour Court.  Pursuant to the directions  of the  Labour Court, the appellant filed n. written  statement in  which  it  was pleaded that  without  prejudice  to  the contention  that  this  case  should  be  decided  ’an   the aforesaid  preliminary  points raised by the  appellant  the order of termination of the respondents’ services was  valid ’because his services were terminated under Regulation 48 of the  Air  India Employees’ Service Regulations  framed  with previous approval of the Central Government, and under  that regulation  the  services  of a permanent  employee  may  be terminated  without assigning any reason. it was added  that without  prejudice  to the plea that the appellant  was  not bound to disclose any reason for terminating the services of the  respondent, the latter’s services we’re terminated  be- cause  of  the appellant’s total loss of confidence  in  the respondent  on  account of grave  suspicions  regarding  his private conduct and behaviour with the Air Hostesses of  the appellant-Corporation. The Labour Court held one the preliminary question that  the

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respondent was a workman concerned in the industrial dispute pending before it and that his discharge was in breach of s. 33 of the Act. On  the question Whether the action taken by the  appellant, was hit by s. 33 of the Act, HELD:  (1)  Section  33  (1)  (b)  bans  the  discharge   or punishment,whether  by dismissal or otherwise, of a  workman for  misconduct  nected with a pending dispute  without  the express permission in writing of the authority dealing  with the  pending proceeding.  Section 33(2)(b) places a  similar ban  in  regard to matters not connected  with  the  pending dispute; but the employer is free to discharge or dismiss  a workman by paying wages for one month provided he applies to the  authority  dealing  with  the  pending  proceeding  for approval of the action taken.  Whether the action is  taken under. 33 (1) (b) or s. 33 (2) (b), the ban is imposed  only in regard to election taken for misconduct whether connected or  unconnected  with the dispute.  Unlike  under  s.  33(3) which gives a blanket protection to ’protected workmen’,  an employer is free to take action against other workmen if  it is not based off any misconduct on their part, [617B-D, C-G] 607 (2) In the present case, on the face of it, the language  of the order does not show that the respondent’s services  were terminated   because  of  any  misconduct.    Prima   facie, therefore,  the impugned order was not an order  discharging or punishing the respondent for any misconduct. [618A-B] (3)  Action  under  Reg.  48 can be  validly,  taken  by  an employer at his sweet-will without assigning any reason, and he is not bound to disclose why he does not want to continue in service a particular employee. [620D-E] (4)  It  is  however open to the  respondent  to  urge  that reliance  on,  Reg. 48 was not bona fide and that it  was  a colourable   exercise   of  the  right  conferred   by   the Regulation,  because, the form of the order is not  decisive and attending circumstances are open to consideration though the  motive  for the order, if not malafide is not  open  to question. [619H; 620B-C] workmen  of sudder office cinnamara v Management  [1971]  II L.L.J.  620.   Chartered  Bank,  Bombay  v.  Chartered  Bank Employees’  Union, [1960] II L.L.J. 222 and Tata Oil  Mills Co. Ltd. v. WorKmen [1964] 11 L. L. J. 113, referred to. (5)  But the reason of the employer for the terminating  the services  of’  his employee need not be his  misconduct  but may,  inter-cilia,  be want of full  satisfaction  with  the employee’s  overall suitability in the job assigned  to  the employee.   Such  want  of satisfaction  does  not   imply misconduct of the employee. [620E-F] (6)  The  loss of confidence in the present case  cannot  be considered to be malafide.  Assuming that the reason  stated in  the  appellant’s written statement could be  taken  into account,  the  bona  fides of the appellant  in  making  the impugned order could not be challenged.  The respondent  had to deal with Air hostesses in the performance of his  duties and  if  the  appellant  was  not  fully  satisfied   beyond suspicion  about  his general conduct  and  behaviour  while dealing  with  them it could not be said that  the  loss  of confidence  was  not  bona fide.  Once  bona  fide  loss  of confidence is affirmed the impugned order must be considered to  be  immune from challenge.  The opinion  formed  by  the employer  about the suitability of his employee for the  job assigned  to  him, even though erroneous, if  bona  fide  is final and not subject to review by industrial  adjudication. Such  an  opinion may legitimately induce  the  employer  to

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terminate  the  employee’s services, but,  such  termination can,  on  no  rational  grounds, be  considered  to  be  for misconduct, and must therefore be held to be permissible and immune from challenge. [620F-H; 621A-B] Management of U.B. dutt & co. v. Workmen of U. B. Dutt & Co. [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 822, distinguished. [The  question whether the reason stated in the  appellant’s written  statement filed without prejudice and  pursuant  to the  direction  of  the Labour Court  could  be  taker  into account, left open.] [621E-F]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1339 of 1967. Appeal by special leave from the Award dated April 28, 1967’ of   the   Central  Government  Labour  Court,   Bombay   in Application No. LCB-39 of 1965. 608 S. D. Vimdalal, S. K. Wadia, D. N. Mishra and O. C. Mathur-, for the appellant. K. P. V. Menon, S. R. Iyer and M. S. Narasimhan, for respon- dent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua,  J.  This.  is  an appeal  by  special  leave  and  the appellant, the Air-India Corporation, Bombay assails Part  I of the Award ’with corrigendum, dated April 28, 1967,  given by  the  Central  Government Labour Court,  Bombay,  on  the complaint  dated  October  16,  1965  made  by  Shri  V.  A. Rebellow,  respondent  no.   1 in  this  Court  (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  complainant) under  s.  33-A  of  the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947_hereinafter called the  Act). The complaint was originally filed by the complainant before the National Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, (Mr.  Justice G. D. Khosla,  retired Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court)  in the Industrial Dispute Reference No. 1 of 1964 but was later transferred  to  the  Central Government  Labour  Court  and numbered as application no.  LCB 39 of 1965. The  impugned  award  merely  dealt  with  the   preliminary points .raised by the appellant that the complainant was not a workman concerned in the aforesaid industrial dispute  and that there was no breach of s. 33 of the Act with the result that the complaint under s. 33-A of the Act was incompetent. The  Labour  Court held the complainant to  be,,  a  workman concerned in the aforesaid industrial dispute pending before the  National  Industrial  Tribunal  on  the  date  of   his dismissal  and  that  the  dismissal  was  not  a  discharge simpliciter  but in breach of the provisions of s.  33.   On this finding his complaint was held to be maintainable.  The two  questions  canvassed  in the  present  appeal  are  (1) whether  the  complainant was a workman and  was  as  such concerned  in  the  aforesaid  dispute  (Industrial  Dispute Reference No. 1 of 1964) and (2) whether the termination  of his service was a dismissal as alleged by him or was a  mere termination  of service not amounting to  dismissal.   Broad facts necessary for understanding the controversy may now be stated: The  order  which was challenged as amounting  to  the  com- plainant’s dismissal reads                                     CONFIDENTIAL                                                   Dated June               19, 1965               (Thru : The Commercial Manager, Cargo)               Dear sir,               It   has  been  decided  to   terminate   your

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             services,  which we hereby do with  immediate               effect.  You will be paid ,one month’s  salary               in lieu of notice. 609               2.  Please  arrange  to return,  as  early  as               possible, all items               of  Corporation’s property in your  possession               to enable us to settle your accounts.               3.   Your  accounts  will  be  settled   after               checking your commitments.                                           Yours faithfully,                                               AIR INDIA                                           Sd/- S. K. KOOKA                                         Commercial Director" On  July,  16, 1965 the complainant acknowledged  the  above letter  terminating his services with immediate  effect  and requested  for reinstatement because according to him  there was  nothing  to  warrant such summary  termination  of  his services.  This is what he wrote :               ". . . In this connection I have to state that               I have served the Corporation for a period  of               over nine years and to the date of terminating               my services, there is nothing on record  which               warrants that my services should be terminated               summarily.   Hence it is requested that  I  be               reinstated and thereafter if the Management is               of  the  opinion that I  have  done  something               against the interest and the fair name of  the               Corporation,  I be charged accordingly,  given               an opportunity to explain my conduct and after               everything  else if I am found guilty,  action               taken against me as the management deems fit.               With   the   experience  I   have   with   the               management’s policy towards, its employees,  I               am confident that I will never ’be deprived of               the  opportunity I have asked for and more  so               in  the light of the faithful service  I  have               rendered.........." The following reply was sent to the complainant on September 8.1965 2.  1 have to inform you that your services were  terminated on  payment  of  30  days’ salary  in  lieu  of  notice,  in accordance  with Rule 48 of the Air-India  Employees’Service Regulations." 610 Regulation   48   of  the   Air-India   Employees’   Service Regulations which was described as Rule 48 in the letter  of September 8, 1965 leads as under                      CHAPTER VIII                   Cessation of service               48.   Termination : The service of an employee               may   be  terminated  without  assigning   any               reason, as under :               (a)  of a permanent employee by giving him  30               days’  notice  in writing or pay  in  lieu  of               notice;               (b) of an employee on probation by giving  him               7  days’ notice in writing or any in  lieu  of               notice;               (c)  of a temporary employee by giving him  24               hours’  notice  in writing or pay in  lieu  of               notice.               Explanation   :  For  the  purposes  of   this               Regulation, the word "pay"’ shall include  all               emoluments  which  would be admissible  if  he

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             were on privilege leave." In the complaint under s. 33-A of the Act it was alleged  by the  complainant that the order dated June 19, 1965  smacked of  vindictiveness  or unfair labour practice and  that  his alleged termination was a cloak for punishing him.  No facts were,   however,  stated  in  support  of   this   averment. According to the averments in this complaint, Regulation  48 postulates the existence of some reason for the  termination of  service and since the Corporation had not disclosed  any reason  for the termination of the complainant’s service  it was  requested that the Corporation be directed to  disclose the reason, if any, for the termination of his service.  The real  grievance of the complainant, it appears, was  founded on  the construction of Regulation 48 as is clear  from  the following averments in para 7 of the complaint:               "The complainant submits that on a  reasonable               construction  of the said Rule,  the  Opposite                             Party  is bound to disclose the reason   if  any               for  the  said  termination  in  the   present               proceedings.  The complainant submits that any               other  construction would be unreasonable  and               make   the  said  rule  itself   unreasonable,               illegal,  void  as also  in  contravention  of               Articles  14,  16, 19 and 311 of  the  Consti-               tution  of  India and is  therefore  void  and               inoperative." In regard to the question of the complainant being a workman concerned  in  a pending industrial dispute it  was  averred that the 611 complainant  had been employed by the Opposite Party  as  an Assistant  Station Superintendent (Crew Scheduling)  in  the grade  of  Rs. 300-25-500-50-650 and was confirmed  in  that post with effect from 1st December, 1963.  In para 8 of  the complaint it was pleaded that :                "the proceedings in reference no.  NIT No.  1               of  1964  were  and are  pending  before  this               Hon’ble  Tribunal  and the  Complainant  is  a               workman  concerned in the said  dispute.   The               Complainant says that under the  circumstances               aforsaid the Opposite Party ought to have made               an   application  for  approval  before   this               Hon’ble Tribunal under Section 3 3 (2) of  the               Industrial   Disputes  Act,  1  947  but   the               Opposite  Party has made no  such  application               nor  has the Opposite Party intimated that  it               proposed  to  make  such  an  application  for               approval while terminating the services of the               Complainant.   The Complainant says. that  the               Opposite  Party has not obtained the  approval               of  this  Hon’ble Tribunal in writing  of  the               action taken by it against the Complainant." On   these  averments  reinstatement  was  claimed  by   the complainant  with  full back wages and allowances  from  the date of the alleged termination of his services. It appears that pursuant to directions from the Labour Court the  appellant filed a further written statement dated  June 30, 1966 and it was submitted :               "Without  prejudice to the contention  of  the               Opposite  Party  that  this  case  should   be               decided  on  the preliminary points  above  as               raised   by   the  Opposite  Party,   as   the               Complainant  has repeatedly made  a  grievance               that  a  written statement on merits  has  not

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             even   been  filed  and  as  this   Honourable               Tribunal  also  indicated at  the  preliminary               hearing  that  a written statement  on  merits               should in any event be kept ready and that  no               further  time would be given to  the  opposite               Party for preparing and filing the same-,  the               Opposite  Party herewith begs to  submit  this               further written Statement." With these; preliminary submissions it was stated as follows in paragraph 7 :               "With reference to, paragraphs 6 and 7 of  the               Complaint,  Regulation  48  of  the  Air-India               Employees’ Service Regulations provides  inter               alia,   that  the  services  of  a   permanent               employee may be terminated, without  assigning               any reason, by giving him thirty days’  notice               in  writing  or pay in lieu  of  notice.   The               construction 612               sought  to be put upon the said Regulation  by               the Complainant is not correct.  The  opposite               Party    denies   that   Regulation   48    is               unreasonable,  illegal  or  void  or  in  con-               travention  of Articles 14, 16, 19 and 311  of               the   Constitution   of   India.    The   said               Regulations have been framed with the previous               approval  of  the  Central  Government   under               section 45 (2)(b) of the Air Corporation  Act,               1953.  The Opposite Party submits that it  was               and  is  not  bound to give  or  disclose  any               reason  for  terminating the  service  of  the               Complainant.   Any contrary view would, it  is               submitted,  render the said Regulation No.  48               completely    nugatory.    However,    without               prejudice  to  this, the Opposite  Party  says               that the Complainant’s service was  terminated               because  of  the total loss of  confidence  on               account  of  grave, suspicions  regarding  his               private   conduct  and  behaviour   with   Air               Hostesses of the Corporation.  The reports and               statements  from the Air  Hostesses  concerned               cannot  be  disclosed  as  they  involve   the               reputation  and future of young and  unmarried               girls.   Having regard to this,  the  Opposite               Party  could not continue the  Complainant  in               its   service  and  it  was   constrained   to               terminate  his  service  in  accordance   with               Regulation 48." The  complainant’s averment that he was a workman  concerned in  the proceedings in the industrial dispute was denied  by the appellant in the first written statement dated March 15, 1966 in para I which reads :               "(a) The Complainant was at no relevant time a               ’workman’  within the meaning of that term  as               defined  in Section 2(s) of the said Act.   At               the  time of the termination of  his  service,               the  Complainant  was  an  Assistant  Station.               Superintendent and was employed in an adminis-               trative,/Supervisory capacity, drawing a total               salary   amounting  to  Rs.  690  per   month.               Moreover,  it may also be pointed out that  in               its  Staff  Notice No. 130 dated  31st  March,               1956,  the Opposite Party has given a  classi-               fication   of  its  personnel,   wherein   the               category of Assistant Station  Superintendents

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             has  been classified as an "Officer"  category               (vide  Entry no.  1/28).  A copy of  the  said               Staff Notice is hereto annexed and marked  Ex.                             No. 1. Further, the said category of A ssistant               Superintendents  has not been  included  among               the categories of workman in the’ dispute  in               Ref.   No. NIT/1 of 1964 pending  before  the,               National Industrial Tribunal composed of  Shri               G. D. Khosla.  Besides, the Class of  officers               designated      as      Assistant      Station               Superintendents  has  always  been,  and   is,               represented by the Air-India Officers 613               Association   which  is  not  an   association               representing  any workmen’ and which is not  a               party  to the dispute in the  above  mentioned               reference.    Further,  the  said   class   of               Officers has not at any time presented  itself               before  the National Industrial  Tribunal  nor               has, it been represented at the hearing of the               said dispute by any of the Unions representing               parties nos. 2 to 7 to the said dispute.               (b) Even assuming, without admitting, that the               Complainant is held to be a workman (which  is               denied)  sub-sections ‘1 and 2 of section  33,               and  consequently section 33A, have,  and  can               have,  no  application having  regard  to  the               circumstances  of the present case.  The  sub-               ject  matter of the Complaint is not a  matter               connected  with the dispute in  the  Reference               before the National Industrial Tribunal nor is               the Complainant concerned in the said dispute.               Further subsection (1) (b) and subsection 2(b)               of  section  33 have application only  in  the               case of dismissal or discharge for  misconduct               in the circumstances set out therein, and  not               to   a   case  of   termination   of   service               simpliciter.    In  the  present   case,   the               Opposite  Party has bona fide  terminated  the               service   of   the   Complainant   under   the               provisions  of  Regulation  48  of  Air  India               Employees’   Service  Regulations  which   are               applicable  to  the Complainant.   There  has,               therefore, been no breach of the provisions of               sub-section  (1)(b)  or  sub-section  2(b)  of               section  33 and unless there is such a  breach               there  can be no invocation of  Section  33A.               On  the contrary, the Opposite ’Party  repeats               that the said sub-sections are inapplicable." The  complainant and the appellant both filed lists  of  the complainant’s   duties   in  proof   of   their   respective contentions, Ex.  E-1 being the appellant’s list and Ex.  W- 13, the complainant’s. The  Labour Court held in the impugned award that  the  com- plainant  as Assistant Station Superintendent was  a  Junior Officer  and as such, as determined in the  Khosla  Tribunal Award,  was  a workman concerned in the  industrial  dispute before  that  Tribunal  and  that  his  discharge  was   not discharge simpliciter but in breach of s. 33 of the Act.  On this view the complaint was directed to be considered on the merits. In this Court Shri Vimadlal argued that keeping in view  the complainant’s duties it is not possible to hold that he is a workman.  According to the submission the complainant was an

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officer   whose  duties  were  primarily  supervisory   and, therefore,  he  could not be described as  a  workman.   The complainant,  it  was  further argued, was at  least  not  a workman concerned in the industrial 11-L1031S sup. CI/72 614 dispute  pending before the Khosla Tribunal.  In any  event, the action taken by the appellant, not being for  misconduct on the part of the appellant but under Regulation 48 was not hit by S. 33 of the Act.  We should like first to deal with the applicability of  ss. 33 and 33A of the Act on the assumption that the complainant was  a  workman  and also as such interested  in  a  pending industrial dispute.  These sections read :               "33.   Conditions of service etc.,  to  remain               unchanged  under certain circumstances  during               pendency of proceedings:               (1)  During the pendency of  any  conciliation               proceeding  before a concilation officer or  a               Board   or   of  any  proceeding   before   an               arbitrator  or a Labour Court or  Tribunal  or               National Tribunal in respect of an  industrial               dispute, no employer shall,-               (a) in regard to any matter connected with the               dispute,  alter,  to  the  prejudice  of   the               workmen   concerned  in  such   dispute,   the               conditions  of  service  applicable  to   them               immediately  before the commencement  of  such               proceeding; or               (b)  for  any misconduct  connected  with  the               dispute,  discharge  or  punish,  whether   by               dismissal or otherwise, any workmen  concerned               in   such  dispute,  save  with  the   express               permission in writing of the authority  before               which the proceeding is pending.               (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding               in  respect  of  an  industrial  dispute,  the               employer may, in accordance with the  standing               orders  applicable to a workman  concerned  in               such  dispute,  or, where there  are  no  such               standing orders, in accordance with the  terms               of  the contract, whether express or  implied,               between him and the workman,-               (a)  alter,  in  regard  to  any  matter   not               connected with the dispute, the conditions  of               service applicable to that workman immediately               before the commencement of such proceeding; or               (b) for any misconduct not connected with  the               dispute,  discharge  or  punish,  whether   by               dismissal or otherwise, that workman               Provided   that  no  such  workman  shall   be               discharged  or dismissed, unless he has  ’been               paid wages for owner 615               month and an application has been made by  the               employer  to  the authority before  which  the               proceeding  is  pending for  approval  of  the               action taken by the employer.               (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in  sub               section    (2)no  employer shall,  during  the               pendency of any such proceeding in respect  of               an industrial dispute,take any action  against               any   protected  workman  concerned  in   such               dispute-               (a)  by  altering, to the  prejudice  of  such               protected  workman, the conditions of  service

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             applicable  to  him  immediately  before   the               commencement of such proceedings; or               (b)  by discharging or punishing,  whether  by               dismissal   or   otherwise,   such   protected               workman,               save with the express permission in writing of               the  authority before which the proceeding  is               pending.               Explanation.-For  the  purposes of  this  sub-               section, a ’protected workman’, in relation to               an  establishment, means a workman who,  being               an   officer  of  a  registered  trade   union               connected  with the establishment,  is  recog-               nised as such in accordance with rules made in               this behalf.               (4)  In  every establishment,  the  number  of               workmen to be recognised as protected  Workmen               for  the purposes of sub-section (3) shall  be               one  per cent. of the total number of  workmen               employed  therein subject to a minimum  number               of five protected workmen and a maximum number               of  one hundred protected workmen and for  the               aforesaid purpose, the appropriate  Government               may make rules providing for the  distribution               of such protected workmen among various  trade               unions,    if   any,   connected   with    the               establishment  and  the manner  in  which  the               workmen  may  be  chosen  and  recognised   as               protected workmen.               (5) Where an employer makes an application  to               a conciliation officer, Board, an  arbitrator,               a Labour Court, Tribunal or National  Tribunal               under  the  proviso  to  sub-section  (2)  for               approval  of  the  action taken  by  him,  the               authority concerned shall, without delay, hear               such application and pass, as expeditiously as               possible such order in relation thereto as  it               deemed fit. 616 33A  Special  provision  for  adjudication  as  to   whether conditions  of  service, etc., changed  during  pendency  or proceedings :               Where  an employer contravenes the  provisions               of   section   33  during  the   pendency   of               proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or               National  Tribunal, any employee aggrieved  by               such  contravention, may make a  complaint  in               writing,  in  the prescribed  manner  to  such               Labour  Court, Tribunal or  National  Tribunal               and  on receipt of such complaint that  Labour               Court,  Tribunal  or National  Tribunal  shall               adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were, a               dispute  referred to or pending before it,  in               accordance with the provisions of this Act and               shall  submit  its award  to  the  appropriate               Government  and  the provisions  of  this  Act               shall apply accordingly." The  basic  object of these two  sections  broadly  speaking appears  to  be  to protect the  workmen  concerned  in  the disputes   which   form  the  subject  matter   of   pending conciliation proceedings or proceedings by way of  reference under  s.  10  of  the Act,  against  victimisation  by  the employer  on account of raising or continuing  such  pending disputes  and to ensure that those pending  proceedings  are brought to expeditious termination in a peaceful atmosphere,

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undisturbed  by  any  subsequent cause  tending  to  further exacerbate  the  already  strained  relations  between   the employer and the workmen.  To achieve this objective a  ban, subject to certain conditions, has been imposed by s. 33  on the ordinary right of the employer to alter the terms of his employees’ services to their prejudice or to terminate their services  under  the  general  law  governing  contract   of employment   and   s.  33A  provides  for   relief   against contravention  of  s.  33, by way  of  adjudication  of  the complaints  by  aggrieved  workmen considering  them  to  be disputes  referred or pending in accordance with the  provi- sions  of  the  Act.   This ban,  however,  is  designed  to restrict   interference   with  the   general   rights   and liabilities of the parties under the ordinary law within the limits  truly necessary for accomplishing the above  object. The  employer  is  accordingly left free to  deal  with  the employees when the action concerned is not punitive or  mala fide  or does not amount to victimisation or  unfair  labour practice.   The  anxiety of the legislature  to  effectively achieve  the object of duly protecting the  workmen  against victimisation  or unfair labour practices consistently  with the  preservation  of  the employer’s  bona  fide  right  to maintain  discipline  and  efficiency in  the  industry  for securing  the  maximum production in a  peaceful  harmonious atmosphere  is  obvious  from the overall  scheme  of  these sections.  Turning, first to s. 33, sub-s. 617 (1)of  this,  section  deals  with the  case  of  a  workman concerned  n  a pending dispute who has  been  prejudicially affected  by an action in regard to a matter connected  with such  pending  dispute and sub-s. (2) similarly  deals  with workmen concerned in regard to matters unconnected with such pending disputes.  Sub-section (1) bans  alteration  to  the prejudice  of  the  workman concerned in  he  conditions  of service   applicable   to   him   immediately   before   the commencement of the proceedings and discharge or  punishment whether  by dismissal or otherwise of the workman  concerned for  misconduct  connected  with  the  dispute  without  the express Permission in writing of the authority dealing  with the  pending proceeding.  Sub-section (2) places  a  similar ban  in  regard to matters not connected  with  the  pending dispute but the employer is free to discharge or dismiss the workman by paying wages for one month provided he applies to the  authority  dealing  with  the  pending  proceeding  for approval of the action taken.  In the case before use we are concerned  only  with  the ban  imposed  against  orders  of discharge  or punishment as contemplated by cl. (b)  of  the two sub-sections.  There are no allegations of alteration of the complainant’s terms of service.  It is not necessary for us to decide whether the present case is governed by  sub-s. (1)  or sub-s. (2) because the relevant clause in  both  the sub-sections  is couched in similar language and we  do  not find  any difference in the essential scope and  purpose  of these two subsections as far as the controversy before us is concerned.  It is noteworthy that the ban is imposed only in regard  to action taken for misconduct whether connected  or unconnected  with the dispute.  The employer is,  therefore, free to take action against his. workmen if it is not  based on  any  misconduct  on  their  part.   In  this  connection reference by way of contrast may be made to sub-s. (3) of s. 33  which  imposes  an unqualified ban on  the  employer  in regard  to  action by discharging or punishing  the  workman whether by dismissal or otherwise.  In this subsection we do not find any restriction such as is contained in cl. (b)  of sub-ss.  (1) and (2).  Sub-section (3)  protects  "protected

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workman"   and  the  reason  is  obvious  for  the   blanket protection  of such a workman.  The legislature in his  case appears to be anxious for the interest of healthy growth and development  of  trade  union movement  to  ensure  for  him complete protection against every kind or order of discharge or punishment because of his special position as an  officer of a registered trade union recognised as such in accordance with  the  rules  made in that behalf.   This  explains  the restricted protection in sub-ss. (1) and (2). It  is in the background of the purpose and scope of s. 3  3 (1 and (2) that we have to consider whether the action taken against  the complainant is hit by either of these two  sub- sections.   We  have seen the form and the language  of  the impugned order.  On 618 its  face the language does not show that the  complainant’s services  were terminated because of any misconduct.   Prima facie,  therefore,  the  impugned  order  is  not  an  order discharging or punishing the complainant for any misconduct. But then the complainant’s learned counsel Shri Menon argued that the face or the form of the order is not conclusive and that  the Court is entitled to and indeed should  go  behind the form and by looking at the real substance of the  matter try  to find the real cause and then come to its  conclusion whether  or not the order is a mere camouflage for an  order of dismissal for misconduct. The  true legal position has been stated by this Court  more than  once and is by now beyond controversy.  In one of  the most  recent  decisions  in The Workmen  of  Sudder  Office, Cinnamara   v  The  Management(1)  this  Court   approvingly referred   to   two  of  its  earlier   decisions   actually reproducing a passage from one of them. This is what was said in Sudder Office case :               "It is needless to point out that it has  been               held  by  this Court in  The  Chartered  Bank,               Bombay v. The Chartered Bank Employees’  Union               ( 2 ) that if the termination of service is  a               colourable exercise of the power vested in the               management or as a result of victimisation  or               unfair   labour  practice, the   Industrial               Tribunal would have jurisdiction to  intervene               and set aside such a termination.  In order to               find  out whether the order of termination  is               one  of the termination simpliciter under  the               provisions of contract or of standing  orders,               the Tribunal has ample jurisdiction to go into               all   the  circumstances  which  led  to   the               termination  simpliciter-.   The form  of  the               order of termination, is not conclusive of the               true  nature of the order, for it is  possible               that  the form may be merely a camouflage  for               an order of dismissal for misconduct.  It  is,               therefore,  open to the Tribunal to go  behind               the  form  of  the  order  and  look  at   the               substance.   If  the  Tribunal  comes  to  the               conclusion  that  though  in  form  the  order               amounts  to  termination  simpliciter  but  in               reality cloaks a dismissal for misconduct,  it               will be open to it to set aside the order as a               colourable   exercise   of   power   by    the               management. Principles  to the same effect have also been reiterated  in the  later decision of this Court in Tata Oil Mill Co.  Ltd. v. WorKmen & anr. (3) where the Court observed as follows :               "The true legal position about the  Industrial

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             Court’s justification and authority in dealing               with (1)   [1971]-Il L.L.J. 620.     (2) [1960]-Il L.L.J. 222. (3)   [1964]-II L.L.J. 113. 619               cases of this kind is no longer in doubt.   It               is  true  that in several cases,  contract  of               employment  or provisions in  standing  orders               authorise an industrial employer to  terminate               the  service  of his  employees  after  giving               notice for one month or paying salary for  one               month  in  lieu of notice,  and  normally,  an                             employer  may, in a proper case, be- entitled               to  exercise  the said power.   But  where  an               order of discharge passed by an employer gives               rise to an industrial dispute, the form of the               order  by  which the employee’s  services  are               terminated  would not be decisive;  industrial               adjudication would be entitled to examine  the               substance of the matter and decide whether the               termination  is in face discharge  simpliciter               or  it amounts to dismissal which has  put  on               the  cloak of discharge simpliciter.   If  the               Industrial  Court is satisfied that the  order               of  discharge  is punitive, that  it  is  mala               fide,  or that it amounts to victimisation  or               unfair  labour  practice, it is  competent  to               the.  Industrial Court to set aside the  order               and,   in   a   proper   case,   direct    the               reinstatement of the employee." Shri Menon on behalf of the complainant, however,  contended that  ignoring the form and language of the  impugned  order and looking at the real substance of the matter it is  clear as  disclosed  by  the  appellant  in  the  further  written statement  that the complainant’s services  were  terminated because  of  a  suspicion  about  his  private  conduct  and behaviour with Air Hostesses whose names were considered not proper  to be disclosed.  This, said the counsel, makes  out an  allegation of misconduct which induced the appellant  to terminate   the   complainant’s  services  and   the   case, therefore, clearly falls within the mischief of s. 33.   The impugned  order, he added, is a colourable exercise  of  the power under Regulation 48, the real object of the  appellant being essentially to punish the complainant for misconduct. No  doubt,  the  position  of  the  industrial  workman   is different  from  that  of a Government  servant  because  an industrial  employer cannot "hire and fire" his  Workmen  on the  basis  of  an unfettered right under  the  contract  of employment,  that  right  now being  subject  to  industrial adjudication  :  and  there is also on  the  other  hand  no provision  of  the Constitution like Arts. 3 1 0 and 3  1  1 requiring  consideration in the case of industrial  workmen. We  are  here only concerned with the question  whether  the impugned action of termination of the complainant’s services is for misconduct as contemplated by s. 3 3 (II) (b) or s. 3 3  (2) (b).  While considering this question it is  open  to the  complainant to urge that reliance on Regulation  48  is not  bona fide, it being a colourable exercise of the  right conferred by that regulation.  He has in fact raised 620 this  argument  and it is this aspect which concerns  us  in this  case.   Let us now scrutinies the present  record  for examining the position from this aspect.’ Now,  the true position, as it appears to be clear from  the

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record of this case, is that the complainant’s services were terminated  under Regulation 48 by paying his salary for  30 days  in  lieu of notice.  The order does  not  suggest  any misconduct  on the part of the complainant and indeed it  is not  possible  to  hold  this  order  to  be  based  on  any conceivable misconduct.  The form of this order is no  doubt not  decisive  and  attending  circumstances  are  open  for consideration,  though  motive for the order,  if  not  mala fide,  is  not  open  to  question.   The  further   written statement which the appellant was directed to file and which was  filed  without prejudice discloses the  fact  that  the appellant  had lost confidence in the complainant  and  this loss  of confidence was due to a grave  suspicion  regarding the  complainant’s private conduct and behaviour  with  Air- Hostesses employed by the appellant, Regulation  48 which has been set out earlier as  its  plain language shows does not lay down or contemplate any  defined essential pre-requisite for invoking its operation.   Action under  this Regulation can be validly taken by the  employer at  his sweet will without assigning any reason.  He is  not bound  to  disclose  why he- does not want  to  continue  in service the employee concerned.  It may be conceded that  an employer  must always have some reason for  terminating  the services   of  his  employee.   Such  reasons   apart   from misconduct  may, inter, alia, be want of  full  satisfaction with  his  overall suitability in the job  assigned  to  the employee concerned.  The fact that the employer is not fully satisfied with the overall result of the performance of  his duties by his employee does not necessarily imply misconduct on  his part.  The only thing that remains to be seen is  if in  this case the impugned order is mala fide.   The  record merely discloses, that the appellant had suspicion about the complainant’s  suitability  for  the job  in  which  he  was employed and this led to loss of confidence in him with  the result  that his services were terminated  under  Regulation 48.   In our view, loss of confidence in such  circumstances cannot  be  considered to be mala fide.  We  are  unable  to conceive of any rational challenge to the bona fides of  the employer  in  making the impugned order in the  above  back- ground.   The complainant, it may be remembered had to  deal with  Air-Hostesses in the performance of his duties and  if the appellant was not fully satisfied beyond suspicion about his general conduct and behaviour while dealing with them it cannot  be said that loss of confidence was not  bona  fide. Once  bona fide loss of confidence in affirmed the  impugned order  must be considered to be immune from challenge.   The opinion formed by 621 the employer about the suitability of his employee, for  the job assigned to him even though erroneous, if bona fide,  is in  our  opinion  final and not subject  to  review  by  the industrial  adjudication.   Such  opinion  may  legitimately induce  the employer to terminate the  employee’s  services; but   such  termination  can  on  no  rational  grounds   be considered to be for misconduct and must, therefore be  held to be permissible and immune from challenge. The  decision in the case of Management of U. B. Dutt &  Co. v.  Workmen of U. B. Dutt & Co.(1) relied upon by  the  com- plainant’s  learned  counsel is of no  assistance to  him. There  one  employed by the management as a cross cutter  in the saw mill was asked to show cause why his services should not  be  terminated  on account of  grave  indiscipline  and misconduct  and he denied the allegations of fact.   He  was thereafter informed about a departmental enquiry to be  held against  him and was suspended pending enquiry.   Purporting

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to act under r. 18 (a) of the Standing Orders, the appellant terminated   the   services  of  S   without   holding   any departmental  enquiry.  On reference of the dispute  to  the Industrial Tribunal this action was held not to be bona fide but a colourable exercise of the power conferred under r. 13 (a)  of  the Standing Order and since no  attempt  was  made before  it  to  defend such action by  proving  the  alleged misconduct, it passed an order for reinstatement of S. Ouite clearly the  facts  there are not parallel  to  the  facts before us.  The facts there are materially different. We  have proceeded on the assumption that the reason  stated in  the  further written statement filed  without  prejudice pursuant to the direction of the Labour Court could be taken into  account.   We,  however, must  not  be  understood  to express any opinion on its propriety either way. In our opinion the Central Government Labour Court,  Bombay, was,  for the reasons foregoing, not right in  holding  that the  complainant  was  guilty of  misconduct  and  that  his services  were terminated for that reason.   We,  therefore, allow this appeal and setting aside the order of the Central Government  Labour Court, Bombay, dismiss the  complainant’s petition  under  s.  33-A  of  the  Act.   In  the  peculiar circumstances  of  the case there would be no  order  as  to costs. V.P.S.                           Appeal allowed. (1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 822. 622