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PETITIONER: AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMANLAL GOVINDRAM & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/03/1975

BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 1187            1975 SCR  (3) 935  1975 SCC  (1) 778  CITATOR INFO :  F          1980 SC1144  (4,5)

ACT: Constitution   articles  14  and  19--Act   empowering   the Municipal  Commissioner to determine whether a person is  in unauthorised   occupation  of  Municipal   premises--Whether unreasonable or contrary to principles of natural  justice-- Choice  to  adopt  remedies one of  which  is  more  drastic whether  violates Article 14--Provision providing appeal  to State Govt. and not to ordinary courts whether unreasonable. Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation (Gujarat  Amendment) Act 1963--Validity of--

HEADNOTE: The  respondents filed Writ Petitions in the High  Court  of Gujarat  challenging  the validity of section  437A  of  the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation (Gujarat  Amendment) Act,  1963.  Section 437A(1) of the Act speaks of the  order of  eviction.  In short, it states that if the  Commissioner is  satisfied  that  the person  authorised  to  occupy  any premises  belonging  to  the  Corporation  as  a  tenant  or otherwise  has  not paid any rent lawfully due from  him  in respect of such premises for a period of more than 2  months or has sublet without the permission of the Corporation  the whole or any part of the premises or has otherwise acted  in contravention  of any of the terms express or implied  under which  he is authorised to occupy such premises or that  any person  is  in  unauthorised  occupation  of  any  municipal premises  the  Commissioner  may  notwithstanding   anything contained  in any law for the time being in force by  notice order that such a person shall vacate them within one  month of  the  date  of service of the  notice.   Section  437A(2) speaks of the service of notice before the order is  passed. Section  437D  speaks of appeals to  the  State  Government. Section 437 of the Act states that the provisions  contained in  section  437  are  in addition  to  those  contained  in sections 60 and 438 of the Act. The Deputy Municipal Commissioner upon whom the    Municipal Commissioner  delegated  powers under  section  437A  served notices  upon the respondents to show cause why they  should not   be   evicted.   The  respondents   appeared   at   the enquiry.Thereafter   an  order  was  passed  directing   the

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respondents  to vacate within one month of the date  of  the notice.  The respondents challenged the said notices in  the High Court of Gujarat by filing Petitions under Article  226 of Constitution.  The High Court held that there is a, valid basis of differentia between occupiers of municipal premises -and  those of other premises and that there is  a  rational nexus between the basis of the classification and the object of the legislation. The High Court held that sections 437A, 437B and 437F of the Act in so far as they relate to an order made under  section 437A  of’  the Act are ultra vires Article 19(1)(f)  of  the Constitution  and  section 437A(1) and (2)  is  ultra  vires Article  14 of the Constitution.  The High  Court,  however, held  that  section  437A  in so  far  as  it  empowers  the Municipal Commissioner to make an order of eviction in cases of  persons  who  are  in  unauthorised  occupation  of  any municipal premises is violative of Article 14 on the  ground that it is left to the arbitrary and unguided discretion  of the Municipal Commissioner to adopt the drastic and  summary remedy  provided  under  section 437A(1)  or  to  adopt  the ordinary  remedy  of  suit.   The  High  Court  upheld   the contention  of the respondents that the  machinery  provided for  eviction  in  section 437A(1) is  unreasonable  on  the ground  that the Municipal Commissioner who  is  constituted the   authority  to  determine  whether  the  condition   of liability  as  set  out in clauses (a) and  (b)  of  section 437A(1)  exists,  is  the Chief  Executive  Officer  of  the Corporation  which  is  the  owner  of  the  premises.   The Municipal  Commissioner  will be both a party and  a  Judge. The High Court further held that many questions of law would have to be decided and the Municipal Commissioner who is the Executive  Officer would he hardly equipped to  decide  such questions of law. Allowing the appeal, 936 HELD  :  In view of the decision of this Court  in  Maganlal Chhagganlal  Private Limited the judgment in Northern  India Caterers  case  does not hold the field.  On the  ruling  of this Court in Maganlal Chhaganlal case the conclusion of the High  Court  that  section 437A offends Article  14  on  the ground  that  there is no clear guidance  on  the  Municipal Commissioner   to  take  proceedings  is  set  aside.    The conclusion  of  the  High Court that  provision  of  section 437A(1)  is unreasonable because the Municipal  Commissioner is in substance a party to the dispute is unacceptable.   He is  the  highest officer of the Corporation.   There  is  no personal  interest of the Municipal Corporation  n  evicting the   respondents.    The  Corporation   represents   public interest.  The Municipal Commissioner acts in public duty in aid  of  public  interest.  If  the  Municipal  Commissioner wrongly exercises his power the action will be corrected  in appeal.   The contention that the provision of section  437A imposes  unreasonable  restrictions  on  the  right  of  the respondents   under  Article  19(1)  since   the   Municipal Commissioner has no power to-summon witnesses and the  State Government  has  to  hear the appeal and  not  the  ordinary courts was negatived.  As long as the persons to be  evicted is  given  the opportunity to produce evidence there  is  no element of unreasonableness.  There are many statutes  which provide  appeals  to the State and not to a  court  of  law, like, Sea Customs Act, Mining Act etc.  The State Government will  employ  persons  who are equipped to  deal  with  such matters and appeal to the State Government will not indicate unreasonableness.   If  there  is any abuse  of  justice  or miscarriage  of  justice or violation of the  principles  of

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natural  justice the courts are always open to redress  such grievances. [940 F; G; 941 B-E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 81 to  103 of 1970. From  the Judgment and Order dated the 16/19/20th  November, 1968 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil  Application Nos.  1124, 1480, 154 of 1966, 81, 82, 472, 473, 896,  1113, 1567 to 1574, 1578, of 1967, and 489 to 493 of 1968. I.  N. Shroff, for the appellants. Vineet  Kumar,  for  respondents  in  81,  83  and  89   and respondent 1 in 85/70. M.  K. Ramamurthy, C. R. Somasekharan and Vineet Kumar,  for respondents in : 90, 93-101 & 103 of 1970. M. C.’Bhandare, M. N. Shroff and S. P. Nayar, for respondent 2 in 85/70. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY,  C.J.-These  23 appeals by  certificate  challenge  the validity of section 437A of the Bombay Provincial  Municipal Corporation   (Gujarat  Amendment)  Act,  1963   hereinafter referred to as the Act. The  High Court held that sections 437A, 437-D, 437F of  the Act in so far as they relate to an order made under  section 437-A of the Act are ultra vires Article 19 (1) (f ) of  the Constitution  and section 43 7-A (1) and (2) is ultra  vires Article 14.  Section 437-A(1) of the Act speaks of the order of  eviction.  Section 437A(2) of the Act speaks of  service of  notice before the order is passed.  Section 437D of  the Act  speaks  of  appeals.   Section 437E  of  the  Act  bars jurisdiction of the Court to question these orders.  Section 437F of the Act states that these provisions are in addition to Sections 60 and 438 of the Act. Section  437-A(1)  of the Act in short states  that  if  the Commissioner is satisfied (a) that the person authorised  to occupy any premises 937 belonging  to the Corporation as a tenant or otherwise  has, whether  before  or  after the commencement  of  the  Bombay Provincial  Municipal Corporation (Gujarat  Amendment)  Act, 1963 (i) not paid any rent lawfully due from him in  respect of  such premises for a period of more than two  months,  or (ii)  sublet, without the permission of the Corporation  the whole or any part of such premises, or (iii) otherwise acted in  contravention  of any of the terms, express  or  implied under which he is authorised to occupy such premises, or (b) that  any  person  is  in  unauthorised  occupation  of  any Municipal  premises, the Commissioner  may,  notwithstanding anythingcontained in any law for the time being in force  by notice served as mentioned in the section order that such  a person shall vacate them within one month of the date of the service of the notice. Sub-section (2) of section 437A of the Act further  provides that  before an order under sub-section (1) is made  against any  person  the  Commissioner shall inform  the  person  by notice  in  writing of the grounds for  which  the  proposed order is to be made and give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation and producing evidence, if any, and to  show cause why such order should not be made,  within  a period to be specified in such notice. The  other provisions in section 437A of the Act are  these. The  Commissioner  may before an order is  made  under  sub- section  (1) grant an extension of the period as to  payment

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and  recovery of the amount claimed.  If any person  refuses or  fails to comply with an order made the Commissioner  may evict that person from and take possession of, the  premises and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. If  a  person, who has been ordered to vacate  any  premises under  sub-clause (i) or (iii) of clause (a) of  sub-section (1) within one month of the date of service of the notice or such longer time as the Commissioner may allow, pays to  the Corporation the rent in arrears or carries out or  otherwise complies   with  the  terms  contravened  by  him   to   the satisfaction of the Commissioner, the Commissioner shall  in lieu  of evicting such person under sub-section  (3)  cancel its  order  made under sub-section (1)  and  thereupon  such person shall hold the premises on the same terms on which he held them immediately before such notice was served on him. The  expression  ’unauthorised occupation’ is  explained  in section 437A of the Act in relation to any person authorised to occupy any Municipal premises to include the  continuance in  occupation by him or by any person claiming  through  or under him of the premises after the authority under which be was allowed to occupy the premises has been duly determined. Section  437-D  speaks of appeal against any  order  of  the Commissioner under section 437-A or section 437-B.   Section 437B  speaks of power to recover rent or damages as  arrears of  land  revenue.   Appeals  are  preferred  to  the  State Government.   Section 437-E bars the jurisdiction  of  civil courts in respect of orders made by the State Government  or the Commissioner. 938 The  Deputy Municipal Commissioner upon whom  the  Municipal Commissioner  delegated  powers under section  437-A  served notices  under  section 437-A upon the respondents  to  show cause  why  they  should not be  evicted.   The  respondents appeared  at  the enquiry held by the appellant No.  3.  The respondents gave their statements in reply.  Appellant No. 3 being  satisfied that the respondents were  in  unauthorised occupation of the premises served notices on the respondents under  section  437-A  ordering the  respondents  to  vacate within one month of the date of the notices. The respondents thereupon filed in the High Court of Gujarat petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution praying  for qnashing the orders issued under section 437-A. The  main grounds of challenge were these.   First,  section 437-A  violates Article 14.  It makes unjust  discrimination between  occupants  of municipal premises and  occupants  of non-municipal premises.  It also discriminates amongst those in  occupation  of municipal premises inter  se  because  it leaves it open to the Municipal Commissioner at his own will to  adopt  either the ordinary remedy of civil suit  or  the summary  remedy  under  the section.  There  is  no  guiding policy or principle in the section to choose the application of  the drastic procedure.  Even if the remedy  provided  in section  437-A for cases falling within clause (a)  of  sub- section (1) is exclusive no choice of remedy is left to  the absolute   uncontrolled   discretion   of   the    Municipal Commissioner.  There is no policy or principle to guide  the Municipal  Commissioner  in the selection  of  occupants  of municipal  premises  who should be proceeded  against  under clause (a) of sub-section (1) even amongst the occupants  of municipal premises falling within clause (a) of  sub-section (1)  inter se.  It is open to the Municipal Commissioner  at his will to proceed against some and not to proceed  against others. Second,  section 437-A imposes unreasonable restrictions  on the  occupant’s  fundamental right to  hold  property  under

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Article 19(1) (f) in as much as the liability to be  evicted under  clause  (a)  of sub-section (1)  arises  not  on  the objective  existence  of the conditions  specified  in  that clause but on the satisfaction of the Municipal Commissioner that  they exist and the machinery provided in  the  section for determining the liability to eviction under both clauses of sub-section (1) is unreasonable. Third,  the orders of eviction contained in the notices  are bad as reasons are not furnished along with the orders. The  High  Court  held  that  there  is  a  valid  basis  of differentiation between occupiers of municipal premises  and those of other premises and there is a rational relation  or nexus between the basis of the classification and the object of the legislation. The  High  Court further held that the discretion  which  is conferred  on  the Municipal Commissioner in the  matter  of enforcement  of  liability falls equally on all  within  the specified  class in section 437-A(1), and, therefore,  there is no discrimination. 939 The  High Court, however, held that section 437-A in so  far as  it empowers the Municipal Commissioner to make an  order of  eviction  in cases falling within  section  437A(1)  (b) viz.,  that any person is in unauthorised occupation of  any municipal   premises  is  violative  of  Article  14.    The reasoning given by the High Court is that it is left to  the arbitrary   and   unguided  discretion  of   the   Municipal Commissioner  to,  adopt  the  drastic  and  summary  remedy provided under section 437-A-(1)   or to adopt the  ordinary remedy of suit. The High Court said that the provisions in section  437-A(1) (a)  of  the Act create a new liability and  a  special  and particular  remedy, which is an exclusive remedy.  The  High Court concluded that the liability to eviction under section 437-A(1)  (a) of the Act could not be enforced  by  ordinary suit.   The High Court held that the liability to,  eviction under  section  437-A(1)  (b) of the  Act  was  an  existing liability, which could be enforced by -suit.  The High Court held  that the liability to eviction under  section  437A(1) (b)  was  therefore  not exclusive  but  only  supplemental. Relying  on  the decision of this Court  in  Northern  India Caterers  Private Ltd. v. State of Punjab &, Anr.  (1967)  3 S.C.R.  399  the High Court held that  section  437A(1)  (b) therefore violated Article 14. The  High Court did not accept the contention  that  section 437-A  violated  Article  19  (1)  (f)  that  there  was  no objective existence of conditions specified for liability to be evicted under section 437-A(1) (a).  The determination of the  question  whether  these conditions  exist  or  not  is entrusted  to the Municipal Commissioner who is  constituted the authority for determining the liability to eviction.  If the  determination by the Commissioner is wrong, it  can  be challenged in appeal. The High Court upheld the contention of the tenants that the machinery  provided  for  eviction in  section  437-A(1)  is unreasonable.  The reasons given by the High Court are that. the Municipal Commissioner who is constituted the  authority to  determine whether conditions of liability as set out  in clauses (a) and (b) of section 437-A(1). exist is the  Chief Executive  Officer of the Corporation which is the owner  of the  premises.  The functions of the Municipal  Commissioner are  such  that  in  reality  and  substance  the  Municipal Commissioner is a party to the dispute.  The Corporation  is a  party to the dispute, because the premises belong to  the Corporation.  The Municipal Commissioner who is  constituted

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the  authority to determine whether the tenant is liable  to be evicted or not is the repository of the entire  executive power  of  the Corporation, and,  therefore,  the  Municipal Commissioner   who  is  an  authority  in  taking  part   in instituting  the  proceedings  against  a  party  would   be disqualified to act as an adjudicator in the proceedings for he  would  then be in substance both judge and  party.   The High  Court  further held that many questions of  law  would have to be decided and the Municipal Commissioner who is the executive  officer would be hardly equipped to  decide  such questions of law.  The hearing of appeal by the State  shows that  the State Government is given the power to call for  a report  from  the  Municipal  Commissioner.   There  is   no provision  in the statute requiring the State Government  to furnish a copy of the report to the tenant.  Therefore,, the provisions are violative of Article 19(1) (f). 940 The High Court also held that the notice embodying the order of eviction must furnish the reasons to the affected person, The decision of this Court in Hari Singh v. Military  Estate Officer (1973) 1 S.C.R. 515 is that where there is only  one procedure for ejectment of persons in public premises  there is   no  vice  of  discrimination.   There  is  a   bar   of jurisdiction  of  courts  of  law in  such  cases.   It  is, therefore, only one procedure for these cases of eviction. The majority decision of this Court in Maganlal  Chhagganlal (P)  Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay &  Ors. (1974) 2 S.C.C. 402 is that where the statute itself  covers only  a class of cases, the statute will not be bad on  that ground.   The  feature  that such cases are  chosen  by  the statute  to be tried under the special procedure  laid  down there  will  not affect the validity of  the  statute.   The contention that the mere availability of two procedures will vitiate  one  of  them i.e. the  special  procedure  is  not supported by reason or authority.  In Maganlal Chhagganlal’s case  (supra)  this  Court  held  that  the  fact  that  the legislature  considered  that  the  ordinary  procedure   is inefficient   ,or  ineffective  in   evicting   unauthorised occupants   of  Government  and  Corporation  property   and provided  a special procedure therefor is a  clear  guidance for  the authorities charged with the duty of  evicting  un- authorised  occupants.  The correct law is now laid down  in Maganlal  Chhagganlal’s  case (supra) and the view  of  this Court  in the Northern India Caterers case (supra) does  not hold  the field.  In Maganlal Chhagganlal’s case (supra)  it has  been  held  that a statute which  deals  with  premises belonging  to  the Corporation and the Government  and  lays down  a special speedy procedure in the matter  of  evicting unauthorised  persons occupying them is a sufficient  reason to  support  such  special procedure.  The  policy  and  the purpose  of  the  Act make it  clear  that  the  legislature intended  to make the statute applicable to a special  class and  provide  a speedy method of  recovering  possession  of these properties. On  the ruling of this Court in Maganlal Chhagganlal’s  case (supra)  the conclusion of the High Court that section  437A offends  Article  14 on the ground that there  is  no  clear guidance  on the Municipal Commissioner to take  proceedings is  set  aside.   It  may  also  be  stated  here  that  the respondents  because  of  the  decision  of  this  Court  in Maganlal  Chhagganlal’s  case (supra) did  not  support  the conclusion  of the High Court on the infraction  of  Article 14. The  conclusion  of  the High Court that  the  provision  in section  437A(1)  is  unreasonable  because  the   Municipal

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Commissioner  is  in  substance a party to  the  dispute  is unacceptable.   The  conferment of power  on  the  Municipal Commissioner   as   an  Administrative   Officer   to   take proceedings   for   eviction  cannot  be  struck   down   as unreasonable  in  the ground that he is a judge in  his  own cause.   He is the highest officer of the Corporation.   The Corporation  acts  through  these  offices.   There  is   no personal  interest of the Municipal Corporation in  evicting these persons.  The Corporation represents public  interest. The  Municipal  Commissioner acts in public duty in  aid  of public interest.  The Municipal Commissioner will apply  his mind to the facts and cir- 941 cumstances of a given case as to whether there should be  an order  for  eviction.  If the  Municipal  Commissioner  will wrongly  exercise his power the action will be corrected  in appeal. The  final contention on behalf of the respondents  is  that the  provisions contained in section 437-A of the Act  which provide   special  procedure  in  respect  of  eviction   of unauthorised  persons imposes unreasonable  restrictions  on the right of the respondents guaranteed under Article 9  (1) inasmuch as the restrictions contemplated therein by way  of procedure  for  eviction are  excessive.   Excessiveness  is contended  to  consist  in  the, absence  of  power  of  the Municipal  Commissioner  to summon witnesses as in  a  civil court and the right of appeal being to the State  Government instead  of ordinary courts.  Counsel on behalf of the  res- pondents  said  that the two salutary.  safeguards,  namely, providing  an appeal to a court of law and conferring  power on  the  Commissioner  to summon  witnesses  were  found  in Maganlal  Chhagganlal’s case (supra) and were absent in  the present case.  It was, therefore, said that the present case is distinguishable. The provisions in the present case show that before an order is made against any person under section 437A(1) the  person concerned is to be given a reasonable opportunity to  tender an  explanation and to produce evidence.  The absence  of  a special provision to compel summoning of witnesses does  not make the section unreasonable.  As long as the person to  be evicted is given the opportunity to produce evidence,  there is no element of unreasonableness. The fact that an appeal is provided to the State and not  to a.   court  of  law  also  does  not  make   the   provision unreasonable.   In many statutes like the Sea  Customs  Act, the   Mining  Act,  appeals  are  provided  to   the   State Government,  This is because of special character of  things forming  subject  matter  of  these  statutes.   The   State Government win employ persons who are equipped to deal  with such  matters.  An appeal to the State Government  will  not indicate unreasonableness.  If there is any abuse of justice or  miscarriage  of justice or violation  of  principles  of natural  justice the courts are always open to redress  such grievances. The orders which were passed gave reasons.  The orders  were not  served.   That  should  not  happen.   That   indicates inefficiency.   There  is no infirmity in the  orders.   The authorities  should serve orders giving reasons  for  making the order. For  these reasons we hold that the provisions contained  in sections 437A, 437D, 437E and 437F are not unconstitutional. The appeals are accepted and the judgment of the High  Court is  set aside, The appellant will get general costs and  one hearing fee,. P.H.P.

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                          Appeals allowed. 942