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PETITIONER: AHMEDABAD WOMEN ACTION GROUP (AWAG) & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       24/02/1997

BENCH: CJI, SUJATA V. MANOHAR, K. VENKATASWAMIW I T HWRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 196 OF 1996LOK SEVAK  SANGH & ORS.V.UNION OF INDIAW I T HWRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 721 OF 1996YOUNG WOMAN CHRISTI AN ASSOCIATION (YWCA) & ORS.V.UNION OF INDIA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T VENKATASWAMI. J.      All these  Writ Petitions  are filed as Public Interest Litigation. In  W.P. (C)  No. 494/96. the reliefs prayed foe are as follows :      (a)  to declare muslim Personal Law      which allows  ploygamy as  void  as      offending Articles 14 and 15 of the      Constitution;      (b)  to declare Muslim Personal Law      which enables a Muslim male to give      unilateral  Talaq   to   his   wife      without  her  consent  and  without      resort  to   judicial  process   of      courts. as void, offending Articles      13. 14 and 15 of the Constitution;      (c)  to declare  that the mere fact      that a  Muslim husband  takes  mote      than one  wife is an act of cruelty      within the  meaning of  Clause VIII      (f) of  Section 2 of Dissolution of      Muslim Marriages Act. 1939.      (d)  to declare  that muslim  Women      (Protection of  Rights  on  Divorce      Act. 1986  is  void  as  infringing      Articles 14 and 15.      (e)  to further  declare  that  the      provisions of  Sunni and  Shia laws      of inheritence  which  discriminate      against females  in their  share as      compared to  the share  of males of      the   same    status.    void    as      discriminating against females only      on the ground of sex.      In writ Petition (CO No. 196/96. the reliefs prayed for are the following:-      (a)  to declare  Sections  2(2).  5      (ii) &  (iii), 6 and Explanation to

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    Section 30 of Hindu Succession Act.      1956. as void offending Articles 14      and 15  read with Article 13 of the      Constitution of India:      (b)  to  declare   Section  (2)  of      Hindu Marriage  Act, 1955,  as void      offending Articles 14 and 15 of the      Constitution of India;      (c)  to declare  Sections 3  (2), 6      and  9   of  Hindu   minority   and      Guardianship Act read with Sections      6 of Guardians and wards Act void;      (d) to  declare the  unfettered and      absolute discretion  allowed  to  a      Hindu spouse  to make  testamentary      disposition without  providing  for      an ascertained  share of his or her      spouse and dependant. void.      In writ  Petition (C)  No.  721/96.      the   reliefs    prayed   for   are      following :-      (a)  to declare  Sections 10 and 34      of India  Divorce Act void and also      to declare  Sections 43  to  48  of      Indian Succession Act void.      At the  outset. we  would like to state that these Writ Petitions do  not deserve disposal on merits inasmuch as the arguments advanced  by the  learned Sr.  Advocate before  us wholly involve  issues of State policies with the Court will not ordinarily  have any concern. Further. We find that when similar attempts  were made, of course by others, on earlier occasions this  Court held  that the  remedy lies  somewhere else and not by knocking at the doors of the courts.      In Maharishi Avadhesh vs. Union of India (1994 (supp) I SCC /18).  This Court  white  dismissing  a  Petition  under Article 32 of the Constitution held as follows:-      "This is  a petition  by  party  in      person  under  Article  32  of  the      Constitution. The  praters are two-      fold. The  first prayer is to issue      a   writ   of   mandamus   to   the      respondents   to    consider    the      question of enacting a common Civil      Code for all citizens of India. The      second prayer  is to declare Muslim      Women  Protection   of   Right   on      Divorce) Act,  1986 as  void  being      arbitrary and discriminatory and in      violation of  Articles  14  and  15      Fundamental Rights and Articles 44.      38, 39 and 39-A of the Constitution      of India.  The third  prayer is  to      direct the respondents not to enact      Shariat Act  in  respect  of  those      adversely affecting the dignity and      right of  Muslim Women  and against      their  protection.  These  are  all      matters for  legislature. The  writ      petition is dismissed.      In Reynold  Raiamani and Another vs. Union of India and Another (1982)  2 SCC  474 this Court while dealing with the scope of  sections 7  and 10 of the Indian Divorce Act. 1869 held as follows :-      4.   It  cannot   be  denied   that      society is  generally interested in

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    maintaining the  marriage bond  and      preserving  the  matrimonial  state      with a  view to protecting societal      stability, the  family home and the      proper  growth   and  happiness  of      children    of     the    marriage.      legislation  for   the  purpose  of      dissolving the marriage constitutes      a  departure   from  that   primary      principle, and  the legislature  is      extremely  circumspect  in  setting      forth  the   grounds  on   which  a      marriage  may   be  dissolved.  The      history    of    all    matrimonial      legislation will  show that  at the      outset    conservative    attitudes      influenced  the  grounds  on  which      separation  or   divorce  could  be      granted. Over  the decades,  a more      liberal attitude  has been adopted.      Tostered by  a recognition  of  the      need for  the individual  happiness      of  the   adult  parties   directly      involved. But  although the grounds      for divorce  have been liberalised,      they nevertheless  continue to form      an   exception   to   the   general      principle       favouring       the      continuation of the marital tie. In      our  opinion.  When  a  Legislative      provision specifies  the grounds on      which divorce  may be  granted they      constitute the  only  condition  on      which the court has jurisdiction to      grant divorce.  If grounds  need to      be   added    to   those    already      specifically  set   forth  in   the      legislation, that  is the  business      of the  legislature and  not of the      courts. It  is another  matter that      in construing the language in which      the grounds  are  incorporated  the      courts  should   give   a   liberal      construction  to   It.  Indeed.  We      think tat  the courts must give the      fullest  amplitude  of  meaning  to      such a  provision. But it must be a      meaning which  the language  of the      section is  capable of  holding. It      cannot be  extended by  adding  new      grounds  not   enumerated  in   the      section.      6.   Miss Thomas  appeals to  us to      adopt   a    policy    of    social      engineering and  to give to Section      /  the   content  which   has  been      enacted  in   Section  28   of  the      special  Marriage   Act.  1958  and      Section 18-B  of the Hindu Marriage      Act, 1955,  both of  which  provide      for divorce  by mutual  consent. It      is possible  to  say  tat  the  law      relating to  Hindu marriages and to      marriages governed  by the  Special      Marriage  Act   Presents   a   more

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    advanced stage  of  development  in      this area  than the  Indian Divorce      Act. However.  Whether a  provision      for  divorce   by  mutual   consent      should be  included in  the  Indian      Divorce  Act   is   a   matter   of      legislative  policy.   The   courts      cannot    extend     or     enlarge      legislative  policy   by  adding  a      provision to  the statute which was      never enacted there.      In Pannalal  Bansilal and  others vs. State of A.P. and Another (1990  (2) SCC 498) Validity of Sections 15, 16, 1/. 29(5) and  144 of  the A.P.  Charitable Hindu  Religions and endowments Act.  1987 were challenged. Inter alia this Court held :-           The first  question is whether      it   is    necessary    that    the      legislature   should    make    law      uniformly   applicable    to    all      religions or  charitable or  public      institutions     and     endowments      established or maintained by people      professing  all   religions.  In  a      pluralist  society  like  India  in      which people  have faith  in  their      respective  religions,   people  of      India     professing      different      religions faiths, born in different      castes, sex  or sub-sections in the      society     speaking      different      languages and dialects in different      regions  and   provided  a  secular      Constitution   to   integrate   all      sections of the society as a united      Bharat. The directive Principles of      the     Constitution     themselves      visualise diversity  and  attempted      to foster  uniformity among  people      of different  rates. A uniform law.      Though   is   .....................      enactment  thereof.   In   one   go      perhaps may  be  counter-productive      to unity    and  integrity  of  the      nation. In  a democracy governed by      rule of  law.  gradual  progressive      change and  order should be brought      about. Making law of amendment to a      law  is  a  slow  process  and  the      legislature  attempts   to   remedy      where the  need is felt most acute.      It would, therefore, be inexpedient      and incorrect  to  think  that  all      laws  have  to  be  made  uniformly      applicable to all people in one go.      The mischief  or  defect  which  is      most  acute   can  be  remedied  by      process of law at stages.      In State  of Bombay  vs. Narasu  Appa  Mali  (AIR  1952 Bombay 84),  Chagla, C.J., while considering the validity of the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946, observed as follows :-      "A question  has been  raised as to      whether it  is for  the Legislature      to decide  what constitutes  social

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    reform. It  must not  be  forgotten      that in  democracy the  Legislature      is  constituted   by   the   chosen      representatives of the people. They      are responsible  for the welfare of      the State and it is for them to lay      down  the  policy  that  the  State      should pursue  Therefore. It is for      them to  determine what legislation      to put  up on  the statute  bock in      order to advance the welfare of the      State.      It was further observed that :-      "There can  be no  doubt  that  the      Muslims have been excluded from the      operation of  the Act  in question.      Even Section 494, Penal Code, Which      makes bigamy  an offence applies to      Parsis, Christians  and others, but      not to  Muslims because polygamy is      recognised as  a valid  institution      when a  Muslim  male  marries  more      than one wife. The question that we      have to  consider is  whether there      is   any   reasonable   basis   for      creating the  Muslims as a separate      class to which the laws prohibiting      polygamy should  not apply. Now. It      is an  historic fact  that both the      Muslims  and  the  Hindus  in  this      country   have   their   respective      religious texts  and  which  embody      their own distinctive evolution and      which are  coloured  by  their  own      distinctive backgrounds. Article 44      itself  recognises   separate   and      distinctive personal  laws  because      it lays  down as  a directive to be      achieved that  within a  measurable      time   India   should   enjoy   the      privilege of a common uniform Civil      Code applicable to all its citizens      irrespective of  race or  religion.      Therefore, what the Legislature has      attempted  to   do  by   the  Hindu      Bigamous  Marriages   Act   is   to      introduce social reform lin respect      of a  particular  community  having      its   own    personal   law.    The      institution    of    marriage    is      differently  looked   upon  by  the      Hindus and  the Muslims. Whereas to      the former,  it is  a sacrament, to      the  latter   it  is  a  matter  of      contract. That  is also  the reason      why the question of the dissolution      of marriage  is differently tackled      by the  two  religions.  While  the      Muslim law  admits of easy divorce,      Hindu   marriage    is   considered      indissoluble   and   it   is   only      recently  that   the  State  passed      legislation   permitting    divorce      among Hindus.  The State  was  also      entitled    to     consider     the

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    educational   permitting    divorce      among Hindus.  The State  was  also      entitled    to     consider     the      educational development  of the two      communities. One community might be      prepared to  accept and work social      reform;  another  may  not  yet  be      prepared for  it: and  Art. 14 does      not lay  down that  any legislation      that    the     State    may     be      communitywise.      From      these      considerations it  follows that  if      there is  a discirmination  against      the Hindu  in the  applicability of      the Hindus  Bigamous Marriages Act.      that discrimination  is  not  based      only  upon   ground  of   religion.      Equally so  if the  law with regard      to  bigamous   marriages   is   not      uniform,   the    difference    and      distinction  is  not  arbitrary  or      capricious,  but   is  based   upon      reasonable grounds.      Gajendragadkar  J.,  in  his  concurrent  but  separate opinion expressed the same view by observing as follows:-      "The next  question is whether this      Act   discriminates   against   the      Hindus   in    reference   to   the      Christian and the Parsi citizens of      this State,  in  so  the  specially      severe provisions  as to punishment      and  procedure.  It  is  true  that      whereas under  the general criminal      law  the   offence  of   bigamy  is      cognizable only on the complaint of      the wife, the impugned Act makes it      cognizable so that the complaint of      the wife,  is unnecessary  to start      the   proceedings    against    the      offending husband.  The offence  of      bigamy is  compoundable  under  the      general criminal law: but not under      the impugned  Act ;  and  the  word      "abettor under  the impugned Act is      also  wider   than  this  question,      however, it must be remembered that      the  evil   of  bigamy   prevailing      amongst the  Hindus  could  not  be      effectively  put  down  unless  the      offence  was  made  cognizable  and      unless amongst  the  abettors  were      included  ever   the  priests   who      officiate at  Hindu Marriages. As I      have   already   mentioned,   Hindu      marriage is  a love and devotion of      the Hindu  wife for  her husband id      well known.  Legislature  may  well      have  thought   that  it  would  be      futile to make the offence of Hindu      bigamy punishable  at the  instance      of the wife because Hindu wives may      not come forward with any complaint      at all.  Among the  Christians  and      the  Parsis,   monogamy  has   been      practised  for  several  years  and

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    marriage amongst  them is  a matter      of contract.  Amongst them  divorce      is permissible, whereas amongst the      Hindus it  was not  permissible for      so many  years. If  the Legislature      acting  on   these   considerations      wanted to  provide  for  a  special      procedure in  dealing with bigamous      marriages  amongst  the  Hindus  it      cannot be said that the Legislature      was  discriminating   against   the      Hindus  only   on  the   ground  of      religion.   It    was    for    the      Legislature to  take  into  account      the social  customs and  beliefs of      the  Hindus   and  other   relevant      considerations   before    deciding      whether it was necessary to provide      for special  provisions in  dealing      with  bigamous   marriages  amongst      them. That  clearly is the province      of the  Legislature  and  with  the      propriety of  their views  or their      wisdom Courts are not concerned. I,      therefore, hold  that there  is  no      substance in  the argument that the      penal provisions  of  the  impugned      Act    constitute    discrimination      against  the  Hindus  only  on  the      ground of religion.           There is  one more  point with      which I  would like to deal. It has      been  argued  before  us  that  the      impugned Act  should have been made      State of Bombay. It is said that if      the  impugned   Act  constitutes  a      measure of  social reform. There is      no reason why the State Legislature      should not have given the Mahomedan      community  the   benefit  of   this      social reform.  The Union  of India      is a  secular State  and the  State      Legislature was  wrong in  making a      distinction between its citizens on      the ground of religious differences      and in  applying the  provisions of      the impugned Act only to Hindus. In      part this argument is political and      as such  we are  not concerned with      it. But  part of  the  argument  is      based  upon   the   provisions   of      Article 14  of the  Constitution of      India and  it is  necessary to deal      with this aspect of the argument.      The learned judge further observed as follows :-      "But it  is argued  that even as to      this  social   reform,  the   State      Legislature should have made it all      pervasive and  should not have left      the Mahomedans  outside its  ambit.      That. as  I have  already said,  is      partly a  political, and  partly  a      legal  argument.   Whether  it  was      expedient   to    make   this   Act      applicable  to  the  Mahomedans  as

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    well as  to the  Hindus would  be a      matter  for   the  Legislature   to      consider. It  is now  well  settled      that the  equality before  the  law      which is  guaranteed by  Article 14      is not offended by the impugned Act      if the Classification which the Act      makes is  based on  reasonable  and      rational considerations.  It is not      obligatory in  taking gradual steps      for social  welfare and reform does      not   introduce   distinctions   or      classifications      which      are      unreasonable,     irrational     or      oppressive, it  cannot be said that      the   equality    before   law   is      offended. The State Legislature may      have   thought   that   the   Hindu      community was  more  ripe  for  the      reform    in    question.    Social      reformers amongst  the Hindus  have      years   past    and   the    social      conscience of the Hindus, according      to the  Legislature, may  have been      mire in tune with the spirit of the      proposed reform.  Besides,  amongst      the Mahomedans  divorce has  always      been   permissible   and   marriage      amongst  them   is  a   matter   of      contract. If  the State Legislature      acting   on   such   considerations      decided to  enforce this  reform in      the  first   instance  amongst  the      Hindus, it  would be  impossible in      my  opinion   to   hold   that   in      confining  the   impugned  Act   to      Hindus as  defined by  the Act,  it      has violated  the  equality  before      law as guaranteed by Article 14. In      my opinion, therefore, the argument      that Article  14 is violated by the      impugned Act mus fail."      Gajendragadkar j.  also expressed  his opinion  on  the question whether  Part III  of the  Constitution applies  to personal laws. The learned Judge observed as follows :-      "The Constitution  of India  itself      recognises the  existence of  these      personal  laws  in  terms  when  it      deals with  the topic falling under      personal  law  in  item  5  in  the      Concurrent List-List III. This item      deals with  the topics  of marriage      and divorce;  infants  and  minors;      adoption;  wills,   intestacy   and      succession;   joint    family   and      partition; all  matters in  respect      of  which   parties   in   judicial      proceedings were immediately before      the    commencement     of     this      Constitution   subject   to   their      personal law.  Thus it is competent      either to  the State  or the  Union      Legislature to  legislate on topics      falling within  the purview  of the      personal law  is not  used in  Art.

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    13, because,  in  my  opinion,  the      framers of  the Constitution wanted      to leave  the personal laws outside      the  ambit   of  Part  III  of  the      Constitution. They  must have  been      aware  that   these  personal  laws      needed  to   be  reformed  in  many      material particulars  and  in  fact      they  wanted   to   abolish   these      different  personal   laws  and  to      evolve one  common code.  Yet  they      did not wish that the provisions of      the   personal   laws   should   be      challenged   by   reason   of   the      fundamental  rights  guaranteed  in      Part III of the constitution and so      they  did  not  intend  to  include      these  personal   laws  within  the      definition of  the expression  laws      in force.  Therefore, I  agree with      the  learned   Chief   Justice   in      holding that  the personal  laws do      not fail  within Article  13(i)  at      all."      In Krishna  Singh vs. Mathura Ahir and others (AIR 1980 SC 707)  this Court while considering the question whether a Sudra could  be ordained  to a  religious order and become a Sanyasi or Yati and, therefore, installed as a Mahant of the Garwaghat Math  according to  the tenets  of  the  Sant  Mat Sampradaya, inter alia held as follows :-      "It would  be  convenient,  at  the      outset,  to   deal  with  the  view      expressed by  the High  Court  that      the strict  rule  enjoined  by  the      Smriti writers as a result of which      Sudras  were   considered   to   be      incapable of  entering the order of      yati or  sanyasi, has  ceased to be      valid because  of  the  fundamental      rights guaranteed under Part III of      the Constitution.  In our  opinion,      the  learned   Judges   failed   to      appreciate that  Part  III  of  the      Constitution does  not  touch  upon      the personal  laws of  the parties.      In applying  the personal  laws  of      the parties. he could not introduce      his own  concepts  of  the  law  as      derived   from    recognised    and      authoritative sources of Hindu law,      i.e.   Smritis   and   commentaries      referred to,  as interpreted in the      judgment of  various  High  Courts,      except where such law is altered by      any usage  or custom or is modified      or abrogated by statute,      In Sarla  Mudgal and  others vs.  union  of  India  and Others (1995) 3 SCC 635 this Court observed :-      "Article 33 is based on the concept      that   there    is   no   necessary      connection  between   religion  and      personal   law   in   a   civilised      society.  Article   25   guarantees      religious freedom  whereas  Article      44 seeks  to divest  religion  from

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    social relations  and personal law.      Marriage,   succession   and   like      matters  of   a  secular  character      cannot  be   brought   within   the      guarantee enshrined  under  Article      25, 26  and 27. The personal of the      Hindus.   such   as   relating   to      marriage, succession  and the  like      have all  a sacramental  origin. In      the same  manner as  in the case of      the Muslims  or the Christians. The      Hindus along  with Sikhs, Buddhists      and  Jains   have  forsaken   their      sentiments  in  the  cause  of  the      national  unity   and  integration,      some other  communities would  not,      though the Constitution enjoins the      establishment of  a  "common  civil      code" for the whole of India.      However, none  of the  decisions referred to above were placed before  the Division Bench as they find no mention in the separate  judgments of  Kuldip Singh, J. and R.M. Sahai, J. That is because there was no occasion to consider whether Part III of the constitution of India had any application to personal laws  or  not.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  we  are satisfied that  the arguments  advanced before us as pointed out at  the outset  involve issues.  in our  opinion, to  by dealt with by the legislature.      We may  further point  out that  the question regarding the desirability  of enacting  a Uniform  Civil Code did not directly arise  in  that  case.  The  questions  which  were formulated for  decision by Kuldip Singh, J. in his judgment were these :      "[W]hether a Hindu husband, married      under  Hindu   law,  by   embracing      Islam,   can    solemnise    second      marriage? Whether  such a  marriage      without having  the first  marriage      dissolved under  law,  would  be  a      valid marriage dissolved under law,      would be a valid marriage dissolved      under  law,   would  be   a   valid      marriage qua  the  first  wife  who      continues to  be Hindu? Whether the      apostate husband would be guilty of      the offence  under Section  494  of      the Indian Penal Code (IPC)?"      Sahai. J.  in  his  separate  but  concurring  judgment referred to the necessity for a Uniform Civil Code and said:      "The desirability  of Uniform  Code      can hardly  be doubted.  But it can      concretize only when social climate      is properly  built up  by elite  of      the  society;  statesmen    amongst      leaders  who   instead  of  gaining      personal  mileage  rise  above  and      awaken the  masses  to  accept  the      change."      Sahai.  J.  was  of  the  opinion  that  while  it  was desirable to have a Uniform Civil Code, the time was yet not ripe and the issue should be entrusted to the Law Commission which  may   examine  the  same  in  consultation  with  the Minorities Commission.  That is  why when  the Court drew up the final  order signed  by both  the learned Judges it said "the writ  petitions are  allowed in  terms of the answer to

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the questions  posed in  the opinion  of Kuldip  Singh,  J." These questions  we have  extracted earlier and the decision was confined  to conclusions  reached  thereon  whereas  the observations on  the desirability  of enacting  the  Uniform Civil Code were incidentally made.      In Madhu  Kishwar &  Others vs. State of Bihar & Others (1996  (5)  SCC  125).  this  Court  while  considering  the challenge made  to certain  provisions  of  the  Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, observed as follows:-      "It is  worthwhile to  account some      legislation  on  the  subject.  The      Hindu Succession  Act  governs  and      prescribes  rules   of   succession      applicable to  a large  majority of      Indians   being    Hindus,   Sikhs,      Buddhists,  Jains  etc.  whereunder      since 1956,  if  not  earlier,  the      female heir  is put on a par with a      male heir.  Next  in  the  line  of      numbers   is   the   Shariat   law,      applicable to  Muslims,  whereunder      the  female  heir  has  an  unequal      share in  the inheritance,  by  and      large half  of what  a  male  gets.      Then comes  the  Indian  Succession      Act which applies to Christians and      by and  large to people not covered      under  the   aforesaid  two   laws,      conferring  in   a  certain  manner      heirship on  females as also males.      Certain chapters  thereof  are  not      made    applicable    to    certain      communities.  Sub-section   (2)  of      Section 2  of the  Hindu Succession      Act  significantly   provides  that      nothing contained  in the Act shall      apply  to   the  members   of   any      Scheduled Tribe  within the meaning      of clause  (25) of  Article 366  of      the Constitution,  unless otherwise      directed by  the Central Government      by means  of a  notification in the      Official  Gazette.   Section   3(2)      further provides  that in  the Act,      unless   the    context   otherwise      requires,   words   importing   the      masculine gender shall not be taken      to include females. General rule of      legislative practice is that unless      there is  anything repugnant in the      subject or context, words importing      the masculine  gender shall  not be      taken to  include females.  General      rule  of  legislative  practice  is      that  unless   there  is   anything      repugnant   in   the   subject   or      context,   words    importing   the      masculine gender  used in  statutes      are to be taken to include females.      Attention be drawn to Section 13 of      the General  Clauses  Act.  But  in      matters of  succession the  general      rule of  plurality would have to be      applied  with  circumspection.  The      afore  provision  thus  appears  to

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    have  been  inserted  ex  abundanti      cautela. Even  under Section  3  of      the  Indian   Succession  Act,  the      State Government  is  empowered  to      exempt any race, sect or tripe from      the operation  of the  Act and  the      tribes of  Mundas, Oraons, Santhals      etc. in the State of Bihar, who are      included in  our concern, have been      so exempted. Thus neither the Hindu      Succession  Act,   nor   even   the      Shariat law  is applicable  to  the      custom-governed    tribals.     And      custom,  as   is  well  recognized,      varies from  people to  people  and      region to region."      "In the fact of these divisions and      visible barricades  put up  by  the      sensitive  tribal   people  valuing      their own  customs, traditions  and      usages,  judicially   enforcing  on      them  the  principles  of  personal      laws applicable  to others,  on  an      elitist  approach  or  on  equality      principle, by judicial activism, is      a   difficult   and   mind-boggling      effort. Brother  K.  Ramaswamy,  J.      seems to  have taken  the view that      Indian      legislatures       (and      Governments too)  would not  prompt      themselves  to   activate  in  this      direction  because   of   political      reasons and  in this  situation, an      activist court.  apolitical  as  it      avowedly is,  could get into action      and legislate  broadly on the lines      as suggested  by the petitioners in      their written  submissions. However      laudable, desirable  and attractive      the result may seem, it has happily      been viewed  by our learned brother      that an activist court is not fully      equipped to  cope with  the details      and intricacies  of the legislative      subject and  can at best advise and      focus attention on the State polity      on the  problem and  shake it  from      its slumber,  goading it to awaken,      march and  reach the  goal. For, in      whatever measure  be the concern of      the court, it compulsively needs to      apply,   motion,    described    in      judicial    parlance    as    self-      restraint. We  agree therefore with      brother K.  Ramaswamy, J. as summed      up by  him in  the paragraph ending      on p.36  (para 46)  of his judgment      that under  the circumstances it is      not  desirable   to   declare   the      customs of  tribal  inhabitants  as      offending Articles 14, 45 and 21 of      the Constitution and each case must      be examined  when  full  facts  are      placed before the court.           With regard  to the  statutory

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    provisions  of   the  Act,  he  has      proposed to  the  reading  down  of      Sections  7   and  8  in  order  to      preserve  their  constitutionality.      This  approach  is  available  from      p.36 (paras  47, 48) onwards of his      judgment.    The     words    "male      descendant  wherever   occurring  ,      would include "female descendants".      It  is   also  proposed  that  even      though the  provisions of the Hindu      Succession Act, 1925 in terms would      not apply  to the  Schedule Tribes,      their general  principles composing      of justice,  equity and  fair  play      would apply  to them. On this basis      it has  been proposed  to take  the      view that the Scheduled Tribe women      would  succeed  to  the  estate  of      paternal parent, brother or husband      as heirs  by  intestate  succession      and inherit  the property  in equal      shares  with  the  male  heir  with      absolute   rights    as   per   the      principles of  the Hindu Succession      Act as  also the  Indian Succession      Act. However,  much we may like the      law  to   be  so   we  regret   our      inability to subscribe to the means      in  achieving  such  objective.  If      this be  the route of return on the      court’s entering  the  thicket,  it      would follow  a beeline for similar      claims in  diverse situations,  not      stopping at tribal definitions, and      a deafening  uproar to  bring other      systems of  law in  line  with  the      line with  the systems  of  law  in      line with  the Hindu Succession Act      and the  Indian Succession  Act  as      models. Rules  of  succession  are,      indeed  susceptible   of  providing      differential     treatment,     not      necessarily equal. Non-uniformities      would not  in  all  events  violate      Article 14.  Judge-made  amendments      to provisions,  should normally  be      avoided. We are thus constrained to      take this  view. even though it may      appear  to   be  conservative   for      adopting a  cautious approach,  and      the one  proposed  by  our  learned      brother   is,    regretfully    not      acceptable to us,"      As a matter of fact the constitutionality of section 10 of the  Indian Divorce  Act was  challenged by  an aggrieved husband and  this Court  in Anil  Kumar Mahsi  vs. Union  of Indian of India and Another (1994) 5 SCC 704 held follows :-      "Taking  into   consideration   the      muscularly weaker  physique of  the      woman,   her   general   vulnerable      physical and  social condition  and      her  defensive  and  non-aggressive      nature  and  role  particularly  in

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    this country,  the legislature  can      hardly be  faulted if  the said two      grounds are  made available  to the      wife and  not to  the  husband  for      seeking    dissolution    of    the      marriage. For  the same reasons, it      can hardly  be said  that  on  that      account the  provisions of  Section      10 of the Act are discriminatory as      against the husband.      We, therefore,  find that  there is      no substance  in the  challenge  by      the petitioner-husband to the vires      of the  provisions of Section 10 as      being  discriminatory  against  the      husband and,  therefore.  violative      of Article 14 of the Constitution."      So far as the challenge to the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights  on Divorce) Act, 1986 is concerned, we understand that the  said issue  is  pending  before  the  Constitution Bench. we,  therefore, do  not see  any reason  to  multiply proceedings in that behalf.      In  the   result  and  having  regard  to  the  earlier decisions  of  this  Court  noticed  above,  we  decline  to entertain these  writ  petitions.  Accordingly,  these  writ petitions are dismissed.